Elite rhetoric can undermine democratic norms*

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Abstract

Democratic stability depends on citizens on the losing side accepting election outcomes. Can rhetoric by political leaders undermine this norm? Using a panel survey experiment, we evaluate the effects of exposure to multiple statements from former president Donald Trump attacking the legitimacy of the 2020 US presidential election. Although exposure to these statements does not measurably affect general support for political violence or belief in democracy, it erodes trust and confidence in elections and increases belief that the election is rigged among people who approve of Trump's job performance. These results suggest that rhetoric from political elites can undermine respect for critical democratic norms among their supporters.

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Scholars focus on how formal rules and laws constrain political leaders, but informal norms also play a critical role in restraining elites (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Azari and Smith, 2012). Two governing norms are thought to be critical to the stability of liberal democracy: toleration of the legitimacy of the opposition and forbearance from using state power to tilt the playing field against political rivals (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). These norms are especially critical after an election when the losing side must consent to the outcome and grant power to the winning side (Anderson et al., 2005).

Little is known, however, about elites' capacity to influence popular support for or enforcement of democratic norms, including respect for the election process and the outcomes it produces. If democracies need the public to sanction leaders who violate the norms on which the system ultimately depends (Weingast, 1997), then elite attacks on those norms represent a key threat to democratic stability.

Unfortunately, citizens may fail to reject or may even support democratic norm violations when they occur. Partisans can recognize and punish norm violations in hypothetical scenarios (Carey et al., 2020; Graham and Svolik, 2020), but the effect sizes are modest compared to other forms of scandal or misconduct (Basinger, 2013). Moreover, forging consensus about what constitutes a norm violation can be difficult—public evaluations are often highly polarized, and partisans demonstrate reduced concern about violations that advantage their party (Carey et al., 2019).

We thus test the extent to which elite rhetoric can erode democratic norms in the contemporary United States, where former president Donald has frequently challenged or disregarded standards of behavior for elected leaders. While our focus on Trump may limit the generalizability of our findings, we examine this pattern during his presidency because norm violations were such an important feature of his tenure. In response to this repeated pattern of behavior, observers voiced concerns that violations of democratic norms had become so familiar that they have become normalized or made the public desensitized (Jentleson, 2019; Klaas, 2020), mirroring effects that have been found after repeated exposure to norm violations or aversive stimuli in other contexts (Bartholow, Bushman, and Sestir, 2006; Bicchieri, 2016).

We specifically consider the effects of Trump's repeated attacks on the integrity of the 2020 presidential election on belief in and support for democratic norms. Although there was no credible evidence of widespread voter fraud in the United States (Minnite, 2011; Kiely et al., 2020), Trump engaged in an unprecedented series of attacks on the legitimacy of the 2020 election (Ballhaus, Palazzolo, and Restuccia, 2021) which were then amplified to an even larger audience (Benkler et al., 2020; Pennycook and Rand, 2021). These claims were an especially egregious violation of democratic norms because they target confidence

in free and fair elections, which is central to citizens' understanding of democracy (Davis, Goidel, and Zhao, 2020). If losers see elections as illegitimate and no longer respect their outcome, the democratic compact can unwind (Anderson et al., 2005).

We expect, as prior research has shown, that exposure to claims of voter fraud will reduce confidence in elections, especially among co-partisans (Albertson and Guiler, 2020). In addition, we expect that exposure to these claims will reduce support for the critical democratic norm of the peaceful transfer of power. We therefore offer the preregistered hypothesis that exposure to rhetoric challenging election legitimacy will decrease respect for electoral norms and trust and confidence in elections relative to rhetoric that does not violate democratic norms, especially as exposure increases over time (H1).

We also consider a series of preregistered research questions. First, we assess whether the effects of norm-violating rhetoric are domain specific or can "spill over" to other domains—in this case, by eroding election confidence even when the norm violations are unrelated to elections (RQ1). In addition, we compare the effects of election-related norm violations (per H1) with rhetoric violating norms unrelated to elections (RQ2).

We next consider two possible mechanisms for these effects. If people observe a norm not being followed, then they may begin to see compliance as both optional and less normatively desirable, especially if norm violations occur frequently (Bicchieri et al., 2020). Perceptions of norms of behavior for elected leaders may thus change if people repeatedly observe attacks on election integrity that go unpunished, a cognitive process we refer to as normalization. We thus ask if our treatments affect perceptions of democratic norms among past political leaders (RQ3).

In contrast, a second process we consider is the tendency for aversive stimuli to evoke weaker psychological responses as exposure levels increase. This process, which we call desensitization, explains why repeated exposure to violence or trauma might numb the fear, anxiety, and physiological arousal that such stimuli initially provoke (Foa et al., 2010). We accordingly test whether exposure to norm-violating rhetoric reduces emotional reactivity to this rhetoric (RQ4).

Exposure to rhetoric claiming that elections are illegitimate, or more general norm-violating rhetoric, may also threaten normative commitments to peace and democracy. RQ5 and RQ6 seek to measure these attitudes by estimating effects on responses to a general index of political violence questions and a broad measure of support for democracy (Drutman, Goldman, and Diamond, 2020). We note, however, that people do not always connect related ideas about politics that are linked by abstract principles (Converse, 1964; Lane, 1962). In addition, responses to abstract questions about support for violence or democracy may not reflect actual behavior in the real-world contexts in which citizens might

engage in violent actions or challenge democratic processes.

Finally, we examine whether views of the figure in question (i.e., Trump approval) and/or partisan identification affect how people respond to norm violations (RQ7), a pattern that has been observed in prior studies of voter fraud beliefs (Albertson and Guiler, 2020).

Our results indicate that attacks on election integrity do not measurably affect our broad measures of support for political violence or belief in democracy (although we cannot rule out their effects on specific violent actions or support for democratic principles, especially among small groups of extremists). However, exposure to Trump's rhetoric erodes trust and confidence in elections and increases the belief that elections are rigged among people who approve of Trump's job performance. We also find suggestive evidence that people become desensitized to norm-violating rhetoric over time. Overall, these results imply that rhetoric from political elites can undermine support for critical democratic norms among their supporters.

Experimental Design

Our four-wave panel experiment was preregistered on October 7, 2020 (https://osf.io/a4tds) and fielded from October 7–24, 2020 on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were first invited to participate in a baseline survey (wave 1) measuring demographic characteristics and pretreatment attitudes (see *SI Appendix* for all survey instruments and study stimuli). Five days later, participants who completed wave 1 were recontacted for wave 2, which was open for 3 d before closing. Participants who completed wave 2 were then eligible to participate in wave 3 (open for 4 d after wave 2) and, subsequently, wave 4 (open for 5 d after wave 3). All participants were then debriefed in two separate messages to ensure they were not misled or discouraged from participating in the upcoming election. The experimental intervention took place in waves 2 and 3 (wave 1 was a baseline survey, and wave 4 was an endline survey). Participants who accepted the invitation to the wave 2 survey were block randomized within groups defined by wave 1 measures of political interest (median split), Trump approval, and support for respecting electoral outcomes (median split).

Respondents each viewed 20 tweets from President Trump in wave 2 and 20 in wave 3. Ten tweets that were unrelated to elections and did not violate democratic norms were fixed across conditions in each wave. The other 10 tweets in the treatment waves were randomized by condition as shown in Table 1.

SI Appendix, Table S2 shows that respondent characteristics are balanced by condition. (See the next section for further details on the sample population, which is politically and demographically diverse, highly attentive, and had very low levels of attrition.)

Table 1: Randomization scheme

Condition	Probability	Norm violation	Election-related
Non-election placebo	$p = \frac{1}{6}$		
Election placebo	$p = \frac{1}{6}$		✓
General norm violation	$p = \frac{1}{3}$	✓	
Election norm violation	$p = \frac{1}{3}$	✓	✓

The experimental treatments are images of real tweets by Donald Trump, excluding their original date stamp and any additional media (see the survey instrument in *SI Appendix* for an example). We selected our experimental stimuli using a protocol specified in *SI Appendix* in which 261 candidate tweets—including many previously identified as election norm violations by subject matter experts—were rated by respondents on Lucid for whether they follow or depart from past practices by American presidents and whether their topic is US elections or some other topic. The two placebo conditions included tweets that respondents considered normal behavior for American presidents (either election-related or not), while the two norm violation conditions included tweets that respondents rated as departing from past practices by American presidents (either election-related or not). The set of tweets for all conditions by survey wave is available in *SI Appendix*, Table S1.

Participant Sample

Participants for this study were recruited from a pool of approximately 3,000 people who previously took part in an unrelated study conducted on Mechanical Turk by some of the authors.[1] Although online convenience samples have notable limitations, results from studies conducted with Mechanical Turk panelists mirror those obtained from nationally representative samples (Coppock, 2019; Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser, 2011; Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012; Mullinix et al., 2015). Using Mechanical Turk is essential for conducting this study due to the theoretical importance of measuring the effects of repeated exposure to the treatment in question over time. Respondent retention rates for multiwave surveys on Mechanical Turk substantially exceed even those observed in benchmark surveys like the American National Election Study (Gross, Porter, and Wood, 2019). As a result, we greatly reduce the risk of posttreatment bias due to differential attrition between conditions, which otherwise plagues survey experiments of this type (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres,

[1]The study was approved by the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at Dartmouth College (ID: STUDY00032100; MOD00010368). All participants provided informed consent prior to participating in the study.

2018). We also note that the pattern of results we observe showing significant effects for some outcomes but not others suggests that the null findings we do observe are not driven by respondent inattention.

Because Mechanical Turk overrepresents political liberals (Krupnikov and Levine, 2014) and we expected heterogeneous treatment effects, we adopted a recruitment strategy that would maximize our ability to compare people of different political leanings. We first conducted extensive screening prior to the study to recruit a substantial number of Republicans/conservatives. We also limited recruitment to respondents who previously identified as a Democrat or Republican or said they leaned toward a major party, excluding so-called pure independents (note that $N = 33$ respondents identified as pure independents in wave 1 of our study). Finally, we screened out bots and low-effort respondents with an open-ended text question. Respondents whose answers did not meet the criteria suggested in prior research were deemed ineligible (Kennedy et al., 2020), as were those who sped too quickly through screening surveys.

The resulting sample provides high-quality survey responses (96% correct on an attention check in wave 1) and represents a wide range of political and demographic groups (see *SI Appendix*, Table S2), including Trump approvers (31.6%) and Republicans (39.3%). Additionally, our sample is externally valid in that it is made up disproportionately of people who frequently use the Internet—precisely the group that is most likely to encounter norm-violating rhetoric on a platform like Twitter. Our respondent pool therefore constitutes a valid sample for testing our hypotheses (although replication on a representative sample would, of course, be desirable).

A total of 2,477 participants completed the wave 1 baseline survey. Those who completed wave 1 were then invited to wave 2, the wave in which participants were assigned to treatment. In total, 2,151 people completed wave 2, the first treatment wave. Wave 2 participants were then invited to wave 3, the second treatment wave ($N = 1{,}960$), and wave 4, the end line survey ($N = 2{,}013$). Participants were paid \$1.50 per wave completed, plus an additional \$2 bonus if they completed all four waves. To reduce the risk of bias due to differential attrition, we include all respondents who completed wave 2 in our analysis regardless of whether they completed wave 3 and/or 4. However, attrition was exceptionally low; 91.1% and 93.6% of wave 2 participants took part in waves 3 and 4, respectively. We find little evidence of differential attrition across treatment conditions overall or by wave (see *SI Appendix* for details).

Outcome Measures

We assess the following preregistered outcome measures (exact wording in *SI Appendix*):

- *Trust and confidence in elections* is a factor score combining responses to questions asking whether respondents trust elections, are confident votes will be counted as intended, and are confident that the ballot count will be run fairly.
- *Respect for electoral norms* was measured as agreement that "An important part of democracy is to accept election losses peacefully"; "Elections in the United States are rigged in favor of [other party (randomized for pure independents)]"; and "Sometimes regular people need to be a little violent to make sure votes are counted correctly" (six-point scales). (These items did not scale well in a factor analysis, so we analyze them separately per our preregistration.)
- *Support for political violence* is a factor score combining responses to questions about how often the following are acceptable (Mason and Kalmoe, 2021): sending threatening and intimidating messages to [other party] leaders, harassing ordinary [other party] persons on the Internet, using violence to advance political goals, and using violence if the [other party] wins the 2020 election (party names randomized for pure independents).
- *Support for democracy* is a factor score combining responses to questions asking whether it would be a good or bad way of governing the United States to have a strong leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections, to have the army rule, or to have a democratic political system. ("Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country" did not load well with the other questions in a factor analysis and was therefore excluded per our preregistration.)
- *Past practices* is the perceived accuracy of the following description of how things generally work in American politics: "Presidential candidates accept the outcome of elections even if they narrowly lose" (four-point scale).
- *Emotional reactions* are measured as the mean levels of anger/outrage (anger), anxiety/fear (anxiety), and enthusiasm/happiness (enthusiasm) that respondents reported feeling after exposure to stimulus tweets (four-point scale).

Results

We first evaluate whether we can pool the nonelection and election placebo conditions. Across 16 preregistered models, we never reject the null of no difference in means be-

tween these conditions (see *SI Appendix*, Table S3). We therefore pool them and treat the combined set of respondents as the reference category in the models below.

We estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with HC2 robust standard errors. Each model includes a set of prognostic covariates chosen using a lasso variable selection procedure (see preregistration for details) and fixed effects for the blocks from our block randomization procedure. We also separately control the false discovery rate (FDR) for main effects and for subgroup effects (Benjamini, Krieger, and Yekutieli, 2006). Except where specifically noted, all main effects and subgroup marginal effects below and in *SI Appendix* incorporate these adjusted p values ($\alpha = 0.05$).

