The task force sought to address the following questions: What goals do political scientists value in electoral systems? In light of these goals, how do they rate various systems? And how have they applied their knowledge of system design in the service of electoral reform?

We conducted two surveys. The first recruited participants from a random sample drawn from the APSA’s member base, asking about normative goals and for respondents’ evaluations of an array of commonly used electoral systems. The second survey was aimed at a much smaller respondent group – political scientists who have served as electoral reform consultants in various countries over the span of the last few decades. It asked about the context in which they did their work, the political actors with whom they interacted, the type of counsel they offered, and how it was received.1

1. Representational Goals and Electoral Systems

The APSA-wide survey presented two main batteries of questions to respondents. One asked respondents to rate the priority, on a five-point scale from “Not Important” to “Top Priority”, afforded to various normative goals associated with the rules used to elect legislators. These included decisiveness, partisan proportionality, individual accountability, government stability, party cohesiveness, representation of women and minority groups, single-party government, and correspondence to preferences of a median voter. The other question asked respondents to rate, on a five-point scale from “Very Bad” to “Very Good”, various electoral systems. These included: single-member district systems, both plurality (SMD_P) and two-round/run-off varieties (SMD_TR and SMD_AV); the single-transferable vote system (STV); proportional representation systems, both closed-list (CLPR) and open-list (OLPR); and mixed-member systems, both parallel (MM-P) and compensatory (MM-C).

As an assist to respondents who may have been unfamiliar with the lexicon of electoral systems, the survey provided examples of national parliaments elected under each type of rule. In order to prevent question order from driving our results, both the order of the two batteries and the ordering of the items within each battery were randomized. The survey also asked for respondents’ nationality, their country of residence, age, sex, minority group status, and a self-assessment of their expertise on electoral systems. The full survey is available online at: XXX.

1 The survey of electoral reform consultants was conducted in December 2011 and the APSA-wide survey was conducted in May 2012.
703 APSA members took at least part of the survey and 611 completed it. Almost all respondents registered opinions about the various normative goals. Response rates for evaluations of electoral systems were lower, most likely due to unfamiliarity with some of the systems. Still, about 70-85% (depending on the system) of those who rated the representational goals also rated the systems.

1.1. Overall ratings of goals and systems

Figure 1 shows the mean rating for each of the nine representational goals included in the survey on the 1-5 scale from highest. Interestingly, government stability rates high, right alongside individual accountability, whereas single-party government rates by far the lowest, while the other six goals are clumped nearer the middle of the scale.

[Figure 1]

Our survey allows us to separate female from male respondents, and those who self-identify as members of ethnic, racial, religious, or linguistic minorities from others. This leads us to ask, therefore, whether women value the representation of women more than men do, and whether minority identifiers value the representation of minorities more than others. The answers, for this set of respondents, appear to be “yes” and “no,” respectively. Figure 2 shows that women value both women’s representation and minority representation more than do men. Figure 3 shows that, by contrast, self-identified minority respondents give no higher priority to minority representation than do non-minority respondents, and value partisan proportionality (often regarded as protective of minority interests) even less.

[Figures 2 and 3]

Figure 4 shows the mean ratings of electoral systems across all respondents. Although the overall rankings suggest a mild collective preference for multiple-winner systems over single-winner systems, the lack of variance in the mean ratings is as striking as anything about the rank order. By contrast with the representational goals (Figure 1), on which aggregate opinions varied starkly, the range of mean ratings for electoral systems is compressed.

[Figure 4]

1.2. How do political scientists link systems to goals?

Beyond these summary statistics, we are interested in whether and how respondents’ stated representational goals connect to their preferences over electoral systems. Much of the scholarly literature on electoral systems amounts to an extended debate on whether the design of electoral rules systematically affects representational outcomes (e.g. Rae 1967, Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Lijphart 1994, Powell 2000, Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). Do proportional systems protect minority interests? Do they produce unstable governments? Do systems in which voters can indicate preferences for specific candidates enhance individual accountability? Does closed-list PR produce disciplined and cohesive parties? Does the alternative vote (also known as Instant Run-
find Condorcet winners who represent the elusive median voter? Does SMD plurality yield decisive outcomes? The APSA-wide survey allows us to explore whether political scientists’ preferences over electoral systems are systematically linked to the values they prioritize.

