

Losing predicts perceptions that elections were decided by fraud, but margin of loss and candidate race do not†

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Abstract

Which factors cause citizens to think that an election was determined by fraud? Fraud beliefs have been shown to be more common among supporters of losing candidates. In the current U.S. context, fraud beliefs are also higher among Republicans than Democrats. However, we know less about the roles of electoral margin and candidate race. Beliefs that candidates won due to fraud might be more likely in closely contested elections, where small shifts in vote share could be decisive, or when non-white candidates defeat white candidates given perceived associations between race and crime or corruption. We examine these questions with a unique survey in which a nationally representative sample ($n = 2,896$) reported their beliefs about the legitimacy of a random subset of 2022 U.S. House election outcomes. Our results indicate that Republican participants are far more likely than are Democrats to believe that House election results were determined by fraud, and that the partisan gap is larger for contests the GOP candidate lost. However, we do not find convincing evidence that these perceptions were driven by the margin by which the losing candidate was defeated or the apparent race of the candidates. These results suggest that party is the dominant factor in perceptions of election legitimacy, trumping losing vote margin and candidate race.

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Widespread belief in voter and election fraud can undermine confidence in elections (Berlinski et al. 2023; Gilbert 2015) and threatens the losers' consent that is an essential component of democratic legitimacy. These concerns are especially acute in the United States. Though voter and election fraud have repeatedly been found to be extremely rare and unlikely to affect results in American elections (Ahlquist, Mayer, and Jackman 2014; Ansolabehere, Luks, and Schaffner 2015; Levitt 2007; Lorraine 2010), the public still believes fraud is widespread (Ansolabehere and Persily 2007; AP-NORC 2016; Bright Line Watch 2022).

Supporters of both major parties are susceptible to misperceptions about fraud, especially when their preferred candidate loses or performs poorly (Beaulieu 2014; Levy 2021). For instance, fraud perceptions were more prevalent among Democrats than Republicans after Al Gore's defeat in the 2000 U.S. presidential election (Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn 2008; Atkeson and Saunders 2007). More recently, however, Donald Trump and his Republican allies have engaged in an unprecedented campaign of baseless claims of electoral fraud. As a result, Republicans are far more likely to believe fraud is prevalent and that Joe Biden was not the rightful winner of the 2020 presidential election (Bright Line Watch 2022, 2023).

Most research has examined beliefs about the general existence of voter fraud (e.g., Pennycook and Rand 2021). Studies that have investigated fraud perceptions in real elections have tended to focus on high-profile contests, most often presidential (Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn 2008, but see Alvarez, Cao, and Li 2021 and Atkeson and Saunders 2007). Concerns about voter fraud may extend to lower-profile elections given that voters express a lack of confidence in the entire electoral system (Berlinski et al. 2023). Although research has examined perceptions of fraud in fictionalized scenarios, there is little systematic evidence examining real elections (Beaulieu 2014). Understanding the determinants of the belief that elections were wrongfully decided due to fraud is thus a pressing concern.

We focus on three key factors: who wins or loses the election, the margin of victory, and the race or ethnicity of winning and losing candidates. Winning or losing is widely recognized to shape election confidence and, specifically, beliefs about fraud in a given contest (Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Clarke and Acock 1989; Ginsberg and Weissberg 1978; Maldonado and Seligson 2014; Sinclair, Smith, and Tucker 2018). Our focus on margin of victory and candidate race

is based on prior research suggesting these factors may affect perceptions of voter fraud. The relationship between vote margin and perceptions of voter fraud is not well understood. Closely contested national elections have provoked widespread concerns about election integrity in the U.S. and abroad (Hasen 2012; Idrobo, Kronick, and Rodríguez 2022), suggesting that voters may be more suspicious that fraud was decisive when margins are narrow. Resentment toward racial minorities is associated with perceptions of voter fraud and electoral unfairness (Udani and Kimball 2015; Wilson and King-Meadows 2016), a relationship that was found to be stronger when Barack Obama was on the ballot (Appleby and Federico 2018). However, research has yet to directly test the association between a winning candidate's race and perceptions of voter fraud. Our design allows us to consider margin of victory and (with caveats) the role of candidate race perceptions in addition to who won and who lost the election.

To examine which contextual and individual-level factors are associated with perceptions of voter fraud, we conducted a nationally representative survey after the 2022 election. Our novel survey task provided respondents with the names of both major-party candidates, their state and district, their partisan affiliations, and the share of the two-party vote they received from a random subset of 2022 House of Representatives elections. Participants were then asked to report whether they thought the victorious candidate was the rightful winner or won due to voter fraud. We analyze how partisanship, margin of victory, and putative candidate race affect these reported perceptions of voter fraud. We also examine how the associations between these characteristics and perceptions of fraud vary by partisan affiliation.

Our results indicate that concerns about voter and election fraud in congressional elections are widespread among Republicans but not among Democrats. Republicans were also more likely to report believing a House contest was decided by fraud when their co-partisan lost. However, we find no strong evidence that the margin by which co-partisan candidates won or lost affected perceptions that House elections were decided by fraud. In addition, despite the often racialized nature of fraud claims, the races of the candidates were not significantly associated with perceptions that election outcomes were decided by fraud. In sum, our results reveal a clear difference between Republicans and Democrats in perceptions of fraud in the 2022 U.S. House elections that is primarily driven by

partisan alignment with the winner, not the vote margin or the races of the candidates.

Theoretical expectations

Previous studies across a range of contexts find evidence of a “winner’s effect” in which co-partisans of victorious parties and candidates express greater satisfaction with democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997), greater confidence in the electoral process (Levy 2021), and less concern about election fraud (Barnes and Beaulieu 2019; Beaulieu 2014; Llewellyn, Hall, and Alvarez 2009) than do out-partisans of winning candidates. Cantú and García-Ponce (2015) find a symmetric effect for electoral defeats — Mexican voters expressed increased fraud beliefs after learning that their party’s candidate had lost. We therefore expect that perceptions of fraud will be higher when the winner is an out-partisan rather than a co-partisan.

In the context of the U.S. 2022 midterm elections, we also expect higher perceptions of fraud among Republicans than among Democrats. Democratic beliefs in fraud have exceeded Republican beliefs in some periods, such as after John Kerry’s loss to George W. Bush in the 2004 presidential election (ABC News 2004; Guskin and Clement 2016; Weiss 2020), and partisan trust in election integrity was approximately equal as recently as the eve of the 2020 election (Bright Line Watch 2020). But since Biden’s victory in 2020, trust in American elections has diverged sharply by party, with Republicans expressing far greater levels of fraud belief than Democrats (Bright Line Watch 2022, 2023; Pennycook and Rand 2021). Moreover, repeated election losses further diminish confidence in election legitimacy (Daniller and Mutz 2019). Republicans won back the House in 2022 but performed below expectations in the 2022 midterms, failing to recapture the Senate (FiveThirtyEight 2022; Sabato, Kondik, and Coleman 2022). In the wake of the 2020 presidential loss, that outcome might further amplify perceptions of fraud among Republicans relative to Democrats.

We also test whether, conditional on losing, vote margins systematically affect fraud perceptions. Prominent examples of close elections, such as the presidential contests in the United States in 2000 and in Bolivia in 2019, have generated widespread concern about election integrity (Hasen 2012; Idrobo, Kronick, and Rodríguez 2022). Persily and Stewart III (2021) show a striking relationship between the Biden-Trump vote margin in 2020 and state-level confidence in election integrity among

Republicans. Not only was GOP confidence lower in states Trump lost, but Republicans were least confident in the states he lost most narrowly (that is, where, conditional on losing, his vote share was highest). In states Trump won, by contrast, the relationship between his vote share and his supporters' election confidence was the reverse, with confidence rising as vote share increased. No such pattern was evident among Democrats.

Why might narrow losses encourage perceptions of voter fraud? We do not expect respondents to have clear expectations about likely vote margins in U.S. House elections, but we expect people to be more suspicious that races were decided by fraud when margins are narrow. First, it is of course mathematically true that fraud is more likely to be decisive when margins are narrow. Second, Americans have recently been exposed to losing candidates challenging results in close elections based on allegations of fraud. Close contests motivate candidates to use all available methods to try to win, including legal action or public statements questioning the outcome (Grimmer et al. 2011; Hasen 2012). We therefore expect that perceptions of fraud among partisans will be highest in elections that their party loses narrowly.