We first evaluate the main effects of exposure to election norm violation and general (nonelection) norm violation tweets relative to the pooled placebo group among our full sample. Table 2 reports tests of H1, RQ1, RQ2, RQ5, and RQ6. Results for the mean value across waves of the trust and confidence in elections and election norm outcomes are reported in the first four columns (see *SI Appendix*, Tables S4 and S5 for results by wave). The last two columns report outcomes measured in wave 4 only. All scale outcomes (trust in elections, political violence, and support for democracy) are standardized factor scores; the support for election norms (accept election, elections rigged, and election violence) items are measured on six-point agree/disagree scales.

Table 2: Main effects of exposure to norm violations

	Trust in elections	Accept election	Elections rigged	Election violence	Political violence	Support democracy
Election norm violations	−0.001	−0.030	0.059	0.030	−0.040	−0.025
	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.031)
General norm violations	−0.017	−0.024	0.067	0.134	0.021	0.036
	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Election − general norm violation	0.016	−0.006	−0.008	−0.105	−0.061	−0.061
	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.032)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2137	2137	2137	2137	2001	2001

The p values are as follows: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the FDR per Benjamini, Krieger, and Yekutieli 2006 with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for pretreatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Outcome variables for first four models calculated as mean of nonmissing values for each respondent across waves 2 to 4 (see *SI Appendix* for results by wave). Support for political violence and democracy were measured in wave 4. The marginal effects of the treatments on support for political violence and democracy (fifth and sixth columns, "Difference in effects" rows) were not preregistered and are thus exploratory; we include these estimates for presentational consistency.

As Table 2 indicates, we find virtually no evidence that exposure to election-related or general norm violations substantially affects trust in elections, respect for election norms, support for political violence, or support for democracy among the full sample of respondents.[2] We also find no significant differences in effects between the election norm violation and general norm violation treatments.

However, these null results may reflect countervailing effects among different subgroups—specifically, effects may vary by approval of President Trump or partisanship per RQ7. Following our preregistration, we therefore allow our treatment effect estimates to vary by whether respondents approve of Trump. We present these marginal effect estimates for Trump approvers and disapprovers in graphical form in Fig. 1. The interaction models from which these estimates are derived, which show that treatment effects often vary significantly by Trump approval, are presented in *SI Appendix*.[3] Fig. 1 first plots how the effect of exposure to norm-violating rhetoric on trust and confidence in elections varies by Trump approval (see *SI Appendix*, Table S7 for full results). Unlike in Table 2, we present marginal effects for the election norm violation and general norm violation conditions by wave as well as the mean across waves.

As the figure indicates, Trump's election norm violations decrease trust and confidence in elections among people who approve of him by 0.24 standard deviations, on average, across waves ($p < 0.005$). By contrast, exposure to the election norm violation tweets actually increases trust and confidence in elections by 0.11 standard deviations, on average ($p < 0.01$ after p values are adjusted to control the FDR), among Trump disapprovers, mirroring the observational trend observed from 2014 to 2016 among supporters of Hillary Clinton (Sinclair, Smith, and Tucker, 2018). This result is consistent with literature that finds citizens often adopt political beliefs that rationalize their partisan preferences (Lauderdale, 2016). More broadly, it suggests that reactions to norm violations may be conditional upon attitudes toward the individual in question. Fig. 1 shows a similar but weaker pattern for general norm violation tweets. Three effect estimates indicate that exposure to

[2]These null effects are fairly precise. We conducted a series of exploratory equivalence tests (Lakens, 2017) for $p < 0.05$ assuming unequal variances. We can rule out effects outside of the following bounds: trust in elections: [–0.07, 0.097] for general norm violation (general) vs. control and [–0.083, 0.083] for election norm violation (election) vs. control; accept elections: [–0.066, 0.073] for general vs. control and [–0.076, 0.065] for election vs. control; elections rigged: [–0.308, 0.056] for general vs. control and [–0.201, 0.055] for election vs. control; election violence: [–0.241, 0.045] for general vs. control and [–0.094, 0.095] for election vs. control; political violence: [–0.13, 0.052] for general vs. control and [–0.009, 0.159] for election vs. control; support democracy: [–0.114, 0.064] for general vs. control and [–0.038, 0.133] for election vs. control.

[3]Results when the treatments are instead interacted with an indicator for whether the respondent identifies with or leans toward the Republican Party are generally very similar; we thus do not discuss them further here but present the results in tabular form in *SI Appendix*.

Figure 1: Marginal effects on trust and confidence in elections by Trump approval

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the FDR per Benjamini, Krieger, and Yekutieli 2006 with $\alpha = .05$). Outcome measures are factor scores combining responses to questions asking whether respondents trust elections (seven-point scale) and are confident that votes nationwide will be counted as intended and that election officials would manage counting fairly (four-point scales). Bars represent 95% CIs (not shown if CI is smaller than circle indicating the point estimate; note that these intervals do not incorporate the FDR correction and so significance cannot be assessed visually). See *SI Appendix*, Table S7 for exact wording and full results.

these statements reduces trust in elections among Trump approvers using unadjusted p values, but none remain statistically significant after our preregistered FDR adjustment (see *SI Appendix*, Table S7).

Similarly, Fig. 2 shows that exposure to rhetoric violating election norms sometimes reduces respect for those norms among Trump approvers (see *SI Appendix*, Tables S9 and S10). Most notably, beliefs that elections are rigged increase by 0.43 points on a six-point scale in wave 2 ($p < 0.005$) and by 0.24 points, on average, across waves 2 to 4 ($p < 0.05$). Election norm violations also decrease willingness to accept election results peacefully among Trump approvers, but only in wave 2 ($p < 0.05$). However, the election norm violation condition has no measurable effect on beliefs that violence is needed for votes to be counted correctly across waves or overall. Similarly, no measurable effects are found for rhetoric violating election norms among Trump disapprovers or for the general norm violation condition among either group.

This pattern of heterogeneous effects by Trump approval does not extend to support for political violence or democracy. The election norm violation treatment does not measurably affect these outcomes among either Trump approvers or disapprovers (see *SI Appendix*, Table S13). We underscore, however, that our findings do not indicate that norm-violating

Figure 2: Marginal effects on democratic norms by Trump approval



* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the FDR per Benjamini, Krieger, and Yekutieli 2006 with $\alpha = .05$). Mean agreement or disagreement with three separate statements on election-related democratic norms (six-point scale) by wave (first through third columns) and across waves (fourth column). Bars represent 95% CIs (not shown if CI is smaller than circle indicating the point estimate). See *SI Appendix*, Tables S9–S12 for exact wording and full results.

rhetoric has no effect on support for political violence or democracy. Caution is required in extrapolating these findings beyond the bounds of the survey context in which they were measured (a caveat we return to and expand upon in the next section).

Finally, we investigate whether repeated exposure to norm violations creates normalization (RQ3) and/or desensitization (RQ4). We test for normalization by examining treatment effects on perceptions of past respect for democratic norms. We find no significant effects of the treatments on beliefs that past candidates failed to respect narrow losses overall or by Trump approval (see *SI Appendix*, Tables S15 and S16). By contrast, evidence of desensitization is mixed (see *SI Appendix*, Tables S18, S19, S21, and S22). Self-reported anger and anxiety both decrease between waves 2 and 3 among people exposed to either type of norm-violating rhetoric (by 0.07 to 0.08 for anger and 0.06 to 0.08 for anxiety, on four-point scales). However, these declines are significant for only one subgroup of respondents in one treatment condition after we apply our preregistered adjustment to the p values to control the FDR: decreased anger in response to general norm violation tweets among Trump disapprovers (–0.14, $p < 0.005$). Additionally, prior exposure to election or general norm violation tweets decreases both anger and anxiety in response to novel

election norm violation tweets in wave 4 (by 0.14 to 0.16 for anger and 0.14 for anxiety, on four-point scales). However, although these contrasts are statistically significant under classical hypothesis tests, none remain significant after our FDR correction. As with the change in reactions between waves 2 and 3, we instead observe only a single significant subgroup effect (anxiety decreases by 0.20 among Trump disapprovers after exposure to general norm violations, $p < 0.05$). Desensitization thus appears to be a more likely consequence of repeated exposure to norm violations than normalization, but our results are not conclusive.

Conclusion

While Donald Trump's attacks on democratic norms prompted concern from journalists, scholars, and everyday citizens, the causal effect of such rhetoric on public attitudes toward democracy is not known. We present a study estimating the effects of exposure to norm-violating rhetoric from a multiwave experiment conducted during the waning days of the 2020 US presidential election. We find no evidence that support for a battery of general questions on political violence or support for democracy change after repeated exposure to these statements.

We urge caution, however, in interpreting these results. Our findings should not be understood to exonerate Trump for inciting violence, including during the January 6 insurrection. First, decades of scholarship in political science tell us that citizens often fail to draw connections between abstract principles and specific political attitudes and behavior (Converse, 1964; Lane, 1962). Second, Trump supporters may refrain from endorsing violence in their survey responses but still act to support it elsewhere. Finally, it is also possible that Trump's rhetoric incites violent, antidemocratic actions among a small number of people whose extreme preferences are rare in a sample like ours, but who can still coordinate to wreak havoc on democracy—a limitation of survey research on this topic.

Moreover, we find compelling evidence that exposure to norm violations has other pernicious effects among Trump's supporters. Among people who approve of his performance in office, repeated exposure to norm-violating rhetoric about electoral fraud erodes trust and confidence in elections and increases beliefs that elections are rigged.

Our study has important limitations. While we strove for realism in the design of our treatments, participants nonetheless encountered Trump's tweets in the context of an online survey rather than the way they would on Twitter or in other settings in which they are exposed to political news and information. The effects of Trump's tweets likely also vary by whether they are reinforced or countered by other information, a design variant that should

be evaluated in future research. Twitter, for example, flagged some of Trump's claims about fraud after the election for including disputed or misleading information, which may shape users' reactions to such content (Conger, 2020). Second, we conducted our experiment in a saturated news environment in which many respondents had presumably already been exposed to Trump's statements multiple times via other means. The effects of additional exposure, including potential normalization or desensitization, may therefore have been limited, especially given Internet use levels in our sample (Druckman and Leeper, 2012). Third, we focused on norm-violating rhetoric from Trump alone, but future research should seek to understand how norm violations by other politicians affect public opinion.

Finally, although treatment effect heterogeneity by sample type is frequently overstated (Coppock, 2019), our study should be replicated in a representative sample if acceptable levels of attrition can be achieved.

Nonetheless, our study offers causal estimates of the effects of Trump's antidemocratic rhetoric on the mass public's commitment to democracy. Norms are typically thought to constrain the behavior of elites (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). As we show here, however, when elites strategically violate norms, their supporters respond accordingly. Just as elites can shape policy views along partisan lines (Lenz, 2013), elite rhetoric can shape normative beliefs in core democratic values such as confidence in elections and support for peaceful transfers of power. These findings do not indicate that elites can erode democratic norms easily or that the effects of norm violations are uniform across the entire population. At least for a politician's supporters, however, support for democratic norms appears to be more fragile than previously assumed. These dynamics represent a potential threat to the acceptance of unfavorable election results.

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Supplementary Information for

Elite rhetoric can undermine democratic norms

Katherine Clayton, Nicholas T. Davis, Brendan Nyhan, Ethan Porter, Timothy J. Ryan, and Thomas J. Wood

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This PDF file includes:

Tables S1 to S39 (not allowed for Brief Reports)
SI References

Survey instruments and study stimuli

wave 1 questionnaire. This study is being conducted by Katie Clayton of Stanford University, Nicholas Davis of the University of Alabama, Brendan Nyhan of Dartmouth College, Ethan Porter of George Washington University, Timothy Ryan of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Thomas J. Wood of the Ohio State University. Your participation is voluntary and you may decline to participate in the survey or withdraw at any time. No information that identifies you will be collected or retained by the researchers. However, any online interaction carries some risk of being accessed. The survey will take about 3 to 5 minutes to complete. After you complete the survey, we may invite you to participate in subsequent surveys. The purpose of the study is to better understand the determinants of attitudes about major public challenges. Possible benefits of participation include having the opportunity to express your opinion about issues of public concern. Possible risks or discomforts you could experience during this study include breach of confidentiality and boredom. If you experience any research-related injury, you should contact the Principal Investigator immediately. Further information regarding this study may be obtained by contacting Brendan Nyhan at nyhan@dartmouth.edu.

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Do you consent to participate in the study?
-Yes
-No

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?
-Republican
-Democrat
-Independent
-Something else

If "Democrat" is selected: Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
-Strong Democrat (1)
-Not very strong Democrat (2)

If "Republican" is selected: Would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a very strong Republican?
-Strong Republican (7)
-Not very strong Republican (6)

If "Independent" or "Something else" is selected: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?
-Closer to the Republican Party (5)
-Closer to the Democratic Party (3)
-Neither (4)

Do you ever use any of the following social media sites? Please indicate which ones you use below (if any).

