

A Paradox of the Red States and Blue States: Federal Spending and Electoral Votes in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election

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Abstract: Thirty of the U.S. states reap more in federal spending than their citizens contribute to the federal government in taxes. The other 20 states provide more in taxes than they receive in spending. In the 2000 U.S. presidential election, George W. Bush won most of the states that are net beneficiaries of federal spending programs, while Al Gore won most of the states that are net contributors to federal spending. A state's ratio of federal spending to tax dollars, particularly non-defense spending, is a statistically and substantively significant predictor of Bush's margin of victory across the states. A state's per capita federal tax burden is also associated with the election result: states with higher tax burdens gave higher vote margins to Gore. Compared to Clinton's state-by-state vote shares in 1996, Gore did worse in states that gained in federal spending per tax dollar from 1998 to 2000.

In the wake of the 2000 U. S. presidential election, pundits and journalists have written much about the "Two Americas:" The red states on the Electoral College map that voted for George W. Bush, and the blue states that voted for Al Gore. The shading of the states on Electoral College scoreboards on election night showed an unmistakable pattern: Bush won a swath of states through the South, Great Plains, and Rocky Mountains while Gore won the Northeast, Great Lakes, and Pacific Coast (see Figure 1). *Boston Globe* reporter Mike Barnicle, appearing on MSNBC, dubbed the Bush states the "family values" states and the Gore states "the sense of entitlement" states. Paul Begala later responded that the Bush states were home to hate crimes, setting off a frenzy of op-ed pieces about the differences between Bush's America and Gore's America. More recently, David Brooks penned a piece in *The Atlantic Monthly* based on visits to a prototypical red community (Franklin County, Pennsylvania) and blue community (Montgomery County, Maryland).

Journalistic claims of differences between the red and blue states are often exaggerated for effect, and inferring the characteristics of individual voters in each state from its color on the electoral map is a classic case of the ecological fallacy: Knowing how a group of individuals voted does not tell us much about how different individuals within the group voted. But the institution of the Electoral College makes comparisons of states salient. In presidential elections, Americans cast their votes as states, not as individuals. Presidential campaigns focus on Electoral College votes, and it is clear that some states are fundamentally different from others, not least in their propensity to cast votes for Democrats or Republicans.

Mike Barnicle's characterization of the red and blue states provides an interesting and, depending on one's perspective, intuitive starting point for explaining Bush's margin of victory (or loss) across states. If Barnicle is correct that Gore states are "entitlement" states, then we might expect that the states won by Al Gore receive the most in federal spending compared to the tax revenues they send to Washington. In short, Gore's states may be net beneficiaries of federal government spending while Bush's states may be net contributors to the federal government. It would make sense that the states that lose money to the federal government would be more likely to vote for the candidate who promised to cut taxes and reduce the scope of government, and that the states that gain from the federal government would support the candidate who would protect or increase federal spending.

The evidence shows that such a story is exactly backwards. In a curious paradox of the Electoral College, Bush won most of the states that benefit from federal spending, while Gore won most of the states that bankroll the federal government. Perhaps more interesting, the states in which Al Gore did worse than Bill Clinton did in 1996 are the states that increased their net take from the federal government in the two years leading up to the 2000 election. These curious empirical patterns hold under several different perspectives on the data, and they raise an interesting puzzle about Electoral College votes and federal spending.

Explaining Variation in the State-Level Vote

Residents of a state may not realize exactly how much they receive in federal dollars for every dollar in taxes they send to Washington, but the product of those federal

dollars—public works projects, military bases, salaries and wages, and even retirement and disability income—are readily observable. Calculating a state’s federal tax burden and federal spending benefits are fairly straightforward given data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Tax Foundation. For FY 2000, the Tax Foundation calculates the federal tax per capita paid from each state (Moody 2001). The Bureau of the Census provides per capita federal spending in each state, broken down by a number of spending types and federal agencies (U.S. Census Bureau 2001). The Tax Foundation, using Census data, further calculates a federal spending to tax ratio for each state, which represents the amount of federal spending for each dollar received from the state in taxes.¹

In 2000, as in 1998, 30 states received more in federal spending than they sent to Washington in taxes. The number of net beneficiaries from federal spending is perhaps a curious coincidence or perhaps an invidious indicator of the politics of redistribution. If the activities of Congress could be defined as taking money from some to give to others, then in order to make any forced redistribution pass the Senate, a Filibuster-proof majority of 60 Senators (or 30 states) would need to benefit. Political-economic models of redistribution tell us that potential beneficiaries of forced redistribution would form a minimum winning coalition – just enough votes to ensure passage of their redistribution plan, but no more (Riker 1962). The fact that 30 states are net beneficiaries of federal spending while 19 are net contributors fits neatly with such a simple model of forced