Our primary approach was to regress respondents’ ratings of a given electoral system on the series of nine representational ideals included in the goals battery of the survey. So, for example, to the extent that political scientists buy into the idea that closed-list PR generates strong parties, but makes coalition government almost inevitable (cf. Lijphart 1994), then we might expect the coefficient on the Cohesive Parties explanatory variable to be strongly positive (the more a respondent values these, the more she favors closed-list PR), and the Single-Party Government explanatory variable to be strongly negative (the more one values this, the less inclined toward closed-list PR).

Rather than present a mass of coefficients and diagnostics, we distill the results from all those regressions in Table 1, which is organized such that the representational goals are listed down the rows in descending order of how highly they are valued overall among respondents (by mean survey response), and the electoral systems are listed across the columns in descending order of how much they are favored (also by mean survey value). The interior cells show whether the estimated effect of valuing some goal (e.g. accountability, proportionality, decisiveness) was statistically discernible from zero, and if so whether the estimated effect was positive (+) or negative (−). By convention, the number of markers (+, ++, ++++) indicates whether the effect was distinguishable at better than .1, .05, or .01, respectively. The bottom row of the table also shows the “baseline” level of support for each type of electoral system; that is, the coefficient on the constant term in each regression, which can be interpreted as the expected level of support for a respondent who cared not a hoot about any of the goals we included in the survey.

The results are consistent with many of the expectations inherent in the electoral systems literature in political science. First, the goal that respondents appear to connect most clearly and consistently with the choice of electoral system is partisan proportionality, probably reflecting how well developed is the scholarly literature on this representational ideal (Taagepera & Shugart 1989; Gallagher 1991; Lijphart 1994; Powell 2000). Caring more about proportionality is strongly associated with favoring MM-compensatory, list PR, or single transferable vote (STV) systems, and just as strongly negatively associated with support for all the single-winner systems – alternative vote, two-round, or plurality – while valuing proportionality provides no guidance to a respondent’s evaluation of MM-parallel systems.

Some other goals also map predictably onto electoral system preferences. Respondents who value decisive electoral outcomes favor SMD two-round and plurality elections, as well as MM-parallel systems that include SMD contests and do not attempt to compensate for their results in awarding list PR seats (e.g. Persson and Tabelini 2003; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). Respondents who value minority representation are more inclined to favor list PR systems (including MM-compensatory) and STV elections, and much less likely to favor SMD plurality (Banducci and Karp 1999; Htun 2004). The more a respondent values median voter outcomes, the stronger the
inclination toward elections by alternative vote, which is touted precisely as a system
designed to reward moderation (Riker 1982; Colomer 2001; Sanders et al. 2011).

Other results sit slightly less comfortably with the established wisdom. For example,
those who value women’s representation lean toward OLPR and appear indifferent to
CLPR. This is interesting in light of the longstanding hypothesis that closed lists are
more favorable to women than open lists (Htun and Jones 2002; Jones 2009), although
it might reflect movement on current debates within the electoral systems literature over
the effects of preference voting on women’s representation (Htun 2005; Kook and
Moser, this volume; Schmidt 2003; Rule and Shugart 1995; Schwindt-Bayer 2009;
Matland 2006; Ellis Valdini 2012). It is also worth noting that the most highly valued
representational goal overall is individual accountability, and the most favored electoral
system is MM-compensatory, yet valuing individual accountability is negatively
associated with favoring mixed compensatory systems! Political scientists, as a group
can connect their goals to electoral systems that will likely advance them, and the
connections between goals and systems well onto arguments developed in the electoral
systems scholarship. But there is considerable heterogeneity in both values and system
preferences within the profession.

