Since ROK President Park Geun-hye’s speech last year in Dresden, Germany, Korea-watchers have been debating how the unification of the two Koreas would affect the fortunes of the ROK. Unification optimists see many gains, starting with a big victory for human rights in the liberation of the North Korean people. Additionally they highlight demographic, budgetary (e.g., reduced military budget) gains that they expect will translate into an economic bonanza for a unified Korea.

Unification pessimists are concerned about the economic price tag of putting Humpty Dumpty back together again — particularly given severe underdevelopment of infrastructure and technology in the North.

This is a worthy and important debate. But before we get there, we shouldn’t gloss over the getting there.

My new article in 38North builds on my earlier study (co-authored with RAND’s Dr. Bruce Bennett) about managing the dangers of North Korean collapse. (See here for an interview we did about the study with 38North.)

In this new piece I argue that before the prospect of Korean unification makes our eyes light up with dollar signs, we must remember the potential perils of transition. These include a humanitarian disaster, a refugee exodus, civil war, and “loose nukes.” They also include the risks of escalation that come from the jostling together of the militaries of China, South Korea, and the United States. Any discussion of the future bonanza (or tax) that is unification must take into account the great uncertainties of the transition period.

And indeed, one might argue that all of the above discussion is predicated on an entirely different debate–about whether or not North Korea will ever collapse. As Aidan Foster-Carter has argued with his usual verve, and as noted DPRK analyst Mark Twain might comment, reports of its death have been greatly exaggerated.