World Outlook: An Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs

NATO’s Uncertain Future: Terrorism and the Challenge of Risk
David Peterson ’10

Hell Hath No Fury Like a Woman Scorned: Palestinian Female Suicide Bombers
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Graduate Unemployment in China: Motivations, Results, and Implications
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Navies and Neo-Mercantilism: Explaining Powers’ Raw Materials Security Strategies
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The Impact of Political Violence on Tourism in the Middle East and North Africa
Ghermayn Baker ’12

Issue #37
“Today we use the term ‘the world’ with what amounts to brash familiarity. Too often in speaking of such things as the world food problem, the world health problem, world trade, world peace, and world government, we disregard the fact that ‘the world’ is a totality which in the domain of human problems constitutes the ultimate in degree of magnitude and degree of complexity. That is a fact, yes; but another fact is that almost every large problem today is, in truth, a world problem. Those two facts taken together provide thoughtful men with what might realistically be entitled ‘an introduction to humility’ in curing the world’s ills.”

President Emeritus John Sloan Dickey
1947 Convocation Address
The Editors of World Outlook would like to express our special thanks to the John Sloan Dickey Center for its encouragement and assistance.
About the Journal:
World Outlook is a student-run international affairs journal that published papers by Dartmouth students. Its name and missions are motivated by the world of late Dartmouth President John Sloan Dickey:

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EDITOR’S NOTE

Over the past several years, international affairs have been characterized both by unanticipated change and by the enduring persistence of undying dilemmas. Though we’ve witnessed some landmark changes to the status quo, such as the election of America’s first Africa-American president, we’ve also seen that many of the world’s most challenging issues, from the fight against terrorism to the recent international financial crisis, continue to test the mettle of the global community. This issue of World Outlook seeks to address this panoply of international challenges that continue to lie at the forefront of world affairs.

We are pleased to undergo this effort by showcasing not only works from students at Dartmouth College, but with selected works submitted from students across the nation. World Outlook is proud to continue this endeavor, as first announced in our spring issue of 2008, as we seek to expand our relationships with universities and colleges around the world. Nonetheless, we remain committed to publishing some of Dartmouth’s best student works from the social sciences.

This issue starts with an inquiry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In this piece, David Peterson, Dartmouth ‘10, sheds light on some of the challenges that NATO faces as it morphs itself into an organization with continued relevance for creating and maintaining security in the 21st century. Peterson argues that recent international challenges such as terrorism pose threats unsuitable to NATO, an organization initially formed to deter threats from the Soviet Union.

Dana Grinshpan, from Ohio State University, continues on the theme of terrorism as she explores the often overlooked and under-scrutinized phenomenon and its cultural roots. This paper proves all the more timely in light of the female suicide bomber attacks that took place in Moscow, Russia during March of this same year.

Next, Mutian Liu, Dartmouth ‘11, explores unemployment and its discontents in China. Though the current economic crisis has forced our eyes to focus only on domestic issues of unemployment, Mutian Liu presents this issue from a different angle as he explores a growing conundrum in China, the rise of the educated-unemployed. In this paper Liu explores the potential that such a group poses not only for the people themselves, but for the Chinese government.

From the College of William and Mary, Alexa Hoyne takes us through the machinations of private security contractors such as Blackwater, and the role they play in America’s military operations abroad. Furthermore, she argues that the problems associated with PSCs, from lack of transparency to difficulty coordinating with the American military, are hindering US efforts in Iraq.

Next, we are pleased to present a piece from a thesis written for University of Virginia’s Department of Politics Distinguished Majors program. In his work on rising powers’ thirst for raw materials, Zachary Riskind offers a bold hypothesis on why democratization can lead states to invoke more security-oriented raw materials security policies.

Lastly, Ghermayn Baker, Dartmouth ‘12, departs from all the doom and gloom with his piece on the tourism industries of the Middle East and North Africa. In this article, Baker explores why an unexpected region of the world has met with considerable success in its tourism industries.

We hope that you find this issue’s selection both engaging in its range and provocative in the articles’ implications. Furthermore, we hope that these works inspire your continued intellectual pursuits.

Noah Dentzel ’10
NATO’s Uncertain Future: Terrorism and the Challenge of Risk

David Peterson

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) once was the premiere security community in the West. Formed in the wake of World War II as a means of deterring the threat of Soviet attack, NATO’s member organizations were bound together by a universal threat. The fall of the Soviet Union, however, has not spelled the end of NATO, as some would have guessed. Instead, NATO has expanded - entering into Somalia, Kosovo and more recently Afghanistan - under the guise of spreading and protecting democratic values. While these excursions have given NATO purpose, they have strained member relationships. And furthermore, the multifaceted threat of terrorism, so unlike the Soviet Union, has only weakened NATO further. Indeed, it is doubtful that NATO will continue to remain a viable security community if thoughtful and meaningful structural change is not made soon.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in the wake of World War II as a security community to deter the threat of Soviet attack. The member nations, after asserting their commitment to freedom, democracy, individual liberty and rule of law, pledged to “unite their efforts for collective defense” and the “preservation of peace and security.”¹ In 1989, however, with the fall of the Soviet Union, many realists thought NATO would disintegrate. The realist prediction did not actualize. Instead, a round of NATO expansion under President Clinton heralded a new era in the transatlantic relationship; one not defined by the deterrence of the communist threat but the spread and protection of democratic values.

The 1990s not only heralded the end of the Cold War, but also a rapid increase in global interconnectedness. The increasing interconnectedness of the world coupled with the rise of the Internet has created an environment that has enabled terrorists to pose a greater risk to Western society. Indeed, transnational terrorist networks utilize the Internet to spread propaganda to the entire world and take advantage of easily accessible weapons to inflict mass damage on Western soldiers and civilians at a minimal cost. During this era in which the Internet poses a threat to our society, global terrorism has not invigorated the Alliance like the Soviet threat in part because of the emergence of a new security mentality. With such an ill-defined, multidimensional enemy, the focus of defense has shifted from threat deterrence to risk management. Predictably, the United States and Europe

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have sought to manage risk in different ways. This shift in thinking has had dire
effects on the inner-workings of NATO and threatens to tear apart the alliance.
However, because the conflicts are the result of a new way of thinking about security,
normal reforms have done nothing to address the root of the problem. As tensions
continue to build, the Alliance has a decision to make: do nothing and dissolve, or
adapt to the problems of risk and emerge as a more flexible conglomeration.

THE EXTERNAL THREAT OF TERRORISM

An examination of terrorism’s intellectual foundations draws persuasive
comparisons to Nazism and Stalin’s socialism, threats that encouraged NATO’s
foundation in the first place. But rather than act within the domain of states,
international terrorists have utilized the developments brought about by
globalization to plan, propagandize and strike in the shadows of the transnational
realm. These two considerations illustrate that global terrorism poses a serious
threat, especially to NATO as the predominant Western power conglomeration.

The Tradition and Motivations of Islamic Terrorism

To understand the danger that global terrorism poses, it is first necessary to
understand its traditions and goals. In Terror and Liberalism, Paul Berman portends
that the current strain of terrorism, what he calls “Muslim totalitarianism,” is the
ideological offspring of fascism and Nazism, and ought to be taken as seriously.
He convincingly lays out the universal, anti-Western intellectual tradition of radical
Islam that makes the growing movement such a threat to NATO itself. According
to Berman, the most influential writer of the radical Islamic tradition was Sayyid
Qutb who was schooled at home and in the United States before joining al-Banna’s
Muslim Brotherhood and becoming the movement’s leading thinker.2 Indeed,
Qutb’s writings offer a discerning glance into the mind and motivations of the
Brotherhood’s Islamic movement. After poring over Qutb’s works, Berman extracts
what he notes as the distinguishing characteristic of Islam from other worldviews:
the notion of Islam as totality.3 This is tied to the idea that truth, in Islam, can
only be attained through some active struggle, which implicitly acknowledges a
connection between martyrdom and the realization of truth.4 In addition to Qutb’s
Islam and his stance on Western societies being used to persuade men, women and
children to die for the faith, the threat to NATO also becomes clear.

Qutb saw modern Western culture as having reached a moment of
“unbearable crisis.”5 The quality of life in the West was “sliding downward,” and
people in the United States and other Western countries led what he considered
the “most miserable lives.”6 This was not an anti-modernist view, however. Qutb
instead blamed the deterioration of the West on the “hideous schizophrenia”
perpetrated by Europe between Christianity and atheism, scientific progress and
the Church; a schizophrenia that swept over the Muslim world, threatening to
destroy the totality of Islam.7

Over the course of the 20th century these movements grew ever more
organized, violent, and focused. When the remnants of European totalitarianism fell with the Berlin wall in 1989, Muslim totalitarian movements such as Baath Socialism and Islamism did not slow in the least. They continued arguing for the restoration of the office of the Caliphate to be built on the rubble of the West. The cultural disintegration that frightened Qutb seemed to be taking place in the liberal democracies of the post-Cold War era as consumerism and secularism dominated the Western landscape. Al-Qaida’s goals against the West, for instance, seem to fall in line with the intellectual tradition that Sayyid Qutb left. In al-Qaida’s 1998 fatwa, the group called on “every Muslim who believes in God” to “kill the Americans and their allies – civilian and military.” This was the “individual duty of every Muslim” that was able. The justification for this action: the West had “declar[ed] war on God, his messenger and Muslims” and was aiming to eliminate the Muslim nation. Muslim totalitarianism has risen from the ruins of European totalitarianism and globalization. This has enabled terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaida, to have the global reach necessary to achieve their goals.

An Environment “Ready-Made” for Terrorism

The creation of a global society has diversified and therefore complicated the definition of a “threat.” Later we will see the effect of this development as it is related to strategy and the formation of a “risk-mentality;” but the confusion of a world in which there is no clear threat but infinite risks can be used to the advantage of non-state actors wishing to pursue violence and inject terror into a society.

Furthermore, while the West is still preponderant in the areas of traditional military force and the economy, in the realm of transnational relations, power is widely dispersed. Actors as diverse as bankers and NGOs, terrorists and hackers, effectuate great change every day by transferring funds and weapons across the globe. Neither the United States nor the West as a whole can achieve primacy in this realm dominated by non-state actors. For example, even though the Internet is dominated by the West, with over 50% of servers based in the United States, the use of the Internet by non-state actors is outside the purview and influence of the West. Indeed, transnational terrorist networks are using the Internet more and more widely to gather, teach and organize converts to their cause.

As the world market has globalized, so too has the global arms market. It is easier and cheaper to attain weaponry than any other time in history. In 2007 alone, the Middle East/North Africa region imported a reported $12 billion worth of arms. Weak controls on firearm ownership, weapons management and misuse by authorized users mean that if these arms were not destined for terrorist camps to begin with, they inevitably many of them ended up there. Furthermore, the example of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States shows the terrorists have expanded their weapons repertoire to outside conventional weapons. Meanwhile, Al-Qaida, for instance, has an expressed interest in obtaining chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and experts note somberly
that the challenges to regulation mean that proliferation will likely increase in the future. The fact that non-state actors are able to acquire conventional and unconventional weaponry easily suggests that states have potentially lost the monopoly of force. The Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security explained that the “threshold for small groups or even individuals to inflict massive damage...is falling dramatically.” Together, the report continues, “unconventional weaponry” and “international terrorism...will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland.” Globalization and the information revolution have created an environment that is indeed “ready-made” for terrorism.

Clearly, the international terrorist organizations that globalization has enabled are a serious threat. Not only has the information revolution facilitated the dissemination of militant Islamic propaganda to the entire world, but globalization has left terrorists climbing the learning curve of deadly technologies at a vigorous pace. Indeed, while no international terrorist organization has acquired CBRN weapons as of yet, they are currently using cheap, unconventional weaponry with great success. The clearest and most abundant example of such technology is the Improvised Explosive Device (IED). They can be both mobile, as when carried by a suicide bomber or left stationary, as roadside bombs. The technology behind IEDs is not sophisticated (as already mentioned, instructions to build a suit can be found online) and cost little to make, yet IEDs have killed 1812 coalition forces in Iraq – approximately 43 percent of all deaths. And as of September 2007, 81,000 IEDs had been detonated in Iraq. While the US has spent nearly $14.5 billion on counter-IED technologies, use has shown no sign of slowing; in November, IED use in Iraq had doubled since January 2006 to nearly 100 per day. All of this has caused the Pentagon to name IEDs as the “single most effective weapon against our deployed forces.”

These developments in Internet and technological revolution are coupled with the rich intellectual tradition of radical Islam, which paints the Western world as an obstacle to Islam’s more perfect future. While incomparable to the Soviet threat that NATO faced during the Cold War, one could imagine that such a preponderant threat to Western security would reinvigorate NATO once again. Indeed, it must; scholars agree that global terrorism requires a multilateral response. Unfortunately, in scrambling to respond to a threat as unpredictable and multidimensional as terrorism, internal conflicts within NATO have arisen that undermine the staying power and effectiveness of the Alliance.

The Internal Challenges of Risk

The post-Cold War era forever changed the nature of the NATO alliance. Not only did the member nations of NATO work to redefine the purview of the alliance itself, but globalization redefined the way which NATO’s member nations conceived of the world around them. The 1990s heralded the rise of a risk-management mentality throughout NATO. This development, and the effects it has had on military capabilities and strategy, has created dangerous rifts in the
Alliance.

**Emergence of the “Risk Society”**

The case of international terrorism shows that globalization has altered the environment we live in to one of “chance and risk.” The growing technical capacity of the past decades has made consequences increasingly incalculable. In response, the West’s security agenda has turned its focus to the problem of risks. This has produced an obsession with the subjective, which is at odds with the objective strategy of threat deterrence that guided NATO since its inception after World War II.

First, let us explain exactly what a risk is. Risks are necessarily unknowable. According to John Adams, risks are “the product of the probability and utility of some future event.” In this way, risks are “virtual” and their existence is only constrained by the limitations of our own imaginations. This very nature of risks makes them un-deterrable. So, the strategy to confront risks must be one of management. One can hope to either prevent the risk from coming to fruition or manage the consequences adeptly. Lastly, because we are consumed with the possibility of risks our present actions are often reactions to future potentialities. In other words, in a risk society, people act by “reflexive rationality,” in contrast to the “means-end rationality” of a threat society.

Has the West truly become a risk society? One may argue that we need not look further than NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1991. For the whole of the Cold War, NATO faced one monolithic threat, the Soviet Union. The Concept in 1991 described the new “security challenges and risks” that the Alliance would face this way:

> In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess.

This proclamation reflects a broadening, and indeed a “radical chang[e]” to NATO’s “approach to security.” The preservation of security was still the Alliance’s aim, but the new environment meant that security, which now included political, economic and social factors as well, could not be safeguarded through only territorial defense. In fact, the Concept makes clear that to preserve “stability in Europe and the security of the Alliance members,” NATO must be “capable of responding to such risks.” In the absence of a defined security threat, NATO in 1991 became an alliance with a mission of risk management.

NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1999 reflects further entrenchment of the risk management mission. As the section delineating security challenges and risks makes clear, the enemy NATO faces is not another state or even a well-defined threat. For example, the 1999 Concept asserts that:
Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and [the] disruption of the flow of vital resources.  

None of the risks described are state actors, nor are they definitive; they are all potentialities. Also this is notably the first time that NATO lists “terrorism,” a heretofore ill-defined and volatile menace, as a risk to the Alliance. This pattern continues as the 1999 Concept lists “uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area” and the “possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance” as risks that “could evolve rapidly” into direct security challenges. To be clear neither the “uncertainty” nor the “regional crises” were, in 1999, threats to the Alliance. NATO was maintaining its legitimacy as an alliance by extrapolating current instabilities into future risks. It is clear that NATO and its member nations were, by the end of the century, nations consumed by risk.

The attacks on the United States in September 2001 only exacerbated this risk-focused conception of the security environment. In response to the attacks, NATO adopted the Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism (MCDT) in November 2002. NATO determined that the threat posed by terrorism was, in many ways, unknowable. While “religious extremism” was one source of terrorism, the 2002 Concept conceded that “terrorism could emerge from economic, social, demographic and political causes” also. In addition, while the “predominant form of terrorist attack remain[ed] the creative use of conventional weapons and explosives,” NATO recognized that it was only a matter of time before new weaponry, such as WMD, were acquired and utilized. When this may happen still remains unknown. In 2002, NATO, firmly focused on the subjective, finally appreciated the expansive risk of international terrorism that globalization had enabled. The next question we must tackle is how the Alliance would seek to manage this risk.

The “Risk Trap” and NATO

The side effect of an Alliance focused on risk is that disagreements over strategy are inevitable. As Christopher Coker writes in Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk, NATO has fallen prey to the “risk trap.” Strategic decisions (the example Coker gives is in reference to the building of a missile defense shield) made in reaction to risks are necessarily contested. This is because the different NATO member nations, while operating under the same value system, have divergent cultures and norms. The United States, seemingly unconstrained by its military, economic and cultural preponderance, is likely to react to risks differently than the European states, bound by the European Union and national pressures. Furthermore, the incalculability and subjectivity of risks suggests that some nations may recognize a risk where other nations see none. European states, for example, may feel threatened by and react to a domestic risk of terrorism while the United States conceives of no such
risk. As the unpredictability of risk would foretell, NATO has been challenged in recent years as the United States and Europe consistently fail to agree upon the necessary strategies to combat risks.

In general, however, the United States and the rest of NATO members do agree on many long-term security goals. On the one hand, the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of March 2006 asserts that the U.S. must “[s]trengthen [its] alliances to defeat global terrorism” and “work with others” to defuse conflicts. Moreover, the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) states that overcoming terrorism is only possible by spreading “effective democracies” throughout the world that will “advance[e] freedom and human rights.” On the other hand, NATO’s 1999 Concept notes that a collectively secure end is to “support and promote democracy.” Moreover, the 1999 Concept heralds “mutually reinforcing organizations,” such as the UN, OSCE and the EU, along with the “indispensable transatlantic link” with North America, as “central” and “essential” to the changing security environment. Indeed, a cursory glance at the United States and NATO’s long-term goals paints an optimistic picture of the future.

It is important to note that a more in-depth examination illustrates that the United States and the rest of NATO have indeed fallen into Coker’s “risk trap,” disagreeing time and again on the best strategy to manage risks. In combating terrorism, for instance, the United States has taken an aggressive and offensive posture. The 2006 NSS asserts that U.S. security can only be preserved by “keep[ing] terrorists from striking the homeland and U.S. interests abroad.” As such, the fight “must be taken to the enemy” to “keep them on the run.” The United States “can no longer simply rely on deterrence” or “defensive measures” to combat terrorism, but must work to “summon the collective outrage of the free world” to end tyranny.

Uncompromising strategic policies bolster this aggressive rhetoric. In September 2006, the National Security Council released the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) in which four short-term policies were outlined that the U.S. would follow to address terrorism. First among them was the assertion that the U.S. must “prevent attacks by terrorist networks.” While the NSCT outlines some defensive measures, such as defense of potential targets of attack and disrupting terrorists’ international travel, in general the strategy for prevention is overwhelmingly offensive. The NSCT unequivocally maintains that the U.S. will best prevent future terrorist attacks by “neutralizing” terrorist leaders and foot soldiers, irrespective of organization and regardless of a recorded act of aggression against the United States. Perhaps this strategy is best encapsulated in the 2006 NSS: “To forestall or prevent such [acts of terrorism], the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense” (my emphasis). In laying out a strategy for managing a risk as unpredictable and all-encompassing as global terrorism, the United States has taken a radically aggressive stance.
While the U.S. developed an offensive strategy, NATO takes a much more on defensive posture in managing the risk of terrorism. To consider NATO’s response to global terrorism, let us return to the 2002 Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism (MCDT). The 2002 Concept outlines four roles for the military in combating terrorism: anti-terrorism, consequence management, counter terrorism and military cooperation. The contrasts with the U.S. are stark. For example, rather than taking the fight to the enemy, NATO’s anti-terrorism plan emphasizes reducing force vulnerabilities. Furthermore, nowhere does NATO concede that preemptive strikes are necessary. The 2002 Concept goes only so far as to justify “military action...to reduce terrorists’ capabilities” when “allied nations agree” that the terrorists have infringed upon international law. Employing “reactive measures” to “mitigate the destructive effects of terrorism” after an attack remains NATO’s focus.46 This seems to be a telling difference. Where the United States seeks to manage the risk of attack by preemption, NATO aims to manage the consequences of attack. The United States and NATO, for whatever reasons, have arrived at drastically different strategic policies.

