The United States is diversifying at an unprecedented rate, changing the face of everyday interactions in our communities. Demographic diversity does not, on its own, enable us to live cohesively and equitably with our neighbors. In the absence of true integration and community, simply living together can reinforce inequalities rather than helping us to overcome them. If we wish to mitigate inequality as the United States and our communities continue to diversify, it is imperative that we understand how to build and sustain positive interactions across difference.

Nevertheless, sociologists often focus on the problems of inequality instead of envisioning their resolution, identifying steps that could be taken to strengthen communities by building trust, commitment, and solidarity. We ask: How can we apply sociological knowledge about interaction processes in small groups and networks to encourage positive interactions in diversifying communities, and isolate points of inflection for social change? We hope that Interacting Across Difference will help identify theoretically grounded, empirically supported answers to this question and help identify the social interventions and policies that will most help build community and reduce inequality in diverse communities.

This event is sponsored by the following groups at Dartmouth College: the Department of Sociology, the Rockefeller Center for Public Policy, the Offices of the President, Provost, Dean of Faculty, and Dean of the College, the Dartmouth Center for the Advancement of Learning, South House, and the Office of Institutional Diversity and Equity. Many thanks for your generous support!
## Program Schedule

### Thursday, September 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:15–1:30 pm</td>
<td>DCAL Seminar with <strong>Elijah Anderson</strong>, “Building an Inclusive Classroom” (<em>Baker 102, First Floor of Baker Library</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:30–8:00 pm</td>
<td>Community dinner at South House with <strong>Elijah Anderson</strong>              <em>(5 Sanborn Road, Hanover)</em></td>
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### Friday, September 22

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>12:00–1:00 pm</td>
<td>IDE Seminar with <strong>Elijah Anderson</strong>, “Black Space/White Space”       <em>(Class of 1930 Room, First Floor of Rockefeller Center)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:00–5:30 pm</td>
<td>Keynote address by <strong>Elijah Anderson</strong>, “The Cosmopolitan Canopy: Race and Civility in Everyday Life” <em>(Rockefeller 003, Basement Level of Rockefeller Center)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:30–6:00 pm</td>
<td>Book signing with <strong>Elijah Anderson</strong> for <em>The Cosmopolitan Canopy</em>   <em>(Outside of Rockefeller 003, Basement Level of Rockefeller Center)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:00–8:00 pm</td>
<td>Dinner for conference presenters                                      <em>(Pine Restaurant, Hanover Inn)</em></td>
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### Saturday, September 23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:30–9:00 am</td>
<td>Breakfast <em>(Class of 1930 Room, First Floor of Rockefeller Center)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>9:00–9:30 am</td>
<td>Opening remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:30–11:00 am</td>
<td>Panel 1: Community Diversity and Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Michael Bader</strong>, <em>Interpreting Inaction as a Negative Space of Social Interaction</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Michael Maly</strong>, <em>Building Empathy, Trust, and Solidarity in Integrated Neighborhoods and Spaces</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Amanda Lewis</strong>, <em>Supporting Diversity and Racial Inequality: Opportunity Hoarding in a Desegregated School</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Evelyn Perry</strong>, <em>The Value of Discord</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Emily Walton</strong>, <em>Racial Democracy or Racial Domination? Revealing Whiteness in Multiethnic America</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00–11:15 am</td>
<td>Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:15–12:00 pm</td>
<td>Remarks from <strong>Richard Wright</strong>, followed by conversation with Panel 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00–1:00 pm</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00–2:30 pm</td>
<td>Panel 2: Interactional Processes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Murray Webster, Jr.</strong>, <em>Cues and Interaction across Status Groupings</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Brent Simpson</strong>, <em>Moral Judgments, Trust, and Cooperation</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Karen Hegtvedt</strong>, <em>Justice Dynamics: Engendering Trust across Differences</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Kimberly Rogers</strong>, <em>Identity Meanings and Unequal Interaction</em></td>
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Both exercises in recognition, naming the problem but also fully and deeply articulating what we do that works to address and resolve issues, are needed to generate anew and inspire a spirit of ongoing resistance. When we only name the problem, when we state complaint without a constructive focus or resolution, we take away hope.

- bell hooks, *Teaching Community* (2003: xiv)

**Orienting Questions**

**Panel 1: Community Diversity and Integration**

What does community and urban scholarship tell us about the past, present, and future of interaction across difference? What does our research suggest about the reproduction of inequality in “integrated” settings? Do the inequality processes we have identified imply particular policies or interventions that may facilitate equity?

**Panel 2: Interactional Processes**

What are the key processes that generate inequality in groups according to major theoretical traditions in social psychology? What interventions would these theories suggest as likely to promote positive group dynamics? What do experimental methods and abstract formal theory bring to the table in generating potential solutions to social problems?

**All Participants**

Is there resonance between the social problems and/or solutions identified in research on diverse communities and research on group dynamics? Can we come together on a set of recommendations for social intervention? What do we know, what don’t we know, and what do we need to know if we are to suggest effective interventions to reduce inequality in diverse settings?
About the Presenters

Elijah Anderson
Professor of Sociology, Yale University

Elijah Anderson is one of the leading urban ethnographers in the United States. His early books—A Place on the Corner (1978), Streetwise (1990), and Code of the Street (1999)—are important works in the sociological canon, which offer rich insight into the meaning of being black and poor in inner-city America. His most recent book, The Cosmopolitan Canopy (2011), takes an innovative turn, evaluating the potential for transformative inter-ethnic interaction in everyday public settings. He introduces the idea of the “cosmopolitan canopy”—an urban island of civility that exists amidst the ghettos, suburbs, and ethnic enclaves where segregation is the norm. Under the cosmopolitan canopy, diverse peoples come together and, for the most part, practice getting along.

Michael Bader
Assistant Professor of Sociology, American University

Michael Bader is an urban demographer, with an overarching focus on racial and spatial dynamics in cities. Always pushing the quantitative methodological envelope, Bader combines “big data” with survey data to understand neighborhood change. One strand of his research investigates factors influencing the housing search process, where he finds that race most clearly shapes the residential perceptions and preferences of whites and Latinos, and matters the least to blacks. Another recent study involved longitudinal analysis of racial neighborhood change since the Civil Rights movement, differentiating between nominal and durable neighborhood integration. Providing some hope for an integrated future, he uncovers a pattern in some neighborhoods, where multiple minority groups are able to establish a substantial, durable presence, while white decline occurs gradually over time.

Michael Maly
Professor of Sociology, Roosevelt University

Michael Maly’s research also challenges the notion that racial integration is inherently unstable. His book Beyond Segregation takes an in-depth, qualitative look at some of the multi-ethnic, durable integration in the post-Civil Rights era. In particular, Maly considers the ways recent global economic and demographic changes have impacted the cities and neighborhoods we live in, finding that local and grassroots strategies often work to both address community needs and build necessary bridges between groups. Maly’s latest book, Vanishing Eden, takes a different tack on understanding integration by examining the legacy of racial change. In this project, Maly investigates the experiences of whites growing up in racial changing neighborhoods in Chicago, exploring the racial lessons learned in such spaces and how whites reconcile this time through nostalgia narratives and colorblind meaning-making to bolster positive white racial identities and whiteness.

Amanda Lewis
Professor of African American Studies and Sociology, University of Illinois at Chicago

Amanda Lewis’ research focuses on the ways that race is negotiated in everyday life, particularly among children in schools. Her approach and style are well-exemplified in her
article on Everyday Race-Making, in which she analyzes the ways that children understand and perform their racial identities in the contexts of their peers, teachers, and schools. More recently, she writes about integration in a high school setting in her book *Despite the Best Intentions*. Much like Maly’s findings about whiteness, she details the ways that inequality is reproduced even in integrated, resource-rich settings. A key takeaway is that, “while integration may well be a necessary condition to advance equity, it is not by itself a sufficient condition to ensure it.” Importantly, Lewis is also a leader in the movement to ensure that academic research on inequality is designed and used for social change.

**Evelyn Perry**  
*Assistant Professor of Sociology, Rhodes College*

Evelyn Perry is an urban ethnographer who is particularly drawn to the messy places where differences meet. Her research examines culture, place, and inequality in the context of neighborhood life. Her book *Live and Let Live* sheds light on the everyday processes of negotiating difference in a racially and economically mixed neighborhood. She details how residents maintain relative stability in their community without insisting on conformity. She expands our understanding of the mechanisms by which neighborhoods shape residents’ perceptions, behaviors, and opportunities and challenges widely held assumptions about what “good” communities look like and what well-regulated communities want. Her current research examines the strategic movement of evangelical Christian families from affluent suburbs to high-poverty urban communities.

**Emily Walton**  
*Assistant Professor of Sociology, Dartmouth College*

As the U.S. population continues to be shaped by immigration in the 21st century, Emily Walton’s research aims to add complexity to the way scholars and policymakers understand the meanings of race and place. Her early work investigated co-ethnic neighborhood concentration, focusing on resilience and providing insight into factors that can promote health and well-being in disadvantaged communities. More recently, she has turned her attention toward understanding social interactions in multiethnic communities, asking how individuals with different backgrounds and identities may come together in transformative interaction.

**Richard Wright**  
*Professor of Geography, Dartmouth College*

Richard Wright is a geographer with fluency in sociological culture and language, and research interests in immigrant incorporation into US society. His work investigates the labor market interactions of immigrants and migrants among the major metropolitan areas and regions of the United States. This research demonstrates the deeply segmented nature of these labor markets and the limited interaction between the foreign born and the native born. He is also interested in racial segregation and housing markets, approaching his geographic questions from a critical perspective of race and racism. In a particularly resonant piece, he argued against using proximity to whites as a benchmark of immigrant progress and that scholars should move beyond the city-suburb binary, thinking that continues to shape much scholarship on immigrant incorporation.
Murray Webster, Jr.
Professor of Sociology, UNC Charlotte

Murray Webster is a social psychologist specializing in status processes and small group interaction. His research examines how status hierarchies affect interaction dynamics and how we can overcome the undesirable effects of status. Specifically, Murray’s work reveals how status distinctions based on race, gender, sexuality, and other characteristics are generalized into expectations about the likely abilities or contributions of group members to a task. These differential performance expectations for group members lead to inequalities of participation, influence, and reward in group interaction. Murray applies social psychological theory to not only understand social problems, but to engineer interventions that reduce inequality.

Brent Simpson
Professor of Sociology, University of South Carolina

Brent Simpson specializes in social psychology, networks, morality, and prosocial behavior (including altruism, trust, generosity, and cooperation). His research identifies the individual and social conditions that promote cooperation and prosocial behavior in both groups and networks. For instance, Brent has shown that activating minimal group identities can promote cooperation by reducing the incentive to ‘free ride’ on others’ contributions. He has also shown that people who make moral judgments about behaviors the group agrees are immoral subsequently act more morally, and become more trusted by others in the group. Brent’s research suggests that trust is greater within than across race-category boundaries, highlighting the need for interventions that increase trust across these boundaries.

Karen Hegtvedt
Professor of Sociology, Emory University

Karen A. Hegtvedt studies social psychology and emotions, with special emphasis on justice processes, legitimacy, and the emergence of trust in groups. Her work considers the multiple roles of groups in justice processes—as contexts of interaction, structures in which evaluations occur, sources of identity, and standards against which fairness is judged. Karen’s research shows how perceptions of fairness in groups impact emotions, trust, and potential responses to inequality. Her work reveals the implications of justice processes for collectivities, showing how the complex interplay between justice, interpersonal trust, and emotions impacts the perceived legitimacy of authority figures, which in turn may affect evaluations of fairness, and compliance and trust in authority and the group itself.

Kimberly Rogers
Assistant Professor of Sociology, Dartmouth College

Kimberly Rogers is a social psychologist specializing in culture, identity, and emotions. Her research explores how macro-inequalities may be either reproduced or overturned through behavior and emotion dynamics in interactions and small groups. Kimberly has studied behavioral and emotional responses to unfair reward distributions and to stereotyped groups, consensus in cultural sentiments within and between cultures, and opinion and sentiment change through interaction. Her recent work uses Bayesian methods to show how stable interaction patterns can emerge out of cultural disagreement and social uncertainty, and to explore the potential for gradual meaning change through social experience.
Kathryn Lively  
Professor of Sociology, Dartmouth College

Kathryn Lively is a social psychologist specializing in emotions and inequality. Her research illuminates linkages between macro- and micro-social order, showing how social systems and local contexts of interaction affect feelings and behavior. Kathryn has studied, for example, emotional responses to inequity among paralegals and within families, and the impact of social domain and characteristics such as gender and age on emotional experience and emotion management. Her recent piece in Advances in Group Processes suggests steps forward in integrating theoretical perspectives in social psychology, and explains the role of social psychological processes in the reproduction of inequality.

Conference Participants

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The Cosmopolitan Canopy: Race and Civility in Everyday Life

Elijah Anderson

http://sociology.yale.edu/publications/cosmopolitan-canopy-race-and-civility-everyday-life

The “cosmopolitan canopy,” a concept that I introduced in my 2011 book, refers to an island of civility located in a sea of segregated living, where diverse people come together and, with the aid of “social gloss” – being polite and on occasion politically correct – typically get along. The “canopy” is a metaphor for civil society and, as such, can contribute to our understanding of race relations in public spaces in our increasingly diverse society.

Encountering one another under the canopy, people may find a respite from racial tensions and enjoy what they have in common. Here they commonly people-watch and engage in a kind of folk ethnography, observing others and sometimes appreciating their diverse expressive styles. They may even learn to get along with members of groups who traditionally had been strangers to their own kind. Thus, as an institution, the canopy can teach and edify, and thereby help to generate more cosmopolitan orientations.

A college campus can be thought of as a cosmopolitan canopy — a diverse place of civility, unlike urban ghettos, suburbs, and ethnic enclaves where segregation is more often the norm. The hallmark of the campus is its universalism and its tolerance for a diversity of people and viewpoints, and almost by definition it is the kind of place where we seek learning and sophistication. In fact, a college campus offers a unique opportunity for cross-cultural interaction, where diverse peoples gather, learn from one another, and for the most part practice getting along. This sort of illumination and appreciation of the lives of others is a vital component of a college education.

Under the canopy, there exist essentially two types of people: the cosmopolitan and the ethnocentric. For short, I call them "cosmos" and "ethnos" — and either type comes in all races, ethnicities, and genders. Of course, everyone is ethnocentric or cosmopolitan to some degree, and these attributes may manifest more or less at any time. The canopy, though, is a setting that encourages us all to express our cosmo side, and to keep our ethno side in check. After all, the primary theme of the canopy is civility; it is a setting where all kinds of people can expect to be welcomed and not discouraged, where everyone can feel a sense of belonging. In other words, in such settings, cosmopolitan norms and expectations are privileged and most often prevail in everyday life.

Therefore, under the canopy, the cosmopolitan person can feel relaxed, even at home. On the other hand, the more ethnocentric person, perhaps hailing from a parochial background, may feel at odds with the diversity of this setting, and might need to reach deep inside himself or herself and stretch to meet its norms. Depending on the person’s sense of group position in the pluralistic racial, ethnic, and class order, operating in this setting may well pose a difficult challenge. To function under the canopy and not be perceived as deviant, the ethno may meet this challenge by painting himself or herself in social gloss in an effort to pass as cosmopolitan, which may be impossible to accomplish; but at least the person is encouraged to try. Adopting or applying social gloss to present oneself as politically correct,
polite, and civil may be against the person’s nature, or at odds with what he or she would really prefer. But the social gloss serves as a sort of mask that typically deflects scrutiny and may allow the person to hide his true feelings.

Under the canopy, because of their relatively parochial backgrounds, ethnocentric people of any race may feel especially challenged. They may sense themselves to be marginal, or even in competition with “others” for place and position in this setting, which they themselves may have only recently joined.

On occasion, however, the “pressures” of diversity may so challenge a person that his social gloss erodes, exposing the fault lines of the canopy. It is in these circumstances that the ethnocentric may have had enough and feel the need to draw lines or create borders between himself and others. Such actions can suddenly shake the civility of the canopy, and tensions may surface. This exhibition may be offensive to others with whom the social space of the canopy is shared. In fact, those who are most stigmatized, or feel marginalized, may take offense at what they experience as a moment of acute disrespect.

Strikingly, the ethnics are the ones who most often draw the color line, or create borders of class, sexual preference, and gender. In these tense situations, as the gloss erodes, latent ethnocentrism or racism may be exposed. Depending on the weakness or strength of the civil society, the canopy may be severely impacted, creating a generalized sense of shock and jeopardizing feelings of comity and positive race relations in the local community. However, the resilience of the canopy ultimately prevails, as the rending of the canopy serves as a teaching moment in which community members can become sensitive to the peculiar challenges others face in the setting. Often, but not always, the resulting social education helps reinforce and spread tolerance through contact, reflection, and mutual understanding.
Interpreting Inaction as a Negative Space of Social Interaction

Michael D. M. Bader

DRAFT: Results and interpretations subject to change. Please contact the authors for the most recent version of the manuscript.

Negative Space of Social Inaction

Early in their careers artists learn the importance of negative space, those parts of artistic compositions not filled with focal elements. Their training teaches them the elements that they do not paint—the negative space—are as important as the elements that they do. Masters become so, in part, through their ability to use negative space to effectively convey meaning in their compositions. Edward Hopper conveyed the isolation of modernity in Nighthawks by using vast amounts of negative space to isolate the lonely figures in a diner. Georgia O'Keefe gave the sense of being enveloped into her flower compositions by using the voluptuous petals as negative space that draw the viewer into the corolla at the flower's center. Andy Warhol painted soup cans imposed on a blank white background so that the cans lock the viewer's eye on the design of the can. In doing so, he forced the viewer to consider the relationship between commercial graphic design and high artistic taste.

