

**Triggers for Mass Killing:**  
**Report on a research project for the**  
**Political Instability Task Force**

This research was conducted for the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). The views expressed herein are the authors' alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the Task Force or the U.S. Government.

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## 1. Motivation and Goals

This report describes the results of a research project designed to identify “triggering events” for mass killing and to begin to quantify how useful monitoring these events might be for improving forecasts of this kind of violence. The project is explicitly modeled on Jim Fearon and David Laitin’s very useful August 2008 report to the PITF on triggers for civil wars (although it does not follow the methodology of that report exactly).

The impetus for this study stemmed from the growing consensus among many PITF members that the current “structural” models used by the PITF to forecast mass killing were nearing the limit of their accuracy. These models were designed to identify countries whose economic, political, social, demographic or international conditions increase their risks of experiencing a mass killing. Structural models are not well suited, however, to generating highly accurate forecasts of precisely *when* at-risk countries will experience a mass killing. With only a few exceptions, the inputs our models rely upon to identify at-risk countries are relatively slow to change and, therefore, cannot be used to precisely predict the timing of a mass killing onset. These risk factors include variables such as high state population, high levels of infant mortality, a low polity score, and investment as a share of GDP. Most of these variables are measured only once annually, so even if they did change rapidly, our currently models would not detect a change in risk until a year later. As a result, even though very few mass killings occur in countries that are not identified as “high-risk” by our models, high-risk countries tend to remain at risk extended periods and our models have very high rates of false positives to true positives.

If we wish to improve our models, therefore, we need to identify the factors that cause high-risk countries to transition from a state of fragile peace or low-level conflict into mass violence against civilians. These “triggers” might not lead to an escalation of violence in countries with low levels of structural risk, but the intuition is that high-risk countries are not as resilient to such shocks.

## 2. Definitions

### *mass killing*

This project relies on the existing PITF definition of state-sponsored mass killing, the same definition the PITF has utilized in its forecasting models since 2006. Mass killing is defined as any event which results in the intentional death of at least 1,000 total noncombatants from a discrete

group during a period of sustained violence. Mass killings are coded as beginning in the first year in which at least 100 intentional noncombatant fatalities are recorded. If fewer than 100 total annual noncombatant fatalities are recorded for any 3 consecutive years during the event, the mass killing is coded as ending during the first year within that 3 year period in which fatalities dropped below 100 per year (even if killing continues at low levels in subsequent years). For this project, mass killing is limited to domestic, state-sponsored mass killings only. Killing by sub-state groups and the killing of foreign citizens during inter-state or colonial wars are excluded.

### *triggers*

Drawing on the terminology used in Fearon and Laitin's 2008 study, I defined a mass killing trigger as an event that:

1. precedes the onset of mass killing;
2. represents a significant change to the status quo in the country in which the mass killing occurs (that is, it is not simply the continuation of ongoing events – although it could be a significant escalation of an ongoing process or event);
3. is not itself part of the mass killing;
4. has a direct, proximate causal connection to the decision to initiate mass killing;

Prior to systematically coding the historical cases, I reviewed a wide variety of theoretical works, including my own previous 2009 report to the PITF on indicators and warnings of mass killing and Andy Bennett's 2014 *Casebook on Mass Killing Events*, to develop a list of 10 potential general categories of triggering events.<sup>1</sup> To ensure that the list of triggers I identified was comprehensive, I also searched for additional triggers of any kind during my review of the historical cases. Fortunately, in the cases I examined, all but three of the primary triggers I identified could be easily classified in one of the 10 general categories I established prior to coding.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> These categories are not always mutually exclusive. For example, if a new opposition group is elected and then assumes power, that event would be coded as both a "new national leadership" and as an "incumbent election loss." If the opposition won the election but was prevented from taking power, however, the event would be coded only as an incumbent election loss.

<sup>2</sup> The three partial exceptions, discussed in more detail below, include one case in which the primary trigger occurred more than one year before the onset of mass killing, and two cases in which the protests which triggered the event were too small to qualify using the criteria I established prior to coding.