2. Taking Electoral Systems Expertise to the Field

Participation by social scientists in the design of democratic institutions generally, and
electoral systems more specifically, has a long – if not always happy – pedigree. The
involvement of the legal theorist Hugo Preuss and the sociologist Max Weber in the
construction of the Weimar Constitution is well documented (Mommsen 1959).2 In
recent years, electoral system scholars have increasingly frequently been invited to
provide guidance to electoral reformers, sometimes via governmental and diplomatic
contacts, other times through non-governmental organizations, and other times via
academic institutions.3 In order to evaluate how political scientists are engaging with
those who design electoral institutions, we designed the Consultant Survey (available
online at: XXX) specifically for scholars who have participated in electoral consulting
missions abroad. Note that the invitation letter (also online at the same location)
requests that survey participants provide a separate response for each such consulting
mission. We sent the invitation to 39 political scientists known by members of the task
force to have participated in electoral reform consulting missions abroad, and we
received 67 distinct responses.

Figure 6 shows the distribution over time of the consulting missions for which survey
respondents provided information. The data are inevitably biased toward currently
active professionals and should not be viewed as providing a precise estimate of rates of
engagement by political scientists in this activity, yet we suspect that the general upward
trend reflected in the figure is accurate for two reasons. First, the events of the Arab
Spring and other regime changes in the Middle East and Central Asia have produced a
boomlet in electoral system design activity. Second, democracy promotion

2 It bears note that the electoral system for the Reichstag was a result of compromise, as are
almost all matters of institutional design in practice, and that the highly proportional list-PR
system was neither Preuss’s nor Weber’s sole handiwork.
3 By way of full disclosure, some members of this task force, including the authors of this report,
have been active in this area.
organizations have grown increasingly active, and frequently draw on academics to support their efforts. Our survey asked respondents to identify what organization, if any, recruited them and organized their consulting activities, and the results are shown in Figure 7.

[Figures 6 and 7]

The most commonly cited contracting organizations are democracy promotion NGOs, such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and the National Democratic Institute, often under contracts from governments or supra-governmental organizations, including the United States Agency for International Development, the United Nations Development Program, or the European Union. In addition to the agencies listed in Figure 7, survey responses pointed to the US Department of State, the US Information Agency, the Government of South Africa, the Government of Colombia, the British House of Commons, the Danish Parliament, the Senate of Mexico, the regional government of Iraqi Kurdistan, the Latvian Department of Local Government, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Goethe Institute in Beirut, the Inter-Disciplinary Center in Herziliya (Israel), and the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic Development (FUSADE).

Figure 8 illustrates the great diversity among consultants in prior knowledge of the countries where they advise on reform. About only about 10% are native, whereas about 30% each report minimal, moderate, and extensive background knowledge of the politics and political actors involved. Most missions themselves, moreover, are of short duration, as shown in Figure 9, with two thirds of consultants spending two weeks or less in country, and fewer than 20% spending more than a month. Moreover, it is not the case that those with less prior knowledge compensate by spending more time. Indeed, of the seven longest missions reported in our survey, those of over three months, four were conducted by natives. Those cases aside, there is no correlation between prior knowledge and time spent in country.

[Figures 8 and 9]

One might question whether political scientists with less than extensive prior knowledge, spending between one and two weeks in country (30% of survey responses share these traits), are qualified to offer advice on electoral system design. As occasional consultants, the authors regard skepticism along these lines as entirely reasonable. The best response is, perhaps, that the imperative for extensive case knowledge depends on the nature of the consulting job. In many instances, consultants are not asked to offer specific proposals for how electoral rules ought to be designed, but rather to provide what amount to academic seminars on electoral systems for politicians whose baseline familiarity with the topic is limited.

One of the authors, for example has conducted crash courses running from one day to about a week for members of parliament in Yemen and Jordan, countries with limited democratic experience in a region with sparse history of competitive elections. In both cases, the executive branch had made a public commitment to send an electoral reform proposal to parliament, but most members of parliament themselves had little idea what the range of reform alternatives actually consisted of. Consulting, in these cases, amounted to providing politicians who would be asked to evaluate and approve (or disapprove, or amend) electoral reform proposals with a grasp of basic concepts (for
example, what a list proportional system is, what a mixed system is, how various formulas for converting votes to seats operate), and with accounts of how various electoral systems have operated in other countries (for example, how open-lists have worked in Brazil, how mixed SMD-PR systems worked in Russia and Ukraine before they were jettisoned, how the combination of block vote with list-PR used for the 2006 Palestinian Authority elections differs from other mixed systems). In these instances, very little of the substance of consulting involves deep knowledge of the case immediately at hand. That knowledge is not lacking in country. The relative needs are for technical expertise, and informed perspectives about experiences elsewhere.

