Month: February 2015

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#OurSharedArctic: Amb. Mark Brzezinski ’79 Stresses Need for Modern Diplomacy and International Cooperation in Dealing with Climate Change and Arctic Management

By: Hung Nguyen
On February 16, 2015, Mark Brzezinski, former U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Sweden, addressed an audience at Dartmouth College as part of a Montgomery Fellowship lecture series on Arctic development and management.

A member of the Dartmouth Class of 1979, Brzezinski also holds a J.D. from the University of Virginia and a D.Phil from Oxford University. Under the Clinton administration, Brzezinski utilized his expert training on international cooperation, serving as the Director of the National Security Council and dealing particularly with Russian and Eurasian issues. He was appointed Ambassador to Sweden in 2011. During his term, Brzezinski has focused on improving public understanding of global Arctic development.
Showing a map of the North Pole with the eight countries on the Arctic Council (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Russia and the U.S.), Brzezinski noted that no single country enjoys dominance in the region. International cooperation, thus, is necessary in order to advance common interests.

From 1988 to 2013, ice cover of the Artic has reduced by half. At this rate, Brzezinski noted, we might be looking at an ice-free Arctic by as early as 2040. Global temperatures could be driven up by 1–4ºC, and if temperatures rise to the point where Greenland ice is melted, sea levels could even rise as high as 23 feet. Half of the United States’ coastline would be under water, putting 16.4 million Americans at risk of displacement.

Brzezinski suggested that we look at the problem of Arctic management and development in two dimensions. It is first a strategic problem: Brzezinski noted the emerging issue of dealing with geopolitics in the region. He argued that we need to keep the Arctic free of conflict and militarization, as well as to settle boundary disputes in a constructive manner. Another important strategic dimension involves building up the capacity to conduct search and rescue (SAR) operations in the Arctic. However, Brzezinski also looked at the Arctic as a human problem that involves survival and livelihoods. Climate change will endanger vital ecosystems, fish stocks, and so on; these effects might even be irreversible. Brzezinski said we should “think of our grandchildren” to really see the future implications. International cooperation, thus, is key to both of these dimensions.

Brzezinski then turned to the role of the Arctic Council and the future of American involvement, as the United States prepares to assume chairmanship of the Council in 2015. During Sweden’s chairmanship (2011–2013), Brzezinski noted, a trifold balance was pursued with great success. These involved: (1) sustainable economic growth, (2) the protection of indigenous populations, and (3) the protection of the environment. He argued that the U.S. chairmanship—whose central theme is “shared opportunities, challenges and responsibilities”—should learn from Sweden. First, it should emphasize the safety, security and stewardship of the Arctic Ocean. This means being ready for increasing numbers of tourists to the region, as well as for emergencies such as oil spills that might occur anytime. Second, the U.S. must enhance economic and living conditions. Telecom infrastructure, Brzezinski stressed, is in need of improvement, as is the problem of physical and mental health (i.e. high suicide rates) in the Arctic. Third and finally, the U.S. needs to address impacts of climate change, including those not readily visible. All three of these objectives are central and crucial to a successful U.S. term, said Brzezinski.

Concluding his lecture, Brzezinski noted that we have difficult choices going forward, and the choices made during the U.S. chairmanship of the Arctic Council will matter tremendously. He believed that optimism is not unwarranted, though. Brzezinski quoted President John F. Kennedy: “Where nature makes natural allies of us all, we can demonstrate that beneficial relations are possible even with those with whom we most deeply disagree, and this must someday be the basis of world peace and world law.” In his words, nature can—and should—be a great unifier that facilitates international cooperation and prompts us all into action.

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The Algerian War and the Remaking of France

By Meredith Alaback

On January 29th, Dartmouth hosted Johns Hopkins Associate Professor, Todd Shepard. An author of the book “The Algerian War and the Remaking of France,” Mr. Shepard is a Francophile historian, specializing in post-WWII French Colonialism. His lecture was divided into two, interwoven discussion points. He commenced with the very specific and crucial time in French imperialistic efforts: the Algerian Independence War, and finished with how the combination of the threat of war and French prospects manifested an idea of a “nation-state”.

