

# WORLD OUTLOOK

AN UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL  
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
AT DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

“Today we use the term ‘the world’ with what amounts to brash familiarity. Too often in speaking of such things as the world food problem, the world health problem, world trade, world peace, and world government, we disregard the fact that ‘the world’ is a totality which in the domain of human problems constitutes the ultimate in degree of magnitude and degree of complexity. That is a fact, yes; but another fact is that almost every large problem today is, in truth, a world problem. Those two facts taken together provide thoughtful men with what might realistically be entitled ‘an introduction to humility’ in curing the world’s ills.”

— President Emeritus John Sloan Dickey,  
1947 Convocation Address

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*World Outlook* is a student-run journal of international affairs that publishes papers written by undergraduates. In addition, the journal features interviews with major global thinkers and opinion pieces written by staff editors. Our name and missions are motivated by the words of late Dartmouth President John Sloan Dickey. Please visit our website at <http://sites.dartmouth.edu/worldoutlook> for more information.

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# EDITOR'S NOTE

Throughout the past year, the international stage has seen incidents of how events occurring in one country are linked to or impacted by events in another. This phenomenon is seen in the developments of the Iran Nuclear Deal, the immigration crisis in Europe driven by war and conflict in the Middle East, and even the rebuilding of US-Cuba relations. While international affairs seem to be focused on nations impacting one another, it is important to recognize the internal politics that often also influence events.

In the 48th issue of *World Outlook*, we focus on how politics occurring within a country can be coupled with external politics to shape the trends and occurrences in each nation. A recurring theme in this issue and in global affairs is the impact of internal obstacles on the ability of the government to achieve a goal. We see instances of crime, corruption, and conflict that serve as impediments to real progress around the world – whether that be the effectiveness of development efforts, the full news coverage of war crimes, or the formation of a new political party. The goal of this issue is to try to identify and understand these obstacles as a way to recognize how nations can conquer and move past them.

We lead with a paper by Akhila Kovvuri of Dartmouth College that examines how organized crime groups are perpetuated by Western-centered development efforts that are implemented in India. She examines how universalizing development policies is more harmful due to the “situatedness” of a place.

Also from Dartmouth, the subsequent paper by Miguel Angela Peña examines the commodity chain framework of the natural chewing gum industry. The paper also considers the impact of the Mexican government's internal corruption and detrimental fiscal policies on the declining chicle industry.

Elijah Jatovsky of Georgetown University writes in the run-up to the March 2015 Israeli elections how a security-credentialed leadership of the Israeli Center-Left could emerge in two scenarios.

Our final essay by Alex Dobyan of Tufts University considers the disparities in media reporting for the 2013 clash between the Nigerian military and Boko Haram insurgents. The paper concludes that the Nigerian military acted on incentives to downplay its role in the casualties and damage.

Also in this issue, *World Outlook* is pleased to include two interviews. The first is with Mark Brzezinski, who was a foreign policy advisor to the Obama campaign and later appointed as Ambassador to Sweden. The second is with Kerri-Ann Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. We conclude with this issue with a Staff Editorial by Michael Everett '19, where he discusses ironic reconciliation of war crimes in Liberia.

The contents of this issue broadly address how internal politics can influence nations just as much as one nation can impact another. We hope you enjoy reading this issue – which represents an outstanding collection of original scholarship and content on the state of global affairs – as much as we enjoyed producing it.

Thanks for reading,  
The Editors

## DOING DEVELOPMENT...THE “RIGHT” WAY?

### A CASE STUDY OF ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS IN INDIA: HOW THEY ACT AS A FACTOR OF “SITUATEDNESS,” IMPACTING DEVELOPMENT AT THE LOCAL SCALE

Akhila J. Kovvuri

Post World War II, there has been an increase in the flow of development aid and efforts from the developed world to the developing. However, these measures are seen as universal tools that can be “manufactured” in the First World and applied elsewhere. In this paper, I argue that such universalization of development efforts does more harm than good due to the “situatedness” of a particular place: the social, economic, cultural and political factors of the place lead to the development intervention playing out in a way different from, and even contradictory to, the intended. To illustrate this phenomenon, I look at a specific activity of organized crime groups in India - the Begging Mafia - that is perpetuated by macroeconomic policies such as neoliberalism and minimized role of state combined with existing problems of poverty, corruption and crime set in India's unique social and cultural environment.

#### INTRODUCTION

“We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.” This was the statement made by United States President Harry Truman during his inaugural address in 1949, famously called the Point Four Speech.<sup>1</sup> His words set in motion the notion that the “developed” West has to put to use its “advanced” knowledge, skill and technology to help develop the “others.” Development strategies are often assumed to be universal tools that work similarly in all places. These strategies ignore the culture, politics and other factors unique to the place being “developed.” Hence, when the development project is implemented on the ground, the results vary vastly from the expectations, often worsening the present problems. To study this further, I look at one such factor of “situatedness”: organized crime in India, especially Mumbai. In particular, I focus on one such transnational organized crime group, the D-Company.

In this paper, I will argue that the factors unique to a place play a vital role in determining the outcomes of a development strategy and thus, have to be taken into consideration. Before diving into how this applies to my case study, I give an overview of the literature on organized crime, the topic I have chosen to situate my thesis in. I delve into the reasons behind the formation of organized crime gangs, the activities they are involved in, and how these activities impact development at the local, national and international scales. While looking at the origins and reasons for the survival of organized crime, I emphasize the influence of globalization and neoliberal policies, and argue that these processes have aided organized crime gangs. While I cover the

Akhila J. Kovvuri is a second year at Dartmouth College majoring in Economics and Geography. Akhila hails from Hyderabad, India and is interested in pursuing further research on urban slums in India, especially the impacts of globalization and culture on urban poverty and development. This paper was originally written for Professor Patricia Lopez's class “Geopolitics and Third World Development.”

impact of organized crime at various scales and on different factors such as economic growth, international relations, corruption, trafficking, financial crimes, security, and human rights, for the purpose of this paper, I highlight the impact of organized crime at the local level.

I posit that there are many works that study the impact of organized crime in the Americas but there is a lack of focus and research specific to Asia. I argue that there is a crucial need for such research if we want to conceptualize and implement place-specific development policies. For this purpose, I narrow my focus to organized crime in India, drawing on the limited academic literature available, along with newspaper articles, documentaries, commercial films and other visual media. At the local level, these mafias in India (including the D-Company) have a tremendous influence on the local population, especially the poor and the slum dwellers, often taking the role of the state.<sup>2</sup> For the case study, I elaborate on one of D-Company's criminal activities—begging mafia—and how the reduced role of the state exacerbates the problem. Many criminal activities such as corruption and terrorism often transcend scales and trickle down to impact the local level in the form of unequal development, communal tensions and loss of lives and livelihoods. I argue that many of these activities and the nature of their impact are unique to India because of the complex and intricate setting (comprising of religion, caste, socio-economic condition, gender dynamics and politics) that characterize India.

### A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON GLOBAL ORGANIZED CRIME

As mentioned earlier, the Four Point Speech and subsequent related ideologies have gained weight; however, they have also been critiqued by many who espouse a more tailored place-specific approach to development.<sup>3</sup> Solutions to obstacles to development, be it the Washington Consensus or the multiple military interventions, often generalize problems and represent the neoliberal ideals of development.<sup>4</sup> Such solutions often ignore social factors, hence making the situation on ground worse.<sup>5</sup> The flows and networks in our world have become so interconnected that all spaces seem to have come together to make one place.<sup>6</sup> However, most often, development strategies are not universally applicable policies that can jump scales and work in a similar fashion everywhere; they have to respect the “situatedness” – keeping in mind the socio-economic, cultural and political factors unique to that region.<sup>7</sup>

One such factor of “situatedness” that I focus on in this paper is organized crime. Research on gangs and organized crime has been conducted across a wide range of disciplines and using various methodologies, such as investigative journalism, economics and statistics, sociology, security, ethnographic research, compilation of existing literature, autobiographies of gang leaders and members, government research.<sup>8</sup>

‘Organized crime’ doesn’t have one set definition; Woodiwiss describes it as “systemic illegal activity for power or profit.”<sup>9</sup> It is a crime that aims to amass wealth through mediation and violence.<sup>10</sup> Such criminal activities are committed by an orga-

nization with hierarchies, specialization, and division of labour for economic gains or public influence.<sup>11</sup> While organized crime is not always committed by gangs or mafias, the former has become synonymous with the latter in recent years.<sup>12</sup> Some gangs have goals that revolve around violent criminal activities which often take the shape of organized crime.<sup>13</sup> Nor is there one definition for a gang, however, generally, gangs are groups that perform illegal actions with some level of organization.<sup>14</sup> More recently, there has been a focus on criminal activities, territorialism, more defined leadership and organization structures.<sup>15</sup>

Originally, the formation of gangs was believed to be due to urban socioeconomic reasons such as poverty and lack of other employment.<sup>16</sup> Many theories have emerged that assign the reason for joining gangs to other things such as lack of family bonding and an unstable childhood, peer pressure and desire to create an identity, a lack of social institutions and other opportunities.<sup>17</sup> The notion that gang membership is limited to poor, unemployed minorities and that gang locations are limited to big cities has been contradicted by the increasing emergence of ethnic-majority gangs from a higher socioeconomic classes.<sup>18</sup>

The types of activities that gangs are involved in are constantly changing as gangs adapt to the changing legal, social and economic environment to survive.<sup>19</sup> Organized crime groups were initially focused on financial crimes but are now expanding into trafficking, terrorism and even legitimate businesses. The reasons for the existence of organized crime groups go beyond the economic to include religious, social and political rationales.<sup>20</sup>

A range of works expound upon how globalization and neoliberal policies have aggravated the problem of organized crime. Globalization is a process that encourages social, economic, and political interactions, relations and exchanges across regions, creating a power hierarchy and leading to unequal growth in the process.<sup>21</sup> Neoliberalism is an ideology that promotes free, global markets, trade and minimized role of the state in controlling or protecting the economy.<sup>22</sup> Many criminal activities like money laundering, corruption, child labour, human trafficking, tax evasion and terrorism are becoming more and more transnational as result of a more neoliberal, globalized world.<sup>23</sup> Some authors have gone to the extent of arguing that organized crime and its activities are still flourishing because global markets, neoliberalism, capitalist ideals of cost cutting and efficient production depend on these very criminal activities.<sup>24</sup> Globalization and the neoliberal policies have weakened the Third World's ability to control their markets, economy and have decreased their sovereignty.<sup>25</sup> This has led to the emergence and strengthening of a global underground economy, expanded illegal markets, and the facilitated tax evasion.<sup>26</sup> Neoliberal ideals decreased social spending of the governments in developing nations and increased their focus on privatisation and land “development” (slum land reclamation), thus creating a wider divide between the poor and the state and increasing the influence of gangs.<sup>27</sup>

In addition to the multiplicity of definitions of gangs and organized crime, the impact of the activities of these organized crime gangs are multi-fold and spread

across the local, national and international scales. At the local level, in many regions such as the Americas and in India, organized crime gangs are powerful non-state actors and impact development by organizing, coordinating and stabilizing the territories they occupy, assuming the role of the state and acting as middlemen of development projects.<sup>28</sup> Due to the local influence that gang members have, they are often invited to join political organizations and parties and maintain close connections with bureaucracy and elected candidates, thus enjoying safety from legal actions to curb their criminal activities.<sup>29</sup>

Organized crime groups affect the development at the national level by interfering in and influencing the working of the government and private businesses.<sup>30</sup> One way in which they do this is through money laundering which refers to transferring money (often made through illicit activities) outside the economy and the nation's banking system to evade taxation and hide the source of the income. This harms the country's economy by causing disinvestment, inequality and emigration.<sup>31</sup> Money laundering is aided by globalization and global financial organizations which have led to increasing shell companies and black markets transactions.<sup>32</sup> The illicit activities that this income is made from include drug, arms and human trafficking and the laundered money is used to further fund such crimes and even terrorism.<sup>33</sup>

Organized crime groups influence the government and the private sector through bribery. Corruption at various levels in the developing countries have led to inefficient use of external aid, investment and have caused delays and cancellations of development projects, which results in economic stagnation and inequality.<sup>34</sup> Political inaction is often due to this influence and fear of such gangs.<sup>35</sup>

Another profit earner, the illicit trade of illegal drugs across borders, is often facilitated by organized crime groups due to the financial incentive.<sup>36</sup> It harms the economy of the developing nation where it is produced as precious resources are directed towards production of drugs over other necessities, making them very dependent on the world and increasing chances of an unstable society and insurgency.<sup>37</sup> Trafficking is not limited to drugs; humans are trafficked by coercing people and transporting them (or their organs) from one country to the other for the purpose of prostitution, menial labour, slavery, organ trade etc.<sup>38</sup> According to the U.S. State Department, almost 900,000 people are trafficked around the world.<sup>39</sup>

There are many works that bring up the increasing Organized crime and Terrorism nexus.<sup>40</sup> Terrorist groups have become more secure in funding due to diversification of funding sources (which includes organized crime groups) and ease in hiding/investing the money as a result of the global financial systems and tax havens.<sup>41</sup> Organized crime groups have helped terrorist organizations by providing finances, recruiting new members and through arms and ammunition trafficking via their well-established channels.<sup>42</sup> United States' "War on Terror" in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to instability in the society and the creation of organized crime groups.<sup>43</sup> There is evidence of organized crime influencing governments, such as that of Pakistan, to help the terrorist groups survive.<sup>44</sup> Organized crime-terror nexus has led to

communal tensions, violence and international conflicts due to the religious bent of some of these organizations.<sup>45</sup> An example is the involvement of organized crime groups in narcotics trade in Kashmir, a bone of contention between India and Pakistan.<sup>46</sup>

Despite the above mentioned literature that incorporates multiple lenses to look at organized crime, it is usually limited to the Americas as most of the research is done in United States.<sup>47</sup> Some believe that this research and United States' policies can be "exported to other parts of the world."<sup>48</sup> But such research also explicitly states that they aim to further United States' security interests.<sup>49</sup> Specific activities of gangs as well as the impact that these have on the people vary based on location, economy, government, economic opportunities, local culture, societal structure, and gender dynamics.<sup>50</sup>

D-Company, a very influential transnational organized crime group in India, is a big player in criminal activities but only few authors, such as Weinstein, Sharma and Clarke, have written about it.<sup>51</sup> Most authors focus on crime-terror nexus, not on impact on women, children, the poor, slums etc. that is place-specific. At the same time, spaces are so interconnected that the world seems to have become one place that is interdependent and it is vital to garner international help and cooperation to solve this transnational issue.<sup>52</sup>

### **D-COMPANY: A CASE STUDY**

D-Company is the largest organized crime group in Asia with over 5,000 people involved in the syndicate.<sup>53</sup> Dawood Ibrahim, the leader of this gang, ranks second on FBI's ten most wanted fugitives list.<sup>54</sup> The D-Company is highly transnational with its reach spreading from Pakistan to South Africa and UAE to Thailand.<sup>55</sup>

Ibrahim is a Sunni Muslim from Bombay, India.<sup>56</sup> Born to a police constable, Ibrahim started off at a young age with petty crimes and offered services such as extortion or collecting money from debtors/smugglers.<sup>57</sup> Ibrahim got involved in the smuggling of drugs and precious metals like gold and silver.<sup>58</sup> Gathering many family members and close contacts, Ibrahim built his empire, the D-Company.<sup>59</sup> With liberalization and removal of trade barriers in India and around the world in 1990s, the smuggling business was no longer profitable as the goods were available legally at an inexpensive rate, and hence the demand for smuggled good decreased.<sup>60</sup> This prompted gangs like the D-Company to move into other profitable ventures such as land development and real estate, especially with India and Mumbai becoming world financial hubs with MNCs investing and the value of land going up at an exponential rate.<sup>61</sup> The D-Company also started investing in legitimate businesses such as shopping malls, hotels and travel agencies and this alone brought the gang a revenue of 2000 crore rupees (equivalent to roughly \$302 million) per annum.<sup>62</sup> The list of D-Company's activities is varied and includes financial crimes such as extortion, tax evasion, counterfeiting, smuggling, and branches out into those involving loss of lives and dignity of humans such as human trafficking, contract killing and terrorism

financing.<sup>63</sup> The D-Company has developed close relationships with politicians and political parties, often influencing them with monetary and even criminal favours, and benefiting in turn by being able to escape the law and the law enforcers.<sup>64</sup>

In the past decade in India, there have been many financial scams involving political parties and businesses. Dawood Ibrahim was involved in many such scams two of them being the Indian Premier League (IPL) spot-fixing case and the 2G scam. IPL is an Indian cricketing tournament that garners lots of attention, fan following and monetary investment through sponsors. Dawood Ibrahim and his associates were declared offenders by a court in New Delhi in case involving match fixing.<sup>65</sup> The second scam, 2G scam, is the biggest financial scam that India has ever seen. It involved some politicians wrongly favouring undeserving telecom companies in an auction for the 2G telecom spectrum. Dawood Ibrahim was an alleged investor in one of these undeserving firms.<sup>66</sup>

In general sense, organized crime gangs are thought to be focussed on economic gains while terrorist gangs are seen as those driven by political or religious ideologies. What was unique about The D-Company was that it brought these two together creating a unique terror-organized crime nexus.<sup>67</sup> D-Company was initially a secular gang with members from both the Hindu and Muslim community.<sup>68</sup> However, after the infamous demolition of Babri Masjid (a religious place for Muslims) in Ayodhya, U.P., India, the D-Company had a drastic change in its ideology, with undertones of Islamic extremism in its activities, such as funding terrorist groups that attack Hindus.<sup>69</sup> After the post 9/11 backlash on terrorist groups, which included freezing their funding sources, terrorist groups like the al-Qaeda developed closer ties with organized crime groups like the D-Company for financing through drug trafficking, etc.<sup>70</sup> The D-Company has used its contacts and clout to help recruit terrorists, provide ammunition to terrorist groups as well as to provide terrorist groups access to the routes that it had initially established for smuggling.<sup>71</sup> Dawood Ibrahim was behind the infamous and very fatal 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts which comprised of 13 coordinated bomb attacks across the city leading to almost a 1000 casualties.<sup>72</sup>

Dawood Ibrahim is currently alleged to be sheltering in Karachi, Pakistan and is said to often travel between Pakistan and Dubai (his base of operations).<sup>73</sup> Despite increasing global connections and trade, it must be noted that similar connectivity and mutual understanding is not shared between all countries and in all fields; the lack of extradition treaty between India and UAE and India and Pakistan prevents India from trying Dawood Ibrahim for his crimes.<sup>74</sup> The D-Company's has allegedly bribed the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's intelligence service, with a share of its profits, thus securing a safe house in Pakistan for Ibrahim.<sup>75</sup>

### ZOOMING IN: THE BEGGING MAFIA

The D-Company engages in a range of criminal activities. Zooming in on one of these – the Begging Mafia – and analysing its features, causes and effects could give us a more detailed picture of what organized crime's impacts are at the local level.

The Begging Mafia is a network and “industry” comprising of mafia leaders and “recruited” beggars that runs on the income earned through child beggars. Most of the children coerced into the begging mafia are between two to eight years old, belong to the lower socio-economic class and were kidnapped off the streets, schools, parks and other public places.<sup>76</sup> According to police reports, 44,000 children are kidnapped every year but the actual figure could be close to a million due to the unreported cases all over India.<sup>77</sup> The Begging Mafia earns around \$3.6 million annually in Mumbai and, in Delhi, the figure is almost \$7 million.<sup>78</sup> The more money people give to the beggars, the more this mafia earns.

