The Ethnic Logic of Campaign Strategy in Diverse Societies: Theory and Evidence From Kenya

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Abstract
Much of the existing ethnic politics literature suggests that in settings where ethnicity is politically salient, electoral competition encourages rival parties to focus narrowly on mobilizing their respective core ethnic constituents, a strategy that exacerbates ethnic divisions and may heighten the risk of conflict. This article develops an alternative account of campaign strategy that proposes that in highly diverse societies, an exclusive focus on core mobilization is likely to be an unattractive strategy. It argues that campaigns will be animated principally by the pursuit of swing voters outside of core strongholds, while the mobilization of core ethnic supporters will be delegated to lower level actors. To support these propositions, the article draws on data collected during Kenya’s 2007 presidential election.

Keywords
Africa, campaigns, elections

A central concern in research on democratization is the divisive potential of ethnic cleavages. According to numerous scholars and policy analysts, elections

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create incentives for political leaders to mobilize rival ethnic coalitions by appealing to ethnic interests and antipathies in ways that sharpen communal antagonisms (D. Horowitz, 1985; Reilly, 2001; Snyder, 2000). By these accounts, the electoral game is about mobilizing the ethnic core, not reaching across the ethno-political boundary that divides the electorate. Despite the powerful appeal of these claims, few empirical studies of election strategy in multi-ethnic settings exist, particularly in Africa’s emerging democracies. Moreover, nearly all of the research on electoral strategy in the ethnic politics literature focuses on parties’ efforts to shore up support within core ethnic support bases, while efforts to court non-core voters have received less attention (de Figueiredo & Weingast, 1999; Dickson & Scheve, 2006; Mendelberg, 2001). This article develops an account of campaign strategy in highly diverse societies, focusing on contexts where no single ethnic group makes up a majority of the population, as is the case in most parts of Africa. It builds on the observation that parties in Africa typically must attract support from multiple ethnic groups to be competitive in national elections and examines how this imperative affects campaign strategies.

Studies of campaign strategy typically distinguish between mobilization (seeking to increase turnout among core supporters) and persuasion (seeking to convert potential swing voters). This article proposes that in diverse societies, the sole focus on mobilizing voters in core ethnic constituencies is unlikely to be an attractive strategy for parties seeking to win national elections. Rather, it argues that in diverse societies the goal of attracting support from potential swing voters leads to a dual strategy by which parties use campaign effort both to mobilize voters in core ethnic strongholds and to pursue voters outside these bases. Second, it proposes that uncertainty about the responsiveness of voters in potential swing groups encourages the adoption of broad, inclusive strategies over narrow ones, leading parties to converge on the same set of ethnic groups. As a result, it is the competition for swing voters—rather than the mobilization of rival coalitions—that principally animates campaign strategy at the national level. Finally, it proposes that the need to seek support from multiple communities leads parties to divide campaign duties between party leaders and lower level actors, with presidential candidates delegating the job of mobilizing co-ethnic supporters to lower level agents in their ethnic strongholds, leaving party leaders free to devote the bulk of their time on the campaign trail to the pursuit of potential swing voters.

To support these propositions, I examine campaign dynamics in Kenya, an emerging democracy where ethnicity is central to politics. The analysis draws on two types of data from the 2007 presidential election that allow for a fine-grained examination of campaign strategy. I use data on the
location of presidential campaign rallies overlaid on ethnic demography to study campaign targeting across ethnic communities. I complement this analysis with survey data on household-level canvassing from a large national survey carried out after the election.

The analysis of presidential rallies shows that, contrary to conventional theory, campaigns are built around the pursuit of potential swing voters (members of groups that do not have a co-ethnic leader in the race), not the mobilization of voters in parties’ respective ethnic strongholds. Moreover, it demonstrates that the leading parties converge on the same set of swing communities rather than targeting opposing ethnic coalitions. The data on household-level contact show that while presidential aspirants prioritize the pursuit of swing voters, they do not neglect the task of mobilizing their most staunch supporters, voters in their respective core ethnic areas. Taken together, these findings challenge the prevailing view that where ethnic identities are politically salient, campaigns are fated to devolve into competing efforts to mobilize rival ethnic factions.

This article contributes to the literature on electoral politics in multiethnic societies in several ways. First and foremost, it adds to a growing literature that uses quantitative approaches to study campaign strategy in Africa’s emerging multiparty systems (Bleck & van de Walle, 2012; Casey, 2015; Ferree, 2011; Posner, 2005; Scarritt, 2006; Wantchekon, 2003; Wantchekon & Fujiwara, 2013). In doing so, it shows that the competition for swing voters can be central to electoral dynamics in settings where ethnicity is salient, a finding that contrasts with existing scholarship that has primarily emphasized the electoral benefits of core ethnic mobilization (Chandra, 2004; D. Horowitz, 1985; Posner, 2005; Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972). This finding has broader relevance to theories of conflict in multiethnic societies, which typically assume that the divisive potential of electoral competition in plural societies stems from the single-minded focus on ethnic mobilization by office-seeking elites (D. Horowitz, 1985; Reilly, 2001; Snyder, 2000). The results reported here call into question this assumption and suggest that theories linking electoral competition to ethnic polarization merit renewed attention.

Second, the results have implications for the larger ethnic politics literature, which finds that societies characterized by high levels of ethnic diversity develop less quickly, face greater challenges in provided public goods, and are less likely to address public health challenges (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, & Weinstein, 2007; Lieberman, 2009). One explanation for the purported ills of ethnic diversity is that because political leaders seek support from narrow ethnic constituencies, they favor core supporters once in office. The findings in this article indicate
that the need to court voters from across ethnic lines may be more important than commonly assumed.

Finally, the analysis demonstrates the value of disaggregating campaign strategy by treating presidential rallies and the ground game as complementary activities. Making sense of the logic of either activity requires appreciating the ways in which the two may serve distinct purposes.

**Campaign Strategy in Africa’s Diverse Societies**

This section develops a series of related propositions about campaign strategy in Africa’s diverse societies. Given the high levels of ethnic diversity across the continent, I focus on contexts where no single ethnic group makes up a majority of the population, as is the case for nearly three quarters of African countries. The arguments offered here build on existing literature on distributional politics (Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Dixit & Londregan, 1996) as well as research on the allocation of campaign resources in advanced democracies (Shaw, 2007; Stromberg, 2008). The core insight from these works, on which I build, is that if the goal of campaigning is persuasion, parties ought to focus their efforts on areas where potential swing voters are concentrated. If, however, the goal is mobilization, parties ought to target areas where existing supporters are located. Extending these insights to political systems where ethnicity is the central electoral cleavage requires developing a conceptualization of core and swing groups in such settings. I argue that core voters are defined as members of ethnic groups that have a co-ethnic leader in the election, while swing voters are defined as members of ethnic groups that do not. This proposition rests on the assertion that voters in settings where ethnicity is politically salient rely on ethnic cues to form electoral preferences and that the informational value of such cues is greater for those with a co-ethnic in the race.

