The Effect of Electoral Inversions on Democratic Legitimacy: [†] Evidence from the United States

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Abstract

When a party or candidate loses the popular vote but still wins the election, do voters view the winner as legitimate? This scenario, known as an *electoral inversion*, describes the winners of two of the last six presidential elections in the United States. We report results from two experiments testing the effect of inversions on democratic legitimacy in the U.S. context. Our results indicate that inversions significantly decrease the perceived legitimacy of winning candidates. Strikingly, this effect does not vary with the margin by which the winner loses the popular vote nor by whether the candidate benefiting from the inversion is a co-partisan. The effect is driven by Democrats, who punish inversions regardless of candidate partisanship; few effects are observed among Republicans. These results suggest that the experience of inversions increases sensitivity to such outcomes among supporters of the losing party.

In self-enforcing democracies citizens are often called upon to accept the victory of the opposition candidate. This belief in the legitimacy of the winner, regardless of party, serves as the lifeblood of consolidated democracies. But what happens when the candidate or party that wins the most votes loses a democratic election? Such *electoral inversions* challenge the core democratic principle that all votes count equally. Two months ahead of the 2020 American presidential election, analysts put the probability of another electoral inversion at 10% (The Economist N.d.). Although this outcome did not take place, inversions in the 2000 and 2016 presidential elections in the United States underscore the importance of examining how voters judge such outcomes and determining whether inversions undermine perceptions of electoral legitimacy.

Inversions can take place when votes are tallied in sub-national districts such that the geographical distribution of votes, not just their total number, affects outcomes. Assembly elections in single-member districts (SMDs) are particularly prone to inversion. Parties that came in second in the popular vote won sole control of government in the United Kingdom in 1951 and 1974, in New Zealand in 1978 and 1981, Canada in 2019, and in the United States in 2000 and 2016. (See, e.g., Christensen 2020 for further examples.)

Although such outcomes are thought to be consequential for democracy, research to date typically focuses on estimating the likelihood of inversions (e.g., May 1948; Kikuchi 2016; Kaniovski and Zaigraev 2018; Geruso, Spears and Talesara 2019). We instead seek to understand the effects of such outcomes on the legitimacy of election results, which are difficult to measure with observational data. Our study is related to previous work interested in understanding political efficacy, vote satisfaction, and legitimacy among voters supporting the losing candidate (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Craig et al. 2006; Nadeau and Blais 1993; Sances and Stewart 2015). We focus on a special case of such a loss, where the voter supports a candidate who "should have won" in some sense. We conduct national survey experiments in the United States to assess the legitimacy of various potential outcomes of the 2020 presidential election. This design allows us to isolate the effects of inversions and popular vote margins from the tendency of supporters of a winning party or candidate to regard electoral outcomes as more legitimate (the "winner effect"). We also

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estimate the electoral winner's effect based on an experimental design, complementing existing evidence of this phenomenon from observational studies.

Our results indicate that popular vote inversions reduce the legitimacy of winning candidates. This inversion penalty varies little by electoral margin within plausible bounds (a popular vote defeat of up to five percentage points) and is insensitive to whether the loser is from the respondent's own party or the opposing one. It is, however, party-specific: the inversion penalty we find is consistently observed among Democrats, the party whose presidential candidates were defeated in the two most recent U.S. electoral inversions. By contrast, we find limited and inconsistent evidence that inversion reduces legitimacy among Republicans. These results suggest that inversion penalties may be concentrated among supporters of the parties most likely to suffer from them.

Theoretical expectations

The principle that all votes should count equally is one of the bedrocks of democracy (Dahl 2008) and is embraced by an overwhelming majority of Americans (Carey et al. 2019). Electoral inversions, which are made possible by rules like the Electoral College that effectively weigh votes from some areas more heavily than others, directly challenge this principle. Originally designed by the framers of the U.S. Constitution to assuage smaller states and "refine" public sentiment, critics argue the Electoral College threatens to instead distort the national popular will by enabling presidential candidates who have not won the majority of the national popular vote to be elected to the nation's highest office.

Given Americans' support for the principle of votes counting equally, we expect inversions to diminish perceived legitimacy, which we define as citizens' recognition of an electoral outcome as rightful and worthy of deference regardless of whether their preferred candidate won:

> H1: We expect the perceived legitimacy of an election result — i.e., which candidate assumes office — to be lower when the Electoral College (EC) winner loses the

popular vote than when the EC and popular vote are won by the same candidate.[1]

Second, supporters of winning candidates and parties report higher system support (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Craig et al. 2006; Nadeau and Blais 1993) and confidence in the vote count (Sances and Stewart 2015) than do those who supported losing candidates and parties. We therefore also expected perceptions of electoral legitimacy to be shaped by partisan electoral fortunes:

> H2: We expect the perceived legitimacy of election results to be greater when a co-partisan wins the Electoral College.

We also preregistered a research question asking whether the reduction in legitimacy after a popular vote inversion would be less pronounced among Republicans (compared to Democrats) because the Republican party benefited from inversions in two recent presidential elections, as well as in the U.S. House of Representatives election in 2012 (Christensen 2020).

In addition, we consider how the popular vote margin might influence the strength of any inversion effect on legitimacy. Election observers and judges all explicitly weigh the scale of reported electoral irregularities against vote margins on the premise that wider victory margins confer increased legitimacy in competitive elections (e.g., Organization of American States 2017; Vickery et al. 2018). Scholars who study elections in autocracies likewise posit that the legitimacy of the winner's claim to rule rises with the vote margin unless it becomes implausibly lopsided (Higashijima 2015; Gehlbach and Simpser 2015; Rundlett and Svolik 2016). Research on U.S. elections reinforces these intuitions. In 2012, confidence in state-level vote counts was lower among supporters of both parties in states in which presidential vote margins were narrower (Sances and Stewart 2015).

These findings all suggest that the popular vote margin is related to the legitimacy of the winning candidate. We specifically consider the possibility that inversions damage legitimacy *more* as

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[1]All hypotheses and research questions were preregistered at https://osf.io/r5muc/?view_only=0fbc60a331ea47dc9085527f67589424 and https://osf.io/7bxkc/?view_only=e53f83a7d0fe42e8a753a357c341eb0c.

the popular vote advantage of the losing candidate increases. The violation of the all-votes-equal principle is more egregious, for instance, if an inversion winner loses the popular vote by four percent rather than by two percent. We therefore offer the following hypothesis:

> H3: When the Electoral College winner and the popular vote winner are different, we
> expect that the perceived legitimacy of the Electoral College winner will decrease as
> the popular vote margin of the losing candidate increases.

We further expected "winner effects" to be greater in inversion elections. After the 2016 election, confidence in the U.S. system increased among Trump voters compared to Clinton voters, a winner effect mirroring past elections in which there was no inversion (Sinclair, Smith and Tucker 2018; Stewart 2019; Levy 2020). However, given that American politics is highly partisan (Abramowitz and Webster 2016), we might expect voters to be more sensitive to inversion victories by the party they oppose than to inversions by the party they prefer. We therefore expect the following:

> H4: We expect the difference in perceived legitimacy between a co-partisan Electoral
> College winner and out-party Electoral College winner will be larger when the Elec-
> toral College winner loses the popular vote.

Finally, we are interested in how political awareness affects responses to inversions. We pre-registered research questions asking whether a respondent's level of general political knowledge or the value the respondent places on democracy shapes their sensitivity to inversions. We also sought to determine whether the salience of recent popular vote inversions would shape attitudes. In one set of experiments, we tested whether reminding participants of the 2016 inversion would affect their reactions to a potential 2020 inversion and their support for changing to a national popular vote system.

Methods

We conducted two between-subjects experiments asking Americans to rate the legitimacy of a potential 2020 electoral outcome. We employ a 2×4 factorial design where the winning party and the popular vote margin are randomly varied but the Electoral College total is held fixed. Each respondent was shown only one scenario.

Our first experiment drew on a nationally representative sample of 3,395 respondents recruited from YouGov's online panel from March 23–30, 2020. In this experiment, we varied the party of the winning candidate (Democrat or Republican) as well as their popular vote margin (win by 3 percentage points [+3], win by 1 percentage point [+1], lose by 1 percentage point [-1], lose by 3 percentage points [-3]).

We conducted a second round of experiments that drew on a sample of 7,749 Democratic or Republican identifiers recruited from Lucid between May 12-22, 2020, using quotas to match population benchmarks. In this round, we replaced the scenario in which the winning candidate won the popular vote by 3 percentage points with one in which they lost by 5 percentage points (the possible popular vote outcomes were thus +1, -1, -3, -5). From this second sample, we also collected additional information such as attitudes on support for replacing the Electoral College with a national popular vote. Finally, the second sample also included an orthogonal manipulation in which respondents were randomly reminded with probability .5 that the outcome of the 2016 experiment was an inversion (i.e., that Donald Trump won the Electoral College but lost the popular vote).

The specific scenario presented to participants focused on potential outcomes in the 2020 elec-

tion, the most proximate and salient case of a potential inversion for our participants.[2] After an introduction explaining we were interested in how people judge the outcomes of presidential elections, respondents were randomly shown one of the following descriptions of a potential outcome of the election in which the popular vote margin and the party of the winning candidate is randomly varied.[3]

> Imagine the {Democratic/Republican} candidate wins the Electoral College and the presidency in 2020 {and wins the popular vote by 3 percentage points (YouGov only) / and wins the popular vote by 1 percentage point / but loses the popular vote by 1 percentage point / but loses the popular vote by 3 percentage points / but loses the popular vote by 5 percentage points (Lucid only)} compared to the {Republican/Democratic} candidate.

