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World Outlook is a student-run journal of international affairs that publishes papers written by undergraduate students. In addition, the journal features interviews with major global thinkers and opinion pieces written by our own staff. Our name and missions are motivated by the words of late Dartmouth President John Sloan Dickey.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

We are a decade and a half into the new millennium and if the importance of the Global South was not already clear it certainly is now. International affairs continue to focus on how events in the Global South are crucial to the security of the Global North. Media headlines in the United States capture progress on the Iranian nuclear deal and worries about Islamist groups in areas throughout the African continent. In this 47th issue of *World Outlook*, we focus on the events in the Global South and how the history, politics, and economic power shape Global North-Global South interaction.

We lead with an insightful correspondence that features a paper by Dartmouth student and *World Outlook* executive editor Freya Jamison. Jamison examines long and short term causes of the civil war in Mali and outlines possible obstacles to peace in the region. This is followed by a letter from Mary Beth Leonard, current US Ambassador to Mali who also served during the 2012 crisis, responding with conclusions drawn from her firsthand experience with the conflict.

In the subsequent paper, Justin Burris of Dartmouth College explores the way in which natural resource multinational corporations manipulate the political apparatuses of their host countries to benefit themselves. Through an examination of the United Fruit Company and De Beers, Burris observes that these multinational corporations always support incumbent authoritarian regimes over a democratic transition.

Amanda Oñate-Trules of Duke University emphasizes the importance of socially conscious music in Latin America to argue that “theory from the south” addresses unequal Global North-Global South power relations.

Our final paper by Angad Kapur of Dartmouth College present another facet of Global North-Global South interaction through his paper on Indo-US relations. Through examination of two periods in the late 20th and early 21st century, Kapur contends that personal political relationships highlighted by respect and understanding are crucial for a successful partnership between India and the United States.

Also in this issue, *World Outlook* is pleased to include an interview with Jake Sullivan, who served as the Director of Policy Planning for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and currently serves as a Senior Advisor for the US Delegation on the Iranian Nuclear Negotiations. He offers insights on Iran, foreign policy, and diplomacy.

We conclude this issue with op-eds by Dartmouth writers that focus on two different conflicts in the Global South. First, Zachary Benton Nelson looks at the causes of the Rwanda March 23 Movement and how the Congolese state and international community would have averted or mitigated the conflict. Next, Theodore Minerva discusses the need to clarify the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a definite interstate dispute to increase the chances of achieving a resolution.

The contents of this issue broadly addresses the interplay between the Global North and the Global South. We hope you enjoy reading this issue — which represents an outstanding collection of original scholarship and content on the state of global affairs — as much as we enjoyed producing it.

Thanks for reading,
Feyaad Allie & Liz Lin

THE 2012 MALI UPRISING: GRIEVANCE, OPPORTUNITY, AND COMMITMENT PROBLEMS

Freya Jamison

In 2012 the central government of Mali was threatened by ethnic separatists in the country's northern region. The separatist movement enjoyed the support of international terrorist organizations and posed a serious threat to governance in Mali. This paper examines the long and short term causes of the civil war, then enumerates spoilers to lasting peace in the region. The conclusions of the paper are based on academic literature, but general theories about civil war can only go so far in explaining war on a case-by-case basis. Mary Beth Leonard, U.S. Ambassador to Mali during the 2012 crisis, responds to the piece with insights that could only be gained by someone experiencing the conflict firsthand. Ultimately, she is optimistic about a stable future in Mali, provided the international community continues to dedicate diplomatic, financial and material resources to the conflict's resolution.

WHY WAR, WHY NOW?

Although often lauded as a model of stable democracy in Africa, Mali is no stranger to armed conflict. For more than fifty years, tensions have existed between the central government in Bamako and the Tuaregs, a nomadic Berber people inhabiting the country's northern regions. A civil war began in March 2012 as rebels captured the major northern provinces of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. In April of the same year, Tuareg rebels, in partnership with radical Islamist groups Ansar al-Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), declared the Independent State of Azawad in Mali's northern region. Considering the country's long and turbulent history, why did conflict escalate to war in 2012 and not before?

Neither greed nor grievance is a sufficient explanation for war in this case. Instead, the conflict was caused by the convergence of long-standing political grievances with opportunities unique to the 2012 environment: governance collapse, the effects of the Libyan civil war, and the rise of Islamist groups in the region.

In this paper, I first establish political exclusion as the ideological motivation of the Tuareg rebels, and then expand upon the short-term factors that made war possible in 2012. Next, I point to international Islamist groups as the main impediment to a durable peace process. Finally, I posit that war could have been avoided through effective implementation of the 1992 National Pact. The case study of Mali demonstrates the destabilizing power of commitment problems and underscores the importance of third parties to the enforcement of peace negotiations.

Freya Jamison is a sophomore at Dartmouth College and is double majoring in Government and Arabic. She is interested in international law, peacebuilding, and gender equality, and plans on attending law school upon graduation. This paper was written in fall 2014 for Professor Jeffrey Friedman for his class on Civil War, Insurgency, and the International Response.

CAUSING THE CONFLICT: GRIEVANCE AND OPPORTUNITY

IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS

Tuareg grievances are deeply political. Following the independence of many African countries in the 1960s, Tuareg communities were excluded from the political and economic benefits of the newly formed West African governments.¹ The First Tuareg Rebellion (1962-64) was a response to the discriminatory modernization policies of the southern ethnic groups that dominated the government in Bamako. In the Second Tuareg Rebellion (1990-94), rebels complained of human rights abuses and the government's intentional withholding of food relief following severely disruptive droughts. These uprisings struggled to consolidate strategy, promote recruitment, and coordinate leadership² and were consequently crushed by government forces.

The repeated failure of peace settlements following these early conflicts created further distrust between the Tuaregs and the government, causing the rebels to escalate their demands from fair political representation to total autonomy. Stewart points to complaints about the speed and fairness of rebel reintegration into the military following the 1992 National Pact as a contributing factor to this loss of faith in the government.³ This disaffection led to the formation of the National Liberation Movement of Azawad (known by its French acronym MNLA) in the late 1990s. The MNLA's stated aim is the creation of an independent Tuareg state called Azawad in the country's north.⁴ One of the MNLA's first acts was freeing a group of Nigerian Tuaregs who had been arrested for protesting government capture of French aid,⁵ suggesting that political ideology was at the root of their formation.

Some scholars question the political motivation of the rebels, pointing instead to supply-induced scarcity (the degradation and depletion of an environmental resource) as the cause of Tuareg aggression. Mabutt (1984) and Oldeman, Hakkeling, and Sombroek (1990) cite the 'desertification' of the Sahel, claiming that forest areas in West Africa are undergoing natural transition from farmland to savannah and then desert, disrupting the agricultural land on which the Tuaregs base their livelihoods.⁶ Benjaminsen calls these studies into question, challenging their methodology. More credibly, these policies incited further political grievances. Krings argues that Tuareg grievances *are* related to the disruption of agricultural lifestyles, but due to harmful agricultural policies of the 1960s-1980s rather than environmental change. An unintended consequence of these policies was the mass migration of unemployed young men to Libya, one of the destabilizing factors that primed the country for war in 2012 (discussed later in this paper). Additionally, the embezzlement of relief funds aimed at alleviating the economic effects of the droughts of the 1970s instead caused public outrage among the (predominantly Tuareg) intended recipients of this aid. The embezzled funds were used for the construction of "drought castles" in the wealthier parts of Bamako,⁷ a public flaunting of the government's power and indifference toward the Tuaregs.

ENABLING FACTORS

Political grievance among the Tuareg is a necessary backdrop to the 2012 conflict, but does not sufficiently explain why grievances did not manifest into war for decades. In 2012, the balance of power in Mali shifted to favor the rebels, who chose to go to war rather than to negotiate from their position of strength. This choice may have been due to rebel disillusionment with the government's willingness to commit to concessions in the past. Three factors, unique to the Malian environment in 2012, catalyzed this discontent into war.

First, governance collapse inhibited the capacity of the Malian government to prevent the rebel offensive. Jones points to two governance problems that characterize a weak state with emerging anarchy: inability of the government to provide essential services to the population, and inability of state security forces to establish law and order.⁸ Both of these conditions were present in Mali at the start of the civil war. A 2013 report by the Congressional Research Service describes the weakness of the government in Bamako, citing "hollowed out state institutions," "a national recession and revenue crisis," and "a regional food security crisis, exacerbated by populations displacements."⁹ These conditions satisfy the first criteria of a weak state. On March 22, 2012, President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a military coup due to concerns that the leader was not doing enough to combat the northern rebels.¹⁰ The coup left the country and army deeply divided, inhibiting the effectiveness of state security forces and fulfilling the second of Jones' criteria. The rebels saw an unprecedented opportunity to attack, and they launched their offensive less than one week after President Touré was ousted.

Rebel fighters enjoyed unprecedented internal cohesion and military strength due to the outflow of weapons and fighters following the Libyan civil war. Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi provided active support for disaffected Tuaregs, offering them payment to join his counterrevolutionary army.¹¹ This offer of steady income and housing appealed to many of the approximated 150,000 externally displaced Malians, who sought refuge in neighboring countries. By the end of the Libyan war in December 2011, 11,230 of these migrants had returned to Mali from Libya.¹² Included in this group was a new generation of "well educated, internet savvy and youthful revolutionaries"¹³ who were well versed in revolutionary philosophy and able to communicate in an inclusive and intelligent manner—the strong and cohesive leadership that had been missing from previous revolts. An influx of weapons accompanied the mass migration of people as unsecured Libyan arsenals were raided and sold along Saharan trafficking routes.¹⁴ By early 2012, the MNLA had access to "thousands of arms, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons."¹⁵ With these new resources, the MNLA was in a unique position of relative military strength in 2012.

Finally, the rise of Islamist groups in the region allowed the MNLA to establish an alliance of convenience against the government, further shifting the balance of power in their favor. Weak governance allowed the rise of informal trade systems in the north of Mali, greatly benefiting the drug and human trafficking operations that had been expand-

ing exponentially in the region since 2006. The profit-seeking international Islamist groups AQIM and MOJWA took advantage of this opportunity to establish economic footholds in the region. Latin American drug cartels also noticed this security vacuum and, in partnership with AQIM, increasingly used West Africa as a transit point to smuggle cocaine to European markets.¹⁶ The Islamists are well-funded and well-armed (in the past 10 years AQIM has profited more than \$200 million USD from kidnapping and ransom operations alone),¹⁷ and share the Tuaregs' goal of keeping Bamako out of the affairs of the north, making them desirable partners for the MNLA. To the Tuareg rebels, Islamist groups provided external support that they had never enjoyed in the past.

TERROR IN THE SAHEL: ISLAMIST GROUPS AS A SPOILER TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

It should be noted that international Islamist groups AQIM and MOJWA are the main impediments to negotiated peace in Mali because, unlike the Tuareg separatists, they have no legitimate interest in a durable settlement. The Bamako government can offer little to the foreign terrorist groups who have no historical claim to the country. In fact, a stable government would actually limit their ability to exploit illegal economic operations in the region. It is hard to imagine a future of cohabitation with the Islamists because their long-term aims are inherently incompatible with the secular goals of both the state and the MNLA. While 90% of the Malian population is Muslim, there is a high likelihood of future conflict between the Sufi majority and the Wahhabi rebel groups - who practice a much more fundamentalist interpretation of Islam calling for the destruction of Sufi shrines¹⁸ - once a settlement deal is reached.

An important distinction must be made between AQIM and MOJWA, who aim to exploit not only Mali, but also the entire region for material gain, and local Islamist movement Ansar al-Dine, which grew out of an MNLA faction and has regional motivations only.¹⁹ Ansar al-Dine is led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a former MNLA leader who split from the group after losing an election for a leadership role in the organization; although his claimed goals are religious, it is likely that this rhetoric is affected as a tool to rally public support and that his true aims are much less radical. Negotiation with Ansar al-Dine is a realistic option for the Malian government.

In light of current circumstances, it is highly unlikely that the Malian government will be able to regain military control of the region and oust the Islamists without external support. AQIM has established deep roots among the local population through intermarriage and acting as a sort of Islamic charity, providing money, medicine, and SIM cards to the inhabitants of northern Mali.²⁰ AQIM's relationship with the locals will make their removal very difficult without a sustained and informed effort. An international counterterrorism campaign is necessary to remove the Islamist threat before an effective peace deal can be reached; otherwise, any negotiated settlement is not likely to be sustainable.

PREVENTING WAR: FAILURE TO EXECUTE THE 1992 NATIONAL PACT

The 2012 civil war may have been avoided with more effective implementation of the 1992 National Pact, which was well designed but poorly executed. The Pact came about as the result of the Tamanrasset Accords of January 1991 intended to end the hostilities of the Second Tuareg Uprising. The government of the Republic of Mali and the representative of the United Movements and Fronts of the Azawad were party to the agreement. The National Pact included provisions that would have directly addressed the main grievances of the separatist rebels and prevented the rise of short-term conflict enablers, including the disarmament and demobilization of combatant and their integration into the Malian armed and civilian forces, the construction of infrastructure in the north to increase investment and catalyze development, and the allocation of “special status” to the three northern provinces of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal.²¹ The deal also promised the allocation of 43.7% of the national budget to the north for development efforts.²²

The failed implementation of the 1992 National Pact was partly intentional (lack of political will) and partly a consequence of strained economic resources. Seely²³ contends that policies of decentralization in the 1990s (including the “special status” provision of the National Pact) were a rational response to prevent separatist movements in the north. President Komaré reasoned that the promise of increased autonomy would placate the rebels, but he had no actual intention of following through with the policies. Even if the government did have the political will to carry out the deal, it did not have the means to do so effectively. At the time, the Malian government faced severe pressure from the International Monetary Fund to cut expenditures, which conflicted with its promise to take on incredibly costly projects such as the reintegration of ex-combatants into civil and military society.²⁴

The international community could have feasibly avoided these enforcement problems with the provision of a third party enforcer and a substantial financial commitment. Multiple international actors had an interest in a stable Mali and could act as monitors and enforcers to the settlement. The nations of ECOWAS, a West African regional security organization, have an interest in avoiding a refugee crisis, the spread of crime to their own nations, and rebellions of their own Tuareg populations. France, Mali’s former colonial power, has significant economic interests in neighboring Nigeria and therefore an interest in promoting security in the region. Small, successful projects that were executed as a result of the National Pact show how economic aid has been a successful tool for building peace in the north. For example, PAREM, a U.N. funded program, offered \$600-700 grants to ex-combatants for projects focused on “livestock, agriculture, commerce, services, and other livelihoods.”²⁵ PAREM successfully channeled money into the northern economy but was constrained by limited management and financial resources.

AVERTING SHORT-TERM ENABLERS WITH THE 1992 NATIONAL PACT

Effective implementation of the 1992 National Pact would have prevented all

three of the factors that triggered civil war in 2012. First, governance collapse would have been avoided because the army would not have been divided over the “Tuareg question,” the cause of the military coup against President Touré. Instead, the semi-autonomous north would be responsible for its own governance and policing, allowing the government in Bamako to devote its limited resources to development (rather than military) spending. Secondly, if Tuaregs had reasonable economic opportunity and a stake in their local government, the offer of a position in armies like Gadhafi’s would be considerably less enticing, preventing the mass return of armed rebels following the Libyan civil war. Finally, a stable north would have prevented the blossoming of illegal economies and the subsequent foreign Islamist presence in the north. Even if Tuareg grievances were not satisfied by the peace deal, the MNLA would be much less likely to incite a war without the confidence offered by the partnership with the well-armed and well-funded religious organizations.

A STABLE FUTURE? CREATING LASTING PEACE IN MALI

Although trust between the two main parties has been compromised due to the repeated failure of past settlements, there is hope for a new treaty to succeed. This is because the government and the MNLA have a shared interest in a stable country and a shared enemy in the Islamist groups. At this point, both sides have incurred significant costs, whereas in past uprisings, the rebels presented a much less intimidating threat to the government. For a new deal to succeed, international intervention (by France, ECOWAS, the African Union, or a multilateral effort) is necessary both to combat terrorism and to ensure that the deal is enforced. Long-term stability will also require significant investment in developing legal economies in the north.

IMPLICATIONS: RESOLVING COMMITMENT PROBLEMS IN CIVIL WAR

Studying Mali’s 2012 civil war is valuable because it demonstrates that even the most thorough and comprehensive peace deal is useless if both parties do not have an incentive to see it carried out. Walter posits that in order for a peace deal to succeed, it must include provisions of both benefit and harm.²⁶ There was no threat of harm to the Malian government if it did not follow through on its promises in the 1992 National Pact. Yet one should have come from an outside party with vested interests in the region, as the presence of an external enforcer has proven successful in the past. Walter points to the transition from white minority rule to governance by a local majority in Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) as a case in which a commitment problem was overcome by the presence of an outside actor (Britain). The lessons of Mali’s troubled history should inform future decision-making about conflict resolution within the country and can contribute to social science debates about civil war settlement.

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AMBASSADOR'S RESPONSE:

Freya Jamison has done an admirable job in gathering the elements of domestic rebellion, terrorist incursion, failings of governance, and regional instability that conspired to create Mali's multi-faceted crisis beginning in 2012, and at tracing the historical trajectory of Tuareg rebellion to current events.

Reliance solely on English-language sources was perhaps a handicap; she paints an overly direct a line from the 1992 National Pact and the outbreak of war in 2012, without reference, for example, to the unrest that provoked the 2006 Algiers Accords. Nevertheless, her eventual conclusion is only strengthened. Indeed, the serial failures to properly implement the variety of agreements reached between the north and south of Mali remind us of the importance of finally finding success in that endeavor. The stakes have only grown higher over time, and security and prosperity for all Malians must inevitably pass through a durable agreement that ends instability in northern Mali, facilitates development and economic growth, and reduces the space for extremists who would use the north and its instability as a safe haven. Whether the issue is counter-terrorism or counter-narcotics, progress is inherently a long-term and regional affair. The international community including the United States has been eager to support Mali in recovering from its recent crisis both for the well-being of Malians and to enable a fruitful partner with its Sahelian neighbors in those long-term tasks.

The current decade's instability brought kaleidoscopic shifts in patterns of allegiance in northern Mali, and my strongest caution flows from her discussion of the links between Tuareg actors and terrorist groups. My personal recollection of evolving events put Iyad Ag Ghali and his Ansar Al-Dine, for example, at the nexus of the opportunistic alliance with AQIM that delivered northern Mali into terrorist control. Although Miss Jamison speculates about the relative approachability of MUJAO and Ansar al-Dine as negotiating partners for the Government of Mali, it is essential to recall that the U.S. Government formally designated both groups as terrorist organizations in 2013.

A theme I have stressed since the earliest days of the crisis remains true today: the crucial task is to gather together those many Malians who wish to work for a restoration of a state able to serve the needs of all its citizens. The current draft agreement recently reached in Algiers provides the vehicle

Mary Beth Leonard has been a Foreign Service Officer since 1988. In that time, she has served as an economic and consular officer in various embassies across the African continent. Highlights of her career include Director for West African Affairs at the US Department of State, Deputy of Chief of Mission in Bamako, Mali, and since 2011 has served as US Ambassador to Mali. Ambassador Leonard holds an undergraduate degree from Boston University and graduate degrees from the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and the US Naval War College.

for that process, and the U.S. Government urges all parties to formally adhere to it.

