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World Outlook is a student-run journal of international affairs that publishes papers written by undergraduate students. In addition, the journal features interviews with major global thinkers and opinion pieces written by our own staff. Our name and missions are motivated by the words of late Dartmouth President John Sloan Dickey. Please visit our website at http://sites.dartmouth.edu/worldoutlook.

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Editors' Note

Since our last issue, the world has seen significant developments in the international arena in terms of its political, social and economic conditions. Populism has continued its rise in Europe, the Trump Administration has brought with it a foreign policy agenda that stands in stark contrast with that of the previous administration, and global markets have experienced both synchronized growth and adverse responses to geopolitical instability, to name a few. For the Spring 2018 issue of *World Outlook*, we sought to capture some of the great diversity we have seen in international issues by including pieces centering upon variety of topics and regions of the world.

This issue begins with a paper by Kelsey Flower that explores the effect of humanitarian aid on violent conflict through case studies of the genocide in Darfur and the South Sudanese Civil War. Flower's paper is followed by another work on foreign aid, though in the far less comprehensively studied area of mental healthcare. Caroline Berens's essay highlights the grave need for a framework to approach mental health in foreign aid given its negligible availability. Next, Lauren Bishop writes of gender equality within terrorist organizations and contends that the increasing frequency of female militants is not indicative of greater equality. The final essay featured in the issue, by Kate Griffiths, concerns the role of partisanship in the British media coverage of Syrian foreign aid and includes a thorough analysis of media sources and the content and structure of newspaper articles.

Also included in this issue is an interview with Visiting Professor of Government at Dartmouth, Rand Beers. Since attending Dartmouth as an undergraduate and earning a master's degree from the University of Michigan, Mr. Beers has served a number of positions within the federal government, including Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to President Barack Obama. The interview, conducted by Kevin He, covers a range of national security issues—from counterterrorism to data privacy concerns. We conclude this issue with a Staff Editorial by Lynette Long '20 who conducts a thorough analysis of post-Cold War relations between the United States and Russia through the lens of several theories from classical security studies.

We hope that you enjoy reading these pieces, which represent the best of the Dartmouth student body's work on international affairs, as much as we did while producing this issue of *World Outlook*.

Sincerely,
Lexi Curnin '19 and Mark Daniels '19
Editors-in-Chief

Humanitarian Aid in the Darfur Genocide and South Sudanese Civil War: A Case Study

Kelsey Flower

This paper explores the subject of the impact of humanitarian aid and its influence on violence in conflicts. I start by exploring the literature on whether support helps reduce violence or furthers it. Then, by using the Darfur Genocide and South Sudanese Civil war as a case study on the issue because of their similarities. I conclude that humanitarian aid highlights the two factors that make the question difficult to answer. The first being that foreign assistance adds uncertainty to the question of whether aid will end conflict sooner, and demonstrates that current theories about how aid increases violence aren't always applicable.

Introduction

The question I asked in this research paper was "When comparing the cases of the Darfur Genocide and South Sudanese Civil War, did increased humanitarian aid in the South Sudanese Civil War help or hurt the conflict situation?" I found that comparing these two cases furthers our understanding of why it is hard to determine the impact of humanitarian aid in two ways: it adds uncertainty to the discussion of whether reducing aid will end violence sooner, and demonstrates that current theories about aid's relationship with violence are not applicable to all situations.

My motivation for shedding light on this question stemmed from the current debate about the effectiveness of humanitarian aid in preventing violence. In Linda Polman's article "The Crisis Caravan: What's Wrong with Humanitarian Aid?" she juxtaposes two types of humanitarians: the "Henri Dunants," who believe that there is always an obligation to help in conflicts, and the "Florence Nightingales," who believe that aid should not always be given, as costly wars tend to resolve themselves quickly (Polman 2010, 2; Polman 2010, 5). Determining the effectiveness of humanitarian aid is a pressing topic, as genocide may result from an incorrect policy response to a humanitarian crisis. This question is particularly relevant to Sudan, a country which has been torn apart by a humanitarian conflict for decades. While there is a lot of research on the lack of aid for the Darfur genocide and on the effectiveness of aid within the South Sudanese Civil War, there has been little research comparing the different uses of aid in these two cases, leading me to my final research question.

Literature Review

The literature on humanitarian aid identifies a key debate about whether global actors are obligated to give aid if there is potential that it will be used to increase violence and cause more harm than good. There are three general positions within this debate: that giving aid is universally helpful and important, that it increases violence and is ultimately harmful, and that it is worth pursuing, but needs more thought and

Kelsey Flower will graduate in Spring 2018 from Dartmouth College. This paper is work from a foreign aid seminar with Professor John Carey.

caution in its implementation. The first category, that it is always important to pursue aid, has both a moral and a practical side. Peter Singer demonstrates the moral side of giving aid at a personal level in his book *The Life You Can Save*, where he argues that if you are not donating to aid agencies to prevent suffering and death when you have the spare money to do so, you are doing something morally wrong (Singer 2009). Benjamin Valentino believes that, with regard to humanitarian aid specifically, the United States should fulfill its promises of aid. After analyzing the Rwandan genocide, why the United States did not intervene more rapidly, and the potential pitfalls of humanitarian intervention, Valentino concludes that "the obstacles to intervention should not be allowed to serve as an excuse for the failure of the United States and the international community to live up to its pledge to prevent genocide" (Valentino 2003, 575–756). One potential flaw of these examples is that, while talking about the obligation to give aid, these arguments do not fully account for potential downsides of giving aid.

At a more practical level, scholars find that aid can do tangible good for communities during periods of conflict. Focusing on a case study in Afghanistan, Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov argue that development programs improve levels of security during program implementation (Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov, 2015). Another study that focused on the Rwandan genocide indicates that humanitarian aid in Africa plays a positive role in reducing conflict rather than exacerbating it, although the authors acknowledged that sometimes conflict is made worse due to humanitarian aid (Minyi et al., 2016). However, because both of these investigations are case studies, they may not be generalizable to humanitarian conflicts everywhere. Additionally, in the Afghanistan case, the results were not found to be significant in villages where there were already high levels of violence (Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov, 2015).

A second camp argues that humanitarian aid often increases violence and that giving aid might be the wrong response to conflict situations. Michael Desch argues that a pragmatic and "cold-blooded" approach to conflicts, where no humanitarian aid is given, would improve the quality of human life around the world (Desch 2003, 421). As support for why aid can end up causing harm, Desch gives the example of the ethnic conflict in the Balkans, where between seven and eight thousand Bosnians were killed in 1995 when Serbs overran the UN-protected safe area Srebrenica. He concludes that perhaps it is "kind to be cruel" (Desch 2003, 426). Michael Weintraub argues that there is empirical support for the argument that development assistance frequently produces welfare gains, but also may lead to increased insurgent violence, through studying a specific conditional cash transfer program in Columbia (Weintraub 2016). Reed Wood and Christopher Sullivan use statistical analysis of conflict violence in two dozen post-Cold War African countries to determine that humanitarian aid is associated with increased rebel violence, but has a much weaker association with heightened government violence (Wood and Sullivan, 2015). Although Desch and Weintraub's arguments are case-specific, they reach conclusions similar to those of Wood and Sullivan, whose data is aggregated from multiple case studies and thus is more generally applicable.

A study by Neil Narang using panel data on cross-national humanitarian aid expenditures directly supports the "Nightingale" position laid out by Polman, finding that wars that receive greater amounts of humanitarian relief appear to last longer than those that receive little or no assistance (Narang, 2014). However, Narang himself warns readers to not view his results as a negation of the moral imperative of giving aid, as the tendency for aid to prolong conflict is "far from empirical law" and the "short-term consequences of not providing relief are oftentimes more devastatingly predictable than its future influence on the duration of war." Therefore, he argues that an "imperative to act quickly to reduce human suffering may prevail" (Narang 2014, 11).

The caveat Narang offers to his own argument highlights the third, more middle-ground position in the literature: that humanitarian aid can do good, but needs to be used and thought about carefully. Polman ends up taking this middle ground after discussing a personal experience seeing aid exploited in post-Rwandan Genocide refugee camps by Hutus, the very people who caused the genocide. She acknowledges that doing nothing is not always the right answer, but believes that the benefits of aid need to be weighed against its potential exploitation by warring parties, asking "at what point do humanitarian principles cease to be ethical?" (Polman 2010, 173). She states that to "Have the audacity to ask whether doing something is always better than doing nothing." When aid organizations are sent to conflict situations, Polman claims that "we should demand they explain exactly what they're going to do and how" (Polman 2010, 179).

One example of implementing humanitarian aid carefully is through the use of peacekeepers. Wood and Sullivan end their paper by arguing that "robust multidimensional peacekeeping missions can effectively reduce violence against civilians by actively defending vulnerable citizens and humanitarian targets from belligerents," and that greater coordination among donor states, aid agencies, and peacekeeping organizations may lead to improved protection of refugees and citizens located around sites of aid distribution (Wood and Sullivan, 2015). Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler similarly find that "peace appears to depend upon an external military presence sustaining a gradual economic recovery," using analysis from two data sets about armed conflicts from 1960 to 2002 (Collier and Hoeffler 2008, 461). Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon use data on UN personnel in peacekeeping operations and civilian deaths for armed conflicts in Africa from 1991 to 2008 to find that the more military and police forces the UN commits to a peacekeeping mission, the fewer citizens are targeted with violence, and that thus UN peacekeeping is an effective mechanism of civilian protection (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, 2013). The incorporation of a broad span of data into the analyses of these last two studies strengthens their arguments, yet these results still may not be applicable all specific humanitarian aid cases.

Overall, the literature touches on three perspectives regarding humanitarian aid in conflict situations: that aid is helpful and important to pursue, that it increases violence and is harmful, and that it is worth pursuing with thoughtfulness and caution. This paper uses a case study of the Darfur genocide and South Sudanese Civil War to help add nuance to this debate through comparing aspects of the Darfur and South Sudan

conflicts to literature from all three categories. Ultimately this will highlight how these theories are not mutually exclusive, and one case can embody aspects of multiple theories.

Case Study

Nature of the Conflict

In order to understand how the Darfur genocide and South Sudanese Civil War shed light onto the three literature perspectives, it is important to first understand the background of the two conflicts. Both the Darfur and South Sudan cases are part of a long history of conflict in Sudan. Sudan was a British colony, with a policy of separate governance for the North and South that was formalized in 1930 by the British Civil Secretary because of many religious and cultural differences of the area (Sudan Backgrounder n.d.). The North (including Khartoum, the Sudanese capital) was predominantly Muslim, while the South was predominantly Christian (Stern and Sundberg, 2007). After World War II, Britain decided to merge the two into a single administrative region, which then gained independence in 1956. A war was fought from 1955 to 1972 between the Northern government and Southern rebels, who demanded a return to the 1930s division that had given them greater regional autonomy. A peace agreement signed in 1972 led to an eleven-year cease-fire, but a second war broke out in 1983 that lasted until 2005 (Sudan Backgrounder n.d.).

