Democratization and Stability in East Asia

Jennifer Lind

Dartmouth College

Anticipating future political transitions in East Asia, many scholars worry that Chinese democratization and Korean unification will fuel regional instability. To inform this debate, this article examines theories that make competing claims about the stability of these potential transitions: theories within the “democratization and war” school and economic interdependence theory. I compare the predictions of these theories in the cases of previous East Asian transitions in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Process-tracing evidence shows that (i) xenophobic nationalism or logrolling by political coalitions were not present and that none of these countries pursued bellicose foreign policies during their democratic transitions. Evidence from these cases undermines the broad formulation of democratization and war theory and is consistent with a more recent, narrower version of this theory. Second, (ii) process tracing reveals the stabilizing processes of economic interdependence in all of these cases. Third and finally, contrary to prevailing views that warn of instability during future transitions, (iii) both the narrow version of democratization and war theory and economic interdependence theory forecast stability during the upcoming political transitions in China and Korea. These findings support foreign policy strategies of economic and institutional engagement toward China and the Korean peninsula.

Looking into East Asia’s future, observers anticipate domestic political transitions and worry about their effects on regional stability. Many observers speculate that China will democratize in the near future (Pei 1998; Bachman 2000; Gilboy and Heginbotham 2001; Gilley 2004; Rowen 2007). Another political transition that might cause regional instability is Korean unification—the extension of the democratic South into the formerly authoritarian North (Eberstadt 1995; Noland 1997; Pollack and Lee 1999). Drawing on scholarship that links political liberalization to interstate war, scholars speculate that these transitions may create regional instability as newly mobilized, highly nationalistic populaces will animate historical resentments and territorial disputes (Bachman 2000:209; Gilley 2004; Goldstein 2005:95; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Bass 2006; Rowen 2007; Shirk 2007; Ross and Feng 2008; Wang 2008). With China a nuclear-armed state in the midst of a power transition vis-à-vis the US hegemon, such instability could be particularly dangerous.

Two international relations theories suggest, however, that this pessimism is misguided: that these countries would be unlikely to pursue nationalistic, belligerent foreign policies during their future political transitions. This paper examines theories that make competing claims about the stability of these upcoming transitions—theories within the “democratization and war” school and economic

1 The author thanks two anonymous reviewers as well as the following colleagues for their constructive comments and advice: Deborah Avant, Stephen Brooks, Amy Grubb, David Kang, Edward Mansfield, John Mearsheimer, Daryl Press, Robert Ross, Jack Snyder, Allan Stam, Benjamin Valentino, and William Wohlforth.

© 2011 International Studies Association
interdependence theory. Evaluating these theories in historical cases of previous East Asian transitions, I argue (i) that the destabilizing processes expected by the previous, broad formulation of democratization and war theory were not present. Domestic institutions in these countries were robust enough to manage the demands of transition without unleashing nationalistic, belligerent foreign policies, as more recent studies in the “democratization and war” literature would expect. Second, (ii) process tracing shows that the stabilizing processes expected by economic interdependence theory were present in all of these cases. Third and finally, (iii) these theories—a narrower version of democratization and war theory, and economic interdependence theory—do not forecast nationalistic, belligerent foreign policies in future transitions in Korea and China.

This study introduces qualitative data to inform debates regarding two important IR theories, which to date have been studied largely with statistical evidence. In particular, this article offers process-tracing evidence for economic interdependence theory. As for its policy prescriptions, this study suggests greater optimism for the stability of East Asia’s future transitions and provides support for foreign policy strategies of economic and institutional engagement toward China and the Korean peninsula.

**Theoretical Framework**

A prominent school within political science theory expects political transitions to unleash forces that can trigger violence. Samuel Huntington argued that both internal and external violence is the product of “rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions” (Huntington 1968:4). Democratization threatens the power, status, or rents enjoyed by many political, military, and business elites. To defend their positions, these elites may seek to drive national policy in ways that benefit their own private interests, often to the detriment of the nation as a whole (Moore 1966; Huntington 1968; Cain 1985; Snyder 1991; Knight 1992). Such individuals or groups are able to hijack national policy because during political transitions, institutions are not yet developed enough to “curb the excesses of personal or parochial desires” (Huntington 1968:24).

Scholars argue that these dynamics cause international conflict through at least two mechanisms. First, many threatened elites, such as the military or business elites, benefit from policies of international aggression (Davis and Hutton-back 1986; Snyder 1991; Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2005; Van Evera 1999). Despite their diminishing political power, these elites are able to hijack national policy through strategies of forming political alliances and logrolling, in which groups trade favors to achieve their desired goals (Snyder 1991; Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2005).

Additionally, both new and old elites cultivate nationalism as they compete for popular support (Gagnon 1994–1995; Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002, 2005; Snyder and Ballentine 1996). Nationalistic and ideological themes unify both elites and masses and can be used to discredit opponents. In underinstitutionalized states that lack a well-developed marketplace of ideas, the absence of disconfirming evidence and alternate viewpoints allows elite-deployed myths to thrive (Van Evera 1990–1991, 1999; Reiter and Stam 1998; Snyder 2000). Nationalistic persuasion increases a country’s risk of involvement in foreign conflicts: elites who play the nationalist card typically scapegoat other countries, emphasizing the threat they pose, blaming them for the country’s problems, and depicting them as culpable for historical wrongs (Van Evera 1994; Kaufman 2001). In the imperfect marketplace of ideas, even an initially reticent population can be convinced that military action is necessary.
The link between democratization and war is widely cited across political science and popular literatures and has been highly influential in foreign policy thought. Many scholars have argued that democratization led to nationalistic belligerence in the Balkans, the Caucases, Western Europe, Latin America, and Japan (Woodward 1995; Snyder 2000; Kaufman 2001; Mares 2001). As Narang and Nelson (2009:358) note, the finding that democratization causes interstate war has “been cited across the academic and foreign policy world as a crucial caveat to the democratic peace theory,” has been widely discussed in influential media, and has informed debates about promoting the spread of democracy in the Middle East. Additionally, they note that the view that democratization elevates the risk of war “has been cited as a key reason why the United States should be careful about promoting democracy in China.”

Although a belief that political transitions raise the risk of war has profoundly influenced academic and foreign policy debates, the literature on which the claim is based has evolved substantially in recent years. An important study by Mansfield and Snyder (1995) offered statistical evidence in support of their claim that democratization substantially raised the risk of interstate conflict. Their study launched an important and fruitful debate in which scholars examined the robustness of their findings (Enterline 1996; Oneal and Russett 1997; Thompson and Tucker 1997; Ward and Gleditsch 1998; Braumoeller 2004). Later work by Mansfield and Snyder (2002, 2005) substantially narrowed their claims about the war-inducing effects of political liberalization. Not all democratizing states are prone to war, they argue: those countries likely to go to war were those with weak domestic institutions that experienced an incomplete transition (as opposed to a transition to full democracy). In such states, “Political institutions are unable to resolve or suppress the conflicts of interest stemming from growing demands for political participation, thereby creating various dynamics that encourage belligerence abroad” (2005:87).

Mansfield and Snyder measure a state’s institutional strength, or “domestic concentration,” using an index that seeks to capture the strength of institutions that “affect a regime’s ability to manage the foreign policy consequences of rising political participation.” Their model predicts that incomplete democratizers face an increased risk of war only when domestic institutional concentration measures below 4 on the 0–9 point scale (the sample mean was 5.7). Mansfield and Snyder (2005:116, 110) argue, “incomplete democratization has little bearing on war when domestic concentration is close to its mean,” and that above this mean, “incomplete democratization actually reduces the probability of war.”

In sum, the views of scholars and policymakers about the link between democratization and war reflect no consensus. On the one hand is a long intellectual tradition that emphasizes the potential for political transitions to unleash praetorian politics that lead to violence. This view pervades both academic and policy debates: it is widely cited in scholarship, the media, and policy debates as grounds to be wary of upcoming East Asian political transitions (Bachman 2000:209; Gilley 2004; Goldstein 2005:95; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Bass 2006; Rowen 2007; Shirk 2007; Ross and Feng 2008; Wang 2008). On the other hand, more recent work claims that democratization will cause war only under a very narrow set of conditions: that is, countries with extremely weak domestic institutions that experience incomplete transitions (Mansfield

---

2 The index was first created by Ted Robert Gurr and measured using the Polity II data set (data were not gathered in Polity III or IV). The index codes the regulation and institutionalization of political participation; the regulation of executive recruitment and designation of chief executive; the degree to which there are constraints on the chief executive’s authority; and the concentration of authority in the central government as opposed to local authorities.
and Snyder 2005). Narang and Nelson (2009) argue that these are rare circumstances indeed, noting “there are no instances of an incomplete democratizer with weak institutions participating in, let alone initiating, an external war since World War I.”