In all of these compositions negative space conveys meaning in how it frames interpretation of the composition despite its retreat from focus. Most research on social inequality rightly focuses on the choices that people make. As social scientists, we often think of our profession as explaining the actions of actors in society. The word action sits right in the title of the conference that brings us all together: Interacting Across Difference. We want to explain the social and psychological (and, ideally, social-psychological) underpinnings of how people with different social characteristics interact.

But shifting our focus to explanations that analyze why people in privileged groups do not make choices that they otherwise could would illustrate how privileges accumulate to particular groups. In my talk, I will argue that our focus on action prevents us from explaining key elements of difference and our difficulty to interact across those differences. By focusing on action, we ignore the manner in which inaction prevents us from sharing spaces and promoting relationships across deep social chasms. Inaction by actors in society creates a negative space that provides the context for understanding agency even as it—like its artistic analogue—recedes from our attention. This sociological conception of negative space would improve our interpretation of social inequality by clarifying the context in which agents act and how that context leads to inequality.

To explain why we come to have such a difficult time interacting with others who differ from ourselves we must, I believe, uncover when and where we act or interact; that task can only be accomplished if we consider the counterfactual: when do we not act? If we draw the contours of social negative space based on inaction when action would be possible, we can derive insights into the perceptions that allow people to interact across difference.
Defining the Scope of the Study

Studying inaction brings with it a set of methodological and conceptual problems. The study of actions revolve around interpretations of discrete events: while we can come to different conclusions about an event, each conclusions must be drawn by analyzing a common stimulus. Inaction, by contrast, comes in infinite forms as literally any event that did not occur would be a subject of study. For that reason, I feel the need to start off with a categorization of inaction as topics of study.

First kind of inaction is the asymptotically probable. Inactions that fall in this category make little sense to study because they do not constitute any meaningful “social fact.” It makes as little sense for me to explain, for example, why people do not pull out umbrellas on a clear night as it did for Durkheim to explain why people do pull out their umbrellas in the rain. Some possibilities do not need deep social scientific inquiry to understand.¹

The second kind of inaction is the inaction by choice. This kind of inaction is agentic in that it comes about because agents perceive an action as possible and choose not to commit to it. As I hope to show later, much of the research on boundary work falls in this category since agents perceive a threat to their identity and actively choose not to do the things that would blur the definition of their identity. This idea also forms the basis of neoclassical economic theory that assumes observable inaction “reveals” a choice that an agent finds suboptimal to acting. I can’t hope to contribute much more to the excellent work across disciplines that occurs on this kind of inaction.

It is a third kind of inaction, the socially probable, on which I wish to focus. This inaction comes about because agents do not perceive the potential choice that they could make despite there being no substantial barrier to making it. I hope to convince you that this type of inaction frames how we perceive the choices that we make and, as such, represents an elemental aspect of social life. It forms, in a sense, a social “negative space” that unconsciously (or subconsciously) frames how we interpret social action as artistic negative space frames compositions.

Perceived Choice

Choice represents the key distinction that I draw between inaction by choice and the socially probable inaction that makes up sociological negative space. The idea of choice, however, carries with it an assumption that one knows the options from which one chooses. The verb from which choice evolved meant “to perceive” as well as “to discern” (OED). This dual sense of choice is retained in the contemporary phrase “I didn’t even know that was an option.” The relationship between perception and choice is also evident when we excuse the behavior of others when we say “He didn’t know any better” and find a lower liability of guilt when the accused “knew of no other options”. If we reduce all action to choices—and thus

¹ A perfectly reasonable debate could arise whether an infinitesimal probability reflects a socially constructed improbability worthy of study or a meaningless choice. In my estimation the underlying question of the debate—what do we expect could have happened?—generates a fruitful conversation that likely yields better counterfactuals of actions that do occur. Such debates will necessarily depend on the context of agents’ inaction.
inaction as a choice not to act—we narrow our conception of agency to what actors perceive as possible.

A choice becomes a potential option, even if it is not chosen, only if it exists in what an agent perceives as possible. Our focus on choice, therefore, takes for granted the way that agents perceive the world. This is true for virtually all actions, in that we often conceive of actions as involving some element of choice, as well as inactions that occur by choice. I would argue that we need to disentangle these two notions, that of discerning from that of perceiving, in order to understand when and where interaction occurs.

Perception develops through a lifetime of experiences, most of which occur in routine and repetitive tasks of habitual daily rounds. Following Bourdieu (1984), I discuss how the organization of daily living inculcates us to see certain options as possible and to obscure others from view (cf., Lareau, 2011). I argue that the negative space of inaction describes one element of the habitus: the manner in which perceptions foreclose the possibility of choices by obscuring their availability. I contend that focusing on the imperceptibility of choices will provide us with a mid-range theoretical construct that can help us delve into the social-psychological roots of inequality and of interaction. The exclusion of imperceptible choices socially conditions inaction to perpetuate inequality.

**Geography of Perception**

Since choices derive from our ability to perceive them as choices in the first place, geography plays a large role in determining what options people can perceive. Space comprises two elements: the physical latitude and longitude on the Earth’s surface and the and the meaning that social actors produce through interactions at those locations. Because our bodies are bound by the laws of classical physics we can only occupy one space at any given time and no other object can occupy that space with us. Our perception of the world necessarily develops in the physical spaces that we inhabit because we can only perceive the world through our senses, the machinery of which (eyes, ears, nose, mouth, and skin) is attached to our corporeal being. We must therefore contend with the fact that the majority of our perceptions of interaction develop when our bodies coexist near each other in space around our daily routines. The movement through daily rounds, what the geographer Alan Pred (1977) calls the “choreography of existence,” in which we perceive the world occur in relatively confined physical spaces (at least relative to the vastness of the globe). Proximity and familiarity characterize the interactions in those spaces, even if the actors themselves might be personally unfamiliar with one another (cf., Anderson, 2011).

Our perceptions become inadequate, however, when we face transitions in our life course for which we have no personal perceptions. In such situations, I suspect that people come to choices based on one of three different sources of information. People might look to the examples of those around them, substituting perceptions of familiar actors for their own. They might look to what family, friends, or neighbors did when facing similar transitions.

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2 The development of virtual spaces of interaction matter as well, in which people may interact asynchronously and aspatially. The principle applies, however, that people must visit the same virtual spaces in order to interact (Hargittai, 2007).
They perceive as options what those before them have done, which constitute only a fraction (however large) of possible options available. Thus, perceptions can lead to homophily from below.

Alternatively, people might rely on the conceptions of space developed by powerful institutions (Lefebvre, 1992). Trading perceptions for conceptions of space allows particular spaces to be dominated by narratives imposed by institutions in society. The most powerful of these powerful institutions are the state and dominant media outlets of the time, but scientific, legal, bureaucratic institutions also create common conceptions. The raison d’être of these organizations is to reduce the messiness of concrete life and abstract it to manageable categories. As a result, these institutions rely on categorization to interpret social interaction that leads to formulaic options that encode spaces as being viable for particular areas of life. Those powerful institutions develop into the repositories of generally “acceptable,” meaning generally perceivable, interpretation of space that individuals cannot on their own refute based on their own perceptions. The categorization necessary leads to homophily from above.

A final, though less common possibility exists, that of “perceptual spaces” that render unperceived spaces perceptible. Thus, the show “Friends” in the 1990s renders perceptible the idea of urban living among upper middle-class white people and “Will & Grace” renders perceptible the idea of normal relationships not defined by heterosexual norms. In this regard, I find it perhaps unsurprising that artists and non-profit workers—people who seek alternative possibilities for the world as it currently exists—have traditionally made up the vanguard of gentrifiers in urban neighborhoods (Ley, 1996, 2003). These perceptual efforts can redraw the contours of the negative space of social interaction to include it in positive space (i.e., that space from which we can perceive options).

Example: Residential Segregation
In addition to laying out the ideas above, I plan to describe how the idea of negative space informs my research on the causes of racial residential segregation in the 21st century.

Conclusion
Explaining social inequality by linking psychosocial aspects of interaction to structural inequality requires that we study inaction in social settings. Like the negative space of artistic compositions, this inaction forms the negative space of social interaction that influences how we interpret interaction (both as social actors ourselves and as analysts of society). The perception of space inculcated in people from birth—and the substitution of common conceptions when people cannot access their own perceptions—affects which places people consider spending time. We must analyze what options could be available but not considered and investigate the perceptions and conceptions people in different groups hold about those places. Doing so can help us articulate the contours of the negative space that frame our interactions with one another.
Note: The following bibliography is incomplete and will be developed with the final version of the resulting paper.

References

Building Empathy, Trust, and Solidarity in Integrated Neighborhoods and Spaces

Michael Maly

Previous research has highlighted that neighborhood racial change does not inevitably lead to resegregation. In fact, a growing number of scholars have documented multiethnic and multiracial communities not only exist, but can be stabilized. Such research stands in contrast to conventional wisdom concerning racial change and patterns of racial segregation in urban areas. As it has become clear that an increasing number of U.S. urban neighborhoods have become more diverse, scholars have begun to examine these spaces in order to unpack their complexity and processes. It is clear that we have an increasing number of spaces that provide the physical and social space to interact across differences. However, this does not mean that we will necessarily break down differences and have meaningful interaction (i.e., two-way integration). Below I highlight two studies I have been involved in on this topic. The findings from the two studies are instructive in identifying both the opportunities and challenges and opportunities for racial equity.

In my 2005 book, Beyond Segregation, I outline the findings from a study of multiethnic and multiracial neighborhoods in New York (NY), Chicago (IL), and Oakland (CA). The data from this study demonstrates that racial change does not inevitably lead to resegregation or racial transition, and that integrated neighborhoods can stabilize even in the face of institutional forces that encourage segregation. In fact, what is evident in this study is that across neighborhoods, the established residents and racially and culturally different incoming groups never intended to be neighbors. And yet, these groups figured out a way to coexist and maintain the diversity. Each neighborhood examined in this study varied in terms of racial demographics, physical character and amenities, class structure, origins of integration, organizational capacity, and even local culture. For example, the racial and socioeconomic character of each neighborhoods led to varied social dynamics, community debates, and organizational approaches. These varied neighborhood dynamics highlight the different kinds of diverse spaces. An appreciation of this variety is key to understanding how to sustain them as viable alternatives to segregated spaces. And yet, such varied local environments make it difficult to offer simple solutions applicable to all communities working toward stable integration.

Even considering the variety of integrated spaces, there are common lessons across the three neighborhoods and cities that are instructive for communities attempting to stabilize diverse communities. While seemingly obvious, local organizations clearly matter. The literature on racial change has demonstrated the importance of community organizations in either spurring resegregation or stabilizing integrated spaces. The data presented in Beyond Segregation highlight the varied and important role of local groups and coalitions in building community across different groups. Local groups not only struggled against outside forces (e.g., developers, lending institutions, or City Hall), but also with themselves. Part of having so many groups is that conflict occurs—or better put public debate over various issues. Conflict, however, does not have to be viewed as something that is always negative, it can also be a source of community development. In each community, dealing with these issues has
led to some multiethnic coalitions. These coalitions were varied in their focus, but the common theme was community betterment through a focus on the needs of the community shared by disparate groups. The community development work ranged from a focus on providing services to immigrant groups, working to stave off residential and economic decline, focusing on beautification, or providing affordable housing.

Examining these communities highlights the reality (difficulty) of maintaining such areas in the face of institutional forces encouraging racial separation and perceptions of racially mixed communities as unstable, unsafe, or changing. All neighborhoods are symbolic and physical entities. Given the historical perceptions of mixed race or integrated communities as physically and economically declining spaces, integrated neighborhoods must attend to their image. In the three communities portrayed in *Beyond Segregation* formed multiethnic and multiracial coalitions to redefine their communities as positive places. Coalitions in each neighborhood focused their efforts on improving basic quality of life issues – including cultivating physical, cultural, social, financial, and political assets. These are present in many stable communities, but for integrates spaces this work is essential to combat stereotypes. Admittedly, such efforts were more indirect (i.e., groups did not overtly engage in such efforts to stabilize integration). Yet, such efforts are very important retaining and attracting (the harder part) residents.

Finally, it is important to note that the integrated communities I examined contained numerous subgroups with varying lifestyles; class interests, goals and ideologies, and thus, are not "unified" in the traditional sense. There was little initial conscious attempt to promote integration. However, once multiethnic and multiracial communities began to collaborate many saw integration as a community asset, which translated into a sense that working to stabilize the racial mix and foster tolerance was important. The further step that is needed involves attempting to clarify values to promote integration across coalition groups. If leaders do not begin to articulate new community values of inclusion and tolerance, the prospect of maintaining integration is limited.

My research and that of others indeed highlight that racial mixing can occur and remain stable. However, these relative positive stories about integrated spaces should not be taken as evidence that achieving demographic diversity signals that our work is complete. In our 2016 book, *Vanishing Eden*, Heather Dalmage and I examined the experiences and stories of white respondents who grew up in or near neighborhoods on Chicago’s South and West sides that were undergoing racial change between 1950 and 1980 (i.e., a period of tremendous neighborhood change). Our analysis of the stories whites tell about racial change illustrates the role racial identity plays in place making activities and the racial borders whites erect to protect white privilege and resources. Open-ended interviews with over 55 former residents of racially changing neighborhoods illustrate the amount of effort – both in terms of discourse and organizing – whites put into creating and maintaining racial solidarity and the privileges of whiteness, often in subtle and unreflective ways. We found that whites were socialized to recognize and protect racial borders, lessons that stayed with them throughout their lives. We argue that this analysis highlights that even when racial mixing does occur, it is essential to pay attention to the power of whiteness, as an often unrecognized form of social power, that challenges our ability to bridge differences between racial and ethnic groups.
As our respondents discussed growing up in racially shifting neighborhoods, we were able to see the process of whiteness, both woven through the institutions and evident in racial discourse, in structuring racialized ways of knowing. We paid close attention to the stories our stories white respondents told about their neighborhoods, interactions, and how they made sense of these experiences today. Clearly, it is through storytelling that we construct communities and our notions of ourselves. In this sense, the collective memory process helps us reaffirm identity, define in-group from out-group, and guide how we think about ourselves, orient or situate a sense of identity. Similar to the findings from other whiteness scholars, our analysis revealed that whites engaged in racial discourse that valorized white actions and spaces, while denigrating blacks and blackness. Our respondents articulated and constructed themselves as victims (e.g., institutions, laws, blacks). This often occurred when whites would naturalize racial segregation, racial isolation, and racial change, failing to see these issues as a problem or importantly, something that whites have control over or can change. In fact, even in these professions of powerlessness, they would report how they as individuals, friends, or even family members acted to protect white privilege. These “possessive” investments in whiteness (i.e., cultural stories) allow them to not implicate themselves in a system of racial inequality, and instead, put the blame on blacks and blackness.

A certain result of such discursive practices is increased racial solidarity, rather than political solidarity. Solidarity is an experience of “willed affiliation,” where individuals have a claim on each other’s energies, compassion, and resources. Political theorists see this willed affiliation as based on trust and responsibility for others regardless of differences. However, when we view some individuals as inherently “other,” what we see is racialized solidarity. Thus, these efforts create a border, a boundary around and understanding of who is an “us” and defines the qualities of the “them.” In short, racial socialization and efforts to protect the privileges of whiteness influence whites to naturalize racial boundaries, bolster group position, and expect non-whites to adopt their values and norms. Thus, any efforts to interact across difference requires efforts to see our solidarity to all members of the community and really, a willingness to come to terms the benefits of whiteness.

Finally, efforts at bolstering racial solidarity result in what we term racially bounded empathy. We explored our respondent’s racial knowledge and ignorance, aspects connected to white’s ability to empathize (i.e., walk in another’s shoes) and build genuine relationships across race lines. We found many whites understood white racism as an individual failing and that failing or flaw can be understood, and thus tolerated, based on their knowledge and empathy for a history in which whites suffered from racial change. For example, we found that whites extended empathy for racist individuals given their experience with racial change (for some, the loss their neighborhoods). Thus, whites understood and accepted individual white racism, while ignoring the experiences or details of black suffering in this same process. In this case, whites empathized with the other whites who held racist views, while ignoring black pain and suffering. Thus, our respondent’s racialized knowledge impeded the empathy that whites feel for other groups. In brief, their empathy was bounded by race. Whites developed empathy for other whites in a way that not only precluded blackness, but also required a further dehumanization of blackness as white racial solidarity is reinforced.
In short, while the potential for racial mixing in racial neighborhoods certainly exists, for true integration to happen we need a critical dialogue across difference. Our ways of knowing others undoubtedly requires human interaction across racial boundaries, however, building strong ties across difference requires empathy, trust, imagination and a shared sense of obligation. Rather than isolation and silence, we need knowledge, as well as acknowledgement of ignorance, for the development of bonds across racial boundaries and between those who currently see themselves as radically different from one another. Thus, genuine solidarity between groups requires working to see each other as part of the same community even when one imagines the other as very different. Accomplishing this is difficult work and involves learning to see through the eyes of the Other and relearning who we are in the context of history.