Map of Sudan and South Sudan, highlighting the Darfur region and capital cities Khartoum and Juba.

Darfur

Until 2005, the Sudanese conflict had primarily focused on the North and South of Sudan, ignoring the Darfur region to the West. The people of Darfur wanted aspects of what the South had been promised in the ceasefire, including some of Khartoum's wealth and resources. They also wanted to be able to play a larger role in the government. Two main rebel groups, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), began fighting for what they viewed as equality for the people of Darfur. In April 2003, they attacked an airport and killed around

75 people. The government of Khartoum closed off the Darfur region, kicked out all foreigners, and mobilized troops in retaliation. They trained Arab militias, called the Janjaweed, to murder Darfur civilians and loot, rape, and burn villages. Although the government of Khartoum still denies having connection to the Janjaweed, the militias were armed by the central authorities and given tactical support from government aircrafts. The attacks were racially charged— the Janjaweed were taught to think of the citizens of Darfur as "slaves" because they were typically black while the Janjaweed and government in the north were Arab (Stern and Sundberg 2007). There have also been inquiries about whether natural resources were involved in the violence, as large gold deposits were discovered in North Darfur's Jebel Amir hills in 2012. The existence of oil in Darfur, which was revealed in 2005 when Sudan's Advanced Petroleum Company began drilling there, has led analysts to speculate whether oil could have been a factor guiding Khartoum's actions as well (Thomas Reuters Foundation 2014).

One of the reoccurring themes of the Darfur genocide has been the passive international response to it. In 2004, the African Union assumed the leading role in international efforts to broker a resolution to the conflict, resulting in a ceasefire agreement in April 2004 between the government, SLA, and JEM. Eighty African Union monitors were supposed to observe the ceasefire, yet ultimately failed to do so. In May 2004, the UN Security Council made its first statement about the conflict, expressing concern for the humanitarian crisis and supporting the African Union's mediation efforts. The international debate was slow to characterize the violence as a genocide. In September 2004, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that the U.S. administration believed that genocide had been committed in Darfur, with both the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bearing responsibility. He said that this genocide "may" still be occurring. However, Powell also said that U.S. policy towards Sudan would not change. Other international actors, including the European Parliament, African Union, and Arab League did not accept the characterization of the violence in Darfur as a genocide (Eyes on Darfur n.d.).

Eventually, international actors began taking passive action against the events in Darfur in the form of resolutions and ground troops. In late 2004, the UN Security Council passed three resolutions calling for a political agreement to end fighting, giving the government of Sudan 30 days to disarm the Janjaweed and establishing a commission to determine whether genocide had occurred. In January 2005, they passed another three authorizing a UN peacekeeping operation, calling on the government to stop their military action, and referring the situation in Darfur from July 2002 onwards to the ICC. The Darfur Peace Agreement was signed by the government of Sudan and the SLA after many rounds of talks in May 2006. The UN passed more resolutions, expanding troops in Darfur and calling for the establishment of officers in Chad due to the growing security threat in eastern Chad resulting from cross-border attacks from Darfur. In 2007, the official United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was implemented, with around 26,000 troops and police. Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese President, repeatedly re-

jected UN Peacekeepers, and created roadblocks and restricted equipment for UNAMID (Eyes on Darfur n.d.). In January 2009, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against al-Bashir for crimes against humanity and war crimes. Despite a further arrest warrant in 2010 for genocide, Bashir has yet to be arrested by the ICC (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, n.d.). Meanwhile, civilians in Darfur and refugees in eastern Chad and the Central African Republic continue to suffer from egregious mass human rights violations (Eyes on Darfur n.d.). In 2014 alone, there were over 400,000 newly displaced individuals. (Sudan Backgrounder n.d.).

South Sudan

The civil war in South Sudan stemmed out of the original Sudanese conflict as well. Part of the 2005 peace agreement between Khartoum and the southern rebels was a referendum on whether the South should remain part of Sudan, or become its own country. In February 2011, the referendum showed that almost 99 percent of Southern Sudan voted for independence, and by July 2011, South Sudan was an independent state (Sudan Backgrounder n.d.). However, in 2013, civil war broke out when President Salva Kiir accused Vice President Riek Machar of planning a coup (BBC 2016). This conflict has mostly involved the country's two biggest ethnic groups—the Dinka being led by Kiir, and the Nuer being led by Machar— and has evolved from a political struggle for power into an ethnic conflict (Lynch 2016). Alan Boswell, a researcher for the Small Arms Survey who recently returned from South Sudan, even said that "ethnic cleansing has characterized this entire war," (Lynch 2016).

In August 2015, President Kiir signed a peace deal with the rebels after the UN threatened sanctions, and in April 2016, Machar returned to take back his job as Vice President in a new unity government led by Kiir (BBC 2016). However, this new government collapsed in July 2016 after a surge of fighting led to the deaths of hundreds of civilians. In December 2016, a U.N. warning of possible genocide motivated the United States to finally embrace an arms embargo against South Sudan, a threat they had held out on for over two years. During the last two months of 2016 alone, at least 1,901 homes were destroyed. Like Sudan, South Sudan has fiercely resisted U.N. peacekeepers. Also, like in the Darfur conflict, UN expert on peacekeeping Richard Gowan said that the combined effort of the United States and Security Council "feels more like symbolic diplomacy than anything real," (Lynch 2016). Although the conflicts in Darfur and South Sudan are not identical, both conflicts possess many similarities that allow for them to be analyzed together in a case study. Although the genocide in Darfur is racially charged, and the conflict in South Sudan is not, the two both stem from ethnic motivations. Both have resulted in similar numbers of displaced people (over 2.8 million in Darfur, and over 2.2 million in South Suden), produced speculation over the importance of natural resources in motivating violence, and are still occurring today, making the conflicts even more relevant to understand the impact of humanitarian aid.

HUMANITARIAN AID RESPONSE

Although the two conflicts are similar in a baseline comparison, the story of humanitarian aid differs drastically between the two, giving further insight into how the amount of aid given to a humanitarian conflict can influence its levels of violence and damage.

DARFUR

In the case of the Darfur genocide, most of the literature focuses on a general lack of humanitarian aid and timely response to the conflict. Gerald Prunier offers a nuanced political explanation for why the international community did not intervene more in Darfur. From the United States' perspective, the situation presented President George Bush with a dilemma: the public was clamoring for action, and the intelligence community was saying Khartoum was too vital to be treated harshly. As a result, the Bush administration compromised on all fronts. Additionally, after Bush won the reelection, less interest was paid in general by his administration to the conflict. The result of this all was a purely humanitarian approach to the crisis with $301 million in aid given during his administration, but no military intervention—which Prunier argues everyone knew was the only option that could have had a drastic effect (Prunier 2006). Scott Straus adds that much of the initial debate in the United States was about whether to call what occurred in Darfur a genocide in the first place, arguing that the energy spent on this debate overshadowed more critical questions about how to craft a proper response to the conflict (Straus 2005).

Other international bodies were equally slow and ineffective in their responses. The Secretary-General of the UN knew that the US did not favor him, and was afraid of making a potentially fatal false move, leading to him appearing weak and irresolute on the issue. The African Union, in addition to having low funding, also tried to minimalize the racial angle of the conflict and would not condemn Khartoum or put responsibilities for the massacres on the Janjaweed (Prunier 2006). "Despite the AU's adoption of a more interventionist charter than its predecessor the Organization of African Unity, the norm of non-interference continues to trump human rights concerns," P.D. Williams said (Williams 2005 42–43). The League of Arab States— which Sudan is also a part of— explicitly supported the Sudanese government, stating that there was no evidence that the government was directly involved in human rights violations, condemning the use of the term "genocide", and opposing threats of sanctions and military interventions (Williams 2005). Williams adds that three main factors explain why strong Western advocates of "sovereignty of responsibility," such as NATO and the EU, did not intervene: increased skepticism about the West's humanitarian interventionism (especially after the invasion of Iraq), Western strategic interests in Sudan, and the relationship between the crisis in Darfur and Sudan's other civil wars. (Williams 2005, 42). Ultimately, Williams argues that while Darfur's geography, sparse population, and low-level nature of militias gave Western intervention the capacity to be effective, the situation suggests that Western states were not prepared to "match their bold words

about the responsibility to protect with concomitant actions" (Williams 2005, 44).

This political inaction and low institutional donor interest, in addition to ongoing insecurity and governmental restrictions on the entrance of international aid staff, led to a dire absence of international relief organizations on the ground that made it difficult to accurately estimate casualty numbers from the genocide (Depoortere et al. 2004). Depoortere et al. concluded that while Darfur demonstrated a typical trend of insufficient and late aid, it had unusually high crude mortality rates due to the combination of international neglect and warring parties that did not grant humanitarian access to affected populations, highlighting the damage that a lack of humanitarian aid can cause (Depoortere et al. 2004).

Oliver Degomme and Debarati Guha-Sapir conducted one of the few studies focusing on humanitarian aid during the genocide, which helps to explain these unusually high mortality rates. Degomme and Guha-Sapir found that increased aid could potentially have prevented outbreaks of diarrhea-related deaths associated with poor displacement camp conditions. First, the authors broke down the violence and mortality in the conflict between 2003 and 2008 into different periods of time. During the first period, from September 2003 to March 2004, the fighting intensified, leading to large-scale displacement and little humanitarian action. Between April and December 2004, the number of humanitarian workers increased from 200 individuals (three per 10,000 affected) to 8,500 (40 per 10,000 affected). From January 2005 to June 2006, the number of affected civilians tripled, and the number of workers increased at a constant rate. However, from July 2007 to September 2007, while the amount of internally displaced people increased by 40 percent, the number of aid workers decreased to only around 29 per 10,000 affected. Finally, from October 2007 to December 2008, the number of workers and displaced people both increased, with a final ratio of about 37 workers per 10,000 affected (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010). In general, although crude mortality rates went below the emergency level of one death per 10,000 people per day in early 2005, there were some spikes in July 2006 and September 2007, and the rates remained high until at least the end of 2007 (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010). The authors determined that around 80 percent of the excess deaths were not the result of violence, but rather diseases such as diarrhea, which could have been easily prevented with aid (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010).

The authors focus specifically on the July 2006 to September 2007 period, when although violence-related deaths decreased, the diarrhea-related mortality rate increased. They state that a possible explanation for this is the eighteen percent reduction of humanitarian workers during that period as the number of affected people increased from 3.5 million to 4.2 million, with the ratio of affected people to aid worker increasing almost 50 percent from 237 to 346 affected people per staff member. The authors ultimately conclude that the decreased humanitarian aid, as a consequence of budget reductions such as UNICEF's and the World Food Program's, led to the rise in disease-related deaths during this period. (Degomme and Guha-Sapir, 2010).