**Economic Interdependence and Peace**

The theory that political transitions will fuel nationalistic belligerence by Korea and China runs directly counter to another argument frequently made about these countries: that they will eschew hawkish foreign policies so not to disrupt the trade and financial relations that fuel their prosperity (Economy 2004; Brzezinski and Mearsheimer 2005; Shambaugh and Yahuda 2008). Scholars have argued that countries that are highly interdependent will avoid crises and war because the economic costs are too high (Rosecrance 1986; Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999; Russett and Oneal 2000; Mansfield and Pollins 2001). Copeland (1996) argues for a dynamic approach: that the pacifying effects of interdependence are caused not by current trade levels, but by expectations about future trading opportunities. While most studies operationalize economic interdependence in terms of the level of interstate trade, Brooks (2005) argues that global foreign direct investment creates strong interdependence with pacifying effects on foreign relations.

Discussing the various ways through which interdependence is expected to cause peace, Mansfield and Pollins (2001:841) note that the most common mechanism emphasizes subnational forces. Through trade, firms and consumers become dependent on access to overseas markets, and thus “These actors have incentives to withdraw support for public officials who take actions—such as engage in military conflicts—that are commercially harmful.” Financial actors (multinational corporations and investors) similarly pressure leaders for a stable political environment (Friedman 2000; Kirshner 2007). These actors who benefit from a stable international political environment—for example those with extensive overseas investment, those dependent on FDI, or those whose exports or imports would be disrupted in the event of conflict—favor policies that promote international stability and oppose policies that might lead to international conflict and economic disruptions. Firms will praise and give campaign donations to politicians whom they believe are more likely to pursue conciliatory rather than hard-line foreign policies. At times of potential crisis, economic actors lobby for conciliation.

**Previous East Asian Transitions**

To shed light on East Asia’s upcoming transitions, I pit theories of democratization and war against one another, and against the theory of economic interdependence and peace. I examine these theories in five previous cases of East Asian democratization: two transitions each in South Korea and Taiwan, and one transition in Japan. I select these cases from the universe of East Asian democratizations that occurred in globalized countries that had security rivalries with important regional implications. In other words, each of these countries had security competitions or territorial claims that might have become animated during their political liberalization; each of these countries democratized while pursuing a strategy of integration with the global economy. As I examine these cases, I adopt Mansfield and Snyder’s (2005) definition of a democratic transition and use the data

---

3 Disputing this claim are Barbieri (1996) and Gasiorowski (1986).
4 This case selection excluded Thailand and the Philippines; the inclusion of those cases would not have changed my findings.
set they used (Polity III) to code the occurrence of transitions in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. As in their study, I examine 5-year periods after the onset of a democratic transition.

The purpose of these case studies is not to test for congruence of outcomes (that is, we know war did not occur), but to determine whether these transitions involved the kind of behavior predicted by the theories, which have been previously evaluated predominantly through statistical testing. The broad version of democratization and war theory, drawn from the long-standing intellectual tradition about praetorianism and political violence, would expect elites to engage in nationalistic persuasion, and would expect coalitions of political, business, and military leaders “logrolling for war.” By contrast, the narrower version of democratization and war theory (that is, which says that democratization only leads to war in the presence of weak domestic institutions) does not expect these destabilizing processes to emerge in these historical cases. In each country, domestic institutions were sufficiently robust such that democratization would not have been expected to cause belligerence. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) cite an elevated risk of international conflict in democratic transitions in states with a score of 4 and below. Domestic concentration scores for the countries at the start of their democratic transitions were South Korea (6), Taiwan (5), and Japan (7). I test these two theories against economic interdependence theory. Because each country was pursuing a strategy of export-led growth, this theory would expect economic interdependence to exert stabilizing pressures on their foreign policies. Additionally, although war did not occur in any of these cases, I test whether these processes occurred and whether they raised the risk of war: I test for lesser increases in bellicosity.

Process-tracing evidence from these cases shows an absence of nationalistic mobilization, and the stabilizing influences of economic interdependence. This evidence undercuts the broad, and widely held, view that democratization causes war. Evidence from this study is consistent with the narrower version of democratization and war theory, which argues that democratization will lead to war only in countries with extremely weak political institutions.

Critics might argue that peace was overdetermined in these cases, given the presence of the American hegemon in East Asia. Formal alliances with South Korea and Japan, and Washington’s support for Taipei, one might argue, dissuaded leaders from bellicose behavior. However, while alliance with the United States is a plausible explanation for the absence of war between US allies, it is a much less plausible explanation for the absence of nationalistic mobilization. In other words, even with a US military commitment, leaders would still have a domestic political interest in nationalistic pandering. Although the United States might have stopped the outbreak of war, we still might have seen the mechanisms—and we do not. Logically, the presence of a superpower patron could even make politicians more—rather than less—likely to rabble rouse: politicians stoke nationalism not for international gains but for domestic ones (in fact, war is one of the major downsides to this strategy). If anything, the US presence might have emboldened enterprising nationalists who saw themselves as having a superpower safety net. Thus, logically one might argue we should have seen more nationalistic pandering because of the US presence, not less.

Empirically, it is clear that the American presence did not restrain either Korea or Taiwan in earlier periods; Taiwan engaged in provocations over Jinmen and Mazu in the 1950s, and in Korea, Syngman Rhee sought to build political support by confronting Japan over fisheries disputes (Cheong 1991). Washington also continually worried that Rhee, who had resisted the Korean war armistice, would start a second Korean war (Cumings 1997:479).

---

Republic of Korea

The Korean peninsula regained independence from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. Two states in the North and South were created (propped up by two superpower patrons), and the peninsula soon erupted in war. After 1953, the Soviet-allied North Korea and the US-allied South Korea settled into a tense standoff that would last a half-century and counting. During this time, a series of dictators ruled the ROK, and the country swung back and forth between autocracy and democratic reform.

The first phase of Korean democratization occurred with democratic reforms initiated under the dictator Park Chung-hee, who had seized power in a 1961 military coup. Park agreed to hold elections in 1963; according to the criteria for measuring regime type, the ROK experienced an incomplete democratic transition from autocracy to mixed regime starting that year (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). Park resigned from the military, ran for the presidency, and won in 1963; he was re-elected in 1967. In Park’s second term, the country suffered a reversal back to autocracy; Park imposed martial law under the Yushin constitution of 1972. After Park was assassinated in 1979, the transitional government rescinded the “emergency decrees” of the Yushin constitution, restored many civil and political rights. However, soon thereafter (in December 1979), General Chun Doo Hwan staged a successful military coup and became President, and the ROK returned to martial law.

The next Korean transition occurred after 1987, when the ROK moved from a mixed regime to democracy. That year, Chun—facing the end of his presidential term and having vowed to step down—appointed his ally Roh Tae-woo as successor. Chun initially refused to hold direct elections, or to allow banned opposition politicians as candidates. This sparked a national outcry; protesters filled the streets, and Roh announced he would refuse the nomination unless free and fair elections were held. Facing the prospect of a massive and bloody crackdown—which could have jeopardized Seoul’s hosting of the 1988 Olympics—Chun acquiesced. According to the Polity III data set, the ROK experienced two incomplete transitions (1962–1967 and 1980–1985) and a third transition culminating in full democracy (1987–1992).

South Korea had several potential flashpoints that might have led to conflict during these transitions. Facing an existential threat from North Korea, South Korea might have advocated a preemptive military strike against Pyongyang. Alternatively, nationalists might have called for moves to destabilize North Korea from within. At a minimum, they could have sought to undermine, isolate, or weaken the North. With respect to Japan, several disputes lingered in Japan–ROK relations, but the main potential security flashpoint was (and is) the dispute over the sovereignty of the island chain known as Tokdo to the Koreans, Takeshima to the Japanese. South Korean nationalists would have been unlikely to advocate a military operation against Japan (given the latter’s status as a US ally and its far greater maritime power). However, nationalists might have taken a hard line on the dispute, or advocated limited shows of force around the islands. Crises or possibly conflict could have occurred, caused by elite nationalist persuasion and prestige strategies, or by coalitional logrolling.

During each of its political transitions, Seoul pursued a strategy of integration with the global economy. Park presided over the shift from import-substitution to export-led growth, which would lead to stunning economic growth that catapulted South Korea into developed-country status. Japan was a major trading partner, and an important source of capital and development aid. Any...
military conflict with Japan over Tokdo/Takeshima would threaten this important economic relationship. Crises with North Korea could escalate to major war on the peninsula, which would take a devastating economic as well as human toll.