We also consider how the race of winning and losing candidates relates to perceptions of fraud. Americans who are most likely to believe fraud occurs tend to hold negative attitudes toward African Americans and immigrants (Udani and Kimball 2015; Wilson and King-Meadows 2016). Some studies indicate that Barack Obama's identity as an African American contributed to concerns about fraud in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections (Appleby and Federico 2018; Wilson and King-Meadows 2016). A related line of research finds that negative racial attitudes contribute to support for restrictive voting policies, which have been endorsed as a means to address perceived threats to electoral integrity (Bentele and O'Brien 2013; Wilson and Brewer 2013). Morris and Shapiro (n.d.) show both an association between racial resentment and belief in fraud *and* experimental evidence that white Americans are more likely to accept accusations of fraud when Black election officials were in charge. Given the consistent pattern between negative racial attitudes and beliefs about elections and this experimental evidence (Morris and Shapiro n.d.), the extent to which nonwhite candidates may increase beliefs in fraud remains an important open question. We use our data to investigate the extent to which candidate race changes how people perceive the prevalence of fraud in individual, real-world elections.

Specifically, we examine whether a nonwhite candidate being on the ballot affects these beliefs about whether the outcome of that particular contest was due to fraud.

Methods

Respondent characteristics

We designed a survey to analyze how co-partisan vote margin and putative candidate race relate to perceptions of voter fraud. Our data come from the second wave of a multi-wave panel study examining perceptions of voter fraud in the U.S. A total of 2,896 U.S. adults recruited by YouGov completed the survey from December 7–20, 2022. Our sample was 51.8% female, 63.6% white, and 19.6% college-educated (four-year college degree). 47.1% identified with or leaned toward the Democratic Party, 35.6% identified with or leaned toward the Republican Party, and 15.7% did not identify with or lean toward either party. Observations were weighted to ensure that the sample was representative.

Measurement approach and outcome variable

To capture perceptions of fraud at the district level, we randomly assigned respondents to answer one question about each of six specific contests from the 2022 U.S. House of Representatives elections. House election data including candidate names, state, district, and vote totals were drawn from the November 22, 2022 results feed from the Associated Press to Politico. Participants were shown information about randomly selected House races that included both a Republican and Democratic candidate.¹ In each trial, the respondent was given the state and district number, the names and party affiliations of the Democratic and Republican candidates, the share of the vote that each received, and the party and name of the winning candidate.² We provided the share of the major party vote as

¹We exclude data on seven elections from our analysis due to errors in the Associated Press dataset, leaving us with data from 374 elections; see Online Appendix B for exclusion criteria.

²At the time of fielding, the losing Republican gubernatorial candidate in Arizona (Kari Lake) was blaming her loss on election fraud in conservative parts of Maricopa County. All respondents were thus randomly assigned one trial from an Arizona district (out of seven possible); the other trials were randomly assigned from the other elections. Our survey also included an experiment prior to these six trials in which some respondents were randomly assigned to receive corrections concerning Lake's false claims about voter fraud; all models control for treatment assignment in this experiment.

opposed to the share of the total vote to maximize clarity for respondents.³

We regard the limited information provided about each race to be a feature of our research design. Voters typically know relatively little about congressional candidates even in their own districts when casting votes (Carson and Jacobson 2023). They may be presented with claims about fraud in other electoral contexts where they may know even less about candidates and context. However, people infer race/ethnicity from names and other contextual information (DeSante 2013; Kaufman, Celaya, and Grumbach n.d.) — in this case, state and partisanship. We therefore infer that respondents form immediate perceptions of candidates based on available information just as they form top-of-head judgments based on available considerations when answering survey questions (Zaller 1992). (Of course, providing more or different information could affect the content or accuracy of these inferences; we discuss these points further in the conclusion.)

Following the treatment respondents were asked “do you think [winning candidate name] was the rightful winner or instead won due to voter fraud?” Respondents chose a binary response from either “rightful winner” or “won due to fraud.”⁴ Figure 1 provides an example of the full question format.

Figure 1: Example survey question measuring perceptions of fraud in House elections

In Congressional district 20 in Texas, the Democratic candidate Joaquin Castro got 68% of the major-party vote and the Republican candidate Kyle Sinclair got 32% of the major-party vote. Do you think Democratic candidate Joaquin Castro was the rightful winner or instead won due to voter fraud?

- Rightful winner
- Won due to voter fraud

³At the time, there were twelve elections in which the rounded share of the major party vote was 50% for each candidate but one candidate had been declared the winner. In these cases, the question listed both candidates as receiving 50% of the major-party vote but indicated which one won.

⁴Given this design, it was not possible to consider other theoretically relevant factors that may affect perceptions of fraud such as voting method (Beaulieu 2016; Llewellyn, Hall, and Alvarez 2009), voter identification laws (Stewart III, Ansolabehere, and Persily 2016), or media coverage (Fogarty, Kimball, and Kosnik 2022).

Explanatory variables

Given our interest in the effects of co-partisan vote margin on fraud perceptions, we first determine whether the candidate from the party supported by the respondent (i.e., the co-partisan candidate) won or lost the election in question. Independents who do not lean toward either party were thus excluded from all analyses. We then separately divide the co-partisan winner and loser categories into quintiles by vote margin. This approach allows us to examine not only how winning and losing affects perceptions of fraud, but also how the vote margin affects those perceptions.

We also coded candidate race/ethnicity in order to (imperfectly) assess whether there are clear patterns of racialized fraud beliefs that would be consistent with previous research. We coded candidate race/ethnicity at the analysis stage rather than providing respondents with explicit information about race and ethnicity at the data collection stage. A key feature of our research design is that participants make fraud assessments based on real candidates and election results. This should enhance external validity but it also sets our research design apart from experimental studies that supply participants with names of fictitious politicians (or other actors) drawn from lists that are curated to convey race/ethnicity and socioeconomic class status (Crabtree et al. 2023; Gaddis 2017). Ultimately, interpretation of the effects of race/ethnicity in our analyses depends on how accurately respondents infer these from the information we provide.

In coding candidate race/ethnicity, we began with data on the demographics of the 117th House from the U.S. House of Representatives Press Gallery (for incumbents) and the Rutgers Center for American Women and Politics Congressional Women Candidates Database (for women challengers). These self-reported data allowed us to code all incumbents and women challengers (453 out of 748 candidates) as white, Black, Asian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic/Latino, or Native American. We then used the R package `wru` (version 1.0.1) to predict the race of the remaining 295 men challengers, using first name, last name, and county to predict the probability that a person is white and non-Hispanic or not (Imai and Khanna 2016; Khanna et al. 2022). Our binary classification was 86% accurate overall, including 93% accuracy for white candidates and 70% for non-white candidates.⁵ All candidates are

⁵We established accuracy rates by applying the classification to the set of candidates for whom we had self-reported race/ethnicity. For assigning race from the `wru` package, we chose .539 as the cutoff that maximized correct predictions where we had a definitive measure of candidate race/ethnicity (for incumbents and female challengers).

thus coded as either white non-Hispanic (referred to hereafter as “white”) or non-white. As mentioned above, we did not explicitly provide respondents with information on candidate race or ethnicity or ask about it directly, relying instead on respondents’ inferences about race from the information provided. The use of names to signal race/ethnicity is well established (Broockman 2013; Butler and Homola 2017; DeSante 2013), and recent scholarship demonstrates improvements to accuracy of inferences about race/ethnicity when names are supplemented with additional information (Kaufman, Celaya, and Grumbach n.d.).

Analytical strategy

Our analyses are conducted at the respondent-election level, where each of the six responses provided by a respondent represents a separate observation. We have 14,587 observations after excluding 260 observations from our analysis due to errors in the Associated Press dataset as well as the 2,529 observations provided by self-identified independents (as mentioned above).