A more tangible example of the “risk trap” at work exists in the growing capabilities gap between the United States and Europe. From a threat deterrence perspective, America’s focus on defense spending even though it has no preponderant enemy in this regard makes little sense. However, from a risk management perspective, the logic behind America’s overwhelming spending becomes clear. The so-called “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) was undertaken to overcome the unpredictability of risks on the battlefield. The vast technological improvements of the RMA are supposed to transform the U.S. military and give it “full spectrum dominance” of every conflict. Proponents of the RMA argue that the near-perfect and all-encompassing information received during conflicts means that the “fog of war” can be lifted, thereby eliminating risk.47 Of course, risk, seemingly, cannot be eliminated, but the United States, as the world hegemon, has chosen to manage future risks through the RMA. This was a strategic decision that only the United States could make. Not only is the American economy larger, but the public is more willing to accept higher defense spending. While the U.S. spent $57.9 billion only on research and development in 2007, the United Kingdom, NATO’s next highest spender, spent $50.2 billion in 2006 on its entire defense budget.48

**Consequences of the “Risk Trap”**

The gaps in military strategy and capabilities between the United States and the rest of NATO members have undermined the Alliance, thereby increasing dependence on the United States to carry out military operations. For example, NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo was for all intents and purposes conducted by the United States on behalf of its European allies. Of the 38,000 sorties 60% were flown by Americans, and of the 900 aircraft involved 2/3 came from the U.S. military. The gap in capabilities becomes more glaring still when one
realizes that the U.S. alone supplied the stealth aircraft, precision munitions and surveillance technologies utilized by the Allies. Furthermore, parallel U.S. and NATO command-and-control centers confused and complicated planning, more so because the Allies did not agree on a military strategy. While the U.S. wanted to increase the number of targets, its European allies sought to avoid escalation of any kind. NATO was ultimately successful in Kosovo only because the U.S. assumed a disproportionate burden and overtook target selection and mission planning responsibilities. This host of issues incited General Wesley Clark to somberly note that NATO had “paid a price in operational effectiveness” during the Kosovo campaign. For U.S. generals, the lesson learned from Kosovo was to not seek war if consensus among allies would be necessary.

The recent conflict in Afghanistan offers further evidence. After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, NATO responded by invoking Article 5 for the first time, pledging that an attack on one member was an attack on all. For “Operation Enduring Freedom,” the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, Alliance partners offered an abundance of troops and resources in a show of unified support. However, due to the non-interoperability between U.S. forces and Alliance troops, the U.S. largely snubbed its allies and entered Afghanistan utilizing highly trained special forces and special operation troops of which its NATO allies had few. The campaign was singular in its use of sophisticated U.S. technology – precision-guided bombs, drones and electronic warfare equipment – and a central U.S. allied command. The U.S. was able to manage the risk of war the way it wanted, maintaining efficiency and strategic consensus while not asking the Alliance for significant assistance. Currently, with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in charge of Afghanistan operations, inefficiency is once again plaguing military operations. Many troops, for example, operate under “national caveats,” which “place limits on what military activities [the nation’s] troops are allowed to do or where they are allowed to go.” This creates a challenge for military planners and again disproportionately places the burden on only certain members of the Alliance.

Furthermore, unwilling to continue assuming more risk than its Allies under the hindrance of NATO Allied command, the U.S. has begun to look elsewhere for support. Indeed, the Alliance’s operational ineffectiveness has encouraged the U.S. to think of NATO more as a secondary ally. For example, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) highlights the Pentagon’s preference for “dynamic partnerships” in comparison to “static alliances” such as NATO. Moreover, the 2006 NSS states U.S. inclination toward “looser form[s] of cooperation” and notes that while “existing international institutions have a role to play,” often “coalitions of the willing may be able to respond more quickly and creatively.” Perhaps this sentiment is best encapsulated by the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s declaration: “the mission determines the coalition; the coalition must not determine the mission.” An example of such coalition is the so-called “coalition of the willing” currently fighting in Iraq. When France, Germany, and Belgium vetoed
a proposal implicitly validating Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States was forced to look elsewhere for multilateral legitimacy.57 This “dynamic partnership” is comprised of forty-nine countries, yet 92% of forces on the ground are American. While technically multilateral, the “coalition of the willing” is certainly unilateral in principle. The United States is no longer constrained by NATO’s military guidelines and archaic operational forces but retains multilateral legitimacy and the freedom to manage risks as it sees fit.

Ultimately, these developments certainly threaten NATO’s status as an effective alliance. If NATO is not able to act effectively militarily then it has no hope of answering to the challenge of global terrorism and preserving its members’ security in an increasingly unpredictable world. If the United States, by far NATO’s most powerful member, continues to show preference for “coalitions of the willing” instead of NATO, the significance and legitimacy of the Alliance will erode. The question we have before us is simple: how can NATO address these problems?

**Reforming NATO**

To its credit, the Alliance has attempted to tackle the gaps in capabilities and military strategy in recent years. Unfortunately, these efforts have fallen short. To overcome the capabilities gap, the Alliance has made some concerted and diverse efforts at reform. Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, NATO leaders introduced a new three-part charter for the Alliance. They agreed that NATO would have to 1) increase its anti-terrorism capabilities, 2) invigorate its counter-terrorism capabilities (including “offensive measures designed to track down, prevent, deter and interdict terrorist attacks”), and 3) extend its consequence management capabilities.58 The 2002 Prague Summit crystallized these goals further when NATO signed a “Capabilities Commitment.”59 Member nations agreed to focus on developing anti- and counter-terror capabilities in line with eight specific initiatives from creating a NATO Response Force (NRF) to redesigning NATO’s science program.60 Just a year later, the Alliance adapted military “transformation” as one of its goals, along with initiating the Allied Transformation Command.61 At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, NATO leaders agreed to institute the Defense Against Terrorism (DAT) program to “strengthen the Alliance’s contribution to the fight against terrorism.”62 The DAT program aims to provide a forum for the members of NATO to help spread technology (mainly through technology demonstrations) and information (tactics, techniques and procedures).63 Different NATO countries have taken the lead on eleven different projects, which heralds a departure from reliance on U.S. technology.

This diverse palate of reforms would seem to address the gap in capabilities as best as any policy measure. Unfortunately, member nations have bluntly ignored minimum defense spending limits and military transformation goals. In 2006, the minimum defense spending rate was set at 2 percent. Only six nations other than the United States reached this threshold and most nations still continued to spend
more on manpower than transformational technology.\textsuperscript{64} In fact, new members to NATO have yet to acquire the minimum technological threshold to which they agreed when first admitted.\textsuperscript{65}

Addressing the friction created by differing military strategies has been a NATO priority since the fall of the Berlin wall. During the 1990s, the Alliance realized that the emergence of new threats meant that states may be faced with individual rather than Alliance-wide security challenges. Greater flexibility than Article 5 would be needed to preserve the security interests of all of NATO’s member nations. In response, NATO leaders developed a system, the Combined and Joint Task Force (CJTF), which would allow coalitions of willing NATO states to form and defuse threats as they arose without involving the entire Alliance. This prescient initiative, seemingly written for the war against terrorism, sought to provide a “flexible and efficient means” for Alliance members to confront emerging threats.\textsuperscript{66}

The CJTF appeared well positioned to answer the challenge of divergent military strategies. First, the system recognized the subjectivity of risks, realizing that the risks that states acknowledge are different depending on many variables. Second, the initiative seemed to allow states with differing military strategies to wage war without problematic Alliance consensus. Unfortunately, the CJTF did not translate well into the post-9/11 world. Many suggested that NATO form a counter-terrorism CJTF, framing NATO as a staging ground for allied contributions to the war on terrorism, but the Bush Administration refused. Rather than operate under the Alliance’s integrated military command structure and face the challenges of inefficiency, the United States sought to construct its own ad-hoc coalition without formal NATO support.\textsuperscript{67}

In both cases, resolute efforts at reform have met serious failure. Pundits from both sides of the Atlantic place the blame on the states or ideology. The most common argument often ends in an ideological confrontation between the pacifistic Europeans and the hawkish Americans. This reductionist argument, however, is unhelpful and only confuses the real reason that no reform effort has been successful: the risk-mentality itself. Considering each case reveals this newfound utility of risk. The United States is clearly frustrated with what it sees as NATO’s impotent response to terrorism. But from a risk management perspective, European NATO’s less offensive posture seems justified and strategic. While there seem to be few domestic U.S. terrorist cells, many more supposedly exist in Europe. In fact, the 2005 bombings in London were perpetrated by homegrown terrorists, showing that the risk of domestic terrorist violence could be greater for European countries than for the United States.\textsuperscript{68} Because domestic terrorism risk is more present in Europe, Europe’s defensive stance is justifiable. Similarly, the capability gap is a result of the United States seeking to manage its risks differently than its European allies. The states along Russia’s border continue to invest in ground forces rather than transformational technology in part because they see the potential, however slim, for a Russian ground invasion.\textsuperscript{69} In order to maintain strong security, these
states consider investment in manpower over RMA technologies essential.

The fact that the risk-mentality so easily explains the failure of NATO’s reforms does not bode well for the future of the Alliance. Rather than galvanizing the Alliance in defiance, the unpredictable risk posed by global terrorist organizations has instead slowly torn NATO apart. But a deeper understanding of risk society enables us to better predict NATO’s future. As each state becomes consumed with its individual methods of managing risk, the gap in capabilities and military strategy will continue to widen. No state will be willing to sacrifice its own security for the preservation of the Alliance. The United States will continue to form ad-hoc coalitions rather than seeking NATO approval. NATO’s European member nations will continue to spend less on military spending than the United States and instead focus more on diplomacy, anti-terrorism and consequence management efforts. Indeed, if all remains the same, NATO will undoubtedly lose legitimacy and slowly dissipate.

This may seem an overly pessimistic conclusion, offering the potential demise of a stronghold of Western security; but it should be taken instead as a guideline for the future. As long as states continue to make strategic decisions in terms of risk, long-lasting alliances, especially those spanning cultures and norms, will be ridden with the internal conflicts outlined in this paper. NATO, however, can still adapt, thereby accepting the limitations that the risk-mentality imposes on the Alliance and revising its purpose to become more of a global partnership. The enterprise might benefit from admitting any and all democracies that wish to join, regardless of their capability. NATO could become a forum for ad-hoc coalition making; a global version of the Combined and Joint Task Force. Without the need for consensus from an Allied command, the new Alliance would not suffer from the struggles that have encouraged the United States to form coalitions of the willing in the first place. Indeed, by approaching the future with the problems of risk in mind, NATO may be able to retain legitimacy as an organization and enable the world’s democracies to better manage their risks.

ENDNOTES

3 Berman, Terror, p. 68.
4 Berman, Terror, p. 69.
5 Berman, Terror, p. 68.
6 Berman, Terror, p. 69.
7 Berman, Terror, p. 76.
8 Berman, Terror, p. 155.
Berman, *Terror*, p. 58.


Al-Qaidia, “Al Qaeda’s 1998 Fatwa.”


Faber, “NATO in Countering Terrorism,” p. 3.


While these statistics specifically refer to the war in Iraq, it should be noted that IED use in Afghanistan against the NATO ISAF is also increasing at a similar rate.

Atkinson, “Single most effective weapon.”

Atkinson, “Single most effective weapon.”


NATO, “NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1991” 7-8 November 1991, para. 2. <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm> It should be noted that NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1999 has the exact same language.


NATO, ‘Strategic Concept 1999,” para. 20.

NATO, “NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism.”

Coker, *Globalisation*, p. 74-75.


NATO, “Strategic Concept of 1999,” para. 35.


Rasmussen, *Risk Society*, p. 35.


Faber, “NATO in Countering Terrorism,” p. 6.

Faber, “NATO in Countering Terrorism,” p. 5.

Faber, “NATO in Countering Terrorism,’ p. 6.


Faber, “NATO in Countering Terrorism,” p. 6.

Lansford, *All for One*, p. 89-90.
67 Lansford, *All for One*, p. 92.

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This research attempts to assess the motivations of Palestinian female terrorists, hoping to contribute insight into the rise of female suicide terrorism in Israel and, by extension, in Iraq. Media portrayals and often policy initiatives address female suicide bombings as the exception rather than the rule especially in cases related to radical Islam. I argue that female and male terrorism can be equally dangerous and that the rise of female participation in Palestinian terrorism needs to be addressed. If women are still unanticipated actors in terrorism, a few female suicide bombers may have a stronger impact on civilians than several male terrorists. I further argue that the case of Palestinian female terrorism needs to be assessed within the context of Arab/Muslim culture, analyzes the act of Palestinian female participation in the context of its own social norms and values.

**Introduction**

On November 6, 2008 a female suicide bomber detonated herself in North Ossetia, a predominantly Christian area of Georgia, killing 12 people and wounding around 40 others. Some asserted that the Islamic Chechen terrorist organization orchestrated the attack (Schwirtz 2008). However, with no group has claimed responsibility for this incident, the act seemed more like a senseless suicide than a strategic assault against an enemy. Once the state-centric war between Georgia and Russia over oil and territory had ended, terrorism was no longer advantageous to either the Georgian or the Russian cause. Furthermore, the unknown woman had no partisan allegiance to either army, making her motivation all the more difficult to understand.

Terrorism has long been considered a male-dominated form of warfare. Media portrayals and policy initiatives address female suicide bombings as the exception rather than the rule, especially in cases related to radical Islam. Today, however, women are coming to the foreground as perpetrators of violence and terror, often acting without the aide of an organization Because they are perceived as being non-aggressive, women have an added tactical advantage in the role of suicide bomber. They are unanticipated. As such, a single female suicide bomber may be capable of inflicting greater destruction than several male terrorists.

This research attempts to assess the motivations and increasing participation in Palestinian terrorism.
of Palestinian female terrorists. However, Palestinian female terrorism must be assessed within the context of Palestinian/Muslim culture. The motivations of women may dramatically differ from those of men, and male oriented counter-terrorism strategies may actually serve to exacerbate female terrorism. Thus this research analyzes the act of Palestinian female participation in the context of its own social norms and values.

Like many before him, Ariel Merari, a respected Israeli terrorism expert, has attempted to define terrorism. Despite the ambiguities of countless alternative definitions, Merari broadly defines terrorism as “certain kinds of violent actions [that] are carried out by individuals and groups rather than by states, with events which take place in peacetime rather than as part of a conventional war” (Merari 1993, 213). However, this broad definition of terrorism does not include important factors, such as motivation (whether political, social, or personal) or outcome. More importantly, Merari does not differentiate between criminal attacks and terrorist attacks. In his work, Ariel Merari categorizes the different variables that make up terrorism. Indeed, he separates the variables of terrorism into situational factors, the idea of chain suicide, the effect of audience, personality factors, changes over time, perpetrating organizations, age, geographical location, and gender. On the topic of gender, Merari notes that in Lebanon during the 1980s, thirty-six people were suicide perpetrators, thirty males and six females. Merari states that the variable of gender needs further study even though, “Undoubtedly, the great majority of the members in the groups under consideration are males. However, because the distribution of members by sex in these groups is unknown, it is impossible to assess “gender proneness” to suicidal terrorism (Reich 1990, 192)."
Traditionally, women have been perceived as victims of violence rather than perpetrators of it.

Figure 1 depicts female terrorists as percentage of total terrorists (ITERATE 2004). The cyclical nature of the graph represents campaigns of terror over the last 26 years. The most recent peak between 2001 and 2004 can be most readily associated with the rise of female terrorists in Iraq and other areas. Thus women will be utilized as terrorists more often during times of war and political uprising. In fact, other sources have found that since 1985, roughly 34% of terrorist attacks perpetrated in Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Israel and the Occupied Territories, Morocco, Egypt, and Iraq were performed by women (Bloom 2005).³ In Israel, between 1985 and 2006, there have been more than 220 female suicide bombers, representing nearly 15% of the overall number of actual suicide bombers in the world, including those intercepted in the final stages of an attack (Schweitzer 2006, 26).⁴

It is difficult for many Westerners to understand the motivations of women who commit horrific acts of violence given our socially constructed idea of female roles and responsibilities in society. Women are viewed as the bearers of life and the moral core of humanity in their roles as mothers, sisters, and daughters. Westerners also tend to perceive women in the Arab/Muslim world as hidden and subservient actors in the state and home. For example, if a Palestinian female suicide bomber commits an attack on the streets of Jerusalem, Western thinkers will raise questions concerning the motivations of this woman and how the use of women as bombers changes the fundamentals of previously male dominated terror organizations. Westerners may rush to believe that these women were coerced and forced to become suicide bombers, but this is often not the case. Understanding women from the Arab/Muslim perspective is essential to the study of female Palestinian terrorism. It is crucial, therefore, to emphasize that Muslim women are not marginal actors in the Arab world, and that there has in fact been an increase of female participation in political activism related to terrorism.

In Lebanon, out of twelve suicide attacks organized by the Syrian Socialist National Party, women were involved in five. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) is estimated to have 10,000 to 18,000 members, half of which are women, according to the Sri Lankan military. Women in the LTTE have been active members since its creation by Vellupillai Prabhakaran. Their role in the organization is not marginalized nor is it stigmatized because of their gender. They perform almost as many attacks as men and in some cases are preferred because of their innocent appearance (i.e. their value as counter-profile agents). Women are trained like men, are given weapons, and are taught how to use these arms (Beyler 2003).⁵

Another example can be found in Turkey. Founded in 1987, the Kurdistan Workers Party opted to use suicide terrorism as their modus operandi in 1995 where women participated in all the group’s activities. These women were trained to tolerate the same “Spartan lifestyle” as their male counterparts. In fact, the PKK’s internal governing rule was one of violence perpetrated by both genders:
the more violent one was the higher one’s status. Because this group’s 20,000 members (consisting of both men and women) are under-studied, no reliable data is available to conclusively assess the gender component of the PKK (Beyler 2003).6

In Chechnya, the notorious Black Widows have been performing terrorist attacks since June 7, 2000. Khava Barayeva was the first female suicide bomber for the Black Widows. Barayeva, a cousin of a well known Chechen field commander, and Luisa Magomadova drove a truck filled with explosives into the temporary headquarters of an elite OMAN (Russian Special Forces) detachment in the village of Alkhan Yurt in Chechnya. The attack subsequently resulted in two dead and five wounded. Since then, the Black Widows have been responsible for 81% of suicide attacks attributed to the Chechen rebel fighters (Akhmedova and Speckhard 2006, 63).7 Women have been participants and followers in many terrorist organizations, including the National Liberation Front of Algeria, the Chechen Black Widows, Tamil Tigers, Weather Underground, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The incidence of women committing acts of terror speaks to both the phenomenon of terrorism itself, as well as to our socially constructed assumptions about women (Hoogensen 2005, 119).8 Therefore, the gender component is one of the many crucial dimensions in understanding terrorism. One must study terrorism from the fundamentals, assessing the factors of individuals involved in terrorism, rather than assessing the factors of just terrorist groups.