I would turn finally to the paper's diagnosis of insufficient international community support for past peace endeavors in Mali. While much contemplation of the reasons for the failures of past peace agreements attended the run-up to the current draft Algiers agreement - and my personal list also gives weight to complicity in corruption both in Bamako and among northern elites - few would doubt that international support is an essential element to durably resolving Mali's multi-faceted crises of governance, rebellion, and terrorist incursion. Happily, the very prescriptions Miss Jamison raises - a muscled intervention to reverse terrorist's gains in northern Mali and a carefully considered support to both the peace process and development resources - are a reality in Mali today. The initial French intervention of Serval, succeeded by the more regionally based Operation Barkhan is working with regional partners, efforts for which the U.S. has been proud to provide enabling support. The umbrella of the United Nations presence, MINUSMA, provides a forum for diplomatic and material support - and yes, pressure - to the peace process and its implementation.

In 2015, Mali stands with the most significant diplomatic, financial, and material resources to ever accompany the goal of durably resolving long-standing questions of Tuareg aspirations. Success in that long elusive goal is a key element in Mali's long-term prosperity, stability, and ability to act as a solid partner with its neighbors to address shared challenges. We urge all parties to take advantage of this unique moment of broad international support to build a lasting peace.

-MARY BETH LEONARD, US AMBASSADOR TO MALI

BANANAS, DIAMONDS, AND REGIME CHANGE: THE AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES OF THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY AND DE BEERS

Justin Burris

Throughout the twentieth century, multinational extractors of natural resources (NRMNCs) routinely manipulated the political apparatuses of their host countries in their favor. Despite the considerable variation in the nature of NRMNC-host country relationships, one feature remains constant. There not a single case in which an early twentieth century NRMNC supported a democratic power transition in one of its host countries as opposed to an incumbent authoritarian regime. Why did twentieth century NRMNCs uniformly supported authoritarian regimes in their host countries? The common histories of the United Fruit Company and De Beers suggest that although authoritarian regimes were better suited to deliver certain benefits than their democratic counterparts, NRMNCs ultimately possessed little agency in determining the regime type of their host countries. Instead, circumstances outside of NRMNCs' control were ultimately responsible for keeping authoritarian regimes in power.

I. INTRODUCTION

The mercantile companies of the Early Modern period possessed nearly all of the powers of sovereignty. Chartered companies such as the Dutch East India Company and Hudson's Bay Company could raise armies, declare war, mint currency, enter treaties, and govern their fellow nationals. While these erstwhile giants were largely extinct or neutered beyond recognition by the end of the 1800s, multinational extractors of natural resources (NRMNCs, short for "natural resource multinational corporations") resurrected the practice of politically interventionist economic colonialism during the early twentieth century. Although these multinational corporations did not enjoy the quasi-sovereign legal status of their forebears, they did attempt to approximate operating by governmental decree and routinely supported authoritarian regimes in their host countries. While the invariable tendency of NRMNCs to support authoritarian leaders is clear, the circumstances that compelled them to do so are not. Why is there not a single case in which an early twentieth century NRMNC supported a democratic power transition as opposed to an authoritarian regime?

The fact that NRMNCs uniformly supported authoritarian leaders in the early twentieth century makes it impossible to empirically examine the causal significance of structural factors. However, the empirical cases of the United Fruit Company (UFCO) in Latin America and De Beers in Africa reveal a set of conditions that both motivated NRMNCs to support authoritarian regimes in their host countries and also impinged on their effectiveness in doing so. UFCO and De Beers were domiciled in different countries, operated on different continents, trafficked in extremely differ-

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ent commodities, and had entirely different operating structures, yet both companies engaged in relatively similar patterns of behavior. Formed in the 1899 merger of several competing tropical fruit-trading businesses, UFCO was a Boston-based grower, transporter, and marketer of bananas. The company controlled vast expanses of Latin America and operated the most extensive logistics network of its time. Originally chartered by Cecil Rhodes under the auspices of the British Empire, De Beers is a pan-African NRMNC focused on the extraction, refinement, marketing, and sale of diamonds. For much of the twentieth century, the German-Jewish Oppenheimer family controlled De Beers and led a global cartel of diamond producers that inflated diamond prices by artificially limiting supply. The common histories of UFCO and De Beers suggest that although NRMNCs stood to benefit from currying the favor of their host governments—and authoritarian regimes were better suited to deliver certain advantages than their democratic counterparts—NRMNCs ultimately possessed little capacity to determine the regime type of their host nations.

By virtue of their very presence, NRMNCs strengthened the authoritarian bargain by which undemocratic leaders persevered in their domination of the state.¹ However, this repercussion was incidental to the essential operations of NRMNCs, and did not constitute an active choice on their part. Moreover, because NRMNCs' investments were fixed and non-lootable, the companies had to bargain to forestall their hosts' expropriation of their hostage assets and possessed scant latitude to make additional requests.^{2,3} Even the newfound wealth arising from the influx of NRMNC's foreign direct investment (FDI) dollars bore little impact on regime type, as rising levels of income do not trigger democratic transitions⁴ and primary sector investment does not directly result in political liberalization.⁵ Lastly, powerful nations such as the United States tapped their domiciled NRMNCs in the service of their own initiatives for political, economic, and ideological hegemony.

The toolkit of democratization is slow-acting and uncertain. However, NRMNCs stood to gain little even if they were able to precipitate a democratic transition in one of their host countries. Authoritarian regimes could provide an abundance of docile labor at controlled rates, rewrite tax codes, and guarantee monopoly rents.⁶ While the preponderance of veto players in an electoral democracy might have fostered policy stability that would prevent disruptions to NRMNCs' operations and increase contract stickiness,⁷ these benefits were offset by an attendant pitfall. Each veto player also represented an incremental actor that NRMNCs would have had to integrate into their patronage networks.⁸ Co-optation was not always an inexpensive endeavor. Similarly, while audience costs might have deterred democratic leaders from reneging on contracts, the fickleness of popular opinion made it a dangerous instrument to rely upon.⁹ NRMNCs had compelling reasons to prefer authoritarian regimes in their host countries, but circumstances outside of their control were responsible for keeping these regimes in power.

II. EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP

Despite the richness of anecdotal cases to draw upon, social scientists have performed relatively little direct analysis on the capacity of NRMNCs to effect regime type. This may be due to the impossibility of performing comparative statistical analysis on cases with such similar historical outcomes or the opacity of NRMNCs' private communications. However, social scientists have proposed numerous theories with consequences that predestine or preclude NRMNCs from effecting regime type regardless of their intentions.

The most famous of these theories is Michael Ross' resource curse hypothesis. According to the resource curse, resource wealth retards long-term economic growth and shores up the regime durability of whoever is in power—whether authoritarian or democratic.¹⁰ Politically, leaders of states with natural resource wealth are able to provide more public services per dollar of tax revenue, creating a cushion of popular contentment¹¹ that allows leaders to be more cavalier to the preferences of their citizens. This political buffer develops regardless of the source of non-tax or the type of regime that receives it, but for different reasons depending on regime type.^{12,13} Resource rents allow democracies to persist by augmenting popular support.¹⁴ However, in the case of authoritarian regimes, increases in resource rents neither inspire nor subvert democratic opposition movements. Instead, resource rents decrease the turnover of authoritarian leadership as profits can be diverted to co-opt would-be contenders to the throne.¹⁵ Taken as a whole, this body of literature suggests that state leaders of the Latin American and African recipients of UFCO and De Beers' FDI were preconditioned to persist regardless of NRMNC involvement.

Raymond Vernon's obsolescing bargain model offers a valuable framework for understanding the relationships between NRMNCs and their host states that largely supersedes the more traditional race to the bottom thesis. The race to the bottom thesis posits that MNCs (*multinational corporations*) hold the power in the MNC-host relationship, as they can dangle the promise of an influx of foreign investment dollars to force potential hosts to compete to offer concessions to attract them.¹⁶ While the race to the bottom thesis may explain the MNC-host relationship prior to investment, the moment that an MNC plants its fixed investments in a state, these dynamics are instantly reversed. Once the investment is made, the threat of expropriation shifts the upper hand in negotiations from the MNC to the host country. At this point, even the terms of the initial deal are up for re-negotiation, as the host country effectively holds the MNCs' assets as hostage.¹⁷ The implications of the obsolescing bargain model are particularly dire for UFCO and De Beers, as their extractive investments are massive and immobile. Unlike a manufacturing concern, which might simply vacate a factory and relocate production, the cost of the next best alternative is nearly incalculable for NRMNCs pursuing specific, hard-to-find resources that require large, sunk investments to extract.

One final body of literature pertaining to MNC-host relations is David Gibbs' business conflict model. In this model, Gibbs seeks to demonstrate that rela-

tions between states are often just a theater for relations between states and companies.¹⁸ Gibbs argues that international diplomacy is neither driven by states' national nor ideological interests, but by the economic interests of their domiciled companies. According to Gibbs, if an American company favors intervention, its CEO simply calls up a government policymaker—a former general counsel, perhaps—to advocate for a military deployment.¹⁹ It is readily apparent that Gibbs' model resembles conspiracy theories at their most cynical, yet the evidence needed to prove or refute the prevalence of these activities is disarmingly scarce. While it is incontrovertible that wealthier citizens possess more avenues to articulate their preferences than their poorer fellow nationals²⁰, even Gibbs admits that “[scholars] can only infer motivation from circumstantial evidence.”²¹ The extent to which back room politics actually resemble the cut and dry graft Gibbs described is hopelessly enshrouded by history and clandestine interactions.²²

Despite the abundance of literature on the subject of historical globalization, only Daniel Litvin's *Empires of Profit* provides a thorough treatment of NRMNC-host country relations that links De Beers to UFCO and even more contemporary companies. Litvin's central contention is that NRMNCs have a bad habit of finding themselves in situations they aren't fully prepared for, and that their political entanglements in their host countries are often the product of friction between misguided ambitions and more prickly realities.²³ Litvin's work has informed my own understanding of NRMNC-host country relations, particularly as they exhibit heavy-handed realpolitik and cultural insensitivity.

III. INHERITORS OF CIRCUMSTANCE

A. THE INCUMBENCY-FAVORING RESOURCE CURSE

Despite their immense wealth, twentieth-century NRMNCs were nearly powerless in determining the regime type of their host countries. As former De Beers chairman Nicky Oppenheimer pronounced in 1999, “natural resources are morally neutral. As such, they can be a source of great good or dreadful ill. The key element is not the resource itself, but how it is exploited.”²⁴

In similar fashion, the literature on the resource curse suggests that the incumbent leadership of resource-rich nations is likely to endure, regardless of the type of regime in place or the type of resource being extracted.²⁵ The resource curse doesn't favor democratization or authoritarianism; it simply preserves the political status quo of its afflicted countries.²⁶ The feature that made the resource-rich states of Latin America and Africa so conducive to rentier politics was that resources were being extracted at all, so that state revenues were decoupled from the countries' overall levels of economic development.²⁷

The primary factor in determining the ratio of public goods per tax dollar is the sequence of institutionalization vs. natural resource wealth.²⁸ If resource wealth arrives before political institutions are fully developed, resource-rich elites will ensure that the ensuing institutions that do emerge serve to line their pockets further, and

the resource curse will set in.²⁹ If, on the other hand, states build institutions with provisions for revenue redistribution well before they have any revenue to account for, their institutions are more likely to promote egalitarian socio-economic development.³⁰

The case of UFCO's involvement in Guatemala provides a textbook example of how the resource curse can set a country down a path of authoritarian persistence. When UFCO arrived in Guatemala in 1901, the company discovered a quasi-feudal system where a small handful of elite families controlled the vast majority of the nation's arable territory.³¹ There were virtually no political institutions to speak of, aside from the joint bureaucratic-civic apparatus of reigning dictator Manuel Estrada Cabrera. Cabrera believed that the development of a chief export was the best antidote for Guatemala's backward economy, and that military-backed authoritarian rule offered a swifter path to transforming the country into an export-oriented powerhouse than any political alternative.³²

Following from this belief, in 1904, Cabrera struck a deal with Minor Keith, co-founder of UFCO. Cabrera offered UFCO a bounty of significant concessions, including exclusive postal rights between Guatemala and the U.S., land grants at a nominal price, and a 99-year lease to operate the Atlantic portion of Guatemala's national railway.³³ In return, UFCO would enlist its engineering talent to construct Guatemala's national railway and would pay the country's government a small fraction of its Guatemala-derived revenues. Although Cabrera never elucidated his full intentions in writing, the dictator also hoped that an alliance with UFCO would signal tacit U.S. military support for his regime and deter would-be coup-plotters.³⁴

From the moment the ink dried until Guatemala's democratic transition in 1986, the country's political environment was dominated by a series of dictators backed by the country's chief source of revenue—its relationship with UFCO.³⁵ UFCO worked with whatever regime was in power when it arrived. Due to the fact that Guatemala did not have any pre-existing guarantees for rent redistribution, the country's citizens languished under authoritarian rule for over three quarters of a century.

The implications of the resource curse are considerably more complex in the case of De Beers' involvements on the African continent. In some countries, De Beers' diamond mines cemented the incumbent leadership in power for decades, while in other countries, mineral rents had virtually no effect on regime durability whatsoever. While the dire politics of Rhodesia in the twentieth century stemmed at least partially from the country's mineral wealth, the vaunted history of Botswana typifies the serendipitous potential for countries to sidestep the resource curse entirely.

In Rhodesia, De Beers itself was responsible for building state institutions. When Cecil Rhodes originally received his charter for the British South Africa Company (the precursor to De Beers), his intent was to "provide an administrative and transport infrastructure, but otherwise... take its profits [through distributions]."³⁶ Under company rule, the Rhodesian state spawned little endogenous institutional de-

velopment and relied entirely upon Rhodes' beneficence. Even later, in the 1920s, Rhodesia's railways, mines, and press were all owned by the Oppenheimer-controlled De Beers.³⁷ Company influence was so pervasive in the nascent state that "the average [congressional] session of the twenties resembled more a well-conducted shareholders' meeting than a national convention."³⁸ Just as Rhodesia belonged to De Beers, De Beers belonged to Rhodesia as well. The company filled a power vacuum and shepherded the country through its first decades of existence, operating the railroad that was so essential to the isolated resource-based economy.³⁹ As time progressed, De Beers overstayed its welcome; the company's formidable presence crowded out the development of alternative economic and political institutions in the state.⁴⁰ But Rhodesia's misfortune was not common to all of De Beers' host countries.

According to a World Bank study, "the case of Botswana illustrates how a natural resource curse is not necessarily the fate of all resource abundant countries, and that prudent economic management can help avoid or mitigate the detrimental effects of the resource curse."⁴¹ Prior to declaring its independence from Britain in 1966, Botswana instituted provisions for revenue sharing in its election manifesto, which were reinforced in the country's 1967 Mines and Minerals Act that transferred all mineral rights to the central government.⁴² Importantly, Botswana implemented these measures a full four years before the country struck its joint venture mining partnership with De Beers, and half a decade before the Orapa mine opened and diamond wealth really began to pour into the country.^{43,44,45} Because Botswana's redistributive institutions preceded the advent of resource rents, the proceeds of the country's diamond mines were allocated relatively uniformly throughout the country and the country was able to sidestep the political implications of the resource curse. However, Botswana is a historical accident. Despite the country's apparent success, De Beers narrow-mindedly collaborated with whatever regime served as a gatekeeper between the company and the country's natural resources.⁴⁶ In the case of Botswana, democracy endured simply because it got there first.

B. HANDS TIED BY THE OBSOLESCING BARGAIN MODEL

The evolving relationships between NRMNCs and their host governments is governed by the principles of the obsolescing bargain model. From the very moment that an NRMNC plants fixed investments in a foreign state, it has to bargain with its host government to preempt national expropriation of its hostage assets. Any non-essential requests that an NRMNC makes of a host country—particularly those relating to a subject as fundamental as regime type—would subvert the company's negotiating leverage that might otherwise be devoted towards the retention of its assets.⁴⁷

The rate at which the bargain between an NRMNC and its host obsolesces is best expressed as a function of the investor's remaining profit potential from its hostage investments and the degree to which its host country cares about its ongoing reputation as a hospitable place to do business.⁴⁸ Countries with a diverse array of unexhausted exportable resources have more incentive to preserve their reputation in

order to attract further FDI in the future. Both UFCO and De Beers contended with single natural resource states that felt that the bulk of their extractive potential had already been accounted for.

UFCO's demeanor during the early 1950s reign of Guatemalan leftist dictator Jacobo Arbenz epitomizes the patterns of behavior that the obsolescing bargain model predicts. Although Guatemala had often held the title of UFCO's single largest banana-producing country, Guatemala grew particularly important to UFCO as the middle of the century drew near.⁴⁹ In the preceding decades, Panama Disease swept from Costa Rica in both north and south directions. The fungal disease caused specimens of Big Mike, the dominant strain of bananas at the time, to wither and die before they could be harvested. By the early 1950s, Guatemala, along with parts of Colombia and Ecuador, were the only growing regions that remained unsullied.⁵⁰

During Arbenz' short tenure from 1951 to 1954, the dictator launched a series of leftist reforms that injured UFCO's interests in Guatemala.⁵¹ However, despite UFCO's displeasure with Arbenz' reforms, the company refrained from articulating its grievances in order to avoid casting itself as an unwanted guest whom Arbenz would be eager to expel.⁵² Arbenz gave workers the right to form unions.⁵³ He laid out plans for a coast-to-coast highway and a hydroelectric facility that would compete with UFCO's monopolies on transportation and electricity.⁵⁴ UFCO silently suffered insult after insult from Arbenz, hoping that the company's reticence would be rewarded with legislation no more punishing than higher compensation for laborers or increased utility competition.⁵⁵

UFCO's cultivated abstention reflected the strategic importance of its Guatemalan investments and the perceived likelihood of expropriation. Arbenz clearly disregarded Guatemala's international reputation as a favorable business environment, given his coordinated maneuvers towards economic self-sufficiency.⁵⁶ However, Arbenz finally crossed the line in 1952 with the passage of his Agrarian Reform Bill. The bill effectively redistributed Guatemala's large unused plots of land—including the hundreds of thousands of UFCO-owned acreage that lay fallow at any given time during a rotational banana harvest⁵⁷—to the country's peasant population.⁵⁸ The Agrarian Reform Bill constituted exactly the kind of naked act of expropriation that UFCO had been dreading all along. Suddenly, the company had nothing left to lose. It was only at this point that UFCO could play hardball with its host, and begin to set in motion the events that would eventually topple Guatemala's fledgling democracy.