A large body of research on ethnic politics demonstrates that in settings where ethnicity is politically salient, voters choose between alternative candidates according to beliefs about how well prospective leaders will represent the interests of their ethnic communities (Bates, 1983; Chandra, 2004; Ferree, 2011; Ichino & Nathan, 2013; Posner, 2005). Where expectations of ethnic favoritism are widespread, ethnicity serves as a useful cue to voters seeking to divine the intentions of alternative candidates and their parties. Ethnicity provides important information about how candidates will behave once in office—which groups they will favor and which they will neglect.

However, ethnic cues may not be equally informative for members of all ethnic groups in presidential elections (nearly all African countries are presidential regimes). A common feature of presidential elections across the
continent is that some groups typically have co-ethnic candidates in the race while others do not. In Kenya, for example, a small number of ethnic groups (often making up less than half of the population) typically have co-ethnic leaders in the race, while voters from most communities face a choice between two or more non-co-ethnics. The Kenyan case is characteristic of African elections more broadly. Across Africa’s multiparty systems, the modal presidential election features a small number of major candidates drawn from different ethnic groups, none of whom face serious competitors from within their own group.²

For voters from groups with a co-ethnic leader in the race, there is likely to be little uncertainty about which candidate will best represent one’s ethnic community, particularly when the leading candidates are drawn from different groups, as is frequently the case. For voters without a co-ethnic leader in the race, the choice is between two (or more) non-co-ethnics, and uncertainty about which of the alternatives will best represent the interests of one’s community is likely to be higher. These voters may look to the broader ethnic profiles of the parties, “counting heads” of co-ethnic leaders arrayed across the various parties to make inferences about each leader’s ethnic intentions (Chandra, 2004). In this way, elite coalitions formed before the election may provide useful signals to voters who do not have a co-ethnic leader in the race. And as a result, pre-election coalition building is a central feature of electoral competition in Africa (Arriola, 2012). However, the ethnic identity of coalition partners and lower level actors provides a weak signal, relative to the signal provided by the ethnicity of presidential aspirants. This is because parties in Africa remain highly centralized and party leaders wield considerable discretion over the distribution of state-controlled goods once in office while lower level actors typically have less influence over government action (Randall & Svasand, 2002). As a result, the identity of presidential aspirants is highly informative while that of lower level officials and coalition partners provides less information.

If ethnic cues are less useful for voters from groups that do not have a co-ethnic leader in the election, then such voters may be more receptive to the parties’ efforts at persuasion during campaigns. Instrumental theories of ethnic voting imply that parties will seek to increase vote share during campaigns by altering voters’ perceptions of which party will best represent their communal interests. Prior research in Africa shows that candidates and their parties use numerous strategies in the effort to do so, including rhetorical appeals made at public rallies, the distribution of handouts and other favors, and symbolic gestures made on the campaign trail (Ferree, 2011; J. Horowitz, 2012). It is the greater potential responsiveness to these attempts at campaign persuasion that defines groups without a co-ethnic leader in the race as
potential swing voters, making them a more appealing target for efforts to increase vote share during the campaign, relative to members of groups that have a co-ethnic leader in the race.³

In viewing all communities that do not have a co-ethnic leader in the race as swing groups, the argument offered here differs from the treatment of ethnic coalitions found in prominent works, particularly D. Horowitz’s (1985) landmark study of ethnic politics. Horowitz views coalition partners as part of parties’ core support bases. By contrast, I argue that it is useful to distinguish core co-ethnic supporters from “allied” groups that make up a broader coalition. Specifically, I argue that when voters in allied ethnic groups express high levels of support for a particular candidate at the start of the race (and these preferences are common knowledge), these communities will be treated as core groups. However, where preferences within allied communities are less uniform or where there is uncertainty about preferences, such groups will be viewed as potential swing groups. Because in practice allied groups may fail to vote as uniform blocs, I treat these groups as part of the potential swing. In the empirical tests that follow, however, I show that the arguments developed here are robust to operationalizing parties’ respective core support bases as their broader ethnic coalitions rather than as co-ethnic voters.

The conceptualization of core and swing groups developed here implies that there will be few potential swing voters available for conversion in parties’ ethnic strongholds or in opponents’ core ethnic areas. Given the geographic concentration of ethnic groups across much of Africa, this means that if the goal of the campaign is to attract new supporters, parties will target areas primarily inhabited by groups that do not have a candidate in the race. If, however, the goal is mobilization, parties will target areas where there is a high density of strong supporters, and the highest concentration of existing supporters is typically in their core co-ethnic strongholds.

How, then, do parties allocate campaign effort and resources across ethnic communities? Much of the existing literature on electoral strategies, particularly work on distributive politics, argues that parties will invest only in persuasion or mobilization (Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Dixit & Londregan, 1996). I propose, by contrast, that in the presence of uncertainty about the likely return from each activity, diversification is a more appealing approach. In Africa’s emerging democracies, there are likely to be potential gains both from persuasion and mobilization. As noted above, in most elections a sizable share of the electorate generally does not have a co-ethnic leader in the race, meaning that a non-trivial portion of the electorate may be available for persuasion and conversion. At the same time, turnout in Africa’s multiparty elections is sufficiently low that mobilization may also yield positive returns.⁴
Parties, however, are likely to face considerable uncertainty regarding the relative return on these alternative investments. Within the scholarly literature on campaigns, there are important ongoing debates about the effectiveness of mobilization and persuasion (Arcenaux, 2007; Bailey, Hopkins, & Rogers, 2013; Gerber & Green, 2000, 2005; Imai, 2005). These debates attest to the fact that even in consolidated democracies considerable uncertainty exists regarding the returns from each type of campaign activity. In emerging democracies, where uncertainty is likely to be greater, investing in both persuasion and mobilization is a useful hedging strategy. If parties knew with certainty that persuasion, for example, would yield the greater return, they might invest solely in the pursuit of swing groups. Absent this knowledge, parties invest in both persuasion and mobilization, seeking to increase both vote share and turnout.

Regarding the targeting of persuasive efforts, I propose that in diverse societies, an inclusive approach is preferable to a narrow strategy that focuses on a limited subset of swing groups. The reason is that targeting decisions, like decisions about how to allocate resources between mobilization and persuasion, are made in the context of pervasive uncertainty. Parties lack information about the responsiveness of voters in different swing communities. In Kenya, for example, it is not uncommon for groups that do not have a co-ethnic leader in the race to divide their support across candidates, making it difficult to anticipate ex ante the extent to which members of particular communities will be receptive to persuasive appeals. Furthermore, in emerging democracies the conventional tools used to target persuasive efforts—voter files, past election results, and public opinion polls—are often unavailable or less informative than in advanced democracies. Accordingly, parties face a formidable challenge in estimating the likely return on investment from campaign efforts that target voters in different swing groups. In this context, diversification is a more attractive strategy than concentrating effort on a subset of communities. One implication is that if the leading parties all pursue a diverse strategy, they will converge on the same set of swing communities rather than courting rival ethnic coalitions.