In the end, Degomme and Guha-Sapir determine that while patterns of

mortality rates over time were typical in Darfur, displaced people were particularly affected in the Darfur conflict by living in conditions of poor sanitary infrastructure. They state that "adequate humanitarian assistance to prevent and treat these potentially fatal diseases is essential. The full effect of the expulsion of non-governmental organizations from Darfur is still not known, but the increased mortality rate during a period of reduced humanitarian deployment in 2006–07 suggests that we should fear the worst" (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010, 299). This point highlights how although it is uncertain what the overall effects of increased aid would be, it is likely that more humanitarian deployment would reduce refugee mortality rates. However, the article does hint at the potential for humanitarian aid to do harm as well, citing the expulsion of humanitarian non-governmental organizations from Darfur after the issue of an arrest warrant from the ICC on President Bashir as an example of humanitarian aid sidetracked by political actions (Degomme and Guha-Sapir, 2010).

Today, there is more information on the dire state of the refugee camps related to the conflict. Violence still happening, both in Darfur and in displacement camps in Chad and the Central African Republic, where thousands of people are still fleeing. Around 360,000 refugees reside in Chad at this point. During their ten plus years of living in refugee camps, there have been tight resources (Jewish World Watch n.d.). Eastern Chad is not a hospitable place to live. There is a significant strain on firewood, and refugees often face violence when foraging for wood. More than a third of the local population is undernourished, and water levels are perpetually low (Red Cross n.d.). Recently, rations have been cut by 60 percent due to funding shortfalls and budget impacts. There are insufficient abilities to generate income, making refugees' ability to supplement food rations difficult. These hardships have led to what the UN Refugee Agency calls "negative coping mechanisms," such as children dropping out of school, exploitation and prostitution of female refugees, increased stress and domestic violence within families, and higher incidences of theft (Jewish World Watch n.d.). The Jewish World Watch said they have "little hope" that things will get better without significant international effort (Jewish World Watch n.d.). The opposite seems to have occurred, with the total amount of aid workers in Darfur halved between 2009 and 2013 (Thomas Reuters Foundation 2014).

Ultimately, the "aid timeline" for Darfur is unique because the international community gave very little aid to Darfur during the height of the conflict. Most literature focuses on the inability to prevent the genocide sooner, and how the international community dealt with the politics regarding humanitarian intervention instead of helping prevent violence and save lives. Now that there is more information about the aid given in refugee camps, there is a sense that more help is desperately needed. Overall, there is a wide consensus that the international community provided "too little, too late," for the Darfur genocide.

South Sudan

South Sudan, in comparison, has received much stronger humanitarian aid during the entirety of its civil war. The United States Agency for International Development has consistently provided updated information and assistance since the beginning of the conflict. This year alone, the government donated $520 million, with around $1 million coming from USAID. USAID has provided nutrition, water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance to populations in need from the beginning of the conflict as well (USAID 2016). Other groups, such as the World Food Programme, have also been consistently active in providing aid to prevent famine (New York Times 2014). In 2015, in addition to 13,000 UN peacekeepers, there were tens of thousands of other workers in South Sudan supporting hundreds of domestic, international, and UN-affiliated groups. The conflict has caused international agencies to need to provide for virtually every basic need of those seeking refuge, the New York Times reported. (Santora 2015).

However, organizations and governments have not been able to easily distribute aid to South Sudan as there have been many violent attacks on the villages where aid is provided, and on humanitarian aid workers and peacekeepers themselves. Violent groups have subjected humanitarian workers to gunfire, looted deposits, and ransacked aid their offices. Where the fighting has been heaviest, at times aid workers need to evacuate the area, and the potential danger has canceled several trips at the last minute (Santora 2015). This July, South Sudanese government forces looted a UN warehouse where food for 220,000 people was kept, according to UN officials (Sieff 2016). More than 100 South Sudanese soldiers looted the compound of the World Food Programme as well, ransacking the agency's warehouse and logistics base and seizing 4,500 tons of food and around 20,000 gallons of diesel, the Wall Street Journal reported (Stevis 2016).

In October 2016, an attack on aid workers in the capital of Juba left one person dead and several NGO staff members assaulted and raped. The UN peacekeeping force stationed less than a mile away failed to respond to calls for help, as did all embassies, including the US embassy. These events have led NGOs to question whether they should consider pulling out of the region, despite the fact that South Sudan is still in dire need of assistance (Grant 2016). In response to the incident, The Washington Post questioned, "is the UN mission there failing to act because it is undermanned or because of a deeper set of systemic flaws?" arguing that an investigation of another recent massacre in Malakal seemed to indicate the latter. In February 2016, fighters broke into a displaced persons camp in the town of Malakal, killing 50 civilians by shooting them or burning them alive, while UN peacekeepers fled their posts. More importantly, according to The Washington Post article, the peacekeepers did not heed warnings that violence was brewing and were not prepared to act, a "lack of foresight and risk management" repeated from the October attack. However, the article did give credit to the "almost impossible" task given to these peacekeepers. UN camps are routinely raided, often by government-backed troops. "It is rare for UN peacekeepers to be tasked with protecting civilians against their own government's troops," The Washington Post said (Bearak 2016), highlighting the uniqueness of this civil war in a failed state.

The United States has not responded effectively to situations like these. In a press conference in August, Secretary of State John Kerry warned that U.S. taxpayers would not continue to help South Sudan if its leaders did not stop the atrocities, but he also announced an extra $138 million in assistance, The Wall Street Journal Reported (Stevis 2016). The package will be provided through the UN and non-governmental partners and include food aid and nutrition programs, drinking water, emergency health services, hygiene supplies, and cholera treatment. (USAID 2016). Other intervention aid efforts into South Sudan have been inconsistent between words and actions as well. Recently, a three-member U.N. commission on human rights declared that South Sudan was on the "brink of catastrophe," with the chairman warning of a repeat of the Rwandan genocide, a steady process of ethnic cleansing, gang rape, and the burning of villages as examples. According to The Washington Post, "the world responded with a shrug" (Washington Post Editorial Board 2016).

Some people are beginning to question these potentially ineffective responses to the war. Mukesh Kapila, a former UN director removed as the resident representative in Sudan after pulling out his staff and calling what was happening in Darfur a genocide, stated that he thinks the best thing to do would be to leave South Sudan. "By providing that modicum of a fig leaf, we encourage the local authorities. We are condoning their actions by remaining silent and not speaking up," Kapila said in The Wall Street Journal (Stevis 2016). Foreign Policy's analysis of the situation was similar. Foreign nations have poured billions of dollars of development aid into the south with "little to show for it today," Foreign Policy reported. "We need to do some soul-searching and see where things could be done better," said Jort Hemmer, a senior researcher at the Dutch Clingendael Institute's Conflict Research Unit (Patinkin 2015). Thus, while aid has been more consistently present in the South Sudanese Civil War than it has been in the Darfur Genocide, its results demonstrate uncertainty about its effectiveness.

DISCUSSION

Despite the drastic differences in the aid given to Darfur and South Sudan, there are no sweeping conclusions gained from this case study about the effectiveness of humanitarian aid on violence. However, analyzing these two cases can still shed light the current literature debate about humanitarian aid by furthering our understanding of why its answer is so unclear. On the one hand, there is the Darfur Genocide as an example of a humanitarian crisis where the international community gave very little aid and barely intervened. Seeing that the violence in Darfur has lasted fourteen years with very little humanitarian interference, and much of the humanitarian aid given has been in refugee camps outside of Darfur itself, this case is a potential counter to Narang's findings that humanitarian aid can prolong violence (Narang 2014). In fact, analysis of the Darfur case seems to bolster the argument that more humanitarian aid would have stopped the conflict sooner. Williams suggests that substantial humanitarian intervention effort done early on could have been very achievable, possibly stopping a decade of ethnic cleansing (Williams

2005). Similarly, the conclusions drawn by Degomme and Guha-Sapir suggest that during times where deaths increased during the genocide, they were not from violence, but rather from refugee camps with poor health conditions as a result of a reduction in humanitarian aid. Although it is impossible to know for sure without a counterfactual, these conclusions seem to support the first literature camp, that aid can have a meaningful effect on reducing violence (Degomme and Guha-Sapir, 2010).

Compared to the clear conclusion that the lack of aid in Darfur's genocide illustrates, the civil war in South Sudan contributes a more varied set of conclusions, ultimately providing evidence for all three broad categories of literature I identified at the start of this paper. First, South Sudan demonstrates that Wood and Sullivan's "second camp" theory that aid increases rebel violence is not necessarily applicable in the case of a failed state (Wood and Sullivan, 2015). When a civil war is fought between the supporters of the President and the supporters of the Vice President in a failed state, it is difficult to determine who is the government and who are the rebels. This confusion makes Wood and Sullivan's theory that humanitarian aid is associated with increased rebel violence, but not with increased government violence limited in its application. Additionally, South Sudan's case makes both Wood and Sullivan and Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon's "third camp" conclusions about UN peacekeeping as an effective form of civilian protection less persuasive (Wood and Sullivan, 2015; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, 2013). Within the South Sudanese Civil War, peacekeepers were both attacked themselves and did a poor job of responding to attacks on aid workers and supply storages. As these two examples demonstrate, the case study of South Sudan refutes general theories on the relationship between violence and aid that the literature had identified.

Despite illustrating that these specific second and third camp theories are not always applicable, the aid given to South Sudan during its civil war has seemed to perpetuate violence in many ways. However, I believe that in regard to the first camp, which argues that humanitarian aid is helpful in mitigating humanitarian conflicts, there is still ambiguity in South Sudan's case. Similar to in the case of Darfur, it is clear that the refugee population is so dependent on humanitarian aid for all their basic needs that it would be hard to say it is not worth providing help to the population despite the costs. Additionally, the case of Darfur brings up the important question of whether a reduction in aid would actually lead to a more rapid ending of violence in South Sudan.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this case study furthers our understanding of why the answer to "does aid help or hurt conflict situations" is so unclear, both supporting and refuting arguments on all sides of the debate. In a situation where the international community provides minimal aid, there is evidence suggesting that more assistance would have ended the conflict sooner, or at least decreased refugee death rates. In a situation where the international community provides significant aid, the support often did lead to attacks on civilians, aid workers, and supplies. However, this in-

crease in violence did not line up with what existing theories predicted — the increase in aid correlated with an increase in government violence in addition to rebel violence, and the addition of peacekeepers did not reduce violence. Additionally, it is apparent that without humanitarian aid, the civilians of South Sudan would not survive, and when reflecting on the Darfur genocide, it is not obvious that reducing aid would necessarily make the civil war end any sooner. Thus, ultimately, this case study creates nuance in our understanding of the humanitarian aid debate by adding uncertainty to the question of whether aid will end conflict sooner, and demonstrating that current theories about how aid increases violence are not always applicable.

NOTES

1. The war in South Sudan has not yet been officially deemed a genocide, but on December 8, 2016, a UN Commission on human rights warned that the situation could turn into a repeat of the Rwandan genocide, highlighting the ethnic cleansing that has occurred so far (Washington Post Editorial Board 2016).