We measure the perceived legitimacy of this outcome by averaging responses to three questions we asked respondents immediately afterward in random order: "Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the rightful winner?," "Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?," and "Do you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?" The first was adapted from Craig et al. (2006) and the second and third resemble surveys conducted after the 2000 and 2016 elections (CNN 2000; Jones 2016). Combining individual scales to reduce measurement error and increase scale reliability

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[2]President Trump questioned the integrity of American elections long before making the specific claim that the 2020 election was stolen. We do not have expectations about how this rhetoric affected responses among Republicans or Democrats to electoral inversions. We note, however, that, prior to November 2020, confidence that votes would be "counted as voters intended" was statistically indistinguishable between Americans who approved of Trump and those who disapproved of him. It was only after the election — long after the experiments reported in this study were conducted — that a partisan gap opened up between Trump supporters and opponents in perceptions of administrative integrity of U.S. elections (Bright Line Watch 2020).

[3]We omit Donald Trump's name to avoid confounding between party and the identification of a nominee — the Democratic nomination was not decided when the studies were conducted.

is an established technique that also helps to address concerns over wording of specific outcome measures. Cronbach's α for internal consistency are 0.93 and 0.89, respectively, for the YouGov and Lucid experiments, indicating that our scale is very reliable. See Supplementary Materials C for full question wording, the distribution of the component variables (measured on four-point scales), and details on the reliability of the combined measure.

Results

Inversion penalties

Figure 1 shows mean values of the legitimacy index by vote margin conditions in our YouGov and Lucid experiments. Non-inversions are plotted to the left of the vertical dashed line and inversions to its right. Comparing inversion and non-inversion scenarios, we find that inversions reduce perceived legitimacy by about a half of a point on our four-point scale in the YouGov sample and a third of a point in the Lucid sample. Thus, if the Electoral College winner is described as losing rather than winning the popular vote, mean legitimacy decreases from 3.30–3.31 to 2.85–2.99, which represent declines of 0.48 (YouGov) and 0.38 (Lucid) standard deviations in our legitimacy index. However, in the experimental condition in which an inversion takes place, the legitimacy of the winner is not sensitive to the margin of victory — it does not matter whether the candidate loses the popular vote by three or five percentage points rather than by one percentage point.

To confirm these results and to determine how they vary by partisanship, we analyze the data using OLS regressions. We estimate the effect on perceived election legitimacy of both the popular vote margin and co-partisanship (i.e., whether the candidate is from the party that the respondent favors or the one the respondent opposes). The models we estimate, which are reported in Table 1, include only partisans (respondents who self-identified as Democrats or Republicans, including

Figure 1: Effect of electoral inversions on election legitimacy

Means by condition with 95% confidence intervals. "Legitimacy" measured based on survey responses which scale together as a composite measure. Dashed line shows where election winner loses popular vote.

leaners) and include controls for individual-level characteristics.[4] The reference category for popular vote margin is the condition in which the Electoral College winner also wins the popular vote by one percentage point.

Across both samples, inversions depress perceived legitimacy, but the margin by which the Electoral College winner loses (or wins) the popular vote does not measurably affect legitimacy in the ranges we evaluated (winning the popular vote by 1 or 3 percentage points or losing it by 1, 3, or 5 percentage points). In our YouGov sample, for instance, inversions damage election legitimacy almost identically regardless of popular vote margin: -0.483 for a one-point inversion (SE=0.047) and -0.506 (SE=0.049) for a three-percent inversion. Similarly, a candidate who loses the popular vote by three percentage points but wins the election is no less legitimate than one who loses the popular vote by one percentage point. Results from Lucid are similar. All inversion scenarios yield lower legitimacy, but by similar amounts: -0.319 (SE=0.026) when the popular vote margin is -1 percentage point, -0.333 (SE=0.026) when it is -3 percentage points, and -0.342 (SE=0.026)

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[4]Results including independents from YouGov are reported in Table D1 in Supplementary Materials D.

Table 1: Effects of winner vote margin on election legitimacy (relative to +1 percentage point)

	YouGov	Lucid
+3 percentage points	0.014	
	(0.041)	
-1 percentage point	-0.483***	-0.319***
	(0.047)	(0.026)
-3 percentage point	-0.506***	-0.333***
	(0.049)	(0.026)
-5 percentage point		-0.342***
		(0.026)
Co-partisan wins	0.416***	0.247***
	(0.034)	(0.019)
Constant	2.945	3.011
	(0.088)	(0.045)
Control variables	✓	✓
Respondents	2664	7150

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. "Election legitimacy" measured based on survey responses which scale together as a composite measure. All models above control for political interest, race, college education, sex, and age group. Both models above include only self-identified Democrats or Republicans including leaners. (See Supplementary Materials D for full results including results with independents in the YouGov sample.)

when it is -5 percentage points.

To confirm that these results are not an artifact of respondents moving between the "Entirely legitimate" and "Somewhat legitimate" categories, we estimate exploratory linear probability models for each disaggregated outcome measure in which the dependent variable is a binary measure of perceived legitimacy. Our results are consistent with those reported above. In our YouGov sample, inversion conditions cause a 14 percentage point reduction in the proportion of people who answer that the winner is "legitimate," a 19-point reduction in those saying that the winner is "rightful," and a 24-point reduction in those saying that the process is "fair." Results are similar for our Lucid sample (11, 14 and 16 percentage points, respectively). (See Supplementary Materials E for further details.)

Our experimental design also enables us to compare directly the magnitude of the inversion effect we find with the winner's effect previously documented in the literature. Respondents from

both parties see winning candidates from their own party as more legitimate than winners from the opposing party. Supporting the winning candidate increases perceptions of legitimacy on our combined measure by 0.416 (SE=0.034) in our YouGov sample and 0.247 (SE=0.019) in our Lucid sample. These estimates are comparable in magnitude to the inversion penalties we observe above.

These results provide support for H1 and H2. Inversions reduce election legitimacy relative to outcomes where the popular vote winner becomes president. Voters whose favored party wins regard outcomes as more legitimate than do those who support the losing party. However, we do not find that larger vote margins magnify the effect of inversions as posited by H3.

Heterogeneous effects by party

A next question is whether inversion effects on legitimacy vary by respondent partisanship. Figure 2 follows the format of Figure 1 but presents results separately for Democrats and Republicans, showing how each group evaluates the perceived legitimacy of a winning copartisan or opposition candidate.

First, we find no evidence to support H4. Neither Democrats nor Republicans punish inversions more severely when an opposing candidate wins the presidency instead of a copartisan.[5] However, we do observe substantial heterogeneity by party. Democrats clearly rate inversion winners as less legitimate, whereas perceived legitimacy is largely stable among Republicans when we compare non-inversion and inversion outcomes. These results are replicated across the two experiments.

Table 2 summarizes how the average marginal effects of the popular vote margin and the party of the winning candidate vary between Democrats and Republicans. (The underlying interaction model is reported in Table G1 in Supplementary Materials G.) As expected, we find substantial co-partisan winner effects in both experiments and among supporters of both parties. In general, people view election outcomes as more legitimate when their preferred party prevails.

Our focus here, however, is understanding how the effects of inversions vary by party. We

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[5]This result is confirmed in Supplementary Materials Table G, which shows that neither Democrat nor Republican respondents punished opposite-party candidates more severely for inversions.

Table 2: Average marginal effects by party (relative to +1 percentage point)

	Democrats		Republicans	
	YouGov	Lucid	YouGov	Lucid
Co-partisan wins	0.492***	0.310***	0.316***	0.165***
	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.048)	(0.026)
+3 percentage points	-0.022		0.066	
	(0.056)		(0.069)	
-1 percentage points	-0.868***	-0.490***	0.048	-0.105***
	(0.057)	(0.034)	(0.068)	(0.037)
-3 percentage points	-0.951***	-0.557***	0.108	-0.113***
	(0.057)	(0.035)	(0.068)	(0.036)
-5 percentage points		-0.592***		-0.096***
		(0.035)		(0.036)
Respondents (by party)	1589	3689	1079	3461

*$p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Marginal effects calculations from the models reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table G1 in Supplementary Materials G. These quantities are calculated by first taking first-order partial derivatives of the model specified in columns 2 and 3 of Table G1 with respect to the variables of interest (having a co-partisan winner or a given popular vote margin). We then use the resulting equations to estimate the average marginal effects of the variable of interest for Democrats and Republican averaging over other terms in the model (i.e., copartisan winner for margins and vice versa).

Figure 2: Effect of electoral inversions on election legitimacy by party

Means by condition with 95% confidence intervals. Left and right panes present separate means for Democratic and Republican identifiers (including leaners); the top and bottom panes present means by whether respondents rated the legitimacy of a scenario in which a copartisan or opposition party candidate win the election. "Legitimacy" is measured based on survey responses which scale together as a composite measure. Dashed line shows where election winner loses popular vote.

consider first the marginal effects of the popular vote margin among Democrats. Relative to the baseline of winning the popular vote by one percentage point, we find substantial inversion penalties when the winning candidate instead loses the popular vote. However, these generally do not vary by margin. Only in the five-point inversion condition in our Lucid experiment can we reject the null hypothesis that the size of the loser's popular vote victory had no effect on perceived legitimacy — perceived legitimacy declines by 0.103 as the size of the inversion increases from one percentage point to five, which is significant at $p<.005$ (see Table F1). Hence, we find very limited support for H3, which is only supported among Democrats in one condition in one sample.

The story among Republicans is strikingly different. In the YouGov experiment, there is no measurable inversion effect at all among Republicans. The Lucid experiment shows small inversion penalties among Republicans that are statistically significant but the point estimates are about one-fifth as large of those observed among Democrats. Moreover, there is again little evidence of

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
Figure 3: Effect of political knowledge by party

increasing legitimacy penalties as the inversion vote margin grows.[6]

In sum, we find no evidence that partisans punish opposition party winners more severely. Instead, Democrats punish inversions consistently, while Republicans barely do so in one experiment and not at all in another. Finally, we find limited and inconclusive evidence that larger inversion vote margins damage legitimacy more than narrower margins (among only one party in just one sample).

Political awareness

Do levels of political knowledge and reminders of the 2016 inversion influence respondents' sensitivity to inversions? We investigated these pre-registered questions in our Lucid experiment. Our results found greater sensitivity to inversions among more knowledgeable respondents only among Democrats, as illustrated in Figure 3. Inversions have modest negative effects on legitimacy among low-knowledge Democrats (-0.210 for a one-point inversion, -0.275 for a three-point inversion, -

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[6]We similarly find no support for H3 in the full sample; see Table D1 in Supplementary Materials D.