Ultimately, triggers for mass killing are events that prompt a significant change in the behavior of state authorities – from *not* engaging in mass killing (whatever else they might have been doing) to initiating mass killing. Each of the triggers described below, therefore, highlights a category of events that might cause state authorities to alter their calculations about the utility or effectiveness of engaging in mass killing. Since triggers are defined as the most proximate cause of the change in state behavior, these ten categories focus primarily on the actions of actors *other* than ruling state authorities or on events beyond the control of the those authorities. For example, if state authorities institute a new discriminatory policy, which then leads to a rebellion by some citizens against the government, which in turn prompts the state to employ mass killing to crush the opposition, the proximate trigger for this event would be the rebellion, rather than the government policy that provoked the rebellion.

### **1. new national leadership assumes power**

This category includes all cases in which new executive leadership is established in the state by any means, legal or extra-legal. The first government of a newly independent territory is automatically coded as an instance of new leadership. *Example:* An opposition movement achieves power following a civil war and immediately begins to eliminate members and suspected supporters of the former regime or dominant ethnic group.

### **2. establishment or major political success of major political opposition movement**

This category includes events in which a major, new political or military anti-government opposition movement is formed or other major political victories by such opposition groups. This category includes formal declarations of independence or successful referenda on secession by major opposition groups. Opposition victories in national elections are excluded from this category, since they are included in category 3 below. *Example (a):* A new political opposition party forms to contest control of the government and the government responds by killing members or suspected supporters of the group. *Example (b):* An opposition movement wins a majority of seats in regional or legislative elections, prompting the regime to crush the opposition out of fear that the opposition might become a threat to the regime's hold on power nationally.

### **3. loss of national election by incumbent leader/party**

This category includes all instances in which the incumbent chief executive of the state loses a national election – whether or not the executive voluntarily relinquishes power.<sup>3</sup> In cases in which no incumbent is competing for office, a loss by the incumbent party or the incumbent's clearly designated successor is coded as a loss for the incumbent. *Example:* A sitting president unexpectedly loses a national election and resorts to mass killing to prevent the opposition from removing him from office.

#### **4. major anti-government protests, strikes, or riots**

This category includes all new protests, rallies, strikes or riots directed against the ruling authorities or major policies of the state (e.g., major economic policies or discriminatory social/cultural policies). Protests must include at least 10,000 people to qualify.<sup>4</sup> *Example:* Demonstrators gather in a public place to advocate the removal of the current government and/or support for an opposition movement. Fearing a loss of power or control, the government violently crushes the protest.

#### **5. first major violent attack/coup attempt against state authorities**

This category encompasses instances in which an opposition group launches its first major, violent attack (resulting in at least 5 fatalities in a week or less), or coup-attempt (whether violent or not or successful or not) against government authorities. *Example:* Members of a rebel movement representing a rival ethnic group launch an attack against police stations, prompting the government to conduct reprisal killings against civilians from the rival ethnic group.

#### **6. major escalation of ongoing armed conflict by opposition group**

This category includes cases of significant escalation of an ongoing armed conflict with the state by an opposition group. *Example:* A rebel group that had primarily engaged in low-level attacks against local security forces in a particular region of the state launches a series of major violent attacks against government buildings in the state capital. These more violent attacks prompt the government to begin targeting suspected supporters of the rebel group.

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<sup>3</sup> I also considered coding simply whether an election occurred at all, but decided against it since it seemed unlikely that an incumbent government would launch a mass killing after winning an election. After coding the cases, I found no examples of mass killings that appeared to have been triggered by incumbent election victories.

<sup>4</sup> I initially used a 200 participant threshold for protests, but this low threshold inflated the counts of protests, especially in periods before t-1, making it less useful diagnostically.

### **7. major increase in the military power of opposition group**

This category includes instances in which existing opposition groups significantly and rapidly increase their military power – regardless of whether they employ that power in attacks against the government. The three primary means by which this might occur are (a) significant new military and/or financial assistance from a foreign source; (b) new alliances between two or more major opposition groups; (3) the capture by the opposition of important material resources (e.g., military equipment, money or revenue generating resources), territories or populations.

*Example:* A rebel group receives significant new military aid from a neighboring country. This aid convinces the government that the rebel group is allied with foreign enemies and increases the government's assessment of the threat posed by the group. The government responds by killing suspected members or supporters of the rebel group.

### **8. major decrease in the military power of opposition group**

This category includes cases in which the military power of an opposition group is significantly diminished, usually by military defeat (regionally or nationally) or by the collapse of an important rebel alliance or the abrupt withdrawal of foreign military aid. *Example:* Rebel military forces in one region of the state are defeated, giving government military forces access to the civilian population in that region. The government then targets suspected rebel supporters in that region.