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Mental Health in Foreign Aid

Caroline Berens

This paper reviews the impact and possibility of mental health resources in foreign aid. While foreign aid often defines "health" as purely physical health, this paper explores— and advocates for— the incorporation of mental health into that concept of health. First, this paper outlines the state of mental health in developing countries. Then, this paper highlights the insufficient psychological resources and treatment currently available in developing countries. After detailing the insufficient resources, this paper highlights certain case studies for mental health interventions in developing countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, China, and Colombia. Finally, current initiatives in foreign aid focused on mental health are outlined. This paper concludes that there is a pressing need for mental health interventions in developing countries.

Background and literature review

In the context of foreign aid, "health" is typically defined as physical health. Foreign aid focuses on improving physical health outcomes in developing countries by, for instance, providing bed nets to prevent malaria, helping people grow food sustainably so they don't go hungry, or vaccinating people against deadly diseases. Mental health is rarely addressed or discussed in these frameworks, perhaps due to the global stigma around mental health issues or the ostensibly greater urgency to rectify physical health issues. Although poor physical health is often rampant in developing countries, impaired mental health is similarly common given the interrelated relationship between the two (Elliott 2016). Moreover, although mental illness is stigmatized throughout the entire world, its treatment in developing countries is shockingly insufficient at best, flagrantly abusive at worst. According to the World Health Organization, or WHO, 78% of global suicides occur in low and middle-income countries (WHO 2017). Ameliorating mental health in developing countries would engender more improvements in physical health, leading to better and more cost-effective outcomes in foreign aid. However, although it has gained more attention in recent years, the role of mental health in foreign aid remains negligible. In this paper, I argue that a greater focus on mental health interventions in foreign aid is imperative, as demonstrated by need and past successes. I first explain historical and current discourse about the state of mental healthcare in developing countries, and the portion of foreign aid dedicated to mental health issues, based on existing literature. Next, I analyze past successes of mental health interventions in developing countries, using both quantitative and qualitative data, and current mental health initiatives. I then discuss a potential counterargument to my thesis: the debate over whether the usage of Western mental health treatment methods in developing countries is appropriate, or ineffec-

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tive. I conclude by reiterating my call for more foreign aid policies focused on mental health and clarifying the importance of implementing them with cultural sensitivity.

State of mental health in developing countries

The relationship between mental health issues and poverty is direct and strong, which has devastating implications for the state of mental health in developing countries. For those living in poverty, mental health issues are more severe, last longer, and have worse consequences (Lund et al. 2010). Mental disorders are also more prevalent in people who are unemployed, living in overcrowded housing, experiencing hunger, or suffering financial difficulties (WHO 2017). Moreover, living amidst violence or conflict increases the chance one has of developing a mental disorder such as depression, anxiety, psychosis, or post-traumatic stress disorder (Marquez 2016). A study by Ferrari et al. found that the Middle East and North Africa, which encompass several areas of high poverty and conflict, have the highest depression rates in the world. The country with the highest level of depression in the world is Afghanistan, where more than one in five people have the disorder. Notably, the rates of depression might be even higher than reported in these regions, as their countries often have poor public health services and may consequently diagnose people at lower rates than are accurate (Ferrari et al. 2013). People in post-conflict areas also tend to have unusually high levels of PTSD; McMullen et al. found that four years after the war in Uganda ended, 57% of adolescents still demonstrated clinically significant symptoms of PTSD (McMullen et al. 2011). Similarly, Familiar et al. found that 44% of citizens suffered psychological distress during the Burundi conflict, and 29% of citizens were still experiencing psychological distress two years after the conflict (Familiar et al. 2015).

Poor mental health and poverty can also exacerbate one another through a cyclical relationship; if people do not have the resources to seek treatment for their mental disorder, their mental condition will likely deteriorate and preclude them from improving their socioeconomic standing. This cyclical and perpetuating relationship is present across multiple generations. If a child is born into poverty, their health is likely to be compromised by the poor nutrition of their mother, as well as her subpar working conditions and exposure to stress. This cumulative exposure to stressors at a young age can disrupt neurological development and brain functioning, which increases risks in adolescents for mental disorders like depression and substance abuse (Elliot 2016).

Insufficient psychological resources and treatment in developing countries

Despite the prevalence of mental health issues in developing countries, the psychological resources and treatment to which people suffering from mental disorders have access are often negligible and can even be harmful. Ngui et al. found that in many developing countries, there is no budget for mental health services (Ngui et al. 2010). In Ghana, the treatment gap of people who have a mental health issue but have not received treatment is 98% (WHO 2017). In Mozambique, there are 0.04 psychiatrists per 100,000 people, which is 30 times less than the global median of psychiatrists

in countries and 150 times less than the median in developed countries (Sweetland et al. 2014). In Ethiopia, a country of 77 million people, there are only 18 psychiatrists, who all work at the same hospital that is located in the capital city (Alem et al. 2008). On a larger scale, international spending for mental health in low- and middle-income countries remains starkly low in comparison to high-income countries. In its 2014 Mental Health Atlas, the WHO found that low-income countries spend $1.53 per capita on mental healthcare annually and middle-income countries spend $1.96, whereas high-income countries spend $58.73 (WHO 2014). In low- and middle-income countries, the majority of expenditures go towards mental hospitals, whereas in high-income countries, the spending is approximately equally distributed among mental hospitals, other inpatient and day care, and outpatient and primary care (WHO 2014).

Reasons for this disparity range from the stigma and lack of awareness around mental health disorders, to basic insufficiencies in the research capacity of a country, to limited material and human resources. Moreover, as Sweetland et al. argue, implementing mental health care and policies requires a sizable workforce that can "assess local needs, adapt and test interventions, and identify implementation strategies" that will bring evidence-based practices to fruition (Sweetland et al. 2014); many developing countries do not have this sizable workforce, and if they do, people are likely focused on immediately rectifying physical health needs such as inaccessibility to clean drinking water or insufficient nutrition.

In some developing countries, poor mental healthcare transcends inadequate resources and results in massive violations of human rights, largely due to a pervasive belief that mental health disorders result from the possession of evil spirits (Gallagher 2016). For instance, common practices by local healers to treat mentally ill people in Aceh, Indonesia include chanting, poking patients with burning sticks, and whipping them to eradicate evil spirits that they believe cause mental illness. If these methods fail, healers resort to what they call "pasung," which refers to confinement; they restrain patients with chains and place them in cells (Miller 2012). One woman in Ghana who suffers from schizophrenia tells a harrowing tale of how, before she received treatment from a healthcare non-profit, she was constrained with a wooden shackle over her ankle, confined to a single room, sprinkled with herbal powders, and painted with pale dye to purge her body of demons possessing her (Carey 2015). In Senegal, some methods to expel depression from the body are even more barbaric: the sufferer has to lay in a wedding bed with a ram as the village dances around the pair, drumming and draping them with cloth. The ram is then slaughtered, alongside two chickens, and the blood of the animals is poured over the naked body of the patient. Finally, the patient is cleansed by village women spitting water on their body (Leach 2015). Although these practices— nearly impossible for those from a developed country to imagine— stem from a basic misunderstanding of mental health mechanisms, they can be quite dangerous in exacerbating preexisting mental disorders due to their isolating and violent natures.

History and current role of mental health in foreign aid

One of the first occurrences that instigated discussion about the role of mental health in foreign aid was a landmark report by the WHO in 2001 titled, "Mental Health: New Understanding, New Hope." The report emphasized the fact that mental health—"neglected for too long," as the report said— is essential for the well-being and success of individuals and countries. The report called for an end to the stigma and discrimination that often accompany mental illness and advocated for the implementation of policies that bolstered prevention and treatment. The report called itself a "landmark publication," for its desire to "raise public and professional awareness" of the burden that mental disorders engender in terms of human, social, and economic costs (WHO 2001).

Ostensibly, the next international publication that shed light on the issue was a series of six papers by Prince et al. in *The Lancet* in 2007, titled "Global Mental Health." Papers ranged in topic from the importance of considering mental health as equal to physical health in "No Health Without Mental Health" to potential obstacles for implementing mental health interventions in "Barriers to Improvement of Mental Services in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries." As described in its executive summary, the report sought to illuminate the shortcomings in mental health services throughout the world and "formulate a clear call to action." The summary explained that despite their "hidden" nature, mental health disorders "represent…a substantial portion of the world's disease burden" and are often ignored, particularly where resources lack in low- and middle-income countries (Prince et al. 2007). Since 2007, several more initiatives to incorporate mental health into foreign aid have emerged, which I will describe in the second portion of my paper; whether they are direct results of the series by *The Lancet* is not certain, but by shedding light on a largely ignored issue, it was undoubtedly an influential publication.

A study by Gilbert et al. found that development assistance for mental health (DAMH) has increased since 2007, rising from accounting for 0.41% of development assistance for health in 2007 to 0.77% in 2013. Although the growth has fluctuated, it has generally followed an upward trajectory. Interestingly, as seen in Figure 1, the proportion of DAMH given by bilateral donors doubled from 2007 to 2013, with moderate increases each year, whereas that given by multilateral organizations was 15 times greater in 2013 than in 2007, with drastic increases each year. Moreover, while the DAMH provided by multilateral donors was previously dwarfed by that of bilateral donors, it surpassed the DAMH of bilateral donors in 2013. This suggests that the attention multilateral donors are giving mental health is increasing considerably, whereas the focus by bilateral donors—although initially higher— is growing at a slower pace (Gilbert al. 2015).



FIGURE 1: DAMH GIVEN BY BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DONORS, 2007–2013 (GILBERT ET AL. 2015).

Between 2007 and 2013, the WHO was the most generous donor to DAMH, followed by the European Union institutions, United States, Norway, and Germany, as seen in Figure 2. Gilbert et al. specify that the data might be slightly skewed, as there was a dearth of information available for private nongovernmental organizations. However, the high spending by the WHO was likely spurred by its 2001 report calling for more focus on mental health in foreign aid (Gilbert et al. 2015).



FIGURE 2: MOST GENEROUS DONORS OF DAMH FROM 2007–2013 (GILBERT ET AL. 2015).

The five countries that received the most cumulative DAMH were all involved in conflict or war during the six-year period: The West Bank and Gaza Strip received the most by far, followed by Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka (Gilbert al. 2015).



Figure 3: Recipients of the most DAMH from 2007-2013 (Gilbert et al. 2015).

The majority of DAMH funding goes to the health sector, followed by the humanitarian sector, government and civil services, and education. From 2007 to 2013, the amount of DAMH given to the education and government and civil service sectors has remained fairly constant, while that given to the humanitarian aid sector and particularly the health sector has increased substantially. This suggests that mental health is starting to be considered an integral part of health, and is particularly imperative after a crisis or conflict, when humanitarian aid is delivered.

Although donor countries are paying more attention to mental health, DAMH still remains extremely low—less than 1%—as a proportion of overall development assistance to health (Gilbert et al. 2015). Besides the stigma of mental illness and the larger focus on more urgent physical needs another reason for this low proportion is the market-driven nature of aid. In his article in *The Guardian*, "Mental Illness and the Developing World," Andrew Chambers suggests that one reason for the "appalling lack of interest from governments and NGOs" in mental health is that the allocation of funds for an aid project is "strongly correlated with the project's marketability to the public." In terms of donations to charities or organizations, Chambers says, people are more likely to give money when they empathize with an individual in a picture; because people suffering from mental health issues do not necessarily appear any different than those who are not, they cannot create a "good" and heartbreaking "snapshot" that a charitable or non-governmental organization can use to elicit funds (Chambers 2010).