Foreign Relations

South Korea was not involved in a war or military crisis during any period of democratic transition. After Korea’s 1963 transition, North Korean behavior grew more provocative: incursions into the DMZ increased relative to the previous era, and with a noticeable spike during the years 1967–1969. “It is clear,” said a government spokesman in 1967, “that the frequent invasion by North Korean forces is an intentional strategy for disturbing the feelings of the people just before the election.” During the next transition, in 1983, North Korean agents attempted to assassinate President Chun during a diplomatic visit to Burma, killing several prominent South Korean officials. Although some advisers urged Chun to respond militarily, Chun, supported by Washington, did not retaliate (Oberdorfer 1997:143). During the third transition, North Korean agents bombed a Korean Air Lines airliner, killing all 115 people aboard. Another round of tension seized the peninsula in 1992, when North Korea threatened to acquire nuclear weapons. Crisis on the peninsula was averted by the 1994 Agreed Framework. In sum, during Korea’s three transitions, North Korean behavior grew more provocative, but Seoul neither initiated crises nor responded to Pyongyang’s provocations.

Inter-Korean relations during the 1987–1992 period actually showed great improvement. In 1988, President Roh announced Nordpolitik, a policy aimed at improving relations with North Korea and normalizing relations with its Communist allies. In 1989, he outlined a new a gradualist and evolutionary approach to reunification (the “Korean National Community”). In 1990, the two Koreas agreed to hold reciprocal visits in Seoul and Pyongyang, which led to further meetings in 1991 that produced historic agreements on reconciliation, nonaggression, denuclearization, and exchanges and cooperation. As the Economist wrote, “the Korean Peninsula looked a little safer this week.” After the nuclear issue was resolved in 1994, bilateral relations grew warmer as time passed; Kim Dae-jung pursued through his “Sunshine policy” a policy of engagement with Pyongyang.

Far from creating conditions that worsened inter-Korean relations, South Korean democratization gave Seoul greater foreign policy freedom toward the North. South Korean military leaders had long used the Communist threat as grounds to seize power, prolong their terms in office, and discredit political opponents. After democratization conferred electoral legitimacy upon political leaders, “One could now support a policy of engagement with North Korea or call for peaceful coexistence without fear of being branded politically illegitimate” (Cha 2003:207). In addition, electoral competition forced conservatives to reach out to the North, lest they lose ground to the opposition on the unification issue. Roh’s Nordpolitik both reduced tensions on the peninsula and undercut the opposition (Kihl 1995:130; Kil 2001:130, 183). Democratization, then, had many beneficial effects on inter-Korean relations.

---

7 In 1965, South Korea deployed 20,000 military forces to Vietnam. The Park administration was reluctant to involve Korea in the war for fear of weakening homeland defense; however, it did so as a result of pressure and financial incentives from its US ally.

8 Between 1953 and 1962, North Korea provoked 71 incidents of violence in the DMZ (armed attacks, exchange of fire, incursions). Between 1963 and 1967, there were 292; there were nearly a thousand between 1967 and 1969 (Lee 2001).

9 Chosun Ilbo, August 1, 1963; August 16, 1963; April 14, 1967.

10 January 4, 1992:30.
Korea–Japan relations also improved during Korean democratization. Park’s policy toward Japan was one of peaceful engagement. During the first period, American aid was declining, at a time when the Korean population was making greater demands on government resources, and the government sought to finance expensive developmental projects. Park thus pushed for diplomatic normalization and closer ties with Japan in the interest of economic gains for Korea. He was not alone: Prime Minister Chung Il-kwon declared, “the nation cannot expect substantial economic growth without successful conclusion of the Korean-Japanese normalization talks, which will spur economic cooperation between the two countries.”

Regarding the potential flashpoint of the Tokdo/Takeshima dispute, Park agreed to table the issue in order to normalize relations. Government documents recently released in Korea also show that Park had sought to conclude a normalization agreement prior to the 1963 election, with the goal of enhancing his electoral chances. In order to expedite normalization, he had made important concessions with Japan on a fisheries dispute, reducing Seoul’s demand for an exclusive fishing zone from 40 to 12 miles. Park’s conciliatory diplomacy toward Japan—conducted in the interest of economic development—led to a period in Japan–ROK relations that scholars characterize as “cordial” and “harmonious.”

Peaceful and productive relations also prevailed during Korea’s next transition (1980–1984). The era was not without rancor; ongoing disputes resurfaced about the Korean CIA’s 1973 kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung from Tokyo, the treatment of ethnic Koreans in Japan, and omissions from Japanese history textbooks (Cha 1999: chapter 6). But no South Korean leaders argued for hawkish behavior toward Japan, and in the end, put disputes aside in favor of productive diplomacy. The two countries held their first summit meeting ever in 1983, and the following year concluded a $4 billion loan agreement, accompanied by official apologies from the Japanese Emperor and Prime Minister for past Japanese aggression. Seoul reacted to significant Japanese increases in military participation during this time not with alarm or criticism, but instead with approval and support, and calls for increased security cooperation (Lind 2008: chapter 2).

Despite persistent disputes—Tokdo/Takeshima and the legacy of World War II (Lind 2008)—relations between South Korea and Japan continued to improve in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Japanese–ROK relations were arguably at their most tense not during a period of democratization, but during a reversal to autocracy in the 1970s (Cha 1999: chapter 4). Since Korean democratization, the Tokdo/Takeshima issue has at times become re-energized; the issue regularly sends crowds of demonstrators into the streets of Seoul, and bilateral relations grew tense in 1996–1997 over South Korea’s construction of a wharf and conduct of military exercises on the disputed islands. However, these episodes of nationalist posturing cannot be attributed to Korean democratization: they

---

13 Dong-a Ilbo, August 27, 2005.
14 See also Dong-a Ilbo, May 7, 1994; International Herald Tribune, July 18, 2001.
persist after the transition to full democracy, notably with another round in 2005–2006.16

**Nationalist Persuasion and Logrolling?**

Electoral campaigns during Korea’s democratic transitions did not reflect hawkish, nationalist rhetoric. South Koreans vote heavily along regional lines rather than according to issues.17 To the extent that campaigns focused on issues at all, they emphasized domestic concerns. In 1963, the most prominent issue was the political legitimacy of Park and the military junta (Kim and Koh 1972:844; Oh 1999b:276–287). Opposition candidates—notably Yun Po-sun, Park’s chief opponent—urged voters to oust people linked to the junta in order to restore democracy. Park’s Democratic Republican Party (DRP), for its part, emphasized economic development and “flayed the opposition leaders as believers of tarnished democracy and toadyism” (Oh 1968:166). Similar themes played out in the 1963 legislative election campaigns (Oh 1968:169). In the 1967 elections, the ruling DRP touted its successful economic development and called for political stabilization and modernization. The opposition countered by arguing that only a privileged few benefited from recent economic gains. (Oh 1968:176–178, 1999b:325) After Park’s 1967 re-election, the opposition again focused on decrying “the autocratic rule of the President” (Oh 1968:183).

The 1987 campaign also featured the themes of democracy versus authoritarianism. Advocating reform, the opposition lambasted the ruling Democratic Justice Party’s (DJP) candidate, Roh Tae-woo, as a continuation of authoritarianism. Roh campaigned (and won) on the issues of political stability and economic prosperity (Okonogi 1993). The 1988 legislative election campaign also focused on domestic issues. Opposition politicians charged the DJP with culpability for the 1980 Kwangju massacre and accused the party of rampant corruption, citing scandals involving former President Chun’s family (Kim 1993:114–116). DJP candidates, on the other hand, promised to investigate scandals, accused the opposition of exaggerating improprieties, and emphasized the need for a continued DJP majority to maintain political stability. In 1992, the presidential campaign was dominated by concerns about social disorder and the weakening economy (Lee 1995:36). Once again, foreign policy took a back seat: as one scholar noted, “the domestic policy agenda of economic growth and social welfare seems to be more salient to middle-class voters...than the distant issues of reunification or foreign policy” (Kihl 1995:137).