References


Supporting Diversity and Racial Inequality: Opportunity Hoarding in a Desegregated School

Amanda Lewis

In a recent paper, Lewis, Diamond & Forman (2015) reviewed some of the challenges in calls for racial integration as a strategy to address racial inequality. While many scholars agree that racial segregation is a key linchpin in the persistence of racialized hierarchies, the call for integration as the unequivocal solution is more contested. Challenges to efforts to desegregate are many and involve not only historic and current opposition to organized efforts to implement desegregation as a policy but also challenges within successfully desegregated spaces with bringing together groups that are not only often different culturally but also come to those interactions with widely different access to resources and power. Building on other recent scholarship, Lewis, Diamond & Forman conclude that while integration may well be a critical condition for advancing equity, it is not by itself a sufficient condition to ensure it. Herein, I further explore these “conundrums of integration” by focusing on some of the dynamics within organizations that prevent desegregated spaces from being places that actually further goals of racial equity (becoming fully integrated).

One key group of racial actors for any effort towards desegregation is whites. Their racial attitudes have historically been examined closely for indications about their willingness to live, work, socialize or attend school in integrated spaces. And there is some indication that whites’ are growing increasingly open to the idea of integration. Scholars have noted a growing trend of white respondents expressing some support for the idea of diversity in particular. As several scholars have recently pointed out, diversity talk these days is ubiquitous (Bell & Hartmann 2007; Berrey 2015; Krysan, Carter & VanLondon 2016; Lewis & Diamond 2015). While clearly a remove from explicit discussion of race, such discourse often refers indirectly to racial diversity. However, this research has found that these expressions of support for the idea of diversity are often accompanied by only shallow commitments to the actual enactment of diversity. As Bell & Hartmann (2007) point out, many today express a value for diversity but fail to actually practice diversity.

This seeming contradiction in diversity talk parallels past findings on racial attitudes that has grappled with the question of how and whether respondents’ reported attitudes are correlated with their behavior. Are their actions as embodied racial subjects aligned with or in contradiction to their expressed beliefs and values with regards to race relations with other groups and racial justice writ large?

One manifestation of this dilemma was a longtime hallmark finding of survey research on racial attitudes. The so-called principles-policy paradox captured the finding that in the post-Civil Rights period, while there was growing support for principles of racial equality, there was far less support for actual policies that would translate those principles into reality (Schuman et al. 1997). While recently Krysan (2012) reported that support from some polices (e.g., housing) that would ensure equal treatment has grown, opposition to most others, particularly those having to do with education and employment policies, remains high. One explanation for this gap between support for principles and support for policies
may be the degree of commitment to the principle – whether support for the principle in question is weak or strong.

As other scholars have noted, however, close attention to evolving racial ideology suggests that this principal/policy gap may not actually represent much of a paradox. For example, writing about “laissez-faire racism” Bobo, Kluegel and Smith (1997) argued, that the hallmark of the current era is a general decline of Jim Crow racism but while still leaving “much of the black population in a uniquely disadvantaged position.” Noteworthy about this era is not only that structural inequalities persist but that blacks are “stereotyped and blamed as the architects of their own disadvantaged status.” Thus, while many whites disavow the explicit racism of the Jim Crow era, they continue to blame the black community itself for their current status, deny personal and societal responsibility for creating black disadvantage and thus resist efforts to directly intervene on racial inequality. This resistance stems possibly both from a belief that blacks are responsible for their situation and concern that the majority itself might lose something in the process. Bobo and colleagues conclude, “In short, a large number of white Americans have become comfortable with as much racial inequality as a putatively nondiscriminatory polity and free market economy can produce.”

Similarly, writing on colorblind ideology argues that while whites assert general support for the abstract idea of equality, many also assert that we have moved into a post-racial era in which racial dynamics are becoming irrelevant. According to this logic, interventions to ensure equality of outcomes not only aren’t necessary but are contrary to principles of equality in that they would function as reverse discrimination against whites. As Krysan (2013: 265) finds “new racial norms of equality have emerged among whites: but these norms did not encompass race-conscious policies that recognized and sought to overcome past and persistent structural disadvantage.”

Herein we explore a recent manifestation of the seeming paradox or contradiction between expressed principles or value, support for diversity, and what actually unfolds in the enactment of that principle. We look specifically at how diversity talk is put to work. Drawing on data from a racially diverse high school, we explore white parents’ discourse and behavior around diversity and racial equity. Data comes from a study of what many would consider to be a “best case scenario” of desegregated spaces – a diverse and highly-successful high school that has been desegregated for decades, situated within a liberal community that many flock to precisely because the schools are diverse and strong. The setting for this research is Riverview, a mid-sized city located within a large metropolitan area in the U.S. Though not nearly as diverse as the large city it abuts, Riverview is, relative to most suburban communities in the metro area, quite diverse. It is a community many flock to precisely because of its diverse population and strong schools – schools that have a long history of success locally and nationally. Riverview High School itself boasts many academic accomplishments. However, it also has a long history of racial differences in school achievement. The data for this study come from interviews with over 170 members of the Riverview school community including students, parents, teachers, administrators and staff. For this paper, I draw primarily from on interviews with and about white parents about their experiences with Riverview High.
Elsewhere we discuss how Riverview functions as a desegregated but not integrated community. Here we focus on some of the dynamics that get in the way of it functioning as a truly integrated institution. To summarize, we heard from many community members, including white middle-class parents themselves and many Riverview staff that, in fact, white parents often purposefully choose to live in Riverview because they want their children to be educated in a diverse community. They offer regular and specific affirmations about the value of living in and educating their children in a diverse community. While interviews revealed white parents wanting their children to be in a diverse school, these same parents also felt strongly about ensuring that their children have the best educational experience. The current system of racialized tracking almost guarantees that these desires will be in direct contradiction with each other. Thus far, most parents seem ready to sacrifice an integrated experience for an advantaged one. They are not just passive recipients of an unjust system however. According to many staff members, white parents have actively opposed and even undermined attempts to rethink the current tracking structure, and they continue to campaign against such change. Further, when pressed in conversation about how they make sense of the persistent and highly visible racial inequities within Riverview, parents offered a variety of defenses of the system that reproduces internal segregation in the school (and thus means their children are not actually in diverse classrooms).

Tracking at Riverview High School reflects patterns others have described as racially stratified academic hierarchies (where white students are far overrepresented in the most advantaged courses). One might describe white parents’ general orientation to these racially stratified academic hierarchies as a form of what Tyrone Forman (2004: 44) has called racial apathy: a modern form of prejudice or racial animus. “Rather than an active and explicit dislike of racial minorities,” he says, racial apathy “refers to lack of feeling or indifference toward societal racial and ethnic inequality and lack of engagement with race-related social issues.” At Riverview, racial apathy includes not only a general disengagement from the racial inequalities at the school and a lack of any sense of responsibility to do anything about them but also a process of delegitimization. As Forman (2004:51) explains, this is the process whereby certain groups are categorized into “negative social categories so as to exclude them from social acceptability.” In fact, many Riverview parents express some sympathy about what they perceive to be the hardships that many black families face. In the most generous reading, they believe those hardships mean that black families have less energy, time, or resources for their children’s education and that, as a consequence, black children are behind educationally. In the less generous reading, they believe that these parents and their children are not as invested in education as they themselves are. In either case, they believe achievement gaps aren’t necessarily a school problem because they arise from different family practices, something for which schools (and they) cannot be expected to be held accountable. White parents then feel little responsibility themselves for how racial inequalities play out in their children’s school. The few black children in honors classes are evidence that blacks that want to can achieve (and those blacks sometimes draw on similar narratives as whites when distinguishing themselves from same-race peers who are lower achieving).

Recently several scholars have built up on Charles Tilly’s notion of opportunity hoarding to describe some of these dynamics (Anderson 2010; DiTomaso 2012; Massey 2007; Tilly 1999; Walters 2007). Diverging somewhat from Tilly’s original more narrow definition, these
scholars define opportunity hoarding as the process through which dominant groups who have control over some good (e.g., education) regulate its circulation, thus preventing out-groups from having full access to it. With regard to school systems, Elizabeth Anderson (2010: 8) writes, “U.S. whites have long hoarded opportunities by establishing school systems that provide no, or an inferior, education to blacks, Latinos and Native Americans.” At Riverview, such educational opportunities were intertwined with educational tracking. Opportunity hoarding involves not only efforts to control access to the good in question but also the development of legitimating narratives that explain and justify limiting access. As Anderson (2010: 19) describes:

However, prejudice and stigma arise from ethnocentric opportunity hoarding and exploitation through at least two routes. First, advantaged groups may cultivate prejudice and stigma to reinforce group boundaries and motivate in-group members to keep their distance from out-groups. Second when ethnocentric conduct generates systematic categorical inequalities, dominant groups create stigmatizing stories about marginalized and subordinated groups to explain and rationalize their disadvantage—mainly by attributing their disadvantage to deficiencies of talent, virtue, or culture intrinsic to the group.

DiTomaso (2012:8) that this dynamic of in-group favoritism is the linch-pin of racial inequality today: “I argue that it is the acts of favoritism that whites show to each other (through opportunity hoarding and the exchange of social capital) that contribute most to continued racial inequality.” While DiTomaso is writing primarily about how white favoritism works in the labor market, the parallels here are important. Her respondents, like ours, are not as focused on directly blocking racial minorities as they are focused on securing advantage for their own. As she highlights, whites do not have to “engage in negative actions toward racial minorities in order to enjoy the privileges of being white.”

However, white middle-class parents are not just advocating for their own children. They are also advocating for the maintenance of the structures of inequality that facilitate their advantage. This resembles the behavior Pamela Walters found in her study of white responses to broad school policy movements (e.g., vouchers and funding equalization). Walters (2007: 25) shows that whites basically worked to “delay, dilute or stop” policies that they perceived would undermine their competitive edge. In her definition of opportunity hoarding she argues that “behavior that reserves for one’s own children the best possible educational opportunities,” has an “inevitable flip side of which is excluding others from those same good opportunities” (Walters 2007: 17).

One could question whether what we observed should really be considered opportunity hoarding if technically everyone could have access to high-track classes (the good in question). However, part of the desirability of high-track classes is their exclusivity. In our conversations with white parents one of the attractions of these courses is that they provide a measure of quality control within a large system. They know that in a school of Riverview’s size and scope not all teachers will be high quality but they know that the best teachers will be assigned to high-track classes. They believe these classes are filled with the most talented and educationally invested students and they don’t want their children’s educational experience contaminated with “basic” students who are, in their minds, less
focused and less skilled. And their interest is not entirely “race-neutral.” As, Wells and Serna (1996: 100-101) discuss in their study of parents’ resistance to detracking efforts, these parents assign students to deserving and undeserving categories:

While the symbols used by politically powerful people to express their resistance to detracking differed from one site to the next, race consistently played a central, if not explicit, role. Although local elites rarely expressed their dissatisfaction with detracking reform in overtly racial terms, their resistance was couched in more subtle expressions of the politics of culture that have clear racial implications. For example, they said they liked the concept of a racially mixed school, as long as the African American or Latino students acted like White, middle-class children, and their parents were involved in the school and bought into the American Dream.

Not that black parents don’t want their kids to get ahead or have advantages. Black and white families generally have the same hopes and dreams for their children, but as Shapiro (2004: 2) argues, they have different “capacity to follow through on their hopes and deliver opportunity.” Whites collectively have far more access than black families to a range of resources, what Shapiro (2004: 2-3) has called “transformative assets” or unearned, inherited assets that enable families to succeed “economically and socially beyond where their own achievements, jobs and earnings would place them.” Importantly, while Shapiro documented these resource differences and the key role they played in different family outcomes, when he talked to families about their accomplishments, they spoke about their own merits and effort. Even as they regularly deployed them to their advantage, white families did not recognize these transformative assets as consequential.

Opportunity hoarding historically was done quite explicitly (e.g., separate schools funded at different levels). Now it is done more subtly and in seemingly less organized fashion. White families in Riverview are not getting together and organizing to keep black families and kids out of honors. But they don’t have to. The historical pattern persists with different mechanisms producing it. Forty to fifty years ago, the best education in Riverview was available primarily to white students – this is still the case. It was never otherwise. We miss key dimensions in trying to understand outcomes today if we detach them from their historical trajectory. It has always been this way. We just now understand it to be meritocratic and a matter of individual choices (poor choices or lack of initiative/caring/right values for black families, and good choices for white families).

In the context of U.S. history, the racialized social system has always depended in part on the actions of private individuals as one way that hierarchy gets defended, enshrined, developed. The point in the case of Riverview is that white parents in their various roles as advocates for their individual children or activists in the community or school board members, defend and protect the system as it is. Racial antipathy is rarely driving their actions – they do not appear to operate with an active dislike for blacks. Whether out of racial apathy, lack of care for the other students, or just a vigorous attempt to provide advantages for their own kid (opportunity hoarding), collectively their efforts help maintain a status quo that benefits their kids to the detriment of others.
This pattern of opportunity hoarding in Riverview is noteworthy also because whites in Riverview are not “typical.” Most whites with school-age children keep their distance from diversity or move away from it entirely (e.g., Shapiro 2004). On the surface, at least, Riverview white parents have made a different decision, opting to live in a relatively diverse community and to send their children to relatively diverse schools. They appear distinct from those described in other recent research that move to all-white districts (Johnson 2006: Wells et al. 2009). However, their decisions and actions within the district are not so different as they work to secure their children access to the best classes, teachers, and tracks.

Drawing on this case study of a racially diverse and highly successful high school community, we explore the seeming contradictions between people’s expressed support for principles of diversity alongside their high tolerance for persistent racial inequity and defense of the practices and policies that maintain internal segregation within that diverse community. We largely agree with Bell & Hartmann (2007:910) that “Diversity talk” may be best understood as a new racial project. In fact, diversity may be a way of talking about race without talking about racism or racial inequality. “If colorblind racism reproduces racial inequalities by disavowing race on the surface, diversity discourse allows American to engage race on the surface but disavow and disguise its deeper structural roots and consequences” (Bell & Hartmann 2007: 910).

Decades ago, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. reminded us to take care to note of the differences between desegregation (as something that “simply removes...legal and social prohibitions”) and true integration (as something creative, profound, far-reaching “genuine intergroup, interpersonal doing”). Any discussion of how to facilitate true integration within desegregated spaces will need to contend with the real differences in power that groups bring and the real ambivalence that dominant groups have in supporting structures and practices that jeopardize their long-held advantages.
References


The Value of Discord

Evelyn M. Perry

Urban scholars, planners, and policymakers worry about the discordant nature of socially mixed neighborhoods. Researchers find that the tensions and conflicts associated with residential diversity undermine local social order and stability, present obstacles to community cohesion, and erode social trust (Bellair 1997, Guest, Kubrin and Cover 2008, Kubrin 2000, Hipp, Tita and Greenbaum 2009, Oliver 2010, Putnam 2007, Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997, Warner and Rountree 1997). These concerns about clashes in the multicultural metropolis are hardly new. Social theorists have long contemplated the disordering effects of diversity. The trouble, simply stated, is that difference produces conflict and conflict is bad for community.

In this brief memo, I argue that micro-level conflict can be constructive—particularly in heterogeneous neighborhoods. I draw on scholarship in urban sociology, social psychology, urban planning, geography, and the sociology of law as well as an ethnographic study of an integrated neighborhood to explore the role of conflict in intercultural settings.

Conflict and Harmony Reconsidered

Much of the scholarship in both community and urban sociology and social psychology treats conflict as a negative outcome in and of itself or as a key contributor to a range of other negative outcomes. Studies of neighborhood effects and studies of intergroup relations routinely contrast conflict with consensus, cooperation, solidarity or other positive features of social life (Fischer 1999; Chizhik, Shelley and Troyer 2009). Recently, social scientists have called for a more nuanced approach to conflict—one that recognizes the constructive potential of conflict in group life (Dovidio, Saguy and Schnabel 2009). This marks a return to early theoretical work that posits a number of positive or integrative functions of conflict (e.g., Simmel 1908, Coser 1956).

Using harmonious relations as a measure of a successful socially mixed community may obscure issues of inequality and injustice. Consensus can be costly. It can suppress or essentialize difference (Young 1990). For example, some socially mixed neighborhoods produce the appearance of solidarity or stability at the expense of marginalizing less-advantaged groups. In an examination of the gentrification of a poor black neighborhood by middle-class blacks, Pattillo (2007) finds that the middle-class residents are successful at developing local social control strategies (e.g. quality of life policing) that enforce their understanding of responsible and respectable behavior. But this success comes at a cost. Pattillo concludes, “The benefits of gentrification do not flow equally, and established poorer residents feel, and indeed are, increasingly supervised and disciplined so that the new residents can fully enjoy the neighborhood as they desire” (285). Chaskin and Joseph (2015) uncover similar dynamics in their study of HOPE VI mixed-income housing developments. Property managers respond to clashes over public behaviors and uses of public space with ramped-up enforcement of middle-class norms. No loitering/hanging
out/visible socializing. No barbecuing in common areas. Their response largely entails intensified surveillance and policing of lower-income residents. Such models of community “improvement” manage difference through coerced assimilation or exclusion and ultimately work against the integrationist goals of the HOPE VI program.

Riverwest

This memo draws on three years of ethnographic fieldwork in the racially and economically mixed neighborhood of Riverwest. In addition to participant observation, I conducted 60 in-depth interviews with a wide range of knowledgeable informants, including (but not limited to) neighborhood organization leaders, business owners, block “mayors” and block “mamas,” journalists, social service providers, police officers, activists, school staff, prominent artists, church clergy, convenience stores clerks, and public characters. Riverwest is one of very few stably-integrated neighborhoods in Milwaukee, a city that is highly segregated by race and class. By the early eighties, Riverwest was home to substantial black, white and Latino (largely Puerto Rican) populations and had become known for being racially diverse (Tolan 2003). 2010 census data shows that approximately 63% of Riverwest’s 12,500 residents are white, 20% are black 12% are Hispanic, 2% are Asian and 3% are multiracial. There is considerable socioeconomic diversity in the neighborhood, as well (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Income Quintile</th>
<th>% Riverwest Households</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lowest fifth (less than $25,000)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second fifth ($25,000 - $50,000)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle fifth ($50,000 - $75,000)</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forth fifth ($75,000 - $125,000)</td>
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<td>Highest fifth (more than $125,000)</td>
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Source: American Community Survey 2010
Note: Income ranges based on 2010 household income quintiles. Range ceilings adjusted to align with ranges reported at the tract level.

