<u>Citation for the Peter Katzenstein Book Prize, 2020</u>

Jeffrey A. Friedman

War and Chance: Assessing Uncertainty in International Politics

The selection committee is pleased to announce the recipient of the 2020 Peter Katzenstein Book Prize: Jeffrey A. Friedman for *War and Chance: Assessing Uncertainty in International Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2019). The Katzenstein Prize is awarded annually to an outstanding first book in International Relations, Comparative Politics, or Political Economy. The prize was established on the occasion of Professor Katzenstein's 40th year at Cornell University and has been made possible by the generous support of his colleagues, collaborators, and former students.

Jeffrey A. Friedman's *War and Chance: Assessing Uncertainty in International Politics* stood out this year for its innovative argument, backed by significant multi-method research, in both theory-building and policy prescription. Drawing on decision theory, psychological approaches to foreign policy-making, and insights from intelligence studies and organizational management, Friedman argues that despite common pathologies of decision-making, analysts and policymakers can and should engage in more rigorous probabilistic reasoning. He dissects key failures in U.S. foreign policy, including Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam War, and the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War. His book relies on a combination of case-study methods, the utilization of a database containing nearly one million geopolitical forecasts, and surveys he conducted of the general public and of more than two hundred national security professionals to explore the logic, psychology, and politics of assessing uncertainty in international affairs. Friedman is as adept using archival documents as he is developing survey experiments, and the decision to survey both elites and non-elites strengthened his findings. The author does not simply explain why intelligence and foreign policy professionals often make mistakes due to faulty probabilistic reasoning or urge them to abandon these efforts given the costly errors in past cases such as the Vietnam and Iraq Wars. Instead, he demonstrates how those responsible for weighing costs, benefits, and the probabilities of success can improve their analysis in the future to develop basic standards for decision-making. Thus the book makes a major contribution to both theory and policy.