¹ The Tax Foundation is an independent, bipartisan research organization, though it does advocate tax reduction and simplification. The Foundation’s tax numbers are widely-used by researchers. To calculate the spending to tax ratio, the Tax Foundation removes budget deficits or surpluses by scaling total revenues received from the states to match total federal expenditures. This adjustment does not significantly change the states’ relative rankings on the spending to tax ratio, but it does reduce the number of states that appear to receive more in federal spending than they pay in taxes, given the budget of FY 2000. Using the Tax Foundation-adjusted spending to tax ratios, 30 states in FY 2000 were net beneficiaries of federal spending. Using unadjusted ratios, only 16 states were.

redistribution. One state, Florida, receives one dollar for every dollar it sends to Washington, making it the pivotal state in the line at the pork barrel, just as was in the Electoral College.

Figure 2 shows the net contributors to the federal government as the shaded states; the net recipients, the unshaded states. The Northeast and Midwest clearly bankroll the South and Great Plains. The pattern of shaded and unshaded states also looks curiously like the pattern on the Electoral College map. In fact, the relationship between the states that voted for Bush and the states that are net beneficiaries of federal spending is strong by any measure ($\chi^2=6.04, p<.02$).

Table 1 puts the relationship between the Electoral College and the distribution of federal dollars in sharper perspective. Of the 30 states that receive more from Washington than they put in, 22 voted for George W. Bush; 23 out of 31 if Florida is included. All of the states that both voted for Bush and receive more money than they put into the federal government are in the South, Great Plains, or West (including Alaska). Of the 19 states that put in more than they receive from the federal government, 12 voted for Gore, most of them in the Northeast and Great Lakes. The bulk of Gore's electoral votes came from California, New York, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, all of which lose more in federal taxes than they gain in federal spending. States in the off-diagonal cells—net beneficiaries that voted for Gore and net contributors that voted for Bush—tend to have tax to spending ratios very close to 1.0.

These are rough numbers that put states in “either/or” categories that may overestimate the extent of the relationship between federal spending and electoral votes. To better assess the spending-votes link, I estimate a series of regressions of Bush's

margin of victory in a state on different measures of a state's benefit from federal spending.² The first of these regressions, reported in Table 2, shows that as a state's ratio of federal spending to taxes increases, Bush's margin of victory increases.³ Substantively, the regression shows that Bush's margin over Gore increases by 20 percentage points for every dollar in spending per dollar of tax that the state receives. Put another way, Bush's margin goes up by 2 percentage points for every additional dime of federal spending in a state per dollar of taxes paid by that state.

Lumping all federal spending together may paint a distorted picture of the relationship between spending and votes. It may be that the Bush states receive most of their federal return on the dollar in the form of defense spending, especially given the relatively larger military presence in the South and Mountain West than in the Northeast or Great Lakes. To examine this possibility, I define two separate ratios of federal spending per tax dollar: One ratio for the amount spent by the Department of Defense per state, including military salaries and procurements, and another for the non-defense dollars spent per state. Putting both of these variables in the regression model pushes the paradox of federal spending even further: There is no relationship between defense spending per state and the state's Electoral College vote. However, the relationship between non-defense spending and the vote becomes even stronger: States that benefit the most from non-defense spending (from retirement and welfare payments to farm subsidies to highway construction) give even higher margins to Bush. For each

² "Margin of victory" is defined as Bush's percentage of the vote in a state minus Gore's percentage of the vote, ranging from a maximum value of 43.4 in Utah to -31.2 in Rhode Island, with the District of Columbia omitted. Margin of victory has a value of 0 in Florida and New Mexico.

³ The ratio reported by the Tax Institute is a state's adjusted federal spending per capita divided by its per capita tax burden, ranging from a high of 2.3 in New Mexico to .6 in Connecticut. I delete the District of Columbia from the analysis since its spending:tax ratio of 6.5 is clearly an outlier with tremendous leverage in any statistical model.

additional 10 cents per dollar that the federal government spends in a state, Bush's margin increases by over 2.9 percentage points.