The Begging Mafia has a horrifying impact on the lives of the children and their families. Since handicapped and starved looking kids can elicit more sympathy and earn more money, the mafia cripples, burns and beats up children and refuses to give them meals.<sup>79</sup> New Delhi itself has around 12,000 crippled beggars on the streets. Most often, young infants are used and put next to slightly older children or female beggars to garner more pity. They are not fed, leading to chronic nutrition deficiencies and marasmus, and are often drugged to keep them quiet.<sup>80</sup> The mafia intentionally gives the beggars gangrene by cutting off blood supply to a part of the body and disfigures their face/body with acid.<sup>81</sup> These children who are forced into begging are also introduced to drugs and the drug trade by the mafia.<sup>82</sup> Because of the ensuing drug addiction, even if some children are rescued, rehabilitation doesn't work on them. They can't find an alternate livelihood due to the lack of any education or skillset and they often escape back to the streets.<sup>83</sup>

Corruption plays a huge role in the Begging Mafia. Senior doctors are paid to surgically remove limbs of the children to cripple them.<sup>84</sup> Though the government is aware of the begging mafia, it has taken little action due to wide network and underground nature of the mafia. The mafia has been able to bribe the police and other officials, even if caught.<sup>85</sup> There are laws such as The Bombay Beggary Prevention Act of 1959, according to which begging is illegal, but it has not been implemented effectively.<sup>86</sup> Also, the most visible part of the begging “industry” are the beggars and law enforcers often target and arrest them, considering them to be the criminal.<sup>87</sup> The actual culprits are still loose and are still earning huge revenues despite the arrests since there are many beggars in the system and arresting a few doesn't make a difference to the mafia leaders. Instead it worsens the already deteriorated lives of beggars, excludes any hope of getting an alternate job, and makes them face further humiliation and torture in jail.<sup>88</sup> Due to these issues as well as the lack of help and security, many child beggars grow up to become criminals.<sup>89</sup> After the kids become older (and the sympathy they can draw decreases), they are forced into prostitution and the black-market organ trade.<sup>90</sup> Due to increasing global networks, these children are sold across borders to forced marriages, adoptions, child labor in factories and to the pornography industry.<sup>91</sup>

The child beggars are not dependent on the begging mafia just for their own survival; they have to support their family so that they can afford the *roti* and *makaan*

(basic food and shelter) needed to survive.<sup>92</sup> They can't leave the mafia even if they have an alternate option as they are emotionally blackmailed and threatened that their family would be killed. For the same reason, they never divulge information about the mafia leaders they work for to anyone.<sup>93</sup>

There is a correlation between the lack of basic amenities and the increasing number of children forced into begging. Those who do not have adequate food, shelter and health facilities, those who live in localities where violence is prevalent and those out of school are most likely to be forced into child labor.<sup>94</sup>

The issue of child beggars has longer, complicated roots including the economic and social condition of their parents and the generations before them. Factors such as unemployment and landlessness have been prevalent in slums in India as most residents of these slums are migrants who came from villages to find jobs in the cities.<sup>95</sup> However, as a result of growing neoliberal ideas, there has been reduced state spending on education, health, housing and employment generation.

Any aid from external sources to curb the begging mafia would pass through the government or the police and corruption is prevalent in both these institutions, leading to very little being passed on to where the resources are actually needed. If the money is given directly to the beggars, all of it goes to the begging mafia, thus further encouraging the mafia with more revenue.<sup>96</sup>

The begging mafia chooses the locations for begging strategically; these are places of worship and tourist hotspots, places where there are fewer people who would refuse to give money to a starved-looking child.<sup>97</sup> Around religious places, beggars are made to carry photos of deities.<sup>98</sup> Religion plays a big role in the lives of people in India and they are often generous in places of worship; Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism and Jainism and other major religions in India profess that one ought to share their wealth with those in need.<sup>99</sup> In such a setting, it is difficult for the state (or any other actor) to intervene as it cannot tell people to stop donating, as people believe that they would be blessed by God if they donate to the poor in religious places.<sup>100</sup> Tourists, especially foreigners, feel a similar sense of obligation to give money under the notion that it would help eradicate poverty in the third world but, in reality, it does more harm than good.<sup>101</sup>

In fact, any external source of aid has to consider various factors such as familial ties, people-government relationship, corruption, access to basic amenities, social norms, religion, class and caste structure.

### **ZOOMING OUT: TAKING ON THE ROLE OF STATE**

Begging Mafia is one the many activities that are run by D-Company and other gangs. One of the reasons that has perpetuated the begging mafia has been alluded to earlier: the reducing role of state in providing essential services to its people. Not just the begging mafia, even those most vulnerable of being pushed into sex trade, slavery and other forms of trafficking are women with limited or no access to education and health services.<sup>102</sup>

Many slum dwellers are illegal settlers who lack land and political rights and are hence denied basic public services.<sup>103</sup> Due to the magnitude of people moving to urban locations for job opportunities, the government and its Housing Board has not been able to provide or manage shelter, leading to the new immigrants becoming illegal squatters in unsafe, unhygienic and densely populated localities.<sup>104</sup> In fact, the government intentionally refused to take action against gangs because they are able to provide to the poor what the government isn't able to: housing, water and electricity connections etc., albeit through corrupt and violent means.<sup>105</sup>

A complex, indirect quid-pro-quo relationship exists between gangs, the government, political parties and the slum dwellers. Gangs get the illegal squatters to register so that they can have an identity as well as the ability to vote for local politicians. The gangs bribe local policemen for the purpose of shielding their own illegal liquor businesses as well as to protect the temporary shelters of squatters from being removed. At the same time, the squatters are subjected to an insecure and violent environment and often have to dance to the tunes of the mafia leaders and members due to the dependency.<sup>106</sup>

Juxtaposing gangs in the Americas and India, one can see a difference in activities, position in society and impact of gangs on the respective community. In Haiti (and even in other countries in Latin America), there are some influential gangs that are seen as vital to the development of their locality by coordinating and policing the community, leading to a drop in homicide rates, offering better services to citizens, housing in slums, mediating development projects and external aid and managing employment of their residents.<sup>107</sup> This is not necessarily the case in India where the gangs' interference in development projects has had a more detrimental effect. Recall that the gangs that provide these local services in India are the very same gangs that take part in transnational criminal activities such as drug and human trafficking, funding terrorism and involvement in high-level national business scams. This is different from the gangs in Mexico or Haiti which are more local, their activities limited to "defending" their zones often with use of violence.<sup>108</sup> Also, the status of the citizens is different in a slum in Bel Air, Haiti as opposed to Dharavi, a slum in Mumbai, India. In the latter, slum dwellers are illegal immigrants and squatters. Clearly, a solution for the problems in Haiti would not work in Mumbai due to the multiplicity of differences that are either embedded in the very structure of the society or were formed as a result of different processes.

### **IN CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, I reiterate that development measures cannot take the form of a one-for-all strategy since every place and its people are inherently different from each other due to various economic, social, cultural and political factors. Differences also arise because of the way a particular place responds to and is affected by global processes such as globalization and international relations. The D-Company is a powerful transnational organized crime syndicate and the presence of its activities in India

is a factor of “situatedness” that makes the scenario in India different. Furthermore, D-Company’s criminal activities negatively affect various scales - local, national and international. In the case of the Begging Mafia, corruption at the level of the higher-ups (police and political parties) protected the mafia leaders and helped the begging mafia survive. Additionally, the plight of the poor forced into begging translates into poor growth and loss of productivity at the national level. The impact of the begging mafia on the beggars is unique to India because of factors such as religious beliefs, social norms, class and caste structure and gender hierarchies. Hence, any solution to the problem of gangs in India has to consider these various factors of “situatedness” as well as the fact that multiple scales are being affected.

Global processes such as globalization and the neoliberal ideology have created international product and labor markets for D-Company’s illegal activities. The increasing global financial networks have made it easier for D-Company to keep its funding and money sources away from scrutiny and legality. Neoliberal policies encourage minimal government expenditure on services such as education, health and housing; this has made the poor even more vulnerable to the gang’s activities. It has caused a distance between the state and its very own people.

While the concept of a universal solution is inept, global cooperation is a necessity to the solution. D-Company and its impacts are highly transnational and multi-scalar. At the same time, international cooperation and solutions should be taken up in tandem with grass-root measures to build the relationship between the state and the poor and initiate development from bottom up. We live in a highly globalized world with everything being so interconnected that inaction from any side or at any level could negate the actions being taken by everyone else.

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## BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: A TWO-ECONOMIC-MODEL ANALYSIS OF THE CHICLE COMMODITY CHAIN

Miguel Angel Peña

The analysis of commodity chains provides a series of linkages connecting the many sources of production and distribution of a particular commodity. By looking closer at the commodity chain framework it is possible to draw conclusions about the inefficiencies and advantages of chain itself. This analysis is applied to the natural chewing gum, or *chicle*, industry since the beginning of its mass commercialization at the beginning of the 20th century until present-day. Chicle is a very special case because unlike the majority of other commodities, it experienced two production booms and each under different economic models: outward-led growth and import substitution industrialization (ISI). Moreover, unlike other commodities its production and manufacturing sectors were divided by the Mexican and American industries. This article concludes that the cause of the decline of the chicle industry is due to the segregation between the production and manufacturing sectors of chicle existing in the outward led-growth model and the corruption and detrimental fiscal policies the Mexican government implemented against the industry during ISI.

### INTRODUCTION

After a century of advertisement and mass commercialization, chewing gum has become the “quintessential American invention.”<sup>1</sup> The *chicle* commodity chain is not a completely American one – as is often suggested. Chewing gum existed long before Thomas Adams added sugar to chicle, which is the raw material chewing gum comes from. Chewing gum existed long before Walter E. Diemer created a chewing gum capable of producing bubbles. The first accounts of chewing gum were well before the “discovery” of America, when the Mayans first chewed chicle. Yet, the chicle commodity chain is unique because, unlike other commodities in Latin America, it experienced two booms, each of which was fundamentally different. The first chicle boom spanned from the beginning of chewing gum commercialization in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century until 1929. This paper will refer to this as the “outward-led growth” period. This period was characterized by a combination of domestic and foreign investors, who benefited from concessions from the Mexican government. The second phase is the “inward-led growth” period. This period started with the presidency of Lázaro Cardenas, whose administration desired to regulate quality, production, and the sources of investments during the 1930s and onward. This paper will argue that this scheme continued until the early 2000s with few variations. It will start with the intrinsic aspects of chicle and how its limitations shaped the commodity chain. Then, it

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will outline each type of economic model according to its characteristics and establish its advantages and disadvantages. Through each period’s benefits and detriments, the paper will argue that chicle’s success is a wonder, considering the corrupt and inefficient economic policies of the producer states and the Mexican government. Against all odds, chicle led to some transformative effects among the southern Mexican states, and generated great amounts of revenue for the Mexican government and American chewing gum companies.

### I. THE COMMODITY CHAIN AS A CONSEQUENCE OF CHICLE’S INHERENT QUALITIES

Chicle’s inherent characteristics make its production and manufacture two segregated processes. This division of labor is reflected through the chain’s production sector being entirely dependent on *chicleros* in the Yucatan Peninsula and their manufacture solely existent in the United States.<sup>2</sup> This division of labor formed because the tree from which natural chewing gum or *chicle* derives is the *Manilkara Zapota*. The *M. zapota* only grows in the forests of the Yucatan Peninsula and the Gran Petén region of Belize and Guatemala.<sup>3</sup> Thus chicle production is specifically limited to this region and consequently Mexico’s geography provides it with a comparative advantage over this resource.

Its geographic limitation, however, was not the only factor that would shape its future commodity chains. The quantity of resin that can be derived from a single tree varies widely from approximately 3 kilograms to as much as 15 kilograms.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the tree can only be tapped during rainy seasons spanning four months when high daily temperatures complement heavy rains.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, trees can only be tapped once every five years.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, the fact that the chicle trees are in remote areas, as well as the fact that the amount of production per season is uncertain, makes production stability weak. Thus, for the production of chicle to be economically feasible, a constant flow of capital that can survive during low yield seasons is necessary. This ambiguity made American entrepreneurs with vast amounts of capital more willing to risk it over domestic capitalists less willing to do so. Subsequently, American entrepreneurs became the tycoons of the chewing gum industry and created their own niche in the chicle commodity chain as the manufacturers of chewing gum.

As mentioned previously, chicle is extracted from the *chicozapote* and thus its production levels are severely unstable. Therefore, investors decided to minimize the amount of capital invested in the production sector. This observation is supported by the fact that the technology used for the extraction of chicle in 1880 is the same used today.<sup>7</sup> Chicleros still only rely on their sharp machetes, resin containers, and knowledge about the best moment to tap a tree. New technology was not applied to chicle extraction because large amounts of it would be required, which also hindered the economic feasibility of chicle extraction.<sup>8</sup> However, having a large workforce and cheap technology made chicle extraction economically feasible. Thus, the investment of capital was not destined to increase productivity per capita, but rather to acquire and maintain a large workforce.<sup>9</sup> The necessity of a large workforce was exacerbat-

ed by the fact that *chicozapotes* were not able to grow in plantations or haciendas like henequen did. Thus, to maintain a large working population the infamous system of *enganche* had to be used: a system in which workers from all over the country were brought to the working field by loaning them money that would later result in extreme debt. In a sense, chicle's intrinsic qualities prompted the use of coerced labor as seen with tobacco in the United States, rubber in Brazil, and sugar in Cuba.

The success of chewing gum depended on how much "added value" was given to chicle. One needed not only to add flavor, but also to package it in a convenient form and sell it.<sup>10</sup> The first step in the chain was to collect the chicle and dehydrate it by boiling it in large copper containers to remove the excess water. During the cooling, the resin was then transferred to brick-shaped molds weighing between 8 to 12 kilograms, which was then exported to the manufacturing companies.<sup>11</sup> The manufacture of chewing gum was capital-intensive because of the extensive use of complex and expensive machines. There were six steps in the manufacture of chewing gum: the grinding and melting of chicle, the mixing of the ingredients into the meddled mass, the rolling of the mass into thin sheets that were cut up into strips of gum, the wrapping of gum, the packaging and boxing of the wrapped sticks, and finally the carrying of the chewing gum to the stock rooms where it was going to be shipped.<sup>12</sup> Each step needed different machinery, and equipment that could only be afforded through great amounts of capital stemming from American entrepreneurs such as Thomas Adams Jr. and William Wrigley Jr. Thus, the nature of chicle caused a huge disparity in wealth and segregation between its production and manufacturing, which had a profound impact on the future commodity chains of chicle in Mexico and abroad.

## II. THE "OUTWARD-LED GROWTH" MODEL OF THE CHICLE COMMODITY CHAIN (1870-1929)

The "outward-led growth" model of chicle started with Thomas Adam Jr.'s "discovery" of chicle's potential. A legend says that former President of Mexico Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna was captured by Texans in 1836, and sent to Washington where Colonel Adams took him as a prisoner. He was amazed by Santa Anna's habit to chew gum and convinced Santa Anna to sell him some. Adams was not convinced of its flavor and decided to add some sweeteners and established the Adams Chewing Gum Company with an initial inversion of 50 dollars.<sup>13</sup> After a few years, he established a web of producers in Tampico, Mexico.

The initial demand for chicle in the US was very low. It only started to increase after 1860. Imports grew by 929,959 pounds from 1885-1886. The next decade the imports of chicle quadrupled and prices rose from \$0.08 to \$0.36 per pound.<sup>14</sup> This initial increase in demand for chicle was developed due to the expansion of urban areas in the United States at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>15</sup>

By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the logistics of the industry were established, including access to exploitable forestlands, a workforce, transportation, industries and

marketing. It was during this time that the most important American chewing gum companies, such as Beechnut, Wrigley and Adams Companies were established and became the suppliers to the international chicle market with a manufactured product. To achieve this hegemony over the market they created a mechanism with other companies such as the Wrigley Import Company, The Chicle Development Company and subsidized companies including the Mexican Exploitation Company. All of these developed a physical presence in Mexico and provided capital, credit and equipment in exchange for a steady source of chicle. These enterprises obtained concessions from the federal Mexican government for chicle's export but depended on other companies – domestic or foreign – for the production of chicle. The commodity chain is depicted in Figure 1.

The production sector inside this "outward-led growth" model had transformative effects because of its ability to incorporate marginalized people into the national economy. This was due to the fact that chicle was located in remote areas, which pressured extraction companies to recruit people from different regions in Mexico. People from Tuxpan, Tampico, Guerrero, Michoacán, and Tabasco went to the jungle every year and gave themselves to the chicle business for six months.<sup>16</sup> The chicle economy made the integration of the "Mayan rebels" into the national economy possible.<sup>17</sup> It was the lumber and chicle industries that – instead of fomenting separatists sentiments in southern Mexico like Henequen did – made the government more effective at imposing its political order over these remote areas.<sup>18</sup> In fact, it was during the first decade of the Mexican Revolution that these southern states saw an unusual collaboration between the rebel Maya and new business entrepreneurs from the Yucatan Peninsula. The commerce in gum transformed the urban features of the region and gave rise to new powerful social groups.<sup>19</sup> Railroads, ports and urban areas were built because of the imminent chicle boom that provided vast amount of foreign capital investment in these areas that, without it, would have been marginalized by the Mexican government.

This economic model, unfortunately, enabled exporting and manufacturing companies to exploit the domestic workforce sector. The concessions given to the Wrigley Import Company, the Chicle Development Company, and the Mexican Exploitation Company allowed them to exploit their workers through an *enganche*-like system. Since foreign or domestic extraction companies had capital they could easily lend money to chicleros, which inundated them in debt. During the early 20<sup>th</sup> century many chicleros had no option but to leave their villages and remain in the forest for months.<sup>20</sup> The travel to the forest and every other tool needed to extract chicle was usually sold by the domestic and foreign contractors and deducted their cost from the debit accumulated by the chicleros. Chicleros had to live five to six months a year on a cash advance paid to them by the contractor who agreed to buy their chicle at negotiated price. The quantity of chicle sold to the contractor by each chiclero was entered into an accounting system at the end of each season, from which the cost of the provisions and the material that had been advanced to him was subtracted. This

system allowed for constant abuse and led to the inevitable debt among chicleros.<sup>21</sup> An observer during the 1930s commented on this vicious cycle stating:


*“Without any amenities during the great part of the year [...] the chiclero would go on a spending orgy the moment he received revenue from his work at the end of the season [...] After a few days he spent everything he earned in one year and then he would have to look for another contractor that would give him money during the dry season – when the exploitation of chicle was impossible.”<sup>22</sup>*


Debt was not, however, the only a method used to coerce chicleros. In fact, the commodity chain in the “outward-led growth” model carefully resembled a debt chain due to the fact that lending money to chicleros caused subcontractors to also plunge themselves in debt. Similarly, the contractors fell into debt because they lent the money received from American Companies to subcontractors – the buyers of chicle. Hence, the chiclero became the enemy of the subcontractor owed wished; the subcontractor, by the same motives, became the enemy of the general contractor, who at the same times despised the agent of the American company that extortions him by demanding lower prices of chicle.<sup>23</sup>

The willingness of contractors and foreign companies to reduce the amount of capital invested in the extraction of chicle and the relative lack of supervision from the Mexican government allowed chiclero camps’ infrastructure to be very poor. The walls of the camps were constructed with weak wooden structures. Moreover, there was a lack of family life and permanent buildings, conditions that are similar to those seen among the southern colonies in the United States in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century. There was virtually no medical attention in those remote areas and many chicleros suffered under the *mosca chiclera* that caused small pieces of ear and nose to become completely devoured by the disease, which eventually lead to death.<sup>24</sup>

The success of this commodity chain, surprisingly, was not due to the impressive advertisement to American audiences surrounding chewing gum but rather to the Defense Department’s decision to provide chicle to the troops for WWI. Figure 2 shows the amount of exports of chicle from 1882-1983. As Fig. 2 shows, the first chicle boom occurred from 1910-1914. The argument behind the Defense Department’s decision was that chicle aided soldiers with digestion and served as a relaxant.<sup>25</sup> The chewing gum manufacturer Wrigley argued that chewing gum “helped to combat thirst, improved concentration and freshened the mouth.”<sup>26</sup> Besides the huge demand spike to up to 4 million kilograms of chicle in the height of WWI, the soldiers disseminated the habit of chewing gum in Europe and the United States when the war ended and thus it increased sales domestically as well as abroad.<sup>27</sup>

After the war, the *upper* (manufacturing and distribution) commodity chain also saw significant changes. In 1929 there were 27 plants in the US manufacturing chewing gum. These 27 plants employed over 2,265 workers.<sup>28</sup> It was also during the





Source: *Capitalismo Y Trabajo En Los Bosques De Las Tierras Bajas Tropicales Mexicanas*, Konrad, 471.

1920s that despite the highest demand seen yet, chewing gum manufacturing plants declined in number: in 1914 there were 74 plants compared to 1929's 37 plants.<sup>29</sup> This is because small factories fared badly during this period of expansion within the industry. The cost of machinery and the difficulty of obtaining a steady supply of chicle prompted only large chewing gum companies to prosper.

Mexico also started to open up local manufacturing companies. At the end of the decade, they employed over 300 people with a median salary of \$5.00 a day.<sup>30</sup> In 1923 the first manufacturing factories were established in Mexico. Two years later more than 1 million kilograms of chewing gum were exported officially. By 1929, it reached its peak for the decade: 2,400,000 kilograms.<sup>31</sup> Thus, great amounts of revenue were generated in every step of the chain: American manufacturers, the Mexican government via export tariffs, and Mexican manufacturing companies. But this system was slated to change as socialist-statist Lázaro Cardenas became President of Mexico and developed the "inward-led growth" economic model of chicle.