Twitter
-Yes (1)
-No (0)

Instagram
-Yes (1)
-No (0)

Facebook
-Yes (1)
-No (0)

YouTube
-Yes (1)
-No (0)

WhatsApp

-Yes (1)
-No (0)

If Twitter is selected: Thinking about the social media sites you use, about how often do you visit or use Twitter?
-Several times a day (5)
-About once a day (4)
-A few times a week (3)
-Every few weeks (2)
-Less often (1)

If Facebook is selected: Thinking about the social media sites you use, about how often do you visit or use Facebook?
-Several times a day (5)
-About once a day (4)
-A few times a week (3)
-Every few weeks (2)
-Less often (1)

Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President?
-Strongly approve (4)
-Somewhat approve (3)
-Somewhat disapprove (2)
-Strongly disapprove (1)

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

An important part of democracy is to accept election losses peacefully.
-Strongly agree (6)
-Somewhat agree (5)
-Slightly agree (4)
-Slightly disagree (3)
-Somewhat disagree (2)
-Strongly disagree (1)

Elections in the United States are rigged in favor of [Democrats *(if respondent identifies or leans Republican)* / Republicans *(if respondent identifies or leans Democrat)*; *party names randomized if respondent does not identify with or lean toward either party*].
-Strongly agree (6)
-Somewhat agree (5)
-Slightly agree (4)
-Slightly disagree (3)
-Somewhat disagree (2)
-Strongly disagree (1)

Sometimes regular people need to be a little violent to make sure votes are counted correctly.
-Strongly agree (6)
-Somewhat agree (5)
-Slightly agree (4)
-Slightly disagree (3)
-Somewhat disagree (2)
-Strongly disagree (1)

Next, we'd like you to think not about 2020, but about the the past fifty years or so. How accurate is each of the following statements in describing how things generally work in American politics?

Presidential candidates accept the outcome of elections even if they narrowly lose.
-Very accurate (4)
-Somewhat accurate (3)
-Not very accurate (2)
-Not at all accurate (1)

Presidents do their best to unify the country by downplaying divisions.

-Very accurate (4)
-Somewhat accurate (3)
-Not very accurate (2)
-Not at all accurate (1)

Presidents hold meetings or speak on the phone with leaders of other countries to discuss foreign policy and global issues.
-Very accurate (4)
-Somewhat accurate (3)
-Not very accurate (2)
-Not at all accurate (1)

Presidents make sure to visit all national parks every year.
-Very accurate (4)
-Somewhat accurate (3)
-Not very accurate (2)
-Not at all accurate (1)

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? [*paragraph break*] Presidential candidates should accept the outcome of elections even if they narrowly lose.
-Strongly agree (6)
-Somewhat agree (5)
-Slightly agree (4)
-Slightly disagree (3)
-Somewhat disagree (2)
-Strongly disagree (1)

Please indicate what percentage of Americans you think would agree with the following statement. If you think every American would agree, enter 100. If you think no one would agree, enter 0. If you think half of Americans would agree, enter 50. You can enter any number from 0-100. [*paragraph break*] What percentage of the public do you think would agree with the following statement? Presidential candidates should accept the outcome of elections even if they narrowly lose.
- *Value entry, 0-100.*

To what extent do you trust elections in this country? Please respond on the scale below where 1 means "not at all" and 7 means "a lot."
-1 (Not at all)
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7 (A lot)

How confident are you that votes nationwide will be counted as intended in this year's election?
-Very confident (4)
-Somewhat confident (3)
-Not too confident (2)
-Not at all confident (1)

How confident are you that election officials will manage the counting of ballots fairly in the election this November?
-Very confident (4)
-Somewhat confident (3)
-Not too confident (2)
-Not at all confident (1)

To the best of your knowledge, how many times does each of these occur in a presidential election?

Voting more than once
-A million or more (7)
-Hundreds of thousands (6)
-Tens of thousands (5)
-Thousands (4)

-Hundreds (3)
-Less than a hundred (2)
-Less than ten (1)

Stealing or tampering with ballots
-A million or more (7)
-Hundreds of thousands (6)
-Tens of thousands (5)
-Thousands (4)
-Hundreds (3)
-Less than a hundred (2)
-Less than ten (1)

Pretending to be someone else when voting
-A million or more (7)
-Hundreds of thousands (6)
-Tens of thousands (5)
-Thousands (4)
-Hundreds (3)
-Less than a hundred (2)
-Less than ten (1)

People voting who are not U.S. citizens
-A million or more (7)
-Hundreds of thousands (6)
-Tens of thousands (5)
-Thousands (4)
-Hundreds (3)
-Less than a hundred (2)
-Less than ten (1)

Voting with an absentee ballot intended for another person
-A million or more (7)
-Hundreds of thousands (6)
-Tens of thousands (5)
-Thousands (4)
-Hundreds (3)
-Less than a hundred (2)
-Less than ten (1)

When, if ever, is it OK for [respondent party (including leaners); randomized if respondent does not identify with or lean toward either party] to send threatening and intimidating messages to [other party] leaders?
-Always (4)
-Frequently (3)
-Occasionally (2)
-Never (1)

When, if ever, is it OK for an ordinary [respondent party (including leaners); randomized if respondent does not identify with or lean toward either party] in the public to harass an ordinary [other party] on the Internet, in a way that makes the [other party] feel unsafe?
-Always (4)
-Frequently (3)
-Occasionally (2)
-Never (1)

How much do you feel it is justified for [respondent party (including leaners); randomized if respondent does not identify with or lean toward either party] to use violence in advancing their political goals these days?
-Always (4)
-Frequently (3)
-Occasionally (2)
-Never (1)

What if the [other party; randomized if respondent does not identify with or lean toward either party] win the 2020 presidential election? How much do you feel violence would be justified then?
-Always (4)
-Frequently (3)
-Occasionally (2)
-Never (1)

Various types of political systems are described below. Please think about each choice in terms of governing this country and indicate if you think that it would be a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing the United States.

Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections
-Very good (4)
-Fairly good (3)
-Fairly bad (2)
-Very bad (1)

Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country
-Very good (4)
-Fairly good (3)
-Fairly bad (2)
-Very bad (1)

Having the army rule
-Very good (4)
-Fairly good (3)
-Fairly bad (2)
-Very bad (1)

Having a democratic political system
-Very good (4)
-Fairly good (3)
-Fairly bad (2)
-Very bad (1)

Next, we would like you to examine some messages that President Trump posted on Twitter.

[*Below is one example; four total tweets were shown. See full list of tweets included by treatment condition.*]



Thinking about the tweets you just saw, how much do you feel:

Angry
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Outraged
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Anxious
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Afraid
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Enthusiastic
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Happy
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

In talking to people about elections, we often find out that a lot of people aren't able to vote because they were not registered, or they were sick, or they just didn't have time. How about you – how likely are you to vote in the general election this November?
-Definitely will vote (4)
-Probably will vote (3)
-Probably will not vote (2)
-Definitely will not vote (1)
-Already voted by mail (5)
-Already voted in person (5)

If you were casting a vote today in the 2020 presidential election, for whom would you vote for President of the United States?
-Joe Biden (Democrat) (1)
-Donald Trump (Republican) (2)
-Another candidate/neither (3)

Which of these topics came up in the Donald Trump tweets you just read?
- The Parkland shooting, National Doctor's Day, and transit funding for New York and New Orleans (1)
- The Sandy Hook shooting, Thanksgiving, and health care funding for Atlanta (2)
- The 9/11 attacks, Christmas, and military funding for the Navy (3)
- The war in Iraq, Hannukah, and Medicare funding for seniors (4)

Do you have any comments on the survey? Please let us know about any problems you had or aspects of the survey that were confusing.
[optional text entry]

Thank you for answering these questions and for your participation. Please do not share any information about the nature of this study with other potential participants. This research is not intended to support or oppose any political candidate or office. The research has no affiliation with any political candidate or campaign and has received no financial support from any political candidate or campaign. We may contact you to invite you to follow-up studies. Your participation in any follow-up studies is entirely voluntary and will not affect your compensation for this study. Should you have any questions about this study, please contact Brendan Nyhan at nyhan@dartmouth.edu.

wave 2 and wave 3 questionnaires. This study is being conducted by Katie Clayton of Stanford University, Nicholas Davis of the University of Alabama, Brendan Nyhan of Dartmouth College, Ethan Porter of George Washington University, Timothy Ryan of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Thomas J. Wood of the Ohio State University. Your participation is voluntary and you may decline to participate in the survey or withdraw at any time. No information that identifies you will be collected or retained by the researchers. However, any online interaction carries some risk of being accessed. The survey will take about 3 to 5 minutes to complete. After you complete the survey, we may invite you to participate in subsequent surveys. The purpose of the study is to better understand the determinants of attitudes about major public challenges. Possible benefits of participation include having the opportunity to express your opinion about issues of public concern. Possible risks or discomforts you could experience during this study include breach of confidentiality and boredom. If you experience any research-related injury, you should contact the Principal Investigator immediately. Further information regarding this study may be obtained by contacting Brendan Nyhan at nyhan@dartmouth.edu.

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Do you consent to participate in the study?
-Yes
-No

We would like you to examine some messages that President Trump posted on Twitter.

[*Twenty total tweets were shown across four screens, with five tweets per page. See full list of tweets included by treatment condition.*]

Thinking about the tweets you just saw, how much do you feel:

Angry
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Outraged
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Anxious
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Afraid
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Enthusiastic
-Very (4)

-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Happy
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

An important part of democracy is to accept election losses peacefully.
-Strongly agree (6)
-Somewhat agree (5)
-Slightly agree (4)
-Slightly disagree (3)
-Somewhat disagree (2)
-Strongly disagree (1)

Elections in the United States are rigged in favor of [Democrats *(if respondent identifies or leans Republican)* / Republicans *(if respondent identifies or leans Democrat)*; *party names randomized if respondent does not identify with or lean toward either party*].
-Strongly agree (6)
-Somewhat agree (5)
-Slightly agree (4)
-Slightly disagree (3)
-Somewhat disagree (2)
-Strongly disagree (1)

Sometimes regular people need to be a little violent to make sure votes are counted correctly.
-Strongly agree (6)
-Somewhat agree (5)
-Slightly agree (4)
-Slightly disagree (3)
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Next, we'd like you to think not about 2020, but about the the past fifty years or so. How accurate is each of the following statements in describing how things generally work in American politics?
Presidential candidates accept the outcome of elections even if they narrowly lose.
-Very accurate (4)
-Somewhat accurate (3)
-Not very accurate (2)
-Not at all accurate (1)

Presidents do their best to unify the country by downplaying divisions.
-Very accurate (4)
-Somewhat accurate (3)
-Not very accurate (2)
-Not at all accurate (1)

Presidents hold meetings or speak on the phone with leaders of other countries to discuss foreign policy and global issues.
-Very accurate (4)
-Somewhat accurate (3)
-Not very accurate (2)
-Not at all accurate (1)

Presidents make sure to visit all national parks every year.
-Very accurate (4)
-Somewhat accurate (3)

-Not very accurate (2)
-Not at all accurate (1)

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? [*paragraph break*] Presidential candidates should accept the outcome of elections even if they narrowly lose.
-Strongly agree (6)
-Somewhat agree (5)
-Slightly agree (4)
-Slightly disagree (3)
-Somewhat disagree (2)
-Strongly disagree (1)

Please indicate what percentage of Americans you think would agree with the following statement. If you think every American would agree, enter 100. If you think no one would agree, enter 0. If you think half of Americans would agree, enter 50. You can enter any number from 0-100. [*paragraph break*] What percentage of the public do you think would agree with the following statement? Presidential candidates should accept the outcome of elections even if they narrowly lose.
- *Value entry, 0-100.*

To what extent do you trust elections in this country? Please respond on the scale below where 1 means "not at all" and 7 means "a lot."
-1 (Not at all)
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7 (A lot)

How confident are you that votes nationwide will be counted as intended in this year's election?
-Very confident (4)
-Somewhat confident (3)
-Not too confident (2)
-Not at all confident (1)

How confident are you that election officials will manage the counting of ballots fairly in the election this November?
-Very confident (4)
-Somewhat confident (3)
-Not too confident (2)
-Not at all confident (1)

Please think again about the statements by President Trump that you read a minute ago. Setting aside how you feel about Trump or his views, would you say that these statements follow or depart from past practices by American presidents?
-Entirely follow past practice (4)
-Mostly follow past practice (3)
-Mostly depart from past practice (2)
-Entirely depart from past practice (1)

Which topic came up most frequently in the Donald Trump tweets you just read?
-His views about the election (1)
-His views about immigration (0)
-His views about police protests (0)
-His views about health care (0)
-His views about climate change (0)
-His views about defense policy (0)

Do you have any comments on the survey? Please let us know about any problems you had or aspects of the survey that were confusing.
[optional text entry]

Thank you for answering these questions and for your participation. Please do not share any information about the nature of this study with other potential participants. This research is not intended to support or oppose any political candidate or

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Do you consent to participate in the study?
-Yes
-No

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

An important part of democracy is to accept election losses peacefully.
-Strongly agree (6)
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Elections in the United States are rigged in favor of [Democrats *(if respondent identifies or leans Republican)* / Republicans *(if respondent identifies or leans Democrat)*; *party names randomized if respondent does not identify with or lean toward either party*].
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Presidents make sure to visit all national parks every year.
-Very accurate (4)
-Somewhat accurate (3)
-Not very accurate (2)
-Not at all accurate (1)

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? [*paragraph break*] Presidential candidates should accept the outcome of elections even if they narrowly lose.
-Strongly agree (6)
-Somewhat agree (5)
-Slightly agree (4)
-Slightly disagree (3)
-Somewhat disagree (2)
-Strongly disagree (1)

Please indicate what percentage of Americans you think would agree with the following statement. If you think every American would agree, enter 100. If you think no one would agree, enter 0. If you think half of Americans would agree, enter 50. You can enter any number from 0-100. [*paragraph break*] What percentage of the public do you think would agree with the following statement? Presidential candidates should accept the outcome of elections even if they narrowly lose.
- *Value entry, 0-100.*

To what extent do you trust elections in this country? Please respond on the scale below where 1 means "not at all" and 7 means "a lot."
-1 (Not at all)
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7 (A lot)

How confident are you that votes nationwide will be counted as intended in this year's election?
-Very confident (4)
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-Not too confident (2)
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How confident are you that election officials will manage the counting of ballots fairly in the election this November?
-Very confident (4)
-Somewhat confident (3)
-Not too confident (2)
-Not at all confident (1)