As early as 1925, De Beers faced similar threats of expropriation when the South African parliament passed the Diamond Control Act. This legislation, which permitted the state to nationalize its diamond mines at any point, was designed in order to scare the company into submission.⁵⁹ It succeeded. Even at a much later point, De Beers capitulated bashfully when faced with the threat of expropriation at the hands of the newly independent Namibian state. The pre-independence South African leadership appreciated De Beers as a utensil for apartheid through the establishment of a white capitalist overclass.⁶⁰ On the other hand, the revolutionary

socialist SWAPO party of Namibia believed that De Beers had plundered the country and openly discussed its intentions to nationalize De Beers' mines once elected.⁶¹ However, for the time being, SWAPO'S threats were just hollow words to De Beers. Despite SWAPO'S verbal assaults, De Beers wanted to retain its mines at all costs, and the company was diplomatic in its responses to SWAPO. How could it afford not to remain amicable, in case the party won? De Beers CEO Harry Oppenheimer publicly announced that the company was "prepared to deal with any legitimate government that comes to power"⁶² in Namibia. Oppenheimer occasionally chided party leaders on the perils of communism, but was careful to never equivocate when conveying that he would do whatever it took to keep Namibia in the cartel—with SWAPO in power or not.⁶³

Although SWAPO was not yet in power in the 1980s, the party had a particularly strong negotiating position given De Beers' fragile strategic position at the time. De Beers' business is based on a cartel structure. Via one of its subsidiaries, the company operates a cartel that purchases and resells diamonds sourced from all over the world. In order to preserve the myth of scarcity and inflate diamond prices, De Beers even purchases diamonds produced outside the cartel—sometimes even at a loss.⁶⁴ In cases where a producer broke from the cartel, De Beers would flood the market with diamonds of a similar quality to those of that particular producer, depressing prices and bullying the producer into rejoining the cartel.⁶⁵ However, at the time of Swapo's threats in the late 1970s and early 1980s, De Beers' cartel seemed more precarious than ever.⁶⁶ De Beers' stranglehold on supply had been attenuating ever since the blossoming of an illicit international diamond trade in the early 1970s.⁶⁷ The Soviet Union was openly on the verge of breaking from the cartel, and the secession of a major producer such as Namibia just might have given the Soviets the confidence to leave the cartel for good. Once that happened, the whole cartel was liable to unravel.⁶⁸

Fortunately for De Beers, by the time SWAPO succeeded in gaining Namibian independence in South Africa, the party had recognized that Namibia needed De Beers more than it had previously cared to admit. The fledgling country lacked the capital, equipment, and expertise required to continue extracting and marketing the country's diamond deposits.⁶⁹ As part of its constitution, Namibia included legislative protections against state expropriations, provided that the government was permitted to participate as an equity partner in any extractive endeavors that take place in the country.⁷⁰

C. IN THE CASE OF PRIMARY SECTOR FDI, "NO BOURGEOISIE, NO DEMOCRACY"

Unlike investments in the manufacturing and services sectors, FDI investment in the primary sector of natural resources does not directly produce politically liberalizing effects.⁷¹ While Debora Spar's original formulation of this relationship does not denote the specific mechanisms through which FDI fails political liberalism⁷², the foundational scholarship of Barrington Moore suggests that a robust

middle class is an essential ingredient for democracy. The critical development of a middle class is undermined by the polarizing effect on income that primary sector FDI tends to produce.^{73,74} Although the presence of a middle class is certainly not a sufficient condition for democracy, the heterogeneity of middle class interests provides a tempering influence on policy that moderates extremist politics.⁷⁵ The cases of UFCO and De Beers demonstrate empirically the ways in which primary sector FDI might be intrinsically illiberal (which is not to say anti-liberal). In both instances, company efforts to build institutional stickiness subjugated lower class employees and consequentially undermined democratic state-building efforts.

UFCO sought to “lock-in” its domestic and expatriate employees through the issuance of tender and the development of company towns.⁷⁶ The company paid workers’ wages in a currency that was only accepted at UFCO-owned stores, generating further profits from the sale of merchandise and creating a disincentive for workers to leave the company.⁷⁷ Corporate-issued tender bred a financial feedback loop that was virtuous for the company, but prevented rising incomes from diffusing throughout the country.⁷⁸ Moreover, when carving out plantations from virgin forest, UFCO built an extensive infrastructure for its employees. The company outfitted its demesne with schools, hospitals, churches, and even housing units that were free for its workers—a perk that strengthened UFCO’s ability to justify its grueling working conditions.⁷⁹ However, these facilities came at great cost for the national development of UFCO’s host countries; as soon as the area was no longer useful to the company (perhaps through the arrival of blight), UFCO would abandon and destroy its improvements to encourage workers to pick bananas elsewhere.⁸⁰ As far as the Honduran government was concerned, the country’s national infrastructure was provided by UFCO.⁸¹ However, the company’s offerings were strictly provisional and inadequate substitutes for the long-term solutions that they inevitably forestalled. Stranded without vital public works such as schools and hospitals, the country’s lower classes stagnated in pre-industrial poverty for decades.

In the case of South Africa, the Oppenheimer family supported apartheid throughout much of the twentieth century in order to provide cheap labor for De Beers’ mines. Both Ernest and Harry Oppenheimer “never subscribed to the view that apartheid was morally wrong.”⁸² Recognizing that a disenfranchised black population could provide an endless supply of cheap unskilled labor for its mines, the company conspired with the Afrikaner government to institutionalize the marginalization of blacks in South Africa.⁸³ Harry Oppenheimer’s enthusiastic support for apartheid was not motivated by racial prejudices, but instead by an eagerness to check rising incomes that would erode De Beers’ profits. He hoped for “informal restrictions on... income, education and opportunity,” and repression was simply most politically viable along ethnic lines.⁸⁴ To this end, Oppenheimer personally bankrolled the pro-apartheid Progressive Party beginning in 1959 and was the founding chairman of the South Africa Africa Foundation, which attempted to drum up support for apartheid internationally.⁸⁵ The profitability of De Beers’ mining operations was intimately linked

to the company's wage expenses, and curtailing the political and economic rights of blacks depressed the company's cost basis of extraction. Under apartheid, a segregated South Africa failed to valorize individual liberties, deprived blacks of voting privileges, and violated both electoral and liberal definitions of democracy.

D. FLYING BLIND

When operating in foreign lands, NRMNCs resembled blind giants stumbling in the dark. Employees of UFCO and De Beers were insulated from the broader social, political, and cultural environments of their host countries. Too often, both companies were embroiled in political strife only because their employees were so out of touch with the values of the indigenous populations surrounding them.

Employees of UFCO were separated from the broader currents of Latin American nations both psychologically and spatially. UFCO erected company towns specifically for its expatriate workers, lavishing upon them free housing, education, healthcare, and utilities.⁸⁶ Living in these segregated enclaves, foreign workers rarely encountered UFCO's indigenous pickers.⁸⁷ UFCO simultaneously propagated a belief in its apparent beneficence, spreading the notion that it was a force for modernization throughout the country.⁸⁸ Given this isolation, UFCO's imported workers had no way to discern that the living conditions of workers' villages were any less agreeable than their own. Moreover, dictators such as Guatemala's Jorge Ubico, Honduras' Manuel Bonilla, and Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza gave UFCO's officers every impression that civil discontent with the company (nicknamed *el pulpo*) was *de minimis*, so as not to frighten off future investment.⁸⁹ The political violence that the company committed often stemmed from an ill-founded arrogance that UFCO was the true force behind any positive development that occurred in its host countries, and that dictators who got in its way were justly removed.⁹⁰ Moreover, the few voices of civil discontent that did reach UFCO's ears were those of the countries' elites, who decried UFCO's transportation monopoly but not the company's treatment of workers or political entanglements.⁹¹ However, this disconnect between UFCO and the true sentiments of its indigenous workers ultimately cost the company dearly. The disaffected children of UFCO's beleaguered pickers initiated a wave of liberal revolutions that swept across Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s and robbed the company of much of its holdings.

De Beers was most ignorant of its surrounding social climate during the earliest years of its existence, when it was helmed by Cecil Rhodes. Rhodes harbored a single-minded obsession with keeping ahead of his competitors and gobbled up territory as quickly as he could to keep it out of their hands.⁹² Along the path of expansion, Rhodes struck a deal with Lobengula, the combative ruler of the Matabele Kingdom, who granted De Beers exclusive mining rights to the kingdom's minerals in return for a paltry sum of money and assorted weaponry.⁹³ Lobengula did not recognize the value of these resources or the great extent to which De Beers would infringe upon his territory and lobbied the British crown to discipline Rhodes for his

actions and to annul De Beers' contract with Matabele.⁹⁴ From Rhodes' point of view, Lobengula's actions were not a desperate effort to rectify a cultural misunderstanding. Rather, they constituted a malicious attempt to go over Rhodes' head and break contract.⁹⁵ After the crown sided with Rhodes, Rhodes waited until Lobengula took a single objectionable move—a small race on the neighboring Shona Kingdom—before he dispatched a militia that stripped Lobengula of his power. While De Beers employees were under the impression that they had liberated the Matabele people from the tyrannical Lobengula, they were unaware that the populace actually adored their former leader, and resented De Beers for its actions.⁹⁶ Moreover, no ruler emerged to replace Lobengula as soon as he was deposed. This was not because the kingdom was disbanded, but was instead due to the years-long process by which the Matabele council selected its king.⁹⁷ When no leader appeared, company men looted the Matabele Kingdom and apportioned its bounties amongst themselves, further incensing the Matabele people. After De Beers and its employees (for which it could scarcely be held responsible) unwittingly committed these injustices, the Matabele commenced a series of violent rebellions that only ended after two years of fighting and culminating in De Beers' annexation of the territory.⁹⁸

E. PAWNS OF INTERSTATE POLITICS

In certain instances, NRMNCs did not even intervene politically of their own accord. Instead, NRMNCs' countries of domicile employed their domestic corporations to further their own agendas. The Guatemalan coup of 1954 and De Beers' aggressive expansionism at the turn of the twentieth century may have coincided with the companies' prerogatives, but NRMNCs' violence was endorsed, and in the case of Guatemala even perpetrated, by their parent states.

The matter of UFCO's culpability in the Guatemalan coup of 1954 depends upon just how responsible the company was for generating CIA interest in intervention. Several facts point to a pre-existing US strategic interest in the region that was unswayed by UFCO's lobbying efforts. First, the US had been determined to build a sphere of influence throughout Latin America well before UFCO was even conceived. Articulated by Theodore Roosevelt in 1904, the Roosevelt Corollary was an addition to America's Monroe Doctrine that asserted the right of the US to intervene in any Latin American nation that was guilty of "flagrant and chronic wrongdoing."⁹⁹ When the US was seeking to build a trans-oceanic waterway to fasten California to the eastern seaboard, it traded military support to a Colombian rebel group in return for their amenability to the construction of the Panama Canal.¹⁰⁰

Second, there was a two-year window between Guatemalan dictator Jacobo Arbenz's initial implementation of his nationalizing Land Reform Acts and when the US eventually intervened. During this period, the enraged UFCO dispatched lobbyists to Washington to galvanize support for a US-backed coup. The US Secretary of State and Director of the CIA, brothers John Foster Dulles and Allen Welsh Dulles respectively, had both previously served as corporate counsels to UFCO, and neither

was more than a single phone call away from the company's president.¹⁰¹ Yet despite the company's exhortations, Washington demurred.¹⁰² In 1951, UFCO tried to covertly send guns to its most loyal nearby dictator, Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua, so that Somoza might annex the country for himself.¹⁰³ However, the Truman administration found UFCO's concealed weapons and reprimanded the company for going behind its back.¹⁰⁴ It wasn't until later that year that the CIA received proprietary intelligence suggesting that Arbenz was in communication with the Soviet Union and was on track to transform Guatemala into a full-fledged "communist puppet state."¹⁰⁵ It was only at this point that the agency finally jolted into action. The CIA shipped down its weapons via the company's "Great White Fleet" and its operatives stayed in UFCO facilities throughout the country.¹⁰⁶ The CIA's paramilitary forces deposed Arbenz and installed in his place a man who would be immune to Soviet influence, the right-wing military dictator Carlos Castillo Armas.

Even today, it is unclear to what extent this action was motivated by UFCO. The Guatemalan coup aligned with UFCO interests, and the company did have high-level access to the government units that were ultimately responsible for pulling the trigger on the coup. But, by the same token, the US government also had strategic interests in the region, and the country's deep relationships with UFCO made the company a trusted partner that could carry out national objectives.

The precursor to De Beers was the British-chartered British South Africa Company. The company's charter effectively rendered it an agent of the crown, through which the British Empire could fulfill its own hegemonic ambitions. Corporate non-compliance with British command would be punished either with the revocation of the company's charter or the termination of its founder, Cecil Rhodes. Pressured by the domineering British crown, Rhodes feverishly scrambled to subvert Dutch power in Africa through the containment of the Dutch-influenced Transvaal state.¹⁰⁷ Rhodes' first step was to forge a political alliance with the Afrikaner Bond political party that granted him the electoral base to become Prime Minister of the British Cape Colony. As minister of the Cape Colony, Rhodes launched numerous expeditions to extend the colony's territory northward to form a land bridge that would prevent the Transvaal territories on either coast of the continent from meeting. These excursions were often bloody and rash, but Rhodes drove recklessly northward as the crown impressed upon him the paramount importance of territorial acquisition.¹⁰⁸ Over time, the crown's persuasions even subsumed Rhodes' own intentions.¹⁰⁹ At the end of his life, Rhodes' highest ambition was to build a railway on this land bridge that would connect Britain's claims in South Africa and Egypt and cement the empire's continental dominance.¹¹⁰ Rhodes had transformed into a thoroughly indoctrinated crusader of the Empire.

III. THE HYPOTHETICAL CASE FOR AUTHORITARIANISM

A. BENEFITS OF AUTHORITARIANISM

Although twentieth century NRMNCs were nearly powerless when it came

to determining the regime type of their host countries, there was little for them to gain even if they were able to effect a democratic transition in one of their authoritarian host countries.

Authoritarian regimes afforded NRMNCs a host of unique benefits. Primary among these, authoritarian regimes could guarantee NRMNCs monopoly rights to mineral extraction and revise tax codes to their benefit.¹¹¹ After the completion of the CIA-initiated Honduran coup of 1908, the installed dictator Manuel Bonilla appointed UFCO divisional president Samuel Zemurray as director of the country's finances. Bonilla and Zemurray jointly arranged for generous UFCO tax concessions and a nationally backed loan to underwrite the company's Honduran operations.¹¹² Buttressed by its formidable economic might and negotiating prowess, De Beers extracted similar benefits from its authoritarian host countries. In 1935, the autocratic colonial authorities of present-day Sierra Leone granted De Beers exclusive mining and prospecting rights throughout the country for 99 years. However, after the country attained independence in 1968, overwhelming public pressure compelled the populist Prime Minister Siaka Stevens to strip De Beers of its monopoly and to eventually nationalize the company's Sierra Leonean subsidiary.¹¹³

In addition to authorizing monopolies and tax exemptions, authoritarian regimes could also furnish a large supply of docile labor at controlled wages.¹¹⁴ While Rhodes was serving as prime minister of the Cape Colony, he assured a steady flow of labor to his mines with the passage of the Glen Grey Act, which levied a tax on black workers who sold their labor outside of a certain area.¹¹⁵ As successful as Rhodes was, when it came to labor, there were limits even to what dictators could provide. During the first decade of UFCO's involvement in Guatemala, Estrada Cabrera forcibly drafted workers from all over the country to serve on UFCO's and in the company's railway facilities.¹¹⁶ However, when the company attempted to transition from paying workers based on daily rates to piece rates, workers went on strike. UFCO appealed to dictator Estrada Cabrera to defuse workers' assaults, but Cabrera responded that even he could do nothing to mollify the workers, and that violence would ensue as long as UFCO did not guarantee its workers subsistence wages.¹¹⁷

B. COSTS OF DEMOCRACY

Higher rates of personnel turnover and the larger number of veto players in a well-functioning democracy impose significant co-optation costs upon NRMNCs seeking political influence.¹¹⁸ UFCO's most loyal national host was the Nicaraguan Somoza family, a hereditary dictatorship that ruled the country for three generations. Ever since U.S. Marines installed Anastasio Somoza Garcia in 1912, the family felt deeply indebted to UFCO, which it perceived as a projection of American power.¹¹⁹ Three generations of Somozas have provided UFCO with cheap, abundant labor and deep tax rebates. The Oppenheimer family, on the other hand, grew so fed up with the recurring outlays required to keep elected Unionist Party politicians loyal to De Beers' cause that Harry Oppenheimer eventually founded his own Progressive Party

through which he could singlehandedly shape South African politics.¹²⁰

Moreover, any action that a democratically elected leader undertakes impacts his or her chances for re-election.¹²¹ While renegeing on contracts with NRMNCs might lower politicians' public approval ratings and increase contract stickiness, citizens and domestic business leaders may, in fact, favor the expulsion of NRMNCs. Jacobo Arbenz, the populist democratically elected leader of Guatemala, reneged on the country's long-standing contract with UFCO. Under this agreement, UFCO would be the country's sole operator of the country's railroads for 99 years. However, when Guatemalan growing families complained that UFCO's stranglehold on the country's transportation system suffocated competition, Arbenz set about building an alternative railway to appease his constituents.¹²² Siaka Stevens, the elected Prime Minister of Sierra Leone, failed to honor the country's promise to De Beers in order to win popular support. In 1935, Sierra Leone granted De Beers a mining monopoly for 99 years, but Stevens encouraged any private citizens who wished to launch their own mining concerns to proceed with their enterprise regardless of the previous guarantee.¹²³

IV. CONCLUSION

As the cases of UFCO and De Beers illustrate, early twentieth century NRMNCs were unable to dictate the regime type of their host nations. NRMNCs faced pressure from their host countries and their parent states. The authoritarian regimes of NRMNCs' host countries were buffered by the resource curse and lack of a politically moderating middle class. Once an NRMNC planted its investments in a host country, the host country's government could bend the behavior of NRMNCs to its will by threatening to expropriate the company's captive assets. Cases where NRMNCs were embroiled in political strife were often due to managerial misinformation or the indiscretions of their employees. Finally, the parent states in which NRMNCs were domiciled also sought to further their own political and economic agendas and exerted tremendous influence over their companies' actions. Moreover, even if NRMNCs did have the capacity to determine the regime type of their host countries, companies would have preferred to preserve the authoritarian regimes that were typically in place.

One outstanding consideration in the study of NRMNC-host country relations is the impact of public perception. While UFCO's actions were lauded by Red Scared Americans, intermittent hordes of anti-imperialist protestors punctuated De Beers' successful European advertising campaigns.^{124, 125} It was only out of fear of Communism that America looked the other way. When describing the UFCO-allied Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, President Franklin D. Roosevelt remarked, "Somoza may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch."^{126, 127} The demise of communism may have taken with it the sole circumstance under which democratic consumers might pardon an NRMNC for collaborating with an authoritarian regime. Perhaps the liberal dictators have run their course.

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NO HAY REVOLUCIÓN SIN CANCIONES (THERE IS NO REVOLUTION WITHOUT SONG)

Amanda Oñate-Trules

In this paper, I will examine the connection between the north and south, and the creation of identity. I use the site of Latin America to argue that theory from the south, exemplified in socially conscious music, is able to both fix and unfix representation, meaning, and power. I propose that theory from the south, which appears to be an act of resistance, actually fixes meaning around unequal power relations between the north and south. Throughout this paper, I analyze the link between identity, power, and meaning through the theoretical framework of identity, and Stuart Hall's theory of representation. I argue that in order to combat hegemonic narratives created by the north, the south has to be understood in its own right. If people begin to view identity outside the binary of north/south, it is possible that global relationships between the north and south can change. Through its ability to give a voice to historically marginalized people around the globe, theory from the south, exemplified by Latin American music, is a tool for shifting ways of thinking and global patterns of inequality. In the site of Latin America, theory from the south acts as a transnational form of storytelling, and is able to promote a narrative different than that of northern hegemony. In time, this traveling story may unravel and destroy the grand narrative and destructive binary of north/south.

INTRODUCTION:

Music is not only a form of entertainment; it is a means of political expression, method of storytelling, and source of collective identity. In this paper, I analyze the connection between music, collective identity, and globalization within the site of Latin America. I pose the question, how is the idea of Latin American identity reflected in music, and how do global relations between the north and south affect this identity? I use the site of Latin America to argue that theory from the south, exemplified in socially conscious music, is able to both fix and unfix representation, meaning, and power. When theory from the south is rooted in identity, as seen in socially conscious Latin American music, even supposed forms of resistance reinforce hegemonic binaries. Socially conscious music is just one of many examples of theory from the south: a way of thinking that resists the dominant narrative constructed by the global north. Things that appear to be resistance, like theory from the south, actually fix representation and meaning around unequal power relations between the north and south. To combat these problematic global hegemonies, we need global resistance.