A final question relates to the division of labor between persuasion and mobilization. Presidential candidates, I propose, delegate the job of mobilizing core co-ethnic supporters to lower level actors—including coalition partners, candidates for lower level offices, local party operatives, and allied civil society groups—within their ethnic strongholds, leaving the candidates free to focus their efforts on courting potential swing groups. This division of labor stems from the parties’ need to garner support from multiple ethnic communities. To do so, presidential aspirants must project inclusive images.
If a candidate is viewed as the “champion” of her own group or a narrow subset of groups, she will have little appeal to members of other communities. Moreover, when candidates hold rallies in their home ethnic areas, these events tend to be well attended by the most loyal and ardent supporters. The massive outpouring of support at these “homecoming” rallies conveys the wrong message to voters from other communities, reinforcing the connection between the candidate and her own ethnic group. The need to project an inclusive image therefore discourages presidential candidates from campaigning extensively in their home ethnic areas. At the same time, presidential candidates have less need to attend to campaign activities in their ethnic strongholds relative to other parts of the country. Parties enjoy an advantage in recruiting high-quality candidates for lower level races within their home ethnic areas (J. Horowitz, 2012). This means that within these strongholds, the presidential candidates are assured that they will have a capable team working on their behalf, unlike swing areas where the battle on the ground may be more evenly fought with rival parties.

One qualification to the above argument is necessary. To this point, the argument has assumed that presidential candidates enter the race with universal support from co-ethnic voters. In practice, however, there may be variation in this regard, as was the case in Kenya’s 2007 election described below. The extent of support among co-ethnic voters affects campaign strategies in two ways. First, when a candidate’s co-ethnic support is less secure, there will be potential swing voters within her own ethnic community. As a result, candidates will have greater incentives to invest in persuasion within their core ethnic strongholds, increasing the amount of time they allocate to campaigning in their core ethnic areas. Second, when a candidate’s co-ethnic support is weak, opponents are more likely to believe that members of the candidate’s group will be available for conversion, increasing the likelihood of incursions on the candidate’s home terrain. In short, candidates who enter the race without the full support of their ethnic community will spend more time in their ethnic strongholds and will face a greater challenge from rivals on their home turf.

To summarize the above discussion, I outline four testable hypotheses related to the conduct of campaigns in Africa’s diverse societies:

**Hypothesis 1 (H1):** Presidential candidates will concentrate campaign effort in swing areas inhabited primarily by groups that do not have a co-ethnic leader in the race, devoting less effort to core areas inhabited primarily by groups that have a co-ethnic leader in the race.

**Hypothesis 2 (H2):** Presidential candidates will converge on the same set of swing communities.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): At the household level, parties will contact members of their core co-ethnic communities at higher rates than they contact members of non-co-ethnic swing groups.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): Presidential candidates who enter the campaign with weaker co-ethnic support will devote more effort to core co-ethnic areas relative to candidates that start the race with more uniform co-ethnic support.

Kenya’s 2007 Presidential Election

To explore campaign strategies, I draw on data from Kenya’s 2007 presidential election. As is typical of elections in Kenya, the race featured a small number of principal contenders drawn from different ethnic communities. The election was primarily a contest between the incumbent president, Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, who headed the Party of National Unity (PNU), and Raila Odinga, a Luo, who headed the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The race also included a minor-party candidate, Kalonzo Musyoka, a Kamba, who led the Orange Democratic Movement of Kenya (ODM-K). Pre-election polls show that Kibaki and Odinga were locked in a close race throughout the campaign period, while Musyoka’s support hovered around 8% to 10% throughout the campaign. The final results showed Kibaki winning by a narrow margin, though election fraud is thought to have marred the vote count.

Kenya’s 2007 race provides an especially interesting context in which to examine the ethnic logic of campaign strategies. The election sparked a period of intense ethnic violence in which at least 1,000 people were killed and another 350,000 were displaced from their homes (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights [KNCHR], 2008). Accounts of the post-election violence point to the divisive nature of the campaigns as one of the root causes of the conflict, making this a particularly important case in which to examine campaign strategies and tactics (International Crisis Group, 2008; KNCHR, 2008). Moreover, Kenya’s 2007 election provides a tough case for the argument that efforts to pursue support outside of parties’ core ethnic constituencies constitute a central aspect of campaign strategy. Accounts of the race typically characterize the leading parties as narrow ethnic coalitions that focused their electoral efforts on mobilizing supporters from distinct ethnic groups around shared grievances, antipathies, or fears (Barkan, 2008; KNCHR, 2008).

As in most parts of Africa, ethnic groups in Kenya are relatively small; the largest group, the Kikuyu, make up only about 21% of the population. As a result, coalition building is central to electoral competition. The incumbent president at the time of the 2007 election, Kibaki, had been elected in 2002 at
the head of a diverse multiethnic coalition, the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC). After coming to power, however, disputes between Kibaki and several prominent leaders from other communities led to the collapse of NARC (Elischer, 2013). In the run-up to the 2007 election, opposition leaders from several of Kenya’s larger ethnic groups coalesced in the ODM-K, a party that emerged out of a failed 2005 constitutional referendum. The party splintered prior to the 2007 election into ODM, headed by Odinga, and ODM-K, headed by Musyoka.

Although all of the parties presented a diverse slate of candidates to the electorate, the leading opposition party, ODM, was most successful in forming an elite coalition of senior leaders—dubbed the “Pentagon”—from across the ethnic spectrum (Elischer, 2013). By contrast, Kibaki’s party, PNU, was dominated by politicians from Kibaki’s own group, the Kikuyu, and leaders from the Meru and Embu communities, two closely related groups to the Kikuyu. Musyoka’s party, ODM-K, attracted few prominent leaders from outside of his own Kamba community.

The initial distribution of support at the start of the campaign likely reflects the elite coalitions cobbled together before the race. Table 1 shows the results of a national public opinion poll conducted in September 2007, about 3 months before the election and before the main period of campaigning. The two leading candidates—Kibaki and Odinga—entered the race with near-universal support from their respective ethnic communities, with 90% of Kikuyus intending to vote for Kibaki and 94% of Luos expressing an intention to vote for Odinga. For the third-place candidate, Musyoka, support within his own community was less secure, but the majority (59%) of Kambas nonetheless expressed an intention to vote for him. The data also show that at the start of the race, PNU drew overwhelming support from Merus and Embus, while ODM entered the campaign with strong backing from Luhyas, Kalenjins, and Kisiis.

In their efforts to court potential swing voters, the leading parties used both positive messages about their own intentions and negative claims about rivals. As the incumbent party, PNU relied on the claim that during Kibaki’s first term all areas of the country had received resources for development. Kibaki’s standard stump speech included a list of purported accomplishments—growing the economy, expanding access to education, building roads, and so forth—that had produced benefits for all regions (and ethnic groups) in the country. At the same time, PNU candidates warned against being left out if communities supported the opposition, as in the following message from a rally in the Rift Valley:

I want to warn the Rift Valley residents, especially the Kalenjins, that . . . ODM is taking them nowhere. It’s the same people who confined the people in this
community in 2002 to the opposition. They are repeating the same thing and woe unto them if they confine the community to the opposition again. (Simon Lilan, Eldoret, December 3, 2007)

For its part, the main opposition party, ODM, sought to portray Kibaki as an ethnic chauvinist who had favored his own Kikuyu community in myriad ways during his first term. Speaking on the Coast, Najib Balala, a senior ODM leader, claimed that “their tribesmen are in the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Education . . . They should not forget that they are not the only Kenyans. There are other tribes in Kenya other than Kikuyus” (Mvita, November 11, 2008). Speaking in the Rift Valley, William Ruto, another senior leader, echoed the same theme:

I want to tell you Kalenjin people . . . between us and Kibaki there is no relation at all. He is an enemy to us . . . He stopped our people from work, burnt our houses, [and] now he wants to take Moi [the prior president, a Kalenjin] to jail. He is employing his people in the army . . . while ours remain pulling carts and riding boda boda [bicycle taxis]. (Eldoret, December 20, 2007)

At the same time, a center piece of ODM’s campaign was the promise to introduce devolved government, which would provide greater resources to local communities to counteract perceived ethnic favoritism in resource distribution.

