Interview on East Asia and the US-Japan Alliance

Talking East Asia and the US-Japan relationship. (Photo by Matthew Keefe)
Talking East Asia and the US-Japan relationship. (Photo by Matthew Keefe)

Last week I spoke with journalist Anthony Fensom, who wanted to talk about the US-Japan alliance and East Asia’s security environment. See his article in the National Interest, in which he speaks to many other East Asia watchers, and see our conversation below.

AF: What’s the current state of US-Japan security ties? What are the main issues?
JL: Relations are generally very good, except I am surprised by a sense of uncertainty among the Japanese. I see it from the U.S. perspective, so I see that first of all, the U.S. is deeply concerned about rising China, and second, that Japan is the most important country to the United States to help resist Chinese dominance in the region. Japan is both powerful and feels threatened, unlike other states in the region which are weak and/or likely to hedge or to bandwagon with China. But Japan is powerful and committed. In terms of shared interest, the alliance has literally never been stronger. But the Japanese leaders I meet don’t seem to see it this way. They seem wary of the U.S. commitment.

AF: Regarding Okinawa’s new anti-base governor, what issues does this present for the alliance?

JL:  Anything that makes the Futenma relocation more challenging is a strain on the alliance. So the election of an official who opposes that relocation is an obstacle. In the never-ending story of Futenma, it’s another setback that Tokyo will need to figure out how to solve. But the Japanese government is totally committed to making this happen.

AF: From a US viewpoint, what is the US hoping for from Japan?

JL: I think for the most part our interests are very much aligned. There are of course some areas where Washington has been dissatisfied or concerned. The Abe government’s handling of history issues has been vexing: denials of past atrocities have alienated Japan from other partners, and created problems and disputes that drain energy and attention that are much needed elsewhere. Also Washington is worried about Japan keeping its cool over the Senkakus, to prevent any possible escalation (and prevent a war that the U.S. will have to fight).

AF: How are you seeing the regional security situation, particularly with the rise of China and North Korea’s continued aggression?

JL: The region is dangerous. North Korea is weak but unpredictable, and we can’t ever forget they have WMD. We also can’t forget that domestic turmoil in North Korea could create devastating instability on the peninsula and in the region. The biggest issue for the region, however, is China’s rise. China is showing itself growing more aggressive as its power increases, and China has territorial disputes with U.S. allies. Taiwan also lurks in the background as an unresolved issue that could bring the U.S. and China to blows. So there are indeed big dangers in this region, which leaders are very wary of managing.

AF: How might other countries e.g. the European Union, Australia, etc. contribute to enhanced regional security?

JL: I don’t see Europe playing much of a role. They’re far away, disinterested, and they have other problems these days. As for the Australians, they have strong economic interests with China as well as longstanding relationships with the United States and Japan. So the Australians might have chosen to hedge their bets, thanks to competing interests and their lovely large moat. But I’ve been surprised that Canberra has been much more assertive than that. It staked out a clear part in the U.S. pivot (with the Marines in Darwin). It’s pursuing very close relations with Tokyo. From the U.S. perspective I think this very much “enhances regional security” (which is the question you asked). But Beijing wouldn’t see it this way of course.

One point I’d like to make is how gratified I am by the fantastic, smart Australian conversations about security. Your scholars are having great debates, and are sharpening and improving the regional and global conversation. I really appreciate this, and really appreciate all of the educational, social, technological, and cultural links that permit us to share in this conversation.

AF: How might a new US president change the Japan relationship?

JL: Not so much. According to the prevailing U.S. grand strategy of global leadership, alliance with Japan is a vital asset. There are no mainstream political elites who want to change the U.S. grand strategy. Thus any likely U.S. president will value and seek to strengthen the alliance with Japan. Sure, some individual presidents will have a better or worse rapport with individual Japanese leaders. But the fundamentals will be there, regardless of if it’s Hillary or Mitt or whomever descending the steps of Air Force One in Tokyo.

AF: How does the Japan security alliance rate in terms of key US security relationships?

JL: Ambassador Mike Mansfield once said that to the United States, Japan was “the most important alliance, bar none.” This was not accurate when he said it in the 1980s, but clearly Mansfield was ahead of his time. It’s true today. In coming decades, China poses a challenge to the liberal, U.S.-led order, and Japan is America’s strongest and most important partner to help with this challenge.

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