To the best of your knowledge, how many times does each of these occur in a presidential election?
Voting more than once
-A million or more (7)
-Hundreds of thousands (6)

-Tens of thousands (5)
-Thousands (4)
-Hundreds (3)
-Less than a hundred (2)
-Less than ten (1)

Stealing or tampering with ballots
-A million or more (7)
-Hundreds of thousands (6)
-Tens of thousands (5)
-Thousands (4)
-Hundreds (3)
-Less than a hundred (2)
-Less than ten (1)

Pretending to be someone else when voting
-A million or more (7)
-Hundreds of thousands (6)
-Tens of thousands (5)
-Thousands (4)
-Hundreds (3)
-Less than a hundred (2)
-Less than ten (1)

People voting who are not U.S. citizens
-A million or more (7)
-Hundreds of thousands (6)
-Tens of thousands (5)
-Thousands (4)
-Hundreds (3)
-Less than a hundred (2)
-Less than ten (1)

Voting with an absentee ballot intended for another person
-A million or more (7)
-Hundreds of thousands (6)
-Tens of thousands (5)
-Thousands (4)
-Hundreds (3)
-Less than a hundred (2)
-Less than ten (1)

When, if ever, is it OK for [respondent party (including leaners); randomized if respondent does not identify with or lean toward either party] to send threatening and intimidating messages to [other party] leaders?
-Always (4)
-Frequently (3)
-Occasionally (2)
-Never (1)

When, if ever, is it OK for an ordinary [respondent party (including leaners); randomized if respondent does not identify with or lean toward either party] in the public to harass an ordinary [other party] on the Internet, in a way that makes the [other party] feel unsafe?
-Always (4)
-Frequently (3)
-Occasionally (2)
-Never (1)

How much do you feel it is justified for [respondent party (including leaners); randomized if respondent does not identify with or lean toward either party] to use violence in advancing their political goals these days?
-Always (4)
-Frequently (3)

-Occasionally (2)
-Never (1)

What if the [other party; randomized if respondent does not identify with or lean toward either party] win the 2020 presidential election? How much do you feel violence would be justified then?
-Always (4)
-Frequently (3)
-Occasionally (2)
-Never (1)

Various types of political systems are described below. Please think about each choice in terms of governing this country and indicate if you think that it would be a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing the United States.

Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections
-Very good (4)
-Fairly good (3)
-Fairly bad (2)
-Very bad (1)

Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country
-Very good (4)
-Fairly good (3)
-Fairly bad (2)
-Very bad (1)
Having the army rule
-Very good (4)
-Fairly good (3)
-Fairly bad (2)
-Very bad (1)

Having a democratic political system
-Very good (4)
-Fairly good (3)
-Fairly bad (2)
-Very bad (1)

In talking to people about elections, we often find out that a lot of people aren't able to vote because they were not registered, or they were sick, or they just didn't have time. How about you – how likely are you to vote in the general election this November?
-Definitely will vote (4)
-Probably will vote (3)
-Probably will not vote (2)
-Definitely will not vote (1)
-Already voted by mail (5)
-Already voted in person (5)

If you were casting a vote today in the 2020 presidential election, for whom would you vote for President of the United States?
-Joe Biden (Democrat) (1)
-Donald Trump (Republican) (2)
-Another candidate/neither (3)

Next, we would like you to examine some messages that President Trump posted on Twitter.

[*Four total tweets were shown. See full list of tweets included by treatment condition.*]

Thinking about the tweets you just saw, how much do you feel:

Angry
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)

-Not at all (1)

Outraged
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Anxious
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Afraid
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Enthusiastic
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Happy
-Very (4)
-Somewhat (3)
-A little (2)
-Not at all (1)

Do you have any comments on the survey? Please let us know about any problems you had or aspects of the survey that were confusing.
[optional text entry]

Thank you for answering these questions and for your participation. Please do not share any information about the nature of this study with other potential participants. This research is not intended to support or oppose any political candidate or office. The research has no affiliation with any political candidate or campaign and has received no financial support from any political candidate or campaign. We may contact you to invite you to follow-up studies. Your participation in any follow-up studies is entirely voluntary and will not affect your compensation for this study. Should you have any questions about this study, please contact Brendan Nyhan at nyhan@dartmouth.edu.

Tweet selection process. We selected our treatment materials (tweets from President Trump) using the process described below. For tweets that do not breach political norms, we used the Trump Twitter Archive (http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com/archive) to search all tweets by Donald Trump. We restricted our collection period to 2020 only and selected 118 tweets that did not obviously seem to violate democratic norms (that is, tweets that did not involve transgressing traditional standards of public communication by elected leaders). These tweets involve mostly innocuous communication about places, events, and policy announcements. Additional criteria for these tweets included: 1) they were not retweets, 2) were neither in a thread nor were first in a thread that made little contextual sense without including other tweets in the thread, and 3) did not include quoted or media content (or make contextual sense with that content omitted). Examples of tweets that seemingly do not breach political norms include: (1) "We just landed Wisconsin a massive Navy shipbuilding contract. Beautiful designs!", (2) "My Administration is closely monitoring Hurricane Douglas off Hawaii & Hurricane Hanna, which has now made landfall in Texas. We continue to coordinate closely with both states – listen to your emergency management officials @Hawaii_EMA & @TDEM to protect your family & property!", and (3) "White House News Conference today at 5:30 P.M. Enjoy!"

To further refine this selection process, we then ran a pretest of the potential tweets selected using the process defined here among 1,851 respondents on Lucid who passed an attention check to examine whether independent coders view the tweets as following or departing from past practices by American presidents. Participants rated each tweet on a four-point scale, where 1 is "entirely follows past practices," 2 is "mostly follows past practices," 3 is "mostly departs from past practices," and 4 is "entirely departs from past practices." The pretest also asked respondents if the topic of the tweet involved U.S. elections specifically or something else to ensure that the placebo content was unrelated to elections, the subject of tweets in another condition (see below). We retained the 44 tweets with the lowest scores on the past practices metric among those for which fewer than 40% of pretest respondents indicated that U.S. elections are the specific topic of the tweet. The resulting group of tweets are those that are seen as maximally consistent with past practices and not closely related to elections. The mean rating on the past practices scale for this group of tweets (on the 1–4 scale) is 2.00.

For tweets that breach political norms but were not focused on elections, we relied on events that Bright Line Watch experts have rated as abnormal and important in their quarterly expert surveys. Again, we searched the Trump Twitter Archive using keywords contained in those events for tweets from 2019 and 2020. We selected 40 tweets using this approach with the same criteria regarding retweets, threads, and media as described above. Examples of tweets that seem to breach political norms but are not focused on elections include: (1) "Ted Wheeler, the wacky Radical Left Do Nothing Democrat Mayor of Portland, who has watched great death and destruction of his City during his tenure, thinks this lawless situation should go on forever. Wrong! Portland will never recover with a fool for a Mayor...", (2) "The press is doing everything within their power to fight the magnificence of the phrase, MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! They can't stand the fact that this Administration has done more than virtually any other Administration in its first 2yrs. They are truly the ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE!", and (3) "I was criticized by the Democrats when I closed the Country down to China many weeks ahead of what almost everyone recommended. Saved many lives. Dems were working the Impeachment Hoax. They didn't have a clue! Now they are fear mongering. Be calm & vigilant!" We pretested these on Lucid as part of the $n = 1,851$ data collection described above and retained the 20 tweets with the highest scores on the past practices metric among those for which fewer than 40% of pretest respondents indicated that U.S. elections are the specific topic of the tweet. The resulting group of tweets are those that are seen as maximally departing from past practices and not closely related to elections. The mean rating on the past practices scale for this group of tweets (on the 1–4 scale) is 3.14. While the norm-violating tweets were not specifically rated for their valence (positive/negative), they are by design generally more negative than the non-norm-violating tweets because norm violations often involve attacks on people or political processes.

Finally, for tweets that breach political norms and involve elections, we focused only on tweets involving the 2020 presidential election. Our collection protocol for these tweets relied on lists provided to us by the *Wall Street Journal* and the website Factba.se (1, 2). Each list was a compilation of tweets sent by President Trump that seemed to undermine faith in American elections. We collected all tweets from 2020 in these lists using the same criteria regarding retweets, threads, and media described above. Since each list was provided to us a few weeks before our pretest and to ensure that the lists covered all relevant tweets, we also performed a keyword search in the Trump Twitter Archive using the keywords "election," "ballot," and "vote" and collected tweets from 2020 that violate or allege violations of one or more of the following Bright Line Watch democratic norms related to elections (3): (1) Elections are conducted, ballots counted, and winners determined without pervasive fraud or manipulation, (2) The geographic boundaries of electoral districts do not systematically advantage any particular political party, (3) Elections are free from foreign influence, (4) All adult citizens have equal opportunity to vote, (5) All votes have equal impact on election outcomes, (6) Voter participation in elections is generally high.

We selected 56 tweets using this approach. Examples of tweets that seemingly breach political norms and are focused on elections include: (1) "The Democrats know the 2020 Election will be a fraudulent mess. Will maybe never know who won!", (2) "Mail-In Ballot fraud found in many elections. People are just now seeing how bad, dishonest and slow it is. Election results could be delayed for months. No more big election night answers? 1% not even counted in 2016. Ridiculous! Just a formula for RIGGING an Election....", and (3) "Rigged Election, and EVERYONE knows it!" We pretested these as part of the same $n = 1,851$ Lucid data collection described above and retained the 24 tweets with the highest scores on the past practices metric among those for which more than 60% of pretest respondents indicated that U.S. elections are the specific topic of the tweet. The resulting group of tweets are those that are seen as maximally departing from past practices and very closely related to elections. The mean rating on the past practices scale for this group of tweets (on the 1–4 scale) is 3.14.

After this initial pretest, we sought to address concern that the placebo tweets above might differ from those in the election

norm violations treatment condition on two dimensions. We thus followed a process like the one described above to select 47 election-related tweets that did not obviously seem to violate democratic norms (that is, tweets that did not involve transgressing traditional standards of public communication by elected leaders). Examples of such tweets include: (1) "Chris Jacobs will be a great Congressman who will always fight for the people of New York. He supports our #MAGA Agenda, will continue to Secure Our Border, Loves our Military, Vets, and is Strong on the #2A. Chris has my Complete Endorsement for the Special Election on 4/28!", (2) "Thank you to the Republican National Committee, (the RNC), who voted UNANIMOUSLY yesterday to support me in the upcoming 2020 Election. Considering that we have done more than any Administration in the first two years, this should be easy. More great things now in the works!", and (3) "Just landed in New York to see my brother, Robert. We're going for New York on November 3rd. We're going to Reduce Taxes, Increase Law Enforcement, and bring it back BIG TIME! #MAGA." We then separately tested these tweets (along with the $44 + 20 + 24 = 88$ tweets that we had already selected using the process previously described to induce wider variance in both election content and normalcy) in a pretest of 1,417 respondents on Lucid using the questions above. We selected the 20 tweets with the lowest scores on the past practices metric among those for which more than 60% of pretest respondents indicated that "U.S. elections" are the specific topic of the tweet (rather than "some other topic"). The resulting group of tweets includes those that are seen as maximally consistent with past practices and closely related to elections. The mean rating on the past practices scale for this group of tweets (on the 1–4 scale) is 2.26.

This pretest of 261 candidate tweets across the four experimental conditions resulted in the following final treatment stimuli: 40 tweets that do not violate democratic norms and are not closely related to elections, 20 tweets that do not violate democratic norms and are focused on elections, 20 tweets that breach political norms but are not focused on elections, and 20 tweets that breach political norms and are focused on elections. We used a brute force randomization technique to partition each group of qualifying tweets into all possible groups of the relevant sizes, compared group differences in mean normalcy within tweet type, and chose the partitioning rules that minimize these differences to decide which tweets of each type go into each wave. The final list of tweets by treatment condition and survey wave is shown in Table SI-1.

909 **List of tweets by wave and treatment condition.**

Table SI-1. Treatment materials

Wave	Group	Tweet text
1	Non-election placebo (all groups)	It has been two years since the tragedy in Parkland. We will always mourn the innocent lives taken from us – 14 wonderful students and 3 terrific educators. Earlier this week, I met with families whose experiences from that horrible day still pierce the soul....
1	Non-election placebo (all groups)	On #NationalDoctorsDay, we recognize the remarkable men & women who treat their fellow Americans, find cures for the diseases & illnesses we face, and never waver in their efforts to treat every patient with the dignity, respect, and empathy they deserve.
1	Non-election placebo (all groups)	I am proud to announce the first $500M of $3.9B in CARES Act transit funding headed to the NY Metropolitan Transportation Authority. Important funding to keep transit systems clean and operating to get people back to work! Spend it wisely! @NYGovCuomo @NYCMayor
1	Non-election placebo (all groups)	$13.9M is heading to New Orleans in @USDOT funding for @NewOrleansRTA! Happy to support bus service and major fleet improvements for the great people of Louisiana and help them keep moving safely.
2	Non-election placebo (all groups)	One of the many great things about our just signed giant Trade Deal with China is that it will bring both the USA & China closer together in so many other ways. Terrific working with President Xi, a man who truly loves his country. Much more to come!
2	Non-election placebo (all groups)	It was my honor to welcome our nation's Mayors to the @WhiteHouse as we continue to strengthen the bonds of cooperation between federal and local governments so that we can deliver great jobs, excellent schools, affordable healthcare, and safe communities for all of our people!
2	Non-election placebo (all groups)	Welcome back to Earth, @Astro_Christina, and congratulations on breaking the female record for the longest stay in space! You're inspiring young women and making the USA proud! Enjoyed speaking with you and @Astro_Jessica on the first all-female spacewalk IN HISTORY last year.
2	Non-election placebo (all groups)	I want to thank all of our Great Government officials on the CoronaVirus Task Force who are working around the clock, in response to the CoronaVirus. Continue to check http://CDC.gov for updates, and follow all recommendations that are available...
2	Non-election placebo (all groups)	Good teamwork between Republicans & Democrats as the House passes the big CoronaVirus Relief Bill. People really pulled together. Nice to see!
2	Non-election placebo (all groups)	I ask all Americans to band together and support your neighbors by not hoarding unnecessary amounts of food and essentials. TOGETHER we will stay STRONG and overcome this challenge!
2	Non-election placebo (all groups)	Great meeting today with the CoronaVirus Task Force in the Oval Office. Stay informed at: http://CoronaVirus.gov.