By cross-analyzing two socially conscious songs written by Latin American artists, with a range of scholarly articles, I will identify the advantages and complications created by theory from the south, embodied by Latin American protest music.

Amanda Oñate-Trules is a senior at Duke University where she studies International Comparative Studies with a focus in Latin America; Spanish; and Environmental Science and Policy. Amanda is a dual citizen of the U.S. and Chile, and has been fascinated by Latin American politics, culture, and history since childhood. She is passionate about social justice and human rights, and loves learning about other cultures through traveling. She hopes to pursue these interests after graduation while constantly learning and expanding her world view.

Although this music seems to empower the south, it reinforces the problematic north-south binary that it is trying to resist. In this context, music acts as both a “fixer” and “unfixer” of representation, meaning, and power. The south must be understood and addressed in its own right, not in the hegemonic binary constructed by the north.

If people begin to view identity outside the binary of north/south, it is possible that global relationships between the north and south can change, over time. Through its ability to give a voice to historically marginalized people around the globe, theory from the south, exemplified by Latin American music, is a tool for shifting ways of thinking and global patterns of inequality. This theory allows people to reclaim and retell their own story, while promoting a different narrative. It is an outlet not only for political expression, but also for hopes of creating change in the world, and allowing criticism of society.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION:

In this paper, I use the concept of identity as a mechanism through which theory from the south is expressed. Chilean anthropologist Mariel Suárez Egizabel defines identity as a “dynamic system of representations by which the social actor, individual or collective, orients their conduct, organizes their projects, constructs their history, looks for contradictions and discovers conflicts...and always in relation with other social actors without whom they cannot define or know themselves.”¹ Suárez Egizabel explains that history is a key element in the configuration and study of identity. She argues that identity is not completely fixed, but rather, it is permanently reconstructed and redefined.

I also use Stuart Hall’s explanation of representation, meaning, and power to understand how identity is fixed and unfixed by unequal power relations. In the video, “Representation and the Media”, Hall explains that “... The issue of power can never be bracketed out from the question of representation, because ideology and power fix meaning.”² Representation and identity are inextricably linked to power, which means that a group in power is able to fix their narrative. In the relationship between the powerful north and historically disempowered south, the north is the creator of the narrative, while the south is not able to tell their own story. Theory from the south tries to unfix preconceived notions about identity, and detangle meaning and representation from power.

WHAT IS ‘THE SOUTH’?:

*“Operation Condor invading my nest, I’ll forgive but I’ll never forget”
- Calle 13, “Latinoamérica”*

The south is not a thing, it is a *relation* that has been made and remade through its past and present relation to northern nations. As Jean and John Comaroff explain in their book *Theory From the South*, “This is why ‘the south’ cannot be defined, a pri-

ori, in substantive terms. The label bespeaks a relation, not a thing in or for itself. It is a historical artifact, a labile signifier in a grammar of signs whose semiotic content is determined, over time, by everyday material, political, and cultural processes, the dialectical products of a global world in motion.³ The Comaroffs define the ‘global south’ as, “...the non-West—variously known as the ancient world, the orient, the primitive world, and now the global south...” The global south is extremely diverse, but shares a history of oppression, “...the closest thing to a common denominator among them is that many were once colonies, protectorates, or overseas ‘possessions,’ albeit not necessarily during the same epoch.”⁴ The Latin American continent, like most of the global south, experienced colonization and exploitation by Western European nations, and later, the United States.

In her book, *Cultural Identity in Latin America*, Birgitta Leander explains that ever since their first encounter with the continent, Europeans took a special pleasure in projecting their fantasies onto Latin America.⁵ Leander argues that the north’s collective social dreams have been fleshed out in America and organized on the basis of images of the ideal into intellectually consistent designs for another type of society, in opposition to the existing order.⁶ In accordance with Leander’s argument, the Comaroffs propose that the south has acted as a laboratory for northern nations, “Sometimes, too, they were fertile staging grounds—even, as is often said nowadays, laboratories—for ways of doing things that were not possible elsewhere: experiments, for instance, in urban architecture and planning, in brutally profitable methods of labor discipline, in socially engineered public health regimes, and in untried practices of governance and extraction, bureaucracy and warfare, property and pedagogy.”⁷ Although the concept of the south is an “imagined community”, and a projection of northern ideas, the centuries of unequal power relations between north and south produced very *real* effects in the unfolding of history.⁸

Northern nations, specifically the United States, maintained active relationships with Latin America since the early 19th century. During the Cold War, the U.S. feared the spread of Soviet influence, and actively worked to halt the spread of the communism around the global south. According to the Comaroffs, the south has acted as a laboratory for northern socio-economic experiments, “... a ‘perfect petri dish of capitalism.’”⁹ Latin America played a major role in the North’s experiments with capitalism: there are multiple cases in which the United States overthrew democratically elected governments perceived as a threat to U.S. political and economic interests, and supported oppressive military regimes around the continent in a covert military operation called Operation Condor.^{10, 11} Latin Americans, from Santiago to San Salvador, are united by a history of violence and oppression imposed by the north, and this experience has been fixed into the collective Latin American identity. However, this situation is not limited to Latin America: the U.S. supported corrupt, violent governments around the globe, in order to fight off the supposed communist threat.¹² Continuous northern influence on the continent reinforces unequal power relations between north and south, and fixes the northern hegemonic narratives.

THEORY FROM THE SOUTH AS A FIXER/UNFIXER OF IDENTITY:

"You tell us that we should sit down, but ideas can only allow us to rise up!"
 - Ana Tijoux, "*Somos Sur (We are the South)*"

Theory from the south, illustrated by Latin American resistance music, is able to both fix and unfix representation, meaning, and power. It gives the south an opportunity to reclaim and retell their own narrative, while proclaiming the collective strength and resilience of historically disempowered people. However, theory from the south is troublesome because it confines people to think within the same hegemonic binary of north/south, which hinders societal change. Theory from the south, which appears to be an act of resistance, further entrenches unequal power relations between the north and south.

In his analysis of the Haitian earthquake, Anthony Oliver-Smith explains disasters as socially created, historically based phenomena: "In short, disasters are not accidents or acts of God. They are deeply rooted in the social, economic, and environmental history of the societies where they occur. Moreover, disasters are far more than catastrophic events; they are processes that unfold through time, and their causes are deeply embedded in societal history. As such, disasters have historical roots, unfolding presents, and potential futures according to the forms of reconstruction."¹³ I apply Oliver-Smith's theory about disasters as historically rooted and socially created phenomena to my discussion of identity as a mechanism of theory from the south, and argue that identity, like natural disasters, is not natural. On the contrary, identity is historically based and socially created, and *recreated*, through interactions with other actors. Analyzing identity "... reveals how deeply embedded it is in the historical processes that resulted in the unequal distribution of risk and vulnerability at the national, regional, and local levels in Latin America and the Caribbean."¹⁴ Furthermore, I argue that identity must be questioned and denaturalized. As Stuart Hall explains, "When we are immersed in something, surrounded by it the way we are by images from the media, we may come to accept them as just part of the real and natural world." Identity is far from natural: in the global south, identity continues to be shaped by centuries of colonization and exploitation at the hands of the global north.

One form of theory from the south is Latin American resistance music. In their song, "Latinoamérica," Calle 13, a Puerto Rican hip-hop band, explores what it means to be Latin American in the 21st century. This song reflects on historical and political themes, and acts as a criticism of northern force and influence in Latin America, while at the same time asserting the collective strength and resilience of Latin American people. Calle 13 attempts to unfix northern power by acting as a spokesperson for Latin America as a whole, and reclaiming the often-overlooked story of the continent. Through their creation of socially conscious music, Calle 13 is somewhat able to unfix, and denaturalize, the representation of north/south rela-

tions. They attempt to empower Latin Americans through sharing their theory from the south—resistance music.

Calle 13 directly addresses the idea of Latin American identity, and believes that Latin America is a product of both its past and present: “English translation: I am Latin America, a people without legs but who still walk, listen!”¹⁵ The artists strongly believe that an important part of Latin American identity is the continent’s collective history of oppression by the north, and the resilience of people to rise above the violence and hardship that they collectively endured over centuries. As Oliver-Smith explains, identity is “a historical product brought into being and maintained by identifiable forces.”¹⁶ Many of the lyrics in “Latinoamérica” reference historical events, such as slave-powered sugar cane plantations in Cuba, and Operation Condor—events that were actively instated or supported by northern governments. As the song title suggests, these events are a crucial part collective identity, they define Latin American people. Calle 13 tries to make the past a source of pride for Latin America; they are reclaiming history and retelling their story that was previously constructed by the north.

Emmanuelle Rimbot, a French historian, engages with the idea of collective identity in relation to music, and how the two are influenced by power. Rimbot argues that when identities are fixed by unequal power relations, as is seen throughout the global south, they have the power to unite and strengthen a particular group, giving it body, consistency, and legitimacy, which leads to mobilization.¹⁷ He explains that in this situation, the singer assumes the role of a mediator, and, s/he converts into a proclaimer of identity, through asserting that there is a group with a history and character of its own that needs to defend itself.¹⁸ The lyrics in “Latinoamérica” explicitly speak out against unequal power relations and northern hegemony, while empowering Latin American people to tell their own story. Calle 13 attempts to unfix the naturalized narrative of Latin America as a passive, disempowered continent. Through their assumed role as a proclaimer of identity, Calle 13 attempts to unite and empower all of Latin America, from Puerto Rico to Patagonia.

Through their music, Calle 13 tries to unfix the hegemonic narrative created by the north, but this does not mean that Latin American identity is inherently anti-modernity, or anti-globalization. As Angelique Haugerud explains in her critique of Thomas Friedman, “Missing the subtleties and complex capabilities of tradition (and culture), Friedman misrepresents resistance to some forms of economic globalization simply as a stark refusal of ‘modernity.’ Anthropologists, by contrast, recognize that resistance may very well signal rejection not of modernity per se but of the social injustices, environmental destruction, and brutal economic inequality that can accompany industrialization and economic neoliberalism.”¹⁹ Pride in tradition and identity is not a rejection of modernity or globalization—on the contrary, Haugerud argues that this pride stems from history of oppression, and entrenched unequal power relations between north and south.

Haugerud defines globalization to refer to the “accelerated flows or intensi-

fied connections—across national and other boundaries—of commodities, people, symbols, technology, images, information, and capital.”²⁰ By rejecting northern hegemony, the south is demanding to be heard, to tell the own story, and to bring justice to a people who were historically oppressed by the north. The narrative of Latin American identity described by Calle 13 is constructed in contrast to the entrenched and hegemonic forms of globalization that benefit people in the north and disempower those in the south. Haugerud sees positive potential for globalization in the future: “...it could also signify an increasing capacity for political alliances and declarations that transcend the nation-state.”²¹ The lyrics of Calle 13’s powerful anthem do indeed transcend the nation-state, unifying Latin America under a shared identity, and creating the potential to reclaim the southern narrative.

Although theory from the south, in this case rooted in identity and embodied by Latin American resistance music, allows the south to reclaim and reconstruct their story, it actually upholds the hegemonic narrative constructed by the north, and is fixed within the troublesome binary of north/south. To combat these problematic and limiting global hegemonies, global resistance and a denaturalization of power relations is necessary. Communication, whether received from news sources or art, is always linked with power, and those groups who wield power in a society influence representation and fix the meaning of these images. Stuart Hall argues that whoever holds power controls representation and meaning, “...So what we’re looking at is a practice, which is always going to be subverted; and, you know, the purpose of power, when it intervenes in language, is precisely to absolutely fix. That is what we used to call ‘ideology’ tries to do.”²² Hall explains that although meaning is never truly fixed, it takes a great deal of power to fix it, because, “The meaning can never be fixed... But meaning depends on a certain kind of fixing. On the other hand, meaning can never be finally fixed. Meaning can be changed. It can only be changed if it cannot finally be fixed, because you bet your life that the attempt to fix it is why power intervenes in representation at all.”²³ Theory from the south, embodied in socially conscious music, tries to unfix the narrative created by the north, but cannot fully do so because the south is constantly in a position of *disempowerment* in relation to the global north.

In her song, “Somos Sur” (We are the South), Ana Tijoux, a Chilean rapper talks about what it means to be from the global south. Ana Tijoux is the daughter of Chilean exiles who fled to France after the military coup d’état in Chile in September 1973. She began her career in the 1990s as a rapper in a popular Chilean hip-hop group, has since started her solo career, and continues to produce hip-hop music with a political message. She has written songs criticizing covert transnational agreements, speaking out against neoliberalism and its effects in Chile, and standing in solidarity with the Chilean student protests of 2011.

“Somos Sur” recognizes the many grassroots social movements taking place around the world.²⁴ Tijoux created this track in collaboration with Shadia Mansour, a Palestinian rapper, and when asked about this partnership, Tijoux responded, “... we decided to make a song that basically talks about the resistance in the south and to

make a parallel between act of resistances in Chile and Palestine” (Democracy Now!). In this song, Tijoux emphasizes defiance against the northern system of oppression, and explains that resistance is a struggle shared by many people across nations. Tijoux’s lyrics clearly criticize the north for exploiting and subjecting the South: “English translation: Nigeria, Bolivia, Chile, Angola, Puerto Rico, and Tunisia/ Algeria, Venezuela, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mozambique, and Costa Rica/ Cameroon, Congo, Cuba, Somalia, Mexico, Dominican Republic, Tanzania/ Yankees, leave Latin America, French, English, and Dutch/ I love you free Palestine.”²⁵ Through her lyrics, Tijoux unites people in all countries that have been disempowered and taken advantage of by the north. She acts as a spokesperson for the historically disempowered people of the south, and unites these people under a unified collective identity. “Somos Sur” boldly resists the northern system of oppression (“Yankees, leave Latin America”), and Tijoux aims to empower the south, and unfixed the hegemonic narrative created by the north.

Although Tijoux, and other socially conscious musicians, try to unfix global relations of power, they are actually reinforcing, and fixing the same binary narrative constructed by the north. The name of Tijoux’s song, “We are the South,” immediately fortifies the north/south binary. She creates a black and white divide between the concept of a unified southern people, and the ‘other’: the global north. The name of the song implies that Tijoux speaks not only for Latin America: she speaks for all historically marginalized people around the south, “English translation: Neither Africa nor Latin America are for auction... All the silenced/All the forgotten/ all the invisible/ everyone.”²⁶ Tijoux explicitly calls on areas of the world that have been exploited by the north, uniting them under a shared history; however, her thinking is confined to the hegemonic narrative of a weak, disempowered south, that was created by the global north. The language used throughout the song concretizes this divide and reinforces the north/south binary: Tijoux uses both familiar and unfamiliar words like ‘you’, ‘us’, and ‘we’. By empowering the south to rise up, and reclaim its own story, she is *reinforcing* the hegemonic narrative, and is trapped within the limiting binary of north/south. As Stuart Hall explains, whoever holds power is able to tell the story, and fix representation and meaning.²⁷ Therefore, because the north is still in a position of power and the south is confined within the hegemonic narrative created by the north, theory from the south, in this case, music, is not fully able to change the narrative... it engrains the narrative even deeper. Even though the south is somewhat able to reclaim their own story through creating music—their own theory—they are not able to escape the binary of north/south because they are still not in a position of power. Furthermore, music from the south reinforces the north’s hegemonic narrative through encouraging people from the south to define themselves in opposition to the global north. The south plays into the north’s system of representation (Hall)—the binary narrative—which reinforces inequality between the north and south.

The binary of north/south needs to be unfixed, and denaturalized, for any progress to occur. As the Comaroffs explain, “Modernity in the south... demands to

be apprehended and addressed in its own right”, not in the hegemonic binary constructed by the north.²⁸ While people are stuck thinking within the hegemonic binary narrative constructed by the north, the south will continue to stay in a position of *disempowerment*.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE VISION:

*“You can’t buy my happiness
 You can’t buy my pain
 You can’t buy my life”
 - Calle 13, “Latinoamérica”*

Theory from the south, exemplified in resistance music, is able to both fix and unfix representation, meaning, and power. Stuart Hall argues that although meaning is never actually fixed, it takes a great amount of power to change representation and the grand narrative. As Hall explains in his analysis of representation in the media, “We must always interrogate what seems to be natural.” The narrative of north/south binary must be questioned for any change to occur. As Hall says, “...When we are immersed in something, surrounded by it the way we are by images from the media, we may come to accept them as just part of the real and natural world.”²⁹ Northern hegemony, and the north/south binary are not natural, and we must question the unequal power relations between the north and south. Perhaps, if this binary is questioned, and denaturalized, we can create a different future.

Manfred B. Steger argues that at its core, globalization is about *shifting ways of thinking*, and altering forms of human contact.³⁰ Steger theorizes about a future condition that he terms ‘globality’, “... We adopt the term globality to signify a social condition characterized by tight global economic, political, cultural, and environmental interconnections and flows that make most of the currently existing borders and boundaries irrelevant... This concept signifies a future social condition that, like all conditions, is destined to give way to new constellations.”³¹ Steger explains that this age has not come about yet, but we are slowly moving towards this condition. Perhaps globality, with its focus on the cultural and environmental, as well as the economic, will prompt people to question the problematic binary between north/south.

In an interview with *Democracy Now!*, an independent news channel, Ana Tijoux speaks about her socially conscious music, including “Somos Sur.” When prompted to speak about the meaning behind the creation of the song, Tijoux said, “It’s about to be the proud without entering in chauvinism, you know? It’s got to do with identity and about very similar history sometimes that repeat in an act of resistance. And so, for us, it was very important to make a song that talk about this identity and this act of union and *altermundialista*³² also, in the beautiful fight of rebellion, beautiful rebellion.”³³ Tijoux recognizes that there needs to be a shift in the way that humans interact with one another across the globe, and believes that music, acting as

a theory from the south, can be a uniting force around the world. Haugerud would agree with Ana Tijoux and argues that today's challenges demand attention to more humane forms of globalization.³⁴

The power of theory from the south, embodied in socially conscious music, lies in its ability to tell a different narrative, while transcending borders. In the site of Latin America, theory from the south acts as a transnational form of storytelling, and is able to promote a narrative different than that of northern hegemony. In time, this traveling story may unravel and destroy the grand narrative and destructive binary of north/south. This theory travels beyond time and space to unite people from the global south, and empowers these people to promote a different, untold, and empowering narrative. It serves as an outlet not only for political expression, but also for hopes of creating change in the world, and allowing questioning of societal norms that have been naturalized over centuries of unequal power relationships. To combat problematic global hegemonies, we need global resistance. There is no revolution without song (*no hay revolución sin canciones*).

APPENDIX

"LATINOAMÉRICA" BY CALLE 13:

Soy lo que dejaron,
 soy toda la sobra de lo que se robaron.
 Un pueblo escondido en la cima,
 mi piel es de cuero por eso aguanta cualquier clima.
 Soy una fábrica de humo,
 mano de obra campesina para tu consumo
 Frente de frío en el medio del verano,
 el amor en los tiempos del cólera, mi hermano.
 El sol que nace y el día que muere,
 con los mejores atardeceres.
 Soy el desarrollo en carne viva,
 un discurso político sin saliva.
 Las caras más bonitas que he conocido,
 soy la fotografía de un desaparecido.
 Soy la sangre dentro de tus venas,
 soy un pedazo de tierra que vale la pena.
 soy una canasta con frijoles ,
 soy Maradona contra Inglaterra anotándote dos goles.
 Soy lo que sostiene mi bandera,
 la espina dorsal del planeta es mi cordillera.
 Soy lo que me enseñó mi padre,
 el que no quiere a su patria no quiere a su madre.
 Soy América latina,
 un pueblo sin piernas pero que camina.