THEORIES OF PALESTINIAN FEMALE INVOLVEMENT IN TERROR

A series of Israeli experts have studied the phenomenon of terrorism extensively, albeit respective to their academic specialties. Ariel Merari is a seasoned psychologist by trade and a terrorism expert in practice. A professor in the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel-Aviv University, has compiled both international and domestic terrorist attacks in a list since 1979, which became a computerized database in the early 1980s. The database has grown to include thousands of terrorist attacks and several hundred terrorist organizations, and is considered the most comprehensive database in the world constantly updated with each new terror attack. The database is separated into three main categories; terrorist events, terrorist groups, and public attitudes toward terrorism.

Despite his extensive research in the field, Merari has never made a comment about the role of females in terrorist attacks. Merari’s main concern was statistical; in his opinion, there are too few female terrorists to make statistical analysis reliable. Moreover, Merari’s primary reasoning for the participation of people in terrorism, regardless of culture or even gender, is primarily psychological, having said that:

Culture and religion in particular seem to be relatively unimportant in the phenomenon of terrorist suicide. Terrorist suicide, like any other suicide, is basically an individual rather than a group phenomenon: it is done by people who wish to die for personal reasons. The terrorist framework simply offers the excuse (rather than the real drive) for doing it and legitimizes
it for being carried out in a violent way. There is no evidence to support the notion that influence of a charismatic political or religious leader is in itself sufficient to drive an otherwise non-suicidal person to wish to commit terrorist suicide. However, such influence may conceivably serve as an ancillary factor, boosting an already existing suicidal tendency and channeling it to a certain modus operandi, time, and place. (Merari 1993, 206-207)9

Merari’s explanations are based on the psychological influences that affect the everyday lives of people before they decide to commit an act of suicide terrorism. Yet does his assessment of the individual necessarily apply in the case of women terrorists?

There is a vital gender component missing in the research of Ariel Merari that would elucidate the motivating factors for men and women. For example, Palestinian women play no central role in terrorist organizations like Fatah, Hamas, or Islamic Jihad. Rather their status in society is prized for bearing children and being the primary caretakers. Women are not subjected to the same propaganda that men are subjected to in Palestinian society. While it is plausible to say that Palestinian men who have committed suicide attacks were subject to rigorous indoctrination can the same be said for women of the same society outside these psychological tactics? Moreover monetary rewards for women are even lower than that of men, and instead of receiving 72 black-eyed Suras in heaven, women will be reunited with their husband as a reward. Indeed, there is no fundamental difference between the earthly and heavenly rewards for women. Women involved in women’s groups may be political in nature, but under no circumstance does their society compel them to take up an armed resistance against Israelis. Instead, terrorist organizations recruit their sons against Israel to become political militants. Does there exist an aggravating factor that pushes women in the same way that motivates men?

A psychological component certainly exists in the motivations of Palestinian female suicide bombers, but Raphael Israeli believes that the psychological explanation for female participation is exaggerated. Israeli, an expert on Islamic terrorism, has written on the motivations of both men and women relating to gender. Israeli believes that a suicide attacker is not subject to a suicidal resolve, as Western psychiatrists impose. On the contrary, Israeli believes that terrorists are a part of a larger scheme for which they are prepared and trained, together with others who share their convictions, and are equipped by arduous physical and mental training. Along with this explanation, Israeli draws upon the similarities between the Japanese kamikaze and the Islamic martyr: “Muslim fundamentalist self-immolating assassins- who have nothing suicidal about them, come closest to kamikazes in organization, ideology, execution of their attack, posthumous glory, and historical background of self-effacing loyalty, and culture of shame.” (Israeli 2003, 78)10 Thus Israeli adopted the appellation- Islamikaze, to describe these terrorists. He also applies the same label to women who involve themselves...
in Islamic martyrdom in the Palestinian Territories. Israeli contends that female participation starts with a Muslim interpretation of honor, and indeed this idea of honor in Muslim society is compelling and deserves examination. Israeli contends that the key to understanding female participation lies in the Muslim definition of honor:

Arabic distinguishes between male (sharaf) and female honor (‘ird). As in the West, man’s honor is related to the deeds he performs and image he projects. His honor is redeemable if he only applies himself to maintain it, shelter it and retrieve it when lost. The woman’s honor, by contrast, refers to her intimacy, modesty and decency in dress, the preservation of virginity until marriage, gentle behavior and seclusion from male society, which is corrupt by definition. If she should fail in one of those categories, her honor is forever lost (Israeli 2004, 66).11

The man is thus deemed the protector of a woman’s honor which, if ruined, dishonors her as well as her family. Israeli contends that the lack of parity between the honor of a man and that of a woman leaves men in a dominant role, that women are constantly struggling to abolish. Israeli primarily believes that Muslim women in the Palestinian Territories are arming themselves as suicide bombers in order to emancipate themselves from the disparity of honor and citizenship within the community. In his work, Israeli asserts that these women listen to the proclamations of religious sheikhs that call on women to become suicide bombers. For instance, Sheikh Yassin, the former infamous religious leader of Hamas, decreed a fatwa that rescinded the usage of a chaperone when a woman leaves her home if she was a going to become a martyr. Another religious leader, Sheikh Abu al-Hassan, decreed that the act of Jihad by women against the Jews was permissible. Israeli believes that Palestinian women become suicide bombers in order to gain equal citizenship and reject their marginal roles in Palestinian society. Israeli even cites the activism of women like Hanan Ashwari, who attained rank in the cabinet of the Palestinian Authority but is most famous for helping lead the first intifada, and Leila Khaled, who was one of the first female terrorists, having hijacked two airplanes in the late 1970s in order to draw attention to the Palestinian people as two of these female emancipators (Israeli 2004, 66).12 During our conversations, Raphael Israeli and I discussed the role of these women in Islam. He was certain that these women were intentionally emancipating themselves by becoming suicide bombers. I told him the stories of some of these bombers who have been dishonored in their community and were even subject to honor killings if they did not redeem themselves by committing suicide attacks, but he remained certain that these women are actually Western-style feminists.

This approach to analyzing female participation in terrorism could be true in other parts of the world where women prize more Western ideas of freedom, but this is not likely to be true in the Palestinian Territories. Israeli references women like Leila Khaled and Hanan Ashwari as women that have taken substantial strides for feminism in the Muslim world and that their endeavors are feminist. The actions
of Ahwari were not violent in nature, and Khaled was a terrorist and a Palestinian patriot with no intentions of suicide or murder. Leila Khaled was a Marxist and, along with her compatriots, hijacked a TWA flight heading for Tel-Aviv. Khaled did not intend to commit suicide or harm the passengers, but rather to redirect the plane to an Arab country where it would be blown up to cause a media sensation. She was later involved in more hijackings, which led to her capture. Khaled did inflict terror on the passengers that she hijacked, but she shed no blood. Indeed, Khaled was a terrorist, activist, and maybe a feminist, but she is not categorized as having the same motivations as Palestinian female suicide bombers like Wafa Idris, who was the first Palestinian woman to commit murder and suicide in Israel. Wafa’s status in the community was a contributing factor for her involvement in a suicide bombing, but her intentions were neither feminist nor Western. She did not seek to emancipate women. Like many after her, Wafa was a matriarchal conservative, subject to her own society’s definition of women’s roles and honor. As we will see, in the case of the Palestinian female suicide bombers, these women are committing suicide terrorism as an act of personal and familial redemption.

Although insights into the motivations of women lay important groundwork for counter-terrorism strategy, Yoram Schweitzer studies the strategies and tactics of terrorist organizations by interviewing both male and female members. Yoram Schweitzer works for the Israeli Policy Institute for Strategic Studies, where he combines academic studies with field work. The institute provides academic work that contributes to Israel’s counter-terrorism policies. Yoram Schweitzer’s field work includes interviews with several failed terrorists, both male and female, and their families. While Schweitzer provided limited insight as to the motivations of female terrorists, he agreed that these women are not feminists. Instead, he focuses on the groups that employ women. According to Schweitzer, Palestinian and Islamic terrorist groups do not seek or recruit women for terrorist attacks, but when the women seek out members of terrorist organizations they are always used as Shahidas (female martyrs) for a tactical advantage. In the Muslim world it is taboo for a woman to seek out a man that is unrelated to her, so when women seek out male members of terrorist organizations they are essentially locked in to committing the attack for fear of being reprimanded by the community for mixing with a non-related man. This implies that if a woman were to put her honor in question by seeking out a man, she may have previously compromised her honor. Not only do women have to be willing to commit these attacks when they seek out terrorist male counterparts to help them, they also have to have a reason to put their honor in jeopardy. In the case of Palestinian female suicide bombers, a woman’s honor must have been irreversibly damaged in order for her to put her honor in danger of being destroyed.

Yoram Schweitzer maintained that female terrorists in the Palestinian Territories are not an intended strategic plan of terrorist organizations, but are merely being employed for tactical reasons. Thus men from these groups do not seek out women nor do they allow their active membership in these groups. In
essence, the implementation of women for terror attacks poses a fundamental religious obstacle for religious leaders, but women’s important tactical advantage overcomes these reservations. At Israeli checkpoints, where Israeli soldiers often rely on profiles factors to identify possible terrorists (including indicators like nervous body language and identification cards), Muslim women are seldom perceived to pose a violent threat toward Israeli targets. In Israel, only recently has the situation shifted to one where women are employed by terror groups and therefore pose a more substantial threat to Israeli civilians. There is a hesitancy to search women because of their modesty and the stereotypical view of women as non-violent. The dominant Western mentality of Israeli soldiers blinded them to the possibility of female attackers and subsequently suffered for this with the death of many Israelis. The Israeli Defense Forces are renowned for their women warriors, but Israel’s perception of Muslim culture did not factor in the use of Muslim women as human bombs. In response to this, female soldiers are now posted at checkpoints for the sole purpose of searching suspicious Palestinian women.

Tactically speaking, female suicide bombers have a substantial advantage in infiltrating checkpoints. Women provide low cost, low risk weapons for an organization’s cause. In terrorist organizations, men are trained and indoctrinated. Their training is an investment of money, effort, and resources; they are then used as leaders, soldiers, planners, and bomb makers (essentially a myriad of positions that make up any militant organization). On the other hand, desperate women have a distinct advantage as suicide bombers. Women are not given months of training, investment of weapons, or even trust. They are given minimal information about their operation, hence women are cost-effective. Terrorists will often ensure success of their mission by equipping the women not only with suicide vests, but also a separate detonator in the hands of another member should she change her mind. Thus the advantage of using female bombers is undeniable. The use of women also creates a media sensation by the publication of their background stories and the brutality of the group that uses women. Indeed, female terrorists create a media stir in Israel and all over the world. When a woman blows herself up in Israel or Iraq, the media highlights the brutality of the event, acting as a monolithic advertisement for the organization that employs female terrorists. In a private interview with Schweitzer, he alluded to the fact that these women serve as a tactical advantage to terror organizations. Schweitzer also did not agree with Raphael Israeli’s assessment that these women are blowing themselves up for feminist goals.

Matriarchal Conservatism – An Alternative Theory

The study of Palestinian female suicide terrorists revolve around their role in Islam. By Western standards, “[Women] are depicted as existing on the margins of society, victimized to such as extent that it defies credibility that such individuals could continue to wage the heroic daily battle that many Arab Women in real life
undertake to survive” (Sabbagh 1996, xiii). These perceptions of female roles in Islam are slanted and untrue; most women, especially matriarchal conservatives, do not feel marginalized by their religion. Contrary to this, these women feel powerful and appreciate their status in the community as faithful, righteous Muslims.

The motivations of Palestinian female suicide bombers relate to a type of Arab feminism the author terms *matriarchal conservatism*, which is prevalent in the Palestinian Territories and similar areas like Iraq. By *matriarchal conservatism* I refer to an Arab/Muslim woman’s own idea of femininity, not in Western terms, but in Arab/Muslim ones. While Western feminists advocate gender equality in the division of labor, politics, and society, some Islamists believe that by presenting themselves publicly in a virtuous way, they sustain their role in society’s traditional structures (Fadwa 159, 1996). Matriarchal conservatism in Islamic discourse does not portray women as diminutive and second-class members of a family unit, but rather as central figures charged with the exceedingly important task of educating their children, especially their sons. Hence, matriarchal conservatism would deem Islamic values rather than Western ones the ultimate liberator. “Thus Islamist discourse refuses to identify the affirmation of the equality of men with women and of newly defined roles for women as having anything to do with liberation, as that term is defined in the West. Islam is seen as providing all of the rights and responsibilities appropriate for women. Islam is thus itself the liberating force that can be set in motion through the devoted adherence or both males and females” (Haddad and Smith 1996, 148). In keeping with matriarchal conservatism, these women will maintain their modesty and virtue for the sake of their honor and that of their families. The responsibility to sustain modesty, honor, and virtue is the central responsibility for matriarchs. Thus, these women will suffer the consequences if their honor is questioned, and will struggle to redeem it when lost. Such consequences may lead women to redeem honor for their families and themselves by perpetrating the most virtuous act, martyrdom. The author has developed one neglected explanation for the phenomenon of female suicide bombers, termed matriarchal conservatism. In short, the author contends that Islamic female suicide bombers are using a very unconventional method (female terrorism) to achieve a very conventional (or traditional) goal – the maintenance or restoration of *female* honor as it is defined by their communities.

*Matriarchal conservatism* does not relate to the Western conception of independent and socially equal women, but rather refers to the idea that Muslim women, in response to their culture, seek honor and status in a community that prizes righteousness, modesty, motherhood, and service to the Prophet Mohammad and the males in their lives. Indeed, the basic discourse in Islam is the rejection of the West and the conviction that “freedoms” enjoyed by Western women are among the key factors in the moral and ethical disintegration of Western societies. “Western sisters” are even depicted as outside of Islamic culture, traitorous for bringing shame upon their families and communities (Haddad and Smith 1996, 138-139). Matriarchs believe that these freedoms enjoyed by Western women do
not liberate them, but instead subject them to the chauvinism of males in Western society (Haddad and Smith 1996). In the eyes of traditional Muslim women, their lives are not oppressive or miserable, and although Western perspectives may lead to the idea that these women are trying to rebel or change their way of life, Muslim women who become suicide bombers are probably not doing so to change the status quo for other women.

Today, political Islam has placed the issue of the roles and rights of women at the center of its agenda. The rhetoric of Islamist teaching, speaking, and writing makes it clear that the ways in which women act, dress, and behave themselves are crucial in the reconstruction of a new and authentically Islamic society (Fadwa 1996, 159). However, there are some women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip who are trying to change the way of life for women in their community to fit a more Western construction of femininity. Women’s committees were founded in the late 1970s and early 1980s and are considered the foundation of the Palestinian women’s movement. The Women’s Work Committee was among the first Palestinian feminist organizations in which the women of WWC produced material and design projects that are now relevant to the daily experiences and struggles of women outside urban centers. Indeed, groups like the WWC and other groups affiliated with them [i.e. the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) which was organized in response to the first intifada, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Union of Palestinian Working Women’s Committee (UPWWC)] have been created to propel female initiatives in the Palestinian Territories, and yet none have committed much less involved themselves in terrorist attacks (Sharoni 1995, 65). These groups are to their Western counterparts, yet none of these organizations use terrorists or suicide bombers to promote their agenda.

The feminist movement in the Palestinian Territories has no relationship to matriarchal conservatism. Mira Tzoreff, a professor at Tel-Aviv University and expert in the social structure of Egyptian culture, believes this in true. While discussing female suicide bombers, Tzoreff contends that these women are committing suicide before they are committing acts of murder or violence. The female suicide bombers have been driven to suicide terror in order to reinstate their honor and the honor of their family in the community. For matriarchal conservatives, honor is the most important virtue of women. In one of the intifada leadership flyers, Palestinian mothers, sisters, and daughters are described as Palestinian manabit – plant nurseries – or as men producing factories. Their more honored purpose is to produce sons, but if their honor is destroyed or even in question, their status in the community is effectively ruined. Indeed, gossip (Kalaam Alnaas) can ruin the status of a woman in the Palestinian community without actually being guilty of any offense. Barbara Victor, a journalist who has interviewed Palestinian suicide bombers, believes that “Given the importance ascribed to honor within Palestinian society, it is no surprise that such a woman might consider it an honor to die for the sake of her
family” (Victor 2003, 199). In these Palestinian societies it is impossible to escape and leave your family and friends, because if you do, you are a disgrace, and the disgrace on your family is even greater (Victor 2003). The unmarried Palestinian woman today lives under a stringent set of social and religious rules; if she is too educated she is considered abnormal, if she looks at a man to whom she is not related she risks exclusion, if she refuses to marry she is deemed out of control, if she sleeps with a man or gets pregnant, she disgraces her family and risks death at the hands of her male relatives (Victor 2003). What follows are the stories of matriarchal conservatives who, subject to the demand of their own culture, have committed suicide and murder in an attempt to restore the honor of their families.

### Matriarchal Conservatives Data Set

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matriarchs</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Terrorist Group Affiliation</th>
<th>Feminist Group Affiliation</th>
<th>Personal Honor Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wafa Idris</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Dishonored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zina</td>
<td>Unmarried</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Tanzim</td>
<td>None</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darine Abu Aisha</td>
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<td>University</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayat Al-Akras</td>
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<td>None</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thouria Khamour</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wafa Al-Bas</td>
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<td>None</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Dishonored</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Above is a sample of Palestinian women who have committed or attempted to commit terror attacks in Israel. Although there are two instances where it is inconclusive whether or not these women have been dishonored in society, none of these women were affiliated with any terror organization nor were these women feminists. What this sample proposes is that matriarchal conservatism does exist among past female suicide bombers. Moreover, this preliminary research should be considered the initial stages of future research that should be conducted in order to reveal matriarchal conservatism in Israel and possibly Iraq. Although it is possible that the motivations of Palestinian women that drive them to suicide terror in Palestine is not mono-causal, a sample that encompasses every attempted and successful female suicide bomber for Palestine will determine those theories. However, given the sampling of this data, culture and honor is undoubtedly an important factor that drives women to engage in terror.

**Conclusion**

The female suicide bombers in Iraq are subject to the same status quo as the Palestinian female suicide bombers in Israel. Honor is still prized above all else, women are subject to the deadly threat of gossip and the idea that they
can sacrifice their life in order to regain status for themselves and their families. Interviews with the family members of these women or with the male operatives who supplied these women with explosives are still needed to prove these theories. Putting aside Western normative opinions of Islamic honor, how does the United States thwart the use of female suicide bombers in Iraq? The aim of this research was that, by analyzing and understanding the motivations of these women, proper actions can be taken to keep these women from performing terror attacks. Women have tactical advantages for committing suicide attacks, like hiding a bomb under a hijab or abaya, the look of innocence to get through a checkpoint, and their inherent newsworthiness. If the American army created new policies by borrowing some of Israel’s tactics to thwart female terrorism, female suicide bombings might be reduced. A simple initiative like employing female soldiers at checkpoints can deter female terrorists, or American forces can support welfare and workers programs outside their original community specifically for women. If the stigma of self-sacrifice for honor is eliminated, and they are given the opportunity to be self-sustaining, these women may not feel forced into becoming terrorists. Indeed, an Iraqi psychiatrist who is familiar with the story of Rania Ibrahim, a female bomber in Iraq, says that “One of the things that could be done [to deter suicide attacks by women] is to trim the volume of women’s unemployment and provide varied jobs for them based on their education and qualifications (Iraq Updates 2008).”