Riverwest’s social mix extends beyond race and class to include diversity in sexual orientation, gender identity, age, politics, family form, lifestyle and scene. Riverwesterners are aware of their exceptional status as a diverse neighborhood in a hyper-segregated city. This strengthens the perception of its multi-faceted diversity as a significant community asset and a source of local pride. Although some long-time residents feel trapped in a now unfamiliar neighborhood, many residents cite diversity as a factor in their decision to move into or stay in Riverwest.

Riverwest is an in-between place. The neighborhood’s ongoing struggle to manage the countervailing pressures of gentrification and decline is expressed in its geographic location. Riverwest is sandwiched between a much more affluent, predominantly white, university neighborhood that is considered part of the “East Side” and Harambee, a lower-income, predominantly African American, higher-crime neighborhood. Holton Street has long served
as the border between Riverwest and Harambee, symbolizing for many the boundary between Riverwest and what they term the “ghetto.” The threat of crime is central to Riverwest’s social organization and figures prominently in many outsiders’ views of the neighborhood.

Conflict Lessons

There are numerous everyday “on the block” conflicts in Riverwest. Neighbors have different definitions of appropriate leisure activities, noise levels, economic activities, uses of public space, property maintenance, parenting practices and communication styles. Although residents often ignore, tolerate or even celebrate these differences, they frequently clash over them. One of the ways in which residents negotiate difference, then, is through conflict. These conflicts sometimes strain neighbor relations, harden social boundaries, discourage investment in Riverwest, draw in official agents of social control, or end in violence. I focus here, however, on the constructive contributions of conflict to community life.

Conflict inspires collaboration. Many blocks in the neighborhood have war stories. I heard myriad tales of neighbors coming together to address a trouble spot on the block. As the activities around a drug house or a problem bar escalate, affected neighbors join efforts against a common threat. They reach out to those responsible for the trouble. They apply collective pressure to the landlord. If all else fails, they coordinate efforts to engage the police. These battles are often long, exhausting, and costly, but residents also describe them as valued chapters in block life. They present opportunities for bonding with proximate neighbors—for creating or deepening relationships (often across social divides). They may have battle scars, but they are shared scars. Shared fate produced by a shared threat can expand residents’ notions of “us.”

Conflict clarifies shared expectations. In Riverwest, residents tend to adopt a flexible approach to neighborhood norms and their regulation. This feature of local culture complicates attempts to impose a uniform set of standards—even legal standards—on a heterogeneous community. In such a context, it can be difficult for a resident to suss out if her response to an incident will garner support from her neighbors. Conflicts offer moments of clarity.

Shortly after Alex Dimas, a white renter, moved to the neighborhood, he had an altercation with a group of young Latino men on his street. They mocked his initial request to stop lighting fireworks on the 4th of July and, when he persisted, they shoved him down. He reported the incident to the police. When Alex woke up the next morning and discovered that his car had been “keyed” (defaced by using keys to scrape off paint), he decided to adjust his strategy. After a chat with the block matriarch (who was also related to some of the young men), the trouble ceased. This conflict taught Alex several lessons about local expectations. Lesson one: invest in relationships with near neighbors. “It’s important to have good relations with you neighbors in as much as getting to know then can cover you from some of the things that happen in the neighborhood.” Lesson two: there was a “softer way of dealing with the problem.” Over time, Alex began to see that signaling a willingness to work things out informally through direct confrontation was often preferable to the escalation or disproportionate responses that sometimes accompany bringing in the police or city officials. Lesson three: there is no such thing as a legitimate noise complaint on the 4th of July.
July. After sharing the story with several longtime Riverwest residents, Alex learned there was little local support for cracking down on fireworks fun on Independence Day.

Conflict opens up opportunities for mutual criticism, dissent, and challenges to the legitimacy of dominant constructions of problems or standards. At a block watch meeting, Maria Pérez complained about a group of young black men who had recently started hanging out by the corner convenience store. She expected sympathy from her neighbors. This is not surprising given the routine criminalization of black men in the United States. Yet her comments were met with skepticism and resistance. When Maria could not provide specific examples of problematic behavior, her neighbors and the police officer present at the meeting dismissed her concerns. This small confrontation produced an opportunity to disrupt broad cultural stereotypes of black troublemakers and signal that “hanging out” did not meet this group’s definition of a problem. Conflicts in Riverwest push some residents to reevaluate their insistence on “obvious” community standards when neighbors argue that enforcing such standards will be impractical or unfairly affect particular households or groups of people.

I have focused on everyday “on the block” conflict, but larger clashes also shape the local interactional context. When residents battle over the impacts of proposed economic development, they articulate competing (and often classed) versions of the “good” community. When they debate the merits of removing basketball hoops from a park or banning hip-hop shows at a bar as crime-prevention strategies, stereotypes are openly aired and challenged. These conflict processes sometimes shore up and sometimes destabilize the boundaries between dominant and nondominant cultural preferences and practices. Cultural geographer Ash Amin argues that when there is ample room for disagreement and dissent, “what or who counts as civil or uncivil ...is a matter of the fine grain daily thrown up for public debate and scrutiny, rather than the product of pure and pre-defined categories of civility and incivility” (2006:1021).

When we type neighborhood conflict as “negative interaction,” we miss its productive potential. When we use harmony or stability as simple indicators of successful integration, we miss the value of instability for challenging inequality. Stability tends to favor the status quo, maintaining existing hierarchies of status and power (Dovidio, Saguy and Schnabel 2009). Everyday conflicts in Riverwest present opportunities for questioning the legitimacy of the established order. These might entail renegotiating hyperlocal codes of conduct (which behaviors a block will endorse, tolerate, or condemn) or expanding categories of social worth and spatial belonging. They might poke holes in claims to “universal” definitions of neighborhood quality of life. Instability, in this case, does not devolve into disorder. Instead, it requires the ongoing negotiation of order—a stream of confrontations, resolutions, compromises, accommodation, and change.

Revisiting the Goals of Integration

Evaluating the consequences of neighborhood conflict and instability pushes us to reflect on the goals of residential integration. Robin D.G. Kelley (1998) describes postwar constructions of integration’s purpose:

> During the postwar period, the term was associated with liberals who conceived of integration as a means of creating racial harmony without a fundamental
transformation of the social and economic order. ...White liberals believed black people would benefit from social interaction with whites, that these poor, disadvantaged folks would adopt their middle-class values, their work ethic and sense of self-esteem. The goal was to produce fully assimilated black people devoted to the American dream. Sharing power was rarely part of the equation.

Although current articulations of the goals of integration policies and programs tend to focus on reducing disparities in access to resources and opportunities, deconcentrating poverty, reducing discrimination and prejudice, or improving interracial and interclass relations, vestiges of the assimilationist agenda Kelley describes endure.

This may be due, in part, to the ways in which dominant cultural norms and values are embedded in the regulatory frameworks of municipal law and urban planning. Based on her study of everyday governance in a diverse metropolis, Valverde asserts “it is clear that the cultural preference of middle-aged, middle-class, married folks who own and lovingly tend a piece of property are constantly reinscribed in law (2012: 49). Planning scholar Leonie Sandercock observes that the urban planning system, too, has “unreflectively expressed the norms of the culturally dominant majority” (2000:15). Tasked with managing fear the city, planners have historically employed strategies of exclusion (e.g. segregation) or cultural assimilation (e.g. producing good citizens through urban design) (Sandercock 2000). When urban policies and rule enforcement are biased in favor of a white, middle-class, property-owning mainstream, they legitimize a moral ranking of kinds of people, kinds of households, kinds of places, and kinds of practices (Valverde 2012). This, in turn, justifies efforts to manage diversity by holding everyone in socially mixed communities to a “higher” standard.

The sociological literature on diverse neighborhoods contains a growing number of cautionary tales. These studies reveal that in many mixed communities, local interactional dynamics often work against goals of equity and inclusion (e.g., Berrey 2015, Chaskin and Joseph 2015, Mayorga-Gallo 2014). Might conflict and a culture that supports bargaining rather than enforcing absolutes be ingredients for a context that enables constructive interactions across difference? Might a working solidarity that requires ongoing negotiation provide a foundation for challenging existing inequalities and transforming the relations of power?

Works Cited


Racial Democracy or Racial Domination? Revealing Whiteness in Multiethnic America

Emily Walton

DRAFT: Please do not circulate without the author’s permission. Sections of this memo have been taken from other manuscripts in progress.

The unprecedented scale of global migration (Lee and Bean 2004; Vertovec 2007) and growing visibility of underrepresented groups in traditionally white spaces (Anderson 2015; Taylor 2016) mean that racialized minorities are both more present and more powerful in multiethnic communities today than at any point in U.S. history (Logan and Zhang 2010). In parallel with these demographic changes, some scholars assert that a racial democracy (Freyre 1956), where neighbors no longer view each other through the lens of race and people of color do not experience overt prejudice or discrimination, should be the ideal goal for integrated settings. In this vein, scholars hopefully inquire about the causes and consequences of conviviality, or the capacity to “live with” difference (Amin 2002; Gilroy 2004; Hall 1993; Padilla, Azevedo and Olmos-Alcaraz 2015; Valentine 2008; Vertovec 2011). Another set of critical race scholars argue that as long as the established racial hierarchy is accepted as natural and legitimate (Denis 2015; Emirbayer and Desmond 2015), turning a (color)blind eye to racial and ethnic differences in multiethnic spaces (Bonilla-Silva 2014) only serves to perpetuate racial domination, where whites are complicit in a rigid and oppressive institutional order that deprives people of color of opportunities, privileges, and human rights (Berrey 2015; Desmond and Emirbayer 2009). These demographic changes coupled with diverging scholarly narratives raise important questions about race relations in an increasingly diverse society.

In the current study, I reveal the processes by which practicing conviviality in consistently multiethnic settings relates to racial domination. I contend that integration involves more than demographic and geographic processes, but also a set of cultural processes determining who has access to resources and opportunities in the community (Berrey 2015). In this paper, I clarify some of the cultural processes at work by conceptualizing three habits of whiteness—socialized norms, orientations, and practices that operate to consolidate and preserve power in the hands of those racialized as white. While the theoretically-rich field of critical whiteness studies has elaborated dispositions of whiteness, the current study is novel in its synthesis and analysis of these particular habits and their potential consequences as they manifest in consistently multiethnic urban neighborhoods. Because habits of whiteness are often invoked unconsciously, my goal is to render them visible and explicit in service of “restoring to people the meaning of their action” (Grenfell 2004, quoting Bourdieu 1962) and bolstering antiracist efforts. This study demonstrates how the whiteness habits of entitlement, anxiety, and ambivalence relate to the racial domination dimensions of displacement, social control, and social distance in consistently multiethnic neighborhoods.
Background

Because racial residential segregation has proved a pernicious and trenchant social problem, a great deal of social science research and policy-making works toward understanding and undoing the roots of this “linchpin” of racial inequality (Massey 2016; Pettigrew 1979). Many of our local and national policies relating to integration are rooted in the premise that contact with diverse others will reduce stereotypes and prejudice (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). These integration goals are present in a recent federal public housing program, HOPE VI, designed with the intention that physical mixing of housing types ultimately will result in social mixing among socioeconomically diverse individuals (Grant and Perrott 2009). There is some evidence that our focus on integration may be working. Despite larger trends suggesting extremely high levels of segregation may persist for decades to come, some studies point out that segregation among African Americans has steadily decreased since 1980 (Iceland 2004; Logan, Stults and Farley 2004) and there is an emerging pathway of integration in “global neighborhoods,” where the traditional black/white color line is replaced by a more stable array of individuals from multiple groups (Fasenfest, Booza and Metzger 2004; Logan and Zhang 2010; Maly 2005). These national-level demographic trends are not playing out evenly across neighborhoods, however, and many multiethnic neighborhoods that appear to be diverse at a given point in time are in fact transitioning from one racial majority to another (Friedman 2008). Bader and Warkentien (2016) demonstrate that a majority of multiethnic neighborhoods are growing at a glacial pace and still remain overly white.

A core assumption underlying arguments for integration is that it fosters meaningful and valuable relationships across lines of social difference. Some urban ethnographers have deeply engaged with these integrated spaces and their critical examinations uncover important details about the processes through which inequality is produced and reproduced. In her investigation of a white/black/Latino multiethnic neighborhood in Durham, Mayorga-Gallo (2014) finds that “living in the same neighborhood is not enough” (p.151); she argues that “diversity ideology maintains an inequitably racial system because it […] focuses on the intentions of privileged persons as opposed to the racialized outcomes of their actions” (p.149). Perry’s (2017:173) analysis of a white/black/Latino neighborhood in Milwaukee also uncovers inequities, demonstrating how powerful residents “draw and enforce symbolic, social, and geographic boundaries to maintain their advantages”. In his ethnography of a gentrifying black/white neighborhood in Washington D.C., Hyra (2017) shows how processes of political and cultural displacement—through which the norms, behaviors, and values of the newcomers prevail over those of original residents—contribute to longtime residents’ withdrawal from social and civic participation. What becomes clear is that none of the integrated neighborhoods these scholars examine are racial democracies, rather they perpetuate inequality even as privileged and powerful residents give lip service to appreciating diversity.

The current analyses integrate and build on these emergent literatures. Starting from the assumption that demographic difference does not equate to meaningful, equitable interaction, I orient my questions around how racial domination unfolds in daily negotiations in diverse places. I suggest that focusing a cultural lens on the invisible habits of whiteness provides new insight into the ways integrated spaces perpetuate inequality. A focus on whiteness enlightens the system itself, bringing us closer to understanding the mechanisms
of a racial ideology at work in maintaining power and hierarchy in diverse settings (Day 2003; Zukin 1991).

As a cultural phenomenon, whiteness is more than a personal disposition, rather it is “located in both the individual person and the world in which she lives” (Sullivan 2006:4). Whiteness functions in an individual as a background for action, an orientation to the world that influences how individuals “take up space” and what they “can do” (Ahmed 2007). Bonilla-Silva (2012) goes further to assert the ubiquity of a white supremacist racial order in everyday life, an ideology that permeates all interaction in racial regimes. Despite, and perhaps because of, its ubiquity in social structure and interaction, habits of whiteness remain the unmarked norm against which “others” are judged, working “as second nature, even though agents consciously, in good faith, may think and say otherwise” (Jung 2015:174). It is precisely the invisibility of whiteness, however, that allows for its ideological power to justify the status quo (Bonilla-Silva 2014). I argue that multiethnic neighborhoods are important arenas of social interaction and that making habits of whiteness visible—illuminating the processes by which whiteness is constructed, legitimized, and acted upon—may render unequal power relations amenable to intervention.

Recent scholarship interrogating the ways racial ideologies shape city spaces find that urban transformations are imbued with whiteness, principally gentrification and rejuvenation of central city spaces to be safer and more “habitable” (Freeman 2006). Increased surveillance and policing are legitimized as necessary to secure the central city as a comfortable space in accordance with the standards of whiteness, and public areas are increasingly “hostile to difference” (Fyfe, Bannister and Kearns 2006). Shaw (2007) elucidates two specific ways whiteness is associated with urban renewal: reliance on a preservationist agenda that romanticizes wealthy Victorian-era pasts, and denial of the oppressive histories and realities associated with minority concentration in central cities. Both processes lend legitimacy to the gentry’s recent claims to and defense of central city areas. Similarly, Mele (2016:368) argues that whiteness is “at the core of contemporary urban development ideology,” finding that privileging the private market and using a colorblind development vocabulary ultimately leave poor, racial and ethnic minorities invisible in the urban community narrative. In this study, I ask how whiteness unfolds in multiethnic neighborhoods where, historically at least, residents have preserved racial and ethnic diversity amid urban change.

Methods

Research Setting. The current study is based on a mixed methods analysis conducted over the course of two years (June 2015 - August 2017) in two consistently multiethnic neighborhoods in Boston—the South End and Fields Corner. I chose these two sites as the only two census tracts in Boston to maintain at least 10 percent representation of four major racial and ethnic groups over the last 25 years (see Table 1). Like many cities across the country, Boston is in the midst of a housing crisis and it has become very expensive to live in Boston. In addition to its recently surging population growth and affluence, the greater Boston metro area confronts a history of extreme racial residential segregation (Logan and Stults 2011) and is notable for its small neighborhood footprints, which mean that gentrification often moves quickly toward a tipping point (Florida 2013). Thus, the two neighborhoods I investigate in this study are special because they have maintained their
multiethnic character—against the odds—for at least 25 years. The story of Fields Corner mirrors that of the South End in many ways; it is a story of wealth at inception, economic decline concomitant with racial and ethnic minority concentration, and relatively recent “rediscovery”.

**Data.** The data collection is part of a larger mixed-methods project that includes surveys, field observations, and interviews. This analysis relies principally on 56 in-depth interviews with residents of both neighborhood. Our interviews focused on the features of important neighborhood places, descriptions of neighborly contact and the content of interactions (inter- and intra-ethnic), experiences with moving to the neighborhood and plans for the future, and interpretations of and reactions to living in a diverse neighborhood.

