Government 50.02 Civil War, Insurgency, and the International Response

Dartmouth College Fall 2018

Prof. Jeff Friedman
Office hours: Mondays, 3:00-5:00pm

x-period Th 12:15-1:05

MWF 10:10-11:15

Silsby 224

Location TBA

This course examines why civil wars begin, how they are fought, how they end, and what the international community can do to mitigate their cost. We use these ideas to explore prominent conflicts, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, Malaya, Colombia, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, and Congo. We ask how effectively the United States, the United Nations, and other actors have responded to these conflicts, and what lessons we can draw for responding to future challenges. Specific topics include the theory and practice of insurgency and counterinsurgency; successes and failures of international peacekeeping; the role of ethnicity and religion; and the relationship between civil conflict and economic development.

The course has four units. Unit 1 discusses why civil wars begin. Unit 2 describes how civil wars are fought, focusing especially on contemporary debates about counterinsurgency. Unit 3 studies how civil wars end, and why some civil war outcomes are more damaging than others. Unit 4 applies these concepts to cases, examining how well our theories of civil war help to structure analysis of complex events.

Requirements

The main assignment for this course is to write a research paper explaining why a civil war was fought and what might have done to prevent it. As part of the research process for this paper, students will also complete shorter "policy memos" that evaluate the strategies employed by the rebels and the state in the conflict they have chosen. The course website contains more details on each assignment.

Final paper. Choose any civil war that is not the subject of a class lecture. Explain why the conflict was fought and what the state and/or the international community could have done to avert the conflict or mitigate its cost. (10-12 pages, 35 percent of final grade.)

Rebel strategy memo. Provide advice to the rebel movement at the start of the war. Describe the group's strategic options and explain what approach you believe they should pursue. (3 pages, 15 percent of final grade.)

State strategy memo. Provide advice to the state (or to an international actor involved in the conflict) at the start of the war. Describe the group's strategic options and explain what approach you believe they should pursue. (3 pages, 15 percent of final grade.)

Paper prospectus. Provide a brief description of the argument you plan to make in your final paper; say how your argument differs from other prominent perspectives on the war; and describe the source base you will use to substantiate your argument. (2 pages, 3 percent of final grade.)

Hour exam. The course does not have a final exam. Instead, there will be an hour-length test during the last unit of the course, worth 25 percent of students' final grades.

Unit 1. How Civil Wars Begin

Iraq: Summer 2006

James D. Fearon, "Iraq's Civil War," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 86, no. 2 (March/April 2007), pp. 2-15

Stephen D. Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006), pp. 2-14

Explaining the Origins of Civil War I: Motivation and Opportunity

Paul Collier, V. L. Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict Trap* (World Bank, 2003), pp. <u>53-79</u>

Paul Collier, "The Market for Civil War," Foreign Policy, no. 136 (May/June, 2003), pp. 38-45

Michael L. Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases," *International Organization*, vol. 58, no. 1 (Winter, 2004), pp. 35-67

Explaining the Origins of Civil War II: Bargaining Failures

Barbara F. Walter, "Bargaining Failures and Civil War," *Annual Reviews of Political Science*, vol. 12 (2009), pp. 243-261

Stacie E. Goddard, "Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy," *International Organization* vol. 60 (Winter 2006), pp. 35-68

The Role of Religion and Ethnicity

Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring, 1993), pp. <u>27-38</u>

Skim: John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'," *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer, 2000), pp. 42-70

Optional: Susan Hayward, "Religion and Peacebuilding," U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 313 (August, 2012), 8pp.

Surveying the Arab Spring

Jack A. Goldstone, "Understanding the Revolutions of 2011," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 90, no. 3 (May/June, 2011), pp. 8-16

Sheri Berman, "The Promise of the Arab Spring," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 92, no. 1 (January/February, 2013), pp. 64-74

Optional: F. Gregory Gause III, "Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 90, no. 4 (July/August, 2011), pp. 81-90

Class Discussion of Unit 1

Marc Lynch, *The Arab Uprising* (PublicAffairs, 2012), pp. 101-159. *Optional*: skim pp. 161-192.