In the Bamian province of Afghanistan, war has left women particularly vulnerable. For years the women in the Bamian province have been the victims of rape and abduction. Hundreds of thousands have been left as widows, mired in a desperate poverty, made worse under Taliban rule because they were not allowed to work or leave home unaccompanied by male relatives. Now women are driving cars, working in public offices and police stations, and sitting on local councils. Most of the people in this province are ethnic Hazaras, Shi’ite Muslims formerly opposed to women working outside the home now permit women to taken on new roles in society to satisfy labor demands. Women are taking jobs as police officers and are seen taking driving lessons, proving it is possible to give opportunities to the women in Iraq. If women are given opportunities elsewhere they may not feel as trapped to redeem their honor by becoming suicide bombers. Giving these women jobs may initially irritate the community, but like the village in Afghanistan, the men will adapt to the new situation due to the overwhelming need for labor and income. Thus, if American forces supplied the women in Iraq with labor or refugee programs outside their villages, women may not have to resort to suicide terror. In fact, it had been found that the higher percentage of women in a country’s labor force, the fewer the number of Islamist terror attacks (Robison et al. 2006). In essence, the women who lose honor in their community, if given the opportunity to leave, may choose welfare programs over suicide.

Matriarchal Conservatism is a paradigm within Islamic culture. These Muslim women choose to commit suicide and murder, a fundamental sin in Islam, in order to redeem honor in the very religious communities in which they live.
American perception has often resembled the idea that “Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned,” where women commit attacks for nationalism, anger, or perhaps equality, whereas the opposite is true. Matriarchal conservatives prize their honor and therefore suffer from its fragile nature. As a result, terrorist organizations recognize this opportunity and will refine their use of female bombers if given the opportunity. Therefore, if matriarchal conservatives are susceptible to the plotting of male-dominated terrorist organizations, counter-terrorism policy needs to also focus on women. We cannot assume that matriarchal conservative women want to live as Americans, with the same cultural norms such as equality and social freedom. Matriarchal conservatives prize their traditional role in society and are not demoralized by fitting into its complex structure. The presence of female suicide bombers in martial environments challenges our ill-conceived notions of Arab feminists. Often we perceive Arab women as submissive participants in domestic and social life, the existence of matriarchal conservatives, however, changes these conceptions of female involvement in warfare and by extension, challenges the roles of Arab women in feminism and warfare.

ENDNOTES

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6 (Beyler 2003)
9 (Merari 1993, 206-207)
12 (Israeli 2004, 66)
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Graduate Unemployment in China: Motivations, Results, and Implications

Mutian Liu

The rapid rise of graduate unemployment has been one unintended consequence of China’s efforts to raise levels of post-secondary education. The implementation of Projects 211 and 985 in the mid-1990s disproportionately directed state finances towards a few select world-class institutions while simultaneously diluting the quality of other universities. Combined with an abrupt increase in enrollment quotas in 1999, these policies resulted in an explosion in the number of college graduates and a subsequent decline in the ability of recent graduates to find suitable employment. The implications of this trend are enormous—growing numbers of technologically savvy, educated, and dissatisfied youth create an explosive potential for political unrest. Moreover, the low value of many Chinese diplomas on the international market as well as growing levels of corruption in academia continue to pose significant threats to China’s higher education system. The Chinese government has implemented a number of stopgap measures, but without solving the root causes of over-enrollment and falling education quality, graduate unemployment will remain a serious problem for years to come.

OVERVIEW

In recent years, the number of Chinese graduates has risen dramatically. From 1995 to 2008, the number of graduates has increased more than five-fold from 926,000 to 6.07 million per year. Though this may be an indicator of China’s successful educational reform, the expansion has also created severe problems ranging from mass unemployment to degradation of educational quality. The intensification of reforms began in 1999 when the rate of growth suddenly rose to 47%. What was the motivation behind such a sudden increase? Why did the government not accommodate this change? And more importantly, how is China going to manage the situation while recovering from the 2008 financial crisis? This paper attempts to answer these questions by examining the reform’s motivations, results, and implications. In short, allured by temporary stability and economic growth, the Chinese government intensified Projects 211 & 985 to expand student enrollment without making adequate adjustments to the market and the education system. As a result, China is plagued by an oversupply of graduates and is suffering the consequences. Ultimately, to maintain regime stability in both the short- and long-run, China must take initiatives to ameliorate graduate unemployment, not

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only by addressing its symptoms but also by resolving its underlying causes, dating back to the 1999 policy.

**THE 1999 EDUCATIONAL EXPANSION**

The Chinese reform experience started in 1978 with Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power. Education reform was an essential element, as Deng’s four modernizations depended heavily on intellectual advancements. Despite this commitment, the government took a gradualist approach. Up until 1998, growth averaged roughly 30,000 new graduates per year, with the 1.16 million graduates of that year comprising 9.8% of their age group.² Then, in 1999, the government suddenly adopted a plan to reach 15% enrollment by 2010³. The “15%” can be traced to Martin Trow’s definition of “mass higher education,” in which 15% of the youth segment enrolls in higher education⁴. But why did the government abruptly increase the quota in 1999? One possible answer is that the government changed its plan for economic development by shifting the focus of human capital from manufacturing to services. This perspective is especially compelling considering most leading economies followed similar paths. Under this plan, China strategically acted to alter its labor force in preparation for the future. Indeed, in 1995, the Chinese leadership initiated Project 211, aimed to elevate 100 Chinese universities to elite status⁵. Yet this explanation fails to answer why no efforts were made to accommodate the future effects of this new initiative, as discussed later.

Another view is that the government was pressured into the decision, as some evidence seems to suggest. According to Li Lixu, the immediate rationale in 1999 had more to do with boosting short-term economic performance than fostering long-term factors of production⁶. The initiative aimed to spark domestic consumption through increased enrollment to ameliorate a slow economy caused by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis⁷ (tuition increases alone were supposed to boost GDP by 0.5%⁸). Furthermore, the conditions seemed ripe for reform according to several indicators: GDP per capita increased from 381 RMB in 1978 to 7,159 RMB in 1999⁹; from 1995 to 1999, the proportion of educational spending for urban families increased from 8.84% to 10.05%¹⁰, reflecting the belief in a high rate of return and increased demand for education¹¹; and the maturation of students born under the one child policy occurred, resulting in more RMB spent per child than previous generations.

Another motive for increasing the graduation quota regards efforts to address unemployment. Due to State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) reforms, China faced a record-breaking 6.52 million unemployed in 1999¹². Compounding the problem, over 3 million secondary students were set to graduate. Thus, the government had to alleviate this pressure by expanding higher education, which effectively placed a four year reprieve on job creation by retaining students through education and preserved an estimated 5-6 million positions for the unemployed¹³. The government also hoped this stimulus would spill over to other sectors and increase popular support by providing additional educational opportunities.
Viewed from this perspective, it seemed natural for the government to intensify its efforts in 1999. Indeed, the government succeeded in many areas: higher education expanded, the economy recovered, unemployment failed to become a major problem, and consumption increased. Unfortunately, one assumption did not hold true. The economic environment in 2003 (when the students graduated) worsened, making efforts to curb unemployment more difficult. Unfortunately, Chinese leadership focused more on its short-term need for stability and failed to accommodate a spike in the number of graduates four years later as its optimistic projections proved to be false.

**How did the policies actually work?**

By 1999, Chinese leadership had implemented three policies designed to expand its educational system: increasing GDP expenditure through Project 211, decentralizing governance through Project 985, and transferring private savings to consumption.

*Project 211 – Consolidation and State Finance*

In 1995, the government began Project 211 in an effort to establish 100 “world-class” universities in the 21st century. Since Chinese universities (even those considered elite) were often deemed inadequate on the world stage – as evidenced by university rankings – the government initiated the program amid rising globalization and increasing demand for skilled workers. The government took two steps to implement this program: consolidation of Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) and augmentation of central finance.

From 1952 to 1978, China imitated the Soviet model of central planning for HEIs, which “departmentalized, segmented and overspecialized [subjects]; teaching was separated from research.” This trend persisted even after reforms in 1985 to marketize higher education by shifting fees to students. As early as 1993, the government began to consolidate HEIs to address the problem of excessive differentiation between teaching and research. The initiative was formalized as Project 211, which coincided with the Ninth/Tenth Five-Year Plan from 1996 to 2005. Though Project 211 was started in 1995, the government began to intensify its efforts starting in 1998. The effect was immediate—by 2000, 556 HEIs had merged into 232 HEIs. While the number of HEIs fluctuated around 1,050 from 1993 to 2000 (the expansion of HEIs offsetting the consolidation), average enrollment per HEI increased significantly from 2,381 to 5,342, indicating systematic consolidation.

![Graph 1](image-url)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of HEIs</th>
<th>Total Enrolment (*10k)</th>
<th>New Enrolment (*10k)</th>
<th>Average Enrollment Per HEI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1065</td>
<td>253.6</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>2381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>279.9</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>290.6</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>2757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1032</td>
<td>302.1</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>2927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>317.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>340.9</td>
<td>108.4</td>
<td>3336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1071</td>
<td>413.4</td>
<td>159.7</td>
<td>3860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1041</td>
<td>556.09</td>
<td>220.61</td>
<td>5342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1225</td>
<td>719.07</td>
<td>268.28</td>
<td>5.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1396</td>
<td>903.36</td>
<td>320.5</td>
<td>6.471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1552</td>
<td>1108.6</td>
<td>382.2</td>
<td>7.143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to these efforts, the Chinese leadership also sought to increase central government funding. According to the Ministry of Education, “The central authorities have decided to increase the proportion of education in government expenditure by 1% every year during the five-year period from 1998 to 2002”21, as illustrated by Graph 122. Though there is little evidence that schools benefited from economies of scale and increased expenditure, the result is clear: universities increased in size and admitted more students.

**Project 985 – Decentralization and Expansion**

Alongside Project 211, Project 985 came into existence at the urging of Jiang Zemin on May 4th, 1998 at the 100th anniversary of the founding of Beijing University23. This project was designed to supplement Project 211 in achieving elite status by focusing on specific universities (originally just Beijing University and Tsinghua University; later expanded to 9 universities in 1998 and 39 in 200424). In other words, similar to the state-owned enterprise reform mantra of “grasp the big, let go the small,” the central government formalized and accelerated HEI decentralization by narrowing down the list of HEIs managed by central organizations from 1022 to 120 (roughly the number of “world class” HEIs), and shifted 896 HEIs to local management25. As a result of this decrease
in central funding, it would seem logical for local governments to cut back enrollment—yet the opposite occurred, for decentralization also increased local control and decreased central oversight. Governments overloaded existing HEIs and established new HEIs to: 1. Meet central mandates by expanding enrollment, 2. Cover budgetary shortfalls by raising tuition, 3. Maximize personal gains by imposing fees. As a result, the number of HEIs increased over time, from 1041 (2000) to 1552 (2003) to 2263 (2008)\textsuperscript{26}. However, this expansion was not only limited to the public sector, and the private sector also experienced growth.

“民办” – “People Managed”/Private HEIs

As the name suggests, 民办 HEIs are universities managed and financed by the “people.” This is somewhat vague, as ownership structures differ for these HEIs across the country, with sources of finance ranging from charities to private investments to state-owned enterprise appropriation funds\textsuperscript{27}. However, the defining characteristic of these HEIs is that the schools do not receive any type of direct government funding (local or central), as the government aims to shift portions of Chinese savings into consumption through projects 211 & 985. By reducing central funds to non-“world-class” universities and increasing local control over HEIs, the central government reduced the quality of these institutions and encouraged entrepreneurs to fill this niche. In effect, this accelerated the marketization of education at the cost of quality in the short-run. As Graph 1 shows, there is a steady increase in the non-budgetary (i.e. private) spending as a ratio of net educational expenditure to GDP until 1998 – 1999. This seems contradictory, yet a plausible explanation is that despite the rise in non-budgetary spending, government expenditure on education has increased dramatically since 1998 to overshadow the effects of private contribution\textsuperscript{28}. This argument is further strengthened when examining the total number of private HEIs. From 1997 to 2002, the number of certified private HEIs increased from 20 to 133\textsuperscript{29}. Even in the private sphere, enrollment figures increased due to the government’s encouragement.

**Result**

Through these policy initiatives, the central government increased control over “world-class” HEIs, focused spending on these top institutions, and expanded non-centrally funded HEIs. These initiatives prioritized certain HEIs at the cost of equality, resonating with Deng’s reform philosophy of “allowing some to get rich first.” Indeed, this was the official interpretation for these projects, as a document suggests “…the goals of the investment methodology for the ‘211 Project,’ aim to ‘collect the wealth, highlight the importance’ based on the domestic universities’ prestige and academics, and support these schools, by avoiding [educational] equality” \textsuperscript{30}. This principle has been carried out in action. As of 2008, “‘211 Project’ schools take on the responsibility of training 4/5 of doctoral students, 2/3 of graduate students, 1/2 of students abroad and 1/3 of undergraduates. They offer 85 percent of the State's key subjects, hold 96 percent of the State's key
laboratories, and utilize 70 percent of scientific research funding.” While Project 211 consolidated existing universities into “world-class” HEIs and increased their funding in order to create elite Chinese universities and produce leaders for the 21st century, Project 985 decentralized higher education, focused those resources to “world class” HEIs, and expanded the number of non-“world-class” HEIs. This precipitated a significant rise in the absolute quality of HEIs, but decreased their average quality as central funding faltered for local schools amid rising enrollment. On the other hand, the projects had the positive externality of creating a niche for private universities that are becoming more visible in higher education, presenting a possible alternative to public education. Yet with limited funding, these schools require time to develop before competing against the public “world-class” schools for recognition.

**Implications**

The effects of Projects 211 & 985 became highly visible, resulting in an explosion of enrollment in higher education. As predicted, this short-term solution revitalized the stagnating economy and reduced unemployment. However, the leadership was incorrect in its belief that its problems would be easier to deal with in 2003. Coupled with the 2008 financial crisis, the dramatic rise of a series of issues has caused serious concerns for China’s political stability. The problems associated with short-sighted educational reform have begun to surface, and the Chinese government faces significant challenges in three areas: graduate unemployment, the weakness of Chinese diplomas, and structural inefficiency.

**Tensions of Unemployment**

The rising unemployment rate is China’s most pressing issue, yet it is only in recent years that graduate unemployment has made headlines. According to 2006 statistics, the percentage of graduates citing “Unemployment after Graduation” as a reason for unemployment reached 43.3%, 60.6%, and 63.6% for vocational, bachelor, and post-bachelor programs, respectively. The recent financial crisis exacerbated the situation – in a survey conducted in February 2009, less than 20% of graduates found jobs, in contrast with 50-60% two years ago. With 6.1 million graduates entering the job market annually and an official figure of 30% of them entering unemployment, an estimated 1.8 million graduates will remain unemployed. This figure only accounts for 2009 graduates, and does not reflect aggregate unemployment, which could number 5 million. This trend is highly problematic because graduates tend to concentrate in large cities with unrealistic expectations of attaining “gold-collar” jobs. This buildup of students led to the emergence of “settlement villages” (聚居村) outside the city proper (collectively known as the “ant tribe” (蚁族)), which offer low rent and easy access to major cities. In 2009, it is estimated that in addition to native unemployed graduates, there are 1 million unemployed graduates living in such towns, with 95.3% born after 1980. This is a particularly acute problem, as these students are educated,
idealistic, vocal, technologically savvy, and active in the political arena\textsuperscript{39}. Their characteristics directly contrast with those of other unemployed groups (i.e. floating population, urban unemployed, etc.), yet all parties share the same woes stemming from the reforms. This combination of complementary skills, appeal to both urban and rural populations, large size, and the ability to reach critical mass creates a dangerously explosive situation.

\textit{“Made in China”}

As with many products produced in China, Chinese diplomas, especially those from non-world-class schools, have low value in the global job market. As a result, many students suffer “underemployment,” as they neither qualify for high-end positions nor are satisfied with unskilled labor. Less than 10\% of China’s labor force is qualified to work for multinational companies, which typically hold higher employment standards. This quality issue creates problems for China when it tries to compete internationally. For example, in 2005, China trained 1.6 million engineers. However, only 160,000 are suitable for multinationals, equaling the number of engineers the U.K. supplies\textsuperscript{40}. As China integrates into the world economy, multinationals become more important—not only for the higher wages they pay, but also for their ability to absorb graduates. From 2003 to 2008, it is estimated that large multinationals employed 750,000 graduate students, while China supplied 1.2 million suitable candidates\textsuperscript{41} out of 30.5 million total graduates\textsuperscript{42}. This means that large multinationals alone can employ roughly 60\% of the talent. The other 40\% is obviously not enough for Chinese companies and smaller multinationals. China faces both an oversupply of under-qualified applicants and a dearth of qualified graduates. In the years ahead, this problem will impact the economy by slowing foreign investment and increasing opportunity costs as Chinese diplomas continue to lose reputation.

\textit{Corruption in Education}

The self-perpetuating problem of inefficient resource allocation among non-“world-class” HEIs also causes concern. Unlike the elite HEIs, these schools lack the proper funding to educate students effectively. In order to improve this condition, officials resort to increasing enrollment, which in turn requires even more funding. The funding problem coupled with educational corruption has caused several problems. In recent years, sparks of tension have surfaced: in 2007, riots broke out at Hefei People’s Liberation Army Artillery Academy because officials refused to certify diplomas\textsuperscript{43}; in 2006, violence ensued at Clothing Vocational College in Jiangxi when officials failed to credit the students for graduation\textsuperscript{44}; also in 2006, students protested against Shengda University in Henan for downgrading their academic credentials\textsuperscript{45}. In addition to administrative corruption, the lack of oversight also encourages students to pursue dishonest means and threatens intellectual integrity. Without the institutionalization of meritocracy in academia, students are more likely to cheat the system (i.e. by pursuing \textit{guanxi}—abusing
personal connections) than to legitimately work toward achieving their goals. This not only hurts higher education by rewarding “privilege” over “talent,” but also misrepresents students’ values in the job market. Hence, rampant corruption and lack of regulation present a multi-faceted problem by diluting existing diplomas, distorting market signals of qualifications, and decreasing efficiency in allocation of human capital. This poses an economic issue as well as a moral dilemma.

**Necessary Improvements for China’s Future**

Amid the problems currently confronting the Chinese leadership, educated unemployment is becoming increasingly scrutinized and conspicuous. Yet the government still has some room to maneuver. Most graduates are not yet desperate due to their economic cushions, and are more likely to lower their expectations than mobilize. This is reflected in the lack of reported protests against the Chinese Communist Party. So far, students are not directly blaming the government; instead, they are channeling their anger toward local officials for corruption as well as toward themselves for not achieving their goals. For example, despite frustration, “settlement village” members are content with their struggles, for they believe it is a necessary phase before they succeed. In addition, the government is more receptive to students’ complaints than to those of other groups, due to their socio-economic background. Sharp social stratification and differentiation among the graduates also make mobilization difficult. Despite the high unemployment rate, many students do find appropriate jobs and are likely to support the government if protests break out.

In addition, the government is fully aware of and is taking steps to address the problem by adopting three strategies. First, the government aims to better match abilities with opportunities by establishing trainee programs. In Shanghai, the government is providing 30,000 intern positions for up to 12 months to raise individuals’ qualifications. Secondly, other programs attempt to adjust the graduates’ expectations. These initiatives include promoting students to local party posts and using them to develop less populated areas in the inner and western provinces. Some plans have been successful – in Shanxi, 10,000 students were given leadership posts – while others such as the “Go West” project have seen more limited gains – only 1,175 students volunteered from Chongqing, Hebei, Hunan, and Shanghai combined. Finally, the government is continuing its old strategy of extending access to education by increasing the quota for masters’ degrees by 5% and PhDs by 1.7% in 2009. Though many initiatives have been taken, their success seems doubtful as they treat only symptoms of graduate unemployment, not its underlying cause.