A final way to look at the data is to disaggregate the ratio of spending to taxes into its constituent parts. The third column of Table 2 presents the results when Bush's margin of victory is regressed on a state's per capita tax burden, per capita defense spending, and per capita non-defense spending. With these variables, the denominator is a state's population rather than federal tax dollars. Both spending variables are no longer statistically significant, and the sign on non-defense spending becomes negative, meaning that additional non-defense spending decreases Bush's margin of victory. The real effect of federal finances on vote shares comes from tax burden. States that have a higher per capita federal tax burden have more Gore voters; states with a lower per capita federal tax burden have more Bush voters. A \$1,000 per person increase in federal taxes indicates a 7.6 percentage point decline in Bush's vote margin. This result is indeed curious since Bush campaigned on a platform of lowering taxes and reducing spending. This message appears to have been best received in states that have low tax burdens already. Voters in states with higher per capita federal tax burdens, concentrated in the Northeast and Great Lakes, were less receptive.⁴

The paradoxical relationship between federal spending levels and votes for Bush may be an artifact of Congress. Republicans in the House and Senate may be funneling federal dollars back to Republican states and congressional districts. Republicans may also spend more federal dollars in states with Republican governors in order to bolster

⁴ All results hold even if I add a state's population as a control variable. The results are also not sensitive to outliers other than D.C. All results hold when I delete outlying observations or random samples of 5 and 10 observations.

their popularity.⁵ An easy test of this hypothesis is to control for the proportion of Republicans in a state's Senate and House delegations, as well as whether a Republican held the state's governorship at the time of the 2000 election.⁶ Results from the model appear in Table 3, where federal spending per state is measured in the first data column by the ratio of defense and non-defense spending to tax dollars, and, in the second data column, by the per capita levels of federal taxes paid, federal defense spending, and federal non-defense spending. In both columns it is clear that the proportion of Republicans in a state's House delegation is positively associated with Bush's margin of victory; the number of Republicans in a Senate delegation, less so. More importantly, in both models the level of federal spending in a state remains statistically and substantively significant. The ratio of federal spending per dollar of tax revenue from a state is positively related to Bush's margin: More federal spending per tax dollar is associated with a higher Bush vote. In the second model, a higher federal tax burden is negatively associated with Bush's margin: States with a higher per capita tax burden give Al Gore more votes. Spending levels are not statistically significant.

As another check on the robustness of the relationship between a state's financial gain from the federal government and its vote in the 2000 election, I add a control for the proportion of the state's vote earned by Bill Clinton in 1996. This is yet another measure of the partisan balance in a state. Controlling for Clinton's vote, we find again that a state's contribution to the federal government—measured by ratio of federal spending to tax dollars or by separate measures of tax burden and spending—is closely associated

⁵ I code Independent governors, Senators, and House members as half Republican, but doing so does not affect the results.

⁶ I use post-2000 election measures of Republican strength in the Congress and the governor's mansions in order to capture the Republican-ness of a state on Election Day 2000. The results are the same if I measure Republican strength using 1998 numbers.

with Bush's margin in 2000. The connection between federal spending per district and Bush's vote is remarkably robust. Even controlling for a state's past presidential vote does not wipe out the relationship.

Controlling for Clinton's margin of victory does wipe out the effect of the Republicans' proportion of delegates to the House and Senate from a state. It is a state's proportion of Republican voters, not its proportion of Republican leaders, that determines Bush's margin.

Another perspective on the relationship between a state's representation in Congress, its prior presidential vote, and its level of federal spending comes from turning federal spending into the variable to be explained. With the ratio of federal spending to tax dollars as the dependent variable in Table 4, it is clear that the state's proportion of Republicans in the House or Senate, and whether the state's governor is Republican, has no explanatory value. Clinton's vote share in 1996 does, however, explain the state's ratio of spending to taxes, but the relationship is the opposite of what one would expect if Clinton were "paying off" states that supported him in 1996. Instead, higher Clinton vote shares in 1996 are associated with lower ratios of spending to tax dollars in a state in 2000. Similarly, in column 3, a higher Clinton vote in 1996 is associated with a higher per capita federal tax burden in 2000.

The results from the regression models all point to the same curious paradox. George W. Bush beat Al Gore in states that are net beneficiaries of federal spending and in which per capita federal taxes are low. Al Gore did better than Bush in states that have higher per capita federal tax levels and that are net contributors to the federal government. This relationship is not an artifact of the Republican congressional

delegations from pro-Bush states directing more federal spending to their states. The paradox holds even controlling for presidential vote shares from 1996.