### III. THE "INWARD-LED GROWTH" MODEL OF THE CHICLE COMMODITY CHAIN (1930-2000s)

This new economic model had significant consequences in the chicle commodity chain. First, it ended the top-down flow of investment from foreign companies to Mexico. Now, all funding for the development of the chicle industry came from the National Bank of Mexico: foreign control over production was abolished. Companies interested in buying chicle depended exclusively on Mexican contractors, which were also dependent on the federal government for the supply of infrastructure.<sup>32</sup> Additionally, all concessions given to foreign companies were ended and Carde-

nas established cooperatives, or *ejidos*, owned by all the chicleros of a particular area. The jurisdiction of chicle extraction was then given to the Federation of Cooperatives that would take the chicle extracted and sell it to other manufacturing companies. The export revenues would then go back to the National Bank of Mexico and a cycle of capital was made. Exports tariffs were based on weight of chicle exported. Most of the time the tariff was \$0.15 to \$0.20 per kilogram of chicle exported, but this tax was highly subsidized by the government.<sup>33</sup> In reality, the tax was \$1.00 per kilogram with a subsidy of \$0.80, thus reducing the tax to \$0.20.<sup>34</sup> Figure 3 shows a diagram of this "inward-led growth" commodity chain.

The 1930s was a very difficult decade for the chicle industry. The Great Depression caused a decrease in prices as well as a decrease in imports due to the lack of demand. However, very high levels of chicle were still being exported as shown in Fig. 2. This was because the chicle production had already expanded to such a level at the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century that the amount being produced had exceeded the amount being exported. This led to excess chicle that could be exported during the difficult times of the Great Depression. Also, during the 1930s, chicle imports coming from Mexico surpassed 14,000,000 pounds, which represented 77 percent of world chicle production.<sup>35</sup> But American companies also had a monopoly over the manufacturing industry. The Wrigley Company led with 60 percent of total manufacturing, followed by the Beechnut Packing Company and the American Chicle Company with 20 and 15 percent, respectively.<sup>36</sup>

It was during this time, as previously mentioned, that cooperatives were formed as part of Cardenas' land reform—a promise derived from the ideals of the Mexican Revolution. Cooperatives were made with the purpose of breaking the cycle of abuse present in the "outward-led growth" model. Chicleros now could sell directly to an American agent without the necessity of intermediaries. Chicle resin would be owned collectively and marketed through the government of the Territory of Quintana Roo or Yucatan. The total revenues generated would be divided among the chicleros according with the amount of chicle extracted.<sup>37</sup>


Although this new model had the distinct advantage of preventing abuse against chicleros, it worsened their bargaining position vis-à-vis American manufacturing companies. This is because allowing the state to organize the cooperatives led to corruption that severely hindered the chicleros' condition.<sup>38</sup> The corrupt leaders perverted the goals of the Revolution as seen through the first Federation of Chicle Cooperatives established in 1937. Rafael Melgar, the governor of Quintana Roo, appointed himself the president of the co-operative Federation.<sup>39</sup> In other words, the chicleros were delivered into the hands of the new organs of state management of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the dominant political party in Mexico for more than 70 years.<sup>40</sup> Then, it became a custom for state governors to appoint themselves as presidents of the cooperatives. Gabriel Guevara, another state governor, passed a vote of censure on the cooperative moment and systematically made efforts to weaken popular support for the program.<sup>41</sup> Guevara also started to use the

Federation's funds for personal enrichment. This internal corruption only worsened from 1944-1958 when Margarito Gomez took office and transferred huge amounts of money from the Federation's funds to his administration and personal accounts. He would also receive money for making concessions for chicle exploitation and by selling some properties of the cooperatives at very low costs, in order to receive very large kickbacks.<sup>42</sup>

Increased governmental intervention in the industry also made the production of chicle less efficient due to increased bureaucracy and higher taxes. This increased intervention can be seen in a 1943 Presidential Agreement stating that the federal government would create five committees in charge of the development and supervision of production, exploitation, and exportation of chicle in the states of Yucatan, Campeche, Tabasco, Chiapas, and the Quintana Roo territory.<sup>43</sup> Several taxes were established in every step of the chain. The transportation of chicle from the jungle to the Campeche harbor saw \$0.50 per kilogram tax. On average every kilogram was taxed \$0.38 just for transportation. The forest taxes were \$240 per ton of chicle exploited. Local and state taxes mounted to up to \$160 per ton of chicle exploited.<sup>44</sup> Thus, the government became a rentier state in regards with chicle, which severely hindered the cooperatives' ability to generate more revenue.

Bureaucratic measures could have killed the commodity chain. Fortunately a second and final boom produced the greatest amounts of chicle exports that would ever be seen. World War II, by the same reasons in World War I, caused a spike in demand for chewing gum as once again the Defense Department declared chewing gum as one of its "strategic military items". It was during this time that annual exports reached their highest point with 25 million pounds.<sup>45</sup> By the end of WWII, chicle extraction was the most important industry in the Yucatan Peninsula, employing over 40,000 people.<sup>46</sup> Yet, after this boom, synthetic materials such as styrene-butadiene and polyisobutylene were introduced in the market because of improved elasticity. According to the Exterior Commerce Bank (Bancomext) it was since the 1950s that a tendency to substitute chicle with other synthetic materials increased.<sup>47</sup> After the 1950s, the chewing gum industry saw a decrease in demand in chicle, due to demilitarization after WWII, which led to the eventual bust of the industry.

Chicle continued to be exported, nevertheless, because of an increased demand in Asia and Europe, especially in Japan and Italy. However, the commodity chain remained virtually unchanged other than the increased bureaucracy. As previously mentioned, it was the demand from Japan and Italy that prevented the total demise of the chicle industry. Chicle exports doubled between 1964 and 1973 due to their demand as shown in Fig. 2.<sup>48</sup> In 1971, the Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior and the chicle cooperatives were able to negotiate a better price for its resin from the Wrigley Company.<sup>49</sup> It was not until 1978 that the President of the Federation of Cooperatives was allowed to be democratically elected. However, this did not bring an end to state intervention. Now, the entire production of chicle had to be sold through one export company, the Impulsadora y Exportadora Nacional (IMPEXNAL), a



branch of the Bancomext. This monopoly was created through a government tax law, which allowed IMPEXNAL to be exempt from paying export taxes.<sup>50</sup> Thus, new bureaucracy diminished again the bargaining power of chicleros since IMPEXNAL determined the price at which chicle would be bought.

IMPEXNAL was still not the only factor that decimated the chicle industry. In the 1980s, Mexican chicle stopped being important to American companies because their products now only used synthetic materials. From 1983-1984, Mexican chicleros produced only 200,000 kilos of chicle and its production stopped being economically feasible.<sup>51</sup> The management of the Federation and a lack of financial accountability led to the establishment of the 1994 Plan Piloto Chiclero (PPC). The PPC led to the founding of the Union de Productores de Chicle Natural (UPCHN), an organization that could now deal directly with the marketing of chicle. Unfortunately, the former managers of IMPEXNAL introduced to foreign buyers a new exporting company: Mexitrade, and told investors not to buy from the UPCHN.<sup>52</sup> Thus, the UPCHN had no choice but to sell to Mexitrade and accept its prices.<sup>53</sup>

State economic policy again severely hindered what was left of the chicle market and subsequently diminished the potential development of the chicle industry. First, the UPCHN received a great bureaucratic burden via forest exploitation and shipment authorizations. All these bureaucratic procedures diminished the capacity of the UPCHN to enter into export contracts. Given the great amount of regulations and administrative requirements, the UPCHN managers calculated they could not take orders for more than 900,000 kilograms of chicle a year even when their production capacity was well over twice that amount. Second, *coyotaje*, or human smuggling, was a severe problem to the Union. *Coyotes* were individuals who approached chicleros and offered them better prices than the cooperatives. *Coyotes* did this because they did not pay any of the costs that cooperatives had already incurred such as licensing costs, environment taxes and exploitation taxes.<sup>54</sup> Thus, selling chicle to *coyotes* caused a decrease in production in the eyes of the Union and thus less revenue collection.

In the last decade, it appears that the Union has acquired more independence and there was a chance for the chicle industry's autonomy. In 1998, the UPCHN started to erode the control Mexitrade had over chicle sales by negotiating directly with Wild Things, a US organic chewing gum manufacturer. This caused a small rise in the price of chicle during the 1999-2000 season.<sup>55</sup> Wild Things offered \$5.25 per kilogram; Mitsuba (a Japanese manufacturer) bought chicle at \$4.70 per kilogram whereas Mexitrade only offered \$3.50 per kilogram.<sup>56</sup> The rise in demand comes from the rising population in Asia and the recent wave of organic food consumption, which has caused the chicle industry to show some revitalization in the last few years.<sup>57</sup>

#### IV. CHICLE TODAY & CONCLUSIONS

Chicle today is irrelevant in the chewing gum market. In 2004, chicle represented only 3.5 percent of the total chewing gum market – dominated by the use of synthetic chewing gum made from hydrocarbons.<sup>58</sup> However, chicle is now creating

its own niche market for natural gum. The demand today comes mainly from Asia because of the Japanese's preference for chicle's texture, elasticity and capacity to absorb flavors.<sup>59</sup>

There is no doubt that the chicle commodity chain is unique. It experienced two booms in two different economic models. Both offered different outcomes to the labor sector in Mexico, and led to the development of cities, infrastructure and manufacturing companies in the Southern states of Mexico as well as job growth in American manufacturing cities. However, as this paper has argued, the chicle industry was constantly, severely hindered by Mexico's state policies and bureaucracy, which damaged the ability for chicleros to obtain more revenue from their work. For the chicle industry to grow it is necessary to free the marketing of chicle, lower taxes, decrease the bureaucracy, and open up to new markets in Asia and Europe.

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## REVIVING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS: HISTORICAL LESSONS FOR THE MARCH 2015 ISRAELI ELECTIONS

Elijah Jatovsky

Lessons derived from the successes that led to the signing of the 1993 Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization highlight modern criteria by which a debilitated Israeli-Palestinian peace process can be revitalized. Written in the run-up to the March 2015 Israeli elections, this article examines a scenario for the emergence of a security-credentialed leadership of the Israeli Center-Left. Such leadership did not in fact emerge in this election cycle. However, should this occur in the future, this paper proposes a Plan A, whereby Israel submits a generous two-state deal to the Palestinians based roughly on that of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's offer in 2008. Should Palestinians find this offer unacceptable whether due to reservations on borders, Jerusalem or refugees, this paper proposes a Plan B by which Israel would conduct a staged, unilateral withdrawal from large areas of the West Bank to preserve the viability of a two-state solution.

### INTRODUCTION

Peace between Israel and the Palestinians appears to be as elusive as ever. Following the most recent collapse of American-brokered negotiations in April 2014, Palestinians announced they would revert to pursuing statehood through the United Nations (UN), a move Israel vehemently opposes. A UN Security Council (UNSC) vote on some form of a proposal calling for an end to "Israeli occupation in the West Bank" by 2016 is expected later this month.<sup>1</sup> In July 2014, a two-month war between Hamas-controlled Gaza and Israel broke out, claiming the lives of over 2,100 Gazans (this number encompassing both combatants and civilians), 66 Israeli soldiers and seven Israeli civilians—the low number of Israeli civilians credited to Israel's sophisticated anti-missile Iron Dome system. An upswing in tensions throughout the Fall of 2014 surrounding Jerusalem's Temple Mount saw a resurgence in sporadic Palestinian terror attacks against Israeli civilians and subsequent Israeli crackdowns in the West Bank, leading many experts to speculate on the emergence of a Third Intifada. On December 2, 2014 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the dissolution of Israel's Parliament. Some analysts view this move as his avenue for securing a fourth term as head of a more right-wing coalition, while others believe this presents an opportunity for turnaround in the Israeli government.

In light of these developments, this paper will present a scenario that could establish the basis for renewed final-status peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The analysis is rooted in precedents established un-

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der previous negotiations and will begin by examining the circumstances of the mid-1990's Oslo process under which peace efforts between the two sides were, in the words of lead U.S. negotiator at the time Dennis Ross, at a "high point."<sup>2</sup> The report will then suggest that certain lessons from Oslo can be channeled into developing objectives for today's context.

This paper's ultimate proposal maintains that there are two to three developments that must occur for a final-status peace process to take shape again. First, the upcoming Israeli elections must produce a center-left coalition that prioritizes peace with the Palestinians and can demonstrate to the Israeli public Yitzhak Rabin-like security credentials. Second, this new government should present a generous, two-state peace proposal to the Palestinians that addresses all core issues: the status of Jerusalem, borders, security, and refugees. This proposal will be referred to in this paper as Plan A. Finally, if the Palestinians reject this proposal, which would occur in the likely event that they find Israel's suggested land swaps, Jerusalem compromise, or refugee solution unacceptable, the Israeli government should implement what this paper will refer to as Plan B—that is, a staged and internationally-coordinated unilateral withdrawal of both Israeli military and civilian presence from the parts of the West Bank that would not remain part of Israel under any arrangement. While Plan B alone is in no terms an ultimate solution, its implementation would be the first step in establishing a basis for final status negotiations.

### A BASIS IN HISTORY: LESSONS OF OSLO

Twenty-one years ago, former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Yasser Arafat shook hands on the White House lawn following their signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP)—a document many hoped would lead to imminent negotiations that would finally end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This period is often described as being the most hopeful era of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Dennis Ross said the moment on the White House lawn felt like the "dawning of a new era."<sup>3</sup> While this effort would collapse two years later following the assassination of Rabin by an Israeli right-wing extremist, four enduring lessons can be derived from the lead-up to the signing of the DOP that inform today's situation:

- 1) Breakthroughs occur unexpectedly
- 2) Both sides must feel there is a cost to not acting
- 3) Mutual trust between the two sides is critical
- 4) The importance of an Israeli leader with both a vision for peace and security credentials

The Oslo process came about as an unexpected development following the American-brokered Madrid Peace Conference. As the sole superpower in the Middle East following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. found itself capable

of having a more assertive role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. In an effort to do so, the U.S. convened a peace conference in Madrid in 1991 that was intended to establish the groundwork for future negotiations between Israel and the Arab world by normalizing relations between the parties. Ross writes, “In many ways the Madrid conference was more about symbolism than practicality. We were breaking the symbolism of denial—a taboo on direct talks between Arabs and Israelis.”<sup>4</sup> However, not everyone was convinced that this approach of attempting simultaneous peace negotiations would be effective, including soon-to-be Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. American journalist Glenn Frankel writes,

Yitzhak Rabin had never been enthusiastic about the Madrid formula for talks between Israel and the Arabs. He believed that by staging four separate negotiations simultaneously, the formula effectively chained all of the Arab parties together—no one could afford to move faster than the other three for fear of being branded a sellout, so the slowest and most intransigent set the pace.<sup>5</sup>

Rabin saw value in playing different peace tracks off one another. Following the Madrid Conference, Rabin authorized the U.S. to secretly notify Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad that Israel was prepared to fully withdraw from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace with Syria. However, following what he perceived as Assad’s tepid response to the offer, Rabin decided to shift his peace efforts toward the Palestinians.<sup>6</sup> In January 1993, he authorized secret negotiations between Israeli academic Yair Hirschfeld and PLO representative Ahmed Qurei (known more commonly by his patronym Abu Ala) in Oslo, Norway. This process would set the groundwork for the eventual signing of the DOP. If there is one consistency throughout the events that led to the eventual signing of the DOP it is that no one saw them coming. While more initial U.S. involvement may have enabled the two sides to develop a document that had fewer misunderstandings—an issue that would present major obstacles for its eventual implementation—today’s pessimists would do well to remember the unexpected and sudden nature under which it was born.

The Oslo process’s unexpected nature was not in-and-of-itself the reason that led to the signing of the DOP. Such a process would not have developed had either side felt there would be no price for choosing to forgo negotiations. Following the First Intifada (1987-1991), Israelis were left with the impression that there would be a cost in the form of tangible Palestinian resistance for a continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hebrew University Professor Avraham Sela writes that the First Intifada “reminded the Israeli public of the ongoing problem of the future of the territories and their inhabitants.”<sup>7</sup>

From the Palestinian standpoint, Arafat felt that the outbreak of the Intifada was making him appear irrelevant and believed that entering negotiations would enable him to regain his role as leader of the Palestinians.<sup>8</sup>

For a revival of negotiations to occur today, both Palestinian and Israeli leaders must believe there is a cost to inaction.

While the consequences of inaction may have served as the parties’ motives for signing the DOP, the newfound sense of trust that developed between the two sides was what carried them across the finish line. Both sides believed they had a true partner for peace, which can largely be credited to the relationship between the two leaders. While Rabin and Arafat were far from personally liking one another, there was a sense between them that the other was serious about his commitments.

Most of the time when historians talk about the newfound trust of the Oslo process they are referring to that between Rabin and Arafat. But there was also a significant trust Israelis developed for Rabin. Israelis viewed the former general and military hero of the Six Day War not only as a leader who had the vision for peace, but also as a realist who would not agree to any deal that would compromise Israel’s security. The military has played a particularly important role, even beyond the realm of security, in Israeli society since the establishment of the State in 1948. Brent Sasely describes the Israeli army as being “an agent of nation-building” with its role in the creation of early agricultural settlements known as *kibbutzim* and writes that the army helped develop a distinctive Israeli society by “absorb[ing] tens of thousands of new immigrants and inculcat[ing] them with emerging Israeli values, norms and practices.”<sup>9</sup> To this day, Israelis will not trust security-related issues (especially in peace negotiations) to be handled by leaders who do not have sufficient security and military clout.

In the current environment, there is no trust between Israeli and Palestinian leaders and neither side believes the other is serious about wanting peace. The only Israeli figures in significant governmental positions that the Israeli public believes will guarantee its security are those who are neither prepared nor seriously willing to oversee the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

Amidst this situation, the key to renewing peace negotiations is recreating an environment conducive to the emergence of unexpected breakthroughs, in which leaders from both sides trust one another and believe that there is a price for inaction. The path to this reality begins by the emergence of another Rabin figure on the Israeli political scene—a timely notion considering Israel just hit election season.

### ELECTING A RABIN FIGURE

There are no obvious Rabin-like figures on the current Israeli political scene who are likely to run for office as the head of a center-left party in the upcoming election. Indeed, former head of the Shin Bet (Israel’s internal security service) Yuval Diskin, who fits the Rabin profile with both his security background and vision for peace, has rejected rumors that he will run for office.<sup>10</sup> However, ‘Rabin figure’ does not necessarily need to refer to an individual. If a center-left politician with the vision for peace but who does not possess the Rabin-like security credentials were to establish a special ‘security team’ comprised of members that *do* have such credentials, this combination might suffice in the eye of the Israeli

public as the necessary Rabin figure.

Such a scenario seems possible in light of the recent announcement by Labor Party Head Isaac Herzog and Hatnuah Party Head Tzipi Livni that they would run on a joint center-left ticket in the upcoming election, with the former serving as Prime Minister for the first two years and the latter for the second two years.<sup>11</sup> A poll conducted by Israel's Channel 10 a day before Herzog and Livni made their official announcement, found that the joint Labor-Hatnuah bloc would receive 22 seats, which would defeat Netanyahu's Likud Party that would win only 20.<sup>12</sup> If the Labor-Hatnuah bloc drew Moshe Kahalon's new party, Yesh Atid, and Meretz, which the same poll predicts will receive 13, 10 and 6 seats respectively, that would give the bloc 51 seats, leaving only 10 to be filled by either the ultra orthodox or Arab parties.<sup>13</sup> The right-wing bloc would comprise Likud, Habayit HaYehudi and likely (but not guaranteed) Yisrael Beiteinu, and would receive 20, 15 and 11 seats respectively according to the Channel 10 poll, amounting to a total of 46 seats.

#### POTENTIAL OBSTACLES

There are a number of obstacles to this outcome. Unlike their mindset post-First Intifada, Israelis today do not view the cost imposed by Palestinians for continued occupation as seriously as they did in 1991. While the 2014 Gaza War and sporadic terror attacks indeed demonstrate that there is a cost in the form of Palestinian violence, Israelis are much less likely to be convinced of the immediate need to enter peace negotiations because of these incidences now than they were 20 years ago. Yonit Levi and Udi Segal, influential reporters on Israel's Channel 2 network, recently wrote that,

The revolutions across the Arab world, the rise of the Islamic State and the summer war with Hamas in Gaza have done little to... arouse hope that peace is around the corner. The Israeli public is skeptical, bitter and assumes that things can—and probably will—get much worse. That's why they vote for Netanyahu.<sup>14</sup>

As indicated above, if Netanyahu were to win a fourth term, it would be as the head of a coalition further to the right of what he headed before. Expressing the angst over this outcome by Israel's left wing, Chemi Shalev, a columnist for the left-leaning daily *Haaretz* cited the proverb in Ecclesiastes, "What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun."<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, the large personalities of leaders of a potential center-left coalition could prove problematic. *Haaretz* columnist Yossi Verter writes that, "As long as [Yesh Atid Head Yair] Lapid fails to realize that he does not have the skills to be prime minister and cannot stand for election as such... [the center-left] camp will not be able to give a good fight to their power-hungry opponents across the political divide."<sup>16</sup> In light of the Labor-Hatnuah alliance, Lapid must be prepared to forgo running for

prime minister to allow a center-left coalition to form.