### **9. onset of international conflict**

This category includes any onset of an international war. I utilized the standard correlates of war definition of war to identify international wars. *Example:* A state is attacked by a neighboring country, following a dispute over the treatment of the neighbor's co-ethnics living in the state. State authorities launch a mass killing driven by fear that the neighbor's co-ethnics will launch a rebellion that will undermine the state's efforts to defend itself in the interstate war.

### **10. defeat of the state in international conflict**

This category includes all instances in which a state loses or ends an international war in stalemate. *Example:* After losing an international war with its neighbor, state authorities engage in mass killing of domestic opposition groups that they blame for causing the defeat.

In their 2008 report, Fearon and Laitin classified civil war triggers into two broad categories which they labeled “opportunity shocks” and “preference shocks.” These categories can be applied here as well. In the case of mass killing triggers, opportunity shocks are changes that affect the relative power of the opposition, making mass killing easier to carry out. These primarily include factors that decrease the opposition’s military power – like rebel military defeats or the collapse of rebel alliances. It might also include the onset of international war, if the war gives state authorities cover to carry out mass killing with less domestic or international attention or opposition. In principle, a major increase in government military power could also constitute an opportunity shock, but I did not see evidence of this dynamic in the historical record, so this category of triggers is not represented in the list above. Preference shocks are changes that affect the desirability or utility of mass killing for ruling authorities, making mass killing more attractive than it was before the shock. These shocks include the rise to power of a new leader or regime with new interests or an ideology that makes the elimination of opposition group more important, or events that indicate the rising power or threat of opposition groups, making their elimination appear more urgent and necessary.

## **Research Design**

To determine whether these events constitute reliable triggers for mass killing I systematically reviewed the history of all 32 cases of mass killing that began in 1990 or later. For each case, I examined events that occurred during the 12 months before the killing began ( $t-1$ ), the 12 months before that ( $t-2$ ) and in the fifth year before the episode began ( $t-5$ ). For each period, I then documented whether *at least one* of each of the ten categories of mass killing described above occurred.<sup>5</sup> All events which met the trigger definitions described above were coded, regardless of whether there was reason to believe that the event was, in fact, casually related to subsequent mass killing. For example, an August 1994 protest against Yeltsin in Moscow is coded as a trigger for the mass killing in Chechnya, which began in December of that year, although there is no direct link between the two events. Coding triggers in this way ensures that the results will be relevant to forecasting, since it is not possible to know in real time whether any such trigger event might be causally related to a future mass killing. A total of 165 triggering events were identified across all

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<sup>5</sup> I did not generate a tally of the number of each event if more than one occurred. Doing could be useful, but would have dramatically increased the time necessary for coding and increased the chances that some events would be overlooked.

three periods.<sup>6</sup> For each of the 32 cases of mass killing, I also identified a “primary trigger,” which I determined, based on the available sources, to be the most casually significant and proximate trigger for each case. To qualify as a primary trigger, the triggering event had to occur no more than 12 months before the onset of the mass killing. Although the coding of primary triggers was, by necessity, qualitative and somewhat subjective, in most cases there was a general consensus among sources regarding the key triggering event. A list of all 32 cases along with their primary triggers and whether or not the primary trigger was documented in contemporary sources is included in the appendix.

Comparing different time periods within counties that have experienced mass killings offers several important methodological advantages for identifying triggering events. First, since the primary motivation of this study was to identify factors that would better pinpoint the timing of mass killing onsets, a within-case comparison seemed most appropriate. This method allows most factors about each country to remain constant, while highlighting temporal variation in triggering events. Second, because certain events, such as smaller protests are more likely to be recorded in secondary histories when they are perceived by historians to be relevant to subsequent mass killings, using only years from cases in which mass killings occurred helps to minimize this bias. Third, utilizing this approach made it possible to analyze a greater number of cases of mass killing, which ought to lend greater confidence to the causal inferences from the qualitative analysis of “primary triggers.” Fourth, a significant economy of effort was obtained by coding multiple time periods from the same country, since the same sources often provided historical information about multiple years prior to the onset of mass killing in the same country.