**Results**

My analyses illuminate three habits of whiteness: entitlement, anxiety, and ambivalence. Each of these habits of whiteness works in the service of racial domination, particularly as it manifests in the displacement and social control of, and social distance from, racialized minorities in multiethnic communities. I ground my presentation of Results in the heuristic model shown in Figure 1. (Note: I do not go into great detail here, but the bulk of my conference presentation will focus on evidence and explication of these habits of whiteness and their consequences.)

**Entitlement and Displacement.** In the process of gentrification in both neighborhoods, both municipal and individual actions are supported by a sense of Entitlement, a habit of whiteness describing the feeling of inherent permission to enter and maintain control over spaces. Entitlement is expressed through the specific mechanism of “Restoring and Revitalizing”, which describes the development decisions that privilege restoration of the neighborhoods’ Victorian (white) pasts, individual financial gain at the cost of community, and amenities that fit with a “trendy” (white) lifestyle. While colorblind on the surface, the processes of restoring and revitalizing areas of minority concentration justify color-conscious displacement through the processes of “Appropriating Spaces” that were once comfortable for nonwhites, and “Pricing Out” low income residents who are primarily people of color.

**Anxiety and Social Control.** As in every American city, both the South End and Fields Corner experienced institutional abandonment during their histories of high racial and ethnic minority representation. Institutional abandonment separated residents from the resources and opportunities they needed to survive and thrive, and many turned to the informal economy for sustenance and protection. This institutional abandonment and our nation’s long history of racial residential segregation thus means that central city spaces are not neutral, but “racially demarcated and magnetized with meaning” (Sullivan 2006:145). Consequently, as wealthy and upper middle class whites work to create comfortable space for themselves in these once predominantly-minority communities, they often find themselves in unfamiliar territory that they perceive to be unsafe and disordered. Whiteness manifests as a heightened sense of Anxiety about danger, whether real or imagined, in the now multiethnic neighborhoods. The explicit mechanisms of social control—“Emphasizing Order”, and “Valuing Rules and Surveillance”—use the invisibility cloak of whiteness to disguise racial domination. This social control is perceived to be colorblind because it justifies the remediation of dangerous behaviors, not dangerous people.
Ambivalence and Social Distance. The final habit of whiteness I consider is Ambivalence. By ambivalence I mean that whiteness manifests as a general outward expression of pleasure and admiration of multiethnic diversity in the neighborhood, however, in many ways the explicit appreciation provides a façade for feelings of distrust and discomfort with cultural difference among their neighbors. Their ambivalence allows them to hold on to these contradictory sentiments—both appreciation and discomfort with diversity—without comprehending the need for deeper, more transformative action to ameliorate inequality. Particularly among new residents to the neighborhoods, “Limiting Engagement” with people of color preserves their own comfort and justifies prioritization of their own well-being above that of the community (Burke 2012). Further, observing limited engagement through a colorblind lens frames it as natural, “Legitimizing Separation and Boundaries” between groups. The whiteness habit of ambivalence ultimately creates social distance among neighbors in multiethnic communities, and thus reinforces racial domination in these spaces.

Discussion

In his famous letter to his nephew, James Baldwin (1998 [1963]:292) claimed that the invisibility of whiteness is its greatest harm: “It is not permissible that the authors of devastation should also be innocent. It is the innocence which constitutes the crime. [...] And if the word integration means anything, this is what it means: that we, with love, shall force our brothers to see themselves as they are, to cease fleeing from reality and begin to change it”. As America becomes less white, it is incumbent upon us, the authors of the devastation, to see ourselves as we really are, to understand how maintaining cultures of whiteness in diverse spaces only perpetuates the domination of racial and ethnic minorities. This study demonstrates how two multiethnic neighborhoods in Boston—neighborhoods that have preserved a convivial spirit among their diverse residents for at least two decades and that are the model to which housing policy aspires—function to mask the inequality their integrated structures seek to remedy.

Powerful residents in these neighborhoods display their whiteness by assuming a sense of Entitlement. As the city of Boston builds new housing and refurbishes old to meet the demands of soaring population growth, the sense of entitlement means individuals are buying properties in minority-dominated neighborhoods at low prices and restoring and revitalizing with an eye toward profit and shaping the community to align with their lifestyles. New homebuyers simply do not see the thriving communities and amenities that serve needs of racialized minority residents as financially or aesthetically valuable. Rather, an individual’s decision to purchase a home in a low-income area of the city, where they do not share social or ethnic background with the existing residents, reflects the prioritization of financial affordability (Ellen, Horn and O’Regan 2012). I find that new residents overwhelmingly view the neighborhoods as blighted and describe them as empty vessels awaiting “revitalization”, a term Slater (2006) says makes palatable the “middle-class colonization of urban neighborhoods”. As the multiethnic neighborhoods become comfortable spaces for whiteness with their yoga studios and trendy restaurants, they become less comfortable for people of color. As Zukin (2016:203) notes, their “habitus succeeds in defining a new habitat.” Racialized minorities in these multiethnic neighborhoods are witnessing the appropriation of their spaces of comfort, such as those with a co-ethnic community and parks where they can relax and enjoy each other’s
company. Another effect of the whiteness habit of entitlement is that low-income individuals, primarily low-income people of color, are simply getting priced out. As the ability to buy or rent a home, purchase groceries, and dine at restaurants becomes increasingly out of reach, maintaining the diversity that defines these multiethnic neighborhoods is becoming an untenable goal.

Whiteness also manifests as race-related Anxiety along with the need to control others to quell their own exaggerated sense of danger. The neighborhood histories of institutional abandonment and minority concentration cannot be divorced from associations of urban decline and lack of safety (Mele 2016; Sampson 2009). New residents filter their perceptions through a cultural narrative frame that highlights certain aspects of the neighborhood, such as perceptions of violence and crime associated with racial minority concentration, while disregarding others, such as the way a large co-ethnic community can provide comfort (Small 2002). In order to make the spaces comfortable for whiteness, residents embodying the habit of anxiety must find ways to control it, which means both controlling the actions and behaviors of their neighbors of color and limiting the kinds of activities that can occur in open, public spaces (Chaskin and Joseph 2013). Traditionally, the right to exercise social control falls to the police in segregated urban America (Steinmetz, Schaefer and Henderson 2016), but in multiethnic neighborhood spaces, it is residents themselves who are on the front lines of policing each other’s behaviors, and they do so through a lens of whiteness (Winders 2013). Anxious residents prioritize order and value rules and surveillance in order to feel at ease in their environments. While residents frame the need for rules as matters of common sense and respect, in many cases infractions are determined in relation to a white norm of appropriate behavior (Goffman 2010 [1971]). Consequently, rule enforcement has a greater impact on low-income people of color. These manners of social control, while allowing those embodying whiteness to feel more comfortable, do not resolve the underlying issues related to lack of safety for racialized minorities. Rather, they create enforceable boundaries between the haves and have-nots and decrease the feelings of security and well-being among the surveilled.

A final habit of whiteness in these multiethnic neighborhoods is Ambivalence. Many white residents profess to celebrate the rich tapestry of diverse cultures they encounter in their daily lives. However, this celebration can generally be characterized as surface-level happy talk (Bell and Hartmann 2007) that masks a deeper-seated discomfort with people of color. Because of this discomfort, residents do not engage intimately in friendships with people of color in the neighborhood, feeling complacent with their superficial connections. The physical separation between racial and ethnic groups is often attributed to cultural differences that prohibit deeper interaction, but this naturalization hides the deeper distrust and lack of interest in connection with individuals not well-versed in cultures of whiteness (Bonilla-Silva 2014). As individuals are separated along racial and ethnic lines, it becomes necessary to create and defend the boundaries between them, ultimately excluding those who deviate from the culture of whiteness from the local meaning of community (Young 1990). The resulting lack of inclusion and recognition perpetuates social withdrawal and isolation among racial and ethnic minority residents and certainly doesn’t reflect an integrated racial democracy.
In order to guard against the normalization of whiteness and subsequent domination of racial and ethnic minorities in these multiethnic spaces, these findings lead to the conclusion that we should adopt a more intentional and planned policy approach to managing integration. Currently, many multiethnic neighborhoods become so through unplanned, incremental evolution toward diversity—what Watson and Saha (2013) call “multicultural drift.” If whiteness legitimizes a sense of entitlement, anxiety, and ambivalence, then race-blind development and revitalization policies will bolster racialized inequality, even in longstanding multiethnic spaces. Understanding the financial motivations of developers and individual homebuyers underscores the need to connect colorblind decision-making to color-conscious results. Encouraging and supporting stable diversity through federal incentives for inclusionary zoning policies, creating affordable rental housing, and investing in community building will help to strengthen and stabilize multiethnic neighborhoods (Turner and Rawlings 2009). In this vein, it may also be possible for residents to collectively organize to offer feasible alternatives to the race-blind “growth machine” of development. Saito (2012) describes a model in which low-income residents draw upon their community networks to form a broad coalition that negotiates a Community Benefits Agreement with developers, in which they agree to provide a range of benefits as part of the “costs of doing business,” and these costs may be offset by city subsidies if the municipality truly values integration. Further, given that a disposition of ambivalence lauds demographic diversity but does not require action to remedy the lack of engagement with racialized minority neighbors, it is necessary to build in institutional safeguards to ensure equitable access to mechanisms for deliberation, participation, and problem solving within the neighborhood (Chaskin and Joseph 2010).

In conclusion, these results demonstrate that the two most stable, multiethnic neighborhoods in Boston—Fields Corner and the South End—are far from racial democracies. Rather than bridging difference in these communities, conviviality provides a stronger foundation for a whiteness to become the invisible norm and thus perpetuates racial domination in multiethnic spaces.
References


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<th>Table 1. Sociodemographic Characteristics of the South End and Fields Corner, 1990-2015</th>
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Note: Data come from the 1990, 2000, and 2010 Decennial Census and 2015 ACS 5-year estimate.
Figure 1. Whiteness and Racial Domination in Multiethnic Communities
Cues and Interaction across Status Groupings

Murray Webster, Jr.

Status inequality—invidious judgments of social worth, esteem, advantage, and competence—is a ubiquitous feature of societies and of task groups within them. Common status groups in many societies include differentiation on gender, race, educational level, wealth, and occupation; but also height and beauty. All status characteristics (as the term is used here) have differentiated states and associated beliefs about social worthiness, esteem, and performance capacities of people in the different states.

These inequalities are, as Ridgeway (2014) and others have analyzed, important components of societal stratification systems. Status inequality is an independent type of stratification, distinct from wealth or political power. Status characteristics inhere in widely shared cultural definitions rather than in money or power, although some elements of a status structure may correlate with some elements of wealth or power inequality. Status characteristics attach to objective features of a group when status beliefs are constructed for them. For instance, while gender and race may be denoted objectively by physical characteristics, what are important sociologically are the cultural definitions of what it means to occupy a particular position on those characteristics. Status definitions are enacted, perpetuated, weakened, or strengthened during interaction in task groups. Social construction of status has two implications here. First, historical change can and often does occur in the social definitions and related judgments of worth and competence. Second, social interventions can overcome status inequalities, under appropriate conditions, even without changes in the overall societal definitions.

One consequence of status inequality is to favor people in one group and disfavor others. Often beliefs regarding inequality are unrelated to knowing the actual reputation or competence of an individual. What is important is that people in a culture believe in group differences, whether or not any particular individual conforms to that belief. Status beliefs are an order-preserving mechanism that simplifies thought processes.

“Can that person perform the complicated mathematical operations to do what we need as an electrical engineer?”

“Well, she is a woman.”

A second consequence is that status inequality tends to segregate groups. While members of a disadvantaged group might wish to interact with those in the advantaged group, those with advantage see little reason to interact with others outside their own group. A third consequence, that will occupy most of my attention at this conference, is that status governs many specific behaviors. That is, often it is possible to identify high-status and low-status behaviors. Reading the behaviors, which depends on knowing the cultural beliefs that sustain status difference, often smooths the process of establishing unequal face to face interactions.

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1 Veblen (1899/1953), Packard (1959), Fussell (1983) and others have chronicled correlates of class-based status and have emphasized that they often are independent of wealth.
interaction. If behaviors are not as expected, as described below, communication suffers. Individuals may not be fully aware of status-behavior links, but they may have a feeling that someone is acting inappropriately or that they themselves are not conveying the image that they wish to.

I will use two bodies of theory on the functioning of status and cues. One is the general theory of status characteristics, first presented by Berger et al. (1977). It describes how status characteristics affect beliefs and interaction, and conditions under which these effects can occur. Second, a recent extension of the theory deals with status cues, by which I mean social information that carries status significance in a particular culture. I focus on how status and status cues can cause problems in communication, and ways in which the problems may be avoided or resolved.

Task-based encounters—committees, work teams, business conferences—probably are the main arenas of interaction and thus are where the processes are most evident. Status characteristics carry beliefs (status beliefs) that one state is preferable, more honored, worthier than the other state, and equally important, beliefs of competence. Status processes are triggered by salient differences within groups and by any beliefs that a particular status characteristic is relevant to the task at hand. Status advantage, in a work team or on a jury, can produce differential participation rates, influence over decisions, judgments about task skills, and many other correlated inequalities.

Status cues (Berger et al. 1986; Fisek, Berger, and Norman 2005) are the social information that individuals use to assign themselves and others to positions in a status hierarchy. Anthropologists, social psychologists, linguists, and even economists have discussed functioning of status cues, though without using this term. Cues signal an individual’s status position. However, cues also differ by status. As someone’s relative status changes from group to group, the production of cues also changes to conform to new task group situations.

Conner (1977) and Ridgeway et al. (1985) have confirmed parts of this theory, but there are few other direct tests. This fall, with my M.A. student Daniel Burrill, I hope to use improved technology to assess both latency as governed by status, and the predicted change in latency as a function of change in status.

I believe that many problems of communicating across groups involve status processes. When the interaction does not go smoothly, status problems can trigger other social processes, including normative conflict and identity conflict. Consider two situations.

1. **Status Agreement.** If people from different groups interact and everyone agrees that members of Group A hold higher status than those from Group B, interaction will proceed...
smoothly. Person A will participate more, give more directives, influence the group more, and generally will be seen, by both self and Person B, as more socially worthy. Person B will hesitate before participating, ask lots of questions, speak softly, and defer to A.

2. Status Conflict. If Person A believes in status superiority of group A and Person B believes in status superiority of Group B, interaction will be conflictual and competitive. A and B will both try to be active and influential and will expect as a matter of course that the other will accept that. On both sides, negative emotions and subsequent social processes (described below) are very likely. Status conflicts are distractions that impede communication across social groups and reduce the effectiveness of task groups in which the members interact.

Interaction always entails display of status cues indicating an individual’s views of her own status as compared to the other. Since relative status position generates cue production, Agreement interactions usually are marked by complementary behaviors; for instance, assertiveness and deference, asking or giving advice, trying to be influential or letting the other take the lead.

Conflict interaction, in contrast, entails incompatible combinations of cues, with both parties expecting the other to defer when they disagree. Why might status conflicts occur? While individual, psychological explanations are common, I believe that social structural changes are more important.

The sharpest status distinctions occur when both groups consider themselves to be status superiors to each other. Instances can be found in some ethnically mixed societies and in some immigration cases, such as between Europeans and Native Americans in 16th and 17th century America. Such situations are not common but they are disruptive and can be difficult to resolve.

A significant source of conflict is social change. For instance, change in the status of gender is taking place unevenly across groups and individuals in our society. In some mixed-gender task groups, everyone believes in status equality of women and men. Those groups will develop inequality structures, but they will not be organized around gender. Other times, members of Group A (e.g., men) may believe that A is status-superior to B (women), while Group B believe in status equality. Members of both of these groups are likely to see the behaviors of the other group as inappropriate. Group A members try to display cues of status superiority and Group B expects display of cues to equality. Group B members display equality cues when Group A expects them to display cues to status disadvantage. Men see the women as “pushy” or “argumentative.” Women see the men as “sexist” or

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4 I have worked in two settings (Johns Hopkins and UCLA) where Ph.D. and M.D. faculty interacted. Each considered his/her own degree more prestigious and socially worthy.

5 A third possibility, that both A and B believe in their group’s status inferiority, is conflictual but different, and I do not deal with it further here.

6 Leaning in (Sandberg & Scovelle, 2013) and “mansplaining” describe contemporary illustrations of some of the interaction difficulties produced by inconsistent views of status positions and of the associated cues.
“controlling.”

A second source of conflictual interactions comes from emphasizing different status characteristics. Everyone possesses multiple status characteristics: gender, age, ethnicity, education, wealth, occupation, height, beauty, etc. While all known status characteristics affect cue production, people do not always know all of the status characteristics of another person. Furthermore, someone may believe in the relevance of only certain characteristics in a particular situation. Consider interaction in a clinic between a female physician and her working class male patient. If the doctor sees only occupation as relevant and the patient sees gender as highly relevant, conflict can occur. The doctor may be likely to display signs of her profession, such as a stethoscope. The patient may expect to be treated deferentially except when discussing medical matters with the doctor. Another medical example: When anesthesiology became a medical specialty (previously the work was handled by a nurse anesthetist), anesthesiologists reported being treated disrespectfully by surgeons. One saw the M.D. as relevant and therefore felt like a status equal, while the other saw the skills (gassing vs. cutting) as relevant and therefore felt like a status superior. In mixed gender task groups in an organization, men may consider gender to be highly relevant while women consider competence or job title as most relevant.