**Conclusion**

The 1978 reforms initiated by Deng aimed to improve the aggregate wealth of China, and reforms in higher education have had similar goals. The expansion of the higher education system was fairly gradual until 1999, when
Chinese leadership decided to stimulate the economy and reduce post-secondary unemployment by increasing enrollment and expanding HEIs. To achieve its goals, the government accelerated Projects 211 & 985 to increase funding for world-class schools, decentralize control of education to local governments, and encourage private consumption. Though the plan initially achieved its goals – the economy rebounded – subsequent consequences have been severe: unemployment, corruption, waste of resources, and degradation of educational quality. Combined with unemployment in other demographic groups (namely the floating population and laid-off urban workers) unemployed college graduates further endanger China’s stability by potentially providing organizational skills, technological outreach, access to resources, and a politically active frame of mind. This creates a highly explosive unemployment situation, as each demographic group supplements the other, crossing the socio-economic divide. The government is aware of the situation and has taken actions to alleviate the problem by providing job opportunities and furthering education. However, these reforms are inadequate, as they do not fully correct the problems of falling educational quality and organized corruption, nor do they reverse the initial decision to forcefully expand higher education. Until national mandates are issued to reduce graduate quotas and increase educational quality, China will continue to face serious problems regarding graduate unemployment.

ENDNOTES

13 Bai, Limin, 132.
14 Ibid, 9.
17 Bai, Limin, 129.
19 Li, Lixu, 15.
22 Chow, Gregory C., and Yan Shen, 2.
23 Li, Lixu, 17.
27 Yan, Fengqiao, and Xiaoying Lin, 96.
28 Chow, Gregory C., and Yan Shen, 3.
29 Yan, Fengqiao, and Xiaoying Lin, 29.
32 “接受教育程度，性别分的城镇失业人员失业员应构成.” 2006 年劳动力抽样
38 蔡思, 蚁族, 第3节.
39 Zhao, Litao, and Yanjie Huang, 7.
41 Ibid, 74.
47 蔡思, 蚁族，第15-17节.
48 Zhao, Litao, and Yanjie Huang, i.
49 Ibid, 9.
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“Number of Schools by Level and Type by Level and Type of Schools.” *All China Data Center*. China Data Online. Web. <http://chinadataonline.org/member/macroy/macrowtshow.asp?code=A1401>.


“Thus the Samadh was perfect/Thus was the lesson plain/Of the wrath of the First Shikaris/The price of the white man slain.../Then a silence came to the river/A hush fell on the shore/And Bohs that were brave departed/And Sniders squibbed no more/For the Burmans said/That a white man’s head/Must be paid for with heads five-score”

- Rudyard Kipling, “The Grave of the Hundred Head”

Navigating the Blackwater: Private Security Contractors and Iraqi Counterinsurgency
Alexa Hoyne

In May of 2003, President George W. Bush proclaimed an end to combat operations in Iraq. More than six years later, the United States remains immersed in a conflict marred by an overreliance on private contractors. This paper examines the United States’ use of private security contractors (PSCs) in Iraq, specifically evaluating how their existence impacts our overall counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. After offering a brief history of the evolution of PSC use, the paper highlights a number ongoing issues associated with PSCs in Iraq, namely the dearth of oversight, transparency, and coordination with the military. While acknowledging that the use of PSCs is not necessarily at odds with COIN strategy, the paper argues that they will significantly hinder U.S. efforts in Iraq without dramatic reforms.

On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush fervently proclaimed Iraq a success. He declared, “With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians. No device of man can remove the tragedy from war. Yet it is a great advance when the guilty have far more to fear from war than the innocent.” Indeed, Bush’s rhetoric conjures up imagery of a noble cause, one in which Iraq is liberated by American soldiers possessing an inherent (or perhaps technologically-driven) ability to distinguish between tribal sheikh and terrorist, innocent and insurgent. What transpires, however, when the manifest lines between soldier and civilian become blurred on both sides of the battlefield? Six years later, the United States remains embroiled in a conflict where unparalleled reliance on private contractors has created a murky sinkhole in which our own accountability, transparency, and successful application of counterinsurgency have become just as nebulous as the often indistinguishable identities of the enemies themselves.

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Although the United States’ use of private contractors has vastly expanded to include a seemingly all-encompassing range of duties, this paper will focus exclusively on the role of armed private security contractors (PSCs), with the hope that the resulting conclusions may render broader applications as well. The paper will scrutinize private security contractors as the quintessence of America’s military-industrial-Congressional complex in Iraq. While it will attempt to provide a balanced portrayal of the rationale behind the use of PSCs in an insurgent environment, the paper will ultimately characterize these contractors as an arm of national security, which, at least in its manner of implementation, has been of significant detriment to American counterinsurgency strategy (COIN). Devoid of stringent governmental processes for compliance, military-civilian coordination, legal retribution, or transparency, PSCs have been operating for years within a virtually opaque no-man’s-land. The ensuing analysis of the United States’ use of PSCs in Iraq will be juxtaposed against the finer points of COIN to implicate both American PSCs and the government itself in a complex web of mutual incompetence with regard to the battle for hearts and minds. The resulting situation is quite divergent from that projected back in May of 2003, and can only be remedied through active collaboration among federal, military, and private sectors to include a multilateral legal framework of operation, an emphasis on cultural training and enhanced PSC-employment of Iraqi nationals, the prohibited outsourcing of oversight, and a subsequent Congressionally-mandated body to regularly oversee compliance.

**How Did We Get Here?: The Evolution of PSCs**

The United States’ use of private contractors is not a particularly novel development, having been extant since our country’s very inception. As early as the Revolutionary War, General George Washington relied on private groups of citizens to provide logistical support to his rag-tag army. His success, one might argue, was at least partially derived from the efforts of these unofficial “private contractors,” representing roughly 14% of the total revolutionary force.² From this point forward, the United States’ use of private contractors became increasingly prolific, with regard to both quantity and diversity of assignments. Aside from merely logistical support, contractors began to take on a wide spectrum of responsibilities including weapons production and pilot training.³ Despite this seemingly omnipresent existence throughout history, the use of private contractors skyrocketed in the years following the Vietnam War and the Cold War. Advancements in weaponry and other military technologies necessarily demanded the enhanced presence in theater of contractors possessing specialized skill-sets.⁴

In addition, as Department of State Political Advisor Matthew Sherman points out, changes in “the makeup of the armed forces itself” following the Cold War only made the need for contractors more pressing. With the elimination of the Soviet Union as the United States’ primary adversary, Sherman explains, the
size of our army greatly diminished. Nevertheless, the need for military action did not vanish quite as definitively as anticipated and American involvement in numerous “small-scale conflicts” such as that in the Gulf War, Somalia, and Yugoslavia necessitated rapid deployments of more pairs of boots than we had to spare. With the military already stretched thin, contractors stepped in to ease some of the strain and offer “services that the military was not well set up to provide.” While these privatized services did at times include security, the nature of the current Iraqi conflict has necessitated a shift in the overall character of these security responsibilities.

Evolving from their predominant roles in assistance with military training in Haiti (1994) and the Balkans (1995), PSCs in Iraq have taken on the armed responsibilities of “static security, convoy security, security escorts, and personal security details.” Within the first initial weeks of conflict, both the Department of Defense and the Department of State recognized that they simply did not possess enough resources or personnel to maintain an adequate and effective operational presence. The first major security contract (to the tune of $53 million) in Iraq was awarded to Blackwater Worldwide in 2003 to ensure the security of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Headquarters and the personal protection of Paul Bremer at the CPA’s head. Founded by former NAVY Seal Erik Prince in 1967, Blackwater’s reputation as an able-bodied group of “former military, intelligence, and law enforcement personnel” was only further solidified with the success it wielded in its responsibilities under DOD. Accordingly, Blackwater’s contract with the DOD was switched over to the Department of State in 2004, when the opening of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad added enhanced security requirements. Faced with the sudden expansive need to protect diplomatic personnel, State’s previously initiated Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) contract with DynCorp was no longer provisionally adequate. As a mechanism toward further institutionalizing its anticipated need for unwavering PSC support, DOS instituted the WPPS II contract in 2005, a five-year $1.2 billion contract which established DynCorp, Blackwater, and Triple Canopy as the foremost DOS-sanctioned PSC presences in Iraq. The DOD relied primarily on EOD Technologies, and the British-based Aegis Defense and ArmorGroup contractors for its security needs, which largely consisted of static and internal security, as well as security oversight. Aegis, in particular, was “awarded a $293 million, three-year contract in 2004 to serve as a coordination hub for over fifty other PSC firms operating in Iraq.”

For merely comprising anywhere from 4-6% of the overall contracting force in Iraq, PSCs clearly possess an inordinate amount of responsibility and generate an enormous financial burden. An August 2008 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study, for instance, reports costs ranging from $6 to $10 billion between the years of 2003-2007. In a country where insurgents could potentially hide around any corner, heavily-armed PSCs have been utilized in major operational endeavors for one of the first times in history, raising enormous
questions over proper rules of force for civilians.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, according to the same CBO report, “CENTCOM’s census reports that about three-quarters of the 7,300 PSC personnel working for DoD in Iraq carry weapons. A similar proportion of armed personnel probably holds for all other PSCs in Iraq.”\textsuperscript{17} Despite PSCs’ comparatively small statistical prevalence, the magnitude of their roles and potential for interaction with local Iraqis render their actions inextricably tied to U.S. successes and failures in theater.\textsuperscript{18} Just as the military was forced to strategically adapt from conventional warfare to counterinsurgency within Iraq, so, too, were PSCs challenged to acclimate accordingly to the insurgent environment in order to ensure the safety of U.S. government property and personnel. In practical terms, these tactical shifts on both the military and the private side had the perhaps unintended (or at least unforeseen) effect of awarding civilian security contractors an unprecedented amount of freedom while simultaneously cultivating a severe dearth in federal oversight.\textsuperscript{19} While by no means unilaterally abused, this freedom has manifested itself in a number of ways that have had deleterious effects on U.S. mission in Iraq.

\textbf{Counterinsurgency Considerations}

Juxtaposed against a more elusive enemy in Iraq, the United States has been palpably thrust out of its comfort zone. Our enemies possess neither concrete identities nor demarcated boundaries and are instead embedded within complex networks among the \textit{populations} themselves.\textsuperscript{20} A successful campaign in Iraq necessitates a counterinsurgency strategy that strives to win over the hearts and minds of the citizenry rather than confront them with overwhelming and pervasive force.\textsuperscript{21} Such an approach will inevitably involve offensive strategies that still manage to command respect from local populations – strategies that work to “make securing the civilian, rather than destroying the enemy, [the military’s] top priority.”\textsuperscript{22} It is perhaps in this way that counterinsurgency operations differ so fundamentally from conventional warfare. As Sarah Sewall’s introduction to the newly-revised Counterinsurgency Field Manual states, “In this context, killing the civilian is no longer just collateral damage. The harm cannot be easily dismissed as unintended. Civilian casualties tangibly undermine the counterinsurgent’s goals.”\textsuperscript{23} Embedded within an environment in which the insurgency is camouflaged by the general population from whom it actively recruits, the United States is faced with an exceptional need to remain in good favor with the local Iraqis. Indeed, as the manual itself proclaims, the “primary objective of any COIN operation” is to cultivate legitimacy amongst the people:

\begin{quote}
Though firmness by security forces is often necessary to establish a secure environment, a government that exceeds accepted local norms and abuses its people... generates resistance to its rule. People who have been maltreated or have had close friends or relatives killed... may strike back at their attackers. Security force abuses... can be major escalating
\end{quote}
factors for insurgencies. 

Operating within an already-delicate security situation, the United States’ margin for error is quite miniscule; with every citizen who turns against our efforts, the prospects for failure grow at an exponential rate. The Iraqi citizens “often [do] not distinguish” between military personnel and PSCs. In their eyes, an American with a gun is an American with a gun. In this regard, even conceding some of the benefits of private security contractors in a counterinsurgency theater of war cannot excuse one mere instance of unprovoked violence against civilians or blatant disregard for cultural considerations. The battle is won and lost with each local interaction.

**BLACKWATER IS NOT NECESSARILY OPAQUE: THE BENEFITS OF PSCS**

Despite their potentially fatal ramifications, the difficulties with private security contractors in a counterinsurgency environment are not necessarily inevitable. In fact, much of the theory behind the enhanced use of PSCs in Iraq correlates quite well with the intricacies of COIN strategy. Primarily, as the COIN Manual states, “successful COIN operations often require a high ratio of security forces to the protected population… COIN is manpower intensive.” Short of reinstating the draft, the United States’ ability to maintain an intensive diplomatic or military security presence in Iraq would be severely compromised if not completely eradicated without the use of PSCs. U.S. government officials who were personal recipients of PSC security details in Iraq frequently praise the contractors for their effective security practices, many noting that the PSCs provided them with confidence to continue about their jobs. As an Inspector General report from late 2008 proclaims, “State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security had been ‘highly effective in ensuring the safety’ of diplomatic personnel in Iraq. There have been no casualties among U.S. diplomatic and civilian officials protected by contractors under the bureau’s supervision.”

Paul Bremer himself has publicly acclaimed Blackwater’s personal security services as witnessed during his tenure as head of CPA, often citing the failure of an assassination attempt in 2003 as an instance in which he felt extremely protected and reassured. In addition to an emphasis on extreme amounts of manpower, the COIN manual also places a great premium on a strategy revolving around relentless situational awareness and an unwavering capacity for flexibility. Boiled down to a short catch-phrase, successful COIN operations are grounded in a cycle of “learning and adaptation.” Commanders must be prepared to alter their strategic approaches at a moment’s notice, in an effort to adjust “better and faster than the insurgents” to constantly-shifting conditions on the ground; the strategy for one sector of society may not yield identical results for another. PSCs offer the military a swift malleability that is rather exceptional in a world where bureaucracy frequently doubles or triples lag-time. Operating under
contracts that can be formulated so as to allow for colossal surge capacity or hasty demobilization as the case may be, PSCs are also “recruited, vetted, hired, trained, and deployed in 90-120 days,” as opposed to the typical two-year time frame required of Department of State special agents.\(^{34}\) Amidst a realm where time can prove the tipping point in determining life or death, PSCs are thus immensely appealing.\(^{35}\) As a corollary, PSCs offer further flexibility with regard to recruitment, which largely occurs within databases organized around individuals with particular skill-sets: “Many of the PSCs such as Blackwater and Triple Canopy boast databases full of personnel with special operations backgrounds, just the kind of experience required for personal security details.”\(^{36}\) These characteristics of PSCs are invaluable in an environment that demands frequent strategic revision, as they allow the U.S. military to quickly meet its operational requirements.

Infused within the very core of counterinsurgency operations lies a ubiquitous requisite for cultural sensitivity; an occupying force cannot possibly cultivate legitimacy or garner support toward reconstructive efforts without displaying respect and command for cultural norms. Specificities of COIN aside, it is truly the capacity to win over the hearts and minds of the local population that will make or break an operation.\(^{37}\) It is in support of this fundamental COIN principle that some offer their most fervent support for PSCs in Iraq. Drew Erdmann, former Minister of Higher Education in post-Saddam Iraq, stated in the context of an interview on the subject: “Private contractors’ ability to hire local personnel allows for a lower profile, which only enhances everyone’s safety. Personally, I’d rather not be walking around Iraq guarded by a 6’2” white guy.”\(^{38}\) Along similar lines, the provision of jobs to unemployed Iraqis also “injects money into the local economy… and give[s] the U.S. a more sophisticated understanding of the local landscape” – both results that should have a beneficial effect on post-war reconstruction and legitimacy.\(^{39}\) Theoretically, therefore, the use of PSCs in Iraq should not be at odds with a counterinsurgency strategy and should, in fact, enhance it.

**WHAT WENT WRONG?: THE REALITIES OF PSCs IN IRAQ**

On 30 March, 2004, a Private Security Company Working Group (PSC WG) gathered in the Green Zone to discuss the projected future of PSC operations in Iraq. The minutes of the meeting contain a quote whose sentiments reverberate tragically in hindsight: “We are creating a private army on an unprecedented scale. It will be larger than coalition forces and will represent a force for good or harm depending on our insistence on the rule of law.”\(^{40}\) In an ironically heartbreaking twist of fate, the bodies of four Blackwater contractors were violently mutilated and dragged through the streets of Fallujah only the next day. Emergent details suggest that military-PSC coordination could have prevented the incident entirely.\(^{41}\) The image of the contractors’ mutilated bodies surrounded by impassioned insurgents is a tangible manifestation
of the divergence between PSC realities and their theoretical benefits to counterinsurgency.

Private security contractors have increasingly come into the limelight in a series of unwarranted and unmitigated displays of violence toward innocent Iraqi civilians. Between 2003 and 2006 alone, “there were over 300 reported cases of contracting mistakes or abuses in Iraq,” none of which were followed up on with any legal prosecution.\textsuperscript{42} In July of 2006, for instance, a Triple Canopy supervisor reportedly fired a series of unprovoked shots into two vehicles en route to the Baghdad Airport, with the shoddy justification that he “wanted to kill somebody before vacation.”\textsuperscript{43} Another 2006 abuse was the “Aegis ‘trophy video,’” featuring scenes that could only be described as emerging straight from the virtual realm of a shoot-em-up video game, quirky theme song and all.\textsuperscript{44} While no single PSC could justifiably be deemed most culpable, Blackwater’s internationally publicized incidents and highly visible role within Iraq rendered its reputation particularly tarnished.\textsuperscript{45} In December of 2006, an inebriated Blackwater contractor purportedly killed a high-profile Iraqi bodyguard within the Green Zone.\textsuperscript{46} In another shocking demonstration of deadly force, a “heavily armed Blackwater convoy” fired upon an array of Iraqi civilian vehicles and pedestrians in a crowded intersection in Nisour Square, killing 17 and wounding countless more.\textsuperscript{47} Despite contradictory accounts of the story from witnesses and Blackwater personnel, a number of both Iraqi and American investigations yielded conclusions that “labeled the shooting a ‘criminal event’” with “every indication of an excessive shooting.”\textsuperscript{48}

The resulting effects of incidents like Fallujah and Nisour Square are an accurate microcosmic representation of the harmful impact PSCs have cumulatively wrought on overall U.S. mission in Iraq. In a conflict relying so heavily on strategies that emphasize the “centrality of the civilian,” any instance in which locals observe contractors overstepping their bounds has a directly proportional effect on American’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{49} Fallujah, for instance, had been a city in which Marines had worked hard to cultivate trust among the populace. After the Blackwater convoy charged through the area without having coordinated with the military, however, the resulting violence led to an all-out assault on the city that obliterated the relationships the Marines had previously built.\textsuperscript{50} Nisour Square, too, is an example that illustrates the extent to which unprovoked violence begets greater violence, helping to fuel the very insurgency we are trying to quell. The incident ignited a heightened influx of anger that arguably contributed to political demands for the revocation of Blackwater’s license and the more general attrition of American military legitimacy.\textsuperscript{51} That Blackwater was later discovered to not even be operating under a legal license with the Iraqi government is only further indicative of the legal oblivion under which PSCs have been operating.\textsuperscript{52}

Although there are many honorable PSC personnel who are in no way haphazard killers, the fact remains that local Iraqis do not distinguish between
one contractor and another. As such, the populace is not likely to absolve any U.S. person, civilian or military, for the violent mistakes of even “as few as five Blackwater employees.” The 2007 Nisour Square event sparked a DOS-sponsored Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq, which concluded that “prompt measures needed to be taken to strengthen the coordination, oversight, and accountability aspects of the State Department’s security practices.” The only thing surprising about these fairly obvious conclusions is the time it took our government to reach them. Although the legal specificities regarding armed civilians is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth at least acknowledging that the overall legality of PSC use has been called into question under military rules of engagement. Perhaps as a result of this already murky existence, the activities of armed PSCs do not fall under any solidified legal precedent, unlike their military counterparts who are subject to both the watchful eye of commanders and a series of rigid legal stipulations. The result is a hazy situation in which PSC activities might hypothetically fall under four different legal codes: Iraqi law (though Bremer’s CPA Order 17 made contractors immune from Iraqi legal retribution), U.S. federal law, Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). As PSCs blur the line between civilian and armed combatant the instant they pick up a weapon, few U.S. authorities can agree as to how (or even if) these legal options apply. Consequently, as a September 2008 GAO Report concluded, PSCs have historically faced astonishing legal impunity. Even those individuals implicated in events like the drunken killing of an Iraqi bodyguard have been merely extricated from the country and replaced without further investigation. Although some of the Blackwater contractors involved in the Nisour Square shooting will be brought up on manslaughter charges in February 2010, the company itself was back in operation within four days of the incident. Such inaction creates enormous hypocrisy; we cannot feasibly expect Iraqis to follow “rule of law and [respect for] human rights when we ourselves cannot.”