#### SHAPING THE ELECTION AROUND PEACE

The Labor-Hatnuah alliance should shape its campaign around restarting the peace process with the Palestinians. Echelons of the Israeli political commentator world are already predicting this issue will play a central role in the elections. Writing in the *Jerusalem Post*, Gershon Baskin maintains that the elections "are about deciding whether Israel will aggressively launch a peace initiative to finally put an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of two states for two peoples."<sup>17</sup> Founder of the Israel Institute for Strategic Studies Martin Sherman writes in the same newspaper that, "The pivotal issue on the agenda in the elections will—or at least, should—be the Palestinian issue... The Palestinian issue impacts nearly every area of life in Israel and until there is a rational and sustainable blueprint of how to deal with it, it will not be possible to arrive at a rational and sustainable blueprint for how to manage the overall affairs of the nation."<sup>18</sup> New York University's Center for Global Affairs Senior Fellow Alon Ben-Meir writes that, "The new election offers Israelis a historic opportunity to elect new visionary and courageous leaders who will first and foremost commit themselves to seek peace with the Palestinians and preserve Israel's democratic principles."<sup>19</sup>

The Labor-Hatnuah alliance should advocate for these renewed peace negotiations on the basis that doing so would improve Israel's long-term security. Unfortunately for this alliance, Labor's weak point at the moment happens to be security. One of the primary reasons offered as to why Netanyahu will be re-elected is because there is no individual from the opposition that can challenge him when it comes to talking security. Netanyahu served in *Sayeret Matkal*, one of Israel's most elite Special Forces units, and his brother was killed in Operation Entebbe, a hostage-rescue Israeli forces conducted in 1976. Shalev writes, "Even if Israelis are tired of Netanyahu, there is no one who can compete with his national security credentials, no battle-trained IDF general like Yitzhak Rabin or Ehud Barak who swept the Labor Party to its only two victories in the past 40 years."<sup>20</sup> Neither Herzog nor Livni have had high-level security positions in government nor did either hold high-ranking positions during their military service. The only security-related matter of which Herzog and Livni, as individuals, may actually have an advantage over Netanyahu is in their promise that they would improve Israel's relationship with the U.S., the country's most important ally and security partner. It is no secret that there have been serious tensions between the Obama Administration and Netanyahu government over the past few months. While the fundamental U.S.-Israel special relationship is in no way threatened, Herzog and Livni could still use the damaged personal relationship between Obama and Netanyahu to their advantage.

While it is true that no *individual* running as the head of a center-left party can challenge Netanyahu on security credentials, an interesting development is taking place among former high-ranking members of Israel's security establishment. A growing

number of influential members of Israel's security establishment have been coming out in the past few years against Netanyahu's lack of investment in the peace process, arguing that not pursuing peace is damaging Israel's long-term security. Six former heads of the Shin Bet appeared in the 2012 documentary *The Gatekeepers* encouraging renewed peace negotiations and ultimate Israeli disengagement from most of the West Bank.<sup>21</sup> A recent letter signed by over 100 members of Israel's security establishment, including retired generals, Mossad directors, and national police commissioners, and published as an advertisement throughout Israeli dailies, called on Netanyahu to embrace a regional solution to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by supporting the Arab League's proposal that outlines a two-state solution.<sup>22</sup>

Writing in *Haaretz*, Israeli journalist Sefi Rachlevsky notes that, "Throughout much of history and in most countries, the military establishment stands to the right of the government. During times fraught with messianism, it finds itself standing to the left of the regime. This is happening now in Israel."<sup>23</sup> This phenomenon, if channeled wisely, could aid Herzog and Livni. Rachlevsky believes this growing disenchantment with the current Israeli government by Israel's security establishment "could enable a turnabout. The energy of worrying about the increasing extremism in the uppermost [security] echelons could turn into a lever for change in Israel."<sup>24</sup> Herzog and Livni could act as the channel for this "lever of change." If the duo can rally the disenchanted security establishment around the Labor-Hatnuah alliance, Netanyahu's security credentials may no longer be as impressive to the Israeli voter whose priority is national security. After all, who would the average Israeli trust: one former Special Forces fighter (who has indeed demonstrated significant security-related leadership achievements), or an entire security establishment united behind a single political party?

Rachlevsky writes, "The only road to creating a turnabout goes through Labor: a pact between parties, movements and leading figures under the rubric of 'One Israel,' which defeated Netanyahu in 1999. That is the only way that the concern of [security] establishment figures...can gain expression."<sup>25</sup> It seems that many members of the security establishment recognize this and are ready to back a Labor-led alliance. At a peace rally in December, another former head of the Shin Bet Carmi Gillon said, "The State of Israel is run today by a bunch of pyromaniacs, led at the hands of egomaniacs to its ultimate destruction."<sup>26</sup> Drawing a historical metaphor, Gillon continued, "We must be the voice of Yohanan Ben Zakai who kept the Jewish flame burning despite the Masada suicides represented today by Bibi Netanyahu and his trusted allies from the extreme right."<sup>27</sup> In an opinion piece published in the widely-circulated daily *Yediot Ahronot* before the new elections were announced, Diskin wrote that he does not believe "the current government will be able to rise above itself and make the necessary moves [to achieve peace with the Palestinians]...It is important for the voters to understand that we do not have to follow the right-wing parties' route to a bi-national state."<sup>28</sup>

If large portions of the Israeli security establishment are ready to back a

center-left coalition, the question then becomes what is the most effective means of channeling this support into votes, especially considering Herzog is widely viewed as being uncharismatic and far from inspirational. Herzog and Livni should assemble a "security team" to fill the gap in their security credentials. This team will be responsible for assuring the Israeli public that any agreement the government signs as part of a peace negotiation meets Israel's complete security needs. At the recent Saban Forum, Herzog mentioned the formation of such a team, without identifying who the specific "security gurus" that "have devoted their life to the state of Israel"<sup>29</sup> were. A refocus on peace efforts coupled with the creation of this security team could revitalize the Israeli center-left electorate by, as Shalev writes, creating "the impression that Netanyahu and his Likud are stagnant while the force and momentum are with his rivals... as befits a time of 'national emergency' that [these security figures] claim is upon us."<sup>30</sup>

#### THE NEW COST OF INACTION

As demonstrated by Oslo, to spearhead negotiations, both parties ultimately need to be convinced that there is too large a price to pay for inaction. If post-First Intifada, the reason the Israeli public supported peace negotiations was because they were convinced that there was a serious cost of occupation in the form of Palestinian resistance, there are reasons to believe that the Israeli public could now be convinced of the necessity to enter into peace negotiations because of the cost of occupation in the form of international isolation. While in recent months the increase in symbolic gestures, such as European nations' official recognition of a State of Palestine, have had minimal impact on Israeli positioning toward negotiations, Daniel Levy, a Middle East expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said that, "the next time the European frustration or egregious Israeli action hits a certain bar, then you'll start to hit tangible issues and not just symbolic ones."<sup>31</sup> On this note, Sherman writes, "The status quo is not sustainable and is continuously deteriorating for Israel—as the recent votes in ever-increasing numbers of European parliaments in favor of unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood starkly underscore."<sup>32</sup> Such actions could include economic sanctions against Israeli companies that do business in occupied territory, which could have a foreseeably significant impact on Israel's economy as the European Union is Israel's largest trading partner at over \$35 billion a year.<sup>33</sup>

Another arena in which Israel faces potential international isolation is the UN. Despite significant U.S. opposition, the Palestinians are planning on bringing a proposal before the UNSC by the end of December that calls for the end of Israel's occupation of the West Bank by 2016. Germany, France and the United Kingdom are currently drafting a more complex proposal that sets a two-year deadline for reaching a permanent status deal peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians.<sup>34</sup> At the time of writing, it is still unclear which proposal will be voted on, if either. In the event that a proposal is voted on, and in the unlikely case that the U.S. were to abstain instead of exercising its veto power,\* this could benefit the Labor-Hatnuah bloc by acting as proof that Israel faces significant costs by not entering negotiations. Such a move on

the international stage by the U.S. would demonstrate to the Israeli public that Israel needs more moderate leaders to avoid further isolation.

Finally, the Labor-Hatnuah alliance can also warn of the possible internal consequences should Israel fail to enter negotiations. As Sherman writes, “One of the most worrying manifestations of these sentiments is the increasing numbers of Israelis seeking to acquire foreign passports, signaling a lack of confidence in the elected leaders’ ability to secure their future – both as individuals and as part of the national collective.”<sup>35</sup> In essence, for Herzog and Livni to win, they must demonstrate that all these costs as a result of further international isolation create an unsustainable status quo. Just as Rabin served as a leader to channel the Israeli post-First Intifada mindset into supporting the entrance of peace negotiations, so too now must the Labor-Hatnuah alliance channel an Israeli recognition of international isolation into renewing peace efforts.

### TRUST

The final element that makes a Labor-led coalition more likely to reopen peace negotiations is its historically good relationship with the Palestinian Authority. Herzog and Abbas also have a personal relationship, which would only benefit this process.

### PLANS A AND B

The election of a Labor-led coalition would only be the first step down the long road of revitalizing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Needless to say, an immediate, comprehensive peace settlement, addressing all major issues and signed by both parties would be the ideal option to resolving this conflict. In the near future, though, such an agreement appears far off. The question therefore becomes how to craft a political reality that establishes enough trust between the two sides to set a basis for this eventual outcome.

### PLAN A

As a demonstration of its seriousness in trying to reach a permanent solution, the new Labor-led government could implement Plan A, which would be an Israeli peace offer on the model of former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s proposal at the Annapolis Conference in 2008. This offer would reflect the requirements that any permanent status deal would encompass, including the establishment of a part of East Jerusalem as the capital of the future State of Palestine, a just addressing of the Palestinian refugee issue, measures to uphold both side’s security, and suggested borders based on Israeli annexation of large bloc settlements in exchange for comparable

\* The chances the U.S. withholds its veto of such a proposal is extraordinarily small. The only circumstance under which this would occur would be if the proposal did not call for withdrawal from Israel’s major bloc settlements, which will be annexed in exchange for land swaps as part of a final status deal. While the proposal being drafted by the Palestinians will not specify this nuance, it is unclear whether the proposal being drafted by the EU-3 will.

land swaps to the Palestinians from territory in Israel proper.

### PLAN B

However, it is unclear whether the Palestinians would accept an offer like this, as demonstrated by the inability of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to accept Olmert’s 2008 proposal. The primary reason for this refusal was that Abbas did not believe the offer met the Palestinian minimum criteria for Jerusalem, refugee issues or borders. A specific example the Palestinians found unacceptable in the 2008 proposal, which would likely repeat itself in an Israeli offer today, is the issue of Israel’s Ariel settlement. Ariel is home to nearly 18,000 Israelis and is more of a city than the traditional conception of a “settlement.” However, it is also 12 miles East of Israel’s 1967-border meaning that if Israel were to annex it as part of a permanent sta-

status deal, the new international border would create a large jut through the northern part of the future State of Palestine. In all likelihood, any Israeli proposal will include Ariel within its borders, with Israel citing the difficulty of removing Ariel’s residents and the settlement’s overall permanence. Palestinians, however, require Ariel become part of their future state as not doing so would compromise the new state’s topographical continuity.

In the event the Palestinians reject Israel’s Plan A because of Ariel and/or any other reason, Israel could then revert to Plan B. This would involve a staged, unilateral withdrawal of Israeli military and civilian presence from territory that would become part of the State of Palestine under *any* proposal once a final deal is reached (marked by red lines on the map to the left). These areas would essentially be based on Olmert’s 2008 offer.



Source: S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace

A unilateral withdrawal would in no way be a permanent solution to the conflict; however, it would demonstrate Israel's seriousness in trying to reach one. A diverse array of Israeli political figures, who can boast plenty of hawkish positions, support forms of a unilateral withdrawal. Former head of the Israeli Defense Forces Military Intelligence Directorate Amos Yadlin and former Israeli chief peace negotiator Gilead Sher write that if the Palestinians were to refuse an Israeli offer,

Israel should pro-actively take constructive, unilateral, internationally coordinated steps towards a two-state reality, meaning the *de facto*—if not yet *de jure*—existence of two nation-states for two peoples... Unilateral Israeli action would create tangible progress toward a two-state solution and generate momentum towards re-establishing negotiations.<sup>36</sup>

Former Israeli ambassador to the U.S. Michael Oren writes, “One solution [to a failed peace process] could be a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian population centers in the West Bank... Israel can still end the occupation of the Palestinians, preserve its security, and perhaps lay new foundations for peace.”<sup>37</sup> In an interview, Oren expanded on this idea saying, “I don't know if remaining in the entire territories, with control over a great number of Palestinians and being exposed to increasing international sanctions—boycotts and delegitimization—I don't know if that brings you to peace... It actually endangers Israel.”<sup>38</sup> Without endorsing the notion, Netanyahu himself has acknowledged that, “The idea of taking unilateral steps is gaining ground, from the center-left to the center-right... Many Israelis are asking themselves if there are certain unilateral steps that could theoretically make sense.”<sup>39</sup> A February 2014 article published in the Israeli daily *Maariv* reported that a former media advisor to Netanyahu named Yoaz Hendel was working on a specific plan for unilateral disengagement that would minimize the withdrawal of Israeli settlers.<sup>40</sup> Details of this plan have yet to emerge.

The term unilateralism has a bad reputation in Israel. Following Israel's unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza in 2000 and 2005 respectively, the country was rewarded with a surge of violence from within the withdrawn territory. However, as Yadlin and Sher argue, these moves were right in principle—they were just carried out using flawed tactics.<sup>41</sup> The proposed unilateral withdrawal from parts of the West Bank would not be a repeat of either Lebanon or Gaza for three reasons. First, the future State of Palestine would be demilitarized and Israel would be able to play a role in ensuring weapons and rockets could not be smuggled in along the Jordan Valley border. Second, the withdrawal would be carried out in stages, in conjunction with both the international community and Palestinian Authority to ensure a power vacuum would not develop. Third, the withdrawal would be implemented under the recognition that the action in-and-of-itself does not suffice as a permanent solution.

Such a withdrawal would be costly, both financially and socially—with the minority of ideological Israeli settlers who do require forced evacuation likely putting up physical resistance as occurred in Gaza. The withdrawal would be carried out over an extended period of time, and if done properly would guarantee Israel's maintenance as a Jewish, democratic state. Moreover, this withdrawal would be tantamount to Israel's official renunciation of claims over areas of the West Bank, which would establish a strong basis for future permanent status negotiations.

## CONCLUSION

Some reading this article will point to the many suggestions made for Israel and question why parallel ones are not provided for the Palestinians. In no way by detailing objectives for Israel and not the Palestinians is this report claiming that the latter does not have a comparable role to play in renewing negotiations. Indeed, no permanent solution can be reached unilaterally. Merely, this analysis maintains that Israel, as the more powerful party of the two, should be the one to initiate this process.

Israeli skeptics on the Right often question Abbas's viability as a partner for peace. While Abbas has his share of both personal and leadership shortcomings, there is no denying his belief in the principle of reaching a two-state solution through non-violent means. As Diskin writes,

I know extremely well the daily brain-washing that claims that Abbas is no partner. I have known Abbas for longer and far better than many of the politicians who spread these slogans. I can honestly say that he has quite a few flaws... but he is still the only Arab leader I know who dared to publicly oppose terror at the height of the second Intifada, even when the Palestinian public supported terror, and after the kidnapping of the three boys and the beginning of the escalation that led to Operation Protective Edge. Abbas, as opposed to Arafat, understands very well that terror is harmful to the Palestinian cause, and therefore instructs his security forces to act against terror in a clear and direct manner.<sup>42</sup>

The clearest shortcoming of a unilateral withdrawal in the eyes of the Left is that it does not address the end-of-claim issues of Jerusalem and refugees. Frida Ghitis writes, “The unilateral move would deprive Israel of its most important goal in talks with Palestinians: a final and definitive resolution to the conflict. For Palestinians, a unilateral Israeli move might produce a state, but it would leave not only Jerusalem, but also the issue of what happens to Palestinian refugees, unresolved.”<sup>43</sup> While all these concerns are valid, they are outweighed by the potential Plan B has to establish the basis for renewed negotiations that address all final-status issues.

Minutes before his assassination, Yitzhak Rabin stood on stage at a peace rally leading the thousands gathered before him in the iconic Israeli song *Shir LaShalom*

(A Song for Peace). One of the final verses reads, “Don’t say the day will come, bring the day about!” Skeptics of an eventual unilateral option would do well to give this song another listen.

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## WHO SELLS THE TRUTH? A CASE STUDY OF REPORTING IN THE BOKO HARAM CONFLICT

Alex Dobyan

A 2013 clash between the Nigerian military and Boko Haram insurgents in Baga, Borno State, Nigeria, resulted in disparities in media reporting on casualty totals and the extent of infrastructural damage. This paper analyzed online news archives for the period from April to July 2013 to determine the methodology and credibility of reported statistics, which highlighted disputing accounts given by Nigerian public officials, politicians, local residents, and international NGOs. This case of military involvement in creation of media narratives was chosen for the robustness of the media environment in which it took place, the length of the period of time during which reporting of the case unfolded, and the breadth of the incongruities in reported death tolls and building destruction totals. While many of these reported figures were of dubious origin, high-quality data from Human Rights Watch (HRW) suggests that the Nigerian military responded to incentives to downplay its role in causing the casualties and damage. These attempts to deflate casualty totals and deflect blame towards Boko Haram were unsuccessful. Hence, the episode harmed Nigeria's credibility among both Nigerians and the international community and eroded its counterinsurgency campaign against Boko Haram.

### INTRODUCTION

A bloody conflict has been ongoing since 2009 in northeastern Nigeria between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram (officially, "Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād, "Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad"), an insurgent group that claims affiliations with transnational jihadist networks such as Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Boko Haram seeks to establish a draconian and dogmatic form of sharia law across all of Nigeria and to that end has engaged in bombings, kidnappings, and mass killings. Nigeria has responded with the deployment of its troops to the region (in tandem with those of neighbors Chad, Cameroon and others), but its counterinsurgency campaign has been criticized internationally for its inefficacy<sup>1</sup> and heavy-handedness.<sup>2</sup> The most notable of alleged human rights violations by Nigerian forces occurred in April 2013 in the northeastern town of Baga, on Lake Chad in Borno State, in which anywhere from dozens to hundreds are reported to have been killed. The subsequent war of words in the Nigerian and international press highlighted the dissemination of facts and figures by the Nigerian military in an attempt to provide more palatable information to engaged publics in support of its operations to stabilize the unrest in the northeast. This paper seeks to analyze media reporting of a key event of this crisis, namely an April 2013 clash between Boko Haram and Nigerian

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forces and subsequent allegations of human rights abuses by the Nigerian military, in order to determine the origin and credibility of statistics cited in reporting and how their dissemination may have implications for the conduct of the conflict.

Mastery of the flow of information is an essential element to any counterinsurgency campaign, and Nigeria's campaign against Boko Haram is no exception. In these conflict situations, victory on the battlefield alone is deemed insufficient; a counterinsurgent force must also win the battle of narratives. The influential counterinsurgency theorist Galula's "first law" of counterinsurgency was that the objective is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory;<sup>3</sup> likewise, U.S. policymakers sought to "win the hearts and minds" of the Afghan and Iraqi populations in order to root out adversary forces and stem terrorist recruitment during the wars in those countries. Hence, imparting information that will bolster support for the counterinsurgent force and negate support for the insurgency is central to the success of any campaign. While this may include a variety of elements from manipulation of cyberspace communications to military deception of the enemy, this paper will concentrate on the use of public affairs, defined as "public information, command information, and public engagement activities directed toward both the internal and external publics."<sup>4</sup> A key conduit for the dissemination of information in the service of a counterinsurgency operation is the press, which may be friendly, neutral or adversary and have a local, national, or international audience. Public interest in the goings-on of military conflict provides an opportunity for actors to strategically spread favorable information to audiences around the globe.