All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered by respondent (corresponding logit models are reported in Online Appendix B; see Tables B3–B4 and B7–B8). Each model includes indicators for co-partisan loss or win margin quintile, which we express in negative or positive terms, respectively. The excluded reference category in our regressions is the co-partisan victories with the narrowest margins (0–10 percentage points). There are thus nine indicator variables describing the vote margin: five quintile indicators for co-partisan losses from the narrowest to the largest margins and four for co-partisan wins. We also include separate indicators for elections in which a nonwhite candidate won and ones in which a white candidate lost. We report a second model in which the nonwhite winner and white loser variables are interacted to determine if the effect of the nonwhite candidate winning varies depending on the loser’s race/ethnicity (that is, if a nonwhite winner defeats a white opponent rather than a nonwhite opponent). Finally, all models include respondent state fixed effects and controls for education, gender, age, and race as well as treatment status in an experiment included in the same survey.

Results

We present descriptive data on perceptions that House elections were won due to fraud for each party in Figure 2. As the figure demonstrates, Democrats rarely attributed the outcomes of 2022 House elections to fraud regardless of the winner, co-partisan vote margin, or the race of the winning candidate. We observe higher levels of attributions of House election outcomes to fraud overall among Republicans. This pattern is especially evident when GOP candidates lose. The effect of vote margin and race/ethnicity of the winning candidate is less clear visually and thus investigated statistically below. Based on these data, we disaggregate all subsequent analyses by party, estimating separate models in the main text and reporting pooled models with interaction terms in Online Appendix B.

Table 1 reports our main results. Indicators for vote margin quintiles are listed from largest co-partisan losses to the largest wins in number line order with wins by the narrowest margins as the reference category. Among Democrats, we find no co-partisan loser effect; coefficient estimates for fraud beliefs never reach significance for co-partisan losses in any vote margin quintile.⁶ Among Republican respondents, by contrast, we find support for the expectation that losses induce greater fraud beliefs than wins. Compared with the cases in which a co-partisan narrowly won, Republicans were much more likely to indicate that House elections were decided by fraud when co-partisans lost at every vote margin quintile (estimates of 0.13–0.22; $p < .005$ in each case).


We also expected fraud perceptions to increase as the vote margin narrows for defeated co-partisans. We test for this effect statistically by computing the differences in coefficients for all possible pairwise combinations of the co-partisan loss and win quintile indicators, adjusting p -values to control the false discovery rate (Benjamini and Yekutieli 2001). After adjustment, none of the comparisons among co-partisan loss quintiles reaches statistical significance.⁷

We observe some evidence that larger winning vote margins affect perceptions that House elections were decided by fraud among Republicans. Even after we control for the false discovery rate on comparisons among vote margin quintiles, we find that Republicans perceive less fraud for the largest

⁶We do not find a co-partisan loser effect among Democrats even when we do not condition on margin and simply compare losers and winners; see Table B9.

⁷Without controlling the false discovery rate, there is a significant difference between the narrowest loss quintile and the largest loss quintile (0.09, $p < .05$).

Figure 2: Perceived voter fraud by vote margin and winning candidate race/ethnicity



Plot presents the proportion of respondents who indicated that a 2022 House election was won due to voter fraud for House elections with two major-party candidates. Estimates reported for survey respondents who identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party or Republican Party. Vote margins are expressed as the share of the major party vote in percentage points for the party with which the respondent identifies (from +100 to -100). Candidates were classified as white or nonwhite (Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, or Other/Mixed) using predictions from `wru` based on first name, last name, and county (Imai and Khanna 2016; Khanna et al. 2022).

quintile wins (45 to 81 percentage points) versus both those in the third quintile (21 to 30 percentage points; $p < .05$) and the excluded reference category of narrowest quintile wins (0 to 10 percentage points; $p < .05$). We do not find similar results for comparisons with co-partisan win quintiles 2 and 4, however, and thus regard these findings as suggestive.

Finally, we also test whether respondents are more likely to indicate that House elections were decided by fraud when non-white candidates win. We do not find evidence to support this expectation. Table 1 reports results from two models for each partisan group. The first includes variables indicating whether the winner of a given race was non-white and whether the loser was white; the second adds the interaction of those variables to test if the effect of a non-white candidate winning on fraud perceptions is greater if they defeat a white candidate. We find no measurable evidence to support these expectations for Democrats or Republicans using either model specification. These results hold when we subset our analyses to white respondents; see Tables B5–B8 in Online Appendix B. Fraud perceptions do not appear to be affected by the putative racial identities of winning and losing candidates in the House elections we examined.

Conclusion

This study presents new evidence about how partisanship, election vote margin, and candidate race/ethnicity affect perceptions that elections were decided by fraud. Using a nationally representative sample, we analyze survey data collected after the 2022 U.S. midterm elections. Our results indicate that Republicans are more likely than Democrats to believe voter fraud determined election outcomes overall and especially when Democrats won. However, we do not find convincing evidence that these beliefs are affected by the vote margin or the race/ethnicity of the winning and losing candidates.

Our study has several limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, our measure of fraud perceptions was relatively stringent—we asked respondents whether they believed fraud determined the election winner, not about the prevalence of fraud generally. Second, we had to predict the race of challenger candidates who were men, for whom self-reported candidate demographic data were not available. Where we had ground truth data, our approach successfully classified 86% of incumbents and women challengers overall (including 93% of white candidates and 70% of non-white

Table 1: Predictors of belief that House elections were decided by fraud

	Democrats	Democrats	Republicans	Republicans
Co-partisan loss margins				
Largest quintile (-81 to -39 p.p.)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Quintile 4 (-38 to -30 p.p.)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)
Quintile 3 (-29 to -20 p.p.)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)
Quintile 2 (-19 to -9 p.p.)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)
Narrowest quintile (-8 to 0 p.p.)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.22*** (0.04)
Co-partisan win margins				
Narrowest quintile (0 to 10 p.p.)	reference category			
Quintile 2 (11 to 20 p.p.)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)
Quintile 3 (21 to 30 p.p.)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Quintile 4 (31 to 44 p.p.)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Largest quintile (45 to 81 p.p.)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)
Nonwhite winner	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
White loser	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Nonwhite winner × white loser		0.00 (0.02)		0.05 (0.04)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Respondent state fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
N (House elections evaluated)	9237	9237	5350	5350
N (respondents)	1563	1563	906	906

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. OLS coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. Outcome variable takes the value of 1 if a respondent said the outcome of a 2022 House election with two major-party candidates was won due to voter fraud and 0 if they said the victor was the rightful winner. Estimates reported for survey respondents who identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party or Republican Party. Vote margins are expressed in the table as the share of the major party vote in percentage points for the party with which the respondent identifies (from +100 to -100). Candidates were classified as white or nonwhite (Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, or Other/Mixed) using predictions from `wru` based on first name, last name, and county (Imai and Khanna 2016; Khanna et al. 2022). Control variables are gender, birth year, treatment status in a prior survey wave, education level, and respondent race (see full results in Table B1). See Online Appendix A for question wording.

candidates). More generally, using real election outcomes maximizes external validity, but at the cost of not having experimental control. Future research should consider designs that randomize candidate race in hypothetical elections or that provide more information about candidates (such as pictures as recommended by Kaufman, Celaya, and Grumbach n.d.).

Third, our study assumes that participants can correctly infer candidate race/ethnicity from the information we provide. One interpretation of these results is that people correctly infer race/ethnicity and that this information is not associated with fraud perceptions. However, the accuracy of these inferences may vary, which could help explain our null results.⁸ Recent evidence suggests that supplementary information beyond names can improve the accuracy of statistical inferences about race/ethnicity (Kaufman, Celaya, and Grumbach n.d.). However, whether party, state, district, and election result provide helpful and accurate cues about candidate race/ethnicity remains an open question given the public's skewed perceptions of the demographics of party adherents (Ahler and Sood 2018). Future work should test the effects of the specific pieces of information we provided on perceptions of candidate race/ethnicity.

Despite these limitations, we advance scholarship on election fraud beliefs by using a large sample of real election results to test perceptions that elections were decided by fraud. We confirm that fraud beliefs are currently far higher among Republicans than Democrats and that fraud beliefs are much higher among Republicans when their candidates lose elections. However, we do not find evidence that vote margin affects beliefs that election outcomes were determined by fraud. While prior research has found evidence that fraud beliefs may be affected by racial animus, our results find that candidate race/ethnicity may not matter.