### Table 1. Voting Intentions by Ethnic Group in September 2007 (Percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Kibaki (PNU)</th>
<th>Odinga (ODM)</th>
<th>Musyoka (ODM-K)</th>
<th>Other/undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamba</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhya</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalenjin</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisii</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meru/Embu</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mijikenda</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (each &lt; 5%)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data come from a survey conducted by the Steadman Group on September 8-20, 2007 (N = 2,020). PNU = Party of National Unity; ODM = Orange Democratic Movement; ODM-K = Orange Democratic Movement of Kenya.
Measuring Campaign Strategy

To measure campaign strategy, I collected data on the two main components of campaigns in Kenya: presidential rallies and door-to-door contact. First, to examine how presidential candidates allocate campaign effort across ethnic communities, I compiled information on the location of rallies held by the three main presidential candidates in the months prior to the election, following an approach used in studies of U.S. campaigns (Shaw, 2007; Stromberg, 2008). Because ethnic groups are geographically concentrated in Kenya, data on the location of campaign rallies provide a useful indicator of which groups the candidates targeted. I collected all articles about campaign events from Kenya’s two leading daily newspapers, *The Nation* and *The Standard*, during the four months prior to the election (August 27 to December 26, 2007). In total, I collected 449 articles, yielding a data set with information on 271 individual rallies (additional details on the coding of rallies and concerns about bias are presented in the online appendix).

To determine which groups the parties targeted at rallies, I geo-coded each campaign event and plotted the rallies over demographic data. Because Kenya’s census data are not sufficiently detailed for this analysis, I use survey data to create estimates of the ethnic composition of parliamentary constituencies, which serve as the unit of analysis in the tests that follow (details on the construction of these estimates can be found in the online appendix). One limitation is that in diverse constituencies, it is not possible to determine which group(s) a candidate sought to reach. This problem, however, is mitigated by the relative homogeneity of parliamentary constituencies. The average size of the largest ethnic group across all constituencies is 81%, and most constituencies (178 of 210) contain a majority ethnic group. In most cases, then, it is possible to determine with a high degree of certainty which groups the candidates sought to reach at their rallies.

Second, to study household-level contact during the campaign, I rely on information from a large, national public opinion poll conducted between December 2008 and January 2009, about a year after the 2007 election. Survey respondents were asked the following question: “Did a candidate or agent from any party come to your home during the campaign before last year’s election?” A follow-up question recorded all parties mentioned by those who gave an affirmative answer.

Analysis of Presidential Rallies

The analysis of presidential rallies proceeds in three steps. I begin by examining targeting across core and swing groups where the parties’ respective core
groups are defined narrowly as co-ethnic voters. I then re-estimate the main models using an alternative definition that treats core groups as the parties’ broader ethnic coalitions. Finally, I examine the extent to which the three leading presidential aspirants converged or diverged across swing groups.

The argument outlined above predicts that presidential aspirants will focus their effort on swing areas—those areas inhabited by groups that do not have a co-ethnic leader in the race. As a first cut, I plot the rallies held by each of the leading candidates—Kibaki, Odinga, and Musyoka—on maps showing the leaders’ respective core co-ethnic strongholds. For the purposes of this preliminary analysis, I define ethnic strongholds as all parliamentary constituencies in which a candidate’s own ethnic group made up 75% or more of the population (in the tests that follow, I show that the key findings are not driven by the choice of this cutoff).

A simple overlay (Figure 1) demonstrates that all three candidates devoted the bulk of their campaign effort to swing areas, constituencies where none of the three groups with a co-ethnic in the race made up 75% or more of the population. As shown in Table 2, which provides the data in tabular form, Kibaki held 75% of all rallies in swing areas, Odinga 92%, and Musyoka 70%. The candidates held relatively few rallies in their own ethnic areas and generally avoided their opponents’ co-ethnic strongholds. Additional analysis in the online appendix shows that similar results obtain using alternative thresholds to define the candidates’ core co-ethnic areas.

To examine campaign targeting more rigorously, I use regression analysis to estimate the relationship between ethnic demography and targeting decisions for each of the three candidates. I do so because ethnic demography
may be correlated with other factors that affect campaign targeting, and it could be these other factors, not ethnicity, that explain the observed patterns. Using negative binomial regression models, which are appropriate for event count data characterized by overdispersion, I estimate a separate model for each candidate (Long & Freese, 2006). In each model, the dependent variable is the number of rallies held by the candidate in each constituency during the four months prior to the election. Although parliamentary constituencies serve as a convenient unit of analysis for this analysis, an inherent limitation is that the approach assumes that all residents within a constituency are being targeted and that rallies are meant to reach only residents of a single constituency. In practice, of course, a single campaign event may aim to attract only certain types of residents and may also attract voters from neighboring constituencies. There is, however, little reason to expect that these limitations will systematically bias the analysis for or against the main hypotheses. And in additional analysis presented in the online appendix, I show that the key findings hold when I use districts (a larger geographic unit) rather than constituencies as the unit of analysis.

I define the key independent variable—swing group share—as the share of the population from groups that did not have a co-ethnic leader in the race (i.e., all groups other than the Kikuyu, Luo, and Kamba). All models control for the number of registered voters per constituency and population density to account for the likelihood that candidates target more populous areas. I also include a measure of constituency size (in square kilometers) and the distance from Nairobi, Kenya’s capital city. Given that candidates may target population centers, I include a measure of the number of major towns per constituency (defined as towns larger than 5,000 people in the 1999 census). Finally, I include a dummy variable for Starehe constituency, which contains Uhuru Grounds, the city park where candidates hold rallies geared for broadcast on national television and radio, not local consumption.