Now that I have provided general background on the poor state of mental health in developing countries, and the inadequate attention it receives in the context of foreign aid, I will explain the successes of specific mental health interventions in developing countries, and other current initiatives focused on the issue.

Mental health interventions in developing countries

Although I have established that providing more mental health care in developing countries is essential, the question then becomes, *how*? Have interventions

thus far been successful? Through the following examples of case studies in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, China, Colombia, Gaza, West Bank, and India, I will argue that previous mental health interventions have been productive and positive.

Victims of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The International Rescue Committee for victims of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo successfully spearheaded a mental health intervention after its civil war, outlined by Bass et al. With its two decades of Civil War, Congo has been labeled the rape capital of the world by the U.N. but has little to no mental health resources for the victims of this trauma (Grady 2013). In 2010, Peterman et al. found that nearly two million Congolese women have been raped in their lifetime, spanning from the age of young children to grandmothers; according to their findings, Congolese women are victimized nearly every minute (Peterman et al. 2010). The sexual violence is often of a barbaric nature, involving gang rapes and penetration with knives or guns (Grady 2013). Such traumatizing attacks have devastating consequences on the victims' mental health and well-being.

The IRC, which collaborated with researchers from Johns Hopkins University and the University of Washington in Seattle on the initiative, used cognitive processing therapy or individual support to treat the women. They assigned the interventions in 16 cities, randomly selected, to women who had experienced sexual violence and demonstrated symptoms of PTSD, depression, and anxiety. The group therapy—conducted by local health workers who had been trained by the IRC—entailed 11 two-hour weekly sessions and urged the victims to question why they blamed themselves for the rape, common behavior for people who have experienced sexual violence. The individual support recipients were able to ask for personal counseling, as well as referrals for economic, medical, or legal support. During mid-2011, a time of ongoing conflict in Congo, the women were assessed three times on their symptoms of PTSD, depression, and anxiety: before the study, immediately after and six months later (Bass et al. 2013).

The improvements in the mental health of the women were great, particularly for the group therapy participants. Of the 70% of group therapy participants who had anxiety or depression before the intervention, only 10% showed symptoms immediately after, and six months later, only 9% did. Of the 60% of group therapy participants who had PTSD before the intervention, only 9% showed symptoms immediately after, and six months later, only 8% did. The results for the individual support were less dramatic, but still positive; of the 83% of individual support participants who had anxiety or depression before the intervention, 53% showed symptoms immediately after, and six months later, only 42% did. Of the 83% of individual support participants who had PTSD before the intervention, 54% showed symptoms immediately after, and six months later, only 42% did. A social worker from Johns Hopkins who supervised the intervention said that anecdotally, barring the statistical improvements, women demonstrated improvements before the study was even complete in areas such as personal hygiene and self-esteem. According to the social workers, the women had

only one complaint: why had they not received this treatment sooner? (Grady 2013).

Based on the results, group therapy—a relatively low-cost intervention—vastly improved the mental health of victims of sexual violence. If this intervention were implemented on a wider scale, it would significantly mitigate the devastating mental health consequences of the rape epidemic in Congo for hundreds of thousands of women, and likely those in other parts of the world.

Brief interventions in China, Colombia, Gaza, and West Bank

Médecins Sans Frontières—also known as Doctors Without Borders—saw similar success in its brief mental health interventions, using principles of Psychological First Aid in post-disaster or conflict-ridden areas: China, Colombia, Gaza, and West Bank. Coldiron et al., who described the interventions, noted that MSF accounted for varying social and cultural contexts when implementing interventions by using local therapists (Coldiron et al. 2013).

In May 2008, the Sichuan province in China was struck by a massive hurricane that killed 100,000 people and displaced five million. From November 2008 to August 2009, MSF offered psychological assistance in sites of temporary housing near the epicenter of the earthquake. Patients were either directed to MSF by healthcare providers or flagged by community screenings and referred to MSF-managed psychological care centers, where they were treated by psychologists and trained volunteer counselors. The majority of patients were diagnosed with anxiety disorders, such as PTSD. Only 14% of patients were assessed as moderately, markedly, or severely mentally ill after the intervention compared to 58% before (Coldiron et al. 2013).

Similar interventions have achieved success in Columbia, which has been ravaged by internal armed conflict for the past 40 years. MSF has provided mental health care in the conflict-ridden Department of Tolima, where citizens have experienced kidnappings, displacements, extortion, and repetitive armed violence. After assessing vulnerable populations, MSF administered either individual or group psychotherapeutic interventions to those who demonstrated clinical depression, anxiety, or PTSD. According to data from February 2005 to February 2008, 76% of patients were identified as moderately or severely mentally ill before the interventions; at its conclusion, 91% of patients showed symptomatic improvement, despite the brief nature of the intervention (Coldiron et al. 2013).

Interventions by MSF in Gaza, which has been rife with armed conflict and political tension for the previous decade, have been similarly effective. Frequent rockets and mortars have harmed the infrastructure of the country, as well as engendered violent injury and death. The intervention was implemented from January 2007 to July 2011. After identifying mental health issues in affected populations, MSF provided either individual or group psychotherapeutic intervention. Most patients had anxiety disorders, with over half suffering from PTSD, and more than half were children under 15. At first contact, 90.5% of patients demonstrated moderate to severe mental health issues. After the intervention, 88.8% had improved symptoms (Coldiron et al. 2013).

Lastly, a similar intervention spearheaded by MSF in the West Bank city of Nablus showed improvements statistically similar to those in Gaza. Like Gaza, West Bank has also been a site of violence and political unrest in the past decade. After assessing mental health issues among the population, MSF provided either individual or group psychotherapeutic intervention.

Among screened patients, anxiety disorders and depression were the most common diagnoses, although PTSD was less common than it had been in Gaza. According to data from January 2007 to December 2011, 88.4% of participants demonstrated moderate to severe symptoms of mental health disorders. After the intervention, 87.9% had improved symptoms (Coldiron et al. 2013).

These four case studies have positive implications for the implementation of brief but effective mental health care across a range of world regions and issues. Coldiron et al. specified that although they did not assess the cost of their interventions, due to the "rapid improvement" they engendered, they would likely be "comparatively small" relative to, presumably, other mental health care programs.

Although areas where ongoing conflict or humanitarian crises are triggering widespread mental health problems might merit the most immediate mental health care, interventions are needed in non-conflict areas as well, as demonstrated by the following intervention in India.

Schizophrenic patients in India

In India, a community-based intervention funded by Wellcome Trust for schizophrenic patients elicited considerable improvements, outlined by Chatterjee et al. According to a study by Loganathan and Murthy in 2011, three out of every 1,000 people in India—which has a population of 1.1 billion people— suffer from schizophrenia. Accordingly, an estimated 3,300,000 people suffer from schizophrenia in the country. Barriers to mental healthcare in India, as well as societal stigmatization of the disorder, are rife (Loganathan and Murthy 2011).

The study by Chatterjee et al., which took place from January 2009 to December 2010, was conducted on people who had been diagnosed with moderate to severe schizophrenia, as well as their caregivers, from three different areas in India. Participants either received collaborative community-based care along with facility-based care, or only facility-based care. The community-based care involved individual treatment plans for patients, structured clinical reviews of their progress by the treating team, psychoeducational information for the patients and their caregivers, and networks with community agencies to help promote social inclusion, provide employment opportunities, and increase access to legal benefits. The facility-based care represented the typical mental health care provided for schizophrenic patients in India, although it is important to note that not all people suffering from schizophrenia have access to this treatment (Chatterjee et al. 2014).

Outcomes, assessed at baseline and at 12 months, were measured by the Indian disability evaluation and assessment scale (IDEAS), which evaluates

disability through examining interpersonal activities, self-care, and communication, and the positive and negative syndrome scale (PANSS), which assesses general psychopathology—schizophrenia in this study (Chatterjee et al. 2014).

Although all participants saw improvements in their symptoms and disability outcomes, as demonstrated by their IDEAS and PANSS scores, those in the combined community-based care and facility-based care (the intervention group), showed more progress than those participating in the facility-based care only (the control group). Of intervention participants, 48% showed a 20% or greater improvement on their IDEAS score, compared to 35% of control participants, at 12 months. Although PANSS scores were on average lower for participants in the intervention group than those in the control group, the percentage of intervention participants who demonstrated a 20% or greater improvement on their PANSS score was 51% for both groups. However, it is important to note that Chatterjee et al. also found that intervention participants were significantly more like likely to report adherence to prescribed medication all or most of the time than the control group. Moreover, as Chatterjee et al. discuss, clinical improvement in severely schizophrenic patients is a gradual process, and a later follow-up with participants might have shown more improvements (Chatterjee et al. 2014).

Chatterjee et al. analyzed the cost effectiveness of the intervention versus the control, and found that the intervention was more expensive, costing $500 more per participant on average over the course of the study. However, one third of these costs went to supervision, which Chatterjee et al. explained is increasingly seen as a fundamental "cornerstone" for the long-term effectiveness of mental health interventions (Chatterjee et al. 2014). Moreover, schizophrenia is arguably the most disabling of all mental disorders (Chaudhury, Deka and Chetia 2006); inevitably, it will require expensive treatment, and is also worth the cost. Although not dramatic, the results of this study suggest that collaborative community-based health care is more effective than the status quo of mental healthcare for schizophrenic patients in India.

Current initiatives focused on mental health

There are a number of current, ongoing initiatives for mental health interventions, some of which are specific responses to humanitarian emergencies and others that have a broader scope, like the case study in India. For instance, the WHO has joined forces with the Ministry of Health in New Zealand to provide psychological support through the Mental Health and Psychological Support Project to victims of the 2015 earthquake in Nepal, after which mental health needs increased substantially. According to USAID, 10% of Nepalese populations affected by the earthquake had suicidal idea. Project activities include reviewing current mental health services in Nepal and building upon them, providing mental health management training to District Public Health Officers, and developing a system to identify mental health problems in children (USAID 2017).

In another initiative, the non-profit Grand Challenges Canada—funded by the Canadian government—has a Mental Global Health program through

which it seeks to "improve treatments and expand access to care for mental disorders" through interventions that are "transformational, affordable, and cost-effective," as well as sustainable. It promotes community-based care —proven to be effective, as demonstrated by the case studies outlined—and also improves access to care for children, develops treatment for use by non-specialists, and increases the supply of medication. According to its goals and estimates, the program could potentially save up to 1 million lives and improve up to 28 million by 2030 (GCC 2017).