Unit 2. How Civil Wars Are Fought

Insurgency

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 [FM 3-24], *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (2014), Part II, "Insurgencies," 28 pp.

Skim the following descriptions of how some particular effective rebel groups fight and organize:

Olga Oliker, Russia's Chechen Wars, 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat (RAND, 2001), pp. 5-32.

Jeffrey Dressler and Carl Forsberg, "The Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan," Institute for the Study of War Backgrounder (December, 2009), 9pp.

Globalsecurity.org, "Sudan People's Liberation Army," ~8pp.

International Crisis Group, "Nepal's Maoists: Their Aims, Structure, and Strategy," Asia Report 104 (October, 2005), pp. 1-2, 7-26.

Counterinsurgency

FM 3-24, *Insurgency and Countering Insurgency* pp. 1-19 to 1-22, 7-1 to 7-4, 9-1 to 9-10. Skim the rest of Part III and use that as a reference for your papers.

Robert R. Tomes, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Parameters*, vol. 34, no. 1 (Spring, 2004), pp. 16-28

Kalev I. Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, vol. 85, no. 3 (May/June, 2005), pp. 8-12

Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

Greg Jaffe, "As Iraq War Rages, Army Re-Examines Lessons of Vietnam," *Wall Street Journal* (20 March 2006), ~5pp.

Robert M. Cassidy, "Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars," *Parameters*, vol. 34, no. 2 (Summer, 2004), pp. 73-83

Debating the Use of Force in Civil War

Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," *Military Review* vol. 85 (November/December, 2005), pp. 2-15

Ralph Peters, "Progress and Peril: New Counterinsurgency Manual Cheats on the History Exam," *Armed Forces Journal* (February, 2007), ~10pp.

David Petraeus, "Counterinsurgency Guidance," HQ International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan (August, 2010), 4pp.

Jason Motlagh, "Petraeus Toughens Afghan Rules of Engagement," Time, 6 August 2010, 1p.

Governance and Development in Civil Wars

Eli Berman, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Constructive COIN: How Development Can Fight Radicals," *Foreign Affairs online* (June 1, 2010), 4 pp.

Ethan Kapstein and Kamna Kathuria, "Economic Assistance in Conflict Zones: Lessons from Afghanistan," Center for Global Development Policy Paper 013 (October, 2012), 15 pp.

**<u>DUE</u>: Bring a hard copy of your rebel strategy memo to class and submit to Canvas before lecture

Why Are Counterinsurgents Increasingly Likely to Lose?

Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes of Counterinsurgency Wars," *International Organization*, vol. 63, no. 1 (Winter 2009), pp. 67-106

David M. Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *International Security*, vol. 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 49-91

Beyond the Two-Actor Assumption

Stephen Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security*, vol. 22, no. 2 (Fall, 1997), pp. 5-53

Fotini Christia and Michael Semple, "Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 88, no. 4 (2009), pp. 34-45

Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud and Declan Walsh, "Hard-Line Splinter Group, Galvanized by ISIS, Emerges from Pakistani Taliban," *New York Times*, August 24, 2014, 2pp.

Class Discussion of Unit 2

Montgomery McFate, "Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship," *Military Review*, vol. 85, no. 2 (March/April 2005), pp. 24-38

FM 3-24 (2014 version), Chapter 3, "Culture," 6pp.

Ben Connable, Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency (RAND, 2012), pp. 95-101, 106-122, 131-146

Unit 3. How Civil Wars End

Peacekeeping and Negotiated Settlements

Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, "Making Peace Settlements Work," *Foreign Policy*, no. 104 (Autumn, 1996), pp. 54-71

Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization*, vol. 51, no. 3 (Summer, 1997), read pp. <u>335-341</u> and skim the rest.

Check out the UN Peace Operations website, and skim the "Brahimi Report," an influential document discussing challenges with UN peace missions.

Military Victories

Monica Duffy Toft, "Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?" *International Security*, vol. 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010), pp. 7-36

Edward Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999), pp. 36-44

Partition

Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security*, vol. 20 (1996), 136-175

Radha Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition," Foreign Affairs, vol. 76 (1997), pp. 22-34

**<u>DUE</u>: Bring a hard copy of your state strategy memo to class and submit to Canvas before lecture.

Discussion: What Should We Do about Syria?