Kilcullen notes the necessity of the "competition to mobilize" in the modern counterinsurgent campaign, noting insurgents "may not seek to seize government, relying instead on their ability to mobilize sympathizers within a global audience and generate local support"; conversely, "the counterinsurgent must mobilize the home population, the host country, the global audience, the populations of allied and neutral countries, and the military and government agencies involved."<sup>5</sup> When either side has no battlefield success to speak of, it may seek to spread extra-factual information in an attempt to rally potential allies to its cause by smearing its enemy's reputation or downplaying the extent to which it has lost territory or sustained casualties. Battlefield mistakes – such as strategic blunders, excessive collateral damage or atrocities – can be met with counternarratives that seek to revise the facts on the ground, cover up culpability, or establish at least plausible deniability that the event ever occurred in the first place. Even in the absence of such events, there is evidence that actors on the battlefield respond to incentives to invent statistics out of thin air to suit their own purposes.<sup>6</sup> In the face of allegations of atrocities, the Nigerian military would have ample reason to alter or make up statistics to influence the media narrative and disseminate them through its statements to the press while other actors could have reason to produce contrary statistics of equally dubious origin. This paper hopes to clarify this question through a case study of the events in Baga in mid-April 2013.

## METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESIS

This paper will use archival Nigerian and international news sources in order to qualitatively analyze the reporting of the casualties and damage resulting from the events in Baga in mid-April of 2013. As will be detailed below, accounts of the events varied substantially depending on the source, the outlet reporting the events, and the date that the story was reported. Sources examined for analysis included five Nigerian newspapers (*Daily Trust*, *Leadership*, *This Day*, *The Sun*, and *Vanguard*) and major international news sources including the *Associated Press* (AP), *Reuters*, *Agence France-Presse* (AFP), and the *New York Times*. The Nigerian sources have been selected both for their diversity in location, viewpoint, and availability in searchable databases available to the author. The date range examined runs from April 16, 2013 (the earliest day on which military engagement in Baga is said to have started, although reporting did not commence until several days later) until the conclusion of July 2013. Qualitative analysis will focus on the description of the events provided in news stories, the attribution of facts and figures, and the extent to which the information is credible and/or verifiable. Systematically opposite reporting of figures in northern Nigeria vis-à-vis southern Nigeria (or in Nigeria vis-à-vis the rest of the world, etc.) would imply opposing mobilizations to conflict depending on the audience. As an example, wide dissemination of reports of a high civilian death toll might erode support for the Nigerian military internationally, but may draw more local support for Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria if the reports are believed. Since only one death toll can represent the reality of the situation, other accounts may be simply erroneous or the result of extrafactual information introduced to the media environment by an actor or actors.

Nigeria's robust print newspaper industry makes the country a relative anomaly among countries engaged in counterinsurgency at present, and so it presents a strong test case to examine news representation of counterinsurgency among domestic audiences. Most reporting is done in English, making discourse analysis more accessible to Western scholars. Previous scholarly work on media in Nigeria suggests that there are significant differences in reporting across media outlets. The media outlets chosen for study in this paper vary in their orientation and audience, some widely so. Ethnicity pervades reporting, with a Nigerian scholar calling the editorial positions of newspapers as "more or less ethnic jingoist."<sup>7</sup> *Daily Trust* and *Leadership* are both based in the capital city of Abuja in central Nigeria; the former is the most widely-circulated newspaper in the country's northern region. *Vanguard* is reputed for its south-oriented editorial viewpoints<sup>8</sup> and often displays a pro-government slant;<sup>9</sup> *The Sun* is chaired by a member of the PDP,<sup>10</sup> the party of President Goodluck Jonathan, while *Thisday* is regarded as having a pro-police and pro-military slant.<sup>11</sup> The latter three are based in Lagos, the economic center and a major media hub. Moreover, the administration of President Jonathan, who hails from the southern state of Bayelsa and who draws much of his popularity from southern regions of Nigeria,<sup>12</sup> is alleged to have attempted to muzzle journalists and media critical

of his policies via judicial and extrajudicial means.<sup>13</sup> As it pertains to Boko Haram, initial scholarship by Okoro and Odemelam suggests that the framing used by Nigerian media has tended to cast the government in a positive light and highlight ethnic differences.<sup>14</sup>

All this is not to imply that Nigerian sources should be disregarded as inferior to international ones; Western journalists may be unable to deploy to the scene in a timely manner, especially in a rural conflict environment. A lack of local expertise may hinder fact-finding. They may simply parrot erroneous reporting produced by local media; southern outlets project a negative, backwards image of northern Nigeria which often influences Western interpretations of Nigerian events.<sup>15</sup> The susceptibility of all journalists to faulty work and external influence is exactly what merits further study of how they have responded in this context. In the case of Baga, whether Nigerian military forces sought to influence the narrative is not in question; they released statements on the affair as the news media took interest in it. Instead, the plausibility, credibility, and verifiability of their statements relative to accounts by others and the distribution thereof are at stake here, with the results having substantial implications for the success of their counterinsurgency efforts. I hypothesize that there will be strong evidence that Nigerian military accounts of the events at Baga will be viewed by international media as less plausible, less credible and will have not been independently verified or be unverifiable, making it more likely that their accounts are deliberately extrafactual. Additionally, I expect to find that the figures released by the Nigerian military to be several times smaller than figures released by other sources; such a demonstrably large difference being able to raise questions about which figures are accurate irrespective of the methodology used to obtain the figures. Nonetheless, I expect to find that these figures will be treated as more credible and plausible in southern-based media outlets and be reported with a higher relative frequency in these sources.

#### OVERVIEW OF MEDIA REPORTING IN THE WAKE OF BAGA

Although the first reports of a skirmish between military forces and Boko Haram insurgents at Baga put the date as April 18, news of a clash was not widely reported until April 22. Interestingly, international sources circulated initial reports before the Nigerian sources, with *Vanguard* the only source to publish an article on that date. The AP reported a figure of 185 dead, attributing the figure to Lawan Kole, a local government official, while offering the caveat later in the article that casualty figures in Nigeria can be inflated by local officials and residents with their own agendas. However, the article noted the commander of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (though it did not identify him as such) Brig. Gen. Austin Edokpaye did not dispute the figures. Edokpaye claimed Boko Haram used human shields, inflating the death toll, and possessed rocket-propelled grenades and other weaponry that could produce large fires. Residents who spoke to an AP journalist, however, claimed Nigerian soldiers deliberately set fire to swaths of Baga.<sup>16</sup> Contrary

to these reports, AFP was much more skeptical of Kole's figure of 185.<sup>17</sup> It said that a spokesman for the armed forces in Borno state, Lt. Col. Sagir Musa, had disputed the toll of 185, saying that "there could have been some casualties, but it is unthinkable to say that 185 people died." It also offered the disclaimer about the trend towards inflated casualty tolls in Nigeria. Meanwhile, the *Vanguard* released only a very short article that did reiterate the figure of 185 deaths, but also squarely blamed Boko Haram, citing the statement by Edokpaye.<sup>18</sup>

It was not until the following day, April 23, that there was widespread reportage on Baga in the Nigerian press, while international coverage continued to proliferate. Prominent news sources like the *New York Times* and *Wall Street Journal*,<sup>19</sup> among others, reported on the events for the first time. Some of these cited the figure of 185 deaths, while others cited a Red Cross official who said 187 had been killed – notwithstanding the Red Cross's own statements to media that they had not yet visited the town and could not at the present time. In Nigeria, a number of casualty totals were reported, with some news outlets even contradicting themselves in different articles. As an example, *Thisday* ran articles with headlines "Boko Haram - MTF Confirms 30 Insurgents, 6 Civilians Killed" (MTF referring to the multinational task force formed to combat Boko Haram soldiers from Nigeria and other countries) and "191 Killed in Multinational Task Force, Boko Haram Clash"<sup>20</sup> on the same day. The latter article cited Nigeria's Defense Headquarters as saying there were 26 total casualties (25 Boko Haram and one Nigerian soldier) and a local senator as saying there were 172 deaths. Clearly, there was some disagreement as to what were the actual events that took place. *Vanguard*, however, stuck to the figure of 185 – in three articles it ran on the 23<sup>rd</sup>, it quoted locals who spoke of widespread devastation,<sup>21</sup> highlighted criticism of the MTF by opposition party ACN,<sup>22</sup> and covered the Nigerian Senate's intention to launch an investigation into the events.<sup>23</sup> The most seemingly sensationalist stories came from the *Daily Trust* – which printed an article titled "How Soldiers Sacked Baga" and said in another that the death toll could be as high as 300, although it did matter-of-factly note the military's rebuttal of the figures.<sup>24</sup>

In the subsequent days, various officials would dispute the death toll, although 185 remained the most frequently used figure in media both in Nigeria and abroad. A senator whose constituency includes Baga, Maina Maaji Lawan, said he counted 228 casualties, which was reported as a story in itself in *Vanguard*, *Thisday* and *Daily Trust*,<sup>25</sup> and later cited contextually in international media. Sen. Lawan seems to have arrived at this number by counting the number of fresh graves himself in his survey of the town. He also estimated there were 4000 houses damaged by fire. A report on BBC's Hausa-language radio service featured a Baga resident as saying, "Anybody who says the number of the dead is not up to 300 then he is not a resident of Baga."<sup>26</sup> The MTF revised its figure upwards to 36 in a report, simultaneously blaming politicians from Borno for distorting the truth and inflating the casualty totals. They said only 30 houses with thatched roofs had been destroyed

and attributed the damage to Boko Haram. However, whereas the governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima, had previously given the death toll as 185 based on information provided by local officials, he seemed to cautiously revise the total to a vague “over 100.”<sup>27</sup> A *Daily Trust* opinion piece said figures as high as 700 had been reported, and even surmised that a military operation in Baga had long been in the works rather than a response to a Boko Haram offensive.<sup>28</sup> *Thisday* sidestepped the issue in one article by giving a rather imprecise figure of “between 36 and 190” deaths.<sup>29</sup> On April 29, the *New York Times* quoted an aid worker who said that “many more than 200” had perished, but that the worker could not be identified by name for fear of retribution.<sup>30</sup> On the next day, the public news network NTA TV reported that the government had found 32 graves as well as recovered six bodies from Lake Chad, which lies a few kilometers from Baga.<sup>31</sup> The question of graves would become a central element in the dispute – the Nigerian military defended its low figures by saying that no mass graves had been uncovered. Yet residents replied that Muslim custom is to bury each body individually, rather than en masse; presumably, these residents would have been responsible for the burial process (as opposed to Nigerian forces). This indicates that mass killings may have occurred even in the absence of mass graves as evidence.

The matter of the magnitude of the damage was to some extent clarified on May 1, nearly two weeks after the conclusion of the alleged killings, by satellite data released by the NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW). Their analysis of images obtained before and after the incident showed an estimated 2,275 buildings destroyed by fires over a large swath of the town.<sup>32</sup> HRW also said that evidence from the destruction showed the fires were unlikely to have been caused by arms fire and were more likely to have been intentionally set; the group also estimated a total of 183 casualties based on interviews with local residents. The release of their assessment drew wide coverage both in Nigeria and internationally – with more coverage appearing at this point than any other save the initial reporting. The main effect was to draw the discrepancies in accounts of the events into focus, and most reporting thereafter highlighted the opposing narratives and statistics together. Most media sources converged on 185 as the death toll they would report, usually attributing it to local residents but often not including a source at all, while the figure of 36 dead (or 37, including a lone Nigerian soldier) was always accompanied by a reference to the Nigerian military, a clarification suggesting that their accounts were viewed as far from authoritative.

Likewise, a number of facts emerged in reporting that highlighted the complications of sourcing accurate reporting from Baga. Firstly, a contingent of Nigerian soldiers controlled all access to Baga in the wake of the battle. As of April 24, more than a week after the earliest date HRW claimed its satellite data detected fires burning in Baga, the Red Cross said it had still not been allowed into the town to provide relief – though that did not prevent the agency from releasing its own estimation of the death toll. Neither was the Nigerian Emergency Management

Agency (NEMA) able to enter Baga, despite government orders to administer aid to affected areas. The Nigerian military claimed at the time that it could not guarantee security to relief workers,<sup>33</sup> but allegations were made that the military was attempting to cover up evidence that soldiers had committed mass killings.<sup>34</sup> Although international news agencies apparently spoke with Baga residents, it seems they must have done so either via internet or in person outside of Baga as residents fled into the bush following the attacks. (Cellphone communication had previously been shut down in the area as the Nigerian government sought to limit its use by Boko Haram to coordinate attacks.) British newspaper *The Guardian* claimed to be the first to send a Western journalist to Baga in an article that was published on May 10 – three weeks after the violence. The incredibly slow pace of reporting fueled critiques of media reports by supporters of the military; one *Vanguard* piece argued that “the extraordinary thing about Friday’s bloody clash at the remote Borno Village of Baga is that most of the news got out to the media only from Sunday, more than 24 hours after the violence began.” These supporters reasoned that if journalists could not be found in Baga at the time of the fracas, their reports ought to be considered less credible than the military forces that were present. Nigeria’s High Military Command itself said that the media had erroneously reported “late” figures, but did not clarify how figures might have been corrupted (as opposed to verified) in the timespan between the attacks and the reporting thereof.<sup>35</sup>

The political implications of the attack in Baga were tremendous; it led the government to impose a state of emergency in three northern states and even resulted in calls for the involvement of the International Criminal Court to prosecute those responsible for atrocities.<sup>36</sup> Despite the high stakes involved, the Jonathan administration did not seem to conclusively take sides with regards to the casualty count. Instead, it said that would launch an investigation into the attacks, as did the country’s Senate. The results were wildly varied. The Senate’s report, released in the beginning of June, said it only found evidence of nine deaths, a figure it arrived at by counting grave sites in Baga. This raised the ire of some of the Senate’s own members, who noted that only one of the committee’s 13 members even traveled to Baga, and one senator lamented that the committee “had come under intense pressure not to indict the military even in the face of glaring evidence of mass murder and massacre.”<sup>37</sup> The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) report also raised questions about the casualty count, as it did not arrive at a conclusive figure, stating only that the process of interviewing residents would take months.<sup>38</sup> Instead, it focused on culpability for the attack, saying it had evidence that Nigerian military committed atrocities, irrespective of how many had actually died. By this time, the international media had lost interest in Baga, and the findings were reported on a much larger scale in the Nigerian press. Notably, *Thisday* did not present any of the criticisms of senators when discussing the Senate report,<sup>39</sup> while *Daily Trust* covered them extensively;<sup>40</sup> likewise, only *Thisday* mounted criticism of the NHRC report.<sup>41</sup>

Of more interest were the political ramifications that had already taken

hold. A state of emergency was imposed in three northeastern states, including Borno, with a 24-hour curfew in place at one point. Nigerian troops were deployed in greater numbers in May 2013, and the state of emergency has remained in place ever since. Also in May, a video of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau decrying the attacks surfaced, drawing attention from media both in Nigeria and abroad.<sup>42</sup> In the video, he contends that Nigerian troops killed townspeople of Baga at will long after their initial confrontation with Boko Haram forces ended, a narrative that aligns with those suggesting three-digit casualty tolls. Regardless of the correctness of his statements, it is clear that Boko Haram attempted to leverage the allegations against Nigerian forces, and implicitly the credibility thereof, as a recruiting tool for their cause.

#### REPUTABILITY OF FACTS AND FIGURES PRESENTED IN BAGA REPORTING

With such a wide range of facts being reported, it is plainly evident that some must be false. While an analysis of news media may not conclusively establish what has happened, it can help determine which facts are more likely to be true given the evidence that has been presented. The methodologies involved in fact-finding are essential for establishing the plausibility and credibility of their results.<sup>43</sup> This presents problems for journalists, who often need to protect their sources in order to continue the flow of information; note that aid workers and locals in Baga insisted on anonymity for fear of being targeted by the authorities. Nonetheless, a version of events that approximates or nears the truth can be gleaned from a close appraisal of the facts and the information behind them.

Casualty totals are difficult to establish, and methodological choices shape ways in which they are over- or under-counted.<sup>44</sup> The news sources reporting on the number of victims in Baga have sometimes named the origins of the figures announced, but have much less commonly provided information on how those figures were derived. The Nigerian Senate investigators, and its legislator for Borno North, Sen. Lawan, both opted to count graves as a way of determining the death toll. Several factors call into question the accuracy of these figures. First of all, there is no agreement on the number of burial areas that needed to be surveyed in the first place – Sen. Lawan counted graves in four areas, while the Senate investigation only counted one location. Furthermore, given that there may have been bodies found in Lake Chad, or survivors that may have succumbed to their injuries after fleeing to the surrounding bush, or corpses that may have been burned completely to ash, it is likely that such a count might be incomplete. In addition, each has an incentive to over- or under-represent the total of deaths. Politicians from regions affected by Boko Haram are reputed to inflate casualty totals in order to sow resentment of the Nigerian military response to Boko Haram in the region; this case would fit strongly with that pattern, especially considering that Sen. Lawan is a member of the opposition. Similarly, the Senate in 2013 was controlled by the party of President Jonathan, the PDP, so it would be unsurprising if they sought to deflate the death toll in a way

that would be more favorable to the Jonathan administration. Obviously, the Nigerian military would also have the same incentives to downplay the number of casualties in order to preserve a favorable perception of itself among the Nigerian public and international community, so its lower casualty toll is also wholly unsurprising. However, the discord between the Nigerian military and Senate's statistics suggest a less-than-systematic approach to distorting the narrative and might suggest that the Nigerian Senate's shoddy methodology may be more to blame for its rather low casualty total.

When quoting figures provided by Baga locals, be they officials or ordinary residents, news reporting provided even less information on how the sources arrived at those figures. Neither did the Nigerian military, which broke down its casualty totals by actor (26 Boko Haram, 10 civilians, and a lone Nigerian soldier) but did not say how it derived those figures. One might presume that the convergence of figures by several sources in the 180-190 range makes it more likely that this total was closest to the actual total of the various totals cited by news media. NGOs such as the Red Cross and HRW are commonly thought to have fewer incentives than actors embroiled in the conflict and hence provide a more credibly accurate representation of the total. However, the former did not say how it arrived at its total of 187 and the latter said only that it reached a conclusion of 183 deaths after interviews with local residents. While interviews can produce a credible estimate of the casualty toll, it is impossible to judge if HRW's count has done so given the absence of information about the size or representativeness of the sample of interview subjects HRW chose.

There is also the issue of “anchoring”, a cognitive phenomenon that describes how humans use the first statistic they hear as a baseline for future estimates even when that number is arbitrarily chosen.<sup>45</sup> This effect could very well explain how the estimates of different organization converged towards a very small range. Local residents may have heard the total of 185 put forth by local officials and repeated it to investigators from the Red Cross and HRW. The investigators themselves may have viewed 185 as the most likely total and decided to discard outliers that may have called that number into question. With the information given, it is impossible to determine if these numbers were in fact accurate as they are not verifiable. It may be most correct to say that based on available information, *every* actor that reported a figure introduced extra-factual information into the media environment, regardless of whether they intended for their estimate to be perceived as factual.

The reporting of the number of buildings damaged contrasted strongly with the number left dead in the wake of the fighting at Baga. HRW's estimate of 2,275 buildings damaged effectively laid to rest the issue of the extent of the damage. Its figure was cited widely in media, even in articles that reported death tolls that contrasted strongly with HRW's count. On its website, the group published a detailed sourcing of its count, citing a review of satellite imagery (which it repub-

lished online), satellite-based sensors that detected heat signatures from Baga from April 16-18, and descriptors of photographic evidence for the extent of the fire's damage. While HRW acknowledged that its count could not be counted as definitive for a number of reasons (for example, buildings may have been obscured under tree cover), the group employed a rigorous methodology and disseminated it publicly. Given this evidence, it can be concluded that the assertion by President Jonathan that Baga had fewer than 1,000 buildings can be considered implausible – the satellite imagery clearly shows that there are several thousand buildings in the town.<sup>46</sup> This evidence suggests that the Nigerian military did attempt to introduce extra-factual information into the information environment in order to support its claims that the extent of the damage caused in Baga by Nigerian forces was limited.

Is there a link between the sources' level of accuracy in calculating the two figures? While HRW might certainly benefit from being perceived as more authoritative and thorough in its investigation of casualty totals given that it has produced substantial evidence in support of its estimate of the number of damaged structures, one should not assume that it has equal capacity to provide accurate totals in both instances as the methodologies associated with each task vary greatly. However, given that the evidence is clear that the Nigerian military at least downplayed the number of houses damaged in the incident, there is reason to suspect it of having tried to lower the number of reported casualties as well in order to create a more coherent narrative of events. It would be difficult to create a convincing narrative that a fire that caused the destruction of 2,000 buildings conveniently killed many more members of Boko Haram than civilians even as Boko Haram insurgents purportedly attempted to use bystanders as human shields. Given that local officials seem to have somewhat underestimated the number of buildings damaged, one might infer that they did not attempt to inflate the number of dead either. However, that does not necessarily mean that its figure of 185 is accurate – merely that it is more likely to be closer to the real figure, given that the evidence that is available (albeit from a single data point) suggests that the Nigerian military has responded to its incentives to deflate the casualty and damage totals and local officials have not responded to their incentives to inflate the casualty and damage totals.<sup>47</sup> On the whole, actors with more credibility reported a death toll at or near 185, while the less credible Nigerian defense establishment was the sole main promulgator of a substantially lower death toll of approximately 36.