When foreign policy issues did arise in South Korean elections during periods of democratic transition, no one advocated hawkish policies. In 1963, Park’s DRP called for normalization and economic cooperation with Japan. Yun and other opposition leaders criticized Park’s negotiations with Japan as humiliating for Korea and argued that Korea’s trade deficit vis-à-vis Japan must be corrected (Oh 1968:178–179).18 The opposition tried to create a scandal linking Park and the DRP to a North Korean official and claimed that the DRP was financially supported by Pyongyang. Opposition leaders decried Korean participation in the Vietnam war, arguing against further troop deployments while the DRP argued that the ROK must contribute to the US-led effort. In the 1987 election, foreign policy issues entered into the headlines upon North Korea’s bombing of the KAL airliner. (Okonogi 1993; Oh 1999a:96) In response, Roh Tae-woo advocated restraint, an approach endorsed by his electorate: as James Cotton (1993:33)

---


17 In the 1987 election, for example, Kim Dae-jung (of Cholla province) received 81% of the Cholla vote, and only 3 percent of the vote in Kyongsang province. In that same election, Kim Young Sam (of Kyongsang province) received 69 percent of the Kyongsang vote, and only 3 percent of the Cholla vote. See Kang (2003:165); Kim and Koh (1972:846).

argues, Roh benefited from a large body of voters who were “prepared to vote for the governing party either through fear of the likely chaos of any alternative or because of the government’s able handling of such vital issues as South Korea’s security....” In sum, other than these issues, domestic topics dominated political campaigns; most importantly, politicians did not attempt to curry favor with voters by advocating hawkish strategies toward either Japan or North Korea—even amidst Pyongyang’s provocations.

During Korean transitions, the groups who might have logrolled for hawkish foreign policies did not do so. Park Chung-hee was a former military leader who retained close ties to the military; Chun Doo Hwan (leader during the second transitional period in the early 1980s) was also a former military commander. Thus, during both periods of rule, the military indeed exerted tremendous influence in ROK governance during this period—the extent of which was regularly the topic of domestic protests and election campaigns. Nonetheless, the military did not push for hawkish foreign policies toward North Korea or Japan. Regarding the latter, surveys show the military to be a strong supporter of Kim’s policy of normalization with Tokyo in the interest of national economic development (Lovell, Sok, and Lee 1969).

During the first democratic transition, the business community strongly supported the ruling DRP and its policy of economic cooperation with Japan. The powerful Korean Businessmen’s Association (KBA) funneled political campaigns to the DRP, excluding the opposition. The KBA stated in 1965 that “for the sake of economic development and promotion of trade, Korea’s normalization with Japan is mandatory, and therefore the KBA approves of the Government policy vis-à-vis Japan.” Business interests showed even broader support through the pronouncements of the National Federation of Industrial, Commercial, and Business Associations, a grouping of 97 different associations formed in 1965. During the national debate over ratification of the normalization treaty, the Federation proclaimed its support for “a new relationship” with Japan.

After 1987, odd coalitions did form in ROK politics, but no evidence suggests that a coalition member sought overseas adventurism or had such an agenda come to fruition through a logroll. Longtime opposition and pro-democracy leader Kim Young-sam performed a shocking turnaround when he formed a “Grand Alliance” in 1990 that included his former arch-enemies from the Democratic Justice Party, and Kim Jong-pil’s New Democratic Republican Party. Having campaigned under the message of “stability,” their new party would rule until 1997.

During this third transition period, the role of the military diminished considerably while the influence of the business community increased. President Kim Young-sam purged a long-standing and politically active faction of the army, the Hanahoe. The military’s formerly substantial political influence was thus greatly reduced; it did not form political alliances to promote a hawkish agenda. The business community, for its part, was growing more politically influential. Scholars attribute increased business influence to democratization: the skyrocketing costs of election campaigns and the need for campaign donations (Moon 1994; Kang 2002: chapter 6). Attempts by politicians to pass economic reforms that would close off tax dodges and limit expansion of the large conglomerates (chaebol) were met with open threats from powerful business leaders to cut off or redirect vital campaign contributions. In response to reform sought by Roh Tae-woo,
the chairman of the Korean Federation of Industries said that his organization ‘‘would henceforth provide donations only to politicians willing to support and protect business freedom’’ (Moon 1994:155; Oh 1999a: chapter 7; Kang 2000:220–244). Reform invariably stalled. ROK business leaders have also sought direct political power, as evinced by the presidential candidacy of Hyundai founder Chung Ju-yang (Kang 2000:101).

While the Korean business community clearly enjoys tremendous influence in economic policy, no evidence suggests that businesses use their influence to push for confrontational foreign policies. As later demonstrated by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, ‘‘deeper integration into the international and regional system through globalization made South Korea vulnerable to the transmission of external pressures and turbulence’’ (Oh 1999a: 217; Moon and Lim 2001:223). The ROK’s business community thus has an interest in foreign policies that promote stability, rather than those that divert capital away from Korea, or cause a stock market crash. Toward North Korea, the business community has recently been a key partner in implementing the Sunshine policy; the chaebol have responded positively to government incentives for trade and investment with the North (Winder 2001).

In sum, three cases of South Korean democratic transition show that politicians did not engage in nationalist persuasion during electoral campaigns, and logrolls did not form in support of hawkish foreign policies. Both the military and business community supported stability in foreign relations with Japan and North Korea.

Taiwan

Following its defeat in the Chinese civil war (1949), the Nationalist party, or Kuomintang (KMT), fled the mainland to the island of Taiwan, and, under the leadership of General Chiang Kai-shek, succeeded in consolidating power. Both the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing claimed to be the rightful governments of one China (consisting of the mainland and Taiwan). The KMT imposed martial law in Taiwan, under which it would rule for forty years. Demonstrations and strikes were prohibited, political parties were illegal, and voting occurred only in local-level elections. General Chiang’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, became premier in 1972.

Taiwan’s democratization occurred in the late 1980s with political reforms initiated by Chiang Ching-kuo and his successor Lee Teng-hui. Elderly mainlanders dominated the KMT at that time; Chiang—himself failing in health—sought to increase KMT legitimacy and secure its future dominance by opening up the party to younger, ethnically Taiwanese politicians. In 1985, he selected Lee as his vice president and successor. Lee was a native-born Taiwanese: a respected economist and experienced politician. Chiang lifted martial law in 1987, before his death the following year.

Lee replaced Chiang and presided over several further reforms. The opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and other political parties were legalized in 1989; the ‘‘Temporary Provisions’’ (which had provided the president with unlimited authority and justified the postponement of general elections since 1948) were rescinded in 1991. Furthermore, Taiwan’s Council of Grand Justices ruled that all mainland-elected KMT politicians would face enforced retirement in 1991. As a result of these reforms, Taiwan held its first elections for the Legislative Yuan in December 1991: a hotly contested race that ended in a KMT landslide. KMT leader Lee was elected to the presidency in Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996. The presidency shifted to the opposition when DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian was elected president in 2000. According to Polity III, Taiwan’s first democratic transition occurred after 1987
(shift from autocracy to mixed regime). It then shifted to full democracy after 1991.  

During both of these transition periods, Taiwan was deeply integrated in the global economy. Since its shift away from a strategy of import-substitution industrialization in the late 1950s, Taiwan pursued an export-led growth model whose spectacular success (growth rates upwards of nine percent per year) earned it the moniker of one of Asia’s “tigers.” Economic ties held additional significance to Taipei; its political isolation and the threat from the PRC meant that “international economic ties had a crucial political function, serving as a surrogate for formal political relationships” (Haggard 1990:146).

In Taiwan, mainland China might have been a primary target around which to mobilize xenophobic nationalism. Nationalist politicians would be unlikely to argue for war (given Taiwan’s small size and population), but they might have sought to destabilize the Beijing regime, or advocated limited military attacks in peripheral areas (as occurred in the 1950s under Chiang Kai-shek). Alternatively, nationalist politicians might have advocated Taiwanese independence or moves in that direction.

Relations with the PRC
Taiwan did not instigate either a war or military crisis during its periods of democratic transition. China, for its part, did initiate a military crisis in July 1995 when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted weeklong military exercises and fired four M-9 missiles into the East China Sea, north of Taiwan. This occurred less than 1 month after President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States to attend his Cornell University reunion: a visit decried by Beijing as a couched effort toward a stronger strategic relationship with Washington. Next, in the month prior to Taiwan’s first direct presidential elections in 1996, the PLA massed 150,000 troops on China’s southeastern coast for military exercises. The PLA fired missiles into the Taiwan Strait for eight days and conducted joint ground, air, and sea exercises aimed at a forced amphibious landing as well as a sea and air blockade (Mann 1998: chapter 17). Because of these exercises, commercial aviation and shipping were diverted from the area under Chinese fire, and the Taiwanese military was put on high alert.

China clearly initiated the crisis because of Taiwanese democratization. Beijing announced in 1995 that its actions were provoked by Lee’s plot with “some people” in the United States to declare Taiwanese independence (Mann 1998: chapter 17). Taiwan’s democratization also provoked the next phase of the crisis: Beijing’s attempt to intimidate Taiwanese voters in the 1996 election. Chinese officials stated that by firing the missiles, they sought “to curb continuing efforts by Taiwan’s President toward independence for the island.” Said the Vice-Chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, Kao Koong-liang, “Beijing is clearly using military means to attain political ends. It is attempting to influence popular morale and to obstruct the development of our constitutional democracy.”