What accounts for social change, such as the decreasing inequality associated with gender status? The main reason, I believe, has been both that women have attained many high-status occupations and the visibility of such women as models holding positions of authority. Instances include two recent Secretaries of State and several corporation heads. Racial status beliefs are changing as well, although more slowly and unevenly than those associated with gender. While there probably are several reasons for the difference, important factors may be the more recent visibility of models and the fact that visible women outnumber visible African Americans in most high-status occupational arenas. Social processes consequent to status conflicts also are interesting. As noted, conflict of status beliefs is perceived by interactants as the other person’s being inappropriate. In other words, s/he is violating norms of how one ought to act. This often leads to other social processes, of which I think two are most important. One is norm enforcement and another is identity salience.

Norm enforcement is an attempt to change behaviors of the other person to restore what s/he sees as the legitimate order. Norm violation produces emotions ranging from mild distaste through moral outrage. It generates differentiated roles, a norm violator and a norm enforcer. The enforcer distributes sanctions, perhaps ignoring someone or directly telling the violator what to do, even name-calling. Norm enforcement processes can defuse if the accused violator acknowledges the norm violation and promises not to do it again. When that does not occur, conflict persists and may even escalate. Escalation occurs when both parties reject the violator role and claim the enforcer. If conflict reaches that stage, until or

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7 Equally interesting are cases where men believe in equality and women believe in male superiority. Here, the men may complain that the women don’t want to participate or work for the team, and women may complain that the men don’t say what they think and are afraid to take charge.

8 A young assistant professor might be mistaken for a student, for instance, with high likelihood of both parties to an interaction seeing the other as acting inappropriately.
unless it resolves (by one person accepting the violator role), the goal of the task group is ignored and won’t be attained.

Identity processes also become likely for both individuals, but they have different sources and involve different mechanisms. Both individuals may attempt to form coalitions with other people in their group, either to augment the enforcement or to combat it. In both cases, the goal of coalition formation is to enforce what each group sees as legitimate, equality or inequality. Identity salience thus is quite likely to intensify conflict and reduce chances for the task group to succeed at its original problem-solving assignment. Communication is impeded because of usually unstated disagreements over legitimate relations between the groups and appropriate display of status cues. Communication might be enhanced by a “clearing the air” open discussion of the differing views on status positions. It is not the different identities that cause the problems. It is disputes over what their status positions are or ought to be.

For the future, I have some conjectures about how status beliefs and status cue expression may change towards greater equality. Among other benefits, such changes will facilitate better communication across groups. For gender and race, the presence of highly visible models seems to be very important. This is sometimes called “role modeling,” but that term implies that the effect is confined to raising status beliefs held by the disadvantaged group. Equally important, if not more so, is to change status beliefs that the advantaged individuals hold. Thus, modeling should be aimed at both groups to succeed. Restricting attention to one group, which I think has been the primary approach, intensifies conflicting views and the likelihood of status conflicts. While it is important for young women and African Americans to see themselves as potential occupants of high status positions, it is at least as important for men and Anglo Americans to see and recognize those role models. If cultural definitions—status beliefs—associated with the groups attain equality, then the characteristics themselves can lose status value and become merely nominal designators.

Communication in that case would lose a major source of blockage. However, it is crucial that both groups of individuals see the models as representing the groups, which means that the models must become commonplace. That is, if a high-status woman is seen as an exceptional case, it still is possible to maintain invidious status beliefs for the group. Identity affiliation changes more slowly than status beliefs, though that need not block communication. Once disagreement regarding legitimate behavior is resolved, I see little reason to expect that group members cannot communicate freely while acknowledging their different identities. Instances of such communication as equals across groups are readily available in multinational business organizations. People from, say, the United States can interact smoothly with collaborators from Germany or China despite sharp divergences in their identities. That depends, of course, on presumed equality of status beliefs across the groups. Communication problems occur if members of one group sees itself as status superiors to the other group.
References Cited
At the conference, I will present on some recent research, done in collaboration with Ashley Harrell (Michigan) and Robb Willer (Stanford) on the role of interpersonal moral judgments in promoting trust, cooperation and social solidarity. Specifically, I will begin by discussing some arguments and evidence presented in Simpson et al. (2013), then turn to a recent elaboration of that research (Simpson et al. 2017). Please note that this document steals liberally from those papers, as well as a popular science piece (that appeared in a Scientific American blog) in which Robb Willer and I summarized some of our results. In the presentation, I will conclude by attempting to draw some links to the core theme of the conference: namely, how we might use insights from these arguments and findings to better understand how to promote trust and cooperation across different social categories.

Moral Judgments, Trust, and Trustworthiness

When and why people set aside narrow self-interest to behave in cooperative ways, working with others to achieve collective ends, is a longstanding and fundamental puzzle in the social sciences (Kollock 1998). Sustaining cooperation is problematic because it is often in the interest of either or both parties in an interaction to exploit the other for egoistic gain. And because of the risk that one’s cooperation may be exploited, it is often prudent for one or both parties to withhold trust. Without trust, cooperation never gets off the ground; without trustworthiness, the potential gains from cooperation cannot be realized. Thus, trust and trustworthiness are critical foundations of voluntary cooperation (Gambetta 1990; Hardin 2002).

While early theorists viewed issues of cooperation and prosocial behavior as central to sociology (Comte 1851; Durkheim 1893; Sorokin 1954), sociologists have largely drifted away from these problems, typically assuming, rather than explaining, human sociality in order to move on to other questions of interest (Wrong 1961). But despite sociologists’ reduced attention to the problem of cooperation, researchers outside of sociology have continued to focus on such fundamental questions, most often drawing on theories of self-interest to explain cooperation. For instance, recent research shows that material sanctions, including punishments for non-cooperation and rewards for cooperation, produce high levels of cooperation, even among would-be free-riders (Yamagishi 1986; Fehr and Gachter 2002). Similarly, research on reputations finds that group members act generously when it leads to a prosocial reputation and, consequently, downstream material and social benefits (Milinski et al. 2002).

Although these explanations help illuminate important features of human cooperation, they overlook significant insights from sociological theorizing about how prosocial behavior can emerge via processes other than self-interest. Foundational sociologists viewed the interpersonal moral judgments that individuals routinely make about one another’s behaviors as critical to cooperation and prosocial behavior. For instance, Durkheim (1893) and others working in the sociology of deviance (e.g., Erikson 1966) argued that the moral judgments of deviant group members clarify moral boundaries, indicating what is
acceptable, normative behavior. These perceptions, in turn, serve to promote adherence to norms and increased prosociality of group members. Tocqueville reached a similar conclusion in his work on how modern civil arrangements promote prosociality, arguing that the deliberations of juries affect not just the judged, but the jurors themselves. The jury, he wrote, “serves to communicate the spirit of the judges to the minds of all the citizens ... It imbues all classes with a respect for the thing judged, and with the notion of right. ... By obliging men to turn their attention to affairs which are not exclusively their own, it rubs off that individual egotism which is the rust of society” ([1835] 2002: 226).

**Moral Judgments and Trustworthiness.** Consistent with the classical scholars, in our first paper on the role of moral judgments in promoting prosocial behaviors (Simpson et al. 2013), we argued that the “stance taking” that occurs in the course of morally judging others has important downstream effects on the judge’s own behavior. The expectation that this stance taking will shape future behavior is based on several key principles from social psychology. First, people typically hew closely to a principle of “commitment and consistency.” As Cialdini (2009: 51) notes, “Once we make a choice or take a stand, we will encounter personal and interpersonal pressures to behave consistently with that commitment.” We argued that moral judgments act as commitments that bind a person to consistent behaviors.

The link between former and subsequent behaviors is also likely driven in part by self-perception processes (Bem 1972; Burger 1999; Gneezy et al. 2012), or a tendency to make attributions about our preferences and identities based on observation of our own behaviors. From this perspective, our behavior may be driven by personal preferences or salient identities, but they might also stem from situational constraints or contextual factors. Whatever the cause, having acted in some way, we infer that we are the sort of person who would be motivated to behave that way. Thus a person who makes a moral judgment of another’s (immoral) behavior comes to perceive herself as caring (more) about the relevant moral domain, and viewing himself as more moral, at least within that particular moral domain.

In an experimental test, which I will describe in more detail in my presentation, we randomly assigned participants to make moral judgments of an (ostensive) other’s unfair behaviors. We then placed these participants in interactions with third parties, whose trust they had an incentive to exploit. As expected, we found that participants who were randomly assigned to make moral judgments of others were more trustworthy – that it, they were less apt to exploit trust that was extended to them – compared to participants who either i) did not observe another act unfairly, or ii) who observed another act unfairly but did not judge them. A follow-up study found support for the proposed mediator: namely, those who were randomly assigned to make moral judgments of others’ unfair or immoral behaviors subsequently perceived themselves to be more moral.

**Moral Judgments and Trust.** In addition to the impact of moral judgments on the judges themselves, we also showed that audiences or observers perceive moral judges as more moral and trustworthy and preferentially associated with moral judges under conditions of risk and uncertainty. This is consistent with arguments by Goffman (1959) and others that people tend to assume that others will act in line with the identities they claim. For instance,
when people witness another engaging in a behavior or taking a stand, they assume this reflects a corresponding set of underlying dispositions or values (Jones 1990). Thus, when a person witnesses someone take a moral stance on an issue, by making a moral judgment of another who has acted immorally, the person will tend to expect that the judge is moral and trustworthy. Our evidence strongly this prediction. In short, we found that moral judgments promote cooperation by promoting both trust and trustworthiness, the two key ingredients to voluntary cooperation.

**Moral Judgments in Groups**

In a recently published extension of this work (Simpson et al. 2017), we moved from the impact of interpersonal moral judgments on cooperation in dyads to the role of interpersonal moral judgments in promoting cooperation and solidarity in groups. In this latter research, we wanted to address the power of moral judgments to reduce free-riding in collective actions. To this end, we had groups of unacquainted people take part in a “public goods” game. In the game, all group members were given a personal allocation of money that they could either keep or contribute to a public fund. Contributions to the public fund were doubled and split equally among group members. The structure of the game means that everyone profits more individually by “free-riding,” keeping – rather than contributing – their own funds, while also taking their share of the public fund. If everyone free-rides, however, there is no public fund and the group as a whole does worse than if it had overcome the temptation to free-ride.

The public goods game has been studied thousands of times, with a familiar result: groups contribute at moderate levels early on, but cooperation quickly unravels. We observed this same pattern in the groups who played the standard game. However, we allowed some groups to communicate moral judgments about one another’s behavior between rounds. These moral judgments were simple ratings of each group member’s play in the game on a scale from “very immoral” to “very moral” (participants could also choose to submit “no judgment”). After submitting their ratings, group members’ computers displayed all the group’s ratings before continuing to the next round of contributions.

Groups who could submit moral judgments of one another sustained high levels of contributions to the public fund across all rounds of the study. That is, merely having the ability to submit evaluations of one another’s morality was enough to solve the cooperation problem in this classic dilemma. This was despite the fact that group members were strangers, isolated in separate rooms, identified to one another only by their assigned participant numbers.

To put this result into context, we also looked at the behavior of groups that were allowed to administer costly monetary fines or rewards to one another. The use of monetary sanctions to induce cooperation is now the standard solution in the literature on public goods (see Simpson and Willer 2015 for a recent review). The effects of these rewards and punishments on contributions was roughly the same as the effect of moral judgments. In other words, people were just as motivated when their moral reputations were on the line as when their study pay was.
But perhaps more important for understanding the power of moral judgments for promoting trust and other aspects of prosocial behavior is what happened after these rounds of the public goods game. Group members were then paired with one another in a series of decisions in which we measured various forms of prosocial behavior towards fellow group members, including measures of generosity, trust, and trustworthiness that all had real money stakes. Members of the moral judgment groups showed higher levels of generosity, trust and trustworthiness than all other groups in the study, including those who had been allowed to use material rewards and punishments to maintain contributions.

Why were these costless moral judgments as effective as material rewards and punishments in the short run, and more effective at promoting generosity, trust, and trustworthiness over the longer run? In addition to the effects of moral judgments on self- and other-perceptions of morality found in our earlier studies (Simpson et al. 2013), we should also be mindful of the depth of individuals’ concerns for maintaining reputations as decent people. The fear of condemnation – and the desire for moral praise – are deeply motivating to most people. Indeed, we found that members of moral judgment groups contributed at higher levels than control groups even in the first round of the game, before group members had any chance to communicate moral judgments. Thus, even the anticipation of moral praise or condemnation was sufficient to motivate group members to contribute at high levels. Because people generally make large contributions to the group from the first round on, most of the moral ratings participants submitted were very positive, praising one another for putting the group’s interests above their own. The few who decided to free-ride, giving below the group’s normative levels, were quickly criticized by their fellow group members. This criticism tended to bring these wayward group members back in line. Thus, while most moral judgments were positive, condemnation – and perhaps more importantly, the threat of moral condemnation – was important as well.

But why did groups featuring monetary sanctions not feature high levels of generosity, trust, and trustworthiness in these later interactions? Existing work suggests that monetary sanctions can promote cooperation when present, but they must be continually applied. Indeed, they can even “crowd out” any intrinsic tendency for group members to trust others and to act in trustworthy ways themselves. In other words, social solidarity cannot be “bought,” at least over the long term.

**Interacting Across Difference**

To sum up our work shows that the interpersonal moral judgments that people routinely make about one another’s behaviors can promote trust and cooperation both in the short term and in downstream interactions. But one key limitation of our work – at least as it relates to the conference – is that it focuses on judgments of others’ immoral behaviors in domains around which there is at least a reasonably high level of consensus about what is moral versus immoral, e.g., cheating or abusing another’s trust. In limiting our focus to issues where people agree on what is moral or immoral, we ignored domains (e.g., abortion) characterized by opposing views about what is right or wrong. Focusing on domains where there is moral consensus allowed us to develop an account of the basic mechanisms through which moral judgments impact perceptions and behaviors, irrespective of individual differences in beliefs or moralities. Gaining insight into these processes is important because widespread agreement about what is morally right does not guarantee moral
behavior. Indeed, cooperation is problematic precisely because, though most people believe that it is wrong to exploit another’s trust for egoistic gain, some nevertheless succumb to the temptation. Moreover, people often suspect that others will give in to this temptation, and thus withhold trust.

But one question that I would like to take up in my presentation is how we might use insights developed here to bridge trust and trustworthiness even when there is (real or perceived) moral dissensus? To anticipate, politicized issues often feature sharply divergent intuitions about what is moral and immoral. In such contexts, while we would expect that a person who makes moral judgments in favor of a given issue is likely to enjoy heightened trust among fellow partisans, it is unlikely to have the same trust-building effects among those who are morally opposed to that stance. We obviously should not underestimate polarization on moral issues, nor should we underestimate the detrimental effects of this polarization on trust. But research in moral psychology also shows some moral domains (e.g., fairness) are valued by both conservatives and liberals (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009) and that there is less political polarization than laypersons generally perceive (Graham, Nosek and Haidt 2012). It seems likely that the communication of moral judgments within those domains where there is more agreement – or where disagreement is more perceived than real – might fortuitously signal commitment to a mutually valued moral cause and, as a consequence, build trust and cooperation where it would otherwise not exist. This strikes me as a promising direction for future research.

References


Justice Dynamics: Engendering Trust across Differences

Karen A. Hegtvedt

About a year ago, I gave a presentation at the International Sociological Association entitled “Justice beyond Social Psychology.” I made two main points in that presentation. First, I demonstrated how justice principles devised in social psychology can be used (and have been used, albeit sparingly) to understand issues arising in the domains of environmental sociology and in healthcare. And, second, by delving a bit deeper into substantive domains, I argued that issues faced in studying the environment or healthcare may highlight conditions or processes that could be “abstracted” to augment basic theoretical approaches to justice processes. The opportunity to speak at this conference provides another avenue to boost recognition of the fruitfulness of doing justice beyond social psychology.

Here I will first offer a primer on basic justice processes. I will highlight how, in analyzing any concrete situation (say an urban problem) in terms of justice, those involved might: 1) come to hold differing evaluations of the same situation; and 2) benefit from consideration of multiple types of justice as a means to tackle the problem. In doing so, I will stress two points about justice dynamics: 1) how they contribute to the development of trust among those differentially positioned with regard to a particular issue; and 2) the role that those not directly affected may play in devising means to rectify perceived injustices. I will draw upon empirical examples, some stemming from my own current research, to illustrate points.

Justice Primer

Philosophers, social scientists, and lay people offer an array of responses to the question “What is justice?” Often, responses reflect the self-interests of the evaluator. Yet, justice constitutes something more than justified self-interest, as captured by one of the 21 quotes carved into red granite at the seven-acre Franklin Roosevelt monument in Washington DC:

The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little.

This quote reflects the concern of social psychologists (e.g., Walster, Walster, and Berscheid 1978) who cast justice as a means for social groups to endure and philosopher John Rawls (1971) who argued that a just society ensures a “floor”—of resources or well-being—for its citizens. There is no singular “justice” but different rules that might define it within a situation and demarcate a moral sense of right and wrong (Peters, van den Bos, and Bobcel 2004).