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0.346 for five points). These effects are amplified (marginal effects of -0.561, -0.640, and -0.602, respectively) among their high-knowledge counterparts. As before, no such effects are observed among Republicans.[7]

Conclusion

Though scholars frequently study the likelihood of electoral inversions (when a party or candidate who gets the most votes does not win), prior studies have not closely examined the effects of inversions on citizens' perceptions of democratic legitimacy or compared inversion effects with the winner's effect. Using survey experiments, we measure both winner's and inversion effects in the context of the most salient sources of potential inversions — presidential elections in the United States, which are decided by the Electoral College. We also explored the impact of respondents' party preferences and level of political knowledge on their reactions to inversions.

In line with our expectations, inversions reduce democratic legitimacy overall. However, the effect in the U.S. context is driven almost entirely by Democrats, who consistently punish inversions in both of our experiments. Republicans, by contrast, view presidents who win after losing the popular vote as similarly legitimate as those who win in non-inversion elections. Among Republicans, we found small inversion effects in one experiment and none at all in another.

Partisanship drives these inversion penalties in both expected and unexpected ways. Our participants rated presidential victors from their favored party as more legitimate regardless of whether they won the popular vote, but we find no evidence that partisan respondents punish inversions more severely when the winning candidate is from the party they disfavor. Instead, inversion penalties vary by respondents' party preferences. Democrats view presidents coming to office after an

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[7]We also investigated the effect of the 2016 inversion reminder on support for replacing the Electoral College, a preregistered research question. The reminder had no effect on support for switching to a direct popular vote among Democrats, but it decreased support for replacing the Electoral College among Republicans. (See Supplementary Materials L.)

electoral inversion from either party as less legitimate and Republicans are insensitive to inversion wins by candidates from either party. A similarly unexpected finding is that legitimacy judgments are not tightly bound to the magnitude of the inversion — it matters little, if at all, whether the victorious candidate lost the popular vote by a small or sizeable margin.

The partisan asymmetries we observe are consistent with other evidence showing that Republicans and Democrats have different democratic commitments, particularly with regard to the equality of votes across all citizens, the core democratic principle violated by electoral inversions. Bright Line Watch surveys conducted in March 2019 and in January/February 2021 show that Republican respondents assign lower values, on average, than do Democrats to the importance of living in a democracy and to the importance of the principle that all votes have equal impact on electoral outcomes (Bright Line Watch 2021*a,b*).

These asymmetries might reflect differences in ideology between the parties, but also differences in personal experiences and in the cues that party elites offer to their voters. Most notably, Republicans have won both recent presidential elections in which there were inversions and are expected to enjoy an Electoral College advantage in the future.[8] Inversion penalties are stronger among more knowledgeable Democratic participants in our experiments; presumably these individuals are more likely to know about these past outcomes and to have received elite cues about them. By contrast, we found weaker and less consistent inversion penalties among Republicans. Further research should explore when and why Democrats and Republicans differ in their views toward democracy, including especially cases in which core democratic principles are violate such as inversions.

What, finally, are the comparative implications of these results? Frequent inversions are thought to lead to general public demand for reform. For example, following successive electoral inversions in the 1970s and 1980s, New Zealanders changed their electoral system through a majority vote in a popular referendum (Drutman 2020). Our results suggest that when barriers to electoral

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[8]Electoral College bias has not consistently favored Republicans, benefiting Democrats as recently as 2004 and 2012, although neither election generated an inversion (Skelley 2021).

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reform are higher and the vulnerability to inversion is borne by only one party, the effects may be limited to heightening sensitivity to the phenomenon in the disadvantage group.

If lived experience drives responses to inversions, then the partisan asymmetries that we find are likely to persist. This continued asymmetry in both the causes and effects of inversions presents a formidable obstacle to any reform of the Electoral College.

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Supplementary Materials

A   Experiment overview

In March and May of 2020, we recruited 3395 and 7748 respondents on YouGov and Lucid, respectively. The YouGov study was fielded among a nationally representative sample of American voters. The Lucid experiment was conducted among a diverse sample of Americans who self-identify as partisans (i.e., excluding independents). In this paper, we will refer to the former as our YouGov sample or experiment, and the latter as our Lucid sample or experiment. These details are summarised in Table A1. Both experiments were pre-registered on OSF [9].

Table A1: Summary of experiments

	Platform	Date	N	Target population
Experiment 1	YouGov	March 23–30, 2020	3395	US electorate
Experiment 2	Lucid	May 12–22, 2020	7749	Partisans only

Our YouGov sample was fielded as part of a YouGov Omnibus survey in which respondents answer multiple survey modules from different YouGov clients. In order to rule out any unforeseen interactions with previous modules and to measure additional respondent covariates that are not offered on YouGov, we therefore fielded a replication and extension study on the Lucid survey platform. Our Lucid study differed in three respects from the YouGov study. First, we measured respondent covariates such as political knowledge, Trump approval, attitudes towards democracy, and system support. We also measured policy attitudes towards reforming the Electoral College. Second, we changed the treatment to replace the scenario in which the Electoral College winner wins the popular vote by 3 percentage points with one in which the Electoral College winner loses the popular vote by 5 percentage points. Finally, we added an additional manipulation in which we randomly reminded respondents of the 2016 Electoral College and popular vote results prior to being exposed to our hypothetical election outcome. Figures A1 and A2 illustrate these experimental procedures.

Two surprising results from the March 2020 sample motivated us to collect additional data. First, we found suggestive evidence that Republican participants rated election outcomes in which the popular vote winner lost in the Electoral College as more legitimate than when the popular vote winner also won the Electoral College. We found this surprising and wanted to see if it would replicate. (In the May experiment, it did not.) A second unexpected result from the first experiment was the absence of a popular vote margin effect—specifically, popular vote inversions of three percentage points were not seen as less legitimate than inversions of one percentage point. To verify this result, we added a five percentage point inversion as a condition in our May experiment and again found very little effect of vote margin on perceived legitimacy conditional on an inversion taking place.

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[9] https://osf.io/r5muc/?view_only=0fbc60a331ea47dc9085527f67589424

and https://osf.io/7bxkc/?view_only=e53f83a7d0fe42e8a753a357c341eb0c.

Figure A1: YouGov experimental procedure

Figure A2: Lucid experimental procedure

B Sample demographics and covariate balance

Table B1 presents sample characteristics for both experiments.

Table B1: Sample characteristics

		Mean	Median	Min.	Max
YouGov	Female	0.53	1	0	1
	Age	47.4	47	18	89
	White	0.65	1	0	1
	Republican	0.32	0	0	1
Lucid	Female	0.52	1	0	1
	Age	44.3	42	18	106
	White	0.71	1	0	1
	Republican	0.48	0	0	1

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The number of respondents by treatment condition is shown in Table B2. Across eight conditions in both experiments, treatment assignment seems to be balanced.

In Tables B3 and B4 we summarize test statistics for covariate balance across treatment arms. For the margins condition, t-tests are conducted relative to the reference category (+1% condition). In Table B5, we also test for covariate balance across those reminded of the 2016 election outcome in our Lucid sample. Out of all 36 tests, only one group's mean (proportion of whites in the -3% condition) is statistically significant relative to control. We further confirm in Table B6 with regressions of treatment assignment on covariates that all observed F-statistics are above conventional significance levels, suggesting that covariates are jointly orthogonal to treatment assignment.

Table B2: Treatment assignment by condition

	Who won EC	+3%	+1%	-1%	-3%	-5%
YouGov	Democrat	405	449	430	406	
	Republican	451	397	420	437	
Lucid	Democrat		956	884	904	852
	Republican		913	940	866	918

Table B3: Covariate balance by popular vote margin treatment

		+3%	+1%	-1%	-3%	-5%
YouGov	Female	0.52	0.52	0.55	0.53	
		(0.01)		(-1.31)	(-0.22)	
	Age	46.5	48.1	47.8	47.4	
		(1.95)		(0.41)	(0.85)	
	White	0.66	0.66	0.65	0.61*	
		(-0.08)		(-0.59)	(-2.23)	
	Republican	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.31	
		(0.48)		(-0.40)	(-0.15)	
Lucid	Female		0.52	0.52	0.52	0.51
				(-0.12)	(0.39)	(0.86)
	Age		44.3	44.7	44.3	44.6
				(-0.81)	(-0.03)	(-0.61)
	White		0.71	0.72	0.70	0.71
				(0.84)	(-0.19)	(0.52)
	Republican		0.48	0.46	0.50	0.51
				(0.85)	(-1.33)	(-1.81)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Means for variable by condition. T-statistic relative to the +1% condition in parentheses.)

Table B4: Covariate balance by party of Electoral College winner treatment

		Democrats won	Republicans won
YouGov	Female	0.52	0.54
			(-0.86)
	Age	48.0	46.8
			(1.98)
	White	0.64	0.65
			(0.73)
	Republican	0.32	0.33
			(-0.08)
Lucid	Female	0.52	0.51
			(0.59)
	Age	44.7	44.3
			(1.00)
	White	0.71	0.71
			(-0.29)
	Republican	0.48	0.49
			(-0.45)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Means for variable by condition. T-statistic relative to the condition where a Democratic candidate wins in parentheses.)

Table B5: Covariate balance by 2016 reminder treatment

		Control	Reminded
Lucid	Female	0.52	0.51
			(0.76)
	Age	44.6	44.4
			(0.52)
	White	0.72	0.71
			(-1.18)
	Republican	0.48	0.49
			(-0.52)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Means for variable by condition. T-statistics relative to control condition in parentheses.)