Table 2. Location of Presidential Rallies (Percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kikuyu core area</th>
<th>Lou core area</th>
<th>Kamba core area</th>
<th>Swing areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kibaki (Kikuyu)</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odinga (Luo)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musyoka (Kamba)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Core ethnic areas are defined as parliamentary constituencies in which Kikuyus, Luos, or Kambas make up 75% or more of population. Swing areas are defined as all other constituencies.
The results are shown in Table 3 (Models 1-3) and Figure 2, which plots the estimated effect of increasing the key independent variable—swing group share—from its minimum to its maximum, holding other factors at their mean or median values. The results are consistent with H1: For all three candidates, the number of rallies held in a constituency is positively associated with the population share from groups that do not have a co-ethnic in the race. It should be noted, however, that the effect on swing group share is significant at conventional levels \( (p < .1) \) only for the two front-runners, Kibaki and Odinga, and not for Musyoka, the minor-party candidate. In substantive terms, the effect of going from the minimum to the maximum value on swing group share is associated with an 86% increase in the predicted number of Kibaki rallies (from .35 to .65), a 725% increase in the predicted number of Odinga rallies (from .08 to .66), and a 33% increase in the predicted number of Musyoka rallies (from .27 to .36), though it is again important to bear in mind that the effect for Musyoka is not statistically distinguishable from zero.

In the pursuit of swing voters, presidential candidates largely avoid both their own core co-ethnic areas and opponents’ ethnic strongholds, as demonstrated by Models 4 to 6 in Table 3, which include measures of the population share of the three communities that had a co-ethnic in the race, the Kikuyu, Luo, and Kamba, and the same set of covariates used in the previous models. Specified in this way, the reference category is the swing group share variable used in the previous models. Figure 3 plots the estimated effect of these variables separately for each candidate, again holding all covariates constant. The results show that the candidates were less likely to hold rallies in constituencies inhabited by the three core groups, including their own communities. Two exceptions, however, are noteworthy. First, Kibaki did not avoid Musyoka’s core Kamba area; he was more likely to hold rallies in Kamba areas relative to swing areas, though the effect is not statistically significant. Second, Musyoka was more likely to hold rallies in his core ethnic area than in swing areas, as can be seen by the positive and significant effect of Kamba share on the number of rallies held by the candidate. These exceptions are consistent with the expectation (H4) that because Musyoka’s co-ethnic support was weaker at the start of the race, he and his opponents had greater incentives to hold rallies in his home ethnic area.

The analysis presented so far demonstrates that the three main presidential aspirants concentrated their campaign efforts on swing groups and did not target campaign effort narrowly toward the mobilization of their respective core co-ethnic supporters. Yet, for the two leading contenders—Kibaki and Odinga—support at the start of the race was not confined solely to their co-ethnic communities. It is important, therefore, to test whether these candidates used a core mobilization strategy aimed at the groups in their respective ethnic coalitions.
Table 3. Negative Binomial Regression Models of Presidential Rallies.

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<tr>
<td>Swing group share</td>
<td>0.614* (0.049)</td>
<td>2.089** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.286 (0.497)</td>
<td>-0.850† (0.062)</td>
<td>-2.929** (0.000)</td>
<td>-2.999** (0.007)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kikuyu share</td>
<td>-2.793** (0.009)</td>
<td>-1.152* (0.036)</td>
<td>-5.254† (0.087)</td>
<td>-2.965* (0.185)</td>
<td>-2.965* (0.018)</td>
<td>-2.965** (0.002)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luo share</td>
<td>-0.653† (0.065)</td>
<td>-0.653† (0.065)</td>
<td>-0.653† (0.065)</td>
<td>-0.653† (0.065)</td>
<td>-0.653† (0.065)</td>
<td>-0.653† (0.065)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kamba share</td>
<td>-0.653† (0.065)</td>
<td>-0.653† (0.065)</td>
<td>-0.653† (0.065)</td>
<td>-0.653† (0.065)</td>
<td>-0.653† (0.065)</td>
<td>-0.653† (0.065)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNU ethnic coalition share</td>
<td>0.085** (0.005)</td>
<td>0.105** (0.008)</td>
<td>0.049 (0.391)</td>
<td>0.103** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.109** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.084 (0.142)</td>
<td>0.090** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.099* (0.931)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODM ethnic coalition share</td>
<td>0.000 (0.178)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.744)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.500)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.556)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.891)</td>
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<td>Voters (10,000)</td>
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<td>0.000 (0.927)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.322)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.450)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.938)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.956)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.896)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.756)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (sq. km.)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.997)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.927)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.322)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.450)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.938)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.956)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.896)</td>
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<td>Population density</td>
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Table 3. (continued)

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<td>−0.001 (0.302)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.512** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.477** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.309 (0.163)</td>
<td>0.557** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.504** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.446* (0.019)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.380* (0.021)</td>
<td>2.247 (0.139)</td>
<td>5.419 (0.134)</td>
<td>2.000* (0.039)</td>
<td>2.200 (0.156)</td>
<td>3.102 (0.232)</td>
<td>2.438* (0.021)</td>
<td>2.823† (0.100)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>−3.612** (0.000)</td>
<td>−1.878** (0.001)</td>
<td>−1.664** (0.000)</td>
<td>−1.349** (0.008)</td>
<td>−1.930** (0.002)</td>
<td>−1.462** (0.000)</td>
<td>−2.630*** (0.000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.082</td>
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</table>

*Note.* *p* values in parentheses. PNU = Party of National Unity; ODM = Orange Democratic Movement; ODM-K = Orange Democratic Movement of Kenya.

†*p < .1.* *p < .05. **p < .01.
Looking at the distribution of support at the start of the 2007 race (shown in Table 1), it is sensible to treat PNU’s core ethnic coalition as the Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu—groups in which Kibaki enjoyed near-universal support at the start of the race. Although PNU drew support from other major groups, it would not be reasonable to treat groups like the Mijikenda or Luhya as core coalition partners. Likewise, one might define ODM’s core ethnic coalition as the Luo and the Kalenjin, the two groups in which Odinga started the race with 75% or more of the vote. Although ODM is often treated as broader coalition party, the data in Table 1 show that Odinga started the race with commanding support only in these two communities.

Figure 2. Estimated effect of swing group share on rallies. This figure shows the estimated effect of increasing swing group share from its minimum to maximum value (0 to 1) on the predicted number of rallies held by each of the presidential candidates, based on Models 1 to 3 in Table 3. Estimated effects are calculated with the number of voters, population density, area, and distance to Nairobi at their means, and the number of major towns and Starehe constituency at their medians. Error bars show 90% confidence intervals. PNU = Party of National Unity; ODM = Orange Democratic Movement; ODM-K = Orange Democratic Movement of Kenya.
To test whether either candidate focused campaign efforts on their broader ethnic coalitions, I estimate campaign targeting models for Kibaki and Odinga, defining the key independent variable as a measure of each candidate’s core ethnic coalition share at the constituency level and again including the same controls used in previous models. The results in Table 3 (Models 7 and 8) show that neither candidate used a strategy focused narrowly on the mobilization of voters from their core ethnic coalitions. For Kibaki, the coefficient on PNU’s core ethnic coalition share is negative and significant, again confirming that the candidate was less likely to campaign in areas where he enjoyed strong support at the start of the race. For Odinga, the coefficient on ODM’s core ethnic coalition share is positive but insignificant, indicating that the candidate did not concentrate on reaching voters in existing ethnic strongholds. In sum, there is no evidence in favor of the proposition that the parties deployed presidential rallies in an effort to bolster turnout among their