Aside from operating under legal oblivion, PSC contravention of COIN strategy is also derived from a coordination gap that exists not only between the military and the private sector, but also between branches of the federal government itself. Prior to December 2007, there existed no unified policy toward PSCs between the DOD and the DOS, despite both departments’ heavy reliance on these civilian contracts. Perhaps most appalling when considered in the context of on-the-ground operational realities, however, is the substandard communication between PSC convoys and military commanders. Devoid of any institutionalized apparatus for tracking PSC movements, the military “[was] forced to coordinate with PSCs informally… [which] led to confrontations between coalition forces and PSCs, a situation referred to as ‘blue on white engagements.’” Friendly fire, however, was not necessarily the most lethal result of communication problems. The U.S. Embassy’s failure to relay timely information to PSCs created a void of “situational awareness” that increased
the likelihood of an unsuspecting PSC convoy venturing into a dangerous area.\textsuperscript{63} Even ignoring the blatant effects such unrestrained actions have on local populations, communication gaps create an environment in which PSCs are essentially operating without any regard for overarching military strategy, something that clearly is at odds with COIN’s focus on unity: “Well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit.”\textsuperscript{64} Poor communication between commanders and PSCs also led to avoidable missteps such as those in Fallujah – missteps which cost both lives and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{65}

The overarching theme of all of these issues is that of extreme negligence in oversight and accountability. The level of incompetence within the federal government has been so pervasive that, when asked by the GAO to produce records of “past oversight actions,” neither contracting officials nor the government itself could comply.\textsuperscript{66} The same GAO report also found that the majority of contracting officers did not even reside in Iraq, despite their role as primary PSC supervisors.\textsuperscript{67} Prior to 2007, there existed no video or audio recording devices to ensure PSC compliance and no rapid response team in the event of a reported abuse or discharged weapon.\textsuperscript{68} For over four years, the DOD had two on-site supervisors responsible for overseeing more than 700 DynCorp employees, though the reliability of these numbers is quite low considering DOD did not even start recording data until more than four and a half years into the war.\textsuperscript{69} To use a rather astonishing quantitative qualifier, Professor Allison Stanger’s newly-released book reports that the 1963 federal workforce had the identical number of employees (1.9 million) as it did in 2008. The overall government budget, however, more than tripled in this same timeframe, with the difference being made up through private contracts. Though the number of contractors grew markedly (more than sevenfold in the Pentagon from 1990 to 2000), the amount of employees devoted to oversight actually decreased by 25\%.\textsuperscript{70} Indeed, the acquisition workforces within the federal government became so miniscule that the government has started to contract out its oversight of contractors – a move so tragically ironic it is comical.\textsuperscript{71}

**Where Do We Go From Here?: Prospects for the Future**

Though deeply entrenched, the issues of legality, communication, and oversight have not been completely ignored. Particularly in the aftermath of mounting criticism following the 2007 Nisour Square incident, the U.S. government has finally attempted reform. On 5 December 2007, the DOS and the DOD mutually agreed to a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) pertaining to the use of PSCs in Iraq – the first effort at formalized coordination between the departments. Provisions in the MOA allow for quarterly progress reviews to ensure complicity, clarifications on Rules for the Use of Force with regard to armed PSCs, and specifications for “movement coordination and control” to cut down on communication failures in theater.\textsuperscript{72} The MOA requires PSCs
to “provide movement details to MNC-I” and to adhere to any ensuring recommendations as to “whether the movement should be altered or canceled based on threat levels… or disposition of Coalition Forces.” Other similar changes with regard to oversight and communication improvements were attempted early in 2004, but were met with little success. For example, the DOD created a Reconstruction Operations Center to coordinate movements of PSCs throughout Iraq – a noble attempt at improvement, but one that would remain severely limited without a centralized authority to which PSCs were accountable. In an effort to further clarify specific contractual requirements, the DOD also amended the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) in 2006 to include provisions allowing contractors to legally wield “deadly force when necessary not only for self-defense, but also to perform their security missions.” At the urging of numerous investigatory reports from groups like the GAO and the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal Protective Services, procedures to enhance accountability and transparency were implemented in late 2007. These procedures include the installation of audio and video recording devices in convoys, requirement that a DOS person accompany all traveling PSCs, and specific numerical identifiers visible on all PSC vehicles. The year 2008 also saw the much-awaited abolition of Bremer’s 2004 Order granting PSCs immunity from Iraqi law. Each of these efforts at development and policy revaluation indicates at least the beginnings of the crucial realization that something must change – and quickly – if we truly expect to be successful at our COIN program in Iraq.

A recent New York Times article exposed a Blackwater corruption scandal in which high-ranking executives covertly paid Iraqi officials as a means of “encouraging” a cessation of criticisms following the Nisour Square incident. That these allegations took over two years to be uncovered raises questions regarding what other scandals still remain unearthed from the past six years or present day PSC activities. While legal status, communications, and oversight have certainly improved since the onset of the Iraq conflict, we still have an enormously long way to go. The reforms, though valuable, stop short of an overarching centralized body for maintaining accountability and transparency of PSCs. Primarily, the government must immediately halt its outsourcing of oversight in favor of a Congressionally-mandated regulatory body. Private contractors depend on their next contract for profit and continued employment. As such, PSC abuses of power are much more likely to go unreported when their regulatory body has a direct stake in the outcome of the oversight. PSCs will become increasingly transparent and uniformly regulated with the existence of a single governmental body holding them accountable to the same legal standards as their military counterparts.

Despite praise for the flexibility of PSCs with regard to surge capacity and rapid deployment, the volatile nature of COIN operations often necessitates
ad hoc strategic shifts on the part of commanders. Without complete command and control over PSCs and the associated ability to quickly modify provisions of a contract, commanders cannot spontaneously and efficiently adapt to the changing tactics of the insurgency.53 Military commanders in theater must thereby be awarded full authority over PSCs operating in their Area of Operation (AO). In keeping with another key element of COIN strategy, PSC personnel must also more increasingly include those with cultural expertise. Proponents of outsourcing commend the private sector’s ability to target specific skill-sets. Nevertheless, we have not adequately taken advantage of these recruitment tactics with regard to PSCs in Iraq, sacrificing quality of personnel for quantity and speed of deployment. Cultural education has become a mandated part of “pre-deployment training,” but we must take these basic courses one step further and promote enhanced cultural awareness through the recruitment of PSCs already well-versed in Arabic and Middle Eastern cultures.54 By that same token, we must work to dramatically increase PSC-employment of Iraqi nationals. Although many U.S. personnel have pointed to PSC utilization of members of the local population as a way of securing legitimacy and solidifying cultural relationships, the reality is that the “Pentagon and DOS have largely outsourced a big chunk of the mission in Iraq to non-US citizens – to virtually everyone but the very people for whom we are allegedly fighting.”55 Although we do award Iraqi contracts to about 27% of the general contracting workforce, the realm of security has remained virtually inaccessible to the Iraqi citizens.56 Naturally, such enhanced hiring practices would require stringent vetting, but the potential benefits of Iraqi participation in the privatized security market are worth the extra costs and expended hours. Successful COIN operations target the crux of the insurgency from within the very body from which it recruits – the population itself. PSC employment of Iraqi nationals would drastically enhance our ability to repair some of the cultural damages that have already been wrought and secure the trust of the local populations.

The failure to create legal boundaries and facilitate communication opened the door for rampant abuses of PSC power and the subsequent lack of oversight meant that, conceivably, such abuses could go unnoticed. The degree to which many resulting incidents of PSC violence have undermined COIN efforts has led some to question whether armed civilians should be permissible at all. While such queries are certainly warranted, it is unlikely that the answer would change anything. The truth remains: the United States is embroiled in a high-scale conflict in Iraq and we would be absolutely incapable of maintaining operational functionality without PSCs to guard our embassies, properties, and personnel. We cannot escape the penumbra of PSCs, at least within the scope of this paper’s focus on Iraq. These companies have become a market force in and of themselves, and the only way with which to proceed must be to accept these realities and instead work toward that which we can change – the degree to which the theory behind PSCs and COIN can effectively coexist.
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Navies and Neo-Mercantilism
Explaining Powers’ Raw Materials Security Strategies

Zachary Riskind

Why do rising powers dependent on imports of vital raw materials such as energy tend to take government-directed approaches to securing supplies—such as building navies or engaging in neomercantilist behavior—rather than relying on the world market? Structural realist explanations hold that this behavior is driven by states’ desire to become more secure. Using case studies of contemporary China’s and Wilhelmine Germany’s raw materials security behaviors, I find that domestic political factors—specifically the attitude of the governing elite towards the state’s heavy industrial sector and the extent that public opinion holds sway over policymakers—hold more explanatory power. This study suggests that policymakers and the intelligence community should track changes in the incentives and disincentives rising powers’ domestic political environments offer for different means of policy influence. Political changes that increase the permeability of government to public opinion—such as a democratic transition—could paradoxically make states adopt more security-oriented raw materials security policies.

INTRODUCTION

Why do rising powers dependent on imports of vital raw materials such as energy tend to take active approaches to securing supplies—mercantilism, naval buildups, and diversification of supply—rather than relying on the world market? According to realist theories of international relations, dependence is a source of insecurity, and actions that reduce dependence are driven by a desire to become more secure. Based on two case studies—contemporary China’s and Wilhelmine Germany’s raw materials security behaviors—I have found that two domestic political factors better explain this phenomenon: the attitude of the governing elite towards the state’s heavy industry sector and the extent that public opinion holds sway over policymakers. Heavy industry, a prominent political actor in late-developing, rising powers, will use different means of acquiring government support in securing raw materials supplies depending on these two factors. The policies that emerge from this domestic political milieu, in turn, have important geopolitical consequences: in Germany’s case, imperialism and naval construction provoked intense security competitions culminating in world war. This is thus an especially timely question, because the international system once again contains

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energy-poor emerging powers—China and India—and the long-term approaches Beijing and Delhi will adopt towards energy security are still unclear.

The direction and extent that heavy industry skews national raw materials security policies primarily depends on the domestic political environment. When the government is insulated from public opinion or dominated by a modernizing elite that identifies positively with the interests of industry, heavy industry will promote its policy preference by exercising direct influence over policymakers. When the government is permeable to public opinion or dominated by an anti-modernizing elite that identifies negatively with the interests of industry, on the other hand, heavy industry will be more likely to promote its policy preferences by exercising indirect influence over policymakers by appealing to the masses—spreading nationalistic propaganda or what Jack Snyder terms “myths of empire.”

When industrial actors use only direct influence over policymaking to realize their policy preferences, the state’s behavior is likely to be biased towards their interests but will be relatively less aggressive in reducing the vulnerability associated with dependence. However, when industry attempts to indirectly influence policymaking through mass political campaigning and propaganda, a more aggressive approach to raw materials security is likely.

I will test this domestic political theory against what I believe to be the strongest alternative explanation: the realist theory that states will act strategically to reduce dependence on imports of vital raw materials because dependence makes a state vulnerable to the political decisions of others. Realism presupposes that dependence-reducing policies are a rational response to vulnerability. Based on this assumption, realism predicts that Germany and China would adopt coherent policies to reduce import dependence. The results of this study indicate that realism does not provide an adequate explanation for rising powers’ raw materials security policies. China’s raw materials security policy is less dependence-reducing than realism would predict, and Germany’s policy is more so.

As I will show, the proposed domestic politics model better explains the cases. The model predicts that more dependence-reducing raw materials security policies will result when special interests use mass politics to influence policy. The German government was dominated by an anti-modernizing elite—the Junkers—who negatively identified with the interests of heavy industry; at the same time, the government was relatively weak and permeable to public opinion. German heavy industry resorted to mass politics to achieve its preferred raw materials security policies, contributing to a radicalization of German public opinion that ultimately forced German leaders to adopt more dependence-reducing policies than they would have liked. On the other hand, China’s government is dominated by the Chinese Communist Party, a modernizing elite, and is relatively insulated from public opinion. China’s National Oil Companies—the most important industrial stakeholder in energy security policy—have therefore relied on direct influence over government officials to achieve their objectives. As the model predicts, a relatively moderate energy security policy has resulted, without serious
dependence-reducing measures such as the development of a blue-water navy.

**Models of Analysis**

Realist theories of international relations hold that the structure of the international system, and a state’s position within it, constitutes the main variable force in determining what behavior a state will adopt. This view is premised on the observation that the international system is anarchic—that is, there is no overarching authority, no “world police,” that can guarantee each state’s security. As a result, states exist in constant fear of being victimized by other states, and if they fail to protect their security they run the risk of being severely penalized—the state could be destroyed. Realism expects policymakers to be cognizant of this risk and act rationally to minimize it.

According to realists, dependence on imports of vital raw materials represents a vulnerability that states—acting rationally—will always try to reduce. Dependence reduces a state’s ability to survive in an anarchic international environment—it will live in fear of “cutoff or blackmail in time of crisis or war.” Most modern economies would collapse if deprived of imports like oil and other raw materials. States dependent on others for vital goods therefore have a strong incentive to “control what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency,” thereby ensuring continued access.

The domestic political argument, on the other hand, maintains that rising powers adopt particular dependence-reducing raw materials security policies mainly because the groups within a state that would benefit most from those policies have a disproportionate amount of influence over foreign policy. Rising powers such as Germany and China tend to industrialize from the top down, with the government playing a large role in financing and organizing industrial growth. This trend results in the abrupt emergence of concentrated industrial interests within the state. These industrial interests, because of their compactness as a group, can exercise influence over policy that is disproportionate to their size, enabling them to skew national policy towards their preferences.

There are two causal mechanisms by which industrial interests could affect a state’s behavior regarding raw materials security behavior. First, they could directly influence policymakers by taking advantage of a privileged position within the policymaking process. Second, they could affect a state’s behavior indirectly, by engaging in mass politics and manipulating public opinion. Propaganda, threat-inflation, and appeals to nationalist sentiments can convince people to support policies that are not within their interest from a rational-choice point of view. If these methods are successful in building public support for particular policies, policymakers might be pressured to adopt those policies even if they personally believe they are not optimal.

The differences between the two theories is in the variables they hold to be most important—circumstances within the domestic political environment or circumstances in the international system—which generates differences in the
kinds of raw materials security policies the theories predict states will adopt. Realism predicts that a state will adopt coherent raw materials security policies that become more focused on reducing dependence on imports as dependence increases. For realism to be supported, the adoption of these policies must be formed by, and reflect considerations of the national interest—state officials must internalize realist logic and direct their actions to accord with it.

Alternatively, the domestic politics model predicts that variations in the kinds of behaviors a state adopts regarding raw materials security will reflect variations in the power or interests of the concerned domestic groups and variations in the means they employ to advance their interests. Policies will not necessarily be coherent or correlate with the level of dependence. This explanation must show that industrial interests exist in both states that influence policy through either direct access to policymakers or engaging in mass politics. It must show that the mass politics approach correlates with a dependence-reducing raw materials security policy.

For this study, I try to explain a particular set of dependence-reducing behaviors on the part of resource-poor rising powers: mercantilism (defined broadly as a state’s attempts to increase the amount of resources directly under its control), geographic diversification of sources of supply, and enhancements of power-projection capabilities to gain more control over supply routes. Two case studies—post-1990 China and Wilhelmine Germany—are used to construct tests of covariation. I will see how the predictions of each theory differ, and how they contribute to explaining changes in the raw materials security policies of each state. In analyzing the cases, I will examine the constellation of decisions taken with reference to raw materials security, measuring how dependence-reducing behavior changes over time. Next, I will determine which of the two theories best explains this outcome using process tracing: I will see how strong the links are between the hypothesized causes for each theory—systemic changes, for realism, and changes in the interests or power of certain domestic groups, for the domestic politics model—and the actual events, processes, or decisions that led up to the outcome. China’s National Oil Companies and Wilhelmine Germany’s heavy industrial sector receive the most attention in this regard because they were groups with most at stake in raw materials policy in their respective countries.

**China**

Since 1993, China has become increasingly dependent on overseas oil imports to meet its energy needs. Nevertheless, Beijing’s energy security policy has been limited to supporting China’s National Oil Companies’ (NOCs) equity investments in overseas energy assets and has not, as of yet, involved the development of a blue-water navy. In this case, I aim to show that realism cannot explain China’s energy security policies since 1993 because in order to actually reduce vulnerability, investments in equity oil overseas must be accompanied by the possession of a blue-water navy capable of protecting the sea lanes by which
the equity oil would be shipped back to China. Without this capability, the Chinese government’s support of the NOCs’ overseas business activities does not conform to realist logic. The domestic politics theory I have proposed explains this apparent incoherence: the equity investment strategy emanates from the NOCs’ commercial motivations, not Beijing’s national security motivations. The NOCs have used a privileged position within China’s energy policymaking process to acquire government support for their commercial endeavors.

According to realism, increasing levels of dependence motivate states to attempt to reduce dependence. Since 1993, when China became a net importer of energy, its level of dependence on oil imports has steadily increased. In 1993, China for the first time became a net oil importer, relying on imported oil to meet 5.8% of its domestic consumption; by 2007, this proportion had reached 46.05%.7 owing to the combination of stagnating domestic oil production and rapidly rising consumption. Consumption of oil increased from 3.3 million barrels per day (mpd) in 19958 to 7.60 mdp in 2007.9 This demand does not show any signs of subsiding in the near future. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, China’s oil demand will surpass 14 mdp by 2025.10 As a result, if China is to reach its economic growth targets—a priority for the current leadership—it will have to increasingly rely on imported oil.

Given this increasing dependence on oil imports, realism would predict Beijing to increasingly—and concomitantly—adopt three policies to reduce the vulnerability it experiences from dependence. First, China would make efforts to build its blue-water naval capabilities in order to gain more control over the sea lanes its oil imports traverse. China currently lacks naval power-projection capabilities, which magnifies the vulnerability associated with its dependence on overseas imports. The U.S. Navy controls the sea lanes by which China receives its oil imports, including the critical route from the Persian Gulf to Asia, and could conceivably prevent oil tankers from carrying supplies to China.11 Without control over the sea lanes, Beijing will have no way of ensuring that any of its overseas oil imports—including its equity production—reaches China. Evidence that China is making a serious effort towards developing a blue-water navy, therefore, is crucial for the case to support the realist hypothesis that the desire to free itself from dependence is motivating China’s energy security behavior. Secondly, realism also predicts that China would expand direct control over oil resources by supporting the acquisition of equity stakes in overseas oil fields by its National Oil Companies (NOCs). Equity barrels produced by the NOCs abroad could be sent home to China, reducing dependence on the international market. Third, realism predicts that Beijing would make an effort to geographically diversify its sources of supply, with a focus on supplies in Central Asia that could be connected to China by land via pipeline, thereby avoiding the aforementioned transportation risks.