Table B6: F-statistics for regressions of treatment assignment on covariates

| Treatment | YouGov | | Lucid | | |
	Margin	*EC winner*	*Margin*	*EC winner*	*2016 reminder*
Female	0.025	0.016	-0.015	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Age	-0.000	-0.001*	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Not white	0.099*	-0.020	0.018	0.001	0.018
	(0.041)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Republican	0.040	0.006	0.063	0.006	0.011
	(0.042)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.012)
F statistic	1.624	1.538	1.525	0.4827	0.7528
	(df = 4; 3390)	(df = 4; 3390)	(df = 4; 7145)	(df = 4; 7145)	(df = 4; 7202)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). OLS models where dependent variable is transformed into numeric. For margin treatment, party treatment and 2016 reminder treatment, the +1% condition, Democratic EC winner condition and control condition are respectively turned into 0.

Table C1: Pair-wise correlations between dependent variables

	YouGov	Lucid
Fair/legitimate	0.81	0.73
Legitimate/rightful	0.82	0.74
Rightful/fair	0.81	0.73

C   Measurement of dependent variables

We measure legitimacy using three questions presented in random order. Each item was coded in the same direction with higher values indicating greater agreement with the result of the election.

- Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the rightful winner?

    – Definitely the rightful winner (4)

    – Probably the rightful winner (3)

    – Probably not the rightful winner (2)

    – Definitely not the rightful winner (1)

- Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?

    – Entirely legitimate (4)

    – Somewhat legitimate (3)

    – Not very legitimate (2)

    – Not legitimate at all (1)

- Do you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?

    – Very fair (4)

    – Somewhat fair (3)

    – Not very fair (2)

    – Not at all fair (1)

In Figure C1, we visualize the distribution of each dependent variable for both experiments. Correlations between all three items are high (0.7–0.8) in both experiments. We therefore combined them to increase scale reliability (Broockman, Kalla and Sekhon 2017). In Table C1, we summarize the correlations between each item. Cronbach's α for internal consistency are 0.93 and 0.89, respectively, for the YouGov and Lucid experiments, suggesting that our scale is very reliable.

Figure C1: Distribution of dependent variables

D   YouGov results with independents

Below we report the full results from Table 1 in the main text as well as additional models including independents from the YouGov sample (column 1) and the Lucid model with the 2016 election reminder included as a control variable (column 4). The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is +1%. Political interest was measured by the following question: "Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs." Responses were measured on a four-point Likert scale with a don't know option (which is treated as missing). The measure of political interest ranges from 1 to 4 where higher values indicate greater interest. Respondent race was measured with the following question: "What racial or ethnic group best describes you?" and is answered in eight categories (White, Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, Native American, Middle Easter, Mixed Race, Other). Respondents who do not identify as white are assigned a value of 1 for the nonwhite measure and those who identify as white are assigned a value of 0. Education levels are measured with the following question: "What is the highest level of education you have completed?" Respondents answered on a six-point scale from "No high school degree" to "Post-graduate degree." The college graduate indicator takes a value of 1 if respondents have a four-year college degree or more and 0 if not. Female respondents are also represented with indicators for respondents who identify as female to the question "Are you male or female?" (1 if female, 0 if male). Finally, indicators are included for age groups of 30–44, 45–59, and 60+ years old; the 18–29 age group is the reference category.

Neither the direction nor magnitude of effect sizes and standard errors varies between model specifications. Relative to +1%, an inversion causes a significant decrease in perceived legitimacy, while an increase in popular vote margin does not. Co-partisans who win are seen as more legitimate. Finally, we confirm that adding the 2016 election result reminder manipulation as a control does not change our results (a consequence of randomization).

Table D1: Effects of winner vote margin on election legitimacy (relative to +1 percentage point)

	YouGov		Lucid	
	With independents	Partisans only	Partisans only	Partisans only
+3 percentage points	0.007	0.014		
	(0.038)	(0.041)		
-1 percentage point	-0.454***	-0.483***	-0.319***	-0.319***
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.026)
-3 percentage point	-0.472***	-0.506***	-0.333***	-0.333***
	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.026)	(0.026)
-5 percentage point			-0.342***	-0.342***
			(0.026)	(0.026)
Co-partisan wins	0.376***	0.416***	0.247***	0.247***
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Political interest	0.090***	0.091***	0.065***	0.065***
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Non-white	-0.166***	-0.167***	-0.174***	-0.175***
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.021)
College educated	0.037	0.049	0.088***	0.088***
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Female	-0.209***	-0.201***	-0.257***	-0.257***
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age 30–44	0.036	0.010	0.083**	0.083**
	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Age 45–59	0.123*	0.114*	0.130***	0.129***
	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Age 60+	0.136**	0.133**	0.184***	0.184***
	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.030)	(0.030)
2016 reminder				0.0173
				(0.019)
Respondents	3194	2664	7150	7150

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. "Election legitimacy" is measured based on survey responses which scale together as a composite measure.

E Linear probability models for binary categories

In Table E1, we show results from an alternative coding of the dependent variable in which we transform the dependent variable into a binary indicator of whether the respondent answered in an affirmative manner to each of the disaggregated response items — i.e, the respondent answers that the candidate who won the Electoral College is "definitely" or "probably" the rightful winner, that the the presidency is "entirely" or "somewhat" legitimate, or that the victory was "very" or "somewhat" fair, the answer is recorded as a 1 and 0 otherwise (see Supplementary Materials C for details on the response items). Each model is a OLS with robust standard errors. The reference category is +1%.

   Across all models, inversions reduce perceived legitimacy by 10–25 percentage points on this binary measure. These results do not vary meaningfully by popular vote margin. Overall, these results suggest that our results reported in the main text are not simply a reflection of respondents changing their responses between the top two affirmative categories; a substantial number of respondents change from positive to negative evaluations

Table E1: Effects of winner vote margin on binary measures (relative to +1 percentage point)

Dependent variable	YouGov			Lucid		
	Fair	*Legitimate*	*Rightful*	*Fair*	*Legitimate*	*Rightful*
+3 percentage points	0.012	0.001	-0.001			
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)			
-1 percentage point	-0.245***	-0.138***	-0.174***	-0.148***	-0.096***	-0.127***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
-3 percentage point	-0.223***	-0.143***	-0.224***	-0.151***	-0.117***	-0.155***
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
-5 percentage point				-0.169***	-0.104***	-0.135***
				(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Co-partisan wins	0.130***	0.115***	0.137	0.093***	0.107***	0.100***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Respondents	3194	3194	3194	7150	7150	7150

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the respondent answered in an affirmative manner for each item. All models above control for political interest, race, college education, sex, and age group. Both models above include only self-identified Democrats or Republicans including leaners. (See Supplementary Materials D for full results including results with independents in the YouGov sample.)

F   Average marginal effects of vote margins with different baseline

We further explore H3 by presenting the average marginal effects of electoral margins on legitimacy using the same models as Table 2, but using the -1 percentage point condition as the baseline. We show these alternative results to highlight that penalties on electoral legitimacy do not seem to be exacerbated by the inversion margin, but simply by the fact of the inversion itself. Table F1 shows these results. Only in the five-point inversion condition among Democrats in our Lucid experiment can we reject the null hypothesis that the size of the loser's popular vote victory made no difference — the estimated marginal effect relative to a 1-point margin is -0.103 (SE=0.035) and is statistically significant.

Table F1: Average marginal effects by party (relative to -1 percentage point)

	Democrats		Republicans	
	YouGov	Lucid	YouGov	Lucid
Co-partisan wins	0.492***	0.310***	0.316***	0.165***
	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.048)	(0.026)
+3 percentage points	0.846***		0.0183	
	(0.055)		(0.068)	
+1 percentage points	0.868***	0.490***	-0.048	0.105***
	(0.057)	(0.034)	(0.068)	(0.037)
-3 percentage points	-0.082	-0.068	0.060	-0.009
	(0.057)	(0.035)	(0.067)	(0.037)
-5 percentage points		-0.103***		0.009
		(0.035)		(0.037)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Marginal effects calculations from the models reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table G1 in Supplementary Materials G. These quantities are calculated by first taking first-order partial derivatives of the model specified in columns 2 and 3 of Table G1 with respect to the variables of interest (having a co-partisan winner or a given popular vote margin). We then use the resulting equations to estimate the average marginal effects of the variable of interest for Democrats and Republican averaging over other terms in the model (i.e., copartisan winner for margins and vice versa).

G   Heterogeneous treatment effects by partisanship

Table G1 shows results from regressions analyzing how the effects of our popular vote margin manipulation on perceived legitimacy vary with the partisanship of respondent and the winning candidate. The reference categories are a Democratic respondent, a win for the opposite-party (Republican) candidate, and a +1 percentage point margin in the popular vote. The top three rows show estimates of the marginal effect of a Republican respondent, a copartisan victory, and the interaction of those two conditions. Below, the table is organized in blocks of four rows, with each block corresponding to an alternative popular vote outcome – a larger (three percentage point) non-inversion margin, then inversions of -1, -3, and -5 percentage points. Within each block, estimates on the interaction terms illustrate the marginal effects of a win by a copartisan candidate, of respondent partisanship (Republican rather than Democrat), and of Republican respondents with a copartisan winner. In our main text, we calculate the average marginal effect of the treatment manipulation; namely, the effect of switching the winner of the EC vote to a co-partisan candidate and switching the popular vote margin (relative to winning the popular vote by 1 percent). As noted in the caption of Table 2, these quantities are calculated by first taking first-order partial derivatives of the model specified in columns 2 and 3 of Table G1 with respect to the variables of interest (having a co-partisan winner or a given popular vote margin). We then use the resulting equations to estimate the average marginal effects of the variable of interest for Democrats and Republican averaging over other terms in the model (i.e., copartisan winner for margins and vice versa). We conduct these calculations using R's `margins` package.

   Starting at the top, the first three rows estimate effects for the baseline scenario of a one-percent popular vote win for the presidential winner. In the initial experiment with YouGov, we find no difference in perceived legitimacy by respondent partisanship, but in the Lucid sample, Republican respondents rate legitimacy higher in this scenario by 0.253 (SE=0.052). In both experiments, the magnitude of the copartisan effect is not distinguishable between Democrats and Republicans.