Figure 3. Estimated effect of core group shares on rallies.
This figure shows the estimated effect of increasing Kikuyu share, Luo share, and Kamba share from their minimum to maximum values (0 to 1) on the predicted number of rallies held by each of the presidential candidates, based on Models 4 to 6 in Table 3. Estimated effects are calculated with the number of voters, population density, area, and distance to Nairobi at their means, and the number of major towns and Starehe constituency at their medians. Error bars show 90% confidence intervals. PNU = Party of National Unity; ODM = Orange Democratic Movement; ODM-K = Orange Democratic Movement of Kenya.
The analysis of presidential rallies demonstrates that the presidential candidates spent the bulk of their campaign effort courting voters from groups that did not have a co-ethnic leader in the race. One question that remains is whether the candidates converged on the same set of swing communities or diverged, each seeking support from a different subset of groups, as much of the existing literature would predict. To answer this question, I examine the share of each party’s rallies held in the ethnic areas of the 10 largest ethnic communities that did not have a co-ethnic in the race. Each group’s core ethnic area is again defined as those parliamentary constituencies in which the group made up 75% or more of the population. Consistent with H2, Figure 4 shows that while there is some variation across parties, the candidates largely converged on the same communities, rather than targeting distinct, non-overlapping coalitions. All parties chose an inclusive strategy that aimed to reach voters in the largest swing groups and generally allocated little effort to smaller swing communities. Additional analysis in the online appendix shows that similar results obtain when alternative thresholds are used to define ethnic areas.

**Figure 4.** Rallies held in major ethnic areas.

This figure shows the share of rallies held by each of the three leading presidential candidates in the ethnic areas (defined as parliamentary constituencies in which each group made up 75% or more of the population) of the 10 largest groups that did not have a co-ethnic leader in the 2007 race. The x axis shows the population size of each ethnic group as a percentage of the national population as measured in the 1989 census. PNU = Party of National Unity; ODM = Orange Democratic Movement; ODM-K = Orange Democratic Movement of Kenya.
In sum, the results in this section indicate that that goal of reaching potential swing voters was a central objective for all three parties and that the presidential aspirants did not court unique, non-overlapping coalitions (whether defined as co-ethnic voters or broader ethnic coalitions). Instead, they actively competed for the same set of voters arrayed across communities that did not have a co-ethnic leader in the race.

Analysis of Household Contact

One might conclude from the results presented so far that parties in Kenya’s 2007 election prioritized persuasion over mobilization, focusing their campaign efforts on the pursuit of non-co-ethnic swing voters rather than the mobilization of core ethnic supporters. I argued, however, that parties should be expected to engage in both persuasion and mobilization, delegating the job of mobilizing core supporters to lower level actors. To test this proposition, I turn to survey data on campaign contact at the household level. The data show that 40% of respondents were contacted by PNU, 41% by ODM, and 13% by ODM-K during the 2007 campaign.\(^\text{11}\)

To examine the ethnic targeting of the parties’ grassroots efforts, I estimate a logit model of campaign contact for each of the three leading parties. The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of household contact. The key independent variable is co-ethnicity (Kikuyu for Kibaki/PNU, Luo for Odinga/ODM, and Kamba for Musyoka/ODM-K). The models control for several covariates that could confound the relationship between ethnicity and household targeting. To ensure comparability between these results and the analysis of presidential rallies, I include the same constituency-level covariates from the previous tests: the number of voters, the size of the constituency, population density, and a dummy variable for Starehe constituency. I exclude two variables used in the analysis of presidential rallies that are not relevant: distance to Nairobi and the count of major towns. I add a control for the margin of victory in the previous parliamentary elections in 2002 to account for the possibility that local-level actors may invest more effort in grassroots contact when they expect local races to be competitive. Because these tests use individual-level data, I also control for respondent characteristics to account for the possibility that parties may be more likely to contact certain types of voters at the local level. Specifically, I control for the number of community groups to which respondents belong and whether respondents serve as leaders in one or more of these groups.\(^\text{12}\) I do so to account for the possibility that the parties may seek out influential community leaders and that civic participation might be correlated with ethnic group. I also include basic demographic variables: gender, age, and education, and whether
respondents reported that they were registered to vote in the 2007 election. Standard errors are clustered by constituency.

The results in Table 4 show that, consistent with H3, the parties did not neglect core co-ethnic voters. Figure 5 plots the estimated effect of co-ethnicity on the probability of being contacted by PNU, ODM, and ODM-K, respectively, holding covariates constant. All three parties contacted voters from their respective core co-ethnic communities at higher rates than voters from other groups. In substantive terms, co-ethnicity is associated with a 32% increase (from .34 to .45) in the predicted probability of being contacted by PNU, a 74% increase (from .34 to .59) for ODM, and a 122% increase (from .09 to .20) for ODM-K.

In sum, these findings confirm that while the presidential aspirants spent relatively little time in their own ethnic areas during the race, their parties did not ignore the need to mobilize co-ethnic voters. This job was left to lower level actors working in support of the parties within their ethnic strongholds.

Robustness Tests and Alternative Explanations

Additional results presented in the online appendix show that the findings related to presidential rallies are robust to a variety of alternative specifications. One concern, noted above, is that parliamentary constituencies are an arbitrary unit of analysis. To address this, I re-estimate the models of presidential rallies using districts (a larger geographic division) as the unit of analysis and find that the central results remain. Second, throughout the analysis, I have defined Kibaki’s core co-ethnic group as Kikuyus. Some scholars treat the Kikuyu as part of one group that also includes the Meru and Embu (e.g., Fearon, 2003). To demonstrate that the results are not affected by my decision to treat the Meru and Embu as distinct groups, I show that the main findings hold when I code Kibaki’s ethnic group as the Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu blocs. Third, one limitation of the above analysis is that it relies on survey data to estimate the ethnic demography of parliamentary constituencies in lieu of census data, which is not available at the constituency level in Kenya. To address possible concerns about this, I show that the main findings are robust to using an alternative data source (the 2003 and 2008 Demographic and Health Surveys) to estimate constituency demographics. Finally, I test whether the ease of access via Kenya’s road network affects targeting decisions by including a measure of whether constituencies are connected to Kenya’s major roadways. The results show that ease of access is never significant and the main results are robust to the inclusion of this variable.

Next, I address a series of alternative explanations. One of the main findings in this article is that the leading parties in Kenya’s 2007 election
converged in their pursuit of voters from potential swing groups. To account for this pattern, I point to the imperative of attracting support from multiple ethnic groups and uncertainty about the relative responsiveness of voters in groups that do not have a co-ethnic leader in the race. There are, however, a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Logit Models of Household Contact.</th>
<th>PNU</th>
<th>ODM</th>
<th>ODM-K</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>0.457**</td>
<td>1.039**</td>
<td>0.883**</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luo</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kamba</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>0.565</td>
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<td>(0.358)</td>
<td>(0.874)</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voters (10,000)</td>
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<td>-0.070†</td>
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<td>(0.080)</td>
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<td>Area (sq. km.)</td>
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<td>(0.014)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.030</td>
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<td>0.053</td>
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*Note. p values in parentheses; standard errors clustered by constituency. PNU = Party of National Unity; ODM = Orange Democratic Movement; ODM-K = Orange Democratic Movement of Kenya.
†p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01.
number of alternative explanations that merit consideration. First, at the time of the 2007 election, Kenya’s constitution stipulated that to win the presidential race in the first round a candidate needed to gain at least 25% of the vote in five of Kenya’s eight provinces. If the leading candidate did not satisfy the “five of eight” rule, a second round run-off would be held between the top two candidates. It is possible that this requirement, not the factors identified above, led the presidential candidates to spend a large portion of their time outside their home ethnic areas.