How broadly does this reflect the experience of electoral consultants surveyed? Figure 10 shows the proportion of consulting missions that interacted with various categories of actors in country. Most consultants interact with a range of actors, but most missions put consultants in contact with government officials at the level of cabinet ministers, national legislators and electoral commissioners, as well as political party officials.

[Figure 10]

We also asked respondents whether, in their interactions with these actors, they offered specific recommendations for electoral system design, or offered more technical information and analysis. Figure 11 indicates that, although slightly less than half of the missions produced specific endorsements, consultants rarely (10%) refrained completely from offering recommendations. In 40% of cases, the recommendations took the shape of negative assessments of specific reform proposals on the table, although without an explicit endorsement of any specific reform solution.

[Figure 11]

What are the issues on which consultants are asked to weigh in? Figure 12 illustrates that in more than three-quarters of instances, agendas included whether parliamentary elections should be single-winner or multiple-winner contests (or some combination of these), questions of the size and structure of electoral districts, the choice of electoral formula and thresholds for representation, and the design of ballot structure. More technical questions about the process of voter registration, election monitoring, vote counting, fraud, and arbitration lagged substantially in the consulting dossiers of our survey respondents, but we suspect that is because the same organizations that recruit political scientists to consult on matters of system design generally lean on legal scholars and former government officials with specific electoral commission experience to consult on matters of electoral administration and dispute resolution.

[Figure 12]

We are also interested in the reform goals of the electoral reformers with whom consultants interact. We asked survey respondents to evaluate, on a four-point scale running from “Not Concerned” to “Central Goal” the priority given to various electoral reform goals among the political actors they met. Figure 13 displays histograms of the distribution of responses on each potential goal listed in the survey. As above, the histograms are ordered – from top to bottom of each column in the figure, and from left to right across the page – according to the mean evaluation, so higher priorities are top and left while lower are bottom and right.
Many of the goals included in the consultants’ survey replicate those included in our APSA-wide survey, although the correspondence is not perfect. Where the surveys corresponded, making comparison straightforward, the correlation of priorities across our two surveys is noteworthy. Stable government and the accountability of individual representatives come out at the top, while party cohesiveness and women’s representation land at the bottom, with representation for marginalized groups falling in between.

The last two questions in the consultants’ survey addressed how the political scientists’ advice was received. Figure 14 shows consultants’ subjective assessments of political actors’ reactions, whereas Figure 15 illustrates the bottom line – at least as understood by those consultants who offered specific recommendations. None of our consultants found their audiences to be completely uninterested in their input, and almost none regarded them as baffled by the topic. The most common subjective assessment, in almost forty percent of cases, was that local political actors were motivated primarily by partisan (or personal, sectarian, movement) concerns, and inclined to draw on the content provided by academic consultants selectively, when that content could be used to bolster positions motivated by other factors.

Figure 15 displays the consultants’ assessments of the outcomes of the reform episodes in which they participated. For consultants who offered specific advice, the modal response is that it had no impact on the outcome. Yet episodes in which some or all of the consultants’ advice was heeded outnumber those in which it was ignored entirely, and of course, in a substantial set of cases, the reform debates are ongoing.

3. Conclusion

One of the core competences of modern political science is the design of electoral systems. So, what do we think we know about this issue? And, how have we translated this knowledge to practitioners of electoral system design in the real world? Our survey of APSA members revealed that political scientists’ preferences about electoral systems are broadly consistent with their normative goals for what electoral systems should aim to achieve, as well as with existing knowledge in the discipline. It is not the case, however, that respondents separate cleanly into distinct camps – whether majoritarian versus proportional, or governability versus inclusivity, or what have you. Respondents showed an inclination to value multiple goals and to try and balance among these. This is, perhaps, what is reflected in the substantial support for mixed-member compensatory systems, famously characterized as the “best of both worlds” by Shugart and Wattenberg (2001). We also found strong support for the open-list form of PR, perhaps

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4 Bear in mind, our survey only asked academics who served as consultants for their assessments of reformers’ goals. It is entirely possible that the assessments are affected by the academics’ own priorities.