Since the within-case approach examines only countries which ultimately experienced a mass killing, however, the results of this methodology cannot be applied directly to the problem of forecasting. When making forecasts, of course, we do not know which countries will go on to experience a mass killing; we can only know the predicted probability of an onset generated by our model. Since country-year observations drawn exclusively from countries prior to a mass killing might be systematically different from observations drawn from high-risk countries that do not directly precede a mass killing, the within-case comparison method might produce biased estimates of the relative frequency of triggers in the forecasting setting. It seems most probable that the frequency of triggers ought to be lower in high-risk years that do not precede a mass killing, which

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<sup>6</sup> This number includes a small number of events that were double-counted, such as when a new leadership comes to power following an incumbent election loss.



would mean that the within-case method would underestimate the diagnostic value of triggering events. Since several of the inputs to the PITF mass killing model, such as armed conflicts, coups and protests are themselves triggers, however, it is also possible that the frequency of triggers could actually be higher in these years.

To help exclude this possibility, therefore, I also drew a random sample of 10 additional country-years from the list of countries that ranked in the top quintile of PITF model risk scores for this period.<sup>7</sup> These observations were then coded using the same procedures used to code prior years in countries that experienced mass killings. Although ten observations are probably insufficient to make confident point estimates of the frequency of triggering events, this exercise should provide some suggestive evidence of whether estimates from the within-case comparison are likely to overestimate or underestimate the utility of each trigger in the forecasting.

To code the occurrence of triggering events I reviewed a wide range of source material for each case, including academic histories, datasets on coups, protests and wars, country reports from NGOs such as human rights watch and amnesty international, and news sources accessed through LexisNexis searches. To further reduce the possibility that some more “routine” events might be more likely to be mentioned in secondary histories when they are perceived to be related to later mass killings, I made a special effort to search for these events in contemporary sources (for example, by searching for the terms “protest,” “demonstration,” “riot” and “strike” in each country in the relevant years).<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, it remains probable that at least some bias remains in the historical record, with certain events being more likely to be recorded because they were perceived to be important to the history of a mass killing.


## Results

Figure 1 shows the distribution of “primary triggers” across the 32 cases of mass killing in the sample. Anti-government protests/strikes and coups/initial major attacks by rebels were the most common triggers, with each category representing 25% of all cases of mass killing since 1990. The assumption of power by new state authorities and the formation or political success of opposition parties accounted for another 10 cases combined.

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<sup>7</sup> I excluded country years from t-1 before mass killings and from ongoing mass killings.

<sup>8</sup> The BBC’s international monitoring service was especially useful in this effort since it includes English translations of a wide range of local sources, especially in Africa.



The loss of elections, increases in opposition military power, and onsets or defeats in international war, however, were not primary triggers for any of the events I reviewed. At least part of the reason for this finding can be explained by the fact that, even when election losses or international wars were causally related to the onset of an episode of mass killing, there were usually other, more proximate triggers as well. For example, the mass killing of Iraqi Shiites in 1991 by the regime of Saddam Hussein was clearly related to Iraq's defeat in the first Gulf War with the United States. The more proximate trigger for the war, however, was the beginning of major protests by Shiites in Basra, which occurred simultaneously. Likewise, the loss of the November 2010 election by Laurent Gbagbo in Cote D'Ivoire played an important part in sparking the subsequent mass killing, but the more proximate trigger for the violence was the major public protest that erupted when Gbagbo refused to relinquish power.

For three cases of mass killing I was unable to identify a primary trigger that met the definitions proposed above. The mass killings which began in Kosovo in March 1998, for example, appear to have been triggered by a series of KLA attacks on Serb police. These attacks, however, did not seem to represent a significant escalation in KLA violence, which had begun in early 1996.<sup>9</sup> It is not clear, therefore, why the March 1998 attacks provoked the dramatic escalation in the


<sup>9</sup> It is possible, therefore, that the initial KLA attacks in 1996 constitute the real trigger for the event, but the rules for coding "primary triggers" require that the triggering event occur no more than 12 months before the onset of the mass killing.

Serbian government response.<sup>10</sup> The mass killings which began in 1993 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire), on the other hand, had a more obvious trigger, but one that did not meet the criteria for any of the trigger categories used in this study. Most sources concur that the killings began in the North Kivu region when members of the Banyarwanda ethnic group launched a protest against the local government, which, in turn, prompted the local government to begin attacks against the Banyarwanda. These protests, however, were too small to meet the definition of a major anti-government protest described above. Similarly, the mass killings in the Niger Delta are widely accepted to have been sparked by a protest in October 1990. But that protest did not meet the 10,000 participant threshold set for this project.