   The next block of rows shows marginal effects of increasing the popular vote margin of the presidential winner to three percentage points. We included this scenario only in the YouGov experiment. We find no difference in effect overall, no difference in the magnitude of the copartisan effect, no effect by respondent partisanship, and none for the interaction between respondent partisanship and the party of the winning candidate. In short, when the popular vote winner wins the presidency, even narrowly, respondents appear to be at their legitimacy ceiling. Moving from a narrow to a more comfortable popular vote margin does not push legitimacy higher.

   The next block of rows shows estimates for a narrow inversion, moving from a popular vote win of one percentage point to a popular vote loss of one percentage point for the presidential winner. The first set of coefficients in this block show the marginal effect of this inversion on Democratic respondents — -0.822 (SE=0.090) in the YouGov sample and -0.475 (SE=0.056) in Lucid. The next estimates show that, contra H4, this decrease in legitimacy is not related to the partisanship of the presidential winner. Among Democrats, assessments of legitimacy decrease as much when a copartisan wins by inversion as when a Republican does. While not statistically significant, Democrats seems to even penalize co-partisan candidates who win an electoral inversion *more*. This negative effect of inversions on legitimacy is absent among Republican respondents (the effect observed among Democrats is offset by positive interactions between the inversion conditions and Republican identification). Finally, we note that the response to inversions among Republicans varied somewhat by party of the winning candidate in the YouGov sample. In the YouGov sample

(but not Lucid), Republicans rated an election outcome in which a Democrat won the Electoral College but lost the popular vote as more legitimate than a Republican co-partisan winning in an inversion. Because this result shows up in the YouGov sample only, and not the Lucid replication, we treat it with caution, but we note that it is the opposite of what H4 would posit—that inversion wins by opposite-party candidates would reduce legitimacy assessments more than inversion wins by copartisans.

The next block of estimates replicate precisely the same pattern for a three percentage point inversion as for the one percentage point inversion above. Democrats rate inversions lower in legitimacy regardless of the partisanship of the winner. This inversion penalty is offset entirely among Republican respondents, where we see the same YouGov-only pattern of greater legitimacy for Democratic inversion winners than Republicans.

Finally, the bottom block shows that these effects persist when the popular vote margin in the inversion scenario is five percentage points (tested in the Lucid experiment only). Democratic respondents punish this inversion, not distinguishing by the partisanship of winner, but the effect is offset among Republicans, who impose no inversion penalty. As these estimates underscore, we find no evidence for H3, which predicted that popular vote margins would affect legitimacy under inversions. Democrats do impose an inversion penalty, but its magnitude is indistinguishable across the vote margin scenarios we tested.

Table G1: Effects of winner margin on legitimacy by partisanship (relative to +1 percentage point)

	YouGov (w/independents)	YouGov	Lucid
Republican respondent	-0.064	-0.008	0.253***
	(0.97)	(0.105)	(0.052)
Co-partisan wins	0.456***	0.496***	0.324***
	(0.061)	(0.073)	(0.050)
Co-partisan × Republican	0.183	0.141	-0.080
	(0.114)	(0.121)	(0.066)
+3 percentage points	-0.028	-0.024	
	(0.066)	(0.085)	
+3 percentage points × co-partisan candidate	0.006	0.004	
	(0.089)	(0.104)	
+3 percentage points × Republican respondent	0.213	0.208	
	(0.134)	(0.144)	
+3 percentage points × co-partisan × Republicans	-0.243	-0.238	
	(0.159)	(0.167)	
-1 percentage points	-0.609***	-0.822***	-0.475***
	(0.070)	(0.090)	(0.056)
-1 percentage points × co-partisan candidate	-0.303**	-0.092	-0.029
	(0.010)	(0.115)	(0.074)
-1 percentage points × Republican respondent	0.935***	1.142***	0.412***
	(0.131)	(0.142)	(0.075)
-1 percentage points × co-partisan × Republican	-0.244	-0.450*	-0.054
	(0.166)	(0.175)	(0.098)
-3 percentage points	-0.713***	-0.986***	-0.565***
	(0.070)	(0.090)	(0.057)
-3 percentage points × co-partisan candidate	-0.200	0.072	0.015
	(0.106)	(0.120)	(0.076)
-3 percentage points × Republican respondent	1.076***	1.343***	0.476***
	(0.126)	(0.137)	(0.075)
-3 percentage points × co-partisan × Republican	-0.300	-0.568***	-0.063
	(0.164)	(0.173)	(0.100)
-5 percentage points			-0.571***
			(0.056)
-5 percentage points × co-partisan candidate			-0.042
			(0.074)
-5 percentage points × Republican respondent			0.570***
			(0.074)
-5 percentage points × co-partisan × Republican			-0.145
			(0.098)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓
Respondents	3194	2664	7150

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. "Election legitimacy" measured based on survey responses which scale together as a composite measure. All models above control for political interest, race, college education, sex, and age group. The models in the center and rightmost columns include only self-identified Democrats or Republicans including leaners. The leftmost model includes all participants in the YouGov sample (including independents).

H   Political knowledge

We test whether political knowledge moderates the effect of popular vote margins on election legitimacy. Political knowledge is measured as the number of correct answers to questions regarding the length of a US senator's term, how many senators represent each state, how many times an individual can be elected President, the name of the Prime Minister of the UK, and the length of a US House member's term. We categorize respondents in roughly equal bins with those who scored 0 or 1 points as "low knowledge," 2 or 3 points as "medium knowledge," and 4 or 5 as "high knowledge" respondents. Table H1 shows these results. We also calculate average marginal effects using the same model for political knowledge and report these results in Table H2. First, in general, high political knowledge is associated with greater perceived legitimacy across all election scenarios. However, this finding masks heterogeneity by party. On average, political knowledge increases legitimacy for Republicans, but decreases legitimacy for Democrats. These differences are exacerbated in inversion conditions—perceived legitimacy is reduced more by inversions among Democratic respondents with high political knowledge compared to those who have low political knowledge, while knowledge generally does not significantly moderate the effects of the popular vote margin among Republicans.

Table H1: Political knowledge interaction (relative to +1 percentage point, and low political knowledge)

	Lucid	
	(1)	(2)
Medium political knowledge	-0.002	0.022
	(0.067)	(0.066)
High political knowledge	0.355***	0.355***
	(0.067)	(0.068)
Co-partisan wins	0.218**	0.246***
	(0.074)	(0.018)
Co-partisan wins × medium knowledge	0.144	
	(0.091)	
Co-partisan wins × high knowledge	-0.006	
	(0.089)	
Republican respondent		0.113
		(0.075)
Republican × medium knowledge		0.161
		(0.090)
Republican × high knowledge		0.081
		(0.089)
-1 percentage points	-0.117	-0.210**
	(0.078)	(0.075)
-1% × co-partisan wins	-0.55	
	(0.106)	
-1% × Republican respondent		0.145
		(0.105)
-1% × medium knowledge	-0.098	-0.191*
	(0.098)	(0.093)
-1% × high knowledge	-0.421***	-0.561***
	(0.103)	(0.098)
-1% × co-partisan wins × medium knowledge	-0.074	
	(0.132)	
-1% × co-partisan wins × high knowledge	0.182	
	(0.137)	
-1% × Republican × medium knowledge		0.150
		(0.129)
-1% × Republican × high knowledge		0.504***
		(0.131)
-3 percentage points	-0.183*	-0.275***
	(0.075)	(0.075)
-3% × co-partisan wins	-0.000	
	(0.107)	
-3% × Republican respondent		0.206
		(0.106)
-3% × medium knowledge	-0.027	-0.157
	(0.097)	(0.094)
-3% × high knowledge	-0.362***	-0.640***
-3% × co-partisan wins × medium knowledge	-0.131	
	(0.134)	
-3% × co-partisan wins × high knowledge	0.111	
	(0.138)	
	(0.101)	(0.100)
-3% × Republican × medium knowledge		0.105
		(0.131)
-3% × Republican × high knowledge		0.575***
		(0.133)
-5 percentage points	-0.202**	-0.346***
	(0.074)	(0.074)
-5% × co-partisan wins	-0.065	
	(0.106)	
-5% × Republican respondent		0.257*
		(0.104)
-5% × medium knowledge	0.015	-0.103
	(0.096)	(0.092)
-5% × high knowledge	-0.291**	-0.602***
	(0.103)	(0.099)
-5% × co-partisan wins × medium knowledge	-0.121	
	(0.131)	
-5% × co-partisan wins × High knowledge	0.103	
	(0.139)	
-5% × Republican × medium knowledge		0.058
		(0.128)
-5% × Republican × high knowledge		0.610***
		(0.131)
Control variables	✓	✓
Respondents	7150	7150

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). OLS model with robust standard errors.

Table H2: Average marginal effect of political knowledge on legitimacy

	All	Lucid Republicans	Democrats
Medium political knowledge	0.026	0.149***	-0.090**
	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.033)
High political knowledge	0.153***	0.408***	-0.087*
	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.036)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided).

I   Democratic support moderators

We attempt to measure a latent factor related to support for democracy. Our measured items consist of three questions below.

- How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is "not at all important" and 10 means "absolutely important," what position would you choose? (full response scale was 1–10 scale)

    - 1 through 7 (low bin)
    - 8 and 9 (medium bin)
    - 10 (high bin)

- Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.

    - Agree strongly (high bin)
    - Agree somewhat (medium bin)
    - Neither agree or disagree (low bin)
    - Disagree somewhat (low bin)
    - Disagree strongly (low bin)

- We should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country's problems rather than relying on a democratic form of government.

    - Agree strongly (low bin)
    - Agree somewhat (low bin)
    - Neither agree or disagree (medium bin)
    - Disagree somewhat (high bin)
    - Disagree strongly (high bin)

Because the three variables do not clearly load on a single factor in a principal components factor analysis, we estimate a separate model for each variable following our pre-analysis plan. To avoid a linearity assumption, each moderator is separated into approximate terciles (shown in parentheses above), where the "High" bin is coded to indicate higher support for democratic values. The results are reported in Table I1. We also calculate average marginal effects in Table I2.