Although the military crisis was indeed linked to Taiwan’s democratization, it is important to note that events did not play out as expected by democratization.

---

23 Jaggers and Gurr (1995). Polity III reports no change after 1991; it codes Taiwan as continuing as anocratic (mixed) after 1991 (the data set ends in 1994). However, I also evaluate the 1991–1995 period, for three reasons: first, two of the three component indices used by Mansfield and Snyder (2005) to measure regime type report a shift after 1991; the more recent Polity IV data set codes a shift from anocracy to democracy in 1991 (Marshall and Jaggers 2003); finally, most Taiwan scholars characterize the early 1990s as a key period in the country’s democratization.

and war theory. China, not Taiwan, initiated the violence. This parallels the Korean case, in which Pyongyang engaged in provocations in order to influence ROK elections. These cases provide evidence for a possible alternate theory that expects one state’s democratization to lead to international conflict based on its effects on other states (Mansfield and Snyder 2005:129). Such a theory has yet to be developed; it would require greater specification, and identification and testing of causal processes.

Nationalistic Persuasion and Logrolling?

Democratization did lead Taiwan to become more nationalistic—in the basic sense that Taiwan increasingly began to view itself as a nation. The overturning of martial law and the Temporary Provisions shifted focus away from the Chinese civil war and led the KMT to drop its claim of ruling all of China. Thus increasingly, Taiwan began to see itself as a distinct polity: neither ruling the mainland nor being ruled by it. The 1992 revision of the sedition law de-criminalized political speech advocating Taiwanese independence and legalized political activity by opposition parties. Therefore, it became legal both for the DPP to participate in Taiwanese politics and to discuss its pro-independence platform.

Just as democratization increased the supply of such ideas, it also increased the demand for them through empowerment of the previously underrepresented ethnic Taiwanese majority. Native Taiwanese were a younger generation with no connections to, and little interest in, the mainland. Politicians such as Lee Teng-hui began to cultivate these voters by asserting a distinct Taiwanese identity; his statements occasionally provoked outrage from Beijing (Chao and Myers 1998:292). Furthermore, Lee’s creation of a new civic nationalism based on loyalty and service to democratic Taiwan made the prospect of unification with the authoritarian Chinese mainland less likely or desirable (Chu and Diamond 1999:820). In sum, democratization promoted the creation of a distinct Taiwanese nationalism, the manifestations of which angered Beijing and raised tensions.

Although democratization did promote greater Taiwanese nationalism in the literal sense, Taiwan did not exhibit the destabilizing pathologies—xenophobic nationalism and logrolling—that democratization and war theory expects to cause war. No Taiwanese politician advocated hard-line policies toward the mainland; electoral campaigns did not reflect a spiral of aggressive or jingoistic sentiment. And importantly, the nationalist card flopped at the polls: the public punished candidates who advocated independence. In the 1991 campaign, the DPP amended its platform to declare explicitly its goal of declaring Taiwanese independence through a national plebiscite (Leng and Lin 1993:826). The KMT countered with scare ads that depicted the tragedy of civil wars around the world and recounted “decades of threatening statements from Beijing to prove the DPP’s irresponsibility and recklessness” (Wachman 1994:208–210; Rigger 2001:126). Tellingly, the DPP’s performance in 1991 was its worst ever. Analysts concurred, “The adamant secessionist calls apparently scared away voters” (Wachman 1994; Jia 2001:194–196; Rigger 2001:127). In the 1996 presidential elections, advocating Taiwanese independence proved a political liability. DPP moderates pleaded in vain with their candidate, Peng Ming-min, to downplay the independence issue (Rigger 2001:127). Frightened by Chinese missile testing and military exercises, voters rewarded caution: Lee Teng-hui trounced Peng with nearly double the number of votes. After some of these losses, the DPP concluded it had to moderate its position on independence in order to get elected (Rigger 2001:100). The party did better in the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections after toning down its pro-independence message (Wachman 1994:214). This trend continued past the democratic transition period; Chen Shui-bian calculated in the

2000 elections that he had to “neutralize the issue on which he was the most vulnerable—cross-strait relations—by moving toward the center” (Diamond 2001: 69; Jia 2001:194; Rigger 2001).

Furthermore, Taipei’s most provocative behavior, under DPP President Chen, cannot be attributed to democratic transition: it occurred a decade too late. Chen’s characterization of “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” outraged Beijing. Chen also held a national referendum concurrent with the March 2004 elections, which (though not on the topic of independence) sought to promote the use of referenda in Taiwanese politics. Still more incendiary was his decision to schedule a referendum with the 2008 presidential election about whether to apply for the United Nations under the name of “Taiwan.” The timing of these events in Taiwan’s political evolution means they cannot be attributed to democratic transition. And as before, the Taiwanese people repudiated Chen’s provocations. Scholars argue that his electoral victories reflect “electoral aberrations rather than the popularity of his policy toward the mainland”: the KMT party split in 2000, and the assassination attempt on Chen prior to the 2004 election (Ross 2006:143). Voters continue to prefer the KMT’s more cautious cross-strait policies and to punish the DPP for provocative behavior.

Taiwanese democratic transitions also show no signs that the military or other actors logrolled for hawkish foreign policies. Under martial law, the military enjoyed the tremendous political power that came from its responsibility for maintaining internal security. It also intervened actively in domestic politics and was not accountable to civilian authority. But since Taiwan’s democratization, the military has a diminished political role. The repeal of the Temporary Provisions in 1987 terminated martial law and thus the military’s internal security mission; in 1992, the disbanding of the Taiwan Garrison Command accorded all domestic policing to civilian police. Legal reforms have created accountability to civilian authority (Fravel 2002:70–71). Finally, the number of military men in the KMT’s Central Standing Committee decreased substantially relative to earlier years; active duty military officers are no longer allowed to hold government positions (Huang 1996:118–119). Thus, Taiwanese democratization reduced the military’s political power.

Although it is uncertain whether someday the military might attempt to influence Taiwan’s cross-strait policy, what is certain is that the military would restrain rather than incite. In 1992, Premier Hau Pei-tsun (a former Chief of the General Staff) said that the military would oppose a declaration of Taiwanese independence, even one resulting from a democratic referendum. In other words, Hau essentially said that the military would stage a coup d’etat against any civilian regime that declared independence (Fravel 2002:66). Thus, Taiwan’s democratization did not lead its military to lobby for adventurist foreign policies.

---

31 The military’s Taiwan Garrison Command served as the domestic police force; military courts prosecuted treason and sedition cases; the National Security Bureau spied on dissidents and censored journalists and publications deemed hostile to the KMT regime (Fravel 2002).
32 Military officers enjoyed leading positions in government, including the governorship of Taiwan; 20–30% of the members of the KMT’s highest leadership body, the Central Standing Committee, were military officers (Huang 1996:118–119); on the military’s lack of accountability to civilians see Fravel (2002:69).
33 The National Security Bureau’s mission shifted away from spying on internal enemies of the KMT and was reorganized toward external threats. The shift from internal to external missions was also reflected in military downsizing and modernization (Fravel 2002:68).
Taiwanese business interests, for their part, do have substantial influence in Taiwanese politics. Scholars note that democratization “unleashed burgeoning corruption” in Taiwan; political campaigns grew prohibitively expensive, requiring candidates to collect large campaign contributions. (Chu 1994:121; Clark 2002:24) The increasing power of legislatures, and infrastructure expansion in the 1990s, enabled politicians to bestow more favors to allies within industry. These factors also led to a boom in “black and gold” politics (organized crime and money), provoking numerous political scandals in the 1990s (Hood 1996:473–475). Businesspeople used political connections to obtain contracts and preferential loans and to influence the stock market (Clark 2002:25).

While it is clear that Taiwanese businesses have access to and influence over politicians, they express a clear preference for international stability and conciliation. Taiwan’s stock market plummets each time there is a hint of crisis with the mainland. Interviews with business leaders after later DPP election victories reflected anxiety within the business community about stability under DPP governance (Chen and Chu 2001:215). Taiwanese firms do not lobby Taipei for independence; instead, they pressure politicians to eschew either unification or independence in favor of economic stability and to lift further the regulations that inhibit the expansion of cross-strait economic ties (Chu 1999:176). Taiwanese businesses have substantial foreign direct investment in the mainland; Taiwan is the PRC’s second-largest investor. Absorbing a quarter of Taiwan’s exports, the mainland is Taiwan’s largest export market (Chen and Chu 2001:219). Lee Teng-hui fended off incessant demands from his business community for lifting restrictions on cross-strait commerce; business leaders lobby the DPP for expansion of commercial ties with the mainland. Many analysts conclude that to capture and sustain support from the economic community, the DPP will have to further expand cross-strait ties. It is clear from their behavior that not only would Taiwanese businesses not lead a logroll for an arms buildup or military adventurism, they would strenuously oppose others’ efforts in that direction.