To assess the usefulness of triggering events in more precisely identifying the timing of the onset of mass killings and in improving the accuracy of forecasts, I compared the frequency of triggering events in years t-1, t-2 and t-5. I also compared the frequency of triggers in year t-1 to the 10 country-years randomly selected from the list of countries in the top quartile of PITF mass killing model risk score. To be more precise, since the data record whether or not *at least one* triggering event of each type occurred in a given time-period, I am actually comparing the percentage of years in each time period with at least one trigger. The more diagnostic the trigger is for mass killing, the larger will be the difference in frequency between years t-1 and t-2 or t-5, or between t-1 and the years from the PITF top quartile list. The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 2, below. To test the statistical significance of the differences between time periods, Table 1 reports the results of comparison of means tests between t-1 and t-2, t-1 and t-5, and between t-1 and the PITF top 20% for each trigger type.

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<sup>10</sup> Tim Judah speculates that when US special envoy Robert Gelbard, who was visiting Pristina in February 1998, condemned the KLA and explicitly referred to them as a “terrorist group” the US had unintentionally “given Milosevic a green light to act.” *Kosovo: War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 138. If so, this might be considered the functional equivalent of a decrease in the opposition’s military power if the statement caused Milosevic to alter his estimate of the likelihood that the US would intervene on behalf of the KLA.



**Table 1: Comparison of means tests (P t-1 = t-2) (P t-1 = t-5) (P t-1 = PITF 20%)**

% years with at least one event (SE in parentheses)	t-1	t-2	t-5	PITF 20%
new state leader	0.44 (.089)	0.16* (.065)	0.09** (.052)	0.2 (.133)
opposition formation/success	0.53 (.090)	0.41 (.088)	0.19** (.070)	0.1* (.1)
election loss	0.19 (.070)	0.09 (.052)	0.00** (0)	0.00 (0)
protests/strikes	0.53 (.090)	0.34 (.085)	0.28* (.081)	0.4 (.16)
1st attacks/coups	0.50 (.090)	0.25* (.077)	0.06*** (.043)	0.1* (.1)
opposition military escalation	0.16 (.065)	0.03^ (.031)	0.03^ (.031)	0.0 (0)
increase opposition mil. power	0.16 (.065)	0.09 (.05)	0.00* (0)	0.0 (0)
decrease opposition mil. power	0.09 (.052)	0.00^ (0)	0.00^ (0)	0.0 (0)
international war onset	0.03 (.031)	0.00 (0)	0.00 (0)	0.0 (0)
international defeat	0.03 (.031)	0.00 (0)	0.00 (0)	0.0 (0)

p^ <= .10 p\* <= .05 p\*\* <= .01 p\*\*\* <= .001

The results reveal a clear pattern. All of the trigger types were more common in the t-1 period than in t-2 and all were lower or equal in t-2 compared to t-5. Despite the fact that the dataset included only 32 observations for each trigger in each time period, the results in Table 1 establish that many of these differences are both substantively and statistically significant. In year t-1, for example, 44% of cases experienced at least one change in national leadership, compared with only 16% of cases in year t-2, 20% in the PITF top 20% sample, and just 9% in year t-5. 47% of cases experienced at least one coup or the first major attack by an opposition group in t-1, compared with 25% in year t-2, 6% in year t-5 and 10% in the PITF top 20% sample. Although anti-government protests and strikes are tied with coups/first attacks as the most common primary trigger for mass killing (Figure 1), protests are not as useful diagnostically since they are relatively frequent in all periods. Protests occurred in 53% of t-1 years, compared to 34% in t-2 and 28% in t-5. Only the difference between t-1 and t-5 was significant at conventional levels.