The domestic politics approach, on the other hand, would predict that Beijing adopts the second policy—government support of the overseas investments of the NOCs—and perhaps the third policy, diversification of import sources—but
not necessarily the first policy, blue-water naval development. This prediction is based on the expectation that the primary industrial stakeholder in Chinese energy policy—the NOCs—will influence Beijing to promote their interests, as well as the fact that they have no interest in blue-water naval development. According to this approach, increases in the NOCs’ policy influence should correlate with increases in government support for their overseas business activities.

Consistent with the domestic politics explanation, Beijing has extended support to the NOCs in their overseas business activities and sought to diversify sources of supply but has not seriously begun developing a blue water navy. The NOCs’ acquisitions of overseas energy assets were formally given the status of a national strategy in May 1997. Former Premier Li Peng “blessed Chinese involvement in the exploration and development of international oil and gas resources and tied such projects specifically to the objective of stable, long-term supplies of oil and gas.” This new policy, termed the “going out” (Zou Chuqu) policy, was spearheaded by China’s three main national oil companies: CNPC, CNOOC, and Sinopec.

Initially, Beijing’s support for the “going out” activities of the NOCs was mostly symbolic. However, from 1999-2000, it began taking a more active role in helping the NOCs acquire energy resources overseas. Beijing increased the provision of financial support by bankrolling foreign investments and extending lines of credit to the NOCs through China’s state owned banks, financing infrastructure projects in energy rich countries, and explicitly linking aid packages to resource acquisitions. Chinese leaders have met personally with their counterparts in oil producing states to engage in project negotiations for specific mergers or acquisitions. These visits often led to the acquisition of overseas oil field rights for the NOCs. Beijing has also supported the NOCs by providing satellite technology to oil-producing countries and using its permanent membership in the UN Security Council to block sanctions against Sudan, where the NOCs have invested heavily.

The ability to control the sea lanes the oil tankers traverse is necessary in order for equity barrels to reduce the vulnerability Beijing experiences from dependence on imports. Hence, for realism to show that the desire to reduce dependence was the main motivator for Beijing’s policy change in 1999, one of two things must be established: that the investments were made concomitantly with increases in naval power-projection capability, or that policymakers could plausibly mistakenly believe that a blue-water navy was not necessary in order for the possession of equity oil to reduce the vulnerability associated with dependence.

Neither of these claims is supported by the evidence. While China’s Navy has modernized many of its capabilities, acquiring destroyers, submarines, sea-skimming anti-ship missiles and fighter jets, these developments are not nearly sufficient to control the sea lanes that oil-laden tankers traverse en route to China. Beijing does not appear to be making a serious effort to gain control of the sea lanes. Instead, it appears to be focusing on “brown-water” (littoral) capabilities and
asymmetric warfare techniques. China still has not produced a single operational aircraft carrier, even though it has benefited from close to two decades of aircraft carrier design study.\textsuperscript{21}

The second option for realists—that policymakers could plausibly but erroneously believe that a blue-water navy is not necessary in order for the possession of equity oil to reduce the vulnerability associated with dependence—is harder to dismiss, since it pertains to the private thoughts of policymakers and what information they have access to. However, it seems very unlikely. Proponents of Beijing’s support for the NOCs’ equity investments typically give two main arguments for how equity oil, by itself, enhances energy security. First, they contend that “should China find itself in a situation where it has money but is unable to buy oil the NOCs would be able to send their foreign equity production to China.” Second, they maintain that “barrels of oil produced by Chinese companies abroad are insulated from fluctuations in world oil prices and can provide the country’s consumers with cheaper oil than the international market.”\textsuperscript{22}

There is a near-consensus among analysts that both claims are wrong. The acquisition of equity oil abroad, they say, cannot guarantee China a supply of oil that is less expensive and more reliable than the international spot market. The first claim—that equity oil provides energy security because it can be sent home in the event of a supply crisis—is doubtful because oil produced abroad by Chinese NOCs is likely to face the same transportation risks as oil purchased by Chinese NOCs on the international market. As Kenneth Lieberthal says,

Equity barrels are in reality no more effective at ensuring China’s national energy security than long-term crude supply contract barrels. The major geopolitical risks to stable oil flows—such as political instability in key exporting countries, wars, ethnic conflict, a potential U.S. blockade of China’s oil in a Taiwan crisis, or transit bottlenecks—would disrupt equity and contract oil flows equally. There is no correlation between equity oil and energy security.\textsuperscript{23}

The second rationale offered for equity oil providing energy security—that it can provide consumers with cheaper oil than the international spot markets and protect against price fluctuations—is similarly unconvincing. Due to high transportation costs—and China’s price controls on oil—the NOCs do not send most of their equity oil back to China; instead, they sell the majority in the global market at the spot price just like other international oil companies.\textsuperscript{24}

Given China’s increasingly technocratic and specialized bureaucracy, Chinese decision-makers can reasonably be expected to have encountered these arguments against the idea that equity oil enhances energy security. Indeed, according to Downs, some decision-makers already doubt whether equity production by China’s NOCs does anything to decrease the country’s vulnerability
from its high level of dependence.25 However, Beijing continues to support the “going out” policy even though it does not appreciably reduce China’s vulnerability. At the same time, it shows no signs of initiating a serious effort to build a blue-water navy, which, in conjunction with equity oil, could actually have a strong dependence-reducing effect.

In short, the evidence suggests that China’s behavior regarding energy security does is not consistent with realism’s prediction that China would exhibit a coherent strategy to reduce dependence. However, consistent with the proposed domestic politics model, China’s energy security policy is aligned with the interests of the NOCs. Moreover, the theory’s hypothesized cause—the NOCs disproportionately influencing policy—is linked to the outcome. The NOCs appear to have taken advantage of the privileged position they occupy within the Chinese energy policymaking process to disproportionately influence policy to their benefit. This accounts for the fact that Chinese government’s support for the overseas investment activities of the NOCs has benefited the NOCs enormously without appreciably enhancing energy security.

To advance their policy preferences, the NOCs use the “direct access” means of policy influence. Direct access to leadership is critical for shaping the policymaking process in China, and China’s oil industry, since its inception, has always derived a substantial amount of policy influence from its close access to central decision-makers. The energy policymaking process is driven primarily by relationship-building and influence-peddling, and many of the top twenty-five leaders with decision-making authority have direct ties to particular energy interests.26 Many years of interchange of personnel between government and industry has forged connection between government and NOCs that ensures the NOCs’ influence on the government.27

The origins of this privileged position can be traced back to China’s late industrialization. When the People’s Republic of China organized economically in 1953, heavy industry—including the oil industry—was given a powerful voice in policymaking as a means of facilitating industrialization. The oil industry has retained this position by continually fighting against reforms that would limit its power. During the development of China’s domestic oil resources, a group of officials tied to the oil industry—known as the “petroleum faction”—emerged as a powerful force within the government on the industry’s behalf.28 With the establishment of the national oil companies in the 1980s, the organizations assumed both policymaking and corporate roles.

Also consistent with the expectations of the domestic politics theory, variations in the power and interests of the NOCs preceded—and correlate with—increases in government support for the NOCs’ overseas business activities. As discussed earlier, the government suddenly adopted a more active role in supporting the NOCs’ overseas business activities in 1999. Increases in the policy influence of the NOCs and the intensity of their commercial interests as a result of China’s 1998 restructuring of the oil industry preceded this policy change. The 1998 restructuring
decentralized and introduced market principles to the industry. The two NOCs that had previously performed both government and business functions—CNPC and Sinopec—were stripped of their government functions, becoming solely corporate entities. The NOCs became vertically integrated corporations, making them more internationally competitive and more autonomous.

The restructuring increased the policy influence of the NOCs in a number of ways. They retained—if not increased—their level of direct access to China’s central decision-makers. As Guo notes, currently, “CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC all have interesting human network relationships and their own route of connections with the central organization of China’s government/Communist Party.” These relationships enabled the NOCs to continue to “report their opinions and requests directly to the State Council and highest leadership departments of the government.” Additionally, the restructuring transferred most of the government’s energy industry expertise to the NOCs, leaving Beijing with insufficient personnel and resources to manage energy governance at the national level. This created an “energy policy vacuum” within the government, forcing it to routinely consult the NOCs on policy matters and thereby giving them an opportunity to influence policy.

Not only did the 1998 restructuring increase the NOCs’ policy influence, but it also increased the intensity of the NOCs’ commercial interests at the expense of their commitment to the national interest, thereby increasing the probability that they use their policy influence for distinctly commercial goals. With the restructuring, the NOCs became corporatized, making management and employees’ welfare more closely associated with the firm’s performance. With the public listings of the NOCs in 2000-02, this trend continued. As listed companies, they needed to be accountable to shareholders, and shareholders expect profitability. In sum, the restructuring of 1998 increased both the NOCs’ policy influence and their desire to use that influence to advance their commercial goals, foremost of which was expanding their reserve portfolios by acquiring equity stakes in oil assets abroad. These changes in the influence and interests of the NOCs preceded—and correlated with—the more active role the government assumed in supporting the NOCs’ overseas investment activities in 1999. In effect, it appears that the NOCs have used their privileged position within China’s energy policymaking process to influence the Beijing to provide more active support for their overseas business activities.

Looking at China’s domestic political system, particularly its energy policymaking process, provides insight into why realist predictions were not fulfilled. The Chinese government has little ability to formulate and implement an effective and coherent energy security strategy. Many different government agencies have authority over energy policy, but no single agency has the political upper hand. As a result, policymaking is characterized by negotiation and bargaining at the middle level of the bureaucracy that is often protracted and inconclusive. The development of an overarching energy authority for energy
policy at the national level could help overcome this “policy paralysis,” but the NOCs have blocked any attempt to create such a governing body, fearing that it would constrain their policy influence.

**Wilhelmine Germany**

Many scholars consider Wilhelmine Germany’s increasingly hard-line dependence-reducing approach towards raw materials security after 1898—including battleship buildup, economic penetration of the Near East, and a more assertive colonial policy—to be a precipitating factor for the First World War. Explaining this case is therefore essential for any theory of why rising powers facing insufficient domestic supplies of vital raw materials adopt dependence-reducing behaviors.

Like China, Germany developed a dependence on imports of many raw materials early on in its industrialization as a result of a lack of domestic resources and rapidly increasing consumption, fueled by growing industrialization and population. The proportion of German imports in the form of raw materials increased from 41% in 1893 to 57% by 1913. Dependence on imported iron, oil, and steel—the most important resources for military and economic power at the time—increased sharply. Imports of foodstuffs increased from 1890 to 1913 at an average of 4.8% a year, well above the overall economic growth rate of 3.9%. In the event of a war, Britain could use its naval dominance to blockade German imports, starving it of raw materials that were vital to its economic and military strength.

Realism would hold that Germany’s leaders felt compelled to adopt more hard-line dependence-reducing behaviors after 1898 because of the vulnerability associated with Germany’s reliance on imports of raw materials. The problem with realist explanations is that, by the early part of the 20th century, German central decision-makers were so constrained by nationalistic sentiments in public opinion that they were unable to act in accordance with their beliefs about what policies were optimal regarding Germany’s raw materials dependence. The force of public opinion—energized by nationalist pressure groups funded by heavy industry—compelled Germany to adopt the raw materials security strategy that it did, not the international system.

Like China, Germany was a late industrializing state, and typical of late industrializing states, Germany’s industrialization was imposed from the ‘top down.’ The German government coordinated the development of a highly centralized and large-scale industrial sector. Industrial development proceeded rapidly, so that by the late nineteenth century, heavy industry abruptly emerged as a compact group with a concentrated interest in the government adopting certain dependence-reducing policies regarding raw materials security, including naval construction, economic penetration of the Near East, and a more assertive colonial policy.

Heavy industry has an interest in the dependence-reducing behaviors
discussed above for a number of reasons. Government orders for ships as part of fleet construction directly benefit some sectors of heavy industry—i.e. the powerful steel, armor and plating, and shipbuilding industries—by increasing demand for their products. Likewise, economic penetration of the Near East provides demand for railway construction, increases access to raw materials, and opens up investment opportunities for the large banks that heavy industry was associated with. Colonial acquisitions similarly held the potential for increased access to raw materials and new investment opportunities.42

Prior to 1898, Germany’s raw materials security behavior was limited to a relatively moderate colonial policy. Germany took several steps in that year, however, that had the potential to substantially reduce its dependence. Most significantly, with the authorization of the Navy Law in the Reichstag, it began constructing of a blue-water navy. Previously, the German navy consisted mostly of fast cruisers intended to protect the trade routes of German shipping; the new naval construction, however, consisted of heavily armored battleships—a fleet that had the potential of rivaling Britain for maritime supremacy in the North Sea.43 If Germany could close the disparity in naval power with Britain, it could reduce the transportation vulnerability that it faced from its high level of dependence on imports.

Also in 1898, Berlin accelerated efforts to expand control of raw material supplies by establishing an exclusive sphere of economic influence over the resource-rich regions of the Ottoman Empire.44 Central to this effort was government support for the construction of a railway from Berlin to Baghdad, which would give Germany direct access to Ottoman mineral deposits, agricultural products, and—most importantly—oil.45 In 1899 the Ottoman Sultan awarded Germany’s Deutsche Bank a concession for a railway, including mineral rights twenty kilometers to either side of the line.46 The German government supported construction of the railway and continually urged strategic considerations on the enterprises involved.47

Another shift in Germany’s raw materials security behavior can be seen from around 1898— a more assertive, and perhaps aggressive colonial policy. Berlin intensified efforts to gain colonial acquisitions, protect its overseas investments, and expand the operational area of its navy. In 1899, Germany challenged U.S. claims in Samoa, almost sparking a naval clash.48 In 1902-03, Germany, along with Britain and Italy, participated in a naval blockade of Venezuela to recover debts and extend its regional influence.49 In 1911, Germany instigated an international crisis (known as the Morocco Crisis) when it sent a gunboat to Morocco to challenge French claims there.50

Realism has trouble explaining these behaviors because they do not seem to be the product of policymakers’ rational deliberations about what policies best enhance Germany’s security. Germany’s post-1898 behavior regarding raw materials security was not optimal for the goal of enhancing Germany’s security because it made other powers feel threatened, provoking a balancing response
from Great Britain that actually increased Germany’s vulnerability. As Jack Snyder says, “Germany’s own choice of a policy of aggression created the very conditions—war, encirclement, blockade”—that the policy purported to hedge against.\textsuperscript{51} Instead of closing the gap in naval power with Britain, Berlin’s naval construction provoked London to increase its own naval strength, thereby starting an arms race that actually increased Germany’s vulnerability. Berlin’s construction of the railway to Baghdad and colonial policy had similarly deleterious effects on Germany’s geopolitical position by contributing to its international image as aggressive and overly willing to use force.\textsuperscript{52}

Realists cannot explain why Germany adopted this self-destructive strategy to gain more control over raw materials: in many cases, central decision-makers adopted policies that they believed were not logical from a realist perspective. Bernhard von Bülow, German Chancellor from 1900-1909, apparently realized that Germany’s naval buildup was provoking an arms race with Britain and not improving Germany’s security and believed that arms control was necessary in order to reduce tensions.\textsuperscript{53} Likewise, he realized that German belligerence over the colonial status of Morocco in 1906 was only serving to alienate Germany internationally and push France, Britain, and Russia closer together.\textsuperscript{54} Hollweg, Bulow’s successor, similarly seemed to understand that instigation of the Morocco Crisis in 1911 would provoke British hostility and that German aggressiveness towards France would only push France closer to Britain. He also was aware that, in the event of a war against Britain, France, and Russia, Germany would have little prospect of success.\textsuperscript{55} In effect, these central decision-makers—occupying perhaps the most powerful political positions in Germany, except for that of Emperor—steered Germany on a course that contradicted what they believed was in its national interest.

Bülow, Hollweg, and other central decision-makers appear to have been politically constrained from acting in accordance with their better judgment by a virulently nationalist public opinion—a public opinion that had been inflamed by the use of mass politics.\textsuperscript{56} An ideology of economic expansionism that was closely aligned with the foreign policy objectives of heavy industry—known as Weltpolitik—had permeated German society, shaping German beliefs about how Berlin should conduct its foreign policy.\textsuperscript{57} Regarding raw materials, Weltpolitik engendered the belief that Berlin must reduce dependence on raw materials imports because other powers were competitors and potential threats. By the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the Weltpolitik ideology had spread widely in the government and business communities and had obtained an extensive public following, not only among the elite but also among the middle class and portions of the working class.\textsuperscript{58} Many Germans, encouraged by journalists, academics, and politicians, advocated aggressive policies with little awareness of the consequent costs and benefits.\textsuperscript{59}

Heavy industry recognized political opportunities in Weltpolitik and played an essential role in propagating the ideology in the late 1890s by financing nationalist pressure groups advocating economic imperialism and naval
construction. The Navy League, perhaps the most influential of these groups, was founded and primarily funded by heavy industry. The propaganda activities of the Navy League generated massive public support for the Naval Laws, and succeeded in securing the passage of the Naval Acts of 1898 and 1900.

Consistent with my domestic political argument, the enormous intensification of the use of mass politics and propaganda as a means of policy influence in the late 1890s correlates with changes in the power and interests of heavy industry. At the same time, its policy preferences changed to favor a more dependence-reducing raw materials policy. During the Depression of 1873-1896, heavy industry was interested in government support for protectionism rather than naval construction or colonial acquisition. However, with the onset of inflation and expansionary economic conditions in the mid-1890s, industrial groups in Germany “began trumpeting the dangers of industry’s growing dependence on foreign supplies of materials” and voicing concerns about excess industrial capacity—problems, they claimed, that could be solved by naval construction. Also during the 1890s, German heavy industry experienced enormous growth. As it grew, and as the amount of sunk investment it made into German industrialization increased, so did the intensity of its policy preferences.

While heavy industry’s interest in dependence-reducing policies intensified, Germany’s domestic political environment changed to offer greater incentives for mass politics as a means of policy influence. The government and bureaucracy were dominated by the Junkers—an agrarian, anti-modernizing elite. The policy preferences of the Junkers—high grain tariffs, low industrial tariffs, high spending on the army, and low spending on the navy—fundamentally conflicted with those of heavy industry. While the Junkers and heavy industry did manage to temporarily reconcile their policy preferences, tensions increased between them in the 1890s and each was constantly jockeying to attain the best political position vis-à-vis the other. The resistance heavy industry encountered in directly influencing the anti-modernizing Junkers created a powerful incentive for engaging in mass politics to gain the political upper hand.

Also in the 1890s, large increases in mass political mobilization expanded the number of Germans active in politics. At the same time, decreases in the government’s cohesion made it less insulated from public opinion. Both of these trends were reflected in the increasing importance of the Reichstag, Germany’s parliament, in determining policy. As it became increasingly difficult to find a consensus between the agrarians and the industrialists, political compromise and consensus-building became more and more important in order to maintain social stability. The Reichstag, as the only completely public part of the German government and the only one elected through a system of universal suffrage, was the most obvious place for this to occur. Public opinion was thus able to penetrate the government more easily.

The government was also made more permeable to public opinion by the decline in the strength of the executive branch after Bismarck’s departure in
1890. Bismarck had resisted domestic pressures to expand the scope of Germany’s colonial policy and steadfastly refused to accompany colonial acquisitions with naval construction. However, subsequent executives—such as Bulow and Hollweg—were not as adept at managing coalitions and maintaining the upper hand in domestic political debates as Bismarck. Thus, the government became less autonomous and the incentive for influencing policy through mass politics increased.

**Implications**

Germany’s quest to gain control over its raw materials imports culminated in a war; China’s quest for energy security is only just beginning, and its geopolitical impact is yet to be determined. Undoubtedly, the response of the international community to China’s behavior—particularly the United States—will be a factor. Knowledge of the significant degree to which the NOCs act autonomously to influence the character of China’s energy security behavior could temper this response by discrediting the idea that it is part of a coherent “grand strategy” coordinated by the Chinese government.