## CONCLUSIONS

This review of the news reporting on the April 2013 events in Baga demonstrates that the Nigerian military has attempted to introduce extra-factual information into the media environment in order to create a more favorable narrative of events and ultimately retain the support of the population in areas affected by Boko Haram activities, Nigeria generally, and among international audiences. These attempts seem to have been unsuccessful. Despite attempts to control the flow of

information in and out of Baga, international reports surfaced anyways. The gulf between the Nigerian military's version of events and reports by other actors seems to have been so large that news sources writing on Baga simply stopped treating the military's version as credible. Claims by the Nigerian defense establishment have done little to scuttle negative opinion among the international community of their actions to combat Boko Haram.<sup>48</sup> Despite perception of media outlets based in southern Nigeria as pro-military, these sources did not seem to treat official figures with substantially more credibility, although the tone of opinion pieces in these sources was somewhat softer. Whether the conduct of Nigerian soldiers was reprehensible as claimed by some is not as relevant to the success of the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram as the extent to which people believed that the military is capable of and likely to commit atrocities such as those alleged at Baga. As the latter increases, so does the level of popular support for (or tolerance of) Boko Haram and the likelihood that ordinary Nigerians might take up the fight against their own government, a lesson mostly unlearned thus far by Nigerian authorities.

If extra-factual information is to be wielded as a weapon on the battlefield, it is most effective when none other than the disseminator would believe it to be anything other than true. Unfortunately, the Nigerian military faces issues such as corruption and a history of rights abuses that have caused virtually all information it releases to be viewed with suspicion, regardless of its veracity. Its reputation was drastically tarnished by the events at Baga such that the country's own human rights commission blamed military soldiers for the destruction of the skirmish and Boko Haram attempted to use the episode as a rallying point. Nonetheless, there are a few steps that the Nigerian military may have taken to produce a more successful outcome, notwithstanding the more obvious and larger problem of preventing its rank-and-file from committing atrocities – or being accused of them, both of which are tremendously detrimental to the counterinsurgency effort. A different version of events might have been more believable for their intended audience – asserting that Boko Haram simply torched the town themselves, or releasing a casualty count that more closely resembled the figures reported in international media. Attempting to manipulate figures in similar future instances can only improve the standing of the Nigerian military – whose reputation has by the time of the writing of this paper deteriorated so far that it is hard to imagine further attempts at deception as anything other than a low-risk proposition. However, given that international NGOs such as HRW have strong verification mechanisms in place to deter cover-ups of any atrocities or other misconduct that may occur, the Nigerian military may conclude the best way to establish its credibility (insofar as it is interested in doing so) is to promulgate statistics that are relatively accurate, regardless of the veracity of the narrative it intends to put forth.

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## ON RUSSIA, GENDER ROLES, AND SANCTIONS: A CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR MARK BRZEZINSKI '87 AND NATALIA BRZEZINSKI

Mark Brzezinski graduated from Dartmouth College with a Bachelor of Arts in government, earned a J.D. from the University of Virginia Law School, and holds a D.Phil. in political science from Oxford University. He also earned a Fulbright Scholarship to study the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland. From 1999-2001, Brzezinski served in the Clinton administration as a director of Russian/Eurasian affairs and director of Southeast European affairs of the National Security Council at the White House. Brzezinski was a foreign policy advisor to the presidential campaign of Barack Obama, and was later appointed Ambassador to Sweden by Obama. World Outlook sat down with Ambassador Brzezinski and Natalia Brzezinski on February 16th, 2015.

[AMB] – Ambassador Speaking

[MRS] – Mrs. Brzezinski Speaking

*You were the director of Russian/Eurasian affairs and also director of Southeast European affairs of the National Security Council towards the end of the Clinton Administration. Do you think, with the hindsight today, that the enlargement of NATO pursued after the fall of the Soviet Union was a sound policy?*

[AMB] Well, of course it wasn't just the expansion of NATO, but the expansion of EU at the same time that brought previously post-communist societies that were fledgling democracies into what is now seen as Europe in terms of the overlay of the boundaries of NATO and the overlay of the boundary of the EU that pretty much captures what is Europe today. And expanding the trans-Atlantic community in terms of security, in terms of the economy, has produced a huge number of benefits across the Atlantic for Americans and I think that's one of the reasons why President Obama is pursuing so vigorously the US-Europe free trade agreement, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Needless to say, a free trade agreement across the Atlantic wouldn't just harmonize regulatory regimes, but it would also harmonize technologies, values, and provide more of an organic link across the Atlantic between what is Europe and America than even what we have today and that's a net benefit for our children because we want a bloc that is more prosperous than what we have today. So absolutely. The expansion of Europe was the right thing to do. We have countries in central Europe that are net security providers at a time when Russia has shown aggression towards Ukraine. It is good that those countries feel the reassurance of NATO for their security, and it's good not just for their security, but it's good for our own as well.

*Are you worried about potential provocations of Russia in the Baltic States?*

[AMB] No, I'm not, because I think, quite frankly, the actions taken by the Russians on quote behalf of Russian minorities in Ukraine was somewhat of a specious reason for going into Crimea. And as specious as that was, it would be specious for anything else to happen. Quite frankly, all of us, Russia included, would benefit from a zone of peace and prosperity between Europe and Russia and not what we have now, which is a sense of trauma and a sense of betrayal.

*Do you think it's possible in the near future to mend that tie?*

[AMB] When I think of the future of American Russian relations in the long term, I'm completely optimistic. I see young Russians wanting Russia to be linked with the international community, and not what we have today which is an isolated and alienated Russia, thanks to Russia's aggression in Ukraine and the sanctions that were imposed as a result. Quite the contrary, it would be good for Russia if its neighbors feared it less.

*Do you think that's possible with Putin still there?*

[AMB] I think it's possible because it's in everyone's self interest, including the Russian leadership's, to have a good normal prosperous collaborate relationship with the West. That certainly is what the president has been pursuing with the Russian government.

*You noted in your article "Still Trying to 'Have it All' in Sweden," "It's not the resources or government policies that advance women; it's developing your own life path and having the confidence to trust yourself and believe in your decisions." How does culture play into that confidence and trust in yourself? What are some cultural, not governmental or legal, barriers that you see in both Europe and the United States that hold women back?*

[MRS] It feeds very much into my own thought evolution after living in Sweden, because look at any ranking, Sweden is the most gender equal society in the world. You have paternity, maternity leave, free day care. You have a feminist foreign policy today being promulgated by the foreign minister. However, only 2% of women are CEOs, if you have all of that, these are the things that American women are fighting for right now, but then what's the missing link? Confidence.

More and more people are pointing to less tangible things like uncon-

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[MRS] – MRS. BRZEZINSKI SPEAKING

scious bias, are we raising our girls the right way, are we raising them to use their voice to stand up for themselves, to say, "Hey, this is what I've accomplished and I'm proud of that and I deserve this promotion or this salary." Are we teaching them how to communicate? And I think that's what I've really come to three years later as realizing as the most important thing. Sweden has 84% of women working full time, the highest per capita. But women in the work force doesn't mean women are leading it. And I think it's much more about leadership and confidence and trusting your own path than I did three years back.

*So how do we move from a society where women are working to a society where women are leading that work?*

[MRS] I think it starts at a very young age. We have a five-year-old daughter and we work on it. She will come home sometimes and say, "I can't be a superhero, that's only for boys." That sounds like a silly example but it starts there and I think America actually does that really well. There's a great new study that just came out from Cornell that I think is very catalytic on this topic that states that although Europe has an extremely successful social infrastructure around women. Women in America tend to work less full time, but they do they tend to be more successful when it comes to rankings in the company. And living abroad has made me really proud to be an American because we do really teach our boys and girls to go for it. "Confidence, go for it, the American dream" – I remember hearing these things as a young child growing up in Chicago, they seemed silly but it's incredibly important to think that you can reach that dream and that is a gift that I've had. There's no country in the world like this one when it comes to supporting that dream.

*What are some of the things that we can do to continue to cultivate that? And how do we define success and measure it when we talk about empowering women?*

[MRS] Two things, and I'm very proud that we've been able to be abroad to communicate the values of this president because no one has been better at that than President Obama. He has said that women's issues are not just about women anymore; they're about men, families, economic prosperity, innovation. The White House Council on Women and Girls has actually backed that up. There are countless facts from the World Bank and the White House that show that more women at the top of companies creates better returns for shareholders, more transparency. I think the facts are there and I'm so happy that the conversations have actually turned in that direction because unless you have facts or metrics nobody will believe you and women add value

and that's incredibly important.

We really are on the forefront. One interesting dynamic that we've introduced is an initiative called Edge, which is basically an audit on companies on gender diversity. Deloitte [a professional services firm] has engaged in it. Edge is an American innovation coming out of several universities and it takes a company, where you are, what does it take to get to the target you want, and most companies do have targets today which is very important, and why aren't you there. But again, it's very new.

*There are some countries in which gender roles are just ingrained in their culture, in Africa and Asia. So what do you think the role of the global north is considering changing someone's culture is very sensitive but those gender roles might be part of the structural problems of those societies?*

[MRS] This is why I'm so happy we're talking about metrics, numbers, and economies, because whether it's Japan, Nigeria, people are realizing that we need women to contribute to society. I always quote this, one of the most interesting formulations I've heard is that two years ago Forbes magazine declared that the new feminism is entrepreneurship. Women look at the world differently and in today's constantly changing, globalizing environment, different is good. We need to have different types of leadership, different types of companies. And you mentioned many different cultures, but the interesting is, do you know the countries where women are starting businesses at faster rates than men? Thailand, Guatemala, Brazil, Nigeria. Africa's actually one of the most innovative places in the world.

One of the most fantastic experiences I've had is when we hosted a few events on entrepreneurship that have been really global and I've met women from Somalia, Nigeria, and the Congo, that are the savviest entrepreneurs I've ever met anywhere, and so I think culture is incredibly important and nobody wants to change that, but I think people are waking up to the fact that if we don't make conditions better for women, our economies will suffer. I mean, Secretary Clinton had said that if we removed barriers for women, GDP would grow 5-6% faster. Money talks, and I think this is a way to cross all barriers.

[AMB] To follow up on that, I would say that from the standpoint of US Embassy Stockholm, one of the most powerful tools that America has in its foreign policy is our authentic values and one of the values that we invoke a

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lot is the fact that America embraces equality. We have our struggles, no question about it, but we're a country that embraces equality and that is something that is a very attractive value the world over. And that has so many advantages over both in terms of achieving that value unto itself and also collaterally getting others to join us in other foreign policy initiatives. So in terms of cultural change, I will only say that I am proud as an American that we have an ideology that includes the embrace of equality and that ideology is tremendously attractive around the world. So that should speak to itself about something fundamental about this, not just American or Swedish.

*Last fall, there was an incident involving an underwater incursion into Swedish waters. In addition, Russian military exercises have increased markedly with bombers flying into the English Channel all the while European defense budgets have fallen. How do we balance this increased activity from Russia with lesser resources both from our NATO allies and the US?*

[AMB] Well with regards to the submarine incursion we have no perspective to the nationality of that incursion, but clearly we are trying to partner with our friends the Swedes to advance joint consultation, joint exercises, joint planning to see what we can do to advance each other's capabilities and also convey deterrence to Russia because we don't like these incursions in Northern Europe. And so it is entirely appropriate for us and the Swedes, a NATO partner, not member, for us to be doing these efforts to advance joint capabilities and we will continue to do that.

*Do you think European parliaments feel a security threat from Russia, or is it a temporary thing that'll pass?*

[AMB] Well I think there is anxiety and uncertainty in Europe right now about what Russia is doing in Ukraine and what Russia will do next, and that's not just felt by parliaments. That's felt by Europeans and its unfortunate that we find ourselves in this situation because we have enough problems now and this could be a moment where the Americans and the Europeans come together about something around an opportunity not just a challenge. And that opportunity could be a closer trade bloc, but unfortunately we are faced with this existential challenge of Russia's annexation of European territory, first time since the end of WWII and that has made people worried.

*So do you see in the future our NATO allies raising their defense budgets to the 2% NATO limit?*

[AMB] Well I certainly hope that that's the case because in certain ways

there has to be a fair division of labor around here and of course we will do all we can to protect our friends and allies in Europe. It is also the case that it can't just be the Americans paying for the security, there have to be Europeans paying for security at a reasonable level as well and that 2% level is entirely reasonable.

*And do you think there are possibly more economic sanctions that can go onto Russia if it continues its aggression? What else can we do?*

[AMB] Well, I do see a growing layer of sanctions on Russia if the hostilities and the occupation of Crimea and the efforts towards destabilizing Ukraine continue.

*Most often sanctions affect the citizens more than the government, and hopefully the government would see this and make changes. Do you see that in Russia?*

[AMB] Well, I think the sanctions have been very carefully targeted towards those who are blacklisted and those companies that are closest to the Kremlin to avoid specifically that and I think that they're beginning to have their effect. But again, nobody desires this situation. I was director for Russia and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council and we made a lot of efforts to bring Russia into the WTO, to support Russia's international integration, so this is totally the opposite of what we've been working towards and that's unfortunate because I do think Russian people would benefit tremendously from being completely integrated in the international community in every way especially economically and its absolutely what the Russian people should have. So this is antipodal to everything we've done but its where we find ourselves thanks to Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

*Is there anything we could've done in the past 10-15 years that could've perhaps mitigated the situation or brought Russia closer into the European sphere?*

[AMB] Well I think that a real effort was made to inspire the best impulses of Putin by bringing Russia into the international orbit in a lot of ways and providing Russia assistance, technical assistance, and/or help with harmonization with various laws and agreements and there are lots of examples as well. That I think was entirely correct as a judgment, as an effort to engage the people of Russia so I don't question that at all. It's unfortunate that Putin and the Kremlin have undercut that track because it really was an effort done in very good faith.

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*Do you think they were ever genuine in faith, in terms of moving towards the European sphere? Do you think they were ever really interested in joining Europe?*

[AMB] Well, you're talking about now 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and we've had different leaders in that time. We've had Chernomyrdin as prime minister, we had Yeltsin as president, and there were real efforts made to really harmonize and engage from academia to business to NGOs and technology and of course nuclear deterrence and counterterrorism. But also to do joint R&D [research and development] in wide variety of areas so a huge amount of resources were spent on that to achieve good results. So it's unfortunate we find ourselves where we are but I actually don't feel that those resources were spent and lost in the sense that when you invest in a society as great as Russia you realize that it doesn't just boil down to a few people...I mean Russia has some of the most creative and scientifically gifted people that you can imagine. That's the future of Russia, so investing in them despite this particular moment is entirely the right thing to do and that's going to pay us back in the future.

*You mentioned nuclear deterrence, and I wanted to ask you some questions about the NPT and how the Russia and US relations are playing into it and if you think some sort of civil nuclear partnership would help better relations.*

[AMB] Well, I think both countries have a shared strategic interest in nuclear security and in making sure that technology doesn't get into the wrong hands and to make sure that material doesn't cross borders to other places that it shouldn't go. So working closely on that for the sake and the protection of our peoples makes eminent sense.

*Where are we at with the NPT presently? The P5 is supposed to disarm. I heard that because Russia wasn't going ahead with the disarmament, we aren't either?*

[AMB] You know that part is beyond my daily wick in the sense that as US Ambassador to Sweden I've been specifically instructed to stay out of things like that.

*So speaking more on US Swedish relations, how are those developed in the past few years and what are some interesting things we've been cooperating with the Swedes with?*

[AMB] Well, Swedish-American relations have never been as strong as they are now. We are collaborating more and delivering more for our respective peoples than ever before and that goes across the board. It goes from security and jointly trying to understand the threat of ISIL, advancing joint capabilities

pertaining to Ukraine, working together on civil-political continuity on Afghanistan where obviously we both have had troops, and where we both still have troops but we're militarily disengaging and so we're seeking civil and political continuity in Afghanistan and working with the Swedes who've invested a lot to understand what's happening in Afghanistan is entirely appropriate. We're working together on counterterrorism initiatives.

We're working very closely secondly on trade and business issues. Sweden is the 12<sup>th</sup> largest investor in the US and for a country of only 9 million people that's a remarkable statistic. That's like the size of the state of Virginia and they are the 12<sup>th</sup> largest investor globally in the US. And they also have the experience of having been in economic crisis themselves in the early 1990s and having pulled themselves out of it without international intervention in the 1990s and they did that primarily by building an economy based heavily around trade and exports. That's not lost on Europe. So the Swedes provide a very useful model when it comes to thinking about next steps in trade between America and Europe because in Sweden prosperity is widely shared. That's important because as we go through the negotiations of the US-EU free trade agreement there are those who will say America is a unified economy system, a unified financial system, but Europe is a disparate set of countries and the benefits of a trade agreement will benefit some more than others. The country that shows that exports and trade can produce a very widely shared prosperity is Sweden and so they're very much engaged on the trade and exports talk.

Third, the future of the Arctic, a strategic space we're all about to understand. We're about to begin the chairmanship of the Arctic council. The Swedes chaired the Arctic council between 2011 and 2013 and we really respect their chairmanship of the Arctic council. It produced really measurable results, namely the first time every an agreement on search and rescue, an agreement on oil spill preparedness and oil spill cleanup, addressing the applications of observer countries. Countries like China, India, Korea have sought to become observers of the Arctic council for some time. During this the Swedish clarified this application. In fact, they are now observers, each of the countries I mentioned among others. Those are important results between countries about a strategic space in which no one is preponderant. No one rules the Arctic, thankfully. It is a place that requires international cooperation and constructed international collaboration.

Fourth, overseas development assistance. The number one partner in the world for USAID, our development agency, today is Sweden because of

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joint commitments in terms of resources. Also, in terms of joint strategies; we've worked hard to advance that because development assistance is definitely a priority for President Obama and it's something that's very much a priority for the Swedes as well. And there's a lot of different iterations of that that it has taken but I'm very proud of the sheer numbers that we've produced that really take the load off the American people. The Swedes have committed to catalyze \$1 billion for Power Africa, President Obama's big initiative for energy in Africa. The Swedes have committed \$1.2 billion for development assistance for Afghanistan and they've committed \$75 million for Ebola response.

Those are numbers that take the load off American citizens and I'm proud of that. And then we've advanced the people. I've really tried to highlight symbolic dates like the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the birth of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who chose not to be indifferent during the Holocaust and saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Jews scheduled for destruction in the Holocaust. Celebrating that legacy and that narrative of human dignity is something that we've really amplified and it's produced good results because when I think about my daughter, I don't want her to be indifferent when she's an adult. The importance of not being indifferent is a big legacy item for the story of Raoul Wallenberg. And I've tried to do things that really kind of symbolize being present in Swedish society. I bicycled across Sweden this summer from water's edge in the west coast to water's edge on the east coast. 600 miles by bicycle. There's no other way I could've embraced Sweden more than by walking across Sweden literally. And I went through the heartland of Sweden, through all these small towns and listened and learned from the people of Sweden on business and trade and it was a great opportunity.

*What are some policies that Sweden does really well that the US should adopt?*

[MRS] Just to echo what Mark has underscored, the reason why we wake up every morning and think what can we do and go to sleep every night feeling the passion in our hearts is because Sweden is such a perfect match both for our personal values and passion and also the vision of President Obama. Shared values are something we talk about a lot and I cannot think of two countries that are more connected in the way they want their future to be. What kind of world they want to give their young? Gender equality. Global awareness. Giving back to the world. A super strong sense of social responsibility, corporate responsibility, sustainability. It's all connected. Mark and I loved this article that was in *The Economist* so much we framed it. We do things like this; we're very symbolic.