Policies pursued by both Taipei and Beijing reflect a belief in economic interdependence theory: that Taiwan’s substantial trade and financial links to the mainland raise the economic and political costs of a Taiwanese declaration of independence, thus making it less likely. Beijing has assiduously cultivated cross-strait ties with this in mind (Leng 1996; Chu 1999:180; Cheng 2005). Taipei, seeming to agree with Beijing’s reasoning, has been reluctant to expand these ties, despite pressure from its business community to do so. As one scholar summarizes, “imperatives of cross-strait economic interdependence do complicate the strategic choices of the state elite and make its members more susceptible for growing demands for more stable cross-strait relations” (Chu 2004:511).

In sum, the case of Taiwan does not reflect hawkish nationalism during its democratic transition. As Etel Solingen (1998:31) has written, the pursuit of internationalist strategies in both Taiwan and South Korea “required downgrading regional conflict and efforts to enhance cooperation”; both these countries pursued “the least confrontational postures possible under a highly adversarial regional context.”

**Japan**

Japan surrendered from World War II on August 15, 1945, and was subjected to military occupation by the United States. US occupational authorities introduced

---

a new constitution, land reform, education reform, and voting rights for women. The Japanese Diet was established as the supreme organ of state power, from which was drawn a prime minister and twelve cabinet members. Japan’s democratic transition thus began when Tokyo regained sovereignty in 1952 (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). At this time, Japan adopted the “Yoshida doctrine,” a grand strategy named for Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, who directed the country toward economic growth as the primary national goal (Pyle 1996:252). According to this strategy, Japan embraced alliance with the United States, membership in international institutions, and an export-led growth model.

In the early 1950s, Japan was in no position to advocate the use of expansionist foreign policies: its military had largely been destroyed in the war or dismantled in the occupation. The United States was recently an occupier and now an ally stationing huge numbers of forces on Japanese soil; the US–Japan Security Treaty gave the United States the authority to quell domestic disturbances in Japan, and surely Washington would also have restrained Japan from launching wars of aggression. Thus, war was not a realistic option for Japan during this period.

Rather, nationalist persuasion or logrolling might have been evinced in the issue areas of rearmament and territorial claims. First, Japan was in the process of rearming and logrolling between political conservatives, and the military could have led to an extensive arms buildup—a policy encouraged by Washington after its decision to build up Japan as an anti-Soviet ally. Second, in addition to losing its empire, Japan lost some of its own territory in the war: notably, the Kurile Islands to the North (ceded to the Soviet Union) and the Ryukyu Islands to the South (including Okinawa—seized by the Americans during the war). Japan also disputed the sovereignty of the Tokdo/Takeshima islands with Korea. Thus, nationalistic politicians or coalitions might have advocated Japanese rearmament, and the restoration of Japanese sovereignty to lost or disputed islands.

In Japan’s political landscape, the Left (the Socialist and Communist parties) advocated neutrality in the cold war standoff, and a pan-Asian foreign policy. They favored close political–economic relations with China were divided on the desirability of closeness with the Soviet Union and were opposed to the US–Japan alliance and to military rearmament (Dower 1979; Berger 1998). Toward the center were the “Liberal” factions of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which supported the Yoshida doctrine. Favoring stability and economic growth above all else, these centrists were strongly anti-Communist and advocated alliance with the United States because it would protect Japan from internal and external Communist threats while minimizing Japan’s defense burden. These factions accepted the trade-offs of this alignment (severance of ties with Communist China and US bases in Japan and Okinawa), but negotiated strongly with Washington to shield Japan from the costs and risks of the alliance: Japanese rearmament and entrapment in American conventional or nuclear wars. Finally, scholars characterize the former Democratic Party factions of the LDP as the Japanese “Right.” Gaullist factions advocated a foreign policy more independent from the United States, and a more robust rearmament and level of military activism. They resented the problems associated with US alignment, particularly the wedge Washington had driven between Tokyo and Beijing. Some wanted to restore relations with the Soviet Union; many wanted close relations with the Kuomintang on Taiwan.

---

38 The LDP was formed by the 1955 merger of the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party: two fiercely competitive conservative parties that each had their own internal competitive factions. The LDP is thus best perceived as a group of hyper-competitive factions whose politics run from center to right of center. For description, see Scalapino and Masumi (1962).
Nationalist Persuasion or Logrolling?

Japanese political parties of this era did discuss and campaign on territorial issues, but these issues clearly ran secondary to other political goals. Leftists sought the return of the northern islands occupied by the Soviet Union, and the return of the American-held Ryukyus. In 1950, the Socialists declared that “sovereignty over Okinawa, Osagawara, Chishima, Habomai, Shikotan, and the southern half of Karafuto [Sakhalin] should rest with Japan...” They reiterated this position at a 1951 party convention and campaigned on the issue in the 1955 elections (Watanabe 1970:114, 116). Because the Left advocated normalization and close relations with the Soviet Union, the island dispute threatened Communist unity; thus, Leftists preferred to emphasize claims against the American possession of the southern islands. For the Left, normalizing and cultivating relations with the Soviet Union was more important than the territorial issue.

Although LDP leaders also made appeals about territorial issues, it is equally clear in their case that territorial claims were secondary to other goals. On the right, some Gaullists (such as Hatoyama Ichiro) were loathe to interfere with Japanese–Soviet normalization, so spoke only vaguely about territorial issues (Morris 1960:121). During Hatoyama’s tenure as Prime Minister, his administration agreed with Moscow to shelve the issue in favor of normalization (Hellmann 1969:35). The more pro-American and more fiercely anti-Communist politicians on the Right advocated a return of the northern territories, but “rarely extended their irredentist demands to the American-held islands” (Morris 1960:66). Centrists preferred to downplay the territorial issue in the South because of problems it might cause within the US–Japan alliance (Morris 1960:130). Akio Watanabe notes that when Socialists raise the southern territorial issue, “The conservatives are embarrassed and try to reject the Socialist proposals,” and “try to offset the effect of such resolutions by combining the problem of the northern territories with that of Okinawa” (Watanabe 1970:102). In other words, the LDP tried to discourage the Socialists from pursuing the territorial issue by linking the southern claim (the LDP’s political hot potato) to the northern claim (the Socialists’ hot potato). In sum, while political leaders did raise territorial issues during this period, none advocated hawkish policies as a means of solving any territorial dispute, and leaders took care not to pursue territorial issues to the point that they threatened other policy priorities.

Evidence does show that public pressure and electoral competition forced politicians to at least pay lip service to the territorial issue, even if they preferred to dodge it. Both Japanese and American elites understood that silence on the territorial issue would be an electoral liability. An American official commented, “The conservatives cannot afford to allow the Socialists to become the sole supporters of Ryukyuan appeals to Japanese nationalism for protection and intervention” (Department of State 1956:5). Another US government analyst noted that because the Socialists’ “brotherly concern for the Ryukyuans” strongly resonated with the Japanese public, conservatives “would render themselves highly vulnerable if they were to acknowledge specifically that US administration of the Ryukyus...was important to the security of Japan, for this would be tantamount to an admission of complete bankruptcy as a government” (Swayne 1961:8; see also Watanabe 1970:158). To armor themselves against criticism from the Socialists and to appear pro-active to the public, the LDP set up a special committee on the Okinawa problem in 1956.39 Prime Minister Kishi Nobosuke was forced

---

39 The topic of Okinawa was absent from the Japanese press until 1955 (Dower 1999:434). However, in 1956, the issue made headlines in Japan because of a program proposed by the US Price Subcommittee Report on Okinawa, which recommended lump-sum payments to purchase title to Okinawan lands for base usage. This aroused strong opposition in Japan because people thought it meant “in effect establishment of a US sovereign area in Japanese territory” (Watanabe 1970:38).
by the pressure of public opinion and electoral competition with the Socialists to make tough statements about Okinawa; he raised the issue during his meeting with US President Eisenhower in 1957, and the issue was included in the Joint Communiqué issued after their meeting (Declassified Documents Collection 1957; see also Watanabe 1970:38).