This institutional explanation, however, is unable to explain the observed patterns. Survey data collected prior to the campaign show that the rule was not a binding constraint. The data, presented in the online appendix, show

Figure 5. Estimated effect of co-ethnicity on household contact.
This figure shows the estimated effect of co-ethnicity (defined as sharing the ethnic identity of each party’s presidential nominee) on the predicted probability of being contacted at home during the campaign, based on the models in Table 4. Estimated effects are calculated with the number of voters, population density, margin of victory, the number of civic groups, age, and education at their means and group leader, female, and registered to vote at their median values. Error bars show 90% confidence intervals. PNU = Party of National Unity; ODM = Orange Democratic Movement; ODM-K = Orange Democratic Movement of Kenya.
that Kibaki had already cleared the 25% mark in at least five provinces by the start of the campaign. Had Kibaki been concerned about the 25% hurdle, he would have in all likelihood concentrated his campaign efforts on the two provinces where his support hovered near the 25% mark, Western and Northeastern. There is no evidence, however, that he did so. Kibaki held 10% of all rallies in Western Province, but held a similar or larger share of rallies in provinces where he was well above the 25% mark, for example, holding 18% of his rallies in Eastern Province where he enjoyed considerable support (51%) at the start of the race. Likewise, there is little evidence that Kibaki aggressively sought to increase his vote share in Northeastern Province where he enjoyed only 27% support at the start of the race. Kibaki held only four rallies (3% of the total) in the province in the months prior to the election.

Likewise, institutional requirements are unable to explain the targeting decisions made by the opposition candidates. The leading contender, Odinga, had cleared the 25% mark by a wide margin in six of the eight provinces well before campaigning got under way. To be sure, he would not want to see his support erode in these provinces, but it seems unlikely that his campaign decisions were driven by concerns about falling below the 25% threshold, given that his support was well above the institutional requirement at the start of the race. Similarly, institutional explanations offer little insight into Musyoka’s choices. The candidate was nowhere near the 25% threshold at the start of the race in any province other than Eastern, where co-ethnic Kambas are concentrated. It is unlikely, therefore, that Musyoka’s strategy was driven by the five of eight rules, given that he had little chance of realistically clearing the 25% threshold outside of Eastern Province. More plausible is that the candidates held rallies in areas where they thought their chances of picking up votes were greatest, targeting multiple groups that did not have a co-ethnic leader in the race because they lacked information needed to assess the relative responsiveness of voters in potential swing groups.

A second alternative explanation points to the possibility of cross-cutting identities that might bridge ethnic divisions. The notion that cross-cutting cleavages may alter ethnic political dynamics has a long tradition (e.g., Lipset & Rokkan, 1967), and recent research from other parts of Africa has confirmed that superordinate identities can alter ethnic voting patterns in ways that might affect parties’ electoral strategies (Dunning & Harrison, 2010; Koter, 2013). Where cross-cutting identities exist, we might expect that the incentives for parties to engage in narrow ethnic mobilization during campaigns will be weakened. Yet, Kenya lacks the types of bridging identities that scholars have identified elsewhere. There is no tradition of “joking cousins” of the kind that exist in some parts of West Africa (Dunning & Harrison, 2010). Nor do religious traditions serve as the foundation for political
organization, as in Senegal (Koter, 2013). Although sectarian divisions within Christianity (Catholic, Protestant, Adventist, etc.) do cross-cut ethnic groups, there is no evidence that these divisions serve as the basis for political mobilization. Islam, however, has emerged as an alternative political cleavage in recent elections (Ndzovu, 2012). However, only about 10% of the population is Muslim, and Islam does not cut across the major tribal divisions.

A third alternative relates to variation in the extent to which subordinate identities are salient within ethnic groups. It is possible that presidential aspirants focus their campaign efforts on some groups because these groups are more divided internally than others due to the salience of sub-tribe identities. The argument is most relevant to the Luhya community, which has historically been riven by sub-tribe divisions (MacArther, 2008). Although this explanation may help to explain why the Luhya were an attractive target for the leading parties in 2007, it does not provide a general framework for conceptualizing core and swing. As shown above, the three leading presidential aspirants also courted the Kalenjin, Kisi, and Meru—all groups that have acted as relatively unified political blocs in recent elections (Rutten, Mazrui, & Grignon, 2001; Throup & Hornsby, 1998). Thus, although subordinate identities may be relevant for some groups, sub-tribal divisions cannot explain campaign targeting decisions more generally in Kenya.

A fourth alternative explanation is that parties target ethnically diverse areas and that these areas happen to be places where ethnic groups without a co-ethnic in the 2007 election were concentrated. One reason to doubt that ethnic diversity is driving the main findings, however, is that, as noted above, most parliamentary constituencies in Kenya are relatively homogeneous. The median size of the largest group at the constituency level was 91%, and only 32 of 210 constituencies (15%) did not contain a majority group at the time of the election. Nonetheless, to test whether the results presented above are driven by ethnic diversity, I rerun the models of presidential rallies and include a measure of ethnic fractionalization. The results (shown in the online appendix) demonstrate that ethnic diversity is associated with an increase in campaign rallies only for one of the three candidates (Odinga) and that the main results presented in Table 3 are robust to the inclusion of this variable.

A final alternative is that core mobilization (increasing turnout among existing supporters) may have been more central to the campaigns than I allow. If correct, I would expect that party leaders would hold rallies in areas where core supporters were concentrated and where they expected turnout to be low. To test this, I re-estimate models of presidential rallies that include measures of turnout in prior elections and an interaction between prior turnout and the estimated vote share of the candidates at the start of the race. The results in the online appendix show that neither turnout nor the interaction
between turnout and estimated vote shares is significant, casting doubt on the idea that core mobilization was a central objective of presidential rallies.

Conclusion

This article extends research on electoral politics in settings where ethnicity is politically salient. Drawing on data from Kenya’s 2007 presidential election, the analysis demonstrates that the salience of ethnicity does not compel parties to focus their efforts on the mobilization of narrow ethnic constituencies. To the contrary, the analysis shows that Kenya’s 2007 election was characterized in large part by the competition for swing voters in groups that did not have a co-ethnic leader in the race. In doing so, this study is among the first to apply methods common in studies of campaign strategy in advanced democracies to an emerging democracy where ethnicity is the principal electoral cleavage.