⁸A particular concern is the possibility that racialized beliefs about fraud *cause* Republicans to incorrectly infer winning Democratic candidates are nonwhite. However, the null results we find suggest that this outcome is not common.

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Online Appendix A: Survey questionnaire

Consent

ABOUT THIS RESEARCH

You are being asked to participate in a research study. Scientists do research to answer questions and learn new information. Some research might help change or improve the way we do things in the future. This consent information will tell you more about the study to help you decide whether you want to participate. Please read this information before agreeing to be in the study.

TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY IS VOLUNTARY

You may choose not to take part in the study or may choose to leave the study at any time. Deciding not to participate, or deciding to leave the study later, will not result in any penalty and will not affect your relationship with YouGov, the University of Notre Dame, Dartmouth College, or the University of Exeter.

As an alternative to participating in the study, you may choose not to take part.

WHY IS THIS STUDY BEING DONE?

The purpose of this study is to learn more about public opinion on U.S. elections and issues in the news.

You were selected as a possible participant because you are an adult American citizen participating in YouGov's survey panel pool. Additionally, you may have agreed to participate in YouGov's Pulse program.

The study is being conducted by Brian Fogarty from the Center for Social Science Research at the University of Notre Dame, Jason Reifler from the Department of Politics at the University of Exeter, and John Carey and Brendan Nyhan from the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. It is funded by the MIT Election Data and Science Lab.

HOW MANY PEOPLE WILL TAKE PART?

If you agree to participate, you will be one of 3,750 participants taking part in this study.

WHAT WILL HAPPEN DURING THE STUDY?

If you agree to be in the study, you will be asked to do the following things:

- Completion of a short survey on YouGov's website or app. The survey is anticipated to take less than 20 minutes to complete.
- Possibly, completion of a short follow-up survey approximately one month from now on YouGov's website or app. The follow-up survey is anticipated to take less than 20 minutes to complete.
- If you have agreed to participate in YouGov's Pulse program, anonymous tracking data on your online website visits may be used by the researchers. However, there are no actions you need to take related to YouGov Pulse and this study.

WHAT ARE THE RISKS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY?

While participating in the study, the potential risks include:

- A risk of completing the survey is being uncomfortable answering the questions.
- To minimize this potential risk, you can skip any questions that you feel uncomfortable answering.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY?

We don't expect you to receive any benefit from taking part in this study, but we hope to learn things that will help scientists in the future.

HOW WILL MY INFORMATION BE PROTECTED?

Efforts will be made to keep your personal information confidential. We cannot guarantee absolute confidentiality. Your personal information may be disclosed if required by law. No information which could identify you will be shared in publications about this study and databases in which results may be stored.

Organizations that may inspect and/or copy your research records for quality assurance and data analysis include groups such as the study investigator and his/her research associates, the University of Notre Dame Institutional Review Board or its designees, and (as allowed by law) state or federal agencies, especially the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), who may need to access the research records.

WILL MY INFORMATION BE USED FOR RESEARCH IN THE FUTURE?

Your information will not be used or distributed for future research studies.

WILL I BE PAID FOR PARTICIPATION?

You will receive 2500 points for completing each survey.

YouGov does not allow for prorated compensation. In the event of an incomplete survey, you will not receive any points.

WHO SHOULD I CALL WITH QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS?

For questions about the study, contact the researcher, Brendan Nyhan at nyhan@dartmouth.edu.

PARTICIPANT'S CONSENT

In consideration of all of the above, I give my consent to participate in this research study. By proceeding, I confirm that I am 18 years old, and agree to take part in this study.

- I agree to take this survey
- Take me to another survey

When it comes to politics, would you describe yourself as liberal, conservative, or neither liberal nor conservative?

- Very liberal
- Somewhat liberal
- Slightly liberal
- Moderate; middle of the road
- Slightly conservative
- Somewhat conservative

-Very conservative

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?

- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent
- Other (open text)
- Not sure

Strong Democrat

Not very strong Democrat

Strong Republican

Not very strong Republican

The Democratic Party

The Republican Party

Neither

Not sure

In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time.

Which of the following statements best describes you?

I did not vote in the election this November

I thought about voting this time, but didn't

I usually vote, but didn't this time

I am sure I voted

Generally, how interested are you in politics?

Extremely interested

Very interested

Somewhat interested

Not very interested

Not at all interested

Do you approve or disapprove of the way Joe Biden is handling his job as President?

-Strongly approve

-Somewhat approve

-Somewhat disapprove

-Strongly disapprove

We would like to get your feelings toward some people, groups, and countries who are in the news these days using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person, group, or country. Ratings between

0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the person or institution and that you don't care too much for that person, group, or country. You would rate them at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward that person, group, or country. If we come to a person or institution whose name you don't recognize, you don't need to rate them.

Election officials
White people
Black people
The news media
Joe Biden
Donald Trump
Republican Party
Democratic Party

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement below.

- By law, abortion should never be permitted.
- In order to reduce the budget deficit, the federal government should eliminate all welfare programs that help poor people.
- The federal government should raise the minimum wage to \$10.
- The federal government should guarantee health insurance for all citizens.
- The federal government should pass new rules that protect the right of workers to join labor unions.
- Thomas Jefferson was the 43rd president of the United States.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

In November 2020, elections were held for 435 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives and 35 seats in the U.S. Senate. In how many of these elections do you think the winning candidate was not the rightful winner but instead won due to voter fraud?

- None
- One or two
- Three to nine
- Ten or more

In November 2022, elections were held for 435 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives and 34 seats in the U.S. Senate. In how many of these elections do you think the winning candidate was not the rightful winner but instead won due to voter fraud?

- None
- One or two
- Three to nine
- Ten or more

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement below.

- People convicted of murder should be given the death penalty.
- The leader of the American government is the prime minister.
- Gays and lesbians should have the right to legally marry.
- In order to reduce the budget deficit, the federal government should raise taxes -on people that make more than \$250,000 per year.
- The Affordable Care Act passed by Congress in 2010 should be repealed.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

Now we'd like to ask you about the election that took place in November 2020 for the presidency, U.S. Congress, and other offices.

How confident are you that your vote was counted as you intended in the 2020 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

How confident are you that votes in your local area were counted as voters intended in the 2020 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

How confident are you that votes in your state were counted as voters intended in the 2020 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

How confident are you that votes nationwide were counted as voters intended in the 2020 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

Do you consider Joe Biden to be the rightful winner of the 2020 election or not the rightful winner?

- Definitely the rightful winner
- Probably the rightful winner

- Probably not the rightful winner
- Definitely not the rightful winner

To the best of your knowledge, how often did each of these occur in the 2020 presidential election?

- Voting more than once in an election.
- Stealing or tampering with ballots.
- Pretending to be someone else when voting.
- People voting who are not U.S. citizens.
- Voting with an absentee ballot intended for another person.
- Officials preventing absentee voters from voting.

- A million or more
- Hundreds of thousands
- Tens of thousands
- Thousands
- Hundreds
- Less than a hundred
- Less than ten

Now we would like to ask you about the elections that took place in November 2022 for the U.S. Congress and other offices.

How confident are you that your vote was counted as you intended in the November 2022 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

How confident are you that votes in your local area were counted as voters intended in the November 2022 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

How confident are you that votes in your state were counted as voters intended in the November 2022 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

How confident are you that votes nationwide were counted as voters intended in the November 2022 election?

- Very confident

- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

To the best of your knowledge, which of these states has had a losing candidate for governor refuse to accept the results of the 2022 election?

- Arizona
- Michigan
- Nevada
- New Hampshire
- Pennsylvania
- Wisconsin

[new page]

[correction treatment; p=.5]

Fact check: False claims of broken Arizona voting machines only in Republican areas

Associated Press

A printing malfunction at about one-quarter of the polling places across Arizona's most populous county gave rise to false claims by former President Donald Trump, Arizona Republican gubernatorial candidate Kari Lake, and social media users suggesting that the problems only affected sites in conservative parts of the county.