Perhaps the largest existing initiative is the Mental Health Gap Action Programme, led by the WHO and started in 2013, which aims to increase treatment services for all mental health-related disorders across low- and middle-income countries. The program states that if its plan is implemented, it will treat tens of millions of people suffering from schizophrenia, depression, and epilepsy and help them lead "normal lives." Current initiatives include supporting survivors of Ebola in Guinea, increasing mental health services in response to Typhoon Hayan in the Phillippines, and reducing suicide rates in Guyana (WHO 2013).

These initiatives show promise but are limited in number. Moreover, the vast majority are spearheaded by non-governmental organizations. As evidenced by the several case studies I outlined, mental health interventions—even brief, moderate ones—can engender marked improvements. Although they are important in any developing country where people do not have adequate access to mental healthcare resources, interventions are especially imperative in conflict or disaster-ridden areas, where mental health is most compromised on a large scale. In the next section, I will briefly discuss potential barriers to implementing such interventions, specifically those involving cultural differences.

Incorporating Western interventions into developing countries

Although given the evidence I outlined, most people would agree that mental health deserves more attention and funding from a foreign aid perspective, some would argue against the current model, which incorporates Western models of mental health care into developing countries. These Western models, some would claim, might not be compatible with developing countries that might be very different culturally.

Anna Leach discusses the issue in her article "Exporting Trauma: Can the Talking Cure Do More Harm Than Good?" She explores whether the traditional Western model of mental health care —"the talking cure"—can be adapted to other cultures. She describes the anecdotal experience of Andrew Solomon, a psychologist writing a book about depression across cultures, in Rwanda: women he was interviewing told him that the disconnect between Western and traditional models of mental health care had been problematic in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. In Rwanda, traditional practices for treating mental illness are similar to the ceremony with the slaughter of the ram in Senegal described above. Solomon said that Westerners coming in after the genocide, despite good intentions, could not fathom what the genocide had been like and that their paternalistic attempts to "reframe everything"

fell somewhere between "offensive and ludicrous." The Rwandan people told him they felt re-traumatized by having to retell their stories— they were brought into dingy rooms for an hour and asked to relive their most traumatic experiences. They ultimately asked the Western workers to leave. As IMC mental health adviser Inka Weissbecker puts it, it is a "foreign concept" to many in developing countries to sit down with a stranger and tell them your most "intimate problems." For instance, author Ethan Watters, who wrote a book on the globalization of the psyche, explained that among people suffering from PTSD, in the Western world it is typical that the patient would take time away from their responsibilities to recover; in somewhere like Sri Lanka, Watters says, this would be counterintuitive because people feel the deepest sense of themselves in their social group, and isolation from this group would prevent this positive emotion (Leach 2015). Watters also used the analogy of September 11th, 2001 in the U.S.: how would Americans have reacted, Watters asks, if healers from Mozambique had knocked on doors of family members of the deceased and said they needed to take part in a traditional ritual to sever their ties with the dead? Such actions would have been met with significant backlash, confusion and even anger (Leach 2015).

In their book *Public Health in the Arab World*, Samer Jabbour and Rouham Yamout express a similar sentiment, arguing that there needs to be an alternative mental health framework in the Arab world to Western aid and health workers rushing in to provide mental health interventions "based on Western models and diagnoses." This alternative framework should "avoid pathologizing suffering and medicalization," Jabbour and Yamount argue, suggesting that Western mental healthcare models do both (Jabbour and Yamount 2012). International relations academic Vanessa Pupavac, who does research on the war in the former Yugoslavia, called for an end to focusing on mental health in foreign aid altogether. She said that in the former Yugoslavia, "trauma" has "displaced hunger" and that "blanket-defining" an entire population as traumatized prevents people from recovering (Pupavac 2001). Although her viewpoint has faced disagreement, the notion of leaving people in developing countries to solve their own problems has been supported by others (Easterly 2006). In response to such stances, Weissbacker points to the human rights violations that can arise from traditional mental health care practices, as previously explained. Weissbacker said that in order to bridge the gap between Western expertise and local cultures and experiences, aid agencies should employ anthropologists, who have more nuanced understandings of cultural differences than health workers or psychologists. She noted that MSFhas employed anthropologists for years. Weissbacker notes that it is imperative that locals be consulted when implementing any mental health aid projects in order to be culturally sensitive (Leach 2015).

Past evidence supports this methodology. A study by Guajardo et al. found that consulting experts before providing mental health care interventions to refugees from Iraq in Australia helped develop culturally-sensitive and appropriate approaches. These experts were held to a high standard—they had to be a qualified mental health worker, such as a social worker or psychiatrist, and have worked in refugee health for at least

four years *and* have experience working with Iraqi refugees. The categories Guajardo et al. found to be important in the interventions—which could be generalizable to implementing any culturally appropriate mental health interventions— were cultural awareness, cross-cultural communication, the stigma associated with mental health problems in specific communities, and barriers to seeking professional help (Guarjardo et al. 2016).

A study by Kopinak also found that Western mental health models cannot stand alone when being implemented in developing countries. She found that in Uganda, Western health care interventions are often devoid of preventative measures, emanate from a completely different cultural base than those in developing countries, and are dominated by such conflicting opinions and treatments that it is "difficult, if not impossible," Kopinak says, to implement programs in developing countries based on this model that are both "effective" and "sustainable." Accounting for "distinctive cultures, values, gender, and social issues" across Uganda—and, ostensibly, other developing countries — when implementing mental health interventions is crucial, she argues (Kopinak 2015).

Although the interventions I previously mentioned were primarily dominated by Western models of mental health care—individual or group therapy discussions—the majority, particularly those led by MSF, incorporated local expertise in their interventions. It is imperative that before implementing any mental health intervention, a diverse range of experts—psychologists, local experts, anthropologists— are consulted on the best way to improve mental health and achieve results in a specific context.

Conclusion

The need for mental health interventions in developing countries is great. Although there has been an increasing focus on the issue in recent years, the portion of foreign aid dedicated to mental health remains insufficient. According to estimates by the WHO, depression will be the leading cause of global disease burden by 2030 (WHO 2011). Due to a lack of resources, societal stigmatization around mental health disorders, and lingering misunderstandings about its mechanisms and treatment, mental health care remains particularly poor in developing countries. This holds especially true in places ravaged by conflict or natural disasters, as such incidents often precipitate massive mental health crises. Moreover, some traditional treatments for mental health issues can violate basic human rights. Developed countries, particularly those deliver aid, have an ethical obligation to address mental health issues in developing countries.

The success of past interventions has promising implications for the viability of foreign aid, even if some of the programs were brief. Although cost-effectiveness analyses were not done for most of the interventions, according to the WHO, treatment of depression and anxiety are inexpensive; the average annual cost of treating depression over 15 years is $0.08 per person in low-income countries and $0.34 in middle-income countries. For treating anxiety disorders, the cost is nearly half of the depression treatment rates per person. This results in a benefit-to-cost ratio of 2.3 to 2.6 for depression, and a ratio of 2.7 to 3.0 for anxiety

(Marquez 2016). Besides demonstrating promising numerical improvements, these interventions can engender unquantifiable long-term improvements in quality of life.

Although the need for mental health interventions has been established, the optimal way to deliver them has elicited controversy, particularly over Western models of mental health diagnosis and treatment. This is a debate that transcends the role of mental health in foreign aid, and extends to foreign aid and development assistance more generally: is it permissible for developed countries to impose their own models and beliefs on developing countries? Ultimately, the solution lies in striking a balance. The majority of interventions I outlined incorporated Western models of mental health diagnosis and treatment, but many also utilized local expertise when implementing programs.

Although Western models of health are imperfect and may need to be modified heavily before being implemented on a country-by-country basis, in some cases it is crucial for awareness of Western science to be spread. Particularly in countries like Senegal, which have antiquated and even dangerous beliefs that mental health disorders arise from possession of the mind by evil spirits, people need to be educated that mental health disorders result from chemical imbalances in the brain. Optimal delivery utilizes both expertise and local experts to ensure effectiveness and cultural sensitivity.

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Suicidal Servitude: How Female Terrorists are Deprived of Liberation

Lauren Bishop

Over the past few decades, both academics and policy makers have linked the stability of states to the empowerment of women (Caiazza 2001, 1). However, most of the policies enacted through the Hillary Doctrine, which pioneered the inclusion of women's rights in United States' foreign policy, focused on women as victims, not perpetrators, of wartime violence (Leidl and Hudson 2015, 5). Reports published by the United States Institute of Peace make an effort to debunk the assumption that men are the only abusers of human rights in areas such as sexual violence (Cohen, Green, and Wood 2013, 4). Further studies claim that throughout history women have participated as militants in over 38 civil conflicts, and this trend is on the rise specifically in terror groups (Caiazza 2001, 1; Jordan and Denov 2007, 42).

The role of women in terrorist organizations, most notably in societies where women are customarily subjugated, has transformed from supportive roles that are an extension of their traditional duties to active military positions such as suicide bombers (O'Rourke 2009, 684). This promotion to active roles is even more surprising in terrorist organizations that have nationalist and religious ideologies because it seems to defy the standard practices of nationalist military groups. Typically, patriarchal nationalism as practiced by these organizations promotes a traditional view of women who remain in the home and support the male members of their family (Leidl and Hudson 2015, 97). While the advancement of women to militant positions previously reserved for men may seem to be the result of greater gender equality within terrorist organizations, terror groups actually use female suicide terrorists (FST) and other female militants because of their strategic viability, not out of an appreciation for the women themselves (O'Rourke 2009, 684; Jordan and Denov 2007, 42). In the analysis of this scholarly debate, this paper will first discuss and then refute the main arguments for the conclusion that terrorist groups have adopted gender equality.

Some scholars argue that the global movement by terrorist organizations to use FST is due to a realization that women have value outside traditional gender norms (Raghavan and Balasubramaniyan 2014, 206). The argument stems from four main points. First, they argue that women join terrorist organizations in an effort to seek liberation and thus change the organization from the inside (Caiazza 2001, 3). Second, that the groups themselves adopt gender equality as a political goal in order to recruit women (Wang 2011, 104; Jordan and Denov 2007, 43). Third, that groups gain greater publicity from Western media by utilizing their female members (Raghavan and Balasubramaniyan 2014, 202). Fourth, that female members "enjoy better standing

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over the male members in terror groups" when looking at groups within societies that lack gender equality (Raghavan and Balasubramaniyan 2014, 206). These four points seem to validate the assumption that women have gained equality within terrorist groups. However, as further analysis of each point will show, this theory is not realistic.