Tú no puedes comprar al viento.
 Tú no puedes comprar al sol.
 Tú no puedes comprar la lluvia.
 Tú no puedes comprar el calor.
 Tú no puedes comprar las nubes.
 Tú no puedes comprar los colores.
 Tú no puedes comprar mi alegría.
 Tú no puedes comprar mis dolores.

Tengo los lagos, tengo los ríos.
 Tengo mis dientes pa` cuando me sonrío.
 La nieve que maquilla mis montañas.
 Tengo el sol que me seca y la lluvia que me baña.

Un desierto embriagado con bellos de un trago de pulque.
 Para cantar con los coyotes, todo lo que necesito.
 Tengo mis pulmones respirando azul clarito.
 La altura que sofoca.
 Soy las muelas de mi boca mascando coca.
 El otoño con sus hojas desmalladas.
 Los versos escritos bajo la noche estrellada.
 Una viña repleta de uvas.
 Un cañaveral bajo el sol en cuba.
 Soy el mar Caribe que vigila las casitas,
 Haciendo rituales de agua bendita.
 El viento que peina mi cabello.
 Soy todos los santos que cuelgan de mi cuello.
 El jugo de mi lucha no es artificial,
 Porque el abono de mi tierra es natural.

Tú no puedes comprar al viento.
 Tú no puedes comprar al sol.
 Tú no puedes comprar la lluvia.
 Tú no puedes comprar el calor.
 Tú no puedes comprar las nubes.
 Tú no puedes comprar los colores.
 Tú no puedes comprar mi alegría.
 Tú no puedes comprar mis dolores.

Você não pode comprar o vento
 Você não pode comprar o sol
 Você não pode comprar chuva
 Você não pode comprar o calor
 Você não pode comprar as nuvens
 Você não pode comprar as cores
 Você não pode comprar minha felicidade
 Você não pode comprar minha tristeza

 Tú no puedes comprar al sol.
 Tú no puedes comprar la lluvia.
 (Vamos dibujando el camino,
 vamos caminando)
 No puedes comprar mi vida.
 MI TIERRA NO SE VENDE.

Trabajo en bruto pero con orgullo,
Aquí se comparte, lo mío es tuyo.
Este pueblo no se ahoga con marullos,
Y si se derrumba yo lo reconstruyo.
Tampoco pestañeo cuando te miro,
Para q te acuerdes de mi apellido.
La operación cóndor invadiendo mi nido,
¡Perdono pero nunca olvido!

(Vamos caminando)
Aquí se respira lucha.
(Vamos caminando)
Yo canto porque se escucha.

Aquí estamos de pie
¡Que viva Latinoamérica!

No puedes comprar mi vida.

“SOMOS SUR” BY ANA TIJOUX:

Tu nos dices que debemos sentarnos,
 pero las ideas solo pueden levantarnos
 caminar, recorrer, no rendirse ni retroceder,
 ver, aprender como esponja absorbe
 nadie sobra, todos faltan, todos suman
 todos para todos, todo para nosotros.
 Soñamos en grande que se caiga el imperio,
 lo gritamos alto, no queda mas remedio
 esto no es utopía, es alegre rebeldía
 del baile de los que sobran, de la danza tuya y mía,
 levantarnos para decir “ya basta”
 Ni África, ni América Latina se subasta,
 con barro, con casco, con lápiz, zapatear el fiasco
 provocar un social terremoto en este charco.

CORO:

Todos los callados (todos),
 Todos los omitidos (todos),
 Todos los invisibles (todos),
 Todos, to, to, todos,
 Todos, to, to, todos
 [:2:]

Nigeria, Bolivia, Chile, Angola, Puerto Rico y Tunisia, Argelia,
 Venezuela, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Costa Rica, Camerún, Congo,
 Cuba, Somalia, México, República Dominicana, Tanzania, fuera yanquis de América
 latina,
 franceses, ingleses y holandeses, yo te quiero libre Palestina.

(Parte Rapeada por Shadia Mansour)

CORO:

Todos los callados (todos),
 Todos los omitidos (todos),
 Todos los invisibles (todos),
 Todos, to, to, todos,
 Todos, to, to, todos
 [:2:]

Saqueo, pisoteo, colonización, Matías Catrileo, Gualmapu
Mil veces venceremos, del cielo al suelo, y del suelo al cielo
vamos, sa, sa, sa, sa, sa, sa, sa, saltando.

Caballito Blanco, vuelve pa' tu pueblo, no te tenemos miedo
tenemos vida y fuego, fuego nuestras manos, fuego nuestros ojos,
tenemos tanta vida, y hasta fuerza color rojo.

La niña María no quiere tu castigo, se va a liberar con el suelo Palestino,
Somos Africanos, Latinoamericanos, somos este sur y juntamos nuestras manos.

CORO:

Todos los callados (todos),
Todos los omitidos (todos),
Todos los invisibles (todos),
Todos, to, to, todos,
Todos, to, to, todos

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2. Stuart Hall 1997. "Representation & the media [electronic resource]."
3. Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff. 2012. *Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America Is Evolving toward Africa*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm. 47.
4. *Ibid.*, 45.
5. Birgitta Leander. 1986. *Cultural Identity in Latin America*. Paris: Unesco. 45.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Jean Comaroff. 2012. *Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America Is Evolving toward Africa*. 5.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. Operation Condor was a secret intelligence and operations system created in the 1970s through which the South American military states shared intelligence, tortured, and executed political opponents. The program was intended to eradicate communist or Soviet influence in the Southern Hemisphere, and suppress active or potential opposition movements. Operation Condor's key members were the military governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, as well as the U.S. Operation Condor was a secret component of a larger, U.S. counterinsurgency strategy to reverse social movements demanding progressive political and socioeconomic change (McSherry 1).
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18. *Ibid.*, 84.
19. Angélique Haugerud. 2005. "Globalization and Thomas Friedman." In *Why America's Top Pundits Are Wrong: Anthropologists Talk Back*, 100.
20. *Ibid.*, 104.
21. *Ibid.*, 114.
22. Hall. "Representation & the media [electronic resource]."
23. *Ibid.*
24. Nick MacWilliam. "What is it to be South American Today: An Interview with Ana Tijoux." *Sounds and Colours*, March 24 2014.
25. Ana Tijoux. 2014. "Chilean Musician Ana Tijoux on Politics, Feminism, Motherhood & Hip-Hop as a 'Land for the Landless.'" *Democracy Now! A Daily Independent Global News Hour*.
26. *Ibid.*
27. Hall. "Representation & the media [electronic resource]."
28. Jean Comaroff. 2012. *Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America Is Evolving toward Africa*. 7.
29. Hall. "Representation & the media [electronic resource]."
30. Manfred B. Steger. 2009. *Globalization*. New York: Oxford University Press. 9.
31. *Ibid.*, 8.
32. The *altermundialista*, or alter-globalization, movement is the name of social movement whose proponents support global cooperation and interaction, but oppose what they describe as the negative effects of economic globalization, feeling that it often works to the detriment of human values such as environmental and climate protection, economic justice, labor protection, protection of indigenous cultures, peace, and civil liberties (Pleyers and Touraine).

33. Ana Tijoux. "Chilean Musician Ana Tijoux on Politics, Feminism, Motherhood & Hip-Hop as a 'Land for the Landless.'" *Democracy Now! A Daily Independent Global News Hour*.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP RELATIONSHIPS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON INDO-US RELATIONS

Angad Kapur

In this paper, I contend that there were two periods in the Indo-U.S. history that came closest to a partnership based on strategic vision and mutual understanding. These were the period post India's 1998 tests and leading up to President Clinton's India visit in 2000, and the period around the Indo-U.S. 123 Civil Nuclear Agreement. I argue that strong personal relationships between political leaderships, built on mutual respect and understanding, are especially important for the success of an Indo-U.S. partnership given the manner in which Indian foreign policy decision-making takes place. In the absence of such strong relationships, the Indo-U.S. relationship is vulnerable to destabilization.

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between India and the United States has been through many phases since India gained independence in 1947. It has been unreliable and limited, despite the opportunity for engagement between the two countries, and the natural predisposition for two liberal, pluralistic democracies to ally, Indo-US relations. For years, Washington's foreign policy dealings with New Delhi were grouped with Islamabad, and classified as Indo-Pak, much to India's displeasure. For the better part of the 20th century, US engagement with India was focused on India-Pakistan disputes. The turn of the 21st century has seen a dramatic change in Indo-US ties by way of increased security and trade engagement. However, as Ashley Tellis points out, a "pernicious transactionalism" and not a strategic vision dictates the present connections.¹ In this paper, I contend that there were two periods in the history of Indo-US relations that came closest to a partnership based on strategic vision and mutual understanding. The first period was the one that followed India's 1998 nuclear tests, leading up to President Clinton's India visit in 2000, and the second, during the Indo-US 123 Civil Nuclear Agreement. I argue that strong personal relationships between political leaderships, built on mutual respect and understanding, are especially important for the success of an Indo-US partnership given the manner in which Indian foreign policy decision-making takes place. In the absence of these, the Indo-US ties will be relations are extremely vulnerable.

First, I provide a brief history of Indo-US relations to contextualize the 'transactionalism' that Tellis uses to characterize them. Second, I provide an overview of existing perspectives on the Indo-US partnership to contextualize this paper's argument, as well as show that the argument has not been addressed yet. Third, I explain the importance of personal political leadership partnerships in the Indian foreign policy context. Fourth, I use two connections between Indian and American

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political leadership as evidence for my argument. Lastly, I use the arrest of Devyani Khobragade in New York City as an example to show the vulnerability of the Indo-US relationship which lacks the foundation of mutual respect and understanding.

BRIEF HISTORY OF INDO-US RELATIONS

While many assert that India and the United States are naturally suited to be allies given their common values of democracy and liberalism, the relationship remained strained for much of the 20th century. A Congressional Research Service study on US-India Security Relations highlights three important reasons for this: Cold War politics, the United States' favorable policies towards Pakistan, and disagreements over nuclear protocols.² In the years following independence, India developed a strongly anti-imperialist stance owing to its colonial legacy. This attitude led India to found the Non Aligned Movement with a handful of other nations. This philosophy of non-alignment and non-dependency displeased the United States. The US also felt that India seemed to favor the Soviet Union. India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had strong socialist and import substitution policies, which were closer to the Soviets' conception of communism than American capitalism.³ In an extremely politically charged Cold War atmosphere, failure to align with the United States kept Indian and American ties strained.

The United States has also historically shared close ties with Pakistan, much to India's annoyance. During the Cold War, Pakistan joined two pro-American organizations: the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Due to India's disinterest in aligning with America, Pakistan was seen as essential to maintaining American influence in the region. India was particularly irked when Pakistan used American weapons in wars it initiated against India. American neutrality after the 1965 war piqued India.⁴ Indira Gandhi's relationship with the Americans was particularly tenuous. Declassified documents of the period revealing conversations between former US President Nixon and former US National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, document Kissinger referring to Gandhi as a 'bitch' and Indians as 'bastards'.⁵ Another reason for the tense relations was the 1971 Bangladeshi War of Independence. The Americans were displeased at India's support to the separatists and put economic and diplomatic pressure on Indians to cut the support. The tensions reached a peak when American aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise, was dispatched to the Bay of Bengal to convey a strong message to India.⁶ A more cordial relationship between the leaderships might have led to a better dealing of the situation.

The Soviet Union's collapse prompted India to adopt a less confrontational attitude towards the West, if only for economic necessity. However, during the end of the Cold War era, another point of contention emerged between the two nations. India sought to assert its pride and autonomy by establishing a nuclear weapons program and not subscribing to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The United States feared that this would lead to a possible arms race between India and Pakistan, result-

ing in an unstable South Asia. The United States' disapproval of the Indian nuclear program gave India a "nuclear weapons pariah status."⁷ An important flashpoint was India's nuclear test in 1998. The Clinton government cracked down on India with economic sanctions. However, the turn of the 21st century saw a vast improvement in relations between the two countries. The US is currently India's most significant trading partner. India now conducts more military exercises with the US than any other country. US share in Indian defense imports has increased from 0.2% in 1999-2003 to over 7% in 2009-2013. Additionally, the 20th century saw only three Presidential visits to India, while just the first two decades of 21st century have already seen an equal number of visits.⁸

Removing the three, previously listed underlying clauses for a tense Indo-US relationship has led to the current state of alliance between the two countries. After the end of the Cold War, the policy of non-alignment had no purpose. Ever since India's liberalization in 1991, economic incentives have drawn India towards partnering with the US from an economic standpoint. The US has largely stopped favoring Pakistan over India. For example, the US supported India. The US and has also come to respect India's desire for a strictly bilateral resolution of the Kashmir issue. The landmark 123 Civil Nuclear Agreement largely resolved Indo-US nuclear issues. However, the recent Indo-US relationship under Obama and Manmohan Singh's second tenure resembles 'transactionalism.'⁹ In this paper, I argue that there were two periods during which Indo-US co-operation was closest to working towards and having a strategic vision. Strong political leadership relationships differentiated these periods from the rest. The first is the one between former Indian External Affairs, Finance and Defence Minister, Jaswant Singh, and former US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott. Their relationship was instrumental in alleviating tensions between the two nations following India's 1998 nuclear test. It eventually led to President Clinton visiting India in 2000 and issuing a joint vision statement with Prime Minister Vajpayee. Clinton's visit was the first US Presidential visit to India in 22 years. The second relationship is that between former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and former US President George W. Bush which was vital to the signing of the 123 Civil Nuclear Agreement - a landmark in Indo-US relations.

CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE INDO-US RELATIONSHIP

There are a limited number of scholars who currently research and write on the Indo-US relationship. It is important to examine existing perspectives to gain a better understanding of the topic. Ashley Tellis argues that it is in the United States' interest to assist India economically and militarily without expecting much reciprocation. US assistance to India's economic rise, which promotes regional peace and stability, is mutually beneficial. Tellis writes that the Indo-US civil nuclear deal was the most vital agreement in setting up the potential for a fruitful partnership. The Indo-US partnership is based on the US seeking to balance China, and will benefit from India's economic ascent. Both the governments should work to create institution-

al and regulatory frameworks that permit their citizens to engage with one another for profitable and social collaboration.¹⁰ However, recent Indo-US engagement has been constricted to 'transactionalism' because of sectoral interests, and the lack of a common strategic vision, dominate. Most importantly, there is room for cooperation between the United States and India in the economic and military fields, especially if the leaders of both states make a sincere effort to comply with the each other.¹¹ Tellis briefly touches upon the significance of strong political relationships driving a strategic Indo-US partnership, but primarily concentrates on system-level benefits that both countries can take advantage of through a stronger partnership.

Schaffer's views echo Tellis' observation on the 'transactionalism' of Indo-US relations. She finds that while there has been a great amount of bilateral engagement, India and the US still fail to share a common world vision. This discrepancy often leads to standoffs at international and multilateral forums on important global issues. Schaffer believes that there are problems surrounding desired outcomes from the relationship. For India, the Indo-US partnership represents strength at home and in the surrounding region. For the US, the benefits are at the global level. Indo-US disagreements stem from the clash of foreign policy ideologies. The strategic core of Indian foreign policy emphasizes autonomy, flexibility and a desire to avoid dependence on stronger powers. The US, on the other hand, likes to dominate over its partners. This difference has created a rift. Schaffer expresses that the US can bridge this gap by helping India become a global leadership force.¹² There is a disinterest in alliance commitments as well as a demand for respect and recognition, even when materially weak. The policy implication of this attitude is that there cannot be a deep political and institutional alliance between the United States and India. However, cooperation can exist when strategic interests align.¹³

Another commentator, Burns, writes that the US and India both seek to spread democracy, expand trade and investment, counter terrorism, and balance China's growing military power. He therefore believes that US strategic interest will align with India more than any other continental Asian power in the 21st century. The second Obama administration saw deterioration in the increasingly friendly Indo-US relationship. The new Modi government is giving both sides a chance to work together to revive their economies and the civil nuclear deal. The bipartisan nature of the support of an improvement in Indo-US ties should allow India to move to the forefront of US strategy in Asia.¹⁴ Malone makes a similar argument. He argues that the reason for a better post-1990 Indo-US relationship is "fundamentally a story about rediscovering common political values."¹⁵ American policymakers through the 20th century viewed India as a revisionist power and not as a potential powerful democratic partner in Asia. In a post 9/11 world, the US followed a value-based approach. This approach coupled with the economic opportunities that India's liberalization presented has led to a convergence of interests between the two countries. Malone also writes that the US sees India as an opportunity to balance China. However, he notes that India and China have some common interests that are opposed to the West, as they are both de-

veloping countries. The relationship between the two countries constitutes a selective partnership and is ultimately unstable.¹⁶

Gilboy & Heginbotham hold a more radical viewpoint than Malone's, regarding the Indo-China-US relationship. They challenge the argument that India and the United States have converging interests and posit that India and China have converging interests that will challenge US interests. They use empirical evidence, such as voting patterns and positions in multilateral organizations, to show that India and China share tighter bonds than India and the US. They argue that the US should rework its relationship with India to ensure greater reciprocity. They assert that the US should cut down on security cooperation with India and demand more politico-economic cooperation from India.¹⁷ All the arguments listed above are relevant to understanding the Indo-US relationship. However they largely concentrate on the international system. They offer arguments on why or why not Indian and US strategic interests will align using this systemic approach. Schaffer touches upon the policy dealings between the two nations, and Narang explains the Indian worldview that causes such a clash. Tellis is the only one who briefly touches upon the role that personal leadership equations can play in transforming the Indo-US relationship. This paper goes on to explore the importance of such relationships in shaping a strategic Indo-US relationship.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP RELATIONSHIPS IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

At the outset, it is necessary to situate the Indian case within existing theoretical literature. Traditionally, international relations theory largely ignores the role of individuals in favor of an emphasis on international systems. Valerie Hudson's book, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, discusses the importance of leaders as well as small group dynamics in foreign policy decision-making. She argues that foreign policy strategies and negotiation relies heavily on an "understanding of the other's worldview."¹⁸ Therefore, both the communication between leadership and leadership attitudes and idiosyncrasies are important in understanding worldviews. Jaswant Singh cites the difference between the Chou Enlai-Kissinger and the Chou-Nehru relationship to illustrate this point. The Chou-Kissinger relationship was outstanding compared to the failings of the Chou-Nehru relationship. He believes that this was led to the growth of the China-US relationship, and the failure of the China-India relationship respectively.¹⁹ Individuals are considered even more paramount in crisis or uncertainty.²⁰ Understanding leader personalities and belief systems is useful in engagement strategies. The Indian approach to foreign policy allows for personal relationships between leaders to have a considerable impact on foreign policy outcomes. In India's case, foreign policy represents the purview of a small and cohesive group with a common and consistent belief system.