Most significantly, these findings suggest that the means employed by concentrated industry interests to influence policy plays an important role in shaping the present and future domestic political environment. If they influence policy through a particular structural position that enables direct access to policymakers, as in China, a moderate policy is likely, although to the extent that the structural situation persists, policy will continue to be biased towards industry interests. If, on the other hand, they influence policy by engaging in mass politics, as in Germany, the way the issue of raw materials security is framed to the public—i.e., what strategic concepts they employ and how they represent the level of threat—could leave the potential for irrationally hard-line policies in the future. If industry interests build support for certain dependence-reducing behaviors by inflating the threat of disruption or otherwise inflaming nationalist sentiments, they have no guarantee that public energy they generate will remain subordinated to their interests. By drawing new, ideologically-driven actors into the policy process, mass politics can distort foreign policy and produce an energy security approach that is so geared towards reducing dependence that they are neither aligned with industry interests nor the national interest.

Policymakers and the intelligence community should remain aware of the relative influence of different individuals and groups in China interested in policies that would reduce dependence on energy imports. Less obviously, they should track changes in the incentives and disincentives the domestic political environment offers for different means of policy influence, remaining vigilant against any arguments that rely on nationalistic appeals or threat inflation. Based on the domestic politics model, it seems likely that China will maintain a relatively soft-line approach. The relative strength and impermeability of the Chinese Communist Party, and the fact that it has transformed itself into a modernizing elite
identifying very positively with industrial interests, creates powerful disincentives against mass political campaigning. The National Oil Companies—the industrial group with the most stake in energy policy and the most influence over it—are unlikely in the foreseeable future to develop an interest in a full-fledged naval construction program to compete with the U.S. Furthermore, their influence over defense and national security policy is more limited than that of heavy industry in Wilhelmine Germany.

Perhaps counter-intuitively, if the Chinese government becomes less unitary and less insulated from public opinion—such as in the event of a democratic transition—increases for mass political campaigns to realize policy preferences could increase. The shipbuilders or NOCs—perhaps simply desiring more generalized government support for their overseas activities—could respond to these incentives by inflating the threat posed by the U.S. to China’s energy security. A nationalistic and newly-energized public opinion could seize on the idea that a blue-water navy is vital for China’s energy security. Chinese policymakers could find themselves reluctantly pushed towards more hard-line policies than they would prefer, as Wilhelmine policymakers appear to have been, with equally unpredictable and dangerous consequences.

ENDNOTES

2 Mearsheimer *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* 17
3 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp.79-128
6 For more on how domestic political groups can disproportionately influence policy, see Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire* (1992).
7 “China’s Oil Output, Consumption both Hit Record High in 2007,” Xinhua, January 31, 2008 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/31/content_7534497.htm)
12 Xiaojie Xu, ‘Chinese NOCs’ Overseas Strategies: Background, Comparison and
Remarks’ (2007): pp. 4


14 Shaofeng Chen (2008): pp. 81

15 This is particularly true in Africa, where infrastructure investment is sorely needed. Downs (2006): 41-42. Also see Shaofeng Chen (2008): 93


17 Shaofeng Chen (2008): 94.

18 Downs (2006): 42

19 “Coming Over the Horizon: China.” The Economist, January 6, 2007


21 Testimony of Dr. Andrew Erickson, Professor at the U.S. Naval War College, at a U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission congressional hearing in March 2007.

22 Downs (2006): pp 37

23 Kenneth Lieberthal and Mikkal Herberg, China’s Search for Energy Security: Implications for U.S. Policy, NBR Analysis April 2006, pp. 20

24 Kong Bo (2006): 75


26 The Eurasia Group. “China’s overseas investments in oil and gas production.” 2006, pp. 6


30 Meaning each company was now engaged in both upstream activities like exploration and production and downstream activities like marketing and refining.

31 Ibid. pp. 25

32 Ibid. pp. 26


36 Jonathen Pollack, Journal of Contemporary China pp. 238


38 For example, recent attempts to create a new energy ministry were blocked by the NOCs. See “Hopes for new China energy ministry fade,” By Richard McGregor in Beijing FT; Published: February 25 2008.


41 Ibid. 18


43 Fischer War of Illusions pp. 50

44 Ibid. pp. 50.

45 A 1901 German report confirmed that region had “a veritable ‘lake of petroleum’ of almost inexhaustible supply.” See E.M Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway* (1966) pp. 15.


51 Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, pp 72.


54 Anderson, *First Moroccan Crisis*, 263-264

55 Konrad Jarausch, *The Enigmatic Chancellor* (1973), 144-145, 126


59 Ibid, 63. Also see Eckart Kehr. *Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy* (1977): pp. 75.

60 Ibid. pp.332.

61 The Navy League and other nationalist pressure groups were eventually self-sustaining and took bellicose policy positions that were contrary to the interests of heavy industry. However, their success might not have been possible without the momentum they gained from the initial backing of heavy industry.

62 Woodruff Smith says that industrial interests were primarily interested in generalized government support in the form of protectionism and mainly advocated colonial acquisition in order to have a coherent protectionist policy. Smith, *The German Colonial Empire* (1978): 13.


65 This is an important point: Germany, unlike China, had universal suffrage for males; this increased the incentive for engaging in mass politics.

Ibid., pp. 44, 47.

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The Impact of Political Violence on Tourism in the Middle East and North Africa

Ghermayn Baker

This paper explores the appeals of tourism throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It analyzes outside factors related to political violence that can potentially have an impact on tourism to and within the region, including both the nations directly involved and their neighbors. This paper argues that the uniqueness of the Middle East and North Africa regarding tourism, along with actions taken by the tourist industry in response to political violence, have worked together to sustain tourism in a region considered by many to be unsafe. It goes on to comparatively analyze the tourist-host relationship in the region, suggesting that the gap in power that the mass tourist industry has over the hosts is less than typically found in other regions throughout the world. This is analyzed through aspects such as the commodification of culture, direct tourist environmental impacts, and extreme tourist development.

INTRODUCTION

Modern tourism, defined as ‘the practice of traveling for recreation’ (Webster and Webster), has typically been linked to economic development and sustainability, particularly in developing nations\(^1\). In general, tourism revenue flows from economically ‘rich’ or ‘developed’ countries to economically ‘poor’ or ‘developing’ countries\(^2\). Tourism can stimulate the economies of these developing nations both directly and indirectly. Directly, there is an economic linkage between tourists and the people of a host nation, through the selling of handicrafts and locally grown agriculture\(^3\). Indirectly, an increase in tourism subsequently creates an increase in employment opportunities for locals\(^4\). Focused mainly in the hotel and travel industries, this employment is crucial because it combats poverty and is thus a key factor for development. Some regions, however, rely on tourism more than others.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), also coined by G8 as the Greater Middle East (GME)\(^5\), is a region that stretches from Mauritania in the West to Pakistan in the East, from Turkey in the North to Sudan in the South, and includes all of the Arabian peninsula, all of North Africa, Cyprus, Somalia, and Djibouti (Figure 1). Throughout history, this region has been secluded from...
the ‘Western World’, as “the region’s authoritarian regimes have maintained… some of the most cumbersome bureaucratic procedures for border crossing that severely limit the mobility of even their own populations?” While this may seem detrimental to the development of tourism as an important economic market, the main market in the GME has been and continues to be oil. With Iraq and Kuwait producing 5 million barrels per day of oil, and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates (Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates) producing an additional 7.7 million barrels per day, the MENA produces 21 percent of the world’s oil. Overall, it is estimated that this region is sitting on 45 percent of the world’s oil. As a result, the region has been relatively economically stable and does not have to rely on tourism as much as other regions of the world.

Two main factors, however, crippled the GME economies and began the shift towards more liberal border policies and openness to tourism development. First, due to economic crisis and income loss in the 1980s caused by the decline of oil incomes, many states in the region turned to tourism development. However, the more crippling factor was the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which caused a decline in tourism all around the world, and also severely impacted the Greater Middle East economies. September 11th marked a turning point in the region, as many nations began supporting policies that facilitated more accessible cross-border travel. For instance, after 9/11, Egypt began allowing tourists from Italy and Germany to visit with only personal IDs. Furthermore, Oman has liberalized their visa process after long being considered a closed society. Interestingly, even Saudi Arabia has sought to expand tourism, albeit religious-based, “by granting umra (or “lesser”
pilgrimage) visas seeking to attract off-season pilgrims who stay longer than the standard Hajj visitors [to Mecca]. Perhaps the most evident example of tourism development in the Middle East and North Africa was the establishment of the Arab Tourism Council in 2001.

As one would expect, tourist numbers in the GME skyrocketed after the borders became more liberalized. In 2002, when global tourist numbers grew a weak 2.7%, the numbers across the ‘Arab Middle East’ sprouted an astounding 16.7%. This number represented the largest growth in any region, and nearly doubled the next highest growth rates in Pacific Asia. Also, 35 million people visited the region in 2004 alone, which represented nearly triple the amount that visited 10 years earlier, in 1994.

With lesser-regulated borders, however, the MENA countries witness an increase in chances of risk, in general, and political violence, in particular. While the numbers may seem promising, this paper explores how tourism in the MENA region can be impacted by outside factors as a result of political violence. It analyzes the steps taken to sustain tourism in spite of these factors, and presents Middle East and North African tourism as a paradox in that it challenges the typical ideas of tourist-host relationships.

**Political Violence & Tourism**

Neumayer defines political violence as “the exercise of physical force with the intention to harm the welfare of physical integrity of the victim… that is politically motivated and can be exercised by governmental or antigovernmental groups.” Modern mass tourists tend to long for relaxing, safe, and unconcerned vacations when they travel. Since they are only willing to travel to a place if they know they will be safe, political violence can dissuade tourists from visiting a specific area. In response to political violence, tourists may choose to travel to an alternate destination with similar characteristics as the destination in which the political violence is taking place, or they may choose to forgo foreign travel altogether. This can lead to local authorities advising against travel and even tour operators suspending tours to the affected area.

Decline in tourism can have a tremendous impact on the hosts as well as the tourists. For instance, beach vendors in Bali were hit hard by the loss of tourism as a result of the 10/12 terrorist bombings in Bali. They reported, in order of descending importance, “loss of income/revenue, stress/depression, more crime, religious tensions, [and] greater competition” as the main consequences they suffered from the bombings. The impact of political violence on tourism, however, is dependent upon the type of tourism that is marketed. Countries that market easily substitutable tourism will be affected by political violence more than countries that have unique tourism characteristics that cannot readily be found elsewhere.
The Tourist-Host Relationship

In most forms of typical modern tourism, the tourists and tourist industry have significantly more power to control tourism than do the hosts. In other words, because tour operators are usually responsible for “promotion, packaging, and transportation of tourists,” they hold much control over tourism. In many instances, the tourist industry may abuse this power in order to force the host nations to meet their needs, thereby displaying their powerful position. For instance, tour operators may refuse to promote a specific area, promote a substitute area in response, and even threaten to cease tours if their demands are not met in regards to commodifying their culture. Since, as previously noted, many nations rely heavily on tourism economically, they are powerless to the demands of the tourist industry and it becomes mandatory that they commodify.

Furthermore, people have gone as far as to suggest that tourism is a more modern form of imperialism. This is because the host destination tends to be very adaptive to tourism. Nash notes that “[t]ouristic expansion takes place according to the needs and resources of productive centers and their people.” He then goes on to describe how the hosts serve while the tourists relax and focus on themselves. These attributes parallel that of early colonialism, highlighting the gap in power between hosts and locals. Nevertheless, this power gap can be transcended based on certain cultural and environmental advantages, local control of tourism, and resistance to commodification.

The Tourist Industry’s Response to Physical Violence

The tourist industry in the Middle East has had to combat many instances of political violence. For example, the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict has sparked many occurrences of instability, such as the Six Day War of 1967, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and the first Intifada of 1987. Each of these had an impact on tourism to the MENA region in some way. Other events such as terrorist attacks targeting tourists have been prevalent throughout the region. Headlines along the lines of “Three bombs rip through Egypt resort,” “British tourist killed in Amman gun attack,” “Suicide Bomber Attacks Tourists at Yemen Temple, Killing 9,” “Terrorist attacks kill 90 wound hundreds at Sharm el-Sheikh resort,” and “Dozens of Israeli tourists killed in bomb attacks on Red Sea resorts” have been fairly commonplace in the region, thereby dissuading tourism.

Nevertheless, tourism has shown remarkable growth in the region, which can be attributed to three main factors. First, tourism promotion has shown a shift with more emphasis being placed on marketing to other Arab countries. Furthermore, the tourist industry has combat by marketing the GME as a safe and accessible place to visit. Finally, tourism development in the region has been more focused on developing enclave tourist sites. The tourist industry throughout the MENA is fighting to make tourism sustainable in what is seen as an unstable region.
1. Promotion of Intra-Arab Tourism

As a direct result of political violence, GME nations have shown an inclination towards promoting their tourism to potential Gulf tourists rather than to potential Western tourists. Mansfeld hypothesizes that Arab tourists will be less reluctant to visit an area rife with political violence than their foreign counterparts. This is both because Arab tourists are more familiar with the region in general, and because their risk assessment in the region is based less on the image conveyed by Western media and more on real life facts.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, many MENA people visiting Europe and North America felt the increasing stigma of ‘Islamophobia’. Because the hijackers were of Arab descent, these tourists were subject to more security checks and bureaucratic hassles, and many of them were even racially profiled. As a result, “by the summer of 2002, a sizable proportion of these… travelers decided to forgo travel to Europe or the United States and instead headed for destinations in other Arab states.” This prompted more intra-Arab tourism promotion and as a result saved the national tourist industries of many nations throughout the region after 9/11.

2. Promotion of the Region as Safe

Although the trend lately has been to market tourism to other regional visitors, foreign visitors are still heavily marketed. In these cases, the industries of the Greater Middle East have sought to extensively promote the region as safe and accessible. These countries, because of their authoritarian pasts, have considerable local control over their national tourist industries. They are able to use this control when advertising tourists to foreign visitors. Through advertising, the tourist industries have projected images of “domestic tranquility” to their foreign markets. This is done with the hope that foreign tourists will not be too fearful to visit the area.

3. Development of Enclave Tourism

Not only has the opening of borders been a result of political violence in the Middle East and North Africa, but some places have also seen extreme tourism development in the form of enclave tourism. Enclave tourism is defined as a clustering process that limits the interaction between tourists and locals but at the same time expands the scope of available tourist activities. Enclave characteristics are large numbers of hotels and other facilities built within a confined space and typically on a beach or shoreline. These enclaves help to protect tourists from political violence.

Dubai, an area that has achieved unparalleled growth in the tourism sector, is perhaps the best example of a successful enclave. In 2002 alone, Dubai saw a rise of over 30% in visitors, making it the fastest-growing tourist destination in the world. Dubai has been able to use this popularity to influence development in other areas throughout the GME as well as project a positive image of the region to outsiders. In fact, the emirate’s defining image is the seven-star Burj al Arab hotel, which is an ode to tourism’s influence in the area and its ability to withstand
political violence\textsuperscript{47}.

**IS MENA TOURISM A PARADOX?**

Despite many instances of political violence that would seemingly truncate tourism to and throughout the greater Middle East, the region has seen a consistent growth in tourism numbers. This is due in part to its unique balance between enclaves and non-substitutable tourism sites. The MENA is home to a variety of high-value, globally known tourist sites that include but are not limited to: the Pyramids and Luxor in Egypt, the rock-carved facades in Jordan, the Roman ruins in Turkey, and the various Biblical and historical holy sites in Israel, Palestine, and Jordan\textsuperscript{48}. These sites, coupled with beachside enclaves, create an appealing balance for tourists. Tourists who want to visit non-substitutable sites--while desiring to be safe from political violence--can choose to vacation in the enclave destinations and take day trips to visit the high-value sites. In this way, this combination prevents the substitution effect from taking place.

**Challenging Typical Tourist-Host Ideals**

The steps taken by the tourist industry in response to political violence have suggested that GME tourism is an exception to typical tourist-host power relationships. One main attribute of this unbalanced relationship is that the hosts are forced to commodify their culture to fit the needs of tourists. Fortunately, this phenomenon is not as widespread in the Middle East and North Africa as it is in other regions. The uniqueness of the region means that tourists are not attracted to one specific aspect, but rather to the region as a whole. Locals are not pressured by the tourist industry to traditionalize their culture and halt modernization, since it seems that tourists to the region are attracted both to the traditional Arab world (high-value sites) and the modern Arab world (modern beachside enclaves).

Furthermore, the region’s secluded and authoritarian past means that locals have more power to control tourism than they do in other regions. For example, Saudi Arabia has recently introduced the idea of a tourist visa, but so far it has only allowed a few small and highly controlled tour groups to obtain these visas\textsuperscript{49}. This local control over tourism, known as ‘high-value/low-volume’ tourism has proven to be a success in other places in the past, particularly in Bhutan\textsuperscript{50}. The more power locals have in controlling tourism, the more equal the power relationship is between themselves and the tourists.

Another attribute that points towards an unequal power relationship is that the impact of tourism causes extreme unregulated overdevelopment, which can be detrimental to the environment. Case in point, in Costa Rica a lack of regulations has allowed tourism development to surge greatly, causing many environmental problems\textsuperscript{51}. Local wildlife is being destroyed at a quick rate as the country seeks to attract as many tourists as possible\textsuperscript{52}. This poses a problem because tourism is indirectly causing the local comparative advantages to be destroyed, thereby losing what attracts tourists in the first place. While the same fate may seem inevitable for
modern enclaves such as Dubai, the local control as previously mentioned creates strict developmental regulations, thereby avoiding environmental degradation.

CONCLUSION

Due to the Greater Middle East’s historical policy of seclusion and recent border liberalization, tourism as an economic market in the region is still very young. Because the region contains nearly a majority of the world’s oil, economic development has been based around the oil industry rather than the tourism industry. After various oil crises in the 1980s, and even more so after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the region has sought to diversify their economic markets. The great economic advantages of tourism around the world are evident, and the Middle East has recently joined in reaping these advantages. Unfortunately, political violence is quite widespread in the Greater Middle East, and was intensified even more by border liberalization. Wars, terrorism, and violations of human rights are commonplace in the region and can potentially deter tourists from visiting, which consequently hampers local economies.

Tourist industries have implemented three main strategies to sustain tourism in this unsafe region. Promotion of tourism to visitors living in other MENA countries has increased, saving local economies in times of need. Also, there are still some foreign markets to which MENA tourism is being promoted, and in these cases the region is promoted by local industries as being safe and accessible. Finally, a developmental shift has been seen recently, going towards the development of beachside enclave resorts that keep tourists safe.

These strategies have all worked together to economically sustain tourism in a region that may be considered unsafe. Moreover, the region can be seen as a touristic success in that the tourist-host relationship here is more equal than that of other regions. This equality can be traced to a lack of commodification of culture, as well as local control over tourism and development.

On February 20, 2009, a bomb went off in Cairo’s Hussein Square, wounding 24 people; including 13 French citizens, 3 Saudis, and 4 Egyptians, as well as killing a French girl. Conlin, a writer for the travel section of the New York Times, was looking over pictures from her recent trip to Cairo with her 17 year-old daughter, when she realized she had been standing in the very same spot that the bomb had gone off just 4 days earlier. Apprehending that she had just come close to being a victim of political violence while vacationing in the MENA, one would assume that she would decide not to go back to Cairo. Conlin, however, epitomizes the paradox of tourism to the Greater Middle East when she says, “we will indeed return. Of that I am sure.” This case is only one exemplification of how the uniqueness of the Middle East and North Africa along with strategies implemented in response to political violence come together to lessen the tourist-host gap and create economically sustainable tourism that overcomes political instability.
ENDNOTES

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