Continued on next page

Table SI-1 – continued from previous page

Wave	Group	Tweet text
2	Non-election placebo (all groups)	Hurricane Laura is a very dangerous and rapidly intensifying hurricane. My Administration remains fully engaged with state & local emergency managers to continue preparing and assisting the great people Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas. Listen to local officials. We are with you!
2	Non-election placebo (all groups)	I was saddened to learn of the passing of India's former President, Pranab Mukherjee. I send my condolences to his family and the people of India as they grieve the loss of a great leader.
2	Non-election placebo (all groups)	Today I spoke with our Nation's Small Businesses, which employ nearly half of America's workforce. We are taking the MOST aggressive action in history to deliver fast relief to your businesses and workers. We will always protect our Small Businesses! @SBAgov
2	Non-election placebo	Kobe Bryant, despite being one of the truly great basketball players of all time, was just getting started in life. He loved his family so much, and had such strong passion for the future. The loss of his beautiful daughter, Gianna, makes this moment even more devastating...
2	Non-election placebo	Jack Welch, former Chairman and CEO of GE, a business legend, has died. There was no corporate leader like "neutron" Jack. He was my friend and supporter. We made wonderful deals together. He will never be forgotten. My warmest sympathies to his wonderful wife & family!
2	Non-election placebo	THANK YOU to our Police Officers, Fire Fighters, and EMS who help us defeat the Virus every day. Our proud nation is grateful for the unwavering dedication and sacrifice of our First Responders and their families. TOGETHER we will beat this!
2	Non-election placebo	Congratulations to Prime Minister Abe of Japan, and the IOC, on their very wise decision to present the Olympics in 2021. It will be a great success, and I look forward to being there!
2	Non-election placebo	Great News: Prime Minister Boris Johnson has just been moved out of Intensive Care. Get well Boris!!!
2	Non-election placebo	Extraordinary rescue yesterday by our brave and "Semper Paratus" U.S. Coast Guard. Our rapid response and the vessel's survival equipment allowed these four mariners to see their loved ones again. Well done @USCG!
2	Non-election placebo	We will miss GREAT Country Rocker, Charlie Daniels, who passed away yesterday in Hermitage, Tennessee. My condolences to his wife Hazel, and their family. Charlie is in my thoughts and prayers. I love his music! #RIPCharlieDaniels
2	Non-election placebo	Saddened to hear the news of civil rights hero John Lewis passing. Melania and I send our prayers to he and his family.
2	Non-election placebo	We MUST protect our National Parks for our children and grandchildren. I am calling on the House to pass the GREAT AMERICAN OUTDOORS ACT today. Thanks @SenCoryGardner and @SteveDaines for all your work on this HISTORIC BILL!

Continued on next page

Table SI-1 – continued from previous page

Wave	Group	Tweet text
2	Non-election placebo	Today, we honor the brave Native American/First Nations soldiers who served our Nation and played a vital role in America's victory in WWII. The Navajo Code was never broken and saved untold American lives. Our country will be forever grateful. Happy Navajo Code Talkers Day!
2	Election placebo	Chris Jacobs will be a great Congressman who will always fight for the people of New York. He supports our #MAGA Agenda, will continue to Secure Our Border, Loves our Military, Vets, and is Strong on the #2A. Chris has my Complete Endorsement for the Special Election on 4/28!
2	Election placebo	Volunteer to be a Trump Election Poll Watcher. Sign up today! #MakeAmericaGreatAgain
2	Election placebo	Great Rally in Pennsylvania last night. Congressman Lloyd Smucker (PA-11) was there and I informed him that he has my complete and total Endorsement for the upcoming 2020 Election. Lloyd has done a great job. I am with him all the way! #MAGA
2	Election placebo	I hope everyone in the Great State of Virginia will get out and VOTE on Tuesday in all of the local and state elections to send a signal to D.C. that you want lower taxes, a strong Military, Border & 2nd Amendment, great healthcare, and must take care of our Vets. VOTE REPUBLICAN
2	Election placebo	No debate on Election Security should go forward without first agreeing that Voter ID (Identification) must play a very strong part in any final agreement. Without Voter ID, it is all so meaningless!
2	Election placebo	I will be in Gulfport and Tupelo, Mississippi, on Monday night doing two Rallies for Senator Hyde-Smith, who has a very important Election on Tuesday. She is an outstanding person who is strong on the Border, Crime, Military, our great Vets, Healthcare & the 2nd A. Needed in D.C.
2	Election placebo	Republicans, get out and vote today for those great candidates that will lead to big victories on November 3rd. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!
2	Election placebo	Just landed in New York to see my brother, Robert. We're going for New York on November 3rd. We're going to Reduce Taxes, Increase Law Enforcement, and bring it back BIG TIME! #MAGA
2	Election placebo	Such a fantastic win for Ron DeSantis and the people of the Great State of Florida. Ron will be a fantastic Governor. On to November!
2	Election placebo	Last day to register to VOTE in Alabama, California, South Dakota and Wyoming! #JobsNotMobs http://Vote.GOP
2	General norm violations	They are not "peaceful protesters", as Sleepy Joe and the Democrats call them, they are THUGS – And it is all taking place in Democrat run cities. Call me and request Federal HELP. We will solve your problems in a matter of minutes – And thanks to the U.S. Marshalls in Portland!

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Table SI-1 – continued from previous page

Wave	Group	Tweet text
2	General norm violations	If I didn't demand that National Guard Troops go into Minneapolis after watching how poorly the Liberal Democrat government was handling things, you wouldn't even have a Minneapolis now. Once they were deployed, in force, all looting, burning and crime stopped DEAD!
2	General norm violations	@PeteHegseth "Oh bye the way, I appreciate the message from former President Bush, but where was he during Impeachment calling for putting partisanship aside." @foxandfriends He was nowhere to be found in speaking up against the greatest Hoax in American history!
2	General norm violations	Does anybody really believe that Roger Stone, a man whose house was raided early in the morning by 29 gun toting FBI Agents (with Fake News @CNN closely in toe), was treated fairly. How about the jury forewoman with her unannounced hatred & bias. Same scammers as General Flynn!
2	General norm violations	This is what happens to someone who loyally gets appointed Attorney General of the United States & then doesn't have the wisdom or courage to stare down & end the phony Russia Witch Hunt. Recuses himself on FIRST DAY in office, and the Mueller Scam begins!
2	General norm violations	Shifty Adam Schiff is a CORRUPT POLITICIAN, and probably a very sick man. He has not paid the price, yet, for what he has done to our Country!
2	General norm violations	The News Reports about the Department of Commerce dropping its quest to put the Citizenship Question on the Census is incorrect or, to state it differently, FAKE! We are absolutely moving forward, as we must, because of the importance of the answer to this question.
2	General norm violations	Nancy Pelosi knew of all of the many Shifty Adam Schiff lies and massive frauds perpetrated upon Congress and the American people, in the form of a fraudulent speech knowingly delivered as a ruthless con, and the illegal meetings with a highly partisan "Whistleblower" & lawyer...
2	General norm violations	PM Justin Trudeau of Canada acted so meek and mild during our @G7 meetings only to give a news conference after I left saying that, "US Tariffs were kind of insulting" and he "will not be pushed around." Very dishonest & weak. Our Tariffs are in response to his of 270% on dairy!
2	General norm violations	THE RIGGED AND CORRUPT MEDIA IS THE ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE!
2	Election norm violations	It is happening again to Crazy Bernie, just like last time, only far more obvious. They are taking the Democrat Nomination away from him, and there's very little he can do. A Rigged System!
2	Election norm violations	So in California, the Democrats, who fought like crazy to get all mail in only ballots, and succeeded, have just opened a voting booth in the most Democrat area in the State. They are trying to steal another election. It's all rigged out there. These votes must not count. SCAM!

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Table SI-1 – continued from previous page

Wave	Group	Tweet text
2	Election norm violations	So ridiculous to see Twitter trying to make the case that Mail-In Ballots are not subject to FRAUD. How stupid, there are examples, & cases, all over the place. Our election process will become badly tainted & a laughingstock all over the World. Tell that to your hater @yoyoel
2	Election norm violations	Because of MAIL-IN BALLOTS, 2020 will be the most RIGGED Election in our nations history – unless this stupidity is ended. We voted during World War One & World War Two with no problem, but now they are using Covid in order to cheat by using Mail-Ins!
2	Election norm violations	Mail-In Ballot fraud found in many elections. People are just now seeing how bad, dishonest and slow it is. Election results could be delayed for months. No more big election night answers? 1% not even counted in 2016. Ridiculous! Just a formula for RIGGING an Election...
2	Election norm violations	Glad I was able to get the very dishonest LameStream Media to finally start talking about the RISKS to our Democracy from dangerous Universal Mail-In-Voting (not Absentee Voting, which I totally support!).
2	Election norm violations	The Democrats are demanding Mail-In Ballots because the enthusiasm meter for Slow Joe Biden is the lowest in recorded history, and they are concerned that very few people will turn out to vote. Instead, they will search & find people, then "harvest" & return Ballots. Not fair!
2	Election norm violations	The greatest Election Fraud in our history is about to happen. This may top the Democrats illegally spying on my campaign!
2	Election norm violations	All the Radical Left Democrats are trying to do with the Post Office hearings is blame the Republicans for the FRAUD that will occur because of the 51 Million Ballots that are being sent to people who have not even requested them. They are setting the table for a BIG MESS!
2	Election norm violations	For our Country to be sending 80 million UNSOLICITED BALLOTS is very unfair and a roadmap to disaster. Even recent small and easier to control elections which did this are a catastrophic disaster. Fraudulent & missing Ballots like never seen before. 20% and 30% off. STOP!
3	Non-election placebo (all groups)	Today I spoke with American physicians and nurses to thank them for their tireless work. Doctors and nurses are at the front lines of this war and are true American HEROES! With their help, America will WIN.
3	Non-election placebo (all groups)	America owes our very hard working food supply workers so much as they produce and deliver high quality food for us during this horrible COVID-19. Join me in thanking our Farmers, Ranchers, Processors, Distributors and Stores! @JohnBoozman
3	Non-election placebo (all groups)	Extraordinary times require even closer cooperation between friends. Thank you India and the Indian people for the decision on HCQ. Will not be forgotten! Thank you Prime Minister @NarendraModi for your strong leadership in helping not just India, but humanity, in this fight!

Continued on next page

Table SI-1 – continued from previous page

Wave	Group	Tweet text
3	Non-election placebo (all groups)	Just spoke to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali of Ethiopia. His Country needs Ventilators, and the U.S. is in good position to help him. We will!
3	Non-election placebo (all groups)	I just got off the phone with former American hostage Michael White, who is now in Zurich after being released from Iran. He will be on a U.S. plane shortly, and is COMING HOME...
3	Non-election placebo (all groups)	Congratulations to my friend President @Andrzej-Duda of Poland on his historic re-election! Looking forward to continuing our important work together across many issues, including defense, trade, energy, and telecommunications security!
3	Non-election placebo (all groups)	I am proud to announce $2 million for the @Sept11Memorial in NYC! This special site ensures that the memory of the nearly 3,000 people killed in the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as those lost in the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, will never be forgotten!
3	Non-election placebo (all groups)	My Administration is closely monitoring Hurricane Douglas off Hawaii & Hurricane Hanna, which has now made landfall in Texas. We continue to coordinate closely with both states – listen to your emergency management officials @Hawaii_EMA & @TDEM to protect your family & property!
3	Non-election placebo (all groups)	I am deeply saddened by the tragic loss of eight Marines and one Sailor during a training exercise off the coast of California. Our prayers are with their families. I thank them for the brave service their loved ones gave to our Nation. #SemperFidelis
3	Non-election placebo (all groups)	Just returned to Washington from Louisiana & Texas, after tours and discussions concerning Hurricane Laura. Thank you to @FEMA and ALL. God bless the families of those who perished!
3	Non-election placebo	Just had a nice conversation with Prime Minister @JustinTrudeau of Canada. Great to hear that his wonderful wife Sophie is doing very well. The United States and Canada will continue to coordinate closely together on COVID-19.
3	Non-election placebo	My team is closely monitoring the flooding in Central Michigan – Stay SAFE and listen to local officials. Our brave First Responders are once again stepping up to serve their fellow citizens, THANK YOU!
3	Non-election placebo	Another $298M heading to @MTA, adding up to over $2B in federal funding from @USDOT so far, part of the $3.9B total from the CARES Act. This is critical to keeping essential personnel moving and aiding metro NYC in recovery. We are here for the people of New York!
3	Non-election placebo	HAPPY MEMORIAL DAY!
3	Non-election placebo	In addition to nearly $8 billion that Treasury provided tribal communities, @HUDgov is releasing an additional $25 million in #CARESAct funding today to respond to the CoronaVirus with improved housing, indoor air quality, and food pantry support.