5 Political scientists’ self-assessments of audience interest and comprehension should, of course, be subject to a standard deflator, as any first-year comparative politics student can attest – and as many can demonstrate.
reflecting a growing concern in the discipline that closed-list PR delivers too much power to party leaders as opposed to individual voters. In answering the second question, our survey of practical experience suggests that political scientists are increasingly engaged in designing electoral systems for governments, and that many of the central areas of research in contemporary electoral studies map closely onto the issues on which electoral reformers seek guidance. That said, reformers seek advice for various reasons, among which pursuit of the best science may not predominate. Political scientists can transmit their knowledge — and the discipline has produced many results relevant to reformers in recent decades — but reformers will deploy that knowledge to their own ends.
References


Figure 1

Mean Value Assigned to Electoral System Goals

Figure 2

Mean Value Assigned to Electoral System Goals by respondent's sex

Graphs by Sex
Figure 3

Mean Values Assigned to Electoral System Goals
by whether respondent self-identifies as a minority

Figure 4

Mean Rating Assigned to Electoral Systems
Figure 5. Political scientists’ evaluations of electoral systems
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MM-Compensatory</th>
<th>OLPR</th>
<th>AV</th>
<th>STV</th>
<th>CLPR</th>
<th>SMD-TR</th>
<th>SMD-P</th>
<th>MM-Parallel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual Legislator Accountability</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Governments</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Proportionality</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisive Outcome</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation of Minority Groups</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies Preferred by Median Voter</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesive Parties</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation of Women</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-Party Government</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline (Coefficient on Constant)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure X. Political scientists’ values regarding electoral systems
Figure 12

Consulting Agenda

- SMD vs PR
- Districts
- Formula/Threshold
- Ballot Structure
- Nominations
- Voter Rolls
- Elec Monitoring
- Vote Technology
- Elec Dispute Arbitration
- Fraud/Vote-Buying

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Figure 13. Relative Weight Given by Local Actors to Various Potential Reform Priorities
Appendix A: APSA-wide survey

Welcome to the survey to assess political scientists’ opinions about rules for electing national legislatures. It is being conducted by the APSA’s Presidential Task Force on Electoral Rules and Democratic Governance. All survey responses will be anonymous. A full report on the results of the survey will be made available to all APSA members and will be publicly available online.

The survey should take between 2 and 5 minutes to complete.
**Page 2: Electoral System Goals**
*(the order of Pages 2 and 3 will be randomized)*

**Question 1.**
What goals do you think an electoral system for a national parliament or congress should try to achieve?
Please indicate the importance you place on each of the goals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Not at all Important</th>
<th>Marginally Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Top Priority</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A proportional parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(where each party's share of seats is proportional to its share of votes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesive political parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountable individual politicians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An equal representation of men and women in parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation of minority racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups in accord with their share of the population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A stable government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A single-party government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governments that produce policies preferred by the median voter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A decisive election outcome (where there is a clear winner)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another goal. Please specify:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(the order of these choices, except "Other", will be randomized)*
## Page 3: Electoral System Preferences

**Question 2.**

Please indicate your opinion of the following electoral systems for electing a national parliament or congress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Very Bad System</th>
<th>Bad System</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Good System</th>
<th>Very Good System</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single-member district – simple-plurality (first-past-the-post) (e.g., UK, USA)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-member district – two-round system (e.g., France, Mali)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-member district – alternative vote (instant run-off) (e.g., Australia, Fiji)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-member district – closed-list proportional representation</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g., South Africa, Spain)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-member district – open-list proportional representation (e.g., Brazil, Sweden)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-member district – single-transferable vote (e.g., Ireland, Malta)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed-member proportional (compensatory) system (e.g., Germany, New Zealand)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed-member majoritarian (parallel) system (e.g., Japan, Mexico)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another system. Please specify:</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(with pop-up boxes explaining the electoral systems)*

*(the order of these choices, except “Other”, will be randomized)*
Page 4: Demographics

Question 3.
Of which country are you a citizen? Country: *(drop-down country choices)*