The cover had a big Viking on it with huge horns and it said, “What can the world learn from the Nordic model?” And the part about Sweden was about a lot of the things that I’m working on a lot there like entrepreneurship, gender equality, and innovation and it really put out the question: What does a country look like that is energy neutral? They have communities that run from their own waste? Where most women work. Where the elderly are taken care of. Where the children are taken care of. That has health care. All things that our president is passionate about, all things we really care about, and basically to say that this is a country where we’ve learned a lot, we’ve learned a lot as people, we’ve learned a lot as parents, I’ve learned a lot as a woman, and I think our country can and is learning through these amazing partnerships that Mark has spearheaded like USAID. Simply put, because of this relationship Mark was able to help facilitate the legacy of President Barack Obama. A US President has never come to Sweden for a bilateral visit, ever. This was unbelievable. And the reasons why he came? Shared values, shared responsibilities, sustainability, innovation, gender equality, tolerance, the Wallenberg legacy. This makes the relationship more than diplomatic—it’s more about people and its extremely inspiring.

[AMB] You know there’s a Swedish word that means balance: *lagom*. And people often invoke it when talking about Sweden or about work life balance. But the way that it’s manifested in Sweden is balance in a wide variety of ways including human kind and nature. There’s a great balance between economic balance and growth, and preservation and conservation and that is matched by an important statistic. In the last 20 years, Sweden has grown its economy by 40%, while reducing in the last 20 years carbon output by 20%. That is what we, the Americans, seek to do, and the Obama Administration is seeking to do and is on track with doing, but the Swedes have already done that. And that is I think a very important example that you can be economically competitive and successful and prosperous while being sustainable. And that’s when you ask me what I want to import to America, its that total holistic approach to sustainability. When I say holistic, I mean it’s not just good to do so let’s have some corporate and social responsibility and do it, but in fact its darn good business it’s a great thing to innovate because the more you innovate in sustainability the better off you will be and there’s a direct link between economic reward and innovation in the sustainability sphere. That’s a great

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thing and that sustainability commitment and fat of life there is something I would want to contribute to our society.

*What made that level of sustainability possible in Sweden? Was it government incentives? Or lots of tech innovation?*

[AMB] Well, there are choices that the swedes made and we face choices that are pertinent to our economy and our society. And so yes, they did do that. I mean there’s a number of different things, but I would never want to import their choices to us but it is a fact that we have a real national security threat coming our way in terms of climate change and what is it that we can do about it? America is very much on the hook because we can be so influential around the world but also we’re the number one carbon emitter so we’re on the hook as a lower level of carbon output itself.

*One of the really big issues in the United States right now is income inequality. Our Gini coefficient is .45. When we talk about societies that are both wealthy and also equal, the Nordic countries come up again. So what are some of the things that they do super well over there that America can learn from?*

[MRS] I think that again it’s very hard to compare. This is a country that’s been relatively homogeneous for most of its history, its never been occupied by a foreign power, Stockholm that is. They are now struggling now with the challenge of integration and diversity. But I will say that something that I find that aids this cause there is this collective purpose and a very high trust in government. If you look at OECD, there are the highest levels of trust in government, in my neighbor, etc. And I think that allows them to accomplish a lot. I’ll give you an analogy that Mark and I always use there’s a law called “every man’s right to land”. What does that mean? Someone could camp right in my backyard and that’s allowed. But I mean that’s crazy for us, I always elicit laughter from Americans. But it’s not my yard. It’s our yard, our land, our country. You can camp there but you better not leave a mess. As an analogy, don’t ruin our environment and they really believe in that. And as the parent of a young child something we see is that they’re so connected to the land. There’s a saying in Sweden there’s no bad weather only bad clothes. Which means I remember putting our daughter in Swedish day care, she’s fluent in Swedish and I would say they’re going outside today I mean it can be snowing and freezing outside and they have these snowsuits on and people are connecting with nature outside from a young age and they have a visceral connection with nature. I always say this to my husband, I’m so happy I married him for many

reasons but for one he's a big outdoors person, he grew up in Virginia in the Blue Ridge Mountains.

As a Chicagoan, you don't have that same connection. So that is something, I mean this collective purpose really impresses me and of course it translates into all different spheres of life but especially the environment I mean lets work together because this is our earth. If there's anything I could bring back and something I always try to convey to young people and young Americans is a call to action on working together to solve the problems. I mean it may take a bit of sacrifice like a smaller house, smaller car or no car, but we really need to focus on these challenges and we have to have a social purpose behind it and I think they do that really well.

[AMB] And you know, on the social inequality question I mean what is to me so impressive about Sweden is, again, it's a country of nine million which is not very big but they are absolutely committed to the challenge and opportunity of development assistance around the world and absolutely engaged especially in advancing innovation. It will be through innovation and ways to empower people around the world through job creation, gender equality and so forth that we will end social inequality and stop the rampant increase of social inequality so that is part and parcel of their development assistance strategy.

*What does Sweden do on both the public and private side that allows it to have a prosperous yet equal society?*

[AMB] Well I mean you take a look at some of the public private partnerships that we've been able to advance in Sweden. And a public-private partnership is generally the most innovative approach because what we've learned is that government to government solutions won't work on some of these development challenges so what we've done in Sweden is advance a public private partnership between USAID, our development agency, and Volvo trucks, which is a Swedish company, and the Swedish development agency which is called SIDA and that public private partnership is focused not on Sweden or on the Nordics or Europe, but in 10 countries in sub-Saharan Africa towards advancing job creation through truck repair training, truck driving training, and the like because in the end empowering people through employment is some of the most lasting and enduring assistance one can provide so that's the

[AMB] – AMBASSADOR SPEAKING  
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kind of thing that we've been trying to advance and I'm proud that we, the US Embassy Stockholm, have managed to work with a foreign auto company to join a public private partnership to the tune of millions of dollars with our development agency USAID. That's a good result.

*How can USAID and SIDA help development entrepreneurship in developing countries?*

[AMB] I think that's exactly what the Volvo deal is about in Africa because its also gender based. A lot of the training is for women who traditionally have not been truck drivers or truck repairers. So there's a particular opportunity there, demographically. And so that's a focused, targeted development assistance project that has brought in the private sector and its technology and intelligence.

*Zooming out of our focus on bilateral relations with Sweden, what do you see as the role of the United States in the world in the next 10 years?*

[MRS] Well, I can give specifically more light to our experience because I think its quite relevant. Diplomacy has changed a lot. What was once a function about keeping things in and gathering information, all of a sudden with the President's election and his view of the world, I mean President Obama has campaigned and led on a new role of America in the world – one based on partnership, one based on dialogue, one based on openness. That is a big change, in addition to that the fact that Twitter was founded, blogging began, social media really opened up the world. I think those two trends have been concurrent with something that we've seen that at least with diplomats or the way in which we see our role in part its going to be about conveying the values of what America is about and I think that's a lot of what I've tried to do. I think the challenge of the future will be the gender challenge, will be big and small organizations need to be innovative and entrepreneurial. How will we continue that?

Finally the environment and sustainability. The interesting thing is I think sustainability is holistic. It is everything from empowering women to children's rights to LGBT rights, sustainable development is about the empowerment of youth, of immigrants, of women, and I think our government has already started that. I mean there's a global entrepreneurship ambassador and all sort of incredibly innovative State Department initiatives that are relatively new and I think foreign policy and diplomacy will have a much broader mandate, a much more open one, and that will be much more challenging but also much more inspiring.

[AMB] I mean I will say that when I look 20, 40 years out, you know there are specific strategic questions that could provide opportunities for changes in direction that I'm sure that you'll pursue that would advance peace and security. But I will say more generally the US will pursue a global role to advance a shared security, shared prosperity, and shared equality because we live in an age where when people, when denied, any of those three things, will insist on it as they should. And we have a record and a self-interest in advancing that and I think that's what American leadership will and should provide.

*What do you see as the big roadblocks to that vision? What do we have to overcome?*

[AMB] Well part of that depends on all of us getting along meaning this. Some of these challenges will require unprecedented international cooperation and unprecedented self-sacrifice and we have to realize that a global approach on some of these challenges and aligning of the interests to address these challenges will require all of us to sacrifice in different ways and I think being prepared to do that to achieve a good result is the right thing to do and so I think speaking openly and honestly about what exactly will be required to achieve this result to achieve this alignment of interest because many of these challenges do not allow for a single nation response there has to be a global approach in order to solve them.

*In some of your opinion blogs you've talked about how US diplomacy could combat corruption, where there any specific instances or countries you were looking at and how do you think the US could respond?*

[AMB] Under President Obama there is an unprecedented crackdown on global bribery and corruption. And that is now widely known and I think part of this is incentivizing good behavior of everyone involved, both bribe makers and bribe takers and there's specific initiatives that the administration has pursued to incentivize the best behavior. I, anecdotally, have never witnessed the focus of the business community on global corruption as I see now, and I think partly that's inspired by the vast increase of investigation and prosecutions for corruption that have been undertaken in the last seven years.

*Shifting gears a bit, any advice for undergraduates?*

[AMB] Let me offer this – nothing is as professionally empowering as passion. Be true to what really interests you and pursue it because you will

[AMB] – AMBASSADOR SPEAKING  
[MRS] – MRS. BRZEZINSKI SPEAKING

find energy and creativity and intellectual innovation that you cannot produce for something that you're not passionate about so be genuine and true about pursuing your passion. I cannot believe how profoundly grateful I am to sit in front of you as a US ambassador in a country where my passions match our engagements so closely so I have pursued those pertaining to climate change and the Arctic with vigor, while of course absolutely the breadth of the engagement of the US – Swedish relationship with huge energy and vigor as well. But I am just grateful that I've been able to really zero in on some personal passions and in so doing advance the ball down the field and so if my advice to my former undergrad self and to you is be true about what you're really interested in. When you sit down at the end of the day what makes you think "Boy I'm really just really fascinated by this," and then go after that! I think that you will find remarkable stamina and unbelievably surprising opportunity in that.

[MRS] Leading off from just what you've said, in order to know what you love and be passionate about you have to try a lot of things. I think its very stressful - my brother is 17 - so he's stressed about, "What am I going to do, what am I going to major in, what kind of college should I go to." I'm 30, and I'm probably going to do something completely different in the next year or the next two years. My parents were immigrants and I'm an only child, and they certainly had a specific view of what I should do, what is successful, you must go to grad school.

I left my grad school after one semester to pursue and internship I never thought I would get in Senator John Kerry's press office. I didn't know anyone, it was amazing I got it. I left, I moved, it was the best decision of my life, the rest is history, we met, we got married, a few years later we're in Sweden. I mean people say this often but take the risk, it usually is always worth it. There have been a few times in my life, and I haven't been working that long, very few times have it not panned out. Challenge yourself. When I moved to Sweden, I'd never done a speech in my life, and I always tell young people in Sweden just say yes. "Natalia, will you speak to a bank? Yes. Will you speak to venture capitalists on microfinancing? Yes." But then I suffer for months. Ariana Huffington wrote in her first book "Fearlessness is like a muscle" and really once you put yourself out there you're used to it and you always go for it and it becomes really easy and exciting.

Finally, connecting with Mark, definitely passion and purpose. A job with meaning. After doing jobs without much meaning or were more super-

ficial. Sometimes I see my friends in Sweden who are female CEOs and they have several kids, husbands, and I think my god how do they do it they must be exhausted. And they always say they're so passionate about it and I always think oh they're just saying that. But now I feel it, I mean I go to bed at night thinking about what we can do more, I wake up excited for every day, needless to say I don't think its possible to top what we're doing right now which is helping to represent Barack Obama and America in another country in ridiculous and amazing and meaningful but I think once you feel that you can find that drive in other places and you bring it everywhere. So try a lot of things until it fits. These days millennial – the average young person—has 5 jobs before the age of 30 so you have time, don't get too stressed about it and enjoy the ride.

*Any last words?*

[AMB] I do think that diplomacy is all about people, about building bridges, about being present, which is absolutely what we've tried to do in Sweden and to engage as broad a breadth of Swedish life and society across the different struggles that America and Sweden share as well as the opportunities that we share, and we're profoundly grateful to be able to do that until the last minute of the last day.

[AMB] – AMBASSADOR SPEAKING  
[MRS] – MRS. BRZEZINSKI SPEAKING

**THE INTERSECTION OF SCIENCE AND POLICY:  
A CONVERSATION WITH KERRI-ANN JONES,  
UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE FOR OCEANS AND  
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS**

Kerri-Ann Jones graduated from Barnard College in 1975 with a bachelor's degree in chemistry and later received her PhD from Yale University. She has worked with the Science and Technology Bureau of the U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID), the National Institute of Health's Fogarty International Center and served on the National Security Council. Additionally, she has held prestigious positions as the Associate Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and as Director of Office of International Science and Engineering at the National Science Foundation. More recently, she was nominated by President Obama in 2009 and is currently serving as the US Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. World Outlook sat down with Kerri-Ann Jones on January 14th, 2015.

*Thank you so much for joining us. It seems like you have been everywhere and into everything. What drew you to doing more policy-oriented work and not necessarily sticking to biomedical research?*

Thanks for the opportunity to be here. I was a biochemistry/bio-physics major in my graduate work. Over the years I went from program work into policy work and I was very lucky to have appointments that were very policy-focused in both the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, and then my most recent job as Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, Environment and Science. I think what drew me to policy was that it was very interesting. It let me really draw on my science background; it let me take that science background into the real world and work with a lot of people on very important issues.

*So how has science guided policy? How has policy guided how the scientific community works?*

I think you hit the nail on the head. There are two ways I look at science policy. The first way is when I was working at places like the National Science Foundation – for example, how does International Policy influence science and investments in science, and advance U.S. science so we can be more engaged in the world and contributing to solutions? I think that was very interesting work and definitely focused in science and how you build more partnerships. There is also the other part of this equation: How is science brought to policy? I worked on that on many issues.

In my most recent job we worked on ocean issues, looking at sustainable fisheries, looking at coastline issues, and looking at ocean acidification. We have also looked at a range of other environmental issues such as air pollution. We have looked at mercury. We have looked at persistent organics.

We have been very involved, of course, in the major environmental challenge that we face: the climate. We are also looking at some of these things which have unique regional dimensions, like the Arctic. The Arctic is very important as its temperature is very affected by climate. It's warming twice as fast as every place else.

You have to have good data and you have to understand what the data is telling you: if a particular fish species is stressed, then, perhaps, the catch should not be quite as large; or if there is something more you need to know about ocean acidification. We need to learn more about what is happening around the world regarding ocean acidification.

That's just a few examples of a range of activities. One I didn't mention is, of course, health. We did an awful lot of work—working with a lot of the other agencies—on global health, where you have to really understand what infectious agents you are dealing with and how it might be possible to address them.

*You mentioned the Arctic—how do you see the Arctic as an issue, considering the intersection between the environmental issues of the melting ice sheets, along with the now geopolitical and economic issues of who owns what is now the sea-lanes that have opened up between the ice sheets?*

There is a lot to be said on that question. The Arctic is a region that, I should point out, is under tremendous environmental stress. That is changing a lot of things on land and in the sea and it is something that is going to take some years to work through. There is the Arctic Council in place. The U.S. is one of 8 Arctic nations. Also on the council are 6 permanent participants of the indigenous peoples of Arctic region who really are the people who live there and are the most affected, so it is really important to not forget about them. While the world is trying to sort this out, the Arctic Council is the regional organization that is trying to have those sovereign nations come together and talk about what this means. How we can deal with some of the environmental concerns? And how can we learn from each other about development?

We are not there yet. There is still more ice, unfortunately, that will probably melt. There is not a tremendous amount of movement across the Arctic Ocean yet, in terms of commerce. But I think that the Arctic nations are going to try to work together to sort this out. Plus, I think that there really isn't, at this point, a tremendous conflict about the Arctic. It really has been dealt with. These eight countries have worked together collaboratively.

The U.S. becomes Chair of the Arctic Council this [2015]spring—which is a big opportunity.

*Where do you see the future of the Arctic developing in terms of economic issues? Have people accepted the fact that it will, sooner or later, just sort of melt away? How are we dealing with what is happening?*

It is hard to say—it is not a definitive situation. The ice is melting and there are a lot of changes and there are a lot of coastline changes. There are also other environmental issues in that the different circulation issues often result in the concentrations of toxins in the North. There are many things that have to be dealt with and I think that the Arctic nations are trying to deal with those. They are trying to study them more. You have to get the science in there to understand it. And then you have to deal with some of the adaptation issues. I believe that that is where we are, in terms of whether everybody has accepted that it is going to be this way. I don't think that people really know what “this way” will be at the endpoint. It is a dynamic situation. I think it is a situation where the Arctic nations are trying to prepare for the change. They are trying to understand it through the science and they are trying to prepare for it.

In the last two Arctic councils, the eight nations signed agreements to try to deal with some of the things that are happening. One was ‘search and rescue’—which is very basic. As you begin to have more activity up there, it is very hard to rescue people. So how can those eight countries work together? They signed another agreement, at the last Arctic council meeting, to look at how we can prevent oil spills—and how we can deal with this issue.

There is a sense that we are seeing a lot of change. We don't know where the endpoint is going to be, but we have to prepare together for this and we have to share information and work together cooperatively. It is going to be a lot of change. It is going to be hard on the indigenous people whose lifestyle is changing. They are seeing tremendous changes and I think it is a really positive thing that they sit on the council as permanent participants.

*You mentioned oil spills, which reminded me of our previous oil spill -- Deep Water Horizon. How has that changed our environmental policy toward the Gulf of Mexico and how has that affected your view of offshore drilling?*

I couldn't really tell you how it specifically changed the policies about drilling in the Gulf because I didn't follow that that closely. I followed the Deep Water Horizon from my position as International Assistant Secretary—

an international dimension of it. How do we inform neighbors in the Caribbean who may have been affected by that spill? We had certain obligations under agreements—so that is what we dealt with. We also had issues with countries who wanted to offer us assistance—technology they might have had—so we had to deal with that incoming assistance and offers that people made. That was the extent to my involvement in that.

In terms of offshore drilling, we have to be tremendously cautious about the environmental impact. Deep Water Horizon really brought that to the forefront. We also have to think about it in terms of places like the Arctic where you have well beyond your usual challenges. I think we have to really balance everybody's excitement about all of this possible resource with these environmental possibilities for problems. The third piece is that it is really interesting and we are very excited about all of these new oil possibilities, but it ties right back into the climate. What does this mean about how we change our energy profile? I think that we have to link those discussions about the potential for a lot of new energy resources—fossil-fuel-based—with our discussions about climate. We have to be conscious about some of the decisions that we make.

*What are your thoughts on the Keystone XL Pipeline and domestic shale production that has come up in the past few years?*

On the Keystone XL Pipeline, I don't really discuss my personal opinion because I was very close to the project and it's very controversial and I just don't think it's appropriate for me to weigh-in and say, "Here's what I think should be done." I know that, in the State Department, the executive order delegates the authority to grant or deny that permit to the Secretary of State. And I know that the team there and the Secretary of State are going to be seized with a lot of work, now that the Nebraska case has been resolved, and that they will be looking at "How do we look at this national-interest determination?" It is a very complicated process and it has been a very controversial review of the project because we don't know yet what the decision will be. So that is my opinion on the Keystone Pipeline – which is to give you a sense of how I was involved in it.

In terms of shale gas and the fracking technology, I think that we are at the beginning of trying to understand it better. It is one of those very difficult issues that puts the whole push of economic development right up against the environmental questions. I think that there is a lot of site-specificity and so I think that there is a lot of science that has to be done—both

from the geological prospective and the hydrological prospective. Also important, is understanding what chemicals are being extracted. I think that we are learning a lot and I think we will see it work out – in a state-by-state approach. I know that Governor Cuomo, in New York, has just banned fracking. It is an interesting approach that he is taking. He looked at the studies and he said, "I don't think we should do this." I know that there are communities around the country where this is really important for economic growth. I think that those communities are going to have to have these discussions that are very, very hard.

This is really the basic discussion of our country at this time: the economic push to really develop more—with the environmental balance. We have a lot to do to learn how we balance these two—to make sure they are compatible. It doesn't mean that you don't do any fracking—it just means that you really understand it and you really understand what it is doing to the area that it is in. You really have to work with understanding what it means in terms of climate and what the other opportunities are for a community. You can't look at any of these issues in isolation.

*It is difficult to balance U.S. national interests, the other things that are going on within the United States and the State Department, and concerns about environmental or scientific issues?*

I think that all of those things work together. It is always a question of balancing national interest and international interests. It is always a question of balancing your engagement with the world and how it affects your country. It's all about how do all of these different roles and players from our states—all the way up to the world—work together on some of these problems? One of the things that was key in my position at the State Department was that we worked with a lot of the other agencies. We were the State Department with the foreign policy agency, but we worked with the Environmental Protection Agency, we worked with the National Institute of Health, we worked with the United States Department of Agriculture – because they have a lot more technical expertise and they are also dealing with a lot of these issues domestically as well as internationally. So all of that has to be synthesized. It is fascinating and it's challenging and it's all important.