Table I1: Effects of democratic support on electoral legitimacy (relative to +1 percentage point)

		Lucid	
	(Live in democracy)	(Democracy best)	(Strong hand)
Moderator (medium)	0.033	0.163*	0.005
	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.065)
Moderator (high)	0.189**	0.316***	0.075
	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.059)
Copartisan wins	0.150*	0.298***	0.219***
	(0.060)	(0.073)	(0.052)
Copartisan wins × moderator (medium bin)	0.131	-0.131	-0.033
	(0.086)	(0.093)	(0.089)
Copartisan wins × moderator (high bin)	0.191*	0.028	0.155*
	(0.080)	(0.088)	(0.075)
-1 percentage point	-0.187**	-0.192*	-0.068
	(0.062)	(0.078)	(0.056)
-1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin)	0.031	-0.062	0.211*
	(0.094)	(0.101)	(0.096)
-1 percentage point × moderator (high bin)	-0.270**	-0.196*	-0.478***
	(0.089)	(0.099)	(0.088)
-1 percentage point × copartisan wins	-0.016	-0.142	-0.102
	(0.087)	(0.107)	(0.076)
-1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins	-0.114	0.116	0.162
	(0.128)	(0.137)	(0.131)
-1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins	0.0419	0.149	0.118
	(0.119)	(0.132)	(0.115)
-3 percentage point	-0.254***	-0.281***	-0.031
	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.057)
-3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin)	0.010	-0.096	-0.446***
	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.094)
-3 percentage point × moderator (high bin)	-0.152	-0.044	-0.486***
	(0.090)	(0.100)	(0.090)
-3 percentage point × copartisan wins	0.052	-0.053	-0.129
	(0.088)	(0.110)	(0.079)
-3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins	-0.143	0.121	0.328
	(0.129)	(0.140)	(0.132)
-3 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins	-0.075	-0.008	0.103*
	(0.122)	(0.136)	(0.119)
-5 percentage point	-0.196**	-0.161*	-0.105
	(0.061)	(0.082)	(0.057)
-5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin)	-0.136	-0.212*	-0.216*
	(0.096)	(0.103)	(0.100)
-5 percentage point × moderator (high bin)	-0.151	-0.161	-0.388***
	(0.089)	(0.102)	(0.089)
-5 percentage point × copartisan wins	-0.028	-0.218*	-0.079
	(0.086)	(0.110)	(0.076)
-5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins	-0.042	0.283*	0.030
	(0.119)	(0.139)	(0.134)
-5 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins	-0.080	0.111	-0.002
	(0.120)	(0.136)	(0.117)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓
Respondents	7150	6954	7150

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. All models above control for political interest, race, college education, sex, and age group.)

Table I2: Average marginal effect of moderators (relative to lowest moderator category)

Moderator	Category	AME
Live in democracy	Medium	0.039
		(0.027)
	High	0.129***
		(0.025)
Democracy is best	Medium	0.072**
		(0.027)
	High	0.263***
		(0.27)
Don't need strongman	Medium	-0.164***
		(0.026)
	High	-0.155***
		(0.022)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point.

J   Electoral sovereignty moderators

We attempt to measure a latent factor related to support for electoral sovereignty. Our measured items consist of three questions below.

- For future presidential elections, would you support or oppose changing to a system in which the president is elected by direct popular vote, instead of by the Electoral College? [10]

    - Support strongly (high bin)
    - Support somewhat (medium bin)
    - Neither support or oppose (low bin)
    - Oppose somewhat (low bin)
    - Oppose strongly (low bin)

- The United States is a republic, not a democracy.

    - Agree strongly (low bin)
    - Agree somewhat (low bin)
    - Neither agree or disagree (medium bin)
    - Disagree somewhat (high bin) [11]
    - Disagree strongly (high bin)

- People should choose their leaders in free elections.

    - Agree strongly (low bin)
    - Agree somewhat (low bin)
    - Neither agree or disagree (medium bin)
    - Disagree somewhat (high bin)
    - Disagree strongly (high bin)

Because the three variables do not clearly load on a single factor in a principal components factor analysis, we estimate a separate model for each variable following our pre-analysis plan. To avoid a linearity assumption, each moderator is separated into approximate terciles (shown in parentheses), where the "High" bin is coded to indicate higher support for elections. The results are reported in Table J1. We also report average marginal effects in Table J2.

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[10]Support for the National Popular Vote was asked both before and after the experimental module of our survey. We use the pre-treatment measure for our moderator here.

[11]In administrating our survey, we made a mistake where this option was incorrectly labeled as "Disagree strongly," resulting in having the "Disagree strongly" option shown twice.

Table J1: Effects of electoral sovereignty on electoral legitimacy (relative to +1 percentage point)

	(EC)	Lucid (is Republic)	(Free election)
Moderator (medium bin)	-0.107**	-0.155	-0.433**
	(0.021)	(0.056)	(0.157)
Moderator (high bin)	-0.081	-0.223**	-0.238
	(0.064)	(0.072)	(0.144)
Copartisan wins	0.197***	0.244***	0.041
	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.208)
Copartisan wins × moderator (medium bin)	0.077	-0.034	0.177
	(0.079)	(0.075)	(0.230)
Copartisan wins × moderator (high bin)	0.190*	0.218*	0.254
	(0.082)	(0.090)	(0.211)
-1 percentage point	-0.016	-0.291***	-0.342
	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.204)
-1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin)	-0.253**	-0.084	0.248
	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.226)
-1 percentage point × moderator (high bin)	-0.581***	-0.018	0.007
	(0.093)	(0.107)	(0.208)
-1 percentage point × copartisan wins	-0.061	-0.002	0.097
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.287)
-1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins	-0.030	0.033	-0.117
	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.319)
-1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins	0.017	-0.175	-0.128
	(0.123)	(0.134)	(0.292)
-3 percentage point	-0.019	-0.276***	-0.350
	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.220)
-3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin)	-0.236**	-0.138	0.221
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.240)
-3 percentage point × moderator (high bin)	-0.644***	-0.018	0.003
	(0.092)	(0.107)	(0.224)
-3 percentage point × copartisan wins	-0.041	-0.073	-0.097
	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.327)
-3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins	-0.091	0.121	0.125
	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.354)
-3 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins	0.029	0.028	0.071
	(0.123)	(0.137)	(0.332)
-5 percentage point	-0.003	-0.265***	-0.442*
	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.183)
-5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin)	-0.345***	-0.068	0.372
	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.208)
-5 percentage point × moderator (high bin)	-0.600***	-0.026	0.118
	(0.094)	(0.107)	(0.188)
-5 percentage point × copartisan wins	-0.154*	-0.044	0.321
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.289)
-5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins	0.136	-0.025	0.175
	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.321)
-5 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins	0.081	-0.187	0.252
	(0.124)	(0.139)	(0.295)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓
Respondents	7150	7150	7150

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. All models above control for political interest, race, college education, sex, and age group.)

Table J2: Average marginal effect of moderators (relative to lowest moderator category)

Moderator	Category	AME
Support NPV	Medium	-0.271***
		(0.024)
	High	-0.420***
		(0.022)
US is not republic	Medium	-0.228***
		(0.023)
	High	-0.151***
		(0.024)
Choose leader in free election	Medium	-0.115
		(0.064)
	High	-0.055
		(0.059)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point.

K   2016 reminder

In our Lucid experiment, prior to showing respondents the hypothetical election profile, half of the respondents were randomized to see a reminder of the 2016 result. The text of the treatment is shown below (the full design of our Lucid experiment is summarized in Figure A2).

> Before we start, we would like to remind you that the most recent presidential election took place in 2016. Donald Trump was elected President after winning the Electoral College (304 Trump to 227 Clinton), although Hillary Clinton won the popular vote (48% Clinton to 46% Trump).

As model (1) indicates, the reminder reduced perceived legitimacy on average among Democrats and increased it among Republicans (averaging over popular vote margin conditions). However, as model (2) indicates, the reminder did not significantly moderate the effects of the popular vote margin on election legitimacy.

Table K1: Effects of 2016 reminder on election legitimacy (relative to +1 percentage point)

| | Lucid | |
	(1)	(2)
Co-partisan wins	0.244***	0.347***
	(0.018)	(0.070)
2016 reminder	-0.057*	-0.029
	(0.027)	(0.078)
Republican respondent	0.465***	0.219***
	(0.026)	(0.075)
Republican respondent × 2016 reminder	0.145***	0.067
	(0.036)	(0.103)
Republican respondent × copartisan wins		-0.112
		(0.096)
Copartisan wins × 2016 reminder		-0.043
		(0.100)
Republican respondent × copartisan wins × 2016 reminder		0.066
		(0.133)
-1 percentage point	-0.311***	-0.458***
	(0.025)	(0.077)
-1% × Republican respondent		0.335**
		(0.107)
-1% × 2016 reminder		-0.039
		(0.112)
-1% × copartisan wins × Republican respondent		0.072
		(0.141)
-1% × copartisan wins × 2016 reminder		0.187
		(0.148)
-1% × Republican respondent × 2016 reminder		0.149
		(0.150)
-1% × copartisan wins × Republican respondent × 2016 reminder		-0.245
		(0.196)
-3 percentage point	-0.345***	-0.545***
	(0.025)	(0.077)
-3% × Republican respondent		0.427***
		(0.108)
-3% × 2016 reminder		-0.039
		(0.113)
-3% × copartisan wins × Republican respondent		0.040
		(0.141)
-3% × copartisan wins × 2016 reminder		0.061
		(0.152)
-3% × Republican respondent × 2016 reminder		0.095
		(0.150)
-3% × copartisan wins × Republican respondent × 2016 reminder		-0.202
		(0.200)
-5 percentage points	-0.356***	-0.546***
	(0.025)	(0.077)
-5% × Republican respondent		0.496***
		(0.106)
-5% × 2016 reminder		-0.054
		(0.112)
-5% × copartisan wins × Republican respondent		-0.161
		(0.139)
-5% × copartisan wins × 2016 reminder		-0.072
		(0.148)
-5% × Republican respondent × 2016 reminder		0.145
		(0.147)
-5% × copartisan wins × Republican respondent × 2016 reminder		0.030
		(0.195)
Control variables	✓	✓
Respondents	7150	7150

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. "Election legitimacy" measured based on survey responses which scale together as a composite measure. All models above control for political interest, race, college education, sex, and age group.)