Narang and Staniland prove insightful in showing the significance of individual and small group decision making highlighting the foreign policy imperatives of Indian foreign policy-making elites. In their opinion, India's "strategic worldview

emphasizes autonomy, flexibility, and a desire to avoid dependence on stronger powers.²¹ In addition, there is a strong want for respect and recognition. This worldview has remained largely consistent through different Indian governments due to many reasons. Particularly important is the low electoral salience of foreign policy matters in India. Voters in India rarely vote for candidates based on their stated foreign policy leanings. There are exceptions like Kashmir. However, in this case, most national leaders would have identical policy perspectives, as it would be considered electoral suicide to sway from existing policy to one more open to giving up Kashmir. A better example would be the Tamil Tigers issue in Sri Lanka. Regional leaders in South India, particularly in the state of Tamil Nadu, found it useful to use foreign policy to fight elections with respect to this issue. Such regional parties often had diverging opinions from national parties. However, save for such rare exceptions, the Indian voter largely does not take into account foreign policy leanings of candidates when casting votes. Indian political leaders therefore do not run campaigns that stress or opine on foreign policy. There are no democratic electoral incentives for Indian political leaders to ideate on foreign policy. In Narang & Staniland's opinion, this leads to a "remarkable continuity" in Indian foreign policy thinking.²² Such insulation from domestic electoral pressures means that foreign policy is the dealing of an Indian 'strategic core.' Foreign policy decisions are made by just a small elite group consisting of the sitting Prime Minister, a few key cabinet ministers and bureaucrats who are part of the Indian Administrative or Foreign Service.²² This analysis has salient implications for the ability of personal relationships between leaders to influence Indian foreign policy. Foreign leaders who understand the Indian need for respect and autonomy, and spend time inculcating personal relationships with the strategic elite, can have a favorable impact on the relationship between their country and India. This belief is especially relevant to the Indo-US relationship.

The United States has conventionally been perceived as a dominant partner in the majority of its foreign policy dealings. Wills refers to America as the bully of the free world and argues that until "America's leaders address...nations with...respect, attention and persuasion, we shall lack foreign policy leadership of any kind."²³ Considering India's foreign policy imperatives of respect and autonomy, it is no surprise that the Indo-US ties will be tense if America adopts its conventional approach of foreign policy dealings. Drezner posits that telling other countries that their actions are irrational, if they do not have the same goals as the US, is "self-defeating diplomacy."²⁴ Given Narang & Staniland's description of the manner in which Indian foreign policy decisions are made, and the United States' dominant partner attitude, there is a natural tendency for the partnership to be unstable. Personal relationships between leaders of both countries therefore have great potential to better Indo-US ties. Such relationships have the ability to promote mutual respect and a strong understanding of the others' worldview. In India's case, where foreign policy decision-making is concentrated with the strategic core, such a strategy is even more potent. In the next section I put forth two cases in Indo-US relations when such a strategy led to land-

mark progress. The first case is the relationship between Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh. The second case is that between George Bush Jr. and Manmohan Singh.

SINGH – TALBOTT AND THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT

On May 11 1998, India conducted its second nuclear test, termed Pokhran II, or Operation Shakti, which announced to the world that India was an official nuclear state.²⁵ In the aftermath of the tests, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee assigned Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh respectively to manage the fallout in Indo-US relations due to America's disagreement with India's tests. During this period, Talbott was US Deputy Secretary of State, while Singh held various portfolios such as Advisor, External Affairs Minister, Defense Minister and Finance Minister. Over two and half years, Talbott and Singh met fourteen times in ten locations. This is considered the most intense and sustained set of interactions between Indian and American representatives above the rank of Ambassador.²⁶ In the same period, Talbott also held a number of meetings with Pakistani officials. Talbott distinguishes the two sets of interactions by saying that those with Pakistan would not qualify as a dialogue. He says that in a successful dialogue, "each makes an effort to understand what the other has said and to incorporate that understanding into a reply."²⁷ In a foreword written for Singh's book, *In Service of Emergent India*, Talbott writes that their dialogue's contribution to the Indo-US relationship was largely successful because of "Jaswant Singh's ability to advocate and defend his government's position while instilling in me and other American officials a high degree of trust and respect."²⁸ He stresses the importance of trust, respect and understanding between the two nations, all of which their dialogue promoted to turn around the Indo-US relationship.

At the time when Talbott and Singh were appointed to be interlocutors for the two countries, Indo-US relations were severely strained. India's nuclear test had caused irked the US as the latter had a stated objective of wanting nations to subscribe to the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The US imposed strong economic sanctions on India following the tests. Furthermore, it persuaded multilateral organizations like the World Bank to delay loans and grants to India.²⁹ The World Bank delayed loans amounting to \$865 million to India in response to the tests. India was nettled too as it thought that the US response to Pakistan's subsequent nuclear test was timid in comparison.³⁰ Also, the late 1980s were a time when the US viewed South Asia as one diplomatic region, reflecting the relative unimportance of India to the United States. Jaswant Singh states "in those days we still lived in the age of the "hyphenated relationship": "India-Pakistan."³¹ In a visit to China in 1998, Clinton made a comment urging the Chinese to accept responsibility to arrest nuclear weapons proliferation.³² This comment directly offended India and contributed to mounting tensions.

Most importantly, the Indians and Americans lacked a sound understanding of each other's worldviews due to a lack of relationship building between political leaderships. The statements and war of words in the aftermath of the nuclear test are

a testament to this fact. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and States Department Spokesperson James Rubin commented that India had misled the US in diplomatic discussions, and claimed that the Indians had expressly given assurances that no such tests would take place. In another statement, a State Department spokesperson used strong words to criticize Indian Home minister Advani. In both cases,, India responded definitely by saying that there were never any assurances made and that there should be a level of courtesy in diplomatic conversation, especially with respect to senior leaders.³³ At a later date, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright commented that India and Pakistan should “climb out of the hole they have dug themselves into.”³⁴ Singh at the time replied that Indians do not dig holes either metaphorically or literally. He spoke that such a comment explains a lack of comprehension on the American’s part to understand the Indian stance and “Indian sensibilities.”³⁵ Talbott and Singh began their dialogues in these tense circumstances, and yet were able to develop a deep friendship that benefited the Indo-US relationship.

There are many instances and actions that describe the Singh-Talbott relationship and its utility. Talbott reveals that both he and Singh have the same picture of the two of them kept in their respective offices as a memory of the journey they took together.³⁶ He writes that they enjoyed informal discussions beyond what their official governmental roles necessitated. He believes that such discussions “were essential to whatever chance we had of fulfilling our original assignment.”³⁷ Such discussions allowed a better mutual understanding, both on an individual and an international level. At the year-end of 1999, Singh officially became External Affairs Minister, thereby outranking Talbott. Traditional diplomatic protocol would dictate that Talbott be replaced in the dialogue with someone of equal rank as Singh. However, on a congratulatory call from Talbott, Singh told him that the dialogue should continue as before.³⁸ An especially tough time for Jaswant Singh was the Kandahar hijacking of an Air India plane. Singh was personally entrusted with going to Kandahar and negotiating the release of the hostages. Talbott made an effort to keep in touch with Singh during the Kandahar crisis and put in a phone call to him every morning.³⁹ Singh writes, “Strobe personally had been most supportive.”⁴⁰

By November 1998, the US had partially lifted sanctions on India. The efforts of Singh and Talbott helped alleviate the hostility. They had also moved forward on achieving the US agenda, as Prime Minister Vajpayee promised to sign the CTBT in a year’s time in his speech at the UN General Assembly.⁴¹ In the midst of the dialogue, Secretary Albright believed it was a good idea to have former President Jimmy Carter become a special envoy to South Asia. Carter would play arbitrator between India and Pakistan. Having spent time with Singh and understanding the Indian worldview, Talbott held that Carter’s appointment was a faulty decision. He argued with both President Clinton and Secretary Albright to ensure that Carter was not selected.⁴² Having developed a personal relationship with Singh, Talbott understood the India’s desire for autonomy, respect and bilateral resolve of any India-Pakistan disputes. Their relationship was important in ensuring that the Indo-US relationship

did not take a dive in 1999 when the Indians did not fulfill their promise of acceding to the CTBT due to a hung parliament. Talbott trusted Singh when he told him that the Indian government had made an honest effort.⁴³ In 1999, the US took India's side on the Kargil conflict and commented that the Kashmir conflict must be resolved bilaterally.⁴⁴ This was a significant move since the US had conventionally been sympathetic or ignorant to Pakistan's activities in Kashmir. Tellis believes that Singh and Talbott's "extraordinary friendship" was critical in influencing America's favorable stance towards India following Kargil.⁴⁵

In 2000, President Clinton visited India, becoming the first US Presidential to visit India since 1978. Singh writes, "This visit might have done more to change the relationship between the two countries than any other single event of recent times."⁴⁶ Clinton's address to Indian parliament stressed the importance of listening and mutual understanding. He acknowledged India's right to autonomous decision-making. Clinton made a short five-hour visit to Pakistan on his way back to the US. He took a stern stance against Pakistan's terrorist activities and urged Musharraf to take Pakistan back to democracy.⁴⁷ Clinton's visit was a pivotal moment in Indo-US relations. During the visit, Vajpayee and Clinton issued a joint document outlining the strategic vision both countries shared for the 21st century.⁴⁸ Within a short span of time, Talbott and Singh's dialogue and relationship was instrumental in alleviating post Pokhran hostilities and prompting such a crucial Presidential visit, thereby laying the foundations of a renewed Indo-US relationship in the 21st century. Singh writes that he and Talbott set the shared objective of "harmonization of positions between the United States and India, as they evolved through a harmonization of respective views."⁴⁹ The level of understanding that their relationship allowed both countries to achieve would not have been possible without it.

SINGH – BUSH AND THE NUCLEAR DEAL

While the relationship and dialogue between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott had resulted in a turnaround in the Indo-US relations, it had not been able to resolve the nuclear problem. The United States has always maintained the need to arrest nuclear weapons proliferation and urged nations to subscribe to the NPT and the CTBT. However, India viewed this as hypocrisy on the United States' part and asserted its autonomy by not subscribing to these treaties. This has historically been a thorn in the relationship. Over the course of their tenures as heads of their respective states, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh worked with each other to remove the obstacles to a new era of Indo-US cooperation. With significant risk to their respective domestic political capital, they went about reaching the pivotal 123 Civil Nuclear Agreement. The agreement was a significant break from both countries' policies and brought the two closer to sharing a strategic vision.

On Singh's 2005 visit to the United States, Bush proposed the civil nuclear agreement. The agreement would mean that the United States would lift nuclear sanctions on India and allow India the benefits of full civil nuclear cooperation with

the United States and other countries. The deal would be a breakthrough for energy deficient India, as it would allow access to capital and technology in fueling India's civil nuclear needs. In return, India would be expected to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities. It would be expected to put all of its civil nuclear reactors permanently up for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Any future civil nuclear reactors would be subject to such inspection. The agreement reserves India's right to conduct a nuclear test, but gives the United States the power to rescind its cooperation and return all of technology if India does so.⁵⁰ The agreement was a significant break from stated Indian and American policies. India's foreign policy had always stressed autonomy and resisted dependence on great powers. By allowing their civilian nuclear facilities to be permanently subject to foreign inspection, India compromised on its strong autonomous character. The agreement cedes a level of dependence on the United States for running India's nuclear program by granting the former the right to rescind cooperation and technology. The United States made significant compromises as well. The United States' stated policy was to sanction countries that did not subscribe to the NPT. India's refusal to comply with the NPT had led to its isolation from the world in nuclear issues and cooperation. Manmohan Singh characterized this as a "nuclear apartheid."⁵¹ Bush therefore reversed a pillar of a more than three-decade-old US foreign policy of non-proliferation to accommodate India.⁵² In effect, he implicitly accepted India into the elite nuclear club. When Bush visited India in 2006, he and Singh jointly declared their intention of going forward with the deal. The deal was finally inked [and operationalized] in October 2008 after both heads of state had dealt with domestic political opposition.⁵³ Former American diplomat Nicholas Burns writes, "During the two years of... negotiations, my Indian counterparts and I worked more closely and intensively than we ever had before."⁵⁴ Bush and Singh's trust-based relationship laid the foundation for such a momentous agreement to go through.

While Singh and Bush did not share the level of personal friendship that Talbott and Jaswant Singh came to develop, their mutual respect and affection for one another is documented. Sanjaya Baru, Singh's media advisor during his tenure, writes that Bush and Singh surprisingly shared a friendship based on mutual respect. He says that Singh, who is widely considered shy and a poor conversationalist, was relaxed in Bush's company and took an "instant liking" to him.⁵⁵ He writes, "Bush was deferential and, rather surprisingly for an American President, kept addressing Dr. Singh as 'Sir'."⁵⁶ He believes that over the year Bush and Singh became buddies.⁵⁷ In a manner rather unlike that of the Prime Minister, Singh publicly told Bush that the "people of India deeply love you" during his visit to US in September 2008.⁵⁸ Singh further commented, "I have been the recipient of your generosity, your affection, your friendship."⁵⁹ Those familiar with Singh will vouch for the fact that such professing of affection is highly uncharacteristic of the usually reserved and reticent leader. A year later when he came to India and the landmark civil nuclear agreement was reached, Bush said, "I really like Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The prime minister is a

wise leader.”⁶⁰ Political science scholar Teresita Schaffer noted that Bush’s relationship with India was one of the few diplomatic and foreign policy successes of his tenure.⁶¹ This could be attributed to the strong respect-based relationship Bush developed with Singh, which enabled them to work courageously towards the 123 agreement.

Dr. Singh was often criticized for his lack of power in driving policy while in government, due to the power resting in Congress party head Sonia Gandhi’s hands. In the case of the civil nuclear agreement, Singh fought hard to ensure the deal went through. Faced with strong domestic political opposition from his Leftist coalition partners, Singh even initiated a no-confidence motion in parliament to ensure that the deal went through. Sanjaya Baru writes that Sonia Gandhi was not enthused about the idea of risking the survival of the government to pass the deal. Singh apparently felt let down by this lack of support.⁶² Despite the opposition, Singh uncharacteristically pushed through with the deal. It is the respect and mutual understanding that Singh shared with Bush that allowed him to trust the United States and stress the importance of the agreement in shaping an Indo-US strategic relationship. Bush was able to understand the Indian need for respect and equal footing, and he leveraged this understanding to push through the landmark deal.

THE VULNERABILITY OF INDO-US TIES: THE CASE OF DEVYANI KHOBRAGADE

In December of 2013, a seemingly petty incident spiraled into a major diplomatic tussle between India and the United States. Devyani Khobragade, Indian Deputy Consul General in New York, was humiliatingly arrested by US law enforcement on charges of visa violations. Devyani was charged for allegedly submitting fake documents that agreed to pay her Indian maidservant \$4500 per month when in reality she was paying her less than \$500 per month. Devyani allegedly coerced the maid to lie in her visa application about receiving a higher pay. Her maidservant left work unexpectedly and brought charges against Devyani; this eventually culminated in her arrest. It was not only the arrest but also the manner of the arrest that caused outrage in India. Devyani was arrested while dropping her children off at school, then strip-searched and kept in general detention. For a country in which “pride and the public face are so important as to become an essential diplomatic quotient,” such humiliation of a diplomat was beyond tolerance.⁶³ The US response to Indian outrage was lukewarm. It took Secretary of State John Kerry three days to put out a statement expressing regret in regards to the manner in which the arrest was made. The Indian government argued that the arrest violated the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that guarantees diplomats courteous treatment if arrested for a grave crime. Following the US government’s general apathy with respect to this case, the Indian government carried out a strong diplomatic backlash. Investigations on American diplomats’ treatment of hired labor were started, security roadblocks outside the American embassy in Delhi were removed, and airport privileges of American diplomats in India were revoked.⁶⁴

In less than a week, a relationship carefully cultivated over a decade and a half came to a standstill over the arrest of a mid-level diplomat. This case is a validation of the uncertainty and instability of Indo-US relations. It exemplifies the rift that exists between the Indian and US foreign policy camp without the existence of meaningful political leadership relationships to inculcate respect and mutual understanding of worldviews. Exemplifying the anger felt in India, External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid, said that it “is no longer about an individual. It is about our sense of self as a nation and our place in the world.”⁶⁵ Given India’s worldview based on the want for respect and autonomy, and its increasing economic and military might, the American camp should have expected such a response. Initial rumors that it was the local States Attorney who had carried out the arrest without the State Department knowing were quashed when New York prosecutor Preet Bharara revealed that the orders to arrest came from the State Department.⁶⁶ The charges might be qualified and the arrest warranted. However, at a time when America insists India is an equal partner, the handling of the arrest makes India feel “patronized, bullied and lectured by the superpower.”⁶⁷ Ex-US Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, noted that the American handling of the incident “gave new meaning to the word stupid.”⁶⁸ The incident is a testimony of the diverging approaches to foreign policy. It shows that without the understanding and respect that strong relationships between political leaderships promote, the Indo-US relationship is extremely vulnerable.

CONCLUSION

Contemporary foreign policy literature has come to largely ignore the importance of individuals and leaders in international relations. While systemic perspectives are no doubt important to the analysis of bilateral relations, they should not constitute the only lens through which analysis is conducted. Personal relationships between political leaderships have attracted limited scholarly work. This paper highlights their importance in light of furthering bilateral relationship between Indian and the United States. The United States and India are both democratic, liberal, market economies and therefore compatible for a strong bilateral relationship. However, their methods of foreign policy dealings and decision-making lead to tensions. India has foreign policy imperatives of autonomy, lack of dependence, and want of respect. Because a cohesive ‘strategic core’ makes decisions with little domestic electoral salience in foreign policy issues., individuals in this ‘strategic core’ exercise great authority in foreign policy decision-making. America is accustomed to being the dominant partner in bilateral relationships, dictating the terms of the relationship. Such a clash in ideology has led to a relationship that has much room for improvement. Given this ideological clash, mutual understanding and respect are essential for the success of the Indo-US relationship. As political leaderships are responsible for the conduct of foreign policy and bilateral relations, such mutual understanding and respect must be inculcated through relationships between the respective political leaderships. Jaswant Singh notes that “trust between individual negotiators thus often becomes the

foundation of a transformation between two countries.”⁶⁹ In the absence of such relationships, the Indo-US relationship could be precarious. The arrest of the Indian diplomat Devyani Khobragade and the ensuing drama are evidence of this vulnerability. Strong partnerships at the leadership level are essential in moving India and the US towards a relationship based on a common strategic vision.

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RECENT CHALLENGES AND TRIUMPHS IN US FOREIGN POLICY

Daniel Benjamin, director of the Dickey Center for International Understanding, introduced Jake Sullivan during his visit to Dartmouth as one of the few people in Washington who everyone knows by a single name – “Jake.” The youngest-ever Director of Policy Planning for the Secretary of State (Hillary’s Ear), Mr. Sullivan assisted Secretary Clinton, and later Vice-President Joe Biden, on a host of critical national security issues for over five years. After stepping down from his influential roles in the Obama Administration to teach at Yale Law School, Sullivan has continued to utilize his policy-crafting and diplomatic expertise to guide ongoing Iranian nuclear talks as Senior Advisor to the U.S. Delegation on the Iranian Nuclear Negotiations. World Outlook sat down with Jake Sullivan to discuss Iran, foreign policy, and diplomacy.

What are some of the hurdles that you had to overcome in order to participate in the face-to-face negotiations with the Iranians in Milan?

The first and most significant hurdle was actually establishing a channel. In the years leading up to the direct negotiations, there had been dealings with Iran through the P5+1 process: the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany, where the US sat at the table with Iran along with these other countries. The US was comfortable with that, Iran was comfortable with that: it was sort of a big tent. But it became clear over time that this issue would only really get resolved if the US and Iran were talking face to face in a bilateral channel. How do you set that up when there are no natural vehicles for the US and Iran to talk to one another substantively? We considered a wide variety of possibilities, and ultimately it was the Sultan of Oman who came forward and said he could facilitate this conversation. But even after we had our first discussion, and that was in the summer of 2012, it was several months before we had the next one because the second obstacle after the initial channel establishment was the long-standing mistrust between the United States and Iran going back to 1979. This mistrust has been reinforced over the years—for a variety of reasons, and due to a variety of factors. So you have the first meeting and there is some feeling of progress but not a lot of confidence that this can go anywhere in the second meeting in the spring of 2013. It wasn’t really until you had a new president in Iran that the Iranians were really serious about having this conversation. That’s when we began much more frequent engagements that ultimately led to the joint plan of action.