Continued on next page

Table SI-1 – continued from previous page

Wave	Group	Tweet text
3	Non-election placebo	Today we celebrated the passage of landmark legislation that will preserve America's majestic natural wonders, priceless historic treasures, grand national monuments, and glorious national parks. It was my great honor to sign the Great American Outdoors Act into law! #HR1957
3	Non-election placebo	Had a lengthy discussion this morning with President Macron of France concerning numerous subjects, but in particular the catastrophic event which took place in Beirut, Lebanon...
3	Non-election placebo	Sad to see the damage from the derecho in Midwest. 112 mile per hour winds in Midway, Iowa! The Federal government is in close coordination with State officials. We are with you all the way – Stay safe and strong!
3	Non-election placebo	Just approved (and fast) the FULL Emergency Declaration for the Great State of Iowa. They got hit hard by record setting winds. Thank you to @SenJoniErnst, @ChuckGrassley, and Governor Kim Reynolds.
3	Non-election placebo	I am pleased to inform the American Public that Acting Secretary Chad Wolf will be nominated to be the Secretary of Homeland Security. Chad has done an outstanding job and we greatly appreciate his service!
3	Election placebo	I hope we can get Admiral @RonnyJackson4TX of Texas, who served our Country so well, into the runoff election in #TX13! Ronny is strong on Crime and Borders, GREAT for our Military and Vets, and will protect your #2A. Get out and vote for Ronny on Tuesday, March 3rd!
3	Election placebo	Mississippi, there is a VERY important election for Governor on November 5th. I need you to Get Out and Vote for our Great Republican nominee, @TateReeves. Tate is strong on Crime, tough on Illegal Immigration, and will protect your Second Amendment...
3	Election placebo	The two big Congressional wins in North Carolina on Tuesday, Dan Bishop and Greg Murphy, have reverberated all over the World. They showed a lot of people how strong the Republican Party is, and how well it is doing. 2020 is a big, and very important, Election. We will WIN!
3	Election placebo	Megan King, who is running for Superior Court Judge in the Pennsylvania election, has my Full and Total Endorsement. She is tough on crime and fully understands all aspects of the law. Vote for Megan tomorrow (Tuesday).
3	Election placebo	Thank you to the Republican National Committee, (the RNC), who voted UNANIMOUSLY yesterday to support me in the upcoming 2020 Election. Considering that we have done more than any Administration in the first two years, this should be easy. More great things now in the works!
3	Election placebo	Vote for TRUMP on November 3rd. I am going to bring our beloved New York back!
3	Election placebo	VOTE TODAY! Go to http://vote.gop to find your polling location. We are going to Make America Great Again! #VoteTrump #ElectionDay
3	Election placebo	NOVEMBER 3RD.

Continued on next page

Table SI-1 – continued from previous page

Wave	Group	Tweet text
3	Election placebo	Scott Walker is very special and will have another great win in November. He has done a fantastic job as Governor of Wisconsin and will always have my full support and Endorsement!
3	Election placebo	REGISTER TO http://Vote.GOP! #MAGA
3	General norm violations	.@GoyaFoods is doing GREAT. The Radical Left smear machine backfired, people are buying like crazy!
3	General norm violations	Mayor Wheeler just got harassed out of his own home in Portland by so-called "friendly protesters". The Anarchists, Agitators and Looters treat him HORRIBLY, even though he is so nice and respectful to them. Criminals only understand strength!
3	General norm violations	Ted Wheeler, the wacky Radical Left Do Nothing Democrat Mayor of Portland, who has watched great death and destruction of his City during his tenure, thinks this lawless situation should go on forever. Wrong! Portland will never recover with a fool for a Mayor...
3	General norm violations	"Regulate Twitter if they are going to start regulating free speech." @JudgeJeanine @foxandfriends Well, as they have just proven conclusively, that's what they are doing. Repeal Section 230!!!
3	General norm violations	Two months in jail for a Swamp Creature, yet 9 years recommended for Roger Stone (who was not even working for the Trump Campaign). Gee, that sounds very fair! Rogue prosecutors maybe? The Swamp! @foxandfriends @TuckerCarlson
3	General norm violations	"Sotomayor accuses GOP appointed Justices of being biased in favor of Trump." @IngrahamAngle @FoxNews This is a terrible thing to say. Trying to "shame" some into voting her way? She never criticized Justice Ginsberg when she called me a "faker". Both should recuse themselves..
3	General norm violations	"I agree with the President, the Supreme Court got it wrong. There should be a question about Citizenship on the Census. A.G. Barr sees a pathway to add the Citizenship Question." Steve Doocy @foxandfriends Working hard on something that should be so easy. People are fed up!
3	General norm violations	THE ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE. Sadly, our Lamestream Media is TOTALLY CORRUPT!
3	General norm violations	I just cannot state strongly enough how totally dishonest much of the Media is. Truth doesn't matter to them, they only have their hatred & agenda. This includes fake books, which come out about me all the time, always anonymous sources, and are pure fiction. Enemy of the People!
3	General norm violations	Has anyone looked at the mistakes that John Brennan made while serving as CIA Director? He will go down as easily the WORST in history & since getting out, he has become nothing less than a loudmouth, partisan, political hack who cannot be trusted with the secrets to our country!
3	Election norm violations	They are taking the nomination away from Bernie for a second time. Rigged!

Continued on next page

Table SI-1 – continued from previous page

Wave	Group	Tweet text
3	Election norm violations	.@GOPLeader Kevin McCarthy informed me that I was 20 for 20 on Tuesday with respect to my Endorsement of candidates. Sadly, I didn't get that information from the Fake News Media. They don't report those things, or the far more than Dems cumulative votes, despite no opposition!
3	Election norm violations	We can't let the Fake News, and their partner, the Radical Left, Do Nothing Democrats, get away with stealing the Election. They tried that in 2016. How did that work out?
3	Election norm violations	Governor @GavinNewsom of California won't let restaurants, beaches and stores open, but he installs a voting booth system in a highly Democrat area (supposed to be mail in ballots only) because our great candidate, @MikeGarcia2020, is winning by a lot. CA25 Rigged Election!
3	Election norm violations	State of Nevada "thinks" that they can send out illegal vote by mail ballots, creating a great Voter Fraud scenario for the State and the U.S. They can't! If they do, "I think" I can hold up funds to the State. Sorry, but you must not cheat in elections. @RussVought45 @USTreasury
3	Election norm violations	There is NO WAY (ZERO!) that Mail-In Ballots will be anything less than substantially fraudulent. Mail boxes will be robbed, ballots will be forged & even illegally printed out & fraudulently signed. The Governor of California is sending Ballots to millions of people, anyone...
3	Election norm violations	Rigged Election, and EVERYONE knows it!
3	Election norm violations	With Universal Mail-In Voting (not Absentee Voting, which is good), 2020 will be the most INACCURATE & FRAUDULENT Election in history. It will be a great embarrassment to the USA. Delay the Election until people can properly, securely and safely vote???
3	Election norm violations	In an illegal late night coup, Nevada's clubhouse Governor made it impossible for Republicans to win the state. Post Office could never handle the Traffic of Mail-In Votes without preparation. Using Covid to steal the state. See you in Court!
3	Election norm violations	The Democrats know the 2020 Election will be a fraudulent mess. Will maybe never know who won!
4	Election norm violations(all groups)	CA25 is a Rigged Election. Trying to steal it from @MikeGarcia2020. @GavinNewsom must act now!
4	Election norm violations(all groups)	RIGGED 2020 ELECTION: MILLIONS OF MAIL-IN BALLOTS WILL BE PRINTED BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, AND OTHERS. IT WILL BE THE SCANDAL OF OUR TIMES!
4	Election norm violations(all groups)	New York Mail-In voting is in a disastrous state of condition. Votes from many weeks ago are missing - a total mess. They have no idea what is going on. Rigged Election. I told you so. Same thing would happen, but on massive scale, with USA. Fake News refuses to report!
4	Election norm violations(all groups)	They are sending out 51,000,000 Ballots to people who haven't even requested a Ballot. Many of those people don't even exist. They are trying to STEAL this election. This should not be allowed!

Additional results

Attrition analysis. Attrition was not random in our study. We tested the null hypothesis of no difference in observable characteristics between respondents who did not complete all waves of the survey and those who completed all four waves for a preregistered series of covariates: Republican identification/lean, nonwhite racial identification, age group, college graduate, male self-identification, the three measures of election norm respect in wave 1, trust in elections as measured in wave 1, support for political violence in wave 1, support for democracy in wave 1, and belief in voter fraud in wave 1. We used t-tests with unequal variances for the binary and continuous measures and chi-squared tests for factors and applied a procedure to control the false discovery rate (4) ($\alpha = .05$). Across a total of 16 t-tests and eight χ^2 tests, we find that Republicans, nonwhite respondents in wave 3, and respondents with lower respect for election-related norms, lower trust and confidence in elections, higher support for political violence, lower support for democracy, and higher belief in voter fraud were more likely to attrit ($p < .05$).

However, attrition does not threaten to bias our treatment effect estimates if it is uniform across conditions. We therefore conducted a series of preregistered tests for differential attrition across treatment groups in our sample. First, we tested the null hypothesis of no difference in attrition rate between conditions in wave 3 and wave 4 of our survey using a χ^2 test. We fail to reject the null in each case. Retention by condition from wave 2 (the first experimental wave) was 90.3% for the control group in wave 3 and 93.7% in wave 4; 91.5% for the General norm violations group in wave 3 and 93.2% in wave 4; and 91.5% for the Election norm violations group in wave 3 and 93.6% in wave 4. We also tested the null of no difference in observable characteristics between people who attrit by condition and wave. Across a total of 72 preregistered tests (48 t-tests and 24 χ^2 tests), we rejected the null just one time: respondents in the control group in wave 3 who did not complete the entire survey had, on average, lower respect for the norm of accepting elections peacefully in wave 1 than respondents in the Election norm violations condition.

We therefore conclude that there is little evidence of differential attrition by condition. Assignment to treatment does not measurably affect respondents' likelihood of completing the survey, nor do those who completed followup waves within condition differ measurably in almost any case on observables from those who did not.

Table SI-2. Sample demographics and balance across treatment conditions

	Non-election placebo	Election placebo	Non-election norm violation	Election norm violation	Total
Age					
18-34	37.5%	32.7%	36.8%	34.4%	35.4%
35-44	28.1%	33.5%	29.5%	30.7%	30.3%
45-54	17.6%	16.3%	17.0%	17.6%	17.2%
55-64	9.4%	9.7%	12.1%	12.0%	11.2%
65+	7.4%	7.7%	4.6%	5.3%	5.8%
Sex					
Female	48.1%	49.0%	52.3%	53.5%	51.5%
Male	51.9%	51.0%	47.7%	46.5%	48.5%
Education					
High school or less	9.6%	10.0%	7.9%	9.2%	9.0%
Some college/associate	30.0%	27.8%	26.5%	26.9%	27.4%
Bachelor's degree	42.1%	42.1%	44.8%	44.4%	43.8%
Graduate degree	18.2%	20.1%	20.8%	19.5%	19.8%
Race					
White	79.1%	82.5%	81.5%	80.6%	81.0%
Non-white	20.9%	17.5%	18.5%	19.4%	19.0%
Party					
Democrat	58.8%	61.1%	60.7%	62.4%	61.0%
Republican	39.3%	37.1%	37.9%	36.2%	37.4%
Independent/something else	1.9%	1.7%	1.4%	1.4%	1.5%
Trump approval					
Trump approver	31.6%	31.8%	30.7%	29.8%	30.7%
Trump disapprover	68.4%	68.2%	69.3%	70.2%	69.3%

$N = 2151$. Respondents who chose "other" for gender ($N = 5$) and any respondents with missing data for demographic variables are excluded from the above percentages. Party identification includes partisan leaners.

Table SI-3. Mean values for main outcomes in non-election/election placebo conditions

	Non-election placebo	Election placebo	p-value
Trust and confidence in elections			
Wave 2	−0.012	−0.016	0.959
Wave 3	0.019	0.030	0.880
Wave 4	0.017	0.017	0.996
Mean	−0.001	0.008	0.888
Accept election results peacefully			
Wave 2	5.407	5.477	0.294
Wave 3	5.413	5.399	0.852
Wave 4	5.410	5.403	0.922
Mean	5.388	5.410	0.726
Elections rigged for other party			
Wave 2	3.313	3.360	0.688
Wave 3	3.307	3.334	0.827
Wave 4	3.419	3.421	0.984
Mean	3.359	3.397	0.734
Violence needed during vote count			
Wave 2	1.695	1.729	0.702
Wave 3	1.708	1.808	0.286
Wave 4	1.764	1.785	0.827
Mean	1.745	1.796	0.534

$N = 2151$. Cell entries in the middle two columns are means by condition for outcomes in left column; p-values from two-sample t-tests with unequal variances in right column.

Table SI-4. Treatment effects on trust and confidence in elections

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	0.025	−0.006	0.003	0.001
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.026)
General norm violations	0.013	−0.035	−0.019	−0.017
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.025)
Election − General norm violations	0.012	0.029	0.023	0.016
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.026)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2137	1950	2001	2137

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variables are standardized factor scores. Mean outcome calculated among non-missing values for each respondent.

Table SI-5. Treatment effects on support for democratic norms

	Accept election results peacefully				Elections rigged for other party				Violence needed during vote count			
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	−0.077	0.001	0.002	−0.030	0.140	0.125	−0.061	0.059	0.084	0.031	0.002	0.030
	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.043)
General norm violations	−0.058	−0.015	0.003	−0.024	0.103	0.112	−0.004	0.067	0.186*	0.105	0.117	0.134
	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.032)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.043)
Election − General norm violations	−0.018	0.016	−0.001	−0.006	0.037	0.012	−0.056	−0.008	−0.102	−0.073	−0.115	−0.105
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.044)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2137	1950	2001	2137	2137	1949	2001	2137	2137	1950	2001	2137

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Mean outcome calculated among non-missing values for each respondent.