Yet Another Paradox

Ratios of federal spending to tax dollars per state are not fixed over time. From 1998 to 2000, Maine, Iowa, Connecticut, Washington, and Colorado each lost over seven cents in federal spending per tax dollar. Meanwhile, Idaho, Mississippi, Alabama, North Dakota, and Alaska each gained over 20 cents in federal spending for each tax dollar sent to Washington. The correlation between a state's ratio of spending to tax dollars in 2000 is correlated with the change in its ratio from 1998 to 2000 at only .64.

Interestingly, states with declining ratios of federal spending to tax dollars also had declining levels of support for the democratic presidential candidate from 1996 to 2000. Table 5 presents the results from regressing a state's difference in the Democratic presidential vote share from 2000 to 1996 on the difference in the federal spending to tax ratio and the difference in per capita tax burden between 2000 and 1998. Ross Perot's vote share in 1996 is a control variable since changes in Democratic fortunes in a state may have been a product of Perot's previous voters switching to the major parties disproportionately, especially after Perot's last-minute endorsement of Bush in 2000. It is clear that Perot's 1996 vote has no effect on declining Democratic vote shares, nor does the change in tax burden. The null result for the change in per capita tax indicates that the Democrats did not lose votes in states due to rising tax burdens.

The only statistically significant explanation for the decline in Democratic votes is the change in the ratio of federal spending to taxes. Gore did worse than Clinton in

states that had increasing ratios of federal spending to taxes from 1998 to 2000. Every dime per dollar gained in federal spending between 1998 and 2000 is associated with a two percentage point decline in the Democratic presidential vote. Florida was one such state, losing two cents in federal spending per tax dollar from 1998 to 2000.

The data show a clear dual relationship between federal spending and electoral votes in 2000: Al Gore fared worse in states that benefit the most from federal spending programs, or at least pay the lowest per capita in federal taxes, and Gore's underperformance compared to Clinton in 1996 was worse in states that increased their share of federal spending since 1998. These apparent facts about federal spending and electoral votes are robust to a host of controls and counter-arguments.

Discussion

The results so far are facts in search of an explanation. There is no clear theoretical reason to expect an incumbent party's presidential candidate to lose in states that benefit from federal spending, and there is certainly no reason to expect that the party's state-by-state decline in vote share would be associated with increases in federal spending per state. If anything, theories of government as an electorally-motivated redistributor of income point to the expectation that voters in states that benefit the most from federal spending should vote for the party that promises more spending, or at least for incumbents who have delivered that spending.

Very little research has examined the historical relationship between federal spending and electoral votes, save for several studies of the allocation of New Deal programs (Anderson and Tollison 1991; Arrington 1970; Couch and Shugart 1998;

Reading 1973; Wallis 1987, 1998; Wright 1974). There is no theoretical guide to why Gore did worse in the states that consume federal expenditures and better in the states that bankroll the federal government.

One possibility is that after the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, voters in states that benefit from federal spending gave credit to the Republican party and its presidential candidate. In Table 4, controlling for the proportion of Republicans in a state's congressional delegation should test this hypothesis. The result is that the proportion of Republicans in a congressional delegation is not closely related to federal spending levels. Furthermore, most of the states that benefit from federal spending were voting Republican well before 1994.

Another possibility is historical. By some accounts, Roosevelt's New Deal programs were targeted to help big city mayors and Southern governors, two groups of elites critical to Roosevelt's multiple re-elections. If federal spending today is largely tied to original New Deal allocations, then it could be the case that Democratic presidential candidates benefited from federal spending until Southern states, which are net beneficiaries of federal spending, switched allegiance to the Republican party after the 1960s. Such an explanation leaves out the Great Plains and Rocky Mountain states, who pulled in large sums of federal spending throughout the New Deal and Great Society. It is also not clear why New England states, Republican a generation ago, would switch allegiance to the party that had redistributed their taxes to other parts of the country.