L   Electoral College support

We measured support for Electoral College twice in our Lucid experiment — once before our experimental section and once after. Our question wording was as follows:

- For future presidential elections, would you support or oppose changing to a system in which the president is elected by direct popular vote, instead of by the Electoral College?

    - Support strongly (1)
    - Support somewhat (2)
    - neither support nor oppose (3)
    - Oppose somewhat (4)
    - Oppose strongly (5)

Survey responses were coded as indicated in parentheses. A higher number indicates higher support for the existing Electoral College system (and conversely less support for the National Popular Vote Initiative).

In Table L1, we estimate several models that predict support for post-treatment Electoral College support. As model (2) indicates, we find that the reminder of the 2016 election outcome increased support for the Electoral College overall among Republicans. However, attitudes toward the Electoral College were not affected by the popular vote margin (model 1) nor were those effects moderated by respondent partisanship (model 2), whether the winning candidate was a co-partisan (model 3), or the interaction between the two (model 4).

Table L1: Effects of winner margins on Electoral College support (relative to +1 percentage point)

	Lucid			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pre-treatment EC support	0.786***	0.734***	0.785***	0.733***
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)
2016 reminder	0.035	-0.030		
	(0.021)	(0.026)		
Republican respondent		0.385***		0.473***
		(0.046)		(0.052)
Copartisan wins			-0.33	-0.005
			(0.041)	(0.048)
2016 reminder × Republican respondent		0.132***		
		(0.040)		
Republican respondent × copartisan wins				-0.043
				(0.076)
-1 percentage point	-0.006	0.040	-0.049	0.024
	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.050)
-1 percentage point × Republican respondent		-0.093		-0.137
		(0.056)		(0.077)
-1 percentage point × copartisan wins			0.083	0.034
			(0.056)	(0.071)
-1 percentage point × Republican respondent × copartisan wins				0.085
				(0.111)
-3 percentage point	0.041	0.047	0.006	0.022
	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.047)
-3 percentage point × Republican respondent		-0.037		-0.061
		(0.056)		(0.073)
-3 percentage point × copartisan wins			0.071	0.051
			(0.057)	(0.073)
-3 percentage point × Republican respondent × copartisan wins				0.053
				(0.111)
-5 percentage points	0.007	-0.006	-0.034	-0.026
	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.050)
-5 percentage point × Republican respondent		0.004		-0.013
		(0.057)		(0.080)
-5 percentage point × copartisan wins			0.080	0.040
			(0.058)	(0.074)
-5 percentage point × Republican respondent × copartisan wins				0.035
				(0.114)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓
Respondents	7028	7028	7028	7028

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. Electoral College support measured based on likert scale in which a higher number means support for the Electoral College. All models above control for political interest, race, college education, sex, and age group.)

M   Survey instruments

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Electoral margins experiment

Survey Flow

EmbeddedData
    pidValue will be set from Panel or URL.
    SUPPLIER_IDValue will be set from Panel or URL.
    SUPNAMEValue will be set from Panel or URL.
    Q_BallotBoxStuffingValue will be set from Panel or URL.
    Q_PopulateResponseValue will be set from Panel or URL.
    Q_RelevantIDDuplicateScoreValue will be set from Panel or URL.
    Q_RelevantIDFraudScoreValue will be set from Panel or URL.
    Q_RelevantIDDuplicateValue will be set from Panel or URL.
    ridValue will be set from Panel or URL.

Standard: Consent (2 Questions)
Standard: Age (2 Questions)
Standard: Gender (2 Questions)
Standard: State (2 Questions)
Standard: PID (2 Questions)

Branch: New Branch
    If
        If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...? Independent Is Selected
        Or Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...? Other Is Selected
        Or Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...? Not sure Is Selected

Standard: PID other (2 Questions)

Branch: New Branch
    If
        If Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party? Neither Is Selected
        Or Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party? Not sure Is Selected

EndSurvey: Advanced

Branch: New Branch
    If
        If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...? Republican Is Selected

Standard: PID Republican (2 Questions)

Branch: New Branch
    If
        If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...? Democrat Is Selected

Standard: PID Democrat (2 Questions)

Standard: Ideo (2 Questions)
Standard: Educ (2 Questions)

Standard: Race (2 Questions)
Standard: Political interest (2 Questions)
Standard: Trump approval (1 Question)
Standard: Live in democracy (2 Questions)
Standard: EC policy PRE (2 Questions)
Standard: Dem support statements intro (2 Questions)
Standard: Dem support statements (5 Questions)
Standard: Political knowledge intro (2 Questions)
Standard: Political knowledge (6 Questions)

BlockRandomizer: 1 -

    Standard: PV margins prompt only (2 Questions)
    Standard: PV margins prompt + 2016 reminder (2 Questions)

BlockRandomizer: 1 -

    Block: R-lose1 (5 Questions)
    Standard: D-lose1 (5 Questions)
    Standard: R-lose3 (5 Questions)
    Standard: D-lose3 (5 Questions)
    Standard: R-win1 (5 Questions)
    Standard: D-win1 (5 Questions)
    Standard: R-lose5 (5 Questions)
    Standard: D-lose5 (5 Questions)

Standard: Explain answer (2 Questions)
Standard: EC policy POST (2 Questions)
Standard: Manipulation checks (5 Questions)
Standard: Trolling (2 Questions)
Standard: Look up (2 Questions)
Standard: Comments (2 Questions)
Standard: End (1 Question)

EndSurvey: Advanced

Page Break —————————————————————————

Q34 This study is being conducted by ███████████████████████████
███████████████████████████████ We ask for your attention for a few minutes and we thank you for your attention and your responses. Your participation is voluntary and you may decline the survey or withdraw at any time. No information that identifies you will be collected or retained by the researchers. However, any online interaction carries some risk of being accessed. Do you consent to participate in the survey?

○ Yes (1)

○ No (2)

███

Q122 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

✱

Q35 In what year were you born? (Please answer in full 4-digit years)

_____

Q121 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q36 Are you male or female?

○ Male (1)

○ Female (2)

Q120 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q44 In which state do you currently reside?

▼ Alabama (1) ... I do not reside in the United States (53)

Q119 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q44 Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?

○ Democrat (1)

○ Republican (2)

○ Independent (3)

○ Other (4)

○ Not sure (5)

Q118 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q45 Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party?

○ The Democratic Party (1)

○ The Republican Party (2)

○ Neither (3)

○ Not sure (4)

Q117 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q47 Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?

○ Strong Republican (1)

○ Not very strong Republican (2)

- -

Q116 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q46 Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?

○ Strong Democrat (1)

○ Not very strong Democrat (2)

- -

Q115 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q43
When it comes to politics, would you describe yourself as liberal, conservative, or neither liberal

nor conservative?

○ Very conservative (1)

○ Somewhat conservative (2)

○ Slightly conservative (3)

○ Moderate; middle of the road (4)

○ Slightly liberal (5)

○ Somewhat liberal (6)

○ Very liberal (7)

Q114 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

End of Block: Ideo

Start of Block: Educ

Q48
What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?

○ Did not graduate from high school (1)

○ High school diploma or the equivalent (GED) (2)

○ Some college (3)

○ Associate's degree (4)

○ Bachelor's degree (5)

○ Master's degree (6)

○ Professional or doctorate degree (7)

Q113 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

End of Block: Educ

Start of Block: Race

Q49 With which race or ethnicity do you most identify?

○ American Indian or Alaska Native (1)

○ Black or African American (2)

○ Asian/Pacific Islander (3)

○ White (4)

○ Hispanic/Latino/Chicano/a (5)

○ Multi-racial (6)

○ Other (7)

- -

Q112 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

End of Block: Race

Start of Block: Political interest

Q50 Generally, how interested are you in politics?

○ Not at all interested (1)

○ Not very interested (2)

○ Somewhat interested (3)

○ Very interested (4)

○ Extremely interested (5)

- -

Q111 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q51 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President?

○ Strongly approve (1)

○ Somewhat approve (2)

○ Somewhat disapprove (3)

○ Strongly disapprove (4)

Q66 How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is "not at all important" and 10 means "absolutely important," what position would you choose?

○ Not at all important1 (1)

○ 2 (2)

○ 3 (3)

○ 4 (4)

○ 5 (5)

○ 6 (6)

○ 7 (7)

○ 8 (8)

○ 9 (9)

○ Absolutely important10 (10)

- -

Q105 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

End of Block: Live in democracy

Start of Block: EC policy PRE

Q85 For future presidential elections, would you support or oppose changing to a system in which the president is elected by direct popular vote, instead of by the Electoral College?

○ Support strongly (1)

○ Support somewhat (2)

○ Neither support nor oppose (3)

○ Oppose somewhat (4)

○ Oppose strongly (5)

Q104 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q86 Now we're going to show you several more statements. After each one,
we would like you to tell us how strongly you agree or disagree.

Q106 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q71 Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.

○ Agree strongly (1)

○ Agree somewhat (2)

○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)

○ Disagree somewhat (4)

○ Disagree stronglly (5)

Q72 The United States is a republic, not a democracy.

○ Agree strongly (1)

○ Agree somewhat (2)

○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)

○ Disagree strongly (4)

○ Disagree strongly (5)

Q73 People should choose their leaders in free elections.

○ Agree strongly (1)

○ Agree somewhat (2)

○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)

○ Disagree somewhat (4)

○ Disagree strongly (5)

Q74 We should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country's problems rather than relying on a democratic form of government.