In reality, voting centers across Maricopa County reported printing issues that stopped some ballots from being counted onsite, including in Democrat-leaning areas, like downtown Phoenix and Tempe.

"We came right down into the heart of liberal Phoenix to vote because we wanted to make sure that we had good machines," Lake said during a press gaggle. "And guess what? They've had zero problems with their machines today."

Trump wrote on Truth Social in reference to the voting snag, "Only Republican areas? WOW!"

Such claims also spread independently on social media, with one Instagram user sharing an image that featured the text, "Funny how in Arizona the voting machines 'stopped working' in predominantly REPUBLICAN areas."

However, the claim that only voting sites in conservative areas in Arizona's Maricopa County experienced issues with tabulating ballots on Election Day is false. Voting centers in both liberal and conservative parts of Maricopa County were impacted by the printing issues, according to the Maricopa County Elections Department.

Technicians were dispatched to all sites where there were printing issues, a county elections official wrote in an email, including sites in Glendale, Phoenix, and Tempe, which all skew toward Democrats.

"It is simply untrue that the voting centers that were impacted are only in Republican areas," said Paul Bentz, a Republican pollster. "There are certainly some Republican areas impacted, but there are a significant number of Democratic-leaning areas as well as a number of swing areas or very competitive areas."

[new page]

According to the article you just read, which of the following happened on Election Day?

- Absentee mail delivery problems in Arizona
- Ballot printing and tabulation problems in Arizona
- Absentee mail delivery problems in Georgia
- Ballot printing and tabulation problems in Georgia
- Absentee mail delivery problems in Ohio
- Ballot printing and tabulation problems in Ohio

[repeat up to three times if not answered correctly]

[new page]

[placebo condition; p=.5]

What do you need for birdwatching?

By Bill Thompson III

The most basic equipment required for bird watching is your eyes, though you will soon need to have more items with you if you intend to make this a pastime or serious hobby. How far you go is a matter of taste and budget.

The most useful thing that you can carry is a notepad and pencil. Use this to make a note of location, time, date, weather and habitat. Do a list of the birds that you see and know. Do a drawing or write down a description of those that you don't. You can look them up later in your field guide. Your notebook should become a diary of where you have been and what you have seen.

A field guide is a book that provides descriptions of birds to assist you in their identification. The descriptions use several factors to help you determine the exact bird that you are looking at. As soon as you see a bird that you do not recognize you will need to have access to a good field guide. There are many to choose from.

Binoculars. These are pretty essential and buy the best that you can afford. A good pair well looked after will last you a lifetime. Take time to choose ones that suit you.

[new page]

According to the article you just read, which of the following is "pretty essential" for birdwatching?

-Hat

- Map
- Binoculars
- Camera

Now we would like to again ask you about the elections that took place in November 2022 for the U.S. Congress and other offices.

How confident are you that your vote was counted as you intended in the November 2022 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

How confident are you that votes in your local area were counted as voters intended in the November 2022 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

How confident are you that votes in your state were counted as voters intended in the November 2022 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

How confident are you that votes nationwide were counted as voters intended in the November 2022 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

How confident are you that votes in Arizona have been counted as voters intended in the November 2022 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

On Election Day 2022, a printing malfunction took place at about one-quarter of the polling places in Maricopa County, the most populous county in Arizona. This problem stopped some ballots from being counted onsite.

Please indicate whether you believe the following statement is accurate or not:

Only voting sites in conservative areas in Arizona's Maricopa County experienced issues with tabulating ballots on Election Day 2022.

- Very accurate
- Somewhat accurate
- Not very accurate
- Not at all accurate

Please state whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:

In the election for Arizona governor, Katie Hobbs, the Democrat, defeated Kari Lake, the Republican, due to election fraud and therefore is NOT the rightful winner.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

In November 2022, elections were held for 435 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives and 34 seats in the U.S. Senate. In how many of these elections do you think the winning candidate was not the rightful winner but instead won due to voter fraud?

- None
- One or two
- Three to nine
- Ten or more

You said that the results of [answer from prior question] elections for the U.S. House and Senate in 2022 were changed by voter fraud. Please explain why you believe this to be true.

[repeated six times; drawn with uniform probability from set of districts contested by two major party candidates]

In Congressional district [number] in [state], the Democratic candidate [name] got [share] of the major-party vote and the Republican candidate [name] got [share] of the major-party vote. Do you think [winning party] candidate [winning candidate name] was the rightful winner or instead won due to voter fraud?

- Rightful winner
- Won due to voter fraud

Now we'd like to again ask you about the election that took place in November 2020 for the presidency, U.S. Congress, and other offices.

How confident are you that your vote was counted as you intended in the 2020 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident

-Not at all confident

How confident are you that votes in your local area were counted as voters intended in the 2020 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

How confident are you that votes in your state were counted as voters intended in the 2020 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

How confident are you that votes nationwide were counted as voters intended in the 2020 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

Do you consider Joe Biden to be the rightful winner of the 2020 election or not the rightful winner?

- Definitely the rightful winner
- Probably the rightful winner
- Probably not the rightful winner
- Definitely not the rightful winner

To the best of your knowledge, how often did each of these occur in the 2020 presidential election?

- Voting more than once in an election.
- Stealing or tampering with ballots.
- Pretending to be someone else when voting.
- People voting who are not U.S. citizens.
- Voting with an absentee ballot intended for another person.
- Officials preventing absentee voters from voting.

- A million or more
- Hundreds of thousands
- Tens of thousands
- Thousands
- Hundreds
- Less than a hundred
- Less than ten

In November 2020, elections were held for 435 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives and 35 seats in the U.S. Senate. In how many of these elections do you think the winning candidate was not the

rightful winner but instead won due to voter fraud?

- None
- One or two
- Three to nine
- Ten or more

[asked if One or two, Three to nine, or Ten or more selected]

You said you think that the results of [one or two/three to nine/ten or more elections] for the U.S. House and Senate in 2020 were changed by voter fraud. Please explain why you believe this to be true.

We sometimes find people don't always take surveys seriously, instead providing humorous or insincere responses to questions. How often do you do this?

- Never
- Rarely
- Some of the time
- Most of the time
- Always

It is essential for the validity of this study that we know whether participants looked up any information online during the study. Did you make an effort to look up information during the study? Please be honest; you will not be penalized in any way if you did.

- Yes, I looked up information
- No, I did not look up information

Thank you for answering these questions. This research is not intended to support or oppose any political candidate or office. The research has no affiliation with any political candidate or campaign and has received no financial support from any political candidate or campaign. Should you have any questions about this study, please contact Brendan Nyhan at nyhan@dartmouth.edu.

Online Appendix B: Additional results

Exclusion criteria

Observations were excluded from the data if the Associated Press data used in the experiment listed the wrong candidate and/or state. In total, data on seven House elections were excluded:

- Herschel Walker (not House candidate, wrong state)
- Matt Cartwright (wrong state)
- Deidre DeJear (not House candidate, wrong state)
- Michael Franken (not House candidate, wrong state)
- Chuck Grassley (not House candidate, wrong state)
- Val Almonord (wrong state)
- Terry Namkung (wrong state)

Additional results

Table B1: Full model results of Table 1

	Democrats	Democrats	Republicans	Republicans
Co-partisan loss margins				
Largest quintile (-81 to -39 p.p.)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Quintile 4 (-38 to -30 p.p.)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)
Quintile 3 (-29 to -20 p.p.)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)
Quintile 2 (-19 to -9 p.p.)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)
Narrowest quintile (-8 to 0 p.p.)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.22*** (0.04)
Co-partisan win margins				
Narrowest quintile (0 to 10 p.p.)	reference category			
Quintile 2 (11 to 20 p.p.)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)
Quintile 3 (21 to 30 p.p.)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Quintile 4 (31 to 44 p.p.)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Largest quintile (45 to 81 p.p.)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)
Nonwhite winner	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
White loser	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Nonwhite winner × white loser		0.00 (0.02)		0.05 (0.04)
Male	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Treatment	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Education: 4-year	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Education: HS grad	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Education: No HS	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.16 (0.08)	0.16 (0.08)
Education: Post-grad	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Education: Some college	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
Race: Black	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.07 (0.12)	0.07 (0.12)
Race: Hispanic	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)
Race: Other	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.11)	0.04 (0.11)
Race: White	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.07 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)
Intercept	-0.95 (0.70)	-0.95 (0.70)	-3.33* (1.58)	-3.33* (1.57)
Respondent state fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
N (House elections evaluated)	9237	9237	5350	5350
N (respondents)	1563	1563	906	906

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. OLS coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. Outcome variable takes the value of 1 if a respondent said the outcome of a 2022 House election with two major-party candidates was won due to voter fraud and 0 if they said the victor was the rightful winner. Estimates reported for survey respondents who identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party or Republican Party. Vote margins are expressed in the table as the share of the major party vote in percentage points for the party with which the respondent identifies (from +100 to -100). Candidates were classified as white or nonwhite (Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, or Other/Mixed) using predictions from `wru` based on first name, last name, and county (Imai and Khanna 2016; Khanna et al. 2022). See Online Appendix A for question wording.