While a small minority of women do join terrorist organizations as a path to emancipation, they are unable to combat the masculinity of the group and do not gain true gender equality. Through interviews with former female members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Jordan and Denov 2007 were able to demonstrate that some women had joined this nationalist terrorist organization in an effort to escape the traditional gender roles of Sri Lankan society (Jordan and Denov 2007, 53). However, they were quick to qualify that this was a secondary objective to the women's main goal: the protection of their communities from marauding government forces. Additionally, further study of this group shows that the LTTE forced the women recruits to masculinize by cutting their hair, forgoing adornment, and adopting male fatigues (Wang 2011, 102). In this case, the group is able to avoid the threat of shifting gender dynamics by forcing the women to abandon their femininity to gain equality (Leidl and Hudson 2015, 98). Other religious or nationalistic terrorist organizations either follow the standard presented by the LTTE, or do not attract women who wish to gain liberation. In fact, most women who join terrorist groups, especially those with nationalistic aims, join out of a sense of duty to protect their community, not seeking gender equality. Aside from these women, some women do join terrorist groups seeking liberation. Growing evidence suggests that many female members from strict patriarchal societies are seeking a way to repent for sexual misconduct (like infidelity or premarital sexual relations) or regain the respect of the community after becoming victims of rape (O'Rourke 2009, 703). Therefore, while a small cadre of women may join terror groups seeking liberation, it is not in the quest of gender equality, but instead in hopes of being reintegrated into their community in their traditional feminine roles.

Furthermore, while certain terrorist organizations adopt female empowerment as a recruitment method, this is not due to a sincere appreciation of women, but rather a tactic borne out of necessity to attract more members, and upon joining, female members are not emancipated. The LTTE were one of the first nationalistic terror groups to adopt the platform of gender equality in the 1980s. They started to recruit women to increase their membership because many male operatives had fled or been arrested by Indian counter-terrorist efforts (Martin 2011, 9). LTTE leaders repeatedly called for female empowerment throughout the 80s and 90s, however this political agenda was mere rhetoric. LTTE reproduced traditional Sri Lankan gender roles by placing an emphasis on female discipline, outlawing pre-marital sex, encouraging female militants to marry male members, and requiring women to gain permission in order to leave the organization (Jordan and Denov 2007, 58). Therefore, both their motivation to increase membership and the reality of conditions within the organization prove that gender equality was never a sincere goal of the LTTE.

While the LTTE was the first and arguably only nationalistic terrorist orga-

nization to recruit women by promising emancipation, other groups in the Middle East and Chechnya actively recruit FST in order to exploit the strategic advantages of female operatives (O'Rourke 2009, 683). The increasing focus of the international community on counter-terrorism efforts has made it more difficult for terror groups to conduct attacks (Gage 2011, 90). Therefore, terrorist groups have had to find innovative ways to conduct violence in the face of successful counter-terrorism campaigns. The societies in which these organizations operate adopt strict gender roles that stress the virtue and modesty of women. In these societies, women are not highly scrutinized by security forces and are able to smuggle larger amounts of explosives under their traditional garments (burqas or saris) (O'Rourke 2009, 685; Jordan and Denov 2007, 58). The ability of women to evade counter-terrorism efforts makes FST much more effective; on average FST result in 8.4 casualties per individual attack while male suicide terrorists (MST) only result in 5.3 casualties (O'Rourke 2009, 687).

Once secular terrorist organizations (which have less loyalty to traditional gender roles) proved the success of FST, religious groups that had originally condemned the use of women in nontraditional roles started to recruit FST. Sheik Yassin, the leader of Hamas, initially spoke out against FST in 2002 when Al-Aqas Martyrs Brigade used a female suicide bomber,

> A women martyr is problematic for Muslim society. A man who recruits a woman is breaking Islamic law. He is taking the girl or woman without the permission of her father, brother, or husband, and therefore the family of the girl confronts an even greater problem since the man has the biggest power over her, choosing the day that she will give her life back to Allah (Victor 2003, 197).

However, Yassin reversed his position just two years later once their effectiveness became evident (O'Rourke 2009, 697). It is highly unlikely that his core beliefs on this matter altered during this time period, but the success of FST was ultimately too irresistible to ignore. Muslim cleric Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah sheds light onto the dilemma,

> It is true that Islam has not asked women to carry out jihad [holy war], but it permits them to take part if the necessities dictate that women should carry out regular military operations or suicide operations (Fadlallah 2002).

The use of FST instead of relegating women to supportive roles does not constitute a change in how these terrorist groups view women. Instead, the exploitation of women as strategically advantageous operatives instead of the inclusion of women in planning positions shows that these terrorist organizations are not committed to gender equality.

While female suicide terrorists gain greater media attention and thus bring more legitimacy to terror groups, the way groups idolize FST as "brides" reinforces their traditional roles instead of championing the women themselves (O'Rourke 2009, 709). Even though female terrorists are increasing in number, they are still considered a rarity because women make up anywhere from less than 5% of an organization (Hamas) to over 30% (LTTE) (Raghavan and Balasubramaniyan 2014, 200). As such, the media usually focuses on the women and the organization they represent rather than the carnage they produce (Martin 2011, 7). The attention gives the terrorist organization a greater platform which they can use to spread their message. Therefore, FST help achieve a central goal of most terror groups: the use of violence "as a means to draw attention to themselves and their respective causes" (Hoffman 1998, 26). However, the propaganda pushed by the terrorist groups typically strip FST of their identity by referring to them as their position within the patriarchal order. Hamas does not publish the names of their FST— not as a security matter but to strip them of their humanity— instead they are given titles like the "Bride of Haifa" or the "Bride of the South" which focuses solely on their traditional position within conservative societies (O'Rourke 2009, 709). Similarly, the FST within the Chechen separatist movement are called "Black Widows," which refers to their widowed status, for their husbands also gave their life to the cause (O'Rourke 2009, 710). While the spotlight does show the community that female operatives can handle the responsibility of frontline positions, assigning FST the title "bride" dehumanizes them and reestablishes traditional gender roles.

Although many terrorist organizations have started to allow women to hold more responsibility by becoming FST, there is little evidence that these women "enjoy better standing over the male members in terror groups" especially in societies where women are typically subjugated (Raghavan and Balasubramaniyan 2014, 206). Excluding leftist terrorist organizations, there are rare cases, specifically within the LTTE, where a woman is permitted to assume a planning or strategy role. However, these instances are an exception to the general standard and do not represent most women in terrorist groups (Raghavan and Balasubramaniyan 2014, 200). In fact, O'Rourke points out that the families of FST in Hamas receive only a $200 stipend a month instead of the $400 stipend the families of male suicide terrorists receive (O'Rourke 2009, 697). Additionally, FST are often required to be accompanied by male members if their mission requires them to travel for more than a day away from the compound (O'Rourke 2009, 698). Furthermore, Yassin's main argument that women do "enjoy better standing over the male members in terror groups" centers around the fact that the "man" (the male handler within the terrorist group) would

supersede the natural order of power over the FST (Raghavan and Balasubramaniyan 2014, 206) (Victor 2003, 197). In an environment where women were not originally utilized because of the question of power within the patriarchal system, it is highly unlikely that women would gain prominence over the male members of the group.

Over the past forty years, the role of women in nationalistic and religious terrorist organizations has changed from tactical or supportive positions to active military roles, most notably suicide terrorism. While the adoption of FST seems to defy the standard patriarchal masculinity perpetuated by nationalistic groups, the transition is not due to the groups espousing gender equality or pursuing female empowerment. Instead, it is a strategic modification assumed because conventional methods used by male terrorists are either no longer viable due to a decrease in the number of male members, or because successful counter-terrorism campaigns have made it harder for traditional tactics to succeed. Therefore, terrorist groups view women as strategic assets who can further their cause through increased publicity, deadlier attacks, and legitimacy gained through the inclusion of women. While terrorist organizations capitalize on this new development, counter-terrorism campaigns lag behind because they are often unwilling to scrutinize women the way they do men. The only way counter-terrorism campaigns can limit the success of FST is if they pursue a gender-neutral screening policy (O'Rourke 2009, 717). Such a policy may be hard to implement because the societies in which FST operate have strict views of women and would be reluctant to violate a woman's modesty through heightened screening. However, if the states that are impacted by FST do not adapt their counter-terrorism strategies, terrorist groups will continue to capitalize on this reluctance and successfully use FST to the detriment of the entire nation.

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Did Partisanship Affect the British Media Coverage of Foreign Aid to Syria Between 2011 and 2013?

Kate Griffiths

I examine the UK media coverage of foreign aid to Syria starting from the initial uprising in 2011 until mid-2013, when issues surrounding extremist groups, immigration, and national security began to consume press coverage. Focusing on *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*, I aim to establish the extent to which partisanship and political ideology influenced this coverage. I conclude that the content of the coverage was not particularly influenced by partisanship, however the structure of the articles was. Additionally, partisanship is far more explicit in general coverage of foreign aid than of specific crisis coverage.

Introduction

The media's relationship with foreign aid has become increasingly complex in recent years. With the rise of twenty-four-hour news cycles, online news updates and social media, it is evident that the media now have a significant influence on foreign policy. This is known as the "CNN effect", a term that originally referred purely to network news but now encapsulates the broad range of real-time news that has resulted from modern technological advances (Robinson 2006). The influence of the media on foreign policy agendas extends to the determination of aid expenditure. Press coverage can impact both the amount of spending by countries and where they choose to spend it, as well as the attitudes held by citizens of donor countries towards aid-giving in general (Van Belle and Hook 2000, 321–346). Media outlets have been criticised for neglecting their duty as the objective purveyors of information. Critics assert that the media now prioritize the shock value and marketability of news stories over the accurate representation of events. There has also been increasing focus on the relationship between the press and the aid organizations themselves. NGOs now utilize the media as a PR tool and form of advertisement in the hopes that increased exposure will lead to increased funding. The media willingly comply in exchange for priority access to aid projects and recipients (Polman 2010; Hieber-Girardet 2017; Cottle and Nolan 2007, 862–878).

Given the influence of the media on foreign aid allocation, the subjectivity of this coverage and its susceptibility to external influence make for an important area of study. This paper will examine this subjectivity through a political lens by establishing whether partisanship exists in the newspaper coverage of UK foreign aid spending, focusing specifically on humanitarian aid to Syria between 2011 and 2013. By analysing the coverage of two well regarded and widely read broadsheets—*The Daily Telegraph* and *The Guardian*—with distinct political ideologies (right- and left-wing

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respectively), I will evaluate how partisanship affects the coverage of foreign aid. I shall limit my analysis of news coverage to the two years following the initial Syrian uprising on March 15, 2011. The Syrian conflict continues to be one of the worst humanitarian crises in history. While it began initially as an isolated crisis, it has since become an issue involving military action, national security, immigration and refugee policy in Europe, and terrorism. As a result, coverage of events in Syria is now influenced both by attitudes towards humanitarian aid, and by attitudes towards these additional, highly contentious issues. Therefore, I have limited my scope to when the focus was primarily on Syrian civilians and peaceful resolution without military intervention. Hence, I can ensure that any partisanship that might occur in the press coverage is related to attitudes towards humanitarian aid, rather than towards the other political issues that have since engulfed the crisis. Throughout this paper, partisanship refers to preference or bias, specifically of a political nature. The newspapers examined are traditionally inclined towards certain political ideologies and so partisanship refers to coverage that exhibits preference for these ideologies, and for the UK political parties that embody them.