## **Discussion**

Several important implications follow from these findings. First, these results identify a relatively small list of potential triggers that account for the escalation of the vast majority of mass killing cases. Just four broad types of events, the rise to power of new national leadership, the formation or major political success of a political opposition group, coups or initial attacks by opposition groups against the government and major anti-government protests, represent more than 80% of all “primary triggers” of mass killing since 1990. Analysts seeking to identify moments during which already high-risk countries might experience an onset of mass killing, therefore, should pay special attention to the occurrence of these events. Second, several of these triggers would appear to be promising inputs in forecasting models. Leadership changes, for example, are 2.75 times more common in years before a mass killing than in earlier periods and 2.2 times more common than in PITF top 20% years. First attacks/coups are twice as likely as in earlier years and five times more common than in PITF top 20% years. Third, although some triggering events, such as the formation of a new political opposition party or the new provision of foreign military aid to a rebel group, might be difficult to detect in real time, many of the most important triggers identified in this research are relatively easy to track in contemporary open sources. Changes in national leadership, major opposition attacks/coups and protests involving at least 10,000 participants, for

example, seldom occur without significant international attention.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, to verify this, I attempted to document whether the primary trigger for each case of mass killing I reviewed had been described in at least one contemporary news source (within a week of its occurrence) using a Lexis-Nexis search. Of the 29 cases with identified triggers, only 2 (less than 7%) were not reported (see appendix for list). Thus, the main practical impediment to employing these inputs in forecasting models is simply the need to update the data more frequently than annually.

This project also suggests several important avenues for future research. First, and most obviously, it would be valuable to explore whether adapting our current models to incorporate these triggers would improve model accuracy. Doing so using variables measuring new leadership and coups – the two most promising triggers identified in the analysis above – ought to be relatively straightforward, since those data are already collected annually. The simplest way to incorporate these variables into our existing models would be to transform our existing annual models into country-month format. The existing structural variables, which are measured annually, would simply be carried forward for each month in a given year, but the trigger variables would provide monthly variation that could be used to predict more precise onset timing. Although coup and leadership data are not currently updated monthly, doing so ought to be relatively inexpensive. Second, it might be worth exploring whether automated event coding of news sources might soon be able to permit the real-time coding of these or other triggers – such as protests or opposition military escalation. Finally, the methodology utilized in this project (and the original Fearon and Laitin project on civil war triggers) could be applied readily to other areas of interest to the PITF including adverse regime changes, large protests, non-state mass killings or to identify “termination triggers” that might help identify the end of civil wars or mass killings.

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<sup>11</sup> This fact also makes it less likely that the higher observed frequency of these triggers in years closer to the onset of mass killing might be driven by hindsight bias in the sources used to code these data.

**Appendix: List of Cases of Mass Killing and Primary Triggers**

<b>EVENT</b>	<b>PRIMARY TRIGGER</b>	<b>CONTEMP. SOURCE?</b>
Kashmir 1990	protests/strikes	yes
Rwanda 1990	1st attacks/coups	yes
Nigeria (Niger Delta) 1990	protests/strikes	.
Chad 1991	new state leader	yes
Sierra Leone 1991	1st attacks/coups	yes
Iraq (Shiites) 1991	protests/strikes	yes
Yugoslavia (Croatia) 1991	opposition formation/success	yes
Algeria 1991	protests/strikes	yes
Haiti 1991	new state leader	yes
Yugoslavia (Bosnia) 1992	opposition formation/success	yes
Afghanistan 1992	new state leader	yes
Tajikistan 1992	1st attacks/coups	yes
Georgia (Abkhazia) 1992	opposition formation/success	yes
Congo Brazzaville 1993	protests/strikes	yes
DRC (Mobutu) 1993	none identified	.
Rwanda (Tutsi vs. Hutu) 1994	new state leader	yes
Russia (Chechnya) 1994	opposition military escalation	yes
Nepal 1995	opposition formation/success	no
Afghanistan (Taliban) 1996	new state leader	yes
Congo Brazzaville 1997	new state leader	yes
Serbia (Kosovo) 1998	none identified	.
DRC (Kabila) 1998	1st attacks/coups	yes
Liberia 1999	1st attacks/coups	yes
Sudan (Darfur) 2003	1st attacks/coups	no
Sri Lanka 2009	decrease opposition military power	yes
Nigeria (Boko Haram) 2009	1st attacks/coups	yes
Cote d'Ivoire 2010	protests/strikes	yes
Libya 2011	protests/strikes	yes
Syria 2011	protests/strikes	yes
Sudan 2011	opposition military escalation	yes
Egypt (Brotherhood) 2013	protests/strikes	yes
South Sudan 2013	1st attacks/coups	yes