Was there any specific reason, other than the Sultan of Oman’s invitation, that Oman was chosen as a place to negotiate?

Oman is a country that has historically good relations with both the United States and Iran. The Sultan is a leader who has the respect of both

President Obama and Secretary Clinton as well as the respect of the Iranian leadership. And so, I think both sides viewed him as an honest broker and viewed Oman as a country that was really capable of providing the kind of facilitation that was required here. I would add that this came to pass on the heels of the episode involving hikers who had been seized on the Iranian border and were held unjustly in our view in Iran for months, even longer. The Omanis were helpful in resolving that situation, so they had already shown that they were capable of using their good offices to positive effect. I think that contributed as well to the confidence we had in this channel.

Do you think that as we communicated more with the Iranians, at least a little confidence began to come back to repair relations at the basic level?

I don't know if I would say that confidence has returned, because confidence really comes with concrete action. And while the Iranians have complied with the joint plan of action over the past year and a half, real confidence will only follow from a comprehensive agreement that resolves international committee's concerns that Iran has actually, verifiably implemented.

What has come through is a capacity on both sides to engage in conversation in a way that is actually driving towards a solution. Now conversation is in the more normal course. Diplomats in the two countries are able to get together to talk about the nuclear file, up to and including the Secretary of State and foreign minister of Iran. So, it's less about us having been able to build confidence, but we have been able to establish a constructive mechanism for dialog to happen that doesn't require the kind of heavy lifting that was required when we set this channel up. And that's good because it means that the transaction costs for actually having the conversation have gone down. The substantive hurdles and actually getting to an agreement are still there. But it's no longer a question about can we talk, but rather, what will we talk about?

Given these indicators of progress, do you believe it's possible for US-Iranian relations to improve in the immediate future? For example, do you think that we would have an embassy there anytime soon?

I think that is less likely, because even if we resolve the nuclear issue, there are significant and deep concerns that the United States has about Iranian policy, both at home and around the world. You've got the Iranian sponsorship of terrorism and Iran's destabilizing activities in the region, Iran's abusive human rights at home, and it will take more than just a nuclear deal for us to get to a point where normalization is a serious prospect.

And how has the emergence of the Islamic state sort of changed our calculus regarding Iran in the region?

I wouldn't say that it's changed any of the fundamental dimensions of

our calculus, but let me talk about three different angles. The first angle is the nuclear file. We have worked hard to keep the nuclear file from the regional affairs, and the reason for that is that we can't trade one off against the other. There are certain fundamental things we need on the nuclear file, and we need these things irrespective of what is happening. So the nuclear file really hasn't been profoundly affected by what's happening with ISIS. The second angle is that, of course, events in the world form part of the context for negotiations and as a backdrop to what is happening, obviously the role of Iran in the region, the role of the United States in the region, are present in the minds of negotiators on both sides. They don't end up making a decisive difference on nuts and bolts of nuclear agreement, but they are there, and that's undeniable. The third angle is what happens in the event that we do reach an agreement. Our concerns about Iran don't end there. We feel like Iran's activities in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon, with respect to Hamas and Israel, and other places as well are deeply problematic and are likely to remain problematic after the nuclear agreement. And we have to be prepared to respond to a deal with that, even in the context of achieving a comprehensive agreement.

Considering that these international agreements have faced domestic opposition both in the United States and Iran, how do you think that the public will receive a sort of agreement on the nuclear issue in both Iran and the US?

In the United States, it fundamentally depends on our ability to make the case to both the Congress and the American people. If the deal does not do what we say it will do—and that is to verifiably cut off all Iran's paths to a nuclear weapon, because that's the deal I think, that's the only deal we will go for. I have confidence that we can sell it. If we can sell it to the Congress, we can sell it to the American people. On the Iranian side, they have a system where the Supreme Leader is the ultimate decision maker. And if he gives his team the green light to sign on the dotted line, metaphorically—I don't think it will actually happen—then we will have every expectation and I think the world might have expectations to follow through on it. That's not to say that there are factions in Iran that are skeptical or in opposition to this deal. But if they sign up to this thing, it's their job to bring all of that in line and to follow through on its terms. And a lot of, I think, the uncertainty and skepticism in the United States in certain quarters can be addressed and resolved simply by us being able to effectively make the presentation that in all of its dimensions. This deal will prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. And that is, for us, the scene we want out of the deal. And that is the basic metric by which these deals should be judged.

The United States and Iran have both looked to Saudi Arabia as an indicator regarding the competing regional powers within the Middle East. Do you see the recent death of Saudi

Arabia's King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz to have any effect on the stability of the region or on the relations with the United States?

On the relations with the US question, I think President Obama's visit there reinforced the notion that whoever the King is, there are some enduring bonds and ties and interests between the United States and Saudi Arabia. And I think he sent that message powerfully through his visit, and the substance of the conversation also reaffirmed that. Successions, in terms of stability, always present questions and challenges. This is a time of transition in Saudi Arabia. We just saw a Cabinet reshuffle today, and we will see more change in Saudi Arabia in the coming weeks. And so one shouldn't be totally sanguine about how things go. But the United States has, I think, pretty strong confidence that the new King and his new team will be capable of carrying out the security and the economic partnership that we've had, and play a role in the region that is ultimately consistent with our interests. As we look forward, I think we are going to have a series of strategic dialogues with Saudi Arabia and with other partners about all of the—for lack of a better term, or maybe this is a technical term—crazy things that are happening in the region right now. What do we do about that? What's our mid- to long-term strategy on that? I hope that the conversation that began with King Salman will continue in the months and years ahead because Saudi Arabia and the United States have got to be on the same page. Not just about ISIS, not just about Iran, but about what a vision for the region is that ultimately addresses some of the fundamental, underlying drivers of conflict and instability. That's got to be a serious adult conversation. And it's got to be a sustained conversation.

What is your response to those who say that a sort of nuclear deal with Iran would be seen in Saudi Arabia as an America that is moving or distancing itself from Saudi Arabia, considering the two see each other as rivals?

Well, as I've just said, that strategic conversation between the United States and Saudi Arabia has to continue in earnest. That is crucial for the bilateral relationship. It's crucial for our regional strategy. It is also crucial for us making clear to Saudi Arabia what a nuclear deal with Iran is, and what it's not. And I think if we are able to deepen our security ties with Saudi Arabia, continue to stay closely aligned with them on the big questions in the region, and have transparency and credibility with them on nuclear issues with respect to Iran, then we can emerge from this deal, stronger as opposed to having more distance between us. But that requires placing a high premium on that type of consultation, and that consultation can only take place at the highest levels. President, Secretary of State, CIA director, Secretary of Defense, Vice President, those—all of those people have to be fundamentally engaged in the process going forward.

You worked very closely with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Vice President Joe Biden during your time with the administration. What, do you believe, were the most important policy goals that they have accomplished and which ones still remain?

For Secretary Clinton, I think that her most important contribution to US foreign policy was her central role to the US rebalance in the Asia Pacific. This is something that, from her first few weeks as Secretary of State, she was focused on, and she carried the flag to her last day on the job. She took her first trip to Asia, she was crucial in reestablishing strong ties with southeast Asian countries, reinforcing our alliances, setting up mechanisms to manage the US-China relationship, and so many other dimensions of that relationship. I believe much of the history of the 21st century will be written in the Asian Pacific and there is no more consequential geopolitical fact than the rise of China. Have the US well situated as the leader in the Asia Pacific, shaping rules-based order for the century ahead. That is as profound an accomplishment as you could ask as Secretary of State to deliver for you in four year time span.

For Vice President Biden, one of the things I worked very closely with him on was deepening US ties in this hemisphere in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Vice President has spoken about a hemisphere that is middle class, secure, and democratic, from Canada to Chile and everywhere in between. That vision is not, by any means, out of reach. That can be, and should be, a strategic goal of the United States: alliance-free market democracies throughout the hemisphere as a global platform for security, stability, prosperity. I think his down payments on that—the things that he has done in the last two years to advance that goal, combined with the President's announcement on Cuba—have positioned us very well strategically on this set of issues.

Speaking of Cuba, what are your thoughts on the recent announcement of potential embassy there?

So when I was director of policy planning, and then during my stint at the White House, I was involved in the effort to bring about this normalization, and was a champion for a different approach. One of the things that you learn after you spend a few years in the government in Washington is that there is a great deal of inertia behind policy. Things can continue to not work for year after year, decade after decade, and it takes leadership, foresight, and strength to say, 'You know what? When something's not working, I'm going to try something else.' And so, I think the President has made the right decision in pursuing this new policy. I think what the American people and the Congress need to understand is that this is really a question about tactics, because the fundamental objective of critics on the Hill of his policy and the President himself are the same. It is fundamentally the advancement of economic political freedom, of Cuban people, and the disagreement is just over what is

the best way to bring that about. The President believes the way we have been trying for the last umpteen years has not been working.

What happened in the last few years that allowed this diplomatic breakthrough and were there economic factors and political factors that lined up just right?

So one aspect has just been the passage of time. That, you know, it has been so long since we had been trying the old policy, it was time to try something new. One aspect is that there have been small, modest adjustments in the Cuban approach. I don't want to overstate them, because it is still fundamentally a dictatorship that suppresses the rights and aspiration of its people. But small, modest changes that suggest an openness on the Cuban side to do this, and then you had a President who, when he came into office, felt that this was something he wanted to keep a close eye on, and if he felt there was an opportunity to move forward on this, he would. And the opportunity presented itself after a series of talks. And so, the President seized it.

How does the status of Guantanamo affect our relationship with Cuba now? Is that a new issue that has come up, or something that we have put inside another box?

Cubans will always say, 'You should return Guantanamo to us.' We have our views, and they have theirs. I don't believe that it would fundamentally disrupt the steps that each side is taking right now, but it is a reminder that here are issues, like that one, and like many others, that remain sources of enormous tension between us, and this relationship is not going to become hunky-dory, or friendly. It will remain tense and difficult because we have a fundamentally different view about what is right and just than the current Cuban leadership has. As long as that remains the case, there will be friction between us, but that doesn't mean that we cannot establish a diplomatic system where we can engage with one another, where we can try to drive openings in the Cuban economically, that could potentially lead to political openings. That is what the President is trying to pursue.

Speaking of the current leadership in Cuba, do you believe that the Castros and their successors will be more open to the United States if we take concrete steps in normalizing trade relations?

Look, I think any leader is going to be more willing to do something on their part if they feel like they are getting something out of a deal. And that would be true in this case. It would certainly make them happy for us to take further steps on the embargo, and further steps on things like Guantanamo, on various designations we have of the Cuban regime, but I think that shouldn't be our metric. Our metric should be quite simple, which is, in the US national security interest. And what is in the interest of the Cuban people?

One of the things on the US national security interest side is that the

issue of Cuba has been a real distraction and a point of division with other countries in Latin America. And the concept of this platform is alliance of free market democracies throughout the hemisphere fundamentally advanced by us taking the Cuba issue off the table. Not making it about us anymore. Instead, turning the spotlight on Cuba, saying, 'okay, it's not about us.' We are meaning to normalize. Now it is about these guys, you've got to come with us, to hold their feet to the fire. So, from a national interest perspective, and from the perspective of trying to advance freedom and democracy. In Cuba, this means taking certain steps to normalize as in move forward and make sense. The exact shape, pace, sequence of that—I think we need to carefully measure at each step along the way and decide whether this is going to help or hurt those two fundamental, underlying objectives.

One of the biggest concerns that I have heard with the media is that the Castros simply aren't rational actors, and even if we're making these steps, the leadership is still fundamentally the same as it was back during the crisis in the '60s. How would you address this?

I think it is overwhelmingly likely, with the Castro brothers, that they have no interest in fundamental change in Cuba. They have staked their entire careers on a certain system of government—a government we strongly object to, and there is no reason to believe that, late in life, they are all of a sudden going to have an altar call. But that being said, the logic here is not that if we do these nice things for Cuba, then they will do nice things for their people. That is not at all the logic. The logic is if we take advantage of openings in Cuba by allowing greater travel, greater economic investment, greater interchange, and if we take the Cuban issue off the table in our dealings with other countries in the region, that's in our fundamental self-interest and it's ultimately in the interests of the Cuban people over time. And pressure from below will begin to shape the decision of the Cuban leadership. And the Castros won't be around forever. There's going to be a next generation of leadership there, and they are going to have to face a new reality about Cuba's relationships with the United States and Cuba's role in the region.

Looking out maybe five or ten years in the future, what do you see as the major threat to the United States' national security?

I think there are a few different categories of threats. One of them is obviously the ongoing threat of violent Jihad terrorism and that is a threat that is evolving. It is in some ways diffusing into smaller and more difficult to pin down elements, so that would be one big area. The second area is the potential for further nuclear proliferation. Part of the reason we are driving so hard and front running the nuclear deal is to fundamentally preserve the non-proliferation regimes so you don't end up in arms races. The third area is cyber, where there is a lot of work to do, and the US leadership should be driving this work

on setting rules of the road for what's in bounds and what's out of bounds on the cyber front. And fourth significant issue that we simply can't wait any longer to confront and grapple is climate change, which represents a threat to everybody. And this year is a crucial year for that. There is a big meeting in Paris at the end of 2015—a goal of that meeting is to produce an agreement where every country in the world agrees to limit its carbon emissions.

President Obama, I think, has taken very positive steps on this, including the bilateral agreement with China, and what he's done on his own, through executive action, here in the United States, and I think we're going to have to have muscular and visionary diplomacy in the lead up to that to try and produce some kind of outcome. So that doesn't even begin to cut the waterfront of all the threats. You have got the potential for the return of geopolitical competition; you've got Russia. China has choices to make on how it's going to manage all its lives, and we have to keep an eye on these things. But with any luck, the US-China relationship will not be about managing differences, as much as it will be about being able to minimize these differences and to maximize cooperation. With Russia, Putin is making, I think, fundamentally bad choices—and may continue to do so. And all we can do is play the long game—strengthen our partners, strengthen ourselves, and narrow the space for him to cause mischief.

You trained Barack Obama and Clinton in debates in 2008. Do you have any tips for being a successful debater?

I wouldn't use the word 'train,' I would use 'helped them prepare.' One important thing to keep in mind when you're debating is that you've got to be able to break down the wall between you and the audience, and really talk directly to them, so the debate should be less about you going at it with your opponent, and more about you bringing in the audience. To say, 'Look, here's what's really going on,' up here, up on stage, almost like you're an actor who has broken out of character for a minute and turned to the audience to say, 'Here's what the deal is, what's really happening.' That puts you at a real advantage, not just tactically, but in terms of being able to connect to the audience so that they not only trust you, but also understand the argument that you're making. So that's one big thing that is worth focusing on.

A second thing is that policy is ultimately in pursuit of purpose. You don't just say, 'I'm for middle class tax cuts,' you have to explain to people why you're doing what you're doing—what you're in it for. So, especially in a policy debate, starting with a statement of purpose—the goal here is X, and this is the way I'm going to get there—is incredibly important. A lot of people end up skipping that step and diving right into to whatever the issue is. And so, being able to state the purpose up front is very important. So those are two tips, I charge for all the rest. I'm joking.

(Laughter) To wrap up, we'd like to ask if you have any tips for undergraduates interested in international relations or policy making.

There is no substitute for grappling with the issues in a concrete way. That means either trying to work in government in an internship where you actually get the kind of contact with reality that comes with being inside the government. Or working in a think-tank which has some proximity to government, where people are very much engaged in the policy debates, and recognizing the constraints the policymakers are facing or working on policy issues in a campaign.

Much of what happens in foreign policy, like much of what happens in domestic policy, happens in the context of politics. Not that it's politics that are driving all of the national policy, but this is democracy and in a democracy, you have to take into account public opinion. You have to take into account Congress, you have to have the sustainability of any given policy choice, and whether or not it will ultimately be repudiated by the American public. And so having some sense of that through a campaign can be a positive thing. Choosing one of those opportunities to get your feet wet and your hands a little dirty in a positive sense, I think, is a very worthy undertaking for every undergraduate, whether for the summer or right after they graduate.

RWANDA: THE GUIDING HAND OF THE MARCH 23RD MOVEMENT

Zachary Benton Nelson

At the fore of unrest in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the March 23rd Movement (M23)—named after a botched peace deal signed on March 23rd 2009—which earned an unprecedented notoriety and posted spectacular successes during its 19 month rebellion. This was a rebellion defined by the avaricious intentions of neighboring Rwanda, but veiled and publicly predicated on addressing political grievances—a messy quagmire steeped in viciousness startling even to such a war-weary region. Although the M23 uprising is pegged as a civil war, it has an unmistakable Rwandan flavor. Rwanda spurred the M23 conflict as an ingenious proxy for a self-motivated adventure of economic imperialism. A comprehensive ceasefire, multilateral sanctions and mining reform could have defused the conflict and considerably mitigated its costs.

This paper will begin with a brief historical account of the M23 rebellion and will be structured around the following questions:

1. What competing arguments exist for the cause[s] of the rebellion? Specifically, what was the nature of Rwandan incitement and involvement?
2. What could the Congolese state/international community have done to avert the conflict or mitigate its cost?

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The word ‘conflict’ fails to capture the wanton violence endemic to the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for the better part of a generation. This ‘conflict’ has manifested itself through a “litany of insurgencies, skirmishes, massacres, systemized rapes, and refugee crises”¹ that are a persistent reality for millions of Congolese. Since 1996, it is estimated that over 5.4 million people, mostly civilians, have died²—more casualties than in all interstate wars since WWII combined—in what historian Gérard Prunier has dubbed ‘Africa’s World War,’ because of extensive intervention by countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola and Rwanda. Today, the volatile Kivu provinces are infested with over 40 insurgent groups³ including the mythical Mai Mai who spray themselves “with magic water to protect themselves from bullets,”⁴ Ugandan Joseph Kony’s elusive Lord’s Resistance Army and a slew of other militias

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armed with everything from 50mm canons to wooden clubs. However, no movement has been as successful as M23.

The history of eastern Congo is frighteningly complex: a tale of capricious ethnic tensions, fluid demographic shifts and a region burdened with pervasive violence. However, in order to fully understand the causes of M23's rise to rebellion, it is essential to comprehend that M23 did not spring forth from the ether. It was rather the final, most cohesive incarnation of an organic evolution of rebel groups operating in the rugged eastern DRC. The National Congress for the Defense of the People, known by its French acronym CNDP, was the precursor to M23. Comprised mostly of ethnic Tutsis from the central Great Lakes region, the CNDP were hardened veterans of the campaign to overthrow Juvenal Habyarimana's Hutu government in Rwanda in 1994. Following those efforts, the CNDP then fought to depose Sese Seko Mobutu in 1996 and became a nagging thorn in President Joseph Kabila's side by 2009, controlling broad swathes of Kivu provinces and constantly fighting the Hutu Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). In tandem with the U.N., a loose coalition of western governments brokered a peace deal on March 23, 2009 in which the CNDP integrated into the Congolese military (FARDC) with hopes of bringing peace and stability to the embattled eastern Congo. In May 2012, merely three years later, the peace accord was shattered: over 600 hundred former CNDP soldiers, under the dual command of General Sultani Makenga and Bosco 'The Terminator' Ntagana, defected from the FARDC and fled into the densely-forested Virunga mountains, birthing the M23 movement.

WHAT COMPETING ARGUMENTS EXIST FOR THE CAUSE[S] OF THE REBELLION? SPECIFICALLY, WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF RWANDAN INCITEMENT AND INVOLVEMENT?