Politicians of the time could have made nationalist appeals that would have been truly destabilizing and would have increased the odds of crises or wars; instead, Japanese leaders raised territorial issues that would go nowhere. Because Japan lacked any ability to challenge the Soviet Union or United States, calls for the return of either the Northern Territories or the Ryukyus were non-starters. Politicians might have taken a stand on issues that Japan had a better chance of influencing; for example, Japanese disputes with Korea.40 Instead, the Left focused on territorial issues of the Ryukyus, knowing nothing could be done in the short term; many politicians on the Right focused on the Kuriles, knowing Japan could never use force to evict the Soviets. Although demands to Seoul may not have been very likely to succeed due to likely US intervention, they were more likely to succeed than a claim against one of the superpowers.

Although Japanese leaders perceived that they had to raise the territorial issue, lest they be punished at the polls, no evidence suggests that any party pursued the territorial issue seriously. Certainly no evidence suggests that in their territorial claims, Japanese politicians took a hard line, let alone advocated military aggression.

Regarding the issue of rearmament, there is still less evidence of calls by Japanese leaders to restore Japan’s military to its former might. As noted, the Left (in keeping with the original interpretation of Japan’s postwar constitution) viewed any military forces as illegal.41 The LDP’s Yoshida school advocated rearmament to minimally satisfy the United States of Japanese burden-sharing. Centrists viewed rearmament not as a political rallying cry, but as an extreme political liability, given the strongly anti-militarist and pro-neutralist strain in Japanese public opinion. This sentiment was evident in several political crises, the most serious of which was the crisis over the US–Japan Security Treaty revision in 1960 (Scalapino and Masumi 1962: chapter 5; Packard 1966). Yoshida told Dulles in 1951 that if he agreed to the American plan for Japan’s large-scale rearmament and membership in a NATO-like regional alliance, Yoshida would be assassinated (Welfield 1988:161).42 The Prime Minister conducted a public political campaign against rearmament, citing “fears of Japanese militarism still present in Asia and the Pacific, the incompatibility of massive rearmament with economic recovery, and public opinion” (Welfield 1988:48). As noted, some politicians did advocate larger military forces; the Gaullists wanted large-scale rearmament, greater military activism, and more independence from the United States. However, Japan followed the course chartered by Yoshida of minimal rearmament and reliance on the US–Japan alliance.

In the Japan case, coalitions of military, politicians, or business interests did not logroll toward a military buildup. The dovish foreign policy and minimal rearmament advocated by most Japanese politicians has already been noted. Additionally, the role of the Japanese military was severely diminished in postwar politics. Former Imperial military officers were active in the Japanese

---

40 Both the Left and the LDP loathed Syngman Rhee’s regime in Seoul, and the American commitment to Korea was hardly certain in the 1950s. On Japan–ROK relations of the time, see Welfield (1988:91–93). Though militarily weak, Tokyo might have engaged in the sorts of activities pursued by the similarly weak ROK in the early 1950s.

41 Article 9 of Japan’s constitution bans the possession of military forces. Over time, this has been interpreted to mean military forces for offensive purposes. Until the 1970s, the Socialists embraced the initial, literal interpretation of Article 9 and argued that Japan’s “Self-Defense Forces” were illegal.

42 see also Asahi Shinbun, February 13, 1964.
government—natural political allies of Japanese Gaullists—and they did push for greater rearmament. An example is the plan of the politically influential Colonel Hattori, who proposed an autonomous army of 15–20 divisions in peacetime, and 50 divisions in times of war. But, “totally at variance with the modest, civilian-controlled defence programme advocated by the Yoshida Government,” Hattori’s plans were rejected by Yoshida and other civilian defense officials (Morris 1960:220).

Finally, although business and agricultural communities did enjoy close ties to and influence over LDP politicians, these ties did not produce destabilizing log-rolls. Conceptualizations of the Japanese policy-making process at this time range from the “Japan, Inc.” model—in which big business dictates policy to contribution-hungry politicians—to the “elitist” model, in which Japan is governed by a triple alliance between big business, the LDP, and the bureaucracy (Scalapino and Masumi 1962: chapter 4; Curtis 1975). Evidence from the time period in question shows that the business community overwhelmingly supported the LDP, whose prevailing foreign policy emphasized economic recovery and repairing Japan’s tarnished international image. The business community evinced the same diversity of preferences as the LDP itself—for example, some preferred normalization and trade with China and the USSR rather than close alliance with the United States. However, as one financial journalist summarized at the time, “The aim of the economic community is to establish long-term economic stability” (quoted in Thayer 1969:68). Business leaders supported policies that fostered stable economic conditions; no one was lobbying for conflicts over islands, and the firms that supported greater rearmament did not prevail.

Findings, Counterarguments, and Conclusions

The Economist has wondered whether in Asia, “economic integration will in the end restrain political hot heads?” Based on IR theory and evidence from past democratization in the region, this article says yes: that China and Korea are unlikely to pursue nationalistic, belligerent foreign policies during their future political transitions.

This article examined theories making competing claims about the stability of these upcoming transitions (theories within the “democratization and war” school and economic interdependence theory). In the cases of previous East Asian transitions, process-tracing evidence shows that the destabilizing processes expected by the broad version of democratization and war theory were not present. Politicians did not pursue prestige strategies overseas in order to curry favor with a jingoistic public, and logrolls for hawkish policies did not form. Rather, consistent with the more recent and narrower version of this theory within this school, domestic institutions were robust enough to manage the demands of transition without unleashing nationalistic, belligerent foreign policies.

Furthermore, each case exhibits the pacifying role of economic interdependence. Economic actors served as restraining, moderating forces, and democratization only increased their influence in the policy-making process. Because of the disruption costs associated with international strife, foreign expansionism was not the preferred goal for which business leaders would be willing to trade favors with coalition partners; quite the contrary, they viewed international instability as a scenario to be avoided at all costs. As Solingen (1998:12) argues, the time at which these transitions took place, which allowed the option of a trading state strategy, “produces a different set of actors and different proclivities among them than might have been expected from existing coalitional frameworks, prominently that of Snyder.” In other words, given the internationalist strategies
pursued by these states, the business community sought to avoid war and instead "logrolled for peace."

The Future East Asian Transitions

Many scholars have speculated that political transitions in China and Korea could lead to the stoking of xenophobic, jingoistic nationalism and the adoption of hawkish foreign policies (Bachman 2000:209; Gilley 2004; Goldstein 2005:95; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Bass 2006). To be sure, both countries have powerful grievances that could fuel nationalistic mobilization. China is aggrieved about its "century of humiliation" vis-à-vis the great powers (Gries 2004: chapter 3; Schell 2008). Disputes with the United States (the EP-3 incident, the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade) previously triggered widespread protests across China. Furthermore, the Chinese resent Japan not only for its invasion and brutal occupation in the 1930s and 1940s, but also for Japan’s failure to candidly remember this period in its textbooks or commemoration (Gries 2004; Shirk 2007; Wang 2008). Japan and China also have territorial disputes that could provide a *causus belli* for nationalistic sentiment.44 Koreans, for their part, hold strong animosity toward Japan for its past aggression (Cha 1999:20–23; Lind 2008). They also resent China because of Chinese claims that Korea’s ancient kingdom of Koguryo was part of China (Gries 2005). Many Koreans—both North and South—deeply resent the American role in Korea’s division (Harrison 2003:187). Korean resentment, or *han*, is characterized as the deep and accumulated resentment of people who feel their small nation is continually and helplessly pushed around by larger countries. In the future, Korean politicians may be tempted to exploit such resentment for their own political gain. As many scholars have argued, both these cases appear to be fertile ground for nationalistic mobilization.

This article suggests greater optimism. The narrower version of democratization and war theory (supported in the previous East Asian cases) does not expect that Chinese or Korean transitions will trigger the onset of xenophobic nationalism and war. This theory holds that countries with relatively robust domestic institutions can democratize without unleashing praetorian politics that lead to violence. This model does not expect an elevated risk of war in the cases of either China or South Korea: using Gurr’s method for calculating domestic concentration, both countries fall within the range of stronger domestic institutions, with China scoring a 5 and South Korea an 8. Therefore, the model expects governments in China and Korea to be able to "manage the rivalry of elite factions and minimize the adverse consequences of interest-group logrolling." Mansfield and Snyder conclude that "with the stronger institutional resources of a more centralized and better regulated state at its disposal, the regime is likely to have less reason to rely on reckless nationalist appeals to consolidate its authority" (2005:88). In sum, the narrow version of democratization and war theory borne out in the previous East Asian cases does not expect political transitions in China and Korea to fuel more hawkish policies and interstate war.

Second, economic interdependence theory also predicts stability for these transitions. Both countries lifted themselves from poverty to wealth through a strategy of global integration and export-led growth, and their continued prosperity depends on access to export markets and international capital. China’s trade is 72% of its GDP; China receives more foreign direct investment than any other country in the world, totaling $111 billion in 2008 (World Bank 2009).45 Its ample foreign direct investment is often cited as a key engine of Chinese

---

economic growth and prosperity. South Korea is also highly economically inter-dependent, with trade constituting 90 percent of its GDP (World Bank 2009).