Justice rules, which I detail next, should be consistent with the following criteria: 1) fostering social cooperation to enhance collective, not simply individual, welfare (Deutsch 1976; Tyler and Blader 2000); 2) reflecting impartiality to circumvent promotion of interests of the decision-maker’s personal interests (Frolich and Oppenheimer 1992; Rawls 1971); and 3) consensus among those affected that the rules are “right” for the situation and apply to everyone. Such criteria lead to a definition of justice as a feature of a collectivity that fosters
productive interaction and social cooperation while minimizing potential conflict and threat of social disintegration (e.g., Hegtvedt 2005; Tyler et al. 1997; Wenzel 2002). Specifically, scholars (e.g., Colquitt et al. 2001; Jost and Kay 2010) distinguish among types of justice. Distributive justice refers to the application of a normative rule to the allocation of benefits or burdens to recipients. Such rules include: equality of outcomes; equity or contributions where outcomes are commensurate with inputs; and needs, where outcomes are proportional to the need for whatever is being distributed. Situational goals shape which of the distributive principles define justice in a given context. In contrast, rules for other types of justice are less situationally dependent (e.g., Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry 1980).

Procedural justice pertains to aspects of decision-making designed to preserve the rights and liberties of individuals and groups. Relevant rules involve ensuring: 1) “voice” or representativeness for those affected by a decision; 2) bias suppression (or impartiality) by the decision-maker; 3) consistency in application of decision-making criteria; 4) accuracy in information used for decisions; 5) correctability in decisions; and 6) ethicality (see Leventhal et al. 1980; Lind and Tyler 1988). Interactional (or interpersonal) justice emphasizes treating people with dignity, respect, and honesty, without prejudice (Bies 2005). And, informational justice addresses the truthfulness and adequacy of explanations for decisions, especially in organizational settings (Greenberg 1993).

Assessing (In)Justice

Typically, to assess justice requires a comparison of an observed distribution, procedure, or treatment to the one expected on the basis of a “just” rule (see Hegtvedt 2006; Jasso 1980). Nonetheless, several considerations shape justice assessments. First, justice evaluations are subjective (Hegtvedt 2006; Jost and Kay 2010). Despite the core comparison between rule-based expectations and observed realities, individual-level and contextual factors shape interpretations of the rule, how to instantiate the rule, and the actual situation. What one person perceives as unjust may not be perceived similarly by another, owing to differences in motivations, positions, invoked social comparisons, and cognitive processing of situational elements (a full review of such factors is beyond the scope of this memo). For example, external attributions for an injustice perpetrator’s behavior decrease the perceived severity of injustice whereas internal attributions heighten it (e.g., Brockner et al. 2007; Mikula 2003; Utne and Kidd 1980).

Second, implied in the nature of subjectivity, is the potential impact of the position of the evaluator. Individuals may be directly affected, in terms of disadvantage or advantage, by a distribution, procedure, or treatment, or they may be observers of injustice suffered by others. While the process of evaluating justice may be similar for those affected and observers (third-parties) (Skarlicki and Kulik 2005), the former are likely to perceive greater severity of injustice and have more intense responses. Yet, as I will argue, the role of observers cannot be underestimated. And, third, despite the existence of multiple forms of justice, not all may seem relevant in a given situation. Moreover, when incomplete information is available for one type of justice, evaluators may use information on another type of justice heuristically to make inferences (e.g., Qin et al. 2015). For example, in the absence of information allowing a comparison of outcomes across group members, individuals will use the fairness of procedures to signal whether their outcomes are fair as
well (van den Bos, Lind, and Wilke 2001). Attention to different types of justice, however, may provide a handle on ways to address a specific injustice.

The process of assessing justice often seems automatic, yet as one approach suggests, people may (consciously or unconsciously) ask themselves a series of “if only” questions, which may figuratively “undo” an event by imagining it otherwise and by so doing locate blame for the injustice, beyond simple attributions. Folger and Cropanzano’s (2001) fairness theory suggests that blame is likely when people believe: 1) “if only” had the perpetrator acted otherwise, they would have been better off; 2) the perpetrator could have acted otherwise; and 3) the perpetrator should have acted otherwise. The “would” question compares expectations based on a justice principle and the actual situation. The “could” question reveals whether the perpetrator had discretion to act in a different manner. And, the “should” question raises concerns about moral and ethical underpinnings of justice. By readily bringing to mind counter-factual statements describing another state of affairs, the injustice perception intensifies. Such cognitive processes allow individuals to use information that they have, to fill in gaps in their information, and to imagine “what could have been” as a basis for claiming an outcome, procedure, or treatment to be fair or unfair (e.g., Nicklin 2013). Nonetheless, individual-level characteristics may color responses to these questions as well. As a consequence, even if similar reasoning is employed, differential interpretations threaten the promise of justice for a collectivity.

To illustrate how individual-level factors may affect different assessments of injustice, I draw upon my collaborative study (with Christie Parris and Cathryn Johnson) on perceived environmental injustice among black Americans. Environmental harms disproportionately affect communities of color (Bullard et al. 2007; Taylor 2014). Most studies addressing placement of such environmental harms are qualitative (e.g., Čapek 1993) and involve those directly affected. In contrast, environmental attitudes and behaviors investigations simply include a categorical measure of race. Our interest focused on whether “observers” similarly perceive such injustices. We hypothesized that observers with stronger black identities and greater experiences with discrimination perceive more severe environmental injustices regarding the distribution of harms and how decisions about environmental issues in a community are made. In summer 2016, we surveyed a random sample of black Americans, measuring such individual level factors and environmental justice perceptions. We also determined whether study participants lived in neighborhoods affected by various types of pollution so that we could compare “observers” to those actually affected by potential environmental injustice. Results show that people with stronger black identities (and stronger environmental identities) perceive greater distributive and environmental injustice. Experiences with discrimination and being affected by pollution in their own neighborhoods only affected perceptions of distributive environmental injustice.

The relationship between the identity strength and assessments of justice implicitly suggests the elements of a situation that may be important to evaluators. While our study augments the literature on the identity-justice relationship, it only addresses variation within particular identities. Yet, situations activate different identities, carrying different expectations for what may be considered in evaluating justice. For example, within organizations managers may activate their “authority” identity, which contrasts with the “subordinate” identity; in healthcare settings, insurers might distinguish themselves from
providers; in environmental disputes, community residents may contrast with developers. Diverse identities and their concomitant resources, and experiences create the potential for different evaluations of whether a situation is just or unjust, thereby influencing responses to perceived injustice.

The justice literature is replete with studies that examine propositions from early distributive justice theorizing (e.g., Adams 1965; Homans 1974; Walter et al. 1978) that individuals who perceive injustice feel distress (e.g., see Cropanzano, Stein, and Nazdic 2011; Hegtvedt and Parris 2014) and are motivated to relieve that distress through behavioral or cognitive responses that “restore” justice (e.g., see Hegtvedt and Cook 2001; Jost and Kay 2010). Yet, little work tackles situations in which there may be explicitly competing justice claims (but see e.g., Coleman 2011; Kals and Maes 2012) or redress strategies that involve more than the individual. Tjosvold, Wong, and Wan (2010), however, argue that resolving conflicting views of justice requires the mutual engagement of different parties in cooperative activities to create collaborative strategies to redress perceived injustice. Such cooperation and collaborative response demands the development of trust among people representing different groups, potentially possessing different group identities.

**Justice and Engendering Trust**

The foregoing discussion raised the specter of conflicting justice claims, owing to different individual-level characteristics and their impact on interpreting information in the situation. To then suggest that justice processes may contribute to enhancing trust among parties may seem contradictory. Yet, as noted previously, some forms of justice evaluations rest more heavily on situational goals and conditions than do others. Thus, here I circumscribe differential justice evaluations to those pertaining to the distribution of outcomes across members of differentially positioned groups. Such a situation may arise when community members and developers debate the citing of a hazardous waste facility or healthcare investors see promise in building a new hospital in a suburban area rather than meet the needs of residents in an underserved rural or urban area. Doing so allows for the question: how can other forms of justice (especially procedural and interactional) potentially enhance trust among parties?

Trust refers to people’s willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another party, which presumably will be beneficial (or at least not harmful) to them (e.g., Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995; Robinson 1996). When disputing parties treat each other in fair and ethical ways, they are likely to view each other as willing to keep promises and commitments, which may contribute to the development of a shared superordinate identity among members of differentially positioned group members. Tyler (e.g., Tyler 2011) suggests that trust emerges from procedural justice processes within organizations. Assuming that people want positive identities, when authorities use procedurally just decision-making rules, they demonstrate respect toward and boost the dignities of their subordinates (e.g., DeCremer and Tyler 2005), which then enhances their self-esteem and identification with and commitment to the group represented by the authority (e.g., Tyler and Blader 2000). Studies show that procedural justice enhances trust among organizational authorities and subordinates (e.g., DeCremer, van Dijke, and Bos 2006; Fulmer and Ostroff 2017; van der Toorn, Tyler, and Jost 2011). Relatedly, judgments regarding politeness, honesty, consideration, and demonstration of concern link positively to perceived legitimacy.
of authorities, which implies a level of trust as well (Tyler 1997). Trust (independent of procedural justice) boosts deference and cooperation (Tyler 2011; Tyler and Huo 2002).

Further evidence of some of these linkages comes from a recent vignette study completed at Emory. In vignettes describing a work organization, my colleagues and I manipulated the extent to which the authority uses fair decision-making procedures and secures needed resources for subordinates (we call this benevolent power use). Our preliminary results (from responses of undergraduates) show that both of these factors positively affect “subordinates” perceptions of fair treatment and trust in their manager. Perceiving treatment as fair and having trust in the manager also enhance perceived legitimacy of the manager and mediate the direct effects use of fair procedures and benevolent power. Such results signal that procedural and interactional justice processes are pivotal to securing social support and approval for a pattern of behavior or a cultural/social object (i.e., legitimacy; see Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway, 2006).

As described, this literature is firmly anchored in dynamics within organizations. The patterns of findings indicate linkages between procedural and interactional justice and trust and legitimacy, which in turn facilitate cooperation among differentially positioned groups. Such cooperation may be a pathway for engendering positive emotions and redressing differential distributive justice perceptions. Yet, what remains to be examined is whether these processes can be extrapolated to address competing justice claims in larger domains, like urban problems where there may be more parties, differentiated by status and power positions, to the dispute, and thus an array of differential perceptions and evaluations of the fairness of the outcomes at stake. I conclude with several observations as to how such extrapolation might unfold, recognizing that my suggestions from work in the social psychology of justice may dovetail with those from conflict resolution or community engagement domains.

Concluding Observations

As previously noted, often fueling differential perceptions of (distributive) justice are a variety of individual-level and contextual factors. Among these are the varied interests or motivations, identities, and interpretations of information and situational features of the parties assessing a distribution of outcomes. To resolve competing claims requires recognition that justice should serve in the interests of the collectivity, broadly defined.

To that end, a first observation is the importance of leveraging other forms of justice (beyond distributive) to help generate trust among members of differentially positioned groups and possibly forge a superordinate identity that also allows respect for specific group identities (e.g., Huo and Molina 2006). Also, considering the range of types of justice in the analysis of any urban problem may reveal new steps toward solutions. Second, given that some groups are disadvantaged in terms of status or resources, the role of neutral observers may be central to forging a distribution seen to be just by all parties. As the former mayor of Atlanta (and United Nations Ambassador) Andrew Young recently noted in an NPR program, numeric minorities benefit from engendering the support of those who are not directly affected by a particular dispute. And, finally, having group members stand back from their own perspective and adapt the questions posed by fairness theory—how would the situation be better, if an agent acted differently, could and should that occur—may provide critical
examination of issues underlying injustice as perceived by one but not another group and lead to innovative solutions.

Such strategies implicitly echo another of Roosevelt’s proclamations:

> We must scrupulously guard the civil rights and civil liberties of all people whatever their background. We must remember that any oppression, any injustice, any hatred is a wedge designed to attack our civilization.

**References**


Identity Meanings and Unequal Interaction

Kimberly B. Rogers

Sociological social psychologists have long argued that there is a reciprocal relationship between self and society (e.g., Mead 1934; Stryker 1980). People are social agents who actively create meaning in their lives. But despite our agency, we have a basic need to streamline our processing of the world around us (DiMaggio 1997) and coordinate our interpretations of and reactions to unfolding events with others (e.g., Goffman 1959). As a result, we largely process and respond to the social world by placing people into categories (Massey 2007) which carry widely-shared and culturally-grounded meanings (e.g., Carter and Fuller 2016; MacKinnon 1994; Serpe and Stryker 2011). While socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann 1966), these identity meanings provide a standard against which the appropriateness of our behavior toward others and their behavior toward us can be judged, and therefore govern our routine social experiences. The close relationship between identity meanings and norms for social action supports interactions that maintain and justify the status quo (Jost, Kay, and Thorisdottir 2009).

In my talk, I will discuss a recent study in which I measured cultural meanings for social identities, and analyzed these meanings as a proxy for status and power differences on key dimensions of social inequality: race/ethnicity, national origin, gender, sexuality, religion, and social class. I found that privileged groups on each of these dimensions possess identities which carry a unique meaning profile – one that elicits cultural associations of authority and dominance and brings others into compliant, supporting roles in interaction. This occurs because identity meanings influence our expectations about appropriate social behavior and emotions, creating interaction dynamics that tend to reproduce social hierarchies. I will present mathematical simulations of interactions between privileged and other groups which show that the patterns of intergroup behavior and emotions that arise from identity meanings damage and discourage interactions across difference. In closing my talk, I will draw on social psychological research to suggest how these problems may be diminished to improve interactions across difference.

Culture as a Basis of Inequality

Inequalities persist over time, well beyond the historical circumstances that produced them. The social order is durable not only because of the active efforts of privileged actors to maintain their position, but because our cultural beliefs make it seem reasonable or even ideal that those with privileged identities take on positions of authority at every level of social life (Jost, Kay, and Thorisdottir 2009): in interpersonal encounters (e.g., Cast 2003; Cast, Stets, and Burke 1999), collaborative groups (e.g., Ridgeway and Berger 1986; Ridgeway, Johnson, and Diekema 1994; Ridgeway 2001), social institutions (e.g., Acker 2006; Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway 2006), and the upper reaches of our economic and political systems (e.g., Khan 2012; Mills 1956). We internalize cultural knowledge as objective reality through socialization (Berger and Luckmann 1966), and use this knowledge
to determine who we are (Cooley 1902; Mead 1934), form typified expectations about others’ intentions, and predict the likely roles, traits, and behaviors of self and other in social interactions (Rogers, Schröder, and Scholl 2013).

For example, we implicitly associate role identities with social identities of comparable standing (Mead 1934), tending to assume that nurses and secretaries are female and that doctors and CEOs are male unless someone specifies otherwise (e.g., male nurse, female CEO). We use others’ social identities and material resources to predict their competence and capability, and see advantaged actors as natural and legitimate candidates for positions of authority (Correll and Ridgeway 2003). When social identities are not useful in establishing an interaction order, such as in homogeneous groups, we make inferences about relative standing from social behavior. For instance, we tend to believe that assertive persons make better leaders than submissive ones, and often yield authority to those who talk first, dominate the floor, and make frequent attempts to influence others (Bales 1950; Fisek, Berger, and Norman 1991). In short, material inequalities arising from historical relations between race, class, gender, sexuality, religious, and other groups are sedimented in the cultural meanings attached to groups’ social identities, and these meanings are the foundation of patterns of present-day intergroup behavior.

As Massey has observed (2007: 8-9), “the roots of social stratification lie ultimately in the cognitive construction of boundaries to make social distinctions...we are wired cognitively to construct general categories about the world in which we live and then to use them to classify and evaluate the stimuli we encounter.” Our basic responses to others are guided by these classification processes, producing categorical inequality (Tilly 1999) as widely shared cultural beliefs are translated into predictable patterns of social action (Massey 2007). We can therefore apprehend the very foundations of social inequality by identifying the patterns of meaning attached to a society’s prevailing dimensions of social classification. Identities are essentially markers that signify and convey where one stands within the social order, and whether one can expect to be in charge of unfolding encounters or in service to them.

**Affect Control Theory**

Affect control theory provides the measurement tools necessary to assess and compare social identity meanings related to inequality, and to foresee their implications for interaction (Heise 1979; 2007). These meanings can be quantified along three basic dimensions: evaluation (good-bad), potency (powerful-powerless), and activity (lively-inactive). These dimensions, referred to collectively as EPA, offer a parsimonious summary of social reality, yet explain substantial variation in meanings across more than 20 national cultures (Osgood, May, and Miron 1975; Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957). They have emerged from several independent literatures as basic dimensions of socio-emotional processing, which facilitate interpersonal communication and coordinated social action (Scholl 2013). Importantly, EPA ratings can be used to measure cultural meanings for identities as well as settings, behaviors, traits, and emotions, allowing for comparison of the meanings of many different concepts within the same representational space. This reflects the schematic nature of humans' social processing (Fallin-Hunzaker 2016). In more practical terms, it is why we can recognize the conceptual similarity between our feelings about mothers, nurturing behavior, and the home, and contrast these with our feelings about
criminals, predatory behavior, and prisons, or investment bankers, competitive behavior, and Wall Street.

Data on identity meanings (and the meanings of other social concepts) are gathered through rating studies, in which respondents report their sentiments for different groups along each EPA dimension, on scales ranging from -4.3 (infinitely bad, powerless, inactive) to +4.3 (infinitely good, powerful, lively). These ratings summarize how good, powerful, and active particular groups seem in general, outside of the context of social events. Entrepreneurs, for example, are generally seen as good, powerful, and active (1.18, 1.88, 1.68), politicians as bad, powerful, and active (-.90, 1.85, 1.80), retirees as good, powerless, and inactive (1.40, -.25, -1.34), and unemployed persons as bad, powerless, and inactive (-1.57, -2.50, -1.60).