Table SI-6. Treatment effects on support for political violence and democracy

	Political violence	Support for democracy
Election norm violations	−0.040	−0.025
	(0.034)	(0.031)
General norm violations	0.021	0.036
	(0.036)	(0.033)
Election − General norm violations	−0.061	−0.061
	(0.034)	(0.032)
Control variables	✓	✓
N	2001	2001

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy. Marginal effects of the treatments on these outcomes ("Election – General norm violations" row) were not preregistered and are thus exploratory; we include these estimates for presentational consistency.

Table SI-7. Treatment effects on trust and confidence in elections (by Trump approval)

(a) Statistical model results

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	0.137^{***}	0.114^{*}	0.085	0.106^{**}
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.030)
Election norm × Trump approver	-0.364^{***}	-0.405^{***}	-0.274^{***}	-0.348^{***}
	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.058)
General norm violations	0.083	0.006	0.006	0.033
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.029)
General norm × Trump approver	-0.220^{**}	-0.133	-0.080	-0.158^{*}
	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.057)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2137	1950	2001	2137

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variables are standardized factor scores. Mean outcome calculated among non-missing values for each respondent.

(b) Subgroup marginal effects

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violation				
Trump approver	-0.227^{***}	-0.291^{***}	-0.189^{*}	-0.242^{***}
	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.049)
Trump disapprover	0.137^{***}	0.114^{*}	0.085	0.106^{**}
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.030)
General norm violation				
Trump approver	-0.137	-0.127	-0.075	-0.125
	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.049)
Trump disapprover	0.083	0.006	0.006	0.033
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.029)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Marginal effect estimates calculated from Table SI-7a.

Table SI-8. Treatment effects on trust and confidence in elections (by party)

(a) Statistical model results

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	0.132**	0.097	0.068	0.090*
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.032)
Election norm × Repub.	−0.293***	−0.287***	−0.181*	−0.250***
	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.054)
General norm violations	0.078	−0.014	0.003	0.023
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.032)
General norm × Repub.	−0.180*	−0.070	−0.080	−0.118
	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.053)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2104	1921	1970	2104

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference category for Republican indicator is Democrats (party variables include leaners; true independents excluded). All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variables are standardized factor scores. Mean outcome calculated among non-missing values for each respondent.

(b) Subgroup marginal effects

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violation				
Republican	−0.162*	−0.190*	−0.113	−0.160***
	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.043)
Democrat	0.132**	0.097	0.068	0.090*
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.032)
General norm violation				
Republican	−0.102	−0.084	−0.077	−0.096
	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.042)
Democrat	0.078	−0.014	0.003	0.023
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.032)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Marginal effect estimates calculated from Table SI-8a.

Table SI-9. Statistical models of support for democratic norms by Trump approval

	Accept election results peacefully				Elections rigged for other party				Violence needed during vote count			
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	−0.001	0.043	0.023	0.014	0.012	0.030	−0.094	−0.020	0.025	−0.014	−0.045	−0.024
	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.051)
Election norm × Trump approver	−0.252	−0.141	−0.072	−0.148	0.423**	0.318	0.114	0.260	0.195	0.152	0.155	0.175
	(0.094)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.076)	(0.122)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.102)	(0.116)	(0.113)	(0.119)	(0.092)
General norm violations	−0.082	−0.017	−0.028	−0.048	0.118	0.100	−0.002	0.074	0.187*	0.065	0.066	0.108
	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.051)
General norm × Trump approver	0.077	0.009	0.106	0.077	−0.050	0.039	−0.010	−0.025	−0.007	0.132	0.168	0.085
	(0.087)	(0.099)	(0.103)	(0.074)	(0.118)	(0.123)	(0.131)	(0.100)	(0.110)	(0.117)	(0.130)	(0.094)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2137	1950	2001	2137	2137	1949	2001	2137	2137	1950	2001	2137

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Mean outcome calculated among non-missing values for each respondent.

Table SI-10. Subgroup marginal effects for support for democratic norms by Trump approval

	Accept election results peacefully				Elections rigged for other party				Violence needed during vote count			
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violation												
Trump approver	−0.252*	−0.098	−0.049	−0.134	0.435***	0.348*	0.020	0.240*	0.220	0.138	0.110	0.147
	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.066)	(0.100)	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.083)	(0.100)	(0.093)	(0.103)	(0.078)
Trump disapprover	−0.001	0.043	0.023	0.014	0.012	0.030	−0.094	−0.020	0.025	−0.014	−0.045	−0.024
	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.051)
General norm violation												
Trump approver	−0.005	−0.008	0.077	0.029	0.068	0.139	−0.012	0.049	0.180	0.197	0.234	0.192
	(0.073)	(0.087)	(0.092)	(0.064)	(0.097)	(0.101)	(0.113)	(0.082)	(0.092)	(0.099)	(0.114)	(0.079)
Trump disapprover	−0.082	−0.017	−0.028	−0.048	0.118	0.100	−0.002	0.074	0.187*	0.065	0.066	0.108
	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.051)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Marginal effect estimates calculated from Table SI-9.

Table SI-11. Statistical models of support for democratic norms (by party)

	Accept election results peacefully				Elections rigged for other party				Violence needed during vote count			
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	−0.017	0.038	−0.032	−0.008	0.030	0.065	−0.051	0.004	0.005	−0.031	−0.053	−0.038
	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.039)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.056)
Election norm × Repub.	−0.160	−0.084	0.101	−0.051	0.317	0.199	0.023	0.171	0.231	0.190	0.167	0.201
	(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.069)	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.098)	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.087)
General norm violations	−0.117	−0.038	−0.050	−0.073	0.160	0.135	0.014	0.099	0.189*	0.079	0.059	0.117
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.070)	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.057)
General norm × Repub.	0.153	0.063	0.139	0.127	−0.135	−0.050	−0.017	−0.076	0.009	0.088	0.173	0.066
	(0.080)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.067)	(0.111)	(0.116)	(0.121)	(0.096)	(0.103)	(0.109)	(0.118)	(0.088)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2104	1921	1970	2104	2104	1920	1970	2104	2104	1921	1970	2104

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference category for Republican indicator is Democrats (party variables include leaners; true independents excluded). All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Mean outcome calculated among non-missing values for each respondent.

Table SI-12. Subgroup marginal effects on support for democratic norms (by party)

	Accept election results peacefully				Elections rigged for other party				Violence needed during vote count			
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violation												
Republican	−0.177	−0.046	0.069	−0.059	0.347***	0.264*	−0.027	0.175	0.235	0.159	0.114	0.159
	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.054)	(0.091)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.077)	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.085)	(0.067)
Democrat	−0.017	0.038	−0.032	−0.008	0.030	0.065	−0.051	0.004	0.005	−0.031	−0.053	−0.038
	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.039)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.056)
General norm violation												
Republican	0.036	0.026	0.090	0.054	0.025	0.085	−0.003	0.024	0.198	0.167	0.233	0.182
	(0.061)	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.054)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.100)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.084)	(0.096)	(0.068)
Democrat	−0.117	−0.038	−0.050	−0.073	0.160	0.135	0.014	0.099	0.189*	0.079	0.059	0.117
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.070)	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.057)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Marginal effect estimates calculated from Table SI-11.

Table SI-13. Treatment effects on support for political violence and democracy (by Trump approval)

(a) Statistical model results

	Political violence	Support for democracy
Election norm violations	−0.016	−0.041
	(0.036)	(0.033)
Election norm × Trump approver	−0.087	0.053
	(0.084)	(0.076)
General norm violations	−0.027	0.002
	(0.039)	(0.035)
General norm × Trump approver	0.162	0.115
	(0.087)	(0.079)
Control variables	✓	✓
	2001	2001

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy.

(b) Subgroup marginal effects

	Political violence	Support for democracy
Election norm violation		
Trump approver	−0.103	0.012
	(0.076)	(0.069)
Trump disapprover	−0.016	−0.041
	(0.036)	(0.033)
General norm violation		
Trump approver	0.135	0.117
	(0.078)	(0.070)
Trump disapprover	−0.027	0.002
	(0.039)	(0.035)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Marginal effect estimates calculated from Table SI-13a.

Table SI-14. Treatment effects on support for political violence and democracy (by party)

(a) Statistical model results

	Political violence	Support for democracy
Election norm violations	−0.021	−0.027
	(0.042)	(0.034)
Election norm × Republican	−0.047	0.005
	(0.074)	(0.069)
General norm violations	−0.025	0.021
	(0.045)	(0.037)
General norm × Republican	0.122	0.027
	(0.076)	(0.071)
Control variables	✓	✓
	1970	1970

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference category for Republican indicator is Democrats (party variables include leaners; true independents excluded). All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy.

(b) Subgroup marginal effects

	Political violence	Support for democracy
Election norm violation		
Republican	−0.069	−0.021
	(0.061)	(0.060)
Democrat	−0.021	−0.027
	(0.042)	(0.034)
General norm violation		
Republican	0.097	0.047
	(0.062)	(0.061)
Democrat	−0.025	0.021
	(0.045)	(0.037)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Marginal effect estimates calculated from Table SI-14a.

Table SI-15. Treatment effects on perceptions of past respect for democratic norms

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	−0.016	0.025	0.057	0.016
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.029)
General norm violations	−0.006	−0.003	0.071	0.018
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.029)
Election − General norm violations	−0.010	0.029	−0.013	−0.002
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.030)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2137	1950	2001	2137

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variables are respondent belief that presidential candidates in the past fifty years have accepted the outcome of elections even if they narrowly lose. Mean outcome calculated among non-missing values for each respondent. Marginal effects of the treatments on these outcomes ("Election – General norm violations" row) were not preregistered and are thus exploratory; we include these estimates for presentational consistency.

Table SI-16. Treatment effects on perceptions of past respect for democratic norms (by Trump approval)

(a) Statistical model results

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	−0.009	0.063	0.079	0.036
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.034)
Election norm × Trump approver	−0.023	−0.127	−0.073	−0.066
	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.076)	(0.068)
General norm violations	−0.010	0.015	0.080	0.020
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.034)
General norm × Trump approver	0.014	−0.061	−0.030	−0.004
	(0.078)	(0.083)	(0.076)	(0.066)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2137	1950	2001	2137

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy.

(b) Subgroup marginal effects

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violation				
Trump approver	−0.033	−0.064	0.006	−0.030
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.058)
Trump disapprover	−0.009	0.063	0.079	0.036
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.034)
General norm violation				
Trump approver	0.004	−0.046	0.050	0.016
	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.066)	(0.056)
Trump disapprover	−0.010	0.015	0.080	0.020
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.034)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Marginal effect estimates calculated from Table SI-16a.

Table SI-17. Treatment effects on perceptions of past respect for democratic norms (by party)

(a) Statistical model results

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	0.002	0.085	0.054	0.041
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.035)
Election norm × Republican	−0.041	−0.141	0.022	−0.051
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.064)
General norm violations	−0.032	0.027	0.054	0.007
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.036)
General norm × Republican	0.064	−0.062	0.045	0.034
	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.072)	(0.062)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2104	1921	1970	2104

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy.

(b) Subgroup marginal effects

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violation				
Republican	−0.039	−0.056	0.076	−0.010
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.054)
Democrat	0.002	0.085	0.054	0.041
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.035)
General norm violation				
Republican	0.032	−0.035	0.099	0.041
	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.050)
Democrat	−0.032	0.027	0.054	0.007
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.036)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Marginal effect estimates calculated from Table SI-17a.

Table SI-18. Wave 2→3 change within condition in reactions to norm violations

	Anger		Anxiety		Enthusiasm	
	Election	General	Election	General	Election	General
Wave 3	−0.065	−0.081	−0.084	−0.055	0.031	0.005
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.027)
N	1316	1314	1316	1314	1316	1314

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variable is mean value of how much people reported feeling angry/outraged (anger), anxious/afraid (anxiety), and enthusiastic/happy (enthusiasm) about the tweets they saw in waves 2 and 3.

Table SI-19. Wave 2→3 change within condition in reactions to norm violations (by Trump approval)

(a) Statistical model results

	Anger		Anxiety		Enthusiasm	
	Election	General	Election	General	Election	General
Wave 3	−0.061	−0.143***	−0.076	−0.068	0.008	0.001
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.030)
Wave 3 × Trump approver	0.025	0.181*	−0.026	0.047	0.063	0.020
	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.063)	(0.065)
N	1370	1365	1310	1304	1310	1304

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy.

(b) Subgroup marginal effects

	Anger		Anxiety		Enthusiasm	
	Election	General	Election	General	Election	General
Trump approver	−0.036	0.038	−0.102	−0.021	0.070	0.021
	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Trump disapprover	−0.061	−0.143***	−0.076	−0.068	0.008	0.001
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.030)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Marginal effect estimates calculated from Table SI-19a.

Table SI-20. Wave 2→3 change within condition in reactions to norm violations (by party)

(a) Statistical model results

	Anger		Anxiety		Enthusiasm	
	Election	General	Election	General	Election	General
Wave 3	−0.062	−0.134***	−0.088	−0.067	0.039	−0.015
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.031)
Wave 3 × Republican	0.019	0.122	0.013	0.022	−0.019	0.041
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.059)
N	1357	1357	1296	1298	1296	1298

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference category for Republican indicator is Democrats (party variables include leaners; true independents excluded). All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy.