From 1830 until 1962, the French claimed almost the entirety of northwestern Africa as theirs for the taking. “La Maghreb” consisted of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, with Algeria ultimately becoming the most important territory. Politically, Algeria was viewed as an extension of France outside of its natural borders. In efforts to legitimize their rule, packs of French citizens sailed across the Mediterranean. Men, women, and children, supported by the French government, flocked to Algeria and settled down in hopes of establishing French culture. Although politically incorrect in modern terms, in the 20th century these French-African citizens were referred to as “pied-noirs”. Shepard notes that, as to be expected, the difference between the natives and the Frenchmen were great. After the recent establishment of “un perspectif laique” (secular perspective) under the first Revolution, the French government essentially banned the inquiry of religion in political situations. For the historically native Muslim population, this idea of separation of religion and state was foreign and unwanted.

Common ethnic disparities were another point of contingency. French men and women were endowed with certain rights from the French government overseas, while the locals were not given such benefits. Up until 1952 (the start of the Algerian Independence War), Shepard explains, the most legitimate right that the French gave to the natives was the title of “French Citizen”. Nevertheless, there were varying degrees of “citizenship” that undeniably continued the discrimination. After years of repression and unequal rights, the Algerians finally rebelled. The rebellion was anticipated, Shepard suggests, and the French did not go down without a fight.

As mentioned earlier, Mr. Shepard focused on the 1940s-1960s; better referred to as the end of the Fourth Republic and the beginning of the Fifth Republic. After the Second World War, the French emphasized the benefits of federalism and their pursuit of a super-national connection. The idea was to create a “Grand Ensemble” or super-nation, erasing the identity of being a “colonial power.” A super-nation would have continued in its dominance of non-domestic territories, only it would have been more humanistic. Ultimately, it was a justification to retain the colonizing life-style that the French had been enjoying for over a hundred years. Allegedly through Federalism, Algerians would be given more sovereignty despite the evident linguistic, religious, and ethnic divide. They would only be given this increase in power on the promise of a continued French executive power.
Thus, Algeria became an experiment. Mr. Shepard discussed that many of the social reforms and promotions that are incorporated into the modern French government were first inserted in Algeria for “testing.” This testing did not last very long, however, as de Gaulle entered the political scene. The messiness of the Fourth Republic was soon replaced with the much needed “cleanup” from the Fifth Republic. As much as he tried to resist, after four years into the French Presidency and eight years of an Algerian Revolution, de Gaulle eventually came to the reluctant conclusion of Algerian Independence.
Shepard finished his detail-oriented presentation with a final, interesting addition to the story: Algerian archives were most detailed during French occupation. Although there is an abundance of information in these archives, there will unfortunately always be a lacking in local Muslim records during this crucial Northwest African period. Overall, Shepard’s presentation elucidated France’s history regarding its rule of Algeria, and how its loss of the colony majorly shaped French politics.

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A Cautious Optimism: Jake Sullivan Expounds on Potential for International Agreements and Bipartisan Compromise in Conversation with Daniel Benjamin

By Bryan Thomson

On January 28th, Daniel Benjamin, director of the Dickey Center for International Understanding, introduced Mr. Sullivan as one of the few people in Washington who everyone knows by a single name – “Jake.” The youngest-ever Director of Policy Planning for the Secretary of State (Hillary’s Ear), Mr. Sullivan assisted Secretary Clinton, and later Vice-President Biden, on a host of critical national security issues for over five years. Even after stepping down from his influential roles in the Obama Administration to teach at Yale Law School, Mr. Sullivan has continued to utilize his policy-crafting and diplomatic expertise in the ongoing Iranian nuclear talks.

The current political and economic context of American foreign policy is simultaneously uplifting and dispiriting – the dollar is strong, oil is cheap and relations with countries like Iran and Cuba are more promising than anytime in recent memory. Yet, ongoing, ‘frozen’ civil wars in Syria and Ukraine, rising tensions with Russia and whispers of the looming possibility of a Cold-War style confrontation with China leave many skeptical about America’s security and ability to support democratic peace and international economic cooperation. After spending years working on these issues in over 100 different countries and 150 different cities, Mr. Sullivan has interpreted these conflicting indicators as a confirmation that America must be firm in her resolve to support like-minded democracies and liberal market economies. Mr. Sullivan explains, that with a strong and consistent foreign policy that prioritizes American security and alliances with like-minded states, the U.S. is poised to excel in the coming years as a moral and economic leader.