○ Agree strongly (1)

○ Agree somewhat (2)

○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)

○ Disagree somewhat (4)

○ Disagree strongly (5)

Q107 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q52
The next set of questions helps us learn what types of information are commonly known to the public. Please answer these questions on your own without asking anyone or looking up the answers. Many people don't know the answers to these questions, but we'd be grateful if you would please answer every question even if you're not sure what the right answer is.

It is important to us that you do NOT use outside sources like the Internet to search for the correct answer. Will you answer the following questions without help from outside sources?

○ Yes (1)

○ No (2)

Q108 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q53
For how many years is a United States Senator elected - that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator?

○ Two years (1)

○ Four years (2)

○ Six years (3)

○ Eight years (4)

○ None of the above (5)

○ I don't know (6)

Q54
How many U.S. Senators are there from each state?

○ One (1)

○ Two (2)

○ Four (3)

○ Depends on which state (4)

○ Don't know (5)

Q55
How many times can an individual be elected President of the United States under current laws?

○ Once (1)

○ Twice (2)

○ Four times (3)

○ Unlimited number of terms (4)

○ Don't know (5)

Q56 Who is the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom?

○ Richard Branson (1)

○ Nick Clegg (2)

○ Theresa May (3)

○ Boris Johnson (4)

○ Margaret Thatcher (5)

○ Don't know (6)

Q57
For how many years is a member of the United States House of Representatives elected—that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. House member?

○ Two years (1)

○ Four years (2)

○ Six years (3)

○ Eight years (4)

○ For life (5)

○ Don't know (6)

Q109 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q78

We are interested in how people evaluate the outcomes of presidential elections, which are decided in the United States by the Electoral College. In the questions that follow, we will ask you to evaluate a possible outcome of the 2020 presidential election.

- -

Q103 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q17

We are interested in how people evaluate the outcomes of presidential elections, which are decided in the United States by the Electoral College. In the questions that follow, we will ask you to evaluate a possible outcome of the 2020 presidential election.

Before we start, we would like to remind you that the most recent presidential election took place in 2016. Donald Trump was elected President after winning the Electoral College (304 Trump to 227 Clinton), although Hillary Clinton won the popular vote (48% Clinton to 46% Trump).

- -

Q102 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q4
Imagine **the Republican candidate wins the Electoral College** and the presidency in 2020 **but loses the popular vote by 1 percentage point** compared to the Democratic candidate.

Q1
Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?

○ Entirely legitimate (1)

○ Somewhat legitimate (2)

○ Not very legitimate (3)

○ Not legitimate at all (4)

Q2
Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the rightful winner?

○ Definitely the rightful winner (1)

○ Probably the rightful winner (2)

○ Probably not the rightful winner (3)

○ Definitely not the rightful winner (4)

Q3
Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?

○ Very fair (1)

○ Somewhat fair (2)

○ Not very fair (3)

○ Not at all fair (4)

Q101 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q18
Imagine **the Democratic candidate wins the Electoral College** and the presidency in 2020 **but loses the popular vote by 1 percentage point** compared to the Republican candidate.

- -

Q19
Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?

○ Entirely legitimate (1)

○ Somewhat legitimate (2)

○ Not very legitimate (3)

○ Not legitimate at all (4)

- -

Q20
Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the rightful winner?

○ Definitely the rightful winner (1)

○ Probably the rightful winner (2)

○ Probably not the rightful winner (3)

○ Definitely not the rightful winner (4)

Q21
Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?

○ Very fair (1)

○ Somewhat fair (2)

○ Not very fair (3)

○ Not at all fair (4)

Q100 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

End of Block: D-lose1

Q5
Imagine **the Republican candidate wins the Electoral College** and the presidency in 2020 **but loses the popular vote by 3 percentage point** compared to the Democratic candidate.

Q6
Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?

○ Entirely legitimate (1)

○ Somewhat legitimate (2)

○ Not very legitimate (3)

○ Not legitimate at all (4)

Q7
Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the rightful winner?

○ Definitely the rightful winner (1)

○ Probably the rightful winner (2)

○ Probably not the rightful winner (3)

○ Definitely not the rightful winner (4)

Q8
Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?

○ Very fair (1)

○ Somewhat fair (2)

○ Not very fair (3)

○ Not at all fair (4)

Q99 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q22
Imagine **the Democratic candidate wins the Electoral College** and the presidency in 2020 **but loses the popular vote by 3 percentage point** compared to the Republican candidate.

Q23
Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?

○ Entirely legitimate (1)

○ Somewhat legitimate (2)

○ Not very legitimate (3)

○ Not legitimate at all (4)

Q24
Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the rightful winner?

○ Definitely the rightful winner (1)

○ Probably the rightful winner (2)

○ Probably not the rightful winner (3)

○ Definitely not the rightful winner (4)

Q25
Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?

○ Very fair (1)

○ Somewhat fair (2)

○ Not very fair (3)

○ Not at all fair (4)

Q98 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

End of Block: D-lose3

Q9
Imagine **the Republican candidate wins the Electoral College** and the presidency in 2020 **and wins the popular vote by 1 percentage point** compared to the Democratic candidate.

- -

Q10
Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?

○ Entirely legitimate (1)

○ Somewhat legitimate (2)

○ Not very legitimate (3)

○ Not legitimate at all (4)

- -

Q11
Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the rightful winner?

○ Definitely the rightful winner (1)

○ Probably the rightful winner (2)

○ Probably not the rightful winner (3)

○ Definitely not the rightful winner (4)

Q12
Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?

○ Very fair (1)

○ Somewhat fair (2)

○ Not very fair (3)

○ Not at all fair (4)

Q97 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q26
Imagine **the Democratic candidate wins the Electoral College** and the presidency in
2020 **and wins the popular vote by 1 percentage point** compared to the Republican
candidate.

- -

Q27
Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?

○ Entirely legitimate (1)

○ Somewhat legitimate (2)

○ Not very legitimate (3)

○ Not legitimate at all (4)

- -

Q28
Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the
rightful winner?

○ Definitely the rightful winner (1)

○ Probably the rightful winner (2)

○ Probably not the rightful winner (3)

○ Definitely not the rightful winner (4)

Q29
Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?

○ Very fair (1)

○ Somewhat fair (2)

○ Not very fair (3)

○ Not at all fair (4)

Q96 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

End of Block: D-win1

Q13
Imagine **the Republican candidate wins the Electoral College** and the presidency in 2020 **but loses the popular vote by 5 percentage point** compared to the Democratic candidate.

- -

Q14
Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?

○ Entirely legitimate (1)

○ Somewhat legitimate (2)

○ Not very legitimate (3)

○ Not legitimate at all (4)

- -

Q15
Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the rightful winner?

○ Definitely the rightful winner (1)

○ Probably the rightful winner (2)

○ Probably not the rightful winner (3)

○ Definitely not the rightful winner (4)

Q16
Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?

○ Very fair (1)

○ Somewhat fair (2)

○ Not very fair (3)

○ Not at all fair (4)

Q95 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q30
Imagine **the Democratic candidate wins the Electoral College** and the presidency in 2020 **but loses the popular vote by 5 percentage point** compared to the Republican candidate.

- -

Q31
Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?

○ Entirely legitimate (1)

○ Somewhat legitimate (2)

○ Not very legitimate (3)

○ Not legitimate at all (4)

- -

Q32
Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the rightful winner?

○ Definitely the rightful winner (1)

○ Probably the rightful winner (2)

○ Probably not the rightful winner (3)

○ Definitely not the rightful winner (4)

Q33
Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?

○ Very fair (1)

○ Somewhat fair (2)

○ Not very fair (3)

○ Not at all fair (4)

Q94 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

End of Block: D-lose5

Q62 We would like to understand your thinking in assessing this outcome. Why did you answer the way you did about whether this outcome is fair and legitimate and whether the victorious candidate is the rightful winner?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Q93 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q65 For future presidential elections, would you support or oppose changing to a system in which the president is elected by direct popular vote, instead of by the Electoral College?

○ Support strongly (1)

○ Support somewhat (2)

○ Neither support nor oppose (3)

○ Oppose somewhat (4)

○ Oppose strongly (5)

Q87 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q88 In the hypothetical 2020 election scenario that you read about, which party's nominee won the Electoral College and was elected president?

○ The Democratic candidate (1)

○ The Republican candidate (2)

○ Not sure (3)

- -

Q67 In the hypothetical 2020 election scenario that you read about, what was the outcome of the popular vote?

○ Democrats won the popular vote by 5 percentage points (1)

○ Democrats won the popular vote by 3 percentage points (2)

○ Democrats won the popular vote by 1 percentage point (3)

○ Republicans won the popular vote by 1 percentage point (4)

○ Republicans won the popular vote by 3 percentage points (5)

○ Republicans won the popular vote by 5 percentage points (6)

○ Not sure (7)

- -

Q86 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Page Break ─────────────────────────────────

Q79 To the best of your knowledge, what was the outcome of the 2016 presidential election?

○ Donald Trump won the Electoral College and won the popular vote (1)

○ Donald Trump won the Electoral College but Hillary Clinton won the popular vote (2)

○ Hillary Clinton won the Electoral College but Donald Trump won the popular vote (3)

○ Hillary Clinton won the Electoral College and won the popular vote (4)

○ Not sure (5)

Q89 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

End of Block: Manipulation checks

Start of Block: Trolling

Q58 We sometimes find people don't always take surveys seriously, instead providing humorous or insincere responses to questions. How often do you do this?

○ Never (1)

○ Rarely (2)

○ Some of the time (3)

○ Most of the time (4)

○ Always (5)

Q90 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q63 It is essential for the validity of this study that we know whether participants looked up any information online during the study. Did you make an effort to look up information during the study? Please be honest; you will still be paid and you will not be penalized in any way if you did.

○ Yes, I looked up information (1)

○ No, I did not look up information (2)

Q91 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q59 Do you have any comments on the survey? Please let us know about any problems you had or aspects of the survey that were confusing.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Q92 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

Q60

Thank you for answering these questions. This research is not intended to support or oppose any political candidate or office. The research has no affiliation with any political candidate or campaign and has received no financial support from any political candidate or campaign.