(b) Subgroup marginal effects

	Anger		Anxiety		Enthusiasm	
	Election	General	Election	General	Election	General
Republican	−0.043	−0.012	−0.075	−0.045	0.019	0.027
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.050)
Democrat	−0.062	−0.134***	−0.088	−0.067	0.039	−0.015
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.031)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Marginal effect estimates calculated from Table SI-20a.

Table SI-21. Treatment effects on emotional reactions to violations of democratic norms

	Anger	Anxiety	Enthusiasm
Election norm violations	−0.155	−0.140	0.018
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.031)
General norm violations	−0.139	−0.142	0.028
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.031)
Election − General norm violations	−0.016	0.002	−0.010
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.031)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓
N	1991	1992	2001

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variables are mean values of how much people reported feeling angry/outraged (anger), anxious/afraid (anxiety), and enthusiastic/happy (enthusiasm) after seeing four tweets violating election norms in wave 4. Marginal effects of the treatments on these outcomes ("Election – General norm violations" row) were not preregistered and are thus exploratory; we include these estimates for presentational consistency.

Table SI-22. Treatment effects on emotional reactions to violations of democratic norms (by Trump approval)

(a) Statistical model results

	Anger	Anxiety	Enthusiasm
Election norm violations	−0.127	−0.140	−0.002
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.030)
Election norm × Trump approver	−0.098	−0.004	0.061
	(0.119)	(0.112)	(0.083)
General norm violations	−0.162	−0.196*	−0.039
	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.029)
General norm × Trump approver	0.079	0.182	0.225
	(0.116)	(0.112)	(0.084)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓
N	1991	1992	2001

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy.

(b) Subgroup marginal effects

	Anger	Anxiety	Enthusiasm
Election norm violation			
Trump approver	−0.224	−0.143	0.059
	(0.100)	(0.092)	(0.077)
Trump disapprover	−0.127	−0.140	−0.002
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.030)
General norm violation			
Trump approver	−0.083	−0.014	0.185
	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.079)
Trump disapprover	−0.162	−0.196*	−0.039
	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.029)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Marginal effect estimates calculated from Table SI-22a.

Table SI-23. Treatment effects on emotional reactions to violations of democratic norms (by party)

(a) Statistical model results

	Anger	Anxiety	Enthusiasm
Election norm violations	−0.110	−0.157	−0.009
	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.034)
Election norm × Repub.	−0.117	0.027	0.051
	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.071)
General norm violations	−0.146	−0.191	−0.054
	(0.067)	(0.070)	(0.032)
General norm × Repub.	0.026	0.128	0.199
	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.073)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓
N	1960	1961	1970

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference category for Republican indicator is Democrats (party variables include leaners; true independents excluded). All models control for pre-treatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy.

(b) Subgroup marginal effects

	Anger	Anxiety	Enthusiasm
Election norm violation			
Republican	−0.227	−0.130	0.042
	(0.091)	(0.084)	(0.062)
Democrat	−0.110	−0.157	−0.009
	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.034)
General norm violation			
Republican	−0.120	−0.063	0.146
	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.066)
Democrat	−0.146	−0.191	−0.054
	(0.067)	(0.070)	(0.032)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Marginal effect estimates calculated from Table SI-23a.

Results without control variables

Table SI-24. Main effects of exposure to norm violations (no controls)

	Trust in elections	Accept election	Elections rigged	Election violence	Political violence	Support democracy
Election norm violations	−0.014	−0.010	0.084	0.005	−0.067	−0.034
	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.077)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.041)
General norm violations	−0.020	−0.013	0.183	0.144	0.043	0.037
	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.076)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.044)
Election − General norm violations	0.006	0.003	−0.099	−0.139	−0.110	−0.071
	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.075)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.042)
N	2147	2147	2147	2147	2011	2011

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Outcome variables for first four models calculated as mean of non-missing values for each respondent across waves 2–4 (see the Supporting Information for results by wave). Support for political violence and democracy were measured in wave 4.

Table SI-25. Treatment effects on trust and confidence in elections (no controls)

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	0.011	−0.038	−0.027	−0.014
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.049)
General norm violations	0.010	−0.039	−0.042	−0.020
	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.050)
Election − General norm violations	0.001	0.001	0.015	0.006
	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.049)
N	2147	1960	2011	2147

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are standardized factor scores. Mean outcome calculated among non-missing values for each respondent.

Table SI-26. Treatment effects on support for democratic norms (no controls)

	Accept election results peacefully				Elections rigged for other party				Violence needed during vote count			
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	−0.053	−0.008	0.002	−0.010	0.163	0.175	−0.017	0.084	0.058	0.023	−0.011	0.005
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.077)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.056)
General norm violations	−0.043	−0.028	0.002	−0.013	0.219	0.241	0.123	0.183	0.196	0.138	0.131	0.144
	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.076)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.059)
Election − General norm violations	−0.010	0.019	−0.001	0.003	−0.056	−0.065	−0.140	−0.099	−0.138	−0.115	−0.142	−0.139
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.082)	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.075)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.058)
N	2147	1960	2011	2147	2147	1959	2011	2147	2147	1960	2011	2147

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Mean outcome calculated among non-missing values for each respondent.

Table SI-27. Treatment effects on support for political violence and democracy (no controls)

	Political violence	Support for democracy
Election norm violations	−0.067	−0.034
	(0.052)	(0.041)
General norm violations	0.043	0.037
	(0.057)	(0.044)
Election − General norm violations	−0.110	−0.071
	(0.053)	(0.042)
N	2011	2011

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy. Marginal effects of the treatments on these outcomes ("Election – General norm violations" row) were not preregistered and are thus exploratory; we include these estimates for presentational consistency.

Table SI-28. Treatment effects on trust and confidence in elections (by Trump approval; no controls)

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	0.197*	0.145	0.119	0.166*
	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.059)
Election norm × Trump approver	−0.593***	−0.605***	−0.480***	−0.576***
	(0.109)	(0.115)	(0.112)	(0.103)
General norm violations	0.129	0.049	0.026	0.079
	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.059)
General norm × Trump approver	−0.399**	−0.317*	−0.242	−0.337*
	(0.113)	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.108)
N	2137	1950	2001	2137

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are standardized factor scores. Mean outcome calculated among non-missing values for each respondent.

Table SI-29. Treatment effects on trust and confidence in elections (by party; no controls)

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	0.171*	0.113	0.087	0.129
	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.062)
Election norm × Repub.	−0.419***	−0.397**	−0.290*	−0.374***
	(0.105)	(0.110)	(0.108)	(0.100)
General norm violations	0.119	0.033	0.026	0.065
	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.063)
General norm × Repub.	−0.294*	−0.197	−0.191	−0.235
	(0.107)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.103)
N	2114	1931	1980	2114

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference category for Republican indicator is Democrats (party variables include leaners; true independents excluded). Dependent variables are standardized factor scores. Mean outcome calculated among non-missing values for each respondent.

Table SI-30. Statistical models of support for democratic norms (by Trump approval; no controls)

	Accept election results peacefully				Elections rigged for other party				Violence needed during vote count			
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	0.030	0.060	0.039	0.045	−0.046	0.002	−0.121	−0.077	−0.014	−0.053	−0.089	−0.071
	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.096)	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.066)
Election norm × Trump approver	−0.271	−0.227	−0.128	−0.180	0.686***	0.569*	0.344	0.522*	0.230	0.245	0.240	0.234
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.096)	(0.170)	(0.184)	(0.179)	(0.158)	(0.143)	(0.141)	(0.145)	(0.125)
General norm violations	−0.044	0.017	−0.000	−0.011	0.181	0.161	0.084	0.139	0.170	0.048	0.053	0.084
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.100)	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.094)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.068)
General norm × Trump approver	−0.016	−0.146	−0.007	−0.016	0.149	0.297	0.171	0.174	0.090	0.307	0.263	0.200
	(0.106)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.094)	(0.170)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.158)	(0.143)	(0.150)	(0.160)	(0.132)
N	2137	1950	2001	2137	2137	1949	2001	2137	2137	1950	2001	2137

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Mean outcome calculated among non-missing values for each respondent.

Table SI-31. Statistical models of support for democratic norms (by party; no controls)

	Accept election results peacefully				Elections rigged for other party				Violence needed during vote count			
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	0.023	0.069	−0.004	0.034	−0.057	−0.004	−0.113	−0.081	−0.075	−0.114	−0.126	−0.121
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.101)	(0.079)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.073)
Election norm × Repub.	−0.192	−0.181	0.039	−0.095	0.564**	0.462*	0.255	0.420*	0.344*	0.354*	0.300	0.323*
	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.087)	(0.163)	(0.172)	(0.168)	(0.151)	(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.116)
General norm violations	−0.066	0.015	−0.005	−0.021	0.199	0.161	0.064	0.139	0.140	0.020	0.021	0.063
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.105)	(0.111)	(0.106)	(0.098)	(0.082)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.075)
General norm × Repub.	0.080	−0.093	0.036	0.040	0.047	0.187	0.157	0.107	0.139	0.300	0.290	0.207
	(0.096)	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.085)	(0.160)	(0.171)	(0.169)	(0.149)	(0.132)	(0.136)	(0.142)	(0.120)
N	2114	1931	1980	2114	2114	1930	1980	2114	2114	1931	1980	2114

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference category for Republican indicator is Democrats (party variables include leaners; true independents excluded). Mean outcome calculated among non-missing values for each respondent.

Table SI-32. Treatment effects on support for political violence and democracy (by Trump approval; no controls)

	Political violence	Support for democracy
Election norm violations	−0.056	−0.079
	(0.058)	(0.044)
Election norm × Trump approver	−0.020	0.125
	(0.123)	(0.102)
General norm violations	−0.038	−0.005
	(0.057)	(0.048)
General norm × Trump approver	0.302	0.151
	(0.145)	(0.108)
	2001	2001

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy.

Table SI-33. Treatment effects on support for political violence and democracy (by party; no controls)

	Political violence	Support for democracy
Election norm violations	−0.085	−0.057
	(0.067)	(0.045)
Election norm violation × Republican	0.039	0.052
	(0.110)	(0.096)
General norm violations	−0.049	0.018
	(0.067)	(0.048)
General norm violation × Republican	0.215	0.034
	(0.121)	(0.100)
	1980	1980

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference category for Republican indicator is Democrats (party variables include leaners; true independents excluded). Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy.

Table SI-34. Treatment effects on perceptions of past respect for democratic norms (no controls)

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	−0.013	0.015	0.053	0.018
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.031)
General norm violations	0.001	−0.006	0.069	0.023
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.031)
Election − General norm violations	−0.014	0.021	−0.015	−0.005
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.032)
N	2147	1960	2011	2147

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are respondent belief that presidential candidates in the past fifty years have accepted the outcome of elections even if they narrowly lose. Mean outcome calculated among non-missing values for each respondent. Marginal effects of the treatments on these outcomes ("Election – General norm violations" row) were not preregistered and are thus exploratory; we include these estimates for presentational consistency.

Table SI-35. Treatment effects on perceptions of past respect for democratic norms (by Trump approval; no controls)

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	0.006	0.072	0.086	0.052
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.036)
Election norm × Trump approver	−0.064	−0.181	−0.100	−0.105
	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.078)	(0.070)
General norm violations	0.008	0.033	0.092	0.038
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.037)
General norm × Trump approver	−0.036	−0.135	−0.074	−0.054
	(0.082)	(0.088)	(0.079)	(0.069)
N	2137	1950	2001	2137

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy.

Table SI-36. Treatment effects on perceptions of past respect for democratic norms (by party; no controls)

	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Mean
Election norm violations	0.016	0.089	0.058	0.052
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.037)
Election norm violation × Republican	−0.067	−0.177	0.003	−0.073
	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.074)	(0.067)
General norm violations	−0.011	0.047	0.069	0.027
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.039)
General norm violation × Republican	0.031	−0.115	0.007	0.001
	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.075)	(0.066)
N	2114	1931	1980	2114

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy.

Table SI-37. Treatment effects on emotional reactions to violations of democratic norms (no controls)

	Anger	Anxiety	Enthusiasm
Election norm violations	−0.143	−0.115	0.011
	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.032)
General norm violations	−0.114	−0.114	0.035
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.032)
Election − General norm violations	−0.029	−0.001	−0.023
	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.032)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓
N	2011	2011	2011

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are mean values of how much people reported feeling angry/outraged (anger), anxious/afraid (anxiety), and enthusiastic/happy (enthusiasm) after seeing four tweets violating election norms in wave 4. Marginal effects of the treatments on these outcomes ("Election – General norm violations" row) were not preregistered and are thus exploratory; we include these estimates for presentational consistency.

Table SI-38. Treatment effects on emotional reactions to violations of democratic norms (by Trump approval; no controls)

	Anger	Anxiety	Enthusiasm
Election norm violations	−0.134	−0.134	−0.013
	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.030)
Election norm × Trump approver	−0.043	0.041	0.084
	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.086)
General norm violations	−0.142	−0.175*	−0.043
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.029)
General norm × Trump approver	0.090	0.195	0.257*
	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.088)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓
N	2001	2001	2001

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy.

Table SI-39. Treatment effects on emotional reactions to violations of democratic norms (by party; no controls)

	Anger	Anxiety	Enthusiasm
Election norm violations	−0.131	−0.157	−0.021
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.035)
Election norm violation × Repub.	−0.038	0.082	0.065
	(0.116)	(0.111)	(0.073)
General norm violations	−0.129	−0.173	−0.057
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.032)
General norm violation × Repub.	0.055	0.151	0.221*
	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.075)
N	1980	1980	1980

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided; adjusted to control the false discovery rate (4) with $\alpha = .05$). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference category for Republican indicator is Democrats (party variables include leaners; true independents excluded). Dependent variables are factor scores combining responses to questions on political violence and support for democracy.

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