Question 4.
In which country do you normally live? Country: *(drop-down country choices)*

Question 5.
How old are you? Age (in years): _______

Question 6.
What is your sex? Female ☐ Male ☐

Question 7.
Are you a member of a racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic minority group? No ☐ Yes ☐

Question 8.
What do you consider to be your level of expertise on electoral systems and their consequences?
None ☐ Modest ☐ Moderate ☐ High ☐ Very High ☐
Appendix B: Invitation letter to Consultants’ Survey

The APSA Task Force on Electoral Rules and Democratic Governance, established by APSA President G. Bingham Powell is engaged in an examination of the role of political scientists in the configuring and refashioning of electoral rules in aspiring and established democracies. Led by Professor Mala Htun, the task force consists of thirteen (?) APSA members who have spent their careers studying and advising on election system design in a broad array of cases and contexts.

As part of its work, the task force seeks to collect information on the advising experiences of academics. We have crafted a short web-based survey of twenty multiple choice questions which should not take more than a few minutes to complete. The survey and its resulting data are anonymous. Each form asks for your experiences working in a specific case. If you have worked in more than one country, and you have the time or inclination, please fill out a form for each case you have been involved in.

The survey can be accessed at: http://www.zoomerang.com/Survey/WEB22DCMCV5FRP/

We value greatly your time in assisting us with this project and look forward to disseminating the knowledge which the task force produces next year.

With great thanks
Bing Powell (APSA President)
Mala Htun (Task Force Chair)
John Carey, Andrew Reynolds, Shaheen Mozaffar (Group 5: Political Scientists and Electoral Reform)
Appendix C: Text of the Consultants' Survey

What is the name of the country in which you were involved in advising on electoral system design?

What was the year of this mission?

What organization contracted you and connected you to political actors in that country?

- 1 = National Democratic Institute
- 2 = European Union
- 3 = United Nations
- 4 = International Foundation for Electoral Systems
- 5 = US Agency for International Development
- 6 = Others
  - African Union
  - Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy
  - Creative Associates
  - International Republican Institute
  - Management Systems International
  - Open Society Institute
  - Organization of American States
  - Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
  - Other (name: _____________________)
  - US Department of State
  - Westminster Foundation
  - World Bank

How much time did you spend in country, in total, consulting and advising?

- 1 = Did not visit country
- 2 = Less than 1 week
- 3 = 1-2 weeks
- 4 = 2-4 weeks
- 5 = 1-3 months
- 6 = More than 3 months

How would you describe your knowledge of politics in the country prior to your involvement advising on electoral system design?

- 1 = Minimal – I had no deep knowledge of politics in that country.
- 2 = Substantial – I was not a ‘country specialist,’ but had solid background knowledge of its politics, and of the prominent actors and their interests and agendas.
- 3 = Extensive – I had conducted extensive academic research on the country prior to advising on an electoral system and/or had spend substantial time in the country studying or doing research.
- 4 = Native – I was born in the country, or lived there for much of my life.
With what sorts of actors did you interact in the course of your advising work? [Check all that apply]?

- High government officials (e.g. cabinet ministers, electoral commission members, members of parliament)
- Mid-level government officials (e.g. vice-ministers, electoral commission staff and technical officers)
- Party officials
- Representatives of civil society groups
- Representatives of opposition protest (or rebel/insurgent) groups
- Representatives/staff of international aid agencies or INGOs
- Labor and trade union representatives
- Academics
- Journalists
- Other (name: ___________________)

Which of the following best describes the content of the advice you (or the team with which you worked) provided?

- 1 = We presented technical information and analysis, but offered no negative or positive assessments with respect to the case at hand.
- 2 = We presented technical information and analysis on electoral system design, and we offered negative assessments of some design alternatives, but we did not explicitly endorse any specific design (or reform) alternative.
- 3 = We offered and explicitly endorsed specific recommendations for electoral system design (or reform).
- 4 = Other (Explain: _______________)

If you chose either of the first two options in the previous question, then which of the following best describes your sense of the extent to which your advice affected the outcome of electoral system design (or reform) in the country?