EPA ratings encode basic knowledge of the social order, as evaluation has been tied to perceptions of actor status or esteem, potency to perceptions of power or dominance, and activity to social vigilance and action readiness (Dippong and Kalkhoff 2015; Heise 1999; Scholl 2013). Measuring identity meanings is not only important because it allows us to understand how social perceptions of diverse groups and concepts hang together or stand apart, but also because it allows us to identify cultural expectations for behavior during interactions, which are based in these meanings. People have a basic motivation to maintain coherence between their interpretations of the events unfolding around them and their deeply-held beliefs about the social world (Heise 1979; 2007). As a result, cultural beliefs about groups’ relative status and power (as captured by identity meanings on the dimensions of evaluation and potency) are largely reinforced through our everyday social encounters, as we act in response to the way “everybody knows things are.” This is known as the affect control principle.

Affect control theorists have developed impression formation models that build on this principle to show how people maintain coherence between culture and situation: through the categories and labels they use to classify self and other and the lines of action they deem most appropriate in the moment. These models are estimated by comparing out-of-context meanings for identities (e.g., mothers) and behaviors (e.g., hugging) to impressions of these elements in the context of specific events (e.g., the mother hugs the child). Estimated across a large and diverse corpus of events, impression change models reveal basic principles of social processing by which people translate identity meanings into expectations for social action (Heise 2007). For instance, we believe that respected people will act nicely and despised ones will act nefariously, that powerful people will be dominant and powerless ones will defer.

When social circumstances seem unexpected or inappropriate, we are far more likely to change our interpretation of the situation to fit with our beliefs about the world than to change our deeply-held beliefs to fit the situation. This has important social functions and implications. At the situational level, it helps us to efficiently arrive at a “working consensus” (Goffman 1959) on the meaning of the situation and how we should comport ourselves within it, harmonizing our relations with others (Patterson 2014). It helps us avoid embarrassing ourselves, upsetting others, and risking social sanctions (Goffman 1959). At the individual level, it helps preserve our limited cognitive resources (DiMaggio 1997) by enabling us to develop a reasonable interpretation of even unusual events with minimal
effort, and without the need to question or amend our cultural knowledge. At the societal
level, our tendency to interpret events in ways that conform with dominant cultural beliefs
justifies existing social hierarchies and sustains them over time (Jost, Kay, and Thorisdottir
2009).

Methods

In my presentation, I will discuss a recent study in which I gathered EPA ratings of a diverse
set of social identities in order to measure groups’ relative status and power and predict
patterns of intergroup behavior and emotions. Building on prior research, I used ratings of
evaluation to measure groups’ relative status or esteem, and ratings of potency to measure
their relative power or dominance (Dippong and Kalkhoff 2015; Heise 1999). I also gathered
activity ratings, following earlier work in ACT. Although these ratings do not have as precise
an equivalent in encoding the social order, they have been linked with readiness to detect
and respond to changes in one’s environment (Scholl 2013), which is likely less necessary
for privileged groups than others. Fifty-five undergraduate students (57% female) at a liberal
arts college in the Northeastern United States took part in this research. As prior work in ACT
has argued that students’ EPA ratings capture “the middle-class sentiments sustaining
social institutions” (Heise 2010: 122), my sample should be ideally positioned to provide
insight into the dominant cultural meaning systems that encode and sustain the social
order.

After completing the informed consent process, participants rated 50 identities on the
dimensions of evaluation, potency, and activity using semantic differential scales ranging
from -4.3 (infinitely bad, powerless, inactive) to +4.3 (infinitely good, powerful, active), as is
standard for rating studies in affect control theory (see Heise 2007). Stimuli were presented
in random order to avoid sequencing effects, and the order of the EPA scales and
orientation of the scale endpoints were also varied randomly for each identity rated. The
stimulus set included 28 social identities pertaining to race/ethnicity, national origin,
gender, sexuality, religion, and class, and 22 masking identities (e.g., student, professor,
mother, friend, athlete, bully). The 28 social identities I studied included the most privileged
social identity on each axis (Morgan 1996) and an array of other identities with differing
amounts of “penalty and privilege” (Collins 1990: 246) based on a review of the literature
and focus groups with students.

I will first present evaluation, potency, and activity ratings of the social identities studied,
which offer insight into cultural perceptions of groups’ relative status and power. I tested for
global differences between EPA ratings of privileged and other social identity groups using
ANOVA, then used a series of paired samples t-tests to test for differences in cultural
meanings between the most privileged social identity in each category and each other
identity on each dimension of meaning (e.g., differences in potency ratings of white versus
black persons). The results of these tests were corrected for multiple comparisons using the
Bonferroni adjustment.

Afterward, I will illustrate the link between cultural meanings, social perception, and
expectations for behavior. I calculated the affective profile of privilege by averaging across
EPA ratings of the most privileged group in each category (white, American, cisgender,
heterosexual, Christian, and rich), and a second meaning profile averaged across all other
identities rated in the study. I then examined the set of concepts most closely associated with each profile using data from the most recent major rating study in ACT (Robinson 2015). I identified the set of role identities, person identities, and social behaviors with a Euclidean distance less than one unit away from each meaning profile, and evaluated the relationship between these concepts and the behavioral dynamics that often define interactions between the privileged and other identity groups (i.e., dominance and deference).

Finally, I will show that social identity meanings predict patterns of intergroup behavior and emotions that justify and sustain the social order. I used K-means cluster analysis to identify shared patterns of cultural sentiments across social identity groups, based on ratings of their evaluation, potency, and activity. Clusters were partitioned based on Euclidean distance. All privileged identities in the study (white, American, cisgender, heterosexual, Christian, rich) were pulled into a single cluster, reflecting their common cultural meanings. After establishing a typology of cultural profiles characterizing groups’ relative status and power (see Figure 1), I simulated 178 social interactions using affect control theory’s models of impression change (Heise 2015) and the EPA ratings gathered in this research. Each simulation models a single interaction between a given actor and object person (the target of an actor’s behavior), predicting the behavior that is most culturally likely, and the likely emotional experiences of both parties involved. I simulated all possible combinations of actors and object persons within each axis of inequality (gender/sexual, racial/ethnic, national, religious, and class identities).

Simulation results were aggregated by cluster, then analyses of variance were used to test whether actors’ membership in a given cluster influenced their predicted behavior, and whether the predicted treatment of object persons varied based on their cluster membership. I examined the effects of both actor and object cluster membership on behavior, as well as the interaction between the two. This process was repeated to analyze the predicted emotional experiences of both actors and object persons by cluster. After each ANOVA, I ran pairwise comparisons to test for differences between specific clusters, again applying the Bonferroni adjustment to correct for multiple comparisons.

Results

As predicted, ANOVA results showed that privileged groups (i.e., white, American, cisgender, heterosexual, Christian, rich) were consistently seen as less nice (p<.001) and active (p<.01) but more powerful (p<.001) than all other social identity groups, across dimensions of inequality. Supporting Collins’ (1986) argument that the meaning of all social identities is constructed in opposition to their most privileged counterpart, privileged groups were rated higher in potency and lower in evaluation than all other groups in the study, suggesting that these social identities carry a unique status and power profile that distinguishes them from others across axes of inequality. Thus, identity meanings for white persons, for example, not only communicate their power relative to other racial identities, but as part of larger systems of domination, within which all race, class, gender, sexuality, nationality, and religious groups are positioned as either oppressor or oppressed. The average EPA meanings for each identity can be found in Table 1, along with the results of paired comparisons. Since power is a hallmark of privilege (McIntosh 1989), I expected that privileged social identities would differ most significantly from other identities of their same category in terms
of relative power (i.e., having the highest potency ratings in their category). Results consistently supported this prediction. Indeed, white, American, cisgender, heterosexual, Christian, and wealthy persons were rated not only as the most potent groups in their respective categories, but among all groups in the study.

Advantaged groups must have legitimacy to maintain their authority over time (Berger, Ridgeway, Fisek, and Norman 1998). However, prior research suggests that less advantaged groups are often seen as warmer and more expressive than others, partly because their perceived lack of power or competence casts them into a reactive, agreeable role in the situation (Conway, Pizzamiglio, and Mount 1996; Ridgeway and Correll 2006). In keeping with these literatures, I found that privileged groups garner moderate esteem (receiving low but generally positive ratings on the evaluation dimension), but are also the least well-respected groups in their category, receiving the lowest ratings of all groups of their type on the evaluation dimension.

My predictions were more open-ended for the activity dimension, since it has not been linked as clearly to the social order in prior research. However, the findings about reactivity and expressiveness mentioned above resonate with literatures which have linked activity with greater attention and responsiveness to changes in one’s environment (Scholl 2013). I therefore expected activity to be lower for privileged social identities than others, who likely have more incentive to be focused on and responsive to interactional developments than do privileged actors given their lower power. My findings largely supported this prediction.

Prior work has shown that widely-shared cultural beliefs about social identities guide our expectations about the likely roles, traits, and social behavior of persons with those identities (Fisek, Berger, and Norman 1991; Heise 2007; Rogers, Schröder, and Scholl 2013). In keeping with this literature, I found that the average meaning profile for privileged social identities is closely associated with a diverse web of social concepts (roles, traits, and social behaviors) signifying authority, which elicit normative cultural expectations that such a person should and will take charge of social interactions (e.g., supervisor, strict, evaluate). In contrast, the average meaning profile for other social identities is associated with more reactive roles, traits, and behaviors (e.g., employee, impressionable, emulate).

Finally, the results of ACT event simulations demonstrate the implications of identity meanings for patterns of intergroup behavior and emotions. High status (evaluation) actors are expected to engage in nicer, livelier behavior than low status actors, and high status objects to be treated more nicely than low status objects. Powerful actors are expected to engage in dominant behavior, while those low in power are expected to act more submissively. Deferential acts are expected toward powerful object persons, and dominant acts toward objects lower in potency. Thus, the cultural meanings attached to particular social identities provide a normative standard against which the appropriateness of social behavior can be judged, and direct us into interaction patterns that reinforce the status quo.

Actors and object persons high in status are also likely to experience more positive, lively emotions in interactions than those low in status, while powerful actors and objects experience more potent emotions than those low in power. As found for behavior, actors and
object persons are predicted to experience the most positive emotions in interactions with high status alters, and the most powerful emotions in interactions with low potency alters.

Event simulations yielded three additional findings with important implications for the maintenance of social hierarchies. First, groups closest in power to the privileged (e.g., Asian Americans, Africans) were rated highest in evaluation, and simulation results suggest that they are called upon to act more nicely than the powerless, perhaps to signal that they are not a threat to privileged groups' dominant position. Second, privileged actors (e.g., Americans, the rich) are expected to engage in disproportionately more powerful behavior toward the least powerful object persons (e.g., immigrants, the poor) than toward alters of any other kind. Their behavior toward these groups, which lack status, is even more powerful than would be predicted by actor or object standing alone. Third, privileged actors experience a steeper drop in the positivity of their emotions than other groups when they engage with actors from outside their cluster (i.e., those with higher status and lower power than they). Actors from all other clusters likewise experience far less positive emotions as a result of their interactions with privileged alters. This effect is most exaggerated for interactions between the highest and lowest power groups (e.g., American-immigrant, rich-poor). This reveals an affective process that encourages privileged individuals to interact amongst themselves and discourages others from engaging with them.

In short, patterns of intergroup behavior and emotions are a natural byproduct of the cultural meanings attached to social identities, but have interactional consequences that tend to justify and reproduce the social order (Jost, Kay, and Thorisdottir 2009). They discourage interactions between powerful and powerless actors. They make it seem reasonable or even preferable that certain types of people step into leadership positions while others follow, and that certain types of people be responsive and upbeat while others can be detached and inflexible. As situations unfold according to cultural scripts, between-group differences in behavior provide evidence to reinforce the beliefs from which they first emerged.

It is noteworthy that members of privileged identity groups are not seen as fundamentally bad people, but simply as somewhat less good than their less advantaged counterparts. In other words, while social identity groups differ in relative status, the absolute status of most groups is above average. This has important implications for system justification. Viewing privileged actors as fundamentally good people characterizes them as deserving of their advantaged position, rationalizes the social order as meaningful, legitimate, and fair, and elicits cooperation from others (Jost, Kay, and Thorisdottir 2009). At the same time, the low relative status of these groups produces little expectation that they play nice in social interactions.

**Improving Interactions Across Difference**

The findings discussed above suggest that privileged identity groups are seen as more powerful than other groups across dimensions of inequality, but lack status relative to groups of their same type. They are also consistently among those rated lowest in activity, indicative of their ability to expect relative autonomy within and control over their social environment. This cultural meaning profile has connotations of authority, shared with a host of role and person identities that span diverse social domains, while the meaning profile
found among other social identities has connotations of peer or subordinate standing. Differences in identity meanings for privileged and other groups produce patterns of intergroup behavior and emotions that reinforce the social order by demotivating between-group interactions and shaping the character of these interactions when groups do come together. Thus, bringing groups into contact with one another is not sufficient to reduce inequality, and may even reinforce existing social divides.

What would need to change for groups that differ in status and power to have more positive interactions? Social psychologists have conducted a host of intervention studies which may offer some insight on this subject. The findings reported above suggest that we can change patterns of intergroup behavior and emotions by changing widely-shared beliefs about identity groups. Indeed, social movements have often worked toward this goal, reappropriating devalued group labels and imbuing them with new more positive and potent meanings intended to level the interactional playing field (e.g., Galinsky et al. 2003). Nevertheless, broad meaning change is likely to prove challenging for social identities, given that the cultural beliefs associated with major social divides are grounded in historical and present-day relations that involve experiences of discrimination, exploitation, and even violence. If meaning change does not take place on a broad enough scale that new meanings are also adopted by powerful actors, deviations from cultural scripts are more likely to result in social sanctions to bring situations in line with norms than improved interactions across difference.

One means of sidestepping the difficulty of diffusing new meanings for established social identities is to craft circumstances in which new labels become relevant or, ideally, dominant in defining the situation – labels that can be applied to all members of a community, or which carry similar meanings for members of different social identity groups. This can be accomplished, for instance, by drawing attention to widely-shared values, goals, skills, or interests, by uniting community members against a shared opponent (e.g., Mansbridge 2001), or by creating new collective identities that apply to everyone in a community, upon which positive, powerful, lively meanings can be imposed (e.g., Miller, Taylor, and Rupp 2016).

Another alternative is to bring community members together in interactions where members of low-power groups are acknowledged by a legitimate, trusted authority for their genuine contributions to a collective goal (Cohen and Lotan 1995). Such acknowledgement not only helps reinforce higher rates of participation from these community members, but gradually pulls the cultural meanings of devalued social identities toward a more positive, empowered space through repeated pairing with valued skills and traits that benefit the broader community. A similar outcome can be achieved through more macro-level social interventions, as identity groups that accrue valued resources and skills, for instance through acquiring higher education or high-paying jobs, would also enjoy these benefits (Harkness 2014; Ridgeway et al. 1998). While a wealthy, white man is not likely to enjoy much of a boost to his standing in the community if we find out he is also well-educated, the same piece of information may have a dramatic impact on our perceptions of and expectations for a poor, black woman (Correll and Ridgeway 2003).
Prior work suggests that we can also pursue desired social outcomes by segueing incrementally through a series of different event interpretations instead of seeking a “shortcut” between our current and goal state. Social psychological models can be applied to identify feasible trajectories for social change. For instance, support groups help divorced and bereaved spouses to achieve positive, empowered emotions by gradually redefining the interactions and identities of the self and lost partner (Francis 1997). The same has been accomplished in social movements. For instance, minority sexual identities, once a source of shame and isolation, were transformed into a source of collective identification and solidarity by first evoking fear, then anger, and finally pride to first raise the potency and then positivity of identity meanings (Britt and Heise 2000). Redefinition can also be used to motivate social change, by emphasizing that the current state of interactions in our community is out of alignment with shared values and beliefs, a strategy known as “frame dissonance” (shuster and Campos-Castillo 2017).

More broadly, prior work suggests that powerful actors have greater control than others over the definition of the situation. They tend to behave in ways consistent with their own identities, influence the behavior of others, and resist the identities that others seek to impose on them (Cast 2003). Similarly, high status actors are more able to influence others’ self-views than lower status actors (Cast, Stets, and Burke 1999). Thus, interventions that capitalize on the status and power of trusted leaders from dominant social identity groups can provide leverage for the diffusion of new beliefs to the broader community, particularly when the content of these interventions highlights the legitimate contributions of disadvantaged actors to collective goals, emphasizing what such people can do to benefit the community at large, not only themselves.

In short, social psychological theory would suggest we can improve interactions across difference by capitalizing on the motive for affective alignment between deeply-held beliefs and interpretations of ongoing events. While no research to date has applied interventions of this sort to improving interactions in multi-ethnic communities, the work described above offers several promising directions for positive social change.

References


Table 1. Paired Sample T-Tests Comparing Meanings for Privileged and Other Social Identities within Dimension of Inequality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identities by Type</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Potency</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race and Ethnicity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>White</td>
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<td>1.58</td>
<td>0.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asian American</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.69</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.99</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.38</td>
<td>1.29*</td>
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<td>Latino/a</td>
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<td>-0.04**</td>
<td>0.65*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
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<td>-0.52**</td>
<td>0.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
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<td>-1.22***</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>National Origin</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>American</td>
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<td>1.21</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
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<td>1.13**</td>
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<td>1.11*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>0.89**</td>
<td>-2.33***</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Reported values are mean identity ratings on each dimension. Identities in each category are sorted from highest to lowest in average potency. Reference group for all comparisons was the first group in each category (e.g., white, American, rich).
Figure 1. Evaluation, Potency, and Activity of Social Identities by Cluster.

Note. Activity ratings are denoted by the size of the marker.