*In a recent bilateral summit with China and in the United States, there was sort of an agreement to try to cap or lower carbon emissions over the next 20 to 30 years. Do you think that sets a good momentum for the talks in Lima? What are your thoughts on this?*

I think it is very important. Everyone has high aspirations, hoping that in Paris, which is the next meeting, there will be an agreement. China and the US have said, “We are going to try to put down some markers. We are going to work together on this.” I think that is very positive because I think it makes a statement. It says that we are serious about this. Not only each country separately but that we are going to work together, and I think that is really positive. I think it was very well received in Lima. I think that, going forward, there is some optimism that there can be an agreement reached in Paris. As I mentioned yesterday, the agreement is only one part of all of this. There are a whole lot of other engagements and regional efforts and programs. I think we have a lot of momentum on the issues and a lot of attention. I think that, more and more across the United States, Americans want to see something be done about it.

*Do you think that international cooperation on climate change will happen in large overarching treaties or will it be a lot more individualized, sectionalized, or a lot more piecemeal?*

I don’t think it’s either/or. I think it is going to be everything. The nature of the problem is multidimensional in terms of what is causing it as well as where the impact is going to be. The U.S. has been working bilaterally, regionally, in small groups of countries, and in the large, multilateral setting at the UN framework convention on climate change and the Paris meeting that will happen at the end of this year. I think that it takes all of those and, I think, increasingly a lot of countries feel that way. [Climate change] is huge. No one treaty will be signed and that makes everything okay. It takes a lot of political will and programs and working at it trying new things and trying to understand it because we have to deal with both mitigation reduction of greenhouse gases and we have to deal with adaptation because we are seeing some of the effects of climate change already. So we have to deal with both of those.

*What’s your experience talking to people from developing countries or governments from developing countries who argue: “we need these carbon emissions to develop” or argue it is unfair that they must follow more stringent rules than they would particularly like? How do you talk to them – are you against or with them?*

I think that it is a discussion that is underway and will go on for a while. I think it is just the recognition that the countries that are members of the UN cover a spectrum of different levels of development. I think that it is true that developed countries have been out there doing things for a while

and they have learned from their mistakes, hopefully. We have learned that certain things are not good and the developing world has seen that as well in their past—wherever they are—but I think that the discussion has gotten much more positive. I think that the thinking is that countries can do what they can, based on where their development is. There is also a lot of effort to help work with developing countries to look at development plans that move in a low-emissions pathway. There are also going to be some funds out there. Funding is a big deal. There was a lot of talk about that at Lima—I think it was the Green Climate Fund or one of the nature funds that has been capitalized very well. I do think that it is being addressed and that it is always going to be a part of the negotiation.

*What, in your eyes, from the United State’s point of view, perhaps, is the most under-rated issue that the U.S. could be dealing with, and perhaps isn’t spending enough attention on?*

That is hard to say. I lived in the State Department where we really had the agenda that was on the international agenda, and I think what really becomes obvious is that all of these problems are very important in their own right and how do you spend time. How do you find the time and the energy and the resources to work on all of them? Clearly, all of the problems related to climate are connected and require attention. I don’t really rate what we should be working on or what we shouldn’t be working on, but really try to pay attention to where the stresses were seeming most obvious and where we could really have the most impact.

Climate is definitely one where there has been a lot of progress. We worked on things like mercury, which was very important. I think the constant work that we have been doing on the oceans is very important. But that is not to say that we were not paying attention to some of the wildlife issues and other topics. I think it is difficult to sort of pick-and-choose. What is clear is that climate is an overarching problem that affects so many things. As you work on many things, they feed into climate and vice-versa. As you work on climate, you could be helping a lot of other things as well.

*I would also like to talk a little about government bureaucracy as a whole in relation to the scientific community. How do you see the relationship – having one foot in each, and can it be straightened out?*

I think that there is a good relationship between the scientific community, if you will, generally speaking, (and how you define the “scientific community” is a question in and of itself) and the U.S. government. There

has been an effort, over the last several years, and certainly in the Obama Administration, to have a lot of scientists appointed to positions that require technical expertise and background. There are always in many agencies and advisory boards – special roles for scientists to come in and say, “here is what our wisdom and experience with these topics tell us.” There is a lot of connectivity. I think there is always room for more because there are so many issues that need information from science. I also think it is good to have exchanges where scientists can come in and be in government for a while and see how it works. Likewise, sometimes government officials can take a break and have a sabbatical someplace at an institution. One thing is that, when you sit in Washington, you do see a lot of scientists coming in and out – coming into meetings and coming into different conferences. You see a lot of input into the policy process – into the negotiation process – from academics, which is very good.

*I know that there have been concerns that there are less and less members of Congress that have been part of the scientific community. Do you share this concern?*

Well, I think that there has never been an enormous number of scientists in our Congress, but I think we did have a few more in the past. That is something that constantly needs to be brought up to the hill: the importance of science. Typically, science has been a bipartisan issue, for example, support of NIH and of NSF. Science, as it relates to other topics such as climate, can be very controversial. A lot of folks in Congress “get” how important science is to the U.S. I think it is mostly looked at in terms of work-force development and our ability to be economically competitive and innovative. And so I think that is generally positive. I think it gets a little more strained when you look at science in particular policy issues.

*Were there certain policy issues that you dealt with where science became not just an objective source of information but more so a tool in political fights?*

I always think of science as objective information. Now whether or not that objective information gets caught up in a fight that becomes partisan—that’s just the nature of it. That happens with a lot of things. It doesn’t mean that the science is politicized—it means the argument is politicized. Sometimes you see that, and the most common place you see that is around climate.

*There has been some criticism recently, about scientific press in terms of the nature of the*

*large scientific journals – and certain retractions recently. There have been a few articles published recently around the normal press and media about the method for published papers, suggesting that the rush for publishing has led to a lot of retractions and falsified results. How do you think major scientific journals can prove their credibility and restore science’s credibility in the eyes of the public?*

I don’t know if the general public thinks about science so much that they really have noticed these retractions. I think that it has been bigger in the scientific community. I read in *Science*, recently, an article about trying to put in place a better review process so they can avoid this. Sometimes it is just a shoddy look at the data: It wasn’t reviewed thoroughly. In other cases, it is falsification, and those are different kinds of problems. But I think there is an effort to be more thorough in all of their processes, which is important. I think that it happens and I think it is good that it is called out. Scientists can be like everybody else. They can be sloppy when they are rushed or you can have people who maybe want to take shortcuts and not have the data be completely solid. I think that it is what it is and I think the journals are trying to pay attention to it. I think, also, that scientists need to sort of think about this themselves and make sure they are being very thorough and that the whole culture within the community is one of being precise and looking at itself and doing a lot of self-evaluation.

*Do you think it is an institutional issue in terms of the way that we have set up the so-called “prestige journals” and a rush for grants and other things or do you think it is just an issue of certain bad eggs within the pot?*

I think what typically happens is that when the pressure gets worse, you see more bad eggs. But that is just how the system is evolving. Everything is on a faster cycle. And so I think what we are seeing is that the system is adapting to this faster cycle. There is pressure. There is competition for funding. That is a reality. And so I think people at the journals will have to pay more attention and so will the academic institutions as they think about how their faculty are submitting things. Do they have time for it? There is a whole systemic question about how much pressure is on the system.

*I also wanted to ask you a little bit about space. The rise of space access, such as Virgin Galactic, has really kind of transformed the way we look at space. What are your views on space and how do you see space evolving as a commercial, diplomatic, or even military frontier in the next 20 or 30 years?*

There are a tremendous number of policy questions about space. In

my portfolio, when I was back at the State Department, we certainly looked at space. We worked closely with NASA. We worked with the UN on several of the treaties that looked at the peaceful uses of outer space. We already are trying to deal with all of the debris in space—who is tracking it, who is responsible, and what happens in the event of collision or damage. But then when you move to the commercial piece, I do think that this is a whole new industry that is coming up. I think that NASA and our Department of Commerce (as well as others around the world) have to begin to think about this. I think they are beginning to think about it, but I think it is a whole new field. In terms of military, I think that has always been an issue where everyone has worked to avoid an arms race in space. I think that will continue to be done.

*Are you worried about the fact that perhaps a nascent China or a nascent Indian space program might disturb the equilibrium that we have in space? How does their entry into what we might consider a new space race affect our own space policy?*

It doesn't particularly worry me. It is just that the world gets more complicated as more and more countries begin to look at space as a place they want to be—for various reasons. But I believe that the international community has dealt with this sort of thing before and that it is just a question of giving it the time and attention that it needs to negotiate possible approaches or guidelines in sharing information in very positive, productive ways—and having mechanisms for challenging issues if there should be any kind of controversies or conflicts that come up as to what is good and what is the right thing to do and what is the wrong thing to do. There will need to be a way to address those.

*Do you think that the recent tensions between the United States and Russia have affected our ability to cooperate in space?*

I don't think they have affected our ability to cooperate in space. I think that what you are seeing, this is my opinion, the tension that we may see in some of the issues about a space program or a space collaboration with Russia has to do with the bigger problem related to the Ukraine. And so it is not so much a space problem as it is bilateral relationship problem because of some aggression that is fairly serious. I think that this will, hopefully, sort itself out as other situations begin to solve themselves.

*So how do you think the “Ukraine situation” has affected our ability to cooperate with the Russians on issues of space? How is it affecting it and how will it do so in the future?*

What has happened is that, clearly, the United States has put some

sanctions on Russia, as have other countries. We have made our positions very, very clear about what we think about this aggression to another sovereign nation and I think that, because of that, there are repercussions that affect other parts of the relationship. I think that is not surprising, given how concerning the situation in the Ukraine is. Hopefully, the sanctions and the pressure from the world community will change Russia's behavior somewhat and things will heal themselves and get back to a more positive space—but this is the nature of what happens when a country behaves this way toward another nation. The rest of the world reacts to say, “Wait a minute. This is not how things should be done. This is not appropriate.” So it is not necessarily a space problem, it is a bilateral problem.

*For a final, wrap-up question, what advice would you have for collegiate undergraduates who are curious about working for the State Department or going into science – perhaps do both? What would you tell them?*

I think that I have been amazingly lucky and it is really exciting. When I started, I never expected that it would turn out to be so interesting and that I would be involved in important issues. So what would my advice be to undergraduates? Well, I think a couple of things. One is that I think you should really follow your curiosity. Really follow it, because you don't know where it is going to end up and I think Dartmouth is a fantastic place to do that. I have been able to meet and talk with students and they are enthusiastic and they have all kinds of opportunities and possibilities before them, in terms of programs or internships, and what not. So I would follow your curiosity. Enjoy what you are doing. Experiment. And if you are in the sciences, I think you should really look at your science from a lot of different perspectives. Not only the depth of the science, the particular discipline that you are in, and what you love about that, but also how it plays in the world and how it plays in your community.

I do think that, in our country, we need science to be more universal. Everywhere. We need science to be talked about so it is not seen as too hard, or only “over here,” or that only certain people can understand it and certain people can't. I would say to follow your curiosity, have a lot of exciting adventures, experiment with what you like and don't like, and engage in the community and in the broader world. I think that a lot of Dartmouth students do that already – from what I have seen. I think that it must be a very exciting place to be and I think they are probably going to have a great time.

*What's next? Where are you headed and what are you going to be up to in a year; 5 years; 10 years?*

I left my position a few months ago and I took some time off to sort of re-balance my life because I was working extraordinarily long hours! Right now, I am just beginning. This is one of the first activities that I have done, where I have come out and begun to talk about what I had been doing before and look at it. What I have told my friends and what I will certainly tell you is that I am just beginning to look for what my next adventure will be. That is exactly how I think about it.

## **THE DEVIL'S COMPROMISE: A JUSTIFICATION OF THE LIBERIAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION**

Michael Everett

Liberia is a nation defined by its ironies. Though former slaves first colonized the country, Liberia's settlers rapidly enslaved the indigenous population and established a plantation agricultural system. While Liberia has the first African female head of state, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, systemic rape and sexual assault is ever-present. And even though it is one of the most Christian countries in the world, criminals walk unpunished for their crimes against humanity. Since the end of the Liberian Civil War in October 2003, the rebel warlords who once committed guerilla slaughter, conducted mass systemic rape, ate human flesh, and sacrificed small children have been allowed to roam free. Some warlords even returned as social and religious leaders in the community. Only one Liberian leader—former president Charles Taylor—has been charged for war crimes.

A proponent of a legalistic-moralist perspective might question how a country can hope to provide stability when it cannot enforce laws against mass genocide. A rational human being might question how people could live their entire lives knowing their neighbor killed their family and has yet to (and likely never will) be punished in a court of law. In most countries, these questions wouldn't have to be asked, but Liberia seems to evade simple definitions of justice as it struggles to come up with answers. In an attempt to provide a better understanding of Liberia's post-conflict complexities and challenges, I will begin with a brief history of the country's founding and civil war, and subsequently posit why the Liberian government's choice to implement a weak "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" (TRC), as opposed to a standard criminal court, was the most strategic policy to bring stability to the Liberian people.

### **THE RISING STORM: HISTORICAL SEEDS OF THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR**

From the very beginning, Liberia has struggled with oppression, conflict and instability. The country started as a Back-to-Africa colony for freed slaves and was funded by the American Colonization Society (ACS).<sup>1</sup> The capital of Liberia was named after the fifth president of the United States, James Monroe. Ironically enough, these recently freed settlers treated the local population the same way their former masters treated them in the United States and Caribbean, limiting their rights and imposing their western value system on the natives. Furthermore, while the initial settlers were a small minority in comparison to the native Africans, they established

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a “democratic” government under which control was centralized in favor of the settling freed slave population.<sup>2</sup>

In 1847, Liberia declared independence from the ACS and, except for two territorial wars against the native population, remained relatively stable for around 130 years. This period of peace lasted until 1980, when Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe overthrew the settler-government and became the first native African to lead the country. Doe’s rise to power marked the start of Liberia’s contemporary political instability.<sup>3</sup>

While Doe proved successful at overthrowing the government, he was ineffective at running it. Doe grew increasingly paranoid, eliminating council members who expressed dissent, favoring members of his own ethnic group, and oppressing other ethnic minorities in the country. These factors, coupled with an economic collapse, prompted American-born rebel leader Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Liberation Front (NPFL) to launch an outright rebellion. A year later Doe was executed by the NPFL and rebel groups fought amongst themselves for control of the government. A peace agreement was eventually reached, and in 1997, Taylor and his newly formed National Patriotic Party (NPP) took control of the new transitional government.<sup>4</sup>

Like Doe, Taylor proved ineffective as a leader, as he couldn’t consolidate his power and prevent infighting among the various rebel factions. Yet another Civil War broke out in the north of the country.<sup>5</sup>

During the Civil War, various rebel groups took control of Liberian provinces through guerilla warfare and the use of child soldiers.<sup>6</sup> Liberia fell into complete societal collapse: both government and rebel forces massacred civilian populations, women of all ages were raped,<sup>7</sup> warlords ritually sacrificed young children before battle,<sup>8</sup> and journalists reported stories of cannibalism.<sup>9</sup> Perhaps the most well known product of the Liberian Civil War is the variety of creatively coined warlord titles, like General Rambo, General Butt Naked, and General Tupac.<sup>10</sup> In sum, approximately 250,000 people were killed and 1.5 million displaced by the end of the conflict.<sup>11</sup>

Eventually, a ceasefire and peace agreement was signed in Accra, Ghana on August 18, 2003 between the government, rebel groups and political parties. A new government was established in 2005 headed by newly elected Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf,<sup>12</sup> and Taylor was sentenced to 50 years in prison by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes.<sup>13</sup>

### THE DEVIL’S COMPROMISE: THE LIBERIAN TRC

With the Civil War over and stability temporarily returned, eyes turned to the perpetrators of the conflict. In order to establish political legitimacy, the reformist Liberian government had to somehow address the conflict and war crimes from which it was born. In 2005, the Liberian government established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to investigate the crimes committed during the First and Second Liberian Civil Wars between 1979 and 2003. This commission’s role was to clarify

what exactly happened during the Civil War (primarily by interviewing the victims and the perpetrators of the crimes) and make policy recommendations to the Liberian government. While the TRC Act states that TRC recommendations should be binding, it was well known that the government would have no constitutional obligation to implement the recommendations due to separation of powers.<sup>14</sup> None of the TRC’s recommendations for a criminal tribunal or the banishment of certain government individuals had to be implemented by the government. In fact, the TRC recommended that President Sirleaf be banished from office for gross human rights violations, yet she was re-elected in 2011.<sup>15</sup> The Liberian TRC was a symbol of resolution, able to reveal the story of human rights violations, but unable to actually provide justice. It is therefore unfortunate that this symbol of justice was the best the Liberian government could do under the circumstances it faced.

Why was a TRC the most appropriate means for resolution available to Liberia in 2005? Three factors should be considered in understanding why Liberian warlords should not be prosecuted and why the Liberian government had to create a TRC: 1) the mass proliferation of violent acts during the Civil War, 2) the security concerns of the Liberian transitional government, and 3) the important cultural role of Christian morality in Liberia.

First, to try warlords in Liberia, one would have to allot blame for the over 250,000 deaths caused during the civil war. Warlords committed many crimes, but so too did their soldiers. Many average Liberians participated in murder, rape and perhaps even cannibalism during the chaos of the civil war. When there was so much violence caused by so many individuals, it is convenient but not moral to attribute crimes to a select few. To enforce justice in such a manner would require prosecuting and imprisoning a large part of the Liberian male population for their wartime crimes. Liberia, as a post-conflict developing nation, simply does not have the resources to institute such a policy. Charging only the men who led rebel groups, a massive task in itself, could also hardly be considered justice as it ignores all those other crimes not directly committed by them. Historically, the judges for the Nuremberg trials have been criticized for trying to apply conventional domestic attribution of guilt to the mass international crimes of the Holocaust.<sup>16</sup> According all guilt to these Nazi leaders distracted Germany from a societal recognition of guilt. Additionally, given the complexity of political hierarchies, it is impossible to prove that all crimes can be directly attributed to these leaders.<sup>17</sup> This same historical precedent holds true for the analogous post-civil war Liberia. Unfortunately, there is no feasible path to justice for the inhumanity of the civil war.

Second, the security situation of the transitional Liberian government made the prospect of a criminal court impossible. The primary reason why a TRC was used in Liberia was because the transitional government was sharing its power with several warring rebel factions. The TRC was a compromise, essentially assuring rebel factions that they would not be tried for their war crimes in exchange for ending the civil war.<sup>18</sup> To provide justice with a criminal court, Liberia would severely destabilize

its security situation. Many of these warlords have reintegrated back into Liberian societies. Some—most notably Joshua Blahey (formerly known as General “Butt Naked”)—have created community programs in their former territories.<sup>19</sup> These killers are no longer killing. However, it is safe to assume that not all warlords have honestly repented for their crimes. While Blahey has stated that if some future criminal court chooses to punish him he would accept the sentence wholeheartedly,<sup>20</sup> other former warlords would not welcome the possibility of prison or execution. If the Liberian government were to establish a traditional criminal court, these warlords who ended the civil war partially to avoid punishment would have large incentive to reignite the civil war. If justice now only proliferates more slaughter that requires more trials and self-destructive correction, then that justice is self-defeating. Liberia must move forward, and to do that it must leave the civil war in the past, not start another one.

Finally, and perhaps the most peculiar reason why Liberia chose not to and should not punish ex-rebels, is the intersection of these inhuman crimes with the Christian spirit of Liberia. Over 85 percent of the Liberian population identifies as Christian.<sup>21</sup> Perhaps a result of American colonization or from hundreds of years of oppression, instability, and inhumanity, the Liberian people are immensely faithful. Many warlords, whether seeking protection from revenge or truly feeling regret, have “repented” for their crimes. Blahey, who openly admits to sacrificing children and consuming their blood, is now a pastor who freely admits to congregations of his crimes, expresses his regret, and proselytizes the value of forgiveness and reconciliation.<sup>22</sup> Liberia survives despite internal pressures to its sovereignty, and Liberians are willing to forgive and sacrifice justice for stability. The TRC commission “forgiving” these warlords, as it did with over thirty individuals, reaffirms the deeply held Christian beliefs on love and humanity instead of re-inflicting wounds and denouncing trails through punishment.

Whatever the reason, Liberia has strategically chosen to forgo the pursuit of justice for the promise of stability and rehabilitative security. Although the Liberian TRC was plagued with low funding, implementation errors and administrative incompetency,<sup>23</sup> on principle, its promotion of discourse over punishment prevented the country from being ripped apart by conflict once more. The Liberian government’s choice to establish a TRC has allowed individuals considered devils by many to live unpunished. This “Devil’s Compromise” has given Liberia one less irony; it is most certainly, as its name suggests, the “Land of the Free.”

## NOTES

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