The reasons for the defection and subsequent cause of the protracted 19-month rebellion have prompted vigorous scholarly debate and are as numerous as the rebel groups wreaking havoc in the eastern DRC. The common narrative for M23's call to arms is twofold. The first element of its justification was the failure of Kinshasa to honor provisions brokered during the 2009 peace agreement: increased pay, promotions based on merit rather than ethnicity, and more cohesive and equitable integration into the FARDC apparatus.⁵ The M23 leadership also demanded that Joseph Kabila's regime "become accountable to its people, end corruption [and] the mistreatment of minority groups."⁶ These grievances appear legitimate; Kinshasa had indeed failed to adequately grant CNDP officials the promised number of high-level positions in the FARDC and willfully neglected their commitment in facilitating the return of Tutsi refugees.⁷ However, closer examination reveals that many former CNDP soldiers were in fact granted lucrative postings and abused their newfound privilege to "accumulate wealth through illegal taxation, cross-border smuggling and protection rackets."⁸ The reintegration process botched the crucial *integration* element, permitting the CNDP troops to "maintain parallel chains of command with the army"⁹—these soldiers were

effectively operating autonomously behind a veneer of assimilation.¹⁰ Complaints by non-CNDP soldiers within the FARDC of this 'special status' prompted Kinshasa to threaten stamping out this blatant corruption by reassigning top officers to far-flung postings.¹¹ It was the fear that their privileges would end that prompted the ex-CNDP troops to rebrand themselves as M23, although they cited the aforementioned grievances as their justification.

The mutiny initially failed—M23 was too weak and disorganized—and its cause seemed doomed, but a benevolent benefactor mysteriously resuscitated it. This guiding hand was Rwanda—the shady engineer of the M23 rebellion. Paul Kagame has vociferously denied supporting M23, dismissing such claims as “ludicrous”¹² and publicly “condemned all forms of external support”¹³ to the rebels. Kagame’s words were hollow. He consciously omitted Rwanda’s precedent of meddling in the eastern Congo. Actually, prior to the birth of M23, Rwanda had openly supported the CNDP in hopes of denying the ‘Hutu Power’-FLDR a Kivu base from which to consolidate power and threaten Rwanda. Furthermore, Kagame rejected an extensive United Nations report that accused Kigali of providing direct “support to M23 rebels, facilitation of recruitment, encouragement...of FARDC desertions as well as the provision of arms and ammunition, intelligence, and political advice.”¹⁴ This critical evidence of direct Rwandan intervention begs the question: why and how would Rwanda support a ‘foreign’ rebel group while openly denying its patronage?

A widely held belief is that Rwanda encouraged the M23 rebellion in order to address long-standing security concerns rooted in the Kivus. Ever since Kagame’s Revolutionary Patriotic Front (RPF) drove the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, including the fanatical *Interahamwe* and Hutu-power ideologues, into the DRC in mid-1994, these extremists have been operating in the rural hinterlands of the Kivu region. Rwanda’s concern is evidenced by its previous support of the majority Tutsi CNDP and is buttressed by the belief that “as long as any of these elements continue to operate in the Congo...they pose a threat greater than the sum of their current troop numbers, as they continue to be fueled by the ideology that fueled the genocide.”¹⁵ Kagame, ever the shrewd politician, was able to exploit Western guilt for failure to intervene in the 1994 genocide to his own ends—launching a series of incursions into Congolese territory starting in 1996 and continuing in some form or another, until the rise of M23 in May 2012.

However, by May 2012, the security argument was no longer credible. The threat posed by the FLDR and its allies was negligible and Rwanda’s sallies into Congolese territory to eradicate these fanatical Hutus had become unpopular with the international community. Critics of Kagame accused his administration of pursuing “cold-blooded ethnic revenge”¹⁶ and being driven by a “sense of entitlement and invincibility [influenced] more [by] its military might than its ethnic affiliation.”¹⁷ Military analysts also pointed to the fact that the military capabilities of these Hutu groups—numbering no more than 2,500 poorly-armed, disorganized men¹⁸—were “no match for Rwandan forces amounting to 700,000 men under arms and a sophis-

ticated military arsenal, consisting of armored personnel carriers, tanks and helicopters.”¹⁹ What had once been a battle of David vs. Goliath had devolved into that of a playground bully tormenting his weak and disheveled subordinate. Still, if Rwanda ever did have to answer for its involvement in enflaming the M23 uprising, its defense of protecting security interests—even if empirically spurious—is difficult to dispute considering the traumatic events in its recent history.

The answer for Rwanda’s involvement in the M23 conflict is greed. Because security intervention was no longer an option, Rwanda stimulated the M23 rebellion through clever manipulation and creative diplomacy while feigning ignorance at accusations of its involvement. M23 was the perfect façade to fuel Kigali’s economic motives and promoting destabilization in the DRC created a smokescreen, masking Rwanda’s extractive intent. Kagame’s regime feigned ignorance at accusations of its involvement, masquerading behind bogus security and humanitarian concerns while thrusting its rapacious hands into the DRC’s mineral reserves.

In M23, Rwanda saw the vehicle through which it could voraciously consume the eastern DRC’s rich mineral reserves, valued at a staggering \$24 trillion.²⁰ These resources include an estimated 30%²¹ of the world’s diamonds, copper, cobalt and a slew of valuable rare-earth minerals including cassiterite (tin ore), tantalum and the increasingly lucrative coltan. The eastern DRC is extraordinarily rugged, heavily forested and overwhelmed by abject poverty. Kinshasa, located over 1,500 km to the west, has historically found it difficult to project power in this embattled region and is handicapped by its own status as the capital of a failed state.²²

Under these conditions, Rwanda realized that it could craft M23 as a viable, popular alternative to Kinshasa’s corrupt government. A young teenager at a M23 recruiting station affirmed this forecast, telling a Western journalist “I want M23 to take over the Congo, because all the young people you see here don’t have jobs. When they take over the country, they’ll create jobs. That’s what they told us.”²³ Shortly after the outbreak of fighting in May 2012, the Congolese Security Minister Richard Muyej claimed, “M23 is another name for Rwanda. It’s all part of Rwanda’s Machiavellian destabilization plan of the east.”²⁴ Rwanda predicted that by inciting and then propping up M23’s insurgency, it could create a political buffer zone in a chaotic fringe region, shielding itself from international scrutiny and enabling unprecedented access to the Kivus’ mineral riches.

Rwanda’s desire to exploit the eastern DRC’s mineral resources by enabling an M23 insurgency stems from its economic insecurity and desire to be a regional hegemon. As a small, land-locked country with minimal natural resources and a burgeoning population mostly oriented toward subsistence agriculture, Rwanda has faced difficulty in diversifying economically. Rwanda suffers from a chronic trade deficit—where imports dwarf the traditional exports of coffee and tea—and minerals (from next door) are essential in reducing the deficit.²⁵ Ever since Rwanda’s initial incursions into the DRC in the late nineties, it is estimated that Rwandan mining revenues have increased at a rate of 10% every year.²⁶ With their presence in the Kivu provinces

becoming unpalatable by 2012, Rwanda was keen to ensure “continued access to Congo’s economic wealth,”²⁷ maintain their lucrative extractive presence and boost mining revenues. With added economic security, Rwanda could peg itself as a regional power, building upon its sense of moral entitlement and further extending its influence throughout Central Africa.²⁸

In the destabilized DRC, commerce is “militarized.”²⁹ The profits go to the player with the biggest stick and this stick is cunningly wielded by Rwanda through its M23 proxy. M23 is bigger, badder and meaner than its competitors. Although the illicit nature of Rwanda’s economic ventures in the Congo is difficult to quantify, it is apparent that the “economic activity in Rwanda today goes far beyond what either the Rwandan economy alone or the current level of international investment could support.”³⁰ One highly developed area of downtown Kigali is even jokingly referred to as ‘Merci Congo’ in reference to the minerals smuggled out of the DRC, rebranded as Rwandan and exported to international markets.³¹ Critics of Kagame’s M23 escape openly accuse him of looting Congo’s minerals, declaring that it is “official state policy.”³² Yet, by continually denying involvement in the M23 mutiny, Kigali was able to continue funneling resources into Rwanda with minimal harassment.

WHAT COULD THE CONGOLESE STATE/INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAVE DONE TO AVERT THE CONFLICT OR MITIGATE ITS COST?

It is clear that the causes of the M23 uprising are multifaceted, but Rwanda’s direct involvement and selfish interests are difficult to reject. Measures to prevent M23’s rise, such as the provision of basic services, increased investment in infrastructure or a firm military commitment, would indeed discourage rebel groups from taking up arms. However, because of Kinshasa’s woefully weak governance and continuous history of violence in the eastern DRC, conflict, in the context of May 2012, was an ever-present reality.

Instead, the Congolese state and international community could have worked in tandem, addressing immediate concerns and then tackling systemic issues, in order to mitigate the severity of the conflict. Foremost among these ‘immediate’ concerns should have been a formalized ceasefire between Kinshasa and the M23 leadership brokered and enforced by the 20,000-men strong MONUSCO contingent deployed in the eastern DRC. This period of relative tranquility could have significantly reduced the potential for escalation and would have created the opportunity for Kinshasa and MONUSCO to engage in grassroots peace initiatives in regional areas where tensions were running high.³³ In addition, “explicit condemnation by the UN security council, African Union, and ICGLR of external involvement in the fighting,”³⁴ while nominally symbolic, paves the way for more sustained pressure on Rwanda’s benefaction.

The most effective method[s] of mitigating the conflict and preventing its resurgence are multilateral sanctions and mining sector reform. A year prior to the M23 mutiny, foreign aid accounted for roughly a quarter of Rwanda’s GDP.³⁵ By threatening to halt the flow of foreign dollars into Kigali’s coffers unless his regime ceased

its tacit funding of M23, the international donor community might have increased its leverage over Kigali. Furthermore, many Western nations, in order to atone for failing to act during the 1994 genocide, have exclusive arms deals with the Rwandan military. By imposing an arms embargo on Rwanda, the international community could severely constrict Kigali's capacity to outfit M23 with military supplies.³⁶ Finally, it is unlikely that as Rwanda continues to prosper, its interest in the DRC's minerals will subside—M23 was a sham to cover for Rwandan exploitation. Through a vigorous, multilateral effort, the international community, Kinshasa and Kigali could have devoted serious effort into comprehensive mining reform. A MONUSCO report advocated the formation of 'Islands of Stability' in rural areas—the "creation of public administrations...trade regimes from the ground up,"³⁷ with the hope that these 'islands' would engender positive economic activity. By increasing transparency, encouraging the investment of legitimate foreign dollars and regulating small-scale mining, this initiative could have spurred the process of bringing jobs to an impoverished area and generating far greater revenues for the entire region.³⁸

From the surface, the M23 insurgency appears to be nothing more than yet another ethnically motivated, anti-government conflict. Closer examination reveals a war that was 'civil' in name, but in reality, anything but. Rwanda created an insurgency and skillfully and quietly embroiled itself in the conflict in the pursuit of material gains. The DRC and international community were slow to act, neglecting the establishment of a comprehensive ceasefire, imposition of sanctions and embargos and mining reform. The 19-month insurgency displaced thousands and further dragged the eastern DRC into an abysmal pit of chronic instability.

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A WAY FORWARD: ISRAEL-PALESTINE AS AN INTERSTATE CONFLICT

Theodore Minerva

Despite decades of violence, there is no meaningful initiative on the horizon to break the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate. The conflict contains aspects of civil war that render it intractable. Professor Donald Horowitz proffers one explanation for the conflict's longevity by shedding light on the competition for moral worth that can arise when opposing ethnic groups occupy the same environment.¹ In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israeli leaders stake such a moral claim by evoking a Jewish homeland that grew out of the Holocaust and yet is still surrounded by enemies. Palestinian leaders, on the other hand, derive moral power from an obsessive focus on the historical injustice in which they relinquished holy lands under duress for the sake of the Jewish state. As Palestinians do not have equal standing in Israel, there is no other means for them to negotiate. If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were a clear interstate dispute, there would be a better chance of achieving resolution. Such a change in the existing dynamic would require that the global community recognize a Palestinian state in the short term, prior to settlement of the major points in dispute. This approach would be difficult given Israel's clear reluctance to participate in the creation of a viable Palestinian state. Clarifying the status of both bargaining parties and setting them on a more equal footing can improve outcomes in a crisis that continues to have severe consequences.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict can easily be mistaken for a war among sovereign states. Palestinian Arab and Israeli Jewish populations are ethnically and religiously distinct, and to a large extent they live and work in separate areas. These factors suggest that their longstanding dispute already operates as an interstate crisis. Yet, a necessary condition for an interstate conflict is the presence of two or more warring sovereign entities, and there are differing views regarding the status of both Israel and Palestine. Israel, a member of the international community for over fifty years, qualifies as a strong state on the continuum that Robert Rotberg sets out in *Why States Fail*, because it fully controls its borders and delivers a full range and a high quality of political goods to its citizens.² Israel also satisfies the dual meaning of *state* outlined by Bruce Porter in *War and the Rise of the State*, namely, that a state include not only a sovereign government and the land, population, and society it controls, but also a set of institutions such as a central government, armed forces, regulatory agencies, and police, whose principal function is to control its territory and maintain internal order.³ Despite Israel's formidable institutional capacities, thirty-two UN member na-

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tions including most Islamic countries – as well as the Palestinian group Hamas – do not recognize the state of Israel's right to exist. Another challenge in portraying the Israeli-Palestinian dispute as an interstate conflict is that Palestinian dominated areas, including the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank, clearly lack sovereign status. Israel exercises substantial authority in these territories, controlling entry and egress, maintaining a blockade of Gaza, and regularly adding to the growing stock of Jewish-only residential settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.⁴ Hostilities between groups like Hamas and Israel are, therefore, akin to civil unrest. When the Israeli military enters the West Bank in a police action or Gaza to counter Hamas aggression, the international community views these forays as fundamentally more acceptable than an incursion into a sovereign state like Lebanon.

The civil strife in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute approximates an intrastate rather than an interstate conflict; however, since the occupied territories are not integrated into the rest of Israel, the hostilities are not a civil war. Bloody intifada uprisings, months-long clashes between Israeli military and Hamas in Gaza, and suicide bombings in Israel proper all reflect Palestinian frustration with occupation as well as moral outrage over historical events. The picture conjures a civil war, but differs from other civil wars in some respects: even though their movements, livelihood, and security are all controlled by Israel, Palestinians living in the territories are not Israeli citizens and the Israeli government does not represent them. Secession or government overthrow are not the goals of Palestinian unrest, as they are in most other civil wars. Rather, Palestinians hope to escape the yoke of Israel and secure their holy lands, reverting to a period that preceded the establishment of the Jewish homeland.

There is a relatively low probability that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be settled any time soon, specifically because its hostilities take the form of civil unrest. In *Bargaining Failures and Civil War*, Barbara Walter asserts that civil wars are harder to settle than interstate conflicts. Civil wars are longer, include more one-sided victories, and suffer a higher rate of recurrence.⁵ Walter's comments resonate in the Israeli-Palestinian context because of the seemingly perpetual cycle of civil unrest and crackdowns. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is among the most protracted in modern history, having stymied generations of peacemakers.⁶ Israel orchestrates a complex security apparatus to keep daily violence to a minimum, but outbursts can occur at any time. When major battles do break out, such as the crisis involving Gaza during the summer of 2014, the outcome is usually decisive in Israel's favor. However, with each militarily definitive victory against a much weaker Palestinian adversary, Israel loses ground in the eyes of global public opinion. This offset increases the likelihood of recurrence as Palestinians capitalize on anti-Israeli sentiment to pressure Israel to change its behavior. Hence, the conflict seems caught in a vicious cycle of violence and tentative calm with no prospect of resolution.

As Walter notes, resolution of intrastate conflicts can be derailed by information asymmetry, difficulties in credibly committing to settlements, and indivisible stakes (land or resources that cannot be split between opposing factions).⁷ All of

these factors apply in the Israeli-Palestinian situation. An example of information asymmetry is the network of secret Hamas tunnels uncovered in recent violent clashes. Vastly increasing the potential for surprise attacks, the tunnels would have allowed Hamas to inflict significant casualties on Israeli soldiers and civilians. However, the improvement in Hamas's capability reduced the chances for a negotiated settlement as it reinforced Israel's concern about unforeseen risk. Israeli and Palestinian leaders cannot credibly commit to agreements because they see vulnerabilities in changes to the status quo. Israel raises concern about security buffers while the Palestinians recognize that Israelis can renege on any settlement, without repercussion, as long as the parties negotiate in an intrastate context. Finally, at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lays Walter's problem of indivisible stakes.⁸ Both Israeli Jews and Arab Muslims see Jerusalem as the symbolic center of their respective religions, and neither is willing to acknowledge any prior claim. Israel currently oversees access to Jerusalem by virtue of its occupation of East Jerusalem. Walter points to the possibility that decisive military victory may be the only way to resolve such claims.⁹

Negotiation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a clear interstate dispute would be the most productive way forward. The two-state solution features a grand bargain, in which issues as diverse as borders, the right of return, and mutual recognition are settled upfront, and the reward for success is an independent Palestinian state. A better starting point to resolve the conflict involves recognition of the State of Palestine, after which negotiation of the remaining issues could begin anew. This may be the path embraced by Sweden, which recently recognized the State of Palestine, declaring that all requisite qualities of a sovereign state exist.¹⁰ One means of testing the efficacy of this approach is to examine how the three factors Walter cites as problematic in intrastate disputes might change in an interstate Israeli-Palestinian conflict. First, with respect to information asymmetry, the external assistance needed to build institutional capacity would compel Palestine to open its borders to NGOs and private investors, making it difficult to retain military secrets and reducing the incentives to do so. In such an environment, Hamas's influence would diminish, and the moderate Palestinian Authority would help unify Gaza and the West Bank. Second, Israel and a Palestinian state could more credibly commit to agreements on a range of issues when they approach them on a state-to-state basis. As Walter notes, third party enforcement can prove critical in situations where there is a power imbalance.¹¹ The global community would presumably have a significant stake in this enterprise and would make every effort to ensure compliance. Third party backing would generate two benefits: Palestinians would gain confidence in the enforceability of agreements, and Israeli leaders would have political cover for difficult decisions such as dismantling settlements in occupied areas. Finally, on the question of Jerusalem and indivisible stakes in an interstate debate, there should be renewed support for administration by an independent entity that could ensure access to holy sites as well as protection for both the sites and visitors.

This analysis suggests that those factors that often undermine bargains in an

intrastate dispute would have more limited effects if an interstate bargain were under negotiation by a Palestinian state and Israel. While not a comprehensive examination of each issue separating the two parties, the findings support the conclusion that an interstate negotiation involving a newly established Palestinian state would be a more productive means of resolving issues than the status quo.

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1. Horowitz, Donald L., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 141-3.
2. Robert I. Rotberg, "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 4.
3. Bruce D. Porter, "The Mirror Image of War." in *War and the Rise of the State*, ed. Bruce D. Porter (New York: The Free Press, a Division of Simon & Schuster, 1994), 5.
4. Central Intelligence Agency. "West Bank." *World Factbook*.
5. Barbara F. Walter, "Bargaining Failures and Civil War." *The Annual Review of Political Science*, 12 (2009): 244.
6. Central Intelligence Agency. "Israel." *World Factbook*.
7. Walter, 245-7.
8. *Ibid.*, 246-7.
9. *Ibid.*, 247.
10. "Sweden Recognises state of Palestine," *Al Jazeera America*, October 30, 2014.
11. Walter, 255.

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