Table B2: OLS results with party \times margin interactions

	Model 1	Model 2
Co-partisan loss margins & interactions		
Largest quintile (-81 to -39 p.p.)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Largest quintile \times Republican	0.11** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)
Quintile 4 (-38 to -30 p.p.)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Quintile 4 \times Republican	0.16*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)
Quintile 3 (-29 to -20 p.p.)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Quintile 3 \times Republican	0.12** (0.04)	0.13** (0.04)
Quintile 2 (-19 to -9 p.p.)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Quintile 2 \times Republican	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)
Narrowest quintile (-8 to 0 p.p.)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Narrowest quintile \times Republican	0.20*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)
Co-partisan win margins & interactions		
Narrowest quintile (0 to 10 p.p.)		[reference category]
Quintile 2 (11 to 20 p.p.)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Quintile 2 \times Republican	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Quintile 3 (21 to 30 p.p.)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Quintile 3 \times Republican	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Quintile 4 (31 to 44 p.p.)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Quintile 4 \times Republican	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Largest quintile (45 to 81 p.p.)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Largest quintile \times Republican	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)
Republican	0.07* (0.03)	0.09* (0.04)
Nonwhite winner	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
White loser	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Male	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Treatment	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Education: 4-year	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Education: HS grad	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Education: No HS	0.09 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)
Education: Post-grad	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)
Education: Some college	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Race: Black	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Race: Hispanic	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Race: Other	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)
Race: White	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Nonwhite winner \times Republican	0.04* (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)
White loser \times Republican	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Nonwhite winner \times white loser		-0.00 (0.02)
Nonwhite winner \times white loser \times Republican		0.06 (0.04)
Intercept	-1.75* (0.79)	-1.76* (0.79)
Respondent state fixed effects	✓	✓
N (House elections evaluated)	14587	14587
N (respondents)	2469	2469

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. OLS coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. Outcome variable takes the value of 1 if a respondent said the outcome of a 2022 House election with two major party candidates was won due to voter fraud and 0 if they said the victor was the rightful winner. Estimates reported for survey respondents who identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party or Republican Party. Vote margins are expressed in the table as the share of the major party vote in percentage points for the party with which the respondent identifies (from +100 to -100). Candidates were classified as white or nonwhite (Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, or Other/Mixed) using predictions from v_{c1} based on first name, last name, and county (Imai and Khanna 2016; Khanna et al. 2022). See Online Appendix A for question wording.

Table B3: Logit model results

	Democrats	Democrats	Republicans	Republicans
Co-partisan loss margins				
Largest quintile (-81 to -39 p.p.)	0.69 (0.74)	0.69 (0.74)	0.84*** (0.22)	0.83*** (0.21)
Quintile 4 (-38 to -30 p.p.)	0.46 (0.62)	0.46 (0.62)	1.12*** (0.23)	1.09*** (0.23)
Quintile 3 (-29 to -20 p.p.)	0.42 (0.66)	0.42 (0.66)	0.98*** (0.23)	1.04*** (0.22)
Quintile 2 (-19 to -9 p.p.)	0.67 (0.62)	0.67 (0.64)	1.12*** (0.21)	1.14*** (0.21)
Narrowest quintile (-8 to 0 p.p.)	0.35 (0.55)	0.35 (0.56)	1.35*** (0.25)	1.34*** (0.25)
Co-partisan win margins				
Narrowest quintile (0 to 10 p.p.)	reference category			
Quintile 2 (11 to 20 p.p.)	-0.14 (0.56)	-0.14 (0.58)	-0.79** (0.30)	-0.84** (0.31)
Quintile 3 (21 to 30 p.p.)	0.23 (0.60)	0.22 (0.68)	-0.30 (0.25)	-0.32 (0.25)
Quintile 4 (31 to 44 p.p.)	0.07 (0.58)	0.07 (0.58)	-0.62* (0.30)	-0.63* (0.30)
Largest quintile (45 to 81 p.p.)	-0.28 (0.60)	-0.28 (0.60)	-1.61*** (0.44)	-1.62*** (0.45)
Nonwhite winner	-0.20 (0.29)	-0.19 (0.54)	0.15 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.22)
White loser	0.22 (0.25)	0.22 (0.29)	0.15 (0.14)	-0.03 (0.18)
Nonwhite winner × white loser		-0.02 (0.57)		0.39 (0.27)
Male	0.17 (0.27)	0.17 (0.27)	-0.39* (0.18)	-0.38* (0.17)
Age	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)
Treatment	0.18 (0.26)	0.18 (0.26)	0.05 (0.19)	0.05 (0.18)
Education: 4-year	-1.60*** (0.37)	-1.60*** (0.38)	-0.34 (0.37)	-0.34 (0.37)
Education: HS grad	-0.25 (0.36)	-0.25 (0.36)	0.47 (0.33)	0.48 (0.33)
Education: No HS	0.57 (0.55)	0.57 (0.55)	1.00* (0.45)	1.00* (0.45)
Education: Post-grad	-1.09* (0.45)	-1.09* (0.45)	-0.56 (0.40)	-0.55 (0.40)
Education: Some college	-0.41 (0.41)	-0.41 (0.41)	-0.10 (0.35)	-0.09 (0.35)
Race: Black	-0.22 (0.59)	-0.22 (0.59)	0.46 (0.92)	0.46 (0.91)
Race: Hispanic	0.08 (0.62)	0.08 (0.62)	0.44 (0.87)	0.42 (0.87)
Race: Other	-0.04 (0.63)	-0.04 (0.63)	0.21 (0.85)	0.19 (0.85)
Race: White	-1.26* (0.58)	-1.26* (0.58)	0.46 (0.75)	0.44 (0.75)
Intercept	-33.31* (14.45)	-33.33* (14.61)	-27.83* (10.93)	-27.77* (10.90)
Respondent state fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
N (House elections evaluated)	9237	9237	5350	5350
N (respondents)	1563	1563	906	906

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Logit coefficients with robust clustered standard errors by respondent in parentheses. Outcome variable takes the value of 1 if a respondent said the outcome of a 2022 House election with two major-party candidates was won due to voter fraud and 0 if they said the victor was the rightful winner. Estimates reported for survey respondents who identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party or Republican Party. Vote margins are expressed in the table as the share of the major party vote in percentage points for the party with which the respondent identifies (from +100 to -100). Candidates were classified as white or nonwhite (Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, or Other/Mixed) using predictions from WZU based on first name, last name, and county (Imai and Khanna 2016; Khanna et al. 2022). See Online Appendix A for question wording.