Furthermore, the countries with which friction might be expected (because of territorial or historical disputes) are major economic partners. The United States is China’s No. 1 export destination and its No. 3 source of imported goods; Japan is China’s No. 2 destination for exports and No. 1 source of imports (CIA 2009). Taiwan, the United States, Japan, and the ROK are also the largest sources of China’s FDI (Kang and Lee 2007). As Cheng (2005:105) points out, Taiwanese firms operating in China not only provide China with its largest source of FDI, they export most of the goods they produce there, accounting for more than a fifth of China’s total exports. Similarly, Seoul’s sometimes tense relations with Tokyo exist in the context of deep economic interdependence. Japan is not only the ROK’s top source for FDI, it is also the ROK’s No. 3 destination for exports and ranks second as a source of imports (CIA 2009).46 In sum, China and South Korea are two countries pursuing strategies of deep economic integration; the countries with which they might be most likely to conflict due to various disputes are also those countries on which they depend for trade and capital. Economic interdependence theory thus would expect this to have a pacifying effect on their foreign relations. Business leaders in these countries are likely to pressure their governments for stable policies; they will be unwilling to “logroll” with other coalition members if doing so leads to involvement in a costly war.

Counterarguments and Caveats

One critique of this study is that the theories I examine—democratization and war and economic interdependence theory—are not exactly parallel, so cannot be directly compared. That is, perhaps focusing on periods of transition, as I do in the empirical cases, is unfair to economic interdependence theory because that theory does not relate to political transitions. One might even expect the palliative effects of economic interdependence to be weaker at such times: first, times of domestic turmoil might be times when economic actors and economic considerations fall in terms of their relative importance. Second, at such times, all the traditional political bonds, relationships, and institutions—that economic actors use to affect the policy-making process—are all up in the air, so these actors cannot exert their normal influence. Third, perhaps in times of political transition, if it looks as if conflict is brewing, those economic actors who have the most to gain from war will receive the most political access and influence. For all of these reasons, perhaps it is unfair to assess the effects of economic interdependence during periods of political transition.

Given that for all of these reasons one might have expected this study to be biased against economic interdependence theory, the evidence I find for the influence of economic interdependence is all the more compelling. This is good reason to believe that economic interdependence is very powerful indeed and will have a stabilizing effect on the future East Asian transitions.

A second critique is that one might wonder how democratization and war theory might be relevant to the case of Korean unification, which after all is a different animal than democratization. While the Korean case will not be the same as a single-state democratization, the democratization and war framework remains pertinent to Korean unification for several reasons. It describes dynamics in countries that have undergone a political transition: countries in which new institutions and parties are created. These parties are jockeying to form alliances. Many new actors are entering the political arena and looking for strategies to

46 See also http://www.investkorea.org.
enhance their appeal to the largest possible number of voters. For all of these reasons, although a unification of two states is indeed distinct from the democratization of one, many similar dynamics obtain.

Finally, one might challenge the optimism of this study’s conclusions. Critics might argue that although IR theory tells us that under prevailing conditions economic interdependence and domestic institutions might exert stabilizing effects, we have no idea how circumstances might change in Korea and China prior to their political transitions. In other words, at the time of Korean unification or Chinese democratization, perhaps these countries will be far less economically interdependent or will anticipate decreased trading opportunities (Copeland 1996). Alternatively, perhaps their domestic institutions will have substantially weakened. If this occurs, the restraining effects of economic interdependence will be weaker, and domestic institutions should not be expected to prevent the destabilizing processes associated with democratic transition.

To be sure, we cannot know when these future transitions might occur, and whether these countries will experience dramatic reductions in their levels of domestic concentration or economic interdependence. Should this occur, the prognosis would indeed be different. However, China appears to be deepening the rule of law and strengthening its political institutions (Gilboy and Read 2008; de Lisle 2008). And while countries continually spar over free trade issues, there are no serious threats to overturn the free trade regime created by the United States and its allies following World War II. It would be a surprising development indeed if two of the world’s most globalized countries decided to move toward greater autarky: since the time of Deng Xiaoping’s and Park Chung Hee’s reforms in China and South Korea, respectively, both countries have embraced an open international posture as the key to national wealth and strength. For all of these reasons, this article argues that within the realm of the regular patterns of international politics that we can approach with theory, neither China nor Korea is the sort of state that we should be worrying about being hijacked by bellicose nationalism during its democratic transition.

Critics might also argue that the optimism of this paper regarding the future transitions is not warranted because of the many other ways in which they might create regional instability. For example, scholars have noted a link between democratization and civil war (Gurr 2000; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gledisch, and Gates 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010). In China, civil war might occur during a democratic transition if separatist movements in Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Tibet are emboldened. Similarly, the fall of the North Korean regime may lead to civil war, humanitarian crises, and regional instability if the United States and China collide in an effort to stabilize the peninsula. Conflict is also possible via another mechanism: Mansfield and Snyder (2005:129) note that transitioning states are sometimes the victim of provocations by other states, and this article shows such dynamics in the previous cases of South Korean and Taiwanese democratization. If Chinese democratization and Korean unification leads to predation by other states, this could of course be extremely destabilizing for the region.

It is true that the world-changing events of Korean unification and Chinese democratization may create regional instability through one of these other mechanisms. It is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate about the occurrence of civil war, predation, or some other mechanism. This article takes on the common view that xenophobic, jingoistic nationalism in transitioning Korea and China will lead those countries to adopt belligerent foreign policies. Relying upon both IR theory and previous cases of East Asian democratization, I argue this is unlikely. While this of course cannot guarantee these transitions will be peaceful, it does tell us that this one route to conflict, about which many people worry, is unlikely.
As scholars consider the likelihood of nationalistic mobilization and conflict in East Asia, there are some caveats to consider with respect to this study’s findings. First, the conclusion that Chinese and South Korean institutions are robust enough to manage the challenges of transition is based on domestic concentration scores that are quite dated. Because data sets beyond Polity II did not measure the factors in the domestic concentration index, the most recent year that these scores can be calculated is 1994. If these data are subsequently measured and found to have changed, this paper’s conclusions may need to be revised. That said, it is unlikely that the domestic concentration scores have changed in a negative direction: as noted above, with respect to China in particular, scholars have commented on the degree of institutional development, decreased corruption, and greater accountability that has resulted from citizens’ demands for better governance.

Secondly, area scholars may argue that the quantitative measurements in Gurr’s domestic concentration index do not accurately measure the robustness of these countries’ domestic institutions. For example, contradicting the quantitative measurement, Goldstein (2005:95) comments that weak Chinese institutions will create problems during Chinese democratization. It is possible that future analysis by China or Korea experts will offer alternative, persuasive ways of measuring domestic institutional strength. This could result in more pessimistic conclusions about these transitions than those argued here.

Third, scholars may propose factors beyond domestic institutional concentration that will affect the development of xenophobic nationalism and bellicose foreign policies. Some scholars, for example, speculate that in China, regional disparities in wealth, and income inequality more generally, will undermine democratic success and potentially create internal violence or diversionary conflict (Gilley 2004:155; Mansfield and Snyder 2005:15). Stark regional income disparity will also be likely between northern and southern Korea. Scholar Andrei Lankov forecasts strong factionalism after unification, which could create polarization between “northern” versus “southern” parties. In this polarized environment, politicians may appeal to lowest-common denominator issues, of which nationalism is a prime example. In sum, area scholars may identify other important drivers of nationalistic mobilization that democratization and war theory neglects.

Although the debate about future East Asian transitions will continue, this article has advanced it in important ways. In contrast to the common view that East Asia’s upcoming democratic transitions will create regional instability, this article—drawing upon IR theory and empirical evidence from previous regional cases of democratization—argues the opposite. Economic interdependence theory and the narrow version of democratization and war theory, both of which are supported in the cases of previous East Asian transitions, expect that China and Korea have the institutional capacity to democratize peacefully. In terms of its policy prescriptions, this article provides support for foreign policy strategies of economic and institutional engagement toward China and the Korean peninsula (Gilboy and Heginbotham 2001; Economy 2004).

References


47 Personal interview, November 2009.

48 It is worth noting that other factors that potentially affect nationalistic mobilization also suggest optimism. Snyder (2000:72) argues that xenophobic nationalism is more likely to develop in states with low per capita GDP. Using his method of calculation, South Korea and China are currently high- and moderate-income countries, respectively; yet another cause for optimism about these future transitions.