Still another possible explanation rests on misinformed voters. It could be that the states, and voters, that benefit most from federal spending do not realize their gains and

instead believe that their tax dollars subsidize someone else. Many pundits and journalists seem to believe that liberal, Northeastern states pull funds out of the federal government for entitlements, welfare, pork barrel projects, and other spending programs. Yet few pundits speak of the large agricultural and welfare spending in Southern and Great Plains states. It could be that Southerners do not realize they are net beneficiaries of federal spending, nor that Northeasterners realize that they lose money to federal spending. It is difficult to imagine, however, that voters would remain misinformed.⁷

Another possible explanation is the opposite of the misinformed voters story: Residents of states that receive more in federal spending than they pay in taxes may live closer to the effects of such spending and want to cut it. It could be that voters in the states that benefit from federal spending see such spending negatively. In the Mountain West, some federal spending takes the form of frequently-reviled national forests and water projects. In the South, some voters may believe that they benefit little from federal spending while other residents of their state benefit a lot. If this explanation is true, why would voters in the Northeast continue to vote for sending their tax dollars to other states.

Similarly, the relationship between federal spending and Electoral votes could be an artifact of examining states rather than individual voters. Imagine a state with a high ratio (greater than 1.0) of federal spending to tax dollars. Suppose that less than half of the residents of the state receive more in federal dollars than they pay in taxes, but the half that receives subsidies more than makes up for the half that do not, such that the


⁷ The paradox of federal spending and Electoral votes finds mention only once in the popular press, at the end of a little-known article: “Middle America may not even, alas, be a haven of rugged individualism. Midwestern voters who tell pollsters that they favor small government are in no rush to give up farm subsidies. One little-known irony of political geography is that the more conservative states tend to be among the top feeders at the federal trough. Bush won 25 (*sic*) of the 31 states that get more in subsidies from the federal government than they pay in taxes.” (Young 2001).

subsidized population must be receiving some federal dollars from out of state. It could be that the subsidized voters in the state voted for Gore, while the majority—the voters who lose money to taxes—voted for Bush. In states that lose money from taxes, a majority of voters might still benefit from federal spending while a small and substantially-taxed minority lose money. The over-taxed minority may vote for Bush while the net recipients of federal spending vote for Gore. This explanation presumes that federal spending in a state produces benefits almost exclusively for the people who directly receive federal payments. It ignores the possibility that individuals who are net contributors to the federal government may receive indirect benefits from spending, such as payments (in wages or purchases) from individuals who are direct recipients of federal dollars. The explanation also leaves a question unanswered: Why do states with higher federal tax burdens vote for Gore, independent of per capita federal spending in the state, while states with lower tax burdens vote for Bush?

Adjudicating among these competing explanations is beyond the scope of the paper, and beyond the scope of existing data. To pursue an explanation based on the behavior of individual voters, we would need data on the taxes paid and federal spending received by individual voters. Measuring a voter's level of benefit from federal spending—including highway use, benefits from defense spending, use of public lands, and money earned from people who rely on federal subsidies, to name a few—is a daunting task.

Whatever the reason, the vote shares of the major party candidates in the 2000 presidential election are closely related to federal taxes and spending.

2000 Electoral College Vote



Federal Spending, 2000




Table 1: Electoral College Outcomes and the Distribution of Federal Spending, 2000

| States | Bush Won | Gore Won | Total |
|-------------------------------------|--|---|-------|
| Net Beneficiary of Federal Spending | <u>22</u> Alabama Arkansas Kentucky Louisiana Mississippi Missouri North Carolina South Carolina Tennessee Virginia West Virginia Alaska Arizona Idaho Kansas Montana Nebraska North Dakota Oklahoma South Dakota Utah Wyoming | <u>8</u> Pennsylvania Maine Maryland Rhode Island Vermont Iowa New Mexico Hawaii | 30 |
| Break-Even | Florida | | 1 |
| Net Contributor to Federal Spending | <u>7</u> New Hampshire Georgia Texas Indiana Ohio Colorado Nevada | <u>12</u> Connecticut Delaware Massachusetts New Jersey New York Illinois Michigan Minnesota Wisconsin California Oregon Washington | 19 |
| Total | 30 | 20 | 50 |

Table 2: Bush's Margin of Victory is Higher in States that Gain from Federal Spending or Have Lower Tax Burdens

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Constant | -18.78* (8.55) | -19.36* (8.63) | 77.06* (20.26) |
| Total Federal Spending per Tax Dollar, FY 2000 | 20.49* (7.12) | | |
| Defense Spending per Tax Dollar, FY 2000 | | -4.67 (26.44) | |
| Non-Defense Spending Per Tax Dollar, FY 2000 | | 24.65* (8.27) | |
| Tax Burden Per Capita, FY 2000 | | | -.0076* (.0016) |
| Defense Spending Per Capita, FY 2000 | | | .0017 (.0035) |
| Non-Defense Spending Per Capita, FY 2000 | | | -.0049 (.0034) |
| Number of Cases | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| R ² | .15 | .16 | .33 |
| Adjusted R ² | .13 | .13 | .29 |
| Root MSE | 16.97 | 16.98 | 15.37 |

Note: Entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. * indicates $p < .05$, two-tailed.