Table B4: Logit model results with party \times margin interactions

	Model 1	Model 2
Co-partisan loss margins & interactions		
Largest quintile (-81 to -39 p.p.)	0.22 (0.59)	0.23 (0.59)
Largest quintile \times Republican	0.66 (0.63)	0.65 (0.63)
Quintile 4 (-38 to -30 p.p.)	0.44 (0.50)	0.43 (0.50)
Quintile 4 \times Republican	0.84 (0.55)	0.81 (0.55)
Quintile 3 (-29 to -20 p.p.)	0.56 (0.54)	0.55 (0.54)
Quintile 3 \times Republican	0.46 (0.60)	0.53 (0.60)
Quintile 2 (-19 to -9 p.p.)	0.58 (0.54)	0.58 (0.55)
Quintile 2 \times Republican	0.60 (0.59)	0.62 (0.60)
Narrowest quintile (-8 to 0 p.p.)	0.52 (0.44)	0.51 (0.44)
Narrowest quintile \times Republican	0.89 (0.54)	0.88 (0.54)
Co-partisan win margins & interactions		
Narrowest quintile (0 to 10 p.p.)	[reference category]	
Quintile 2 (11 to 20 p.p.)	-0.18 (0.47)	-0.18 (0.47)
Quintile 2 \times Republican	-0.59 (0.57)	-0.64 (0.58)
Quintile 3 (21 to 30 p.p.)	0.36 (0.53)	0.34 (0.59)
Quintile 3 \times Republican	-0.69 (0.59)	-0.68 (0.65)
Quintile 4 (31 to 44 p.p.)	0.03 (0.53)	0.02 (0.54)
Quintile 4 \times Republican	-0.58 (0.60)	-0.59 (0.60)
Largest quintile (45 to 81 p.p.)	-0.39 (0.51)	-0.40 (0.51)
Largest quintile \times Republican	-0.99 (0.65)	-1.00 (0.65)
Republican	1.49** (0.54)	1.64** (0.55)
Nonwhite winner	-0.19 (0.23)	-0.16 (0.50)
White loser	0.23 (0.26)	0.24 (0.30)
Male	0.09 (0.15)	0.09 (0.15)
Age	-0.26 (0.15)	-0.26 (0.15)
Treatment	0.01* (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)
Education: 4-year	-0.63* (0.29)	-0.62* (0.29)
Education: HS grad	0.35 (0.27)	0.36 (0.27)
Education: No HS	0.90* (0.38)	0.90* (0.38)
Education: Post-grad	-0.68* (0.32)	-0.67* (0.32)
Education: Some college	-0.13 (0.29)	-0.13 (0.29)
Race: Black	0.32 (0.53)	0.32 (0.53)
Race: Hispanic	0.33 (0.56)	0.32 (0.56)
Race: Other	0.13 (0.58)	0.11 (0.58)
Race: White	-0.08 (0.49)	-0.09 (0.49)
Nonwhite winner \times Republican	0.35 (0.24)	0.02 (0.55)
White loser \times Republican	-0.10 (0.30)	-0.30 (0.36)
Nonwhite winner \times white loser		-0.03 (0.59)
Nonwhite winner \times white loser \times Republican		0.45 (0.66)
Intercept	-27.10** (9.17)	-27.14** (9.17)
Respondent state fixed effects	✓	✓
N (House elections evaluated)	14587	14587
N (respondents)	2469	2469

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Logit coefficients with robust clustered standard errors by respondent in parentheses. Outcome variable takes the value of 1 if a respondent said the outcome of a 2022 House election with two major-party candidates was won due to voter fraud and 0 if they said the victor was the rightful winner. Estimates reported for survey respondents who identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party or Republican Party. Vote margins are expressed in the table as the share of the major party vote in percentage points for the party with which the respondent identifies (from +100 to -100). Candidates were classified as white or nonwhite (Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, or Other/Mixed) using predictions from `vrui` based on first name, last name, and county (Imai and Khanna 2016; Khanna et al. 2022). See Online Appendix A for question wording.

Table B5: OLS model results; white respondents only

	Democrats	Democrats	Republicans	Republicans
Co-partisan loss margins				
Largest quintile (-81 to -39 p.p.)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Quintile 4 (-38 to -30 p.p.)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)
Quintile 3 (-29 to -20 p.p.)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)
Quintile 2 (-19 to -9 p.p.)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)
Narrowest quintile (-8 to 0 p.p.)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.21*** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.04)
Co-partisan win margins				
Narrowest quintile (0 to 10 p.p.)	reference category			
Quintile 2 (11 to 20 p.p.)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)
Quintile 3 (21 to 30 p.p.)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Quintile 4 (31 to 44 p.p.)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Largest quintile (45 to 81 p.p.)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.08* (0.03)
Nonwhite winner	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
White loser	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)
Nonwhite winner × white loser		0.01 (0.01)		0.00 (0.04)
Male	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Treatment	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Education: 4-year	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Education: HS grad	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.11** (0.03)	0.11** (0.03)
Education: No HS	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.13 (0.07)	0.13 (0.07)
Education: Post-grad	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Education: Some college	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Intercept	-0.59 (0.48)	-0.58 (0.48)	-2.39 (1.50)	-2.39 (1.50)
Respondent state fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
N (House elections evaluated)	6166	6166	4746	4746
N (respondents)	1042	1042	803	803

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. OLS coefficients with robust clustered standard errors by respondent in parentheses. Only white respondents included in this analysis. Outcome variable takes the value of 1 if a respondent said the outcome of a 2022 House election with two major-party candidates was won due to voter fraud and 0 if they said the victor was the rightful winner. Estimates reported for survey respondents who identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party or Republican Party. Vote margins are expressed in the table as the share of the major party vote in percentage points for the party with which the respondent identifies (from +100 to -100). Candidates were classified as white or nonwhite (Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, or Other/Mixed) using predictions from `wrta` based on first name, last name, and county (Imai and Khanna 2016; Khanna et al. 2022). See Online Appendix A for question wording.

Table B6: OLS model results with party \times margin interactions; white respondents only

	Model 1	Model 2
Co-partisan loss margins & interactions		
Largest quintile (-81 to -39 p.p.)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Largest quintile \times Republican	0.14*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)
Quintile 4 (-38 to -30 p.p.)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Quintile 4 \times Republican	0.17*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)
Quintile 3 (-29 to -20 p.p.)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Quintile 3 \times Republican	0.17*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)
Quintile 2 (-19 to -9 p.p.)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Quintile 2 \times Republican	0.18*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)
Narrowest quintile (-8 to 0 p.p.)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Narrowest quintile \times Republican	0.22*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)
Co-partisan win margins & interactions		
Narrowest quintile (0 to 10 p.p.)	[reference category]	
Quintile 2 (11 to 20 p.p.)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Quintile 2 \times Republican	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Quintile 3 (21 to 30 p.p.)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Quintile 3 \times Republican	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Quintile 4 (31 to 44 p.p.)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Quintile 4 \times Republican	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Largest quintile (45 to 81 p.p.)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Largest quintile \times Republican	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Republican	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)
Nonwhite winner	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
White loser	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Male	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Age	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Treatment	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Education: 4-year	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Education: HS grad	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Education: No HS	0.07 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)
Education: Post-grad	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Education: Some college	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Nonwhite winner \times Republican	0.05** (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
White loser \times Republican	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Nonwhite winner \times white loser		0.00 (0.01)
Nonwhite winner \times white loser \times Republican		0.01 (0.04)
Intercept	-1.34 (0.78)	-1.34 (0.78)
Respondent state fixed effects	✓	✓
N (House elections evaluated)	10912	10912
N (respondents)	1845	1845

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. OLS coefficients with robust clustered standard errors by respondent in parentheses. Only white respondents included in this analysis. Outcome variable takes the value of 1 if a respondent said the outcome of a 2022 House election with two major-party candidates was won due to voter fraud and 0 if they said the victor was the rightful winner. Estimates reported for survey respondents who identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party or Republican Party. Vote margins are expressed in the table as the share of the major party vote in percentage points for the party with which the respondent identifies (from +100 to -100). Candidates were classified as white or nonwhite (Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, or Other/Mixed) using predictions from `wtu` based on first name, last name, and county (Imai and Khanna 2016; Khanna et al. 2022). See Online Appendix A for question wording.