Mr. Sullivan’s policy decisions are formed by a convincing pragmatism built on a realist understanding of the modern international system. Mr. Sullivan claims that, in the recent successful multilateral sanctions of Iran, “countries are coming at this from their own self-interest.” Because “the United States has made this a high priority,” Mr. Sullivan asserts, “I think countries have responded to that.” Touting the recent breakthroughs in the nuclear talks with the country, Sullivan notes how even the Russians and Chinese have come on board to put pressure on Iran for a solution. The bottom line for Mr. Sullivan in the Iranian case and others is that when the U.S. seeks to improve security worldwide, “all our partners can understand the technological and strategic interests” behind decisions, and policy goals can be realized through cooperation.

In building a new nuclear policy with Iran, the U.S. has strived for “a massive increase of transparency measures” that incentivizes cooperation and permanent progress. Because of ongoing conversations with Iran in Oman over the past two years, Mr. Sullivan and others have ensured with high confidence that the Iranian nuclear program is not “moving forward in any meaningful way.” Now, daily inspector access is granted, and joint European and American pressure through sanctions has been successful in creating the very real possibility for a deal with Iranian leadership. Mr. Sullivan stated, “There is a deal that can give the international community confidence… the world presently lacks confidence… but Iran has been complying.” In addition to the European-American cooperation on Iran, Mr. Sullivan contends that increasing European defense budgets and strengthening the continent’s economic prospects needs to be a major strategic goal of the United States.

Mr. Sullivan also sees hope in the political gridlock of Washington – an issue many have lamented for years. Though bipartisan agreement has been scant in the past decade, a “fair degree of commonality between Congress and the Executive Branch” can and will be found if an agreement with Iran regarding their nuclear program is reached, claims Mr. Sullivan. In defense of this claim, he cited the recent bill to arm Syrian rebels that passed after ISIS increased their territorial holdings in late 2014. Mr. Sullivan argues that, “In moments of crisis, especially in a national security crisis- there still is the wherewithal, not just for parties to come together, but to do so quickly.” While he is “not saying it will be easy,” Mr. Sullivan has “seen enough of the areas where bipartisanship is still possible to believe this can be carried out.”

If Mr. Sullivan is to be believed, a new type of American exceptionalism that acknowledges other countries’ sovereignty and mutual interests has begun to guide policy across the globe. In India, President Obama’s recent visit affirmed that historical Indian “nervousness has been slowly receding.” No longer does the nation feel a disconnect between a strategic partnership with America and her own autonomy. This sentiment applies elsewhere across the globe; America should not think in Cold War terms like ‘spheres of influence’ in the Baltics and Ukraine, but rather encourage deliberated self-determination and participation in the international system. Mr. Sullivan stressed the need to allow Ukraine to choose her own leaders and own path out of civil war – ideally not one that spurns Russia, but embraces the nation’s longstanding ties to both the east and west. At the same time, we must not turn our back on Putin, but rather “offer him an opportunity to choose a different path” in line with both our interests and those of the Russian people.

Though talk of compromise and global integration through increased cooperation may seem idealistic and impractical in the face of seemingly intractable conflicts, Mr. Sullivan cautioned that this path forward is not preordained nor decided by the United States alone. Progress is “driven by state decision-making,” and progress in Iraq must come from Baghdad, movement in Donetsk from Moscow, and peace in the East China Sea from Beijing and Tokyo. However, Mr. Sullivan cautions, “keeping the pressure on Putin is important: it has got to be a high priority… we can’t, at the end of the day, dictate [his choices] for him.” A positive, long-term improvement in American diplomacy worldwide will come from a combination of American willingness to support democratic and economically free states, and leaders like Putin realizing that aggression and hostility “is not a path that will produce anything but problems down the road.” Without both pieces of the solution, this cautious optimism may be sadly misplaced.

The conversation between Mr. Benjamin and Mr. Sullivan ultimately centered on the idea that, as a nation, we must move beyond a “historical amnesia” – the false notion that the United States has ever been a colossus capable of determining the fate of far-flung regions of the world liable to conflict, such as the Middle East, Ukraine, Iran and the South and East China Sea. Our path forward is not one of frequent unilateral action as the world’s policeman – a route that has already proven costly and ineffective –rather, it is one characterized by a capacity to cajole, promote growth and freedom, and to build institutions based on commonalities. The future of our diplomatic relations rests on American moral earnestness and willingness to act in mutual benefit with other nations – from Europe to India and China to even Iran and Russia.