Data Source: U.S. Bureau of Census (2001) and Moody (2001).

Table 3: Bush's Margin of Victory is Higher in States that Gain from Federal Spending or Have Lower Tax Burdens, Controlling for Republicans in Congress and Governorships

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|---|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Constant | -40.92* (7.88) | 36.18* (18.32) | 102.85* (11.10) | 131.57* (10.91) |
| Defense Spending per Tax Dollar, FY 2000 | 1.69 (20.52) | | -16.39 (9.09) | |
| Non-Defense Spending per Tax Dollar, FY 2000 | 21.66* (6.18) | | 12.34* (2.80) | |
| Tax Per Capita, FY 2000 | | -.0062* (.0014) | | -.0029* (.0007) |
| Defense Spending Per Capita, FY 2000 | | .0031 (.0029) | | -.0013 (.0013) |
| Non Defense Spending Per Capita, FY 2000 | | -.0032 (.0028) | | -.0001 (.0013) |
| Republican Governor, 1998 | 2.41 (4.12) | 6.02 (4.02) | -.69 (1.82) | .87 (1.84) |
| Number of Republicans in U.S. Senate Delegation, 1998 | 5.53* (2.47) | 3.25 (2.44) | .40 (1.15) | -.49 (1.13) |
| Proportion of Republicans in U.S. House, 1998 | 28.95* (6.11) | 27.09* (5.84) | 2.67 (3.30) | 2.70 (3.19) |
| Clinton's 1996 Vote Share | | | -2.32* (.17) | -2.26* (.17) |
| Number of Cases | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| R ² | .57 | .62 | .92 | .93 |
| Adjusted R ² | .52 | .57 | .91 | .91 |
| Root MSE | 12.60 | 11.99 | 5.53 | 5.35 |

Note: Entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. * indicates $p < .05$, two-tailed.

Data Source: U.S. Bureau of Census (2001) and Moody (2001).

Table 4: Federal Spending in the States is Not Determined by Congressional Delegation, But is Related to Clinton's Vote Share in 1996

| | Defense Spending Per Tax Dollar | Non-Defense Spending per Tax Dollar | Tax Burden Per Capita |
|---|------------------------------------|---|--------------------------|
| Constant | .38* (.16) | 1.99* (.51) | 2396.36 (2205.18) |
| Republican Governor, 1998 | -.056 (.029) | -.009 (.096) | 370.91 (410.36) |
| Number of Republicans in U.S. Senate Delegation, 1998 | -.00004 (.019) | -.004 (.062) | -264.72 (268.60) |
| Proportion of Republicans in U.S. House Delegation, 1998 | -.07 (.05) | -.20 (.18) | 637.68 (753.43) |
| Clinton's 1996 Vote Share | -.004 (.003) | -.018* (.009) | 82.71* (37.88) |
| Number of Cases | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| R ² | .12 | .09 | .20 |
| Adjusted R ² | .04 | .01 | .12 |
| Root MSE | .09 | .30 | 1295.7 |

Note: Entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. * indicates $p < .05$, two-tailed.

Data Source: U.S. Bureau of Census (2001) and Moody (2001).

Table 5: State Gains in Federal Spending per Tax Dollar Explain Gore's Decline in Vote Relative to Clinton in 1996

| Explanatory Variable | Estimate |
|---|-------------------|
| Constant | 1.83 (2.13) |
| Spending Per Tax Dollar in 2000 – Spending Per Tax Dollar in 1998 | -21.61* (6.55) |
| Per Capita Tax Burden in 2000 – Per Capita Tax Burden in 1998 | -.0033 (.0028) |
| Perot's Share of Vote in 1996 | -.10 (.23) |
| Number of Cases | 50 |
| R ² | .22 |
| Adjusted R ² | .17 |
| Root MSE | 3.30 |

Note: Dependent Variable is Gore's percentage of vote – Clinton's percentage of Vote. Entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. * indicates $p < .05$, two-tailed.

Data Source: U.S. Bureau of Census (2001) and Moody (2001).

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