Table B7: Logit model results; white respondents only

	Democrats	Democrats	Republicans	Republicans
Co-partisan loss margins				
Largest quintile (-81 to -39 p.p.)	-1.50 (0.82)	-1.49 (0.82)	0.83*** (0.21)	0.83*** (0.21)
Quintile 4 (-38 to -30 p.p.)	-0.21 (0.60)	-0.21 (0.61)	1.10*** (0.23)	1.09*** (0.23)
Quintile 3 (-29 to -20 p.p.)	-0.79 (0.66)	-0.82 (0.66)	0.93*** (0.22)	0.95*** (0.22)
Quintile 2 (-19 to -9 p.p.)	-0.23 (0.60)	-0.20 (0.61)	1.17*** (0.21)	1.18*** (0.21)
Narrowest quintile (-8 to 0 p.p.)	-0.16 (0.58)	-0.15 (0.59)	1.30*** (0.26)	1.30*** (0.26)
Co-partisan win margins				
Narrowest quintile (0 to 10 p.p.)	reference category			
Quintile 2 (11 to 20 p.p.)	-0.88 (0.61)	-0.85 (0.63)	-0.97*** (0.27)	-0.98*** (0.28)
Quintile 3 (21 to 30 p.p.)	-0.46 (0.65)	-0.34 (0.72)	-0.48 (0.29)	-0.48 (0.29)
Quintile 4 (31 to 44 p.p.)	-1.24 (0.71)	-1.29 (0.71)	-0.77** (0.27)	-0.78** (0.27)
Largest quintile (45 to 81 p.p.)	-1.42* (0.71)	-1.41* (0.71)	-1.34** (0.41)	-1.34** (0.41)
Nonwhite winner	-0.73* (0.32)	-1.00* (0.50)	0.18 (0.12)	0.08 (0.19)
White loser	-0.61 (0.32)	-0.71* (0.36)	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.16)
Nonwhite winner × white loser		0.41 (0.75)		0.14 (0.24)
Male	0.62 (0.41)	0.63 (0.40)	-0.39* (0.16)	-0.39* (0.16)
Age	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Treatment	0.46 (0.39)	0.46 (0.39)	0.15 (0.16)	0.15 (0.16)
Education: 4-year	-1.12 (0.64)	-1.12 (0.64)	-0.03 (0.30)	-0.03 (0.30)
Education: HS grad	0.85 (0.53)	0.85 (0.53)	0.80** (0.26)	0.80** (0.26)
Education: No HS	0.17 (1.21)	0.20 (1.21)	0.93* (0.44)	0.93* (0.44)
Education: Post-grad	-0.25 (0.65)	-0.25 (0.65)	-0.19 (0.36)	-0.19 (0.36)
Education: Some college	-0.08 (0.72)	-0.09 (0.72)	0.19 (0.28)	0.19 (0.28)
Intercept	-48.67* (22.67)	-48.17* (22.67)	-21.34* (10.69)	-21.34* (10.69)
Respondent state fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
N (House elections evaluate)	6166	6166	4746	4746
N (respondents)	1042	1042	803	803

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Logit coefficients with robust clustered standard errors by respondent in parentheses. Only white respondents included in this analysis. Outcome variable takes the value of 1 if a respondent said the outcome of a 2022 House election with two major-party candidates was won due to voter fraud and 0 if they said the victor was the rightful winner. Estimates reported for survey respondents who identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party or Republican Party. Vote margins are expressed in the table as the share of the major party vote in percentage points for the party with which the respondent identifies (from +100 to -100). Candidates were classified as white or nonwhite (Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, or Other/Mixed) using predictions from `wru` based on first name, last name, and county (Imai and Khanna 2016; Khanna et al. 2022). See Online Appendix A for question wording.

Table B8: Logit model results with party \times margin interactions; white respondents only

	Model 1	Model 2
Co-partisan loss margins & interactions		
Largest quintile (-81 to -39 p.p.)	-1.55 (0.84)	-1.55 (0.85)
Largest quintile \times Republican	2.39** (0.87)	2.38** (0.88)
Quintile 4 (-38 to -30 p.p.)	-0.37 (0.65)	-0.36 (0.65)
Quintile 4 \times Republican	1.51* (0.70)	1.50* (0.70)
Quintile 3 (-29 to -20 p.p.)	-0.69 (0.69)	-0.70 (0.69)
Quintile 3 \times Republican	1.65* (0.74)	1.68* (0.74)
Quintile 2 (-19 to -9 p.p.)	0.02 (0.81)	0.03 (0.82)
Quintile 2 \times Republican	1.17 (0.84)	1.16 (0.85)
Narrowest quintile (-8 to 0 p.p.)	-0.25 (0.61)	-0.24 (0.62)
Narrowest quintile \times Republican	1.57* (0.70)	1.56* (0.71)
Co-partisan win margins & interactions		
Narrowest quintile (0 to 10 p.p.)		[reference category]
Quintile 2 (11 to 20 p.p.)	-0.95 (0.64)	-0.94 (0.67)
Quintile 2 \times Republican	-0.02 (0.71)	-0.05 (0.73)
Quintile 3 (21 to 30 p.p.)	-0.54 (0.61)	-0.48 (0.68)
Quintile 3 \times Republican	0.06 (0.69)	-0.01 (0.75)
Quintile 4 (31 to 44 p.p.)	-1.25 (0.75)	-1.27 (0.75)
Quintile 4 \times Republican	0.48 (0.81)	0.50 (0.80)
Largest quintile (45 to 81 p.p.)	-1.54* (0.70)	-1.53* (0.71)
Largest quintile \times Republican	0.21 (0.81)	0.21 (0.82)
Republican	0.87 (0.68)	0.89 (0.67)
Nonwhite winner	-0.65* (0.29)	-0.83* (0.42)
White loser	-0.38 (0.28)	-0.44 (0.33)
Male	0.19 (0.15)	0.19 (0.15)
Age	-0.27 (0.15)	-0.27 (0.15)
Treatment	0.01* (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)
Education: 4-year	-0.16 (0.28)	-0.16 (0.28)
Education: HS grad	0.82*** (0.24)	0.82*** (0.24)
Education: No HS	0.86* (0.40)	0.86* (0.40)
Education: Post-grad	-0.21 (0.32)	-0.21 (0.32)
Education: Some college	0.15 (0.26)	0.15 (0.26)
Nonwhite winner \times Republican	0.83** (0.31)	0.90* (0.45)
White loser \times Republican	0.34 (0.30)	0.33 (0.36)
Nonwhite winner \times white loser		0.27 (0.66)
Nonwhite winner \times white loser \times Republican		-0.13 (0.70)
Intercept	-23.40* (9.58)	-23.39* (9.60)
Respondent state fixed effects	✓	✓
N (House elections evaluated)	10912	10912
N (respondents)	1845	1845

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Logit coefficients with robust clustered standard errors by respondent in parentheses. Only white respondents included in this analysis. Outcome variable takes the value of 1 if a respondent said the outcome of a 2022 House election with two major-party candidates was won due to voter fraud and 0 if they said the victor was the rightful winner. Estimates reported for survey respondents who identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party or Republican Party. Vote margins are expressed in the table as the share of the major party vote in percentage points for the party with which the respondent identifies (from +100 to -100). Candidates were classified as white or nonwhite (Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, or Other/Mixed) using predictions from `svtu` based on first name, last name, and county (Imai and Khanna 2016; Khanna et al. 2022). See Online Appendix A for question wording.

Table B9: OLS model with binary measure of co-partisan loss

	Democrats	Democrats	Republicans	Republicans
Co-partisan lost	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)
Nonwhite winner	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
White loser	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Nonwhite winner × white loser		-0.00 (0.01)		0.05 (0.04)
Male	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Treatment	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Education: 4-year	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Education: HS grad	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.06 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Education: No HS	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.16 (0.08)	0.16 (0.08)
Education: Post-grad	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Education: Some college	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
Race: Black	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.06 (0.12)	0.06 (0.12)
Race: Hispanic	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)
Race: Other	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.11)	0.04 (0.11)
Race: White	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.07 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)
Intercept	-0.94 (0.70)	-0.95 (0.70)	-3.46* (1.59)	-3.45* (1.59)
Respondent state fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
N (House elections evaluated)	9237	9237	5350	5350
N (respondents)	1563	1563	906	906

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. OLS coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. Outcome variable takes the value of 1 if a respondent said the outcome of a 2022 House election with two major-party candidates was won due to voter fraud and 0 if they said the victor was the rightful winner. Estimates reported for survey respondents who identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party or Republican Party. Candidates were classified as white or nonwhite (Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, or Other/Mixed) using predictions from `wru` based on first name, last name, and county (Imai and Khanna 2016; Khanna et al. 2022). See Online Appendix A for question wording.