Project on Middle East Political Science, *The Political Science of Syria's Civil War* (December 2013), read pp. 8-33 and skim the rest.

Unit 4. Applications

The American Indian Wars

Francis Paul Prucha, "The Florida War" in *The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier*, 1783-1846 (Indiana, 1977), pp. 269-306

Colombia and Sierra Leone

International Crisis Group, "War and Drugs in Colombia," Latin America Report 11 (January 2005), 34pp.

James Rupert, "Diamond Hunters Fuel Africa's Brutal Wars," *Washington Post* (16 October 1999), 6pp.

P. W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Cornell, 2003), pp. 3-18, 106-115.

El Salvador and the Congo

Charles T. Call, "Assessing El Salvador's Transition from Civil War to Peace," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elisabeth Cousens eds., *Ending Civil Wars* (Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 543-591

Herbert Weiss, "War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *Current African Issue Papers Series*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2000, 27 pp.

Optional: Alan Doss, "In the Footsteps of Dr. Bunche: The Congo, UN Peacekeeping, and the Use of Force," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, (2014), 33pp.

**<u>DUE</u> before next class: Submit a single document containing your rebel strategy memo, your state strategy memo, and your paper prospectus to Canvas by 6pm on October 31.

Paper Workshop

No assigned readings: read each others' work and prepare feedback for the final paper. You do not need to send written feedback in advance.

Iraq, 2003-2006

PBS Frontline, "Losing Iraq" (see website). For what it's worth, I assume the critical title of this documentary was designed simply to draw interest. The film itself is about as nonpolitical as you can get with this stuff. (And as you'll see, when the US leaves in 2011, Iraq was certainly not "lost"!) There are also supplementary interviews with Petraeus, Crocker, et al. online.

Discussion: Iraq, 2007-Present

PBS Frontline, "The Rise of ISIS" (see website).

<u>Afghanistan</u>

Seth Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency," *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), pp. 7-40

Frances Z. Brown, "The U.S. Surge and Afghan Local Governance," U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 316 (September 2012), 16 pp.

Karl W. Eikenberry, "The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2013), pp. 59-74

Optional: See Eikenberry's memos challenging the strategy in Afghanistan, which were released during the WikiLeaks dump.

Preparing for the Future

Seth G. Jones and Patrick B. Johnston, "The Future of Insurgency," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 36, no. 1 (January 2013), pp. 1-25

Stephen D. Biddle, "Afghanistan's Legacy: Emerging Lessons of an Ongoing War," *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2014), pp. 73-86.

Havard Hegre and Havard Mokleiv Nygard, "Peace on Earth? The Future of Internal Armed Conflict," *Conflict Trends Policy Brief* 1, 3pp.

Discussion of Unit 4/Conclusion

Course Policies

Grades for written work. Students' written work will be evaluated on command of course material and ability to apply that material in thoughtful, creative ways. The median grade for mid-level courses in the Government Department is a B+. In order to receive a higher grade, students must demonstrate that they fully grasp major course concepts and that they can use those concepts effectively.

Last year, the distribution of final grades for this course was: C-range and below (7), B-range (15), A- (7), A (6). There is no curve mandating similar a similar distribution of grades in the future.

Academic honesty. Students are responsible for understanding Dartmouth's rules on academic honesty.

Class attendance is not mandatory, but you must let me know in advance if you cannot attend.

Extensions. All of the written assignments for this class are posted on Canvas at the start of the term. Please do not ask for an extension unless you have encountered an emergency.

Late submissions. Late submissions receive a one-grade penalty (e.g., A- to B-) which recurs every 24 hours.

Formatting written work. All written work should be double-spaced, 12-point font, one-inch margins, letter paper, and normal character spacing. Abnormal formatting will receive the same one-grade penalty as late work.

Students with disabilities who may need disability-related academic adjustments and services for this course are encouraged to see me privately as early in the term as possible. Students requiring disability-related academic adjustments and services must consult the Student Accessibility Services office.