Although the empirical analysis in this article is based on a single country, the argument offered here should be relevant to other multiethnic contexts in Africa and elsewhere. Like Kenya, most African countries are highly diverse and lack a single ethnic group that can capture power by voting as a unified bloc. Data compiled by Fearon (2003) show that across African countries, the median size of the largest ethnic group is 38% of the population. The implications of ethnic diversity have been studied extensively by scholars focusing on coalition politics (Arriola, 2012), public policies (Lieberman, 2009), and development (Easterly & Levine, 1997). The implications for campaign strategies, however, have so far received less attention. This research demonstrates that when the leading candidates in presidential contests are drawn from different ethnic groups (as is typically the case), we should expect that the competition to gain vote share during the campaign will incline the aspirants to converge on the same set of swing groups—those that do not have a co-ethnic in the race.

At the same time, the argument developed here is likely to be less relevant to some contexts. In countries where the largest ethnic group makes up a majority, a core mobilization strategy may be a more attractive option than a broad inclusive effort to court non-co-ethnic swing voters. Second, in cases where the leading contenders are drawn from the same ethnic community (as in Kenya’s 2002 election), competition for voters in that group may incline the aspirants to devote a greater share of campaign effort to co-ethnic voters. And the arguments outlined here may be of less relevance to cases like Tanzania, where ethnicity is thought to be less politically salient.

The results in this article have several implications for the broader ethnic politics literature. First, the finding that competition for swing groups may
exist in settings where ethnicity is politically salient suggests that long-standing assumptions common to the ethnic politics literature should be amended. It is wrong to assume that parties that have strong roots in particular ethnic communities will focus their electoral efforts around the mobilization of voters from those groups. Although ethnic mobilization is likely to be an important campaign goal in most elections and may be the primary goal in some contexts, this article demonstrates that in settings like Kenya an exclusive focus on increasing turnout among existing supporters in core ethnic constituencies will typically hold little appeal.

The findings are also relevant to the literature on democratization in multiethnic societies, much of which cautions that electoral competition sets in motion divisive forces that can undermine democratic stability. The results presented in this article do not so much challenge this hypothesis as suggest that the mechanisms that lead from electoral competition to polarization and breakdown merit renewed exploration. This point is vividly illustrated by the Kenyan case, where divisive campaigns are widely thought to have contributed to ethnic violence and the near-collapse of the democratic system after the 2007 election. The findings presented in this article suggest that if the campaigns contributed to these outcomes, it was not because the leading parties sought only to mobilize their respective ethnic constituencies.

The results presented here are also relevant to scholarship on ethnic favoritism in multiethnic societies. Studies from sub-Saharan Africa suggest that favoritism is widespread across the continent (Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, Morjaria, & Padró i Miquel, 2015; Franck & Rainer, 2012; Jablonski, 2014; Kramon & Posner, 2014). It is typically assumed that the inclination to favor co-ethnic supporters follows from the narrow mobilization strategies used by office-seeking elites to gain power. The findings from this article, however, show that multiparty competition in diverse societies can create incentives for more inclusive electoral strategies that target a broad spectrum of the population. It follows that the imperative of seeking support from many ethnic groups during elections may lead to more broad-based distributive strategies after elections. Consistent with this speculation, Burgess et al. (2015) show that ethnic favoritism with regard to road construction in Kenya has prevailed only during the single-party era but not during periods of multiparty competition. The potential effects of multiparty competition on distributive strategies in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa merit further exploration.

Finally, the results highlight the value of disaggregating campaigns by looking at multiple aspects of campaign strategies simultaneously. Much of the exiting literature on campaigns implicitly assumes that parties can be treated as unitary actors. This article demonstrates, however, that in some
cases distinct components of the campaign may follow different logics. Studies of campaign strategy may reach inaccurate conclusions from examining a single aspect in isolation. Indeed, if one were to look only at household-level canvassing in Kenya’s 2007 election, one might conclude that the leadings parties prioritized the mobilization of co-ethnic voters. Looking solely at the location of presidential rallies, one might reach the opposite conclusion. A more accurate assessment emerges when these two components are analyzed together.

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Notes
1. Data compiled by Fearon (2003) show that only 28% (12 of 43) of countries with a population larger than one million people in Africa contain a single ethnic group that on its own makes up 50% or more of the population.
2. Data collected from multiparty presidential elections between 1990 and 2010 show that on average groups with one or more co-ethnic candidate in the race make up only about 43% of the population. Furthermore, the top two contenders came from different ethnic communities in 83% of elections, and the leading candidates (top two) only faced a significant co-ethnic competitor (defined as one or more candidate who received 5% or more of the vote) in 24% of races. These data are based on elections in 38 African countries for which it was possible to determine the ethnic identity of the main candidates (those that received 5% or more of the vote), and for which it was possible to estimate the population share of the candidates’ ethnic groups using the ethnic classifications in Fearon (2003).
3. This conceptualization of swing voters differs from that found in the literature on campaigns in mature democracies, which variously defines swing voters as
non-partisans, ideological moderates, or “cross-pressured” voters (J. Campbell, 2001; A. Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Hillygus & Shields, 2008). Such approaches, however, have little relevance to emerging democracies in Africa where policy positions and partisan allegiances are less central.

4. Kuenzi and Lambright (2007) show that the average turnout in African multi-party elections between 1990 and 2004 was 64% of registered voters.

5. Details on the content of campaign speeches come from recordings of rallies made by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR). For more extensive discussion of the campaigns, see J. Horowitz (2012), KNCHR (2008), and MacArthur (2008).

6. Quotes were obtained from recordings of campaign rallies collected by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights.

7. These data come from a survey that was conducted as part of an evaluation of Kenya’s national civic education program (Finkel, Horowitz, & Rojo-Mendoza, 2012 provide additional details). Because the sample frame was designed to oversample particular groups, it was necessary to re-weight the data to approximate a sample of the Kenyan population. To determine how the sample should be weighted, I compared the data with a random-sample survey conducted by the Afrobarometer in 2005. I found that it was necessary to weight by province, urban/rural location, and gender. On other variables—age, education, and community group membership—the data closely resembled the Afrobarometer sample, and no weighting was necessary.

8. For each of the outcome variables, the variance is greater than the mean. For Kibaki, the mean number of rallies per constituency is .57 and the standard deviation (SD) is 1.1; for Odinga, the mean is .38 and the SD is .73; and for Musyoka, the mean is .33 and the SD is .69.


10. For urban parliamentary constituencies in Nairobi and Mombasa, I code the number of major towns as 1.

11. Party of National Unity (PNU) was a coalition that included several smaller parties. For these tests, I define voters who have been contacted by PNU as those who reported having been reached by PNU or any of its main partners (Kenya African National Union [KANU], Democratic Party [DP], Forum for the Restoration of Democracy–Kenya [FORD-K], Forum for the Restoration of Democracy–People [FORD-P], Safina, Forum for the Restoration of Democracy–Asili [FORD-A], and National Rainbow Coalition–Kenya [NARC-K]). The substantive findings of the tests do not change when PNU’s coalition partners are excluded.

12. To measure membership in community groups, the survey asked respondents whether they belonged to each of the following groups: a church or religious group, a youth or sports group, a trade union, a women’s group, a cultural or school organization, a burial society, a civic organization, a tribal or clan association, a business or professional society, a political party, and other. The measure of group membership is a sum of positive answers. The measure of leadership comes from a question that asked whether respondents were presently or had ever been a leader in one or more of these groups.
References


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