- 1 = None of the recommendations I (or my team) offered were incorporated into the design (or reform) outcome.
- 2 = Some elements of the advice I (or my team) provided were incorporated in the electoral system design (or reform) outcome.
- 3 = The advice I (or my team) provided was accepted and implemented.
- 8 = The electoral reform process on which I advised has not yet been resolved, so it's too soon to tell.
- 9 = The episode on which I advised ended with no agreement on reform (or electoral system design).
Of the following types of electoral system design issues, which were on the agenda during your advising work (check all that apply)?

- Single-winner vs. PR vs. mixed-member system
- Size and structure of electoral districts
- Election formulas and/or thresholds
- Ballot structure (e.g. closed lists vs. personal preference voting)
- Process of nominating candidates and securing ballot access
- Voter registration and identification
- Poll watching and election monitoring
- Voting and vote-counting technologies
- Election dispute arbitration mechanisms
- Anti-fraud and anti-vote-buying measures
- Other (Explain: ______________)

Which of the following describes the disposition toward the advice and analysis you offered among the political actors in the host country with whom you interacted?

- 1 = Lack of interest or engagement.
- 2 = Incapacity to understand the results from academic analysis of electoral systems, or its relevance to the questions of electoral system design (or reform) on the table.
- 3 = A reasoned reluctance, based on deep local knowledge, to accept the relevance of academic analysis to the matters of electoral system design (or reform) at stake in the country at that time.
- 4 = Interest motivated by partisan (or personal, sectarian, movement) concerns, and proclivity to select results from academic research that could be used to bolster positions motivated by other factors.
- 5 = Sincere interest and desire to use the results from academic research to improve the quality of representation through elections.
- 6 = Other (Explain: ______________)

Please indicate the degree to which political representation more inclusive of women was explicitly considered (whether ultimately realized or not) as a goal of the electoral reforms on which you consulted?

- 1 = Not considered
- 2 = A consideration, but not a priority
- 3 = A priority, to be balanced against others
- 4 = The central goal

Please indicate the degree to which political representation inclusive of marginalized groups (e.g. racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc.) other than women was explicitly considered (whether ultimately realized or not) as a goal of the electoral systems reforms on which you consulted?

- The central goal
• A priority, to be balanced against others
• A consideration, but not a priority
• Not considered

Please indicate the degree to which fostering stable governments was explicitly considered (whether ultimately realized or not) as a goal of the electoral systems reforms on which you consulted?

• The central goal
• A priority, to be balanced against others
• A consideration, but not a priority
• Not considered

Please indicate the degree to which increasing or decreasing the number of parties was explicitly considered (whether ultimately realized or not) as a goal of the electoral systems reforms on which you consulted?

• The central goal
• A priority, to be balanced against others
• A consideration, but not a priority
• Not considered

Please indicate the degree to which ensuring that each citizen's vote carries equal weight in determining election outcomes (e.g. questions of malapportionment and/or disproportionality) was explicitly considered (whether ultimately realized or not) as a goal of the electoral systems reforms on which you consulted?

• The central goal
• A priority, to be balanced against others
• A consideration, but not a priority
• Not considered

Please indicate the degree to which improving the accountability of representatives to voters was explicitly considered (whether ultimately realized or not) as a goal of the electoral systems reforms on which you consulted?

• The central goal
• A priority, to be balanced against others
• A consideration, but not a priority
• Not considered

Please indicate the degree to which fostering more cohesive political parties was explicitly considered (whether ultimately realized or not) as a goal of the electoral systems reforms on which you consulted?

• The central goal
• A priority, to be balanced against others
• A consideration, but not a priority
• Not considered

Please rank order your own approach to your advising mission.

• Raise awareness of election system options generally
• Advocate for a specific system choice to be adopted
• Advocate for a constrained range of choices
• Focus on one or more specific technical issues
• Focus on gender or minority issues of representation

What is your primary professional occupation:

Con
• Private consultant
• Professional staff in a consulting firm (e.g. MSI, Creative Associates, IFES)
• Professional staff in an NGO (e.g. IRI, NDI)
• Professional staff in government agency (e.g. USAID, DFID, DOS, EU)
• Academic
• Other (please specify____________________)

Please use the space below to offer any additional comments or reflections on your experience.