Partisanship and Foreign Aid

In order to examine partisanship across foreign aid coverage, it is first important to briefly explicate the policies adopted towards aid by UK governments in recent history. The attitudes towards foreign aid of the main two political parties in the UK—Conservative and Labour—can be seen in both the amount of aid spending that has occurred during their terms in government and the nature of that spending. Between 1970 and 2010 Conservative governments displayed a clear tendency to spend less on foreign aid than Labour ones.



Figure 1 Source: OECD

Figure 1 provides a visual representation of this trend, showing that, generally speaking, aid spending as a percentage of GDP decreased throughout the term of a Conservative government, and increased throughout the term of a Labour government. Further differences in ideology influencing foreign aid can be seen by how these two governments spend their aid and the rhetoric they use when defending their aid policies to the British public.

The Conservative party used a distinctively Nationalist rhetoric when announcing its plans for foreign aid in their manifesto for the 1970 General Election. They asserted that developing countries should be left to their own devices when dealing with their individual issues, and that assistance from the British government should be reserved only for "those matters freely agreed upon as being of common interest" (Craig 1975, 343). The subsequent Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major continued in the same vein, cutting foreign aid spending as a percentage of GNP and reallocating aid to align it more closely with Britain's national interest.

Labour governments, in comparison, tended to place much greater emphasis on improving the welfare of recipient countries. Labour's 1974 manifesto advocated that organizations whose objectives included the "peaceful settlement of disputes, ...the promotion of human rights, …[and] the rule of law and to the improvement of living standards throughout the world" (Craig 1975, 466) be given priority in the allocation of British aid. And in the late 1990s, aid under the Labour government of Tony Blair underwent a clear shift from the explicit advancement of the national interest to a "growing emphasis on ethical [and] moral duties to protect the rights and interests of others" (Chandler 2003, 295).

The Conservative and Liberal-Democratic coalition government that took office in 2010 continued with the aid-giving practices set in motion by the previous Labour government and continued to increase foreign aid spending, despite other domestic and international budget cuts. This is a significant consideration that I will discuss this in more depth later.

PARTISANSHIP AND UK MEDIA COVERAGE

Having established partisan trends in the approach to foreign aid, it is now important to determine partisan trends in the UK media. In this paper, I examine the differences in the coverage of foreign aid between *The Guardia*n and *The Telegraph*. I chose these papers as they are both popular and well regarded, while still maintaining distinct political leanings. Whilst UK tabloids such as *The Daily Mail* and *The Sun* are known to cover news in more emotional and involved ways, the two broadsheets I am examining are renowned for their accurate coverage and typically restrained reporting style (Baker 2010, 310–338).

According to a MORI survey conducted in 2005, 64% of *Telegraph* readers intended to support the Conservative Party in the coming elections, *The Guardian on* the other hand, had a far more left-wing readership, with 48% of readers intending to vote for the Labour Party, and a further 34% backing the Liberal Democrats. *The Telegraph's* core readership is typical of the traditional 'middle England' demographic, populated by retired army officers with patriotic memories of Great Britain's nationalistic history. The personal links between the paper's editors and the leadership of the Conservative Party, along with the paper's influence over Conservative activists, has resulted in the paper being referred to as the 'Torygraph' ('tory' is a term used to identify Conservative voters, often used with negative connotations) in

common parlance. One the contrary, *The Guardian* holds a reputation as a platform for liberal and left-wing opinions. This has led to the use of the phrase 'Guardian reader' as a label for people holding liberally-oriented political views. The partisanship of these papers is reinforced by the fact that these two publications are continuously used as models of analysis for media coverage due to their representation of press from both the left and right political spectrums (Doulton and Brown 2009, 191–202; O'Grady 2011, 2489–2500; Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti 2016, 265–279).

It has been established that Conservative governments are less inclined than Labour governments to spend money on aid, especially in a predominantly humanitarian way and that *The Telegraph* shares and supports the ideologies of Conservative governments, whereas *The Guardian* and its readership favor more liberal views. These facts would indicate that coverage in these two newspapers should vary so that *The Telegraph* can be expected to produce articles that are critical of foreign aid to Syria and that *The Guardian* will produce articles that are more supportive.

Case Study: Syrian Uprising and Civil War

The Syrian uprising in 2011 and the civil war that followed have been acknowledged as amongst the worst humanitarian crises of our time. The uprising began when protesters took to the streets to challenge the authoritarian regime of President Bashar al-Assad. What started as pro-democracy protests turned violent when security forces opened fire on demonstrators, killing many. This triggered more nationwide protests and by July 2011, hundreds of thousands of Syrians were protesting. These protesters began forming rebel groups and the violence escalated into a fully-fledged civil war. By June 2013, the UN had estimated that at least 90,000 people had died in the fighting. The violence lead to an enormous number of refugees fleeing the country. Approximately 4.5 million have fled since the conflict began, and a further 6.5 million are estimated to have been internally displaced within Syria. The Syrian crisis triggered the biggest ever call for humanitarian aid from the UN. Roughly 70% of the population was left without access to adequate drinking water, one in three people rendered unable to meet their basic food needs, and more than two million children are out of school, and four out of five people live in poverty. The warring parties worsened the problems by refusing humanitarian agencies access to civilians in need. As well as those requiring aid in Syria, there are also large amounts of aid needed to support the refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries including Lebanon and Jordan (BBC 2016).

Important Considerations

It is important to outline the political climate in the United Kingdom at the time of the Syrian uprising. In 2010, David Cameron took office as Prime Minister as part of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government. Cameron was explicit in his assertion that his government was not going to cut foreign aid even though it was looking to reduce spending in other departments.

This broke away from the traditional Conservative position. It was not, however, the result of a shift in party ideology. Rather, it was an initiative lead by a few high-ranking members of the new cabinet (Heppel and Lightfoot 2012, 130–138). If partisanship does affect *The Telegraph's* coverage of aid to Syria, it could take two forms: it could either break away from its traditional conservativism to support the new Conservative Prime Minister, or it could choose to prioritize coverage of the backbenchers' dissent and disagreement over the increased aid spending. The Guardian also faces a dilemma: it could follow its traditional liberalism and present aid spending positively, supporting the new Conservative Prime Minister, or it could portray aid spending in a negative way to criticise the Prime Minister's actions. An additional complexity for *The Guardian* is the Liberal Democrat coalition as more *Guardian* readers than ever voted for the Liberal Democrats in the 2005 General Election due to disenchantment with the Labour Party. Therefore, it may focus a disproportionate amount on Liberal Democrat politicians when it covers aid to Syria to appeal to these readers.

Focus of study

In comparing media coverage of foreign aid to Syria in *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph*, I will look to identify the following things. First, I will look for differences in the portrayal of aid to Syria: is UK aid spending portrayed in a positive or negative way? I will also ask whether either newspaper focuses more on the UK government as an actor in the situation or limits itself to a more widespread coverage of the crisis and aid requirements. I will also examine the focus of the news articles, looking to establish whether aid is central to the article, or a secondary consideration. Following my case study analysis, I will compare this focused coverage of aid to Syria with a brief analysis of the general coverage of foreign aid in these newspapers, to determine whether there is more or less partisanship in specific case coverage of foreign aid compared to macro coverage of foreign aid.

Methods and Results

Using the search engine Factiva, I searched for news articles that included the keywords "Syria" and "foreign aid" or "humanitarian aid" or "humanitarian assistance" and were published between March 15, 2011 and June 13, 2013. This timeframe encompasses the period from the beginning of the Syrian uprising up until the point at which military intervention, extremist groups and the flow of refugees into Europe began to overtake humanitarian concerns in press coverage. Broadly speaking, coverage of aid to Syria varied little between the two papers. Neither paper was critical of the British government's provision of aid to alleviate this humanitarian crisis. There were, nonetheless, some elements of the coverage by these two newspapers that appear to suggest some degree of partisanship or preference for certain ideologies. The initial articles reporting the government's announcement of its intention to give aid to Syria perpetuate the attitudes that might be expected considering the respective political leanings of the two papers. *The Telegraph* mentions the aid

commitment in a single sentence at the end of a mostly unrelated article entitled "Nicolas Sarkozy admits David Cameron was right to veto European treaty" (Mason 2012). The emphasis here is clearly on the successes of the Conservative Prime Minister. *The Guardian* dedicated comparatively more coverage to the initial aid commitment, outlining the amount to be spent, how it would be distributed, and the humanitarian needs it aimed to satisfy. That at such an early stage in the Syrian crisis—the estimated number of affected civilians was only 20,000 at the time—*The Guardian* covered aid to the country so extensively supports the hypothesis that *The Guardian* was more sympathetic to aid concerns than was *The Telegraph.*



Figure 2

This inequity of coverage disappeared once the extent of the crisis became clear. In fact, as shown in Figure 2, *The Telegraph* in fact had slightly more headlines that featured aid or humanitarian assistance than *The Guardian*. This difference was greatly intensified when including headlines and lead paragraphs. While many of the articles that resulted in the search incorporated a reference to humanitarian aid as a small side note, these figures show that *The Telegraph* had more coverage that was focused on the need for, or commitment and use of, aid. This is surprising considering the typical conservative ambivalence or antipathy towards aid. One reason for this may be that the Conservative government was such a vocal proponent of giving aid to Syria. The time frame of this coverage coincided with the first Conservative Prime Minister in 13 years, and it is likely that *The Telegraph* did not want to criticize him, especially given that the Conservative government was a weak one as it was in a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Another reason for this could be that, despite the traditional conservative disinclination to support foreign aid, the Syrian crisis was such an objectively horrific humanitarian disaster that there were no valid criticisms of the aid commitments.



FIGURE 3

One way in which the coverage differed distinctly was in the way the newspapers represented the UK government. While neither newspaper was critical of the government and their actions around giving aid to Syria, the amount of representation of the government and government figures varied drastically. This can be seen in Figure 3, which shows the number of headlines that named UK politicians. Of the articles, *The Guardian* only mentioned Cameron in their headlines, and this occurred only twice. When they featured Justine Greening in a headline, they only referred to her as a 'minister' and went on to identify her in the actual article. Contrastingly, *The Telegraph* named either Cameron or Foreign Secretary William Hague in 11 of their headlines. This distinction continued in the body of the articles, with members of the cabinet being extensively referenced and quoted in *The Telegraph* coverage. *The Guardian* on the other hand would tend to have minimal quotations and references and these would come towards the end of the articles (excluding the few articles that were focused on the actions of a particular politician). An example of this is seen in the article covering the Syrian crisis summit. Hillary Clinton is quoted in the lead paragraph and is quoted once again, giving the perspective of the American government, before William Hague is quoted with his input for the UK government. As shown in the graph, US political leaders are in fact equally if not more represented in *The Guardian* coverage than their UK counterparts. While there is no open criticism of the actions of the UK government, as one might have expected considering the partisanship of *The Guardian* discussed previously, the unequal representation of the UK government in these two papers' coverage certainly points towards some bias at play.



Figure 4

A final difference between the two papers and their coverage of Syrian aid between 2011 and 2013 is the overall focus of the article. Figure 4 shows the number of articles that focused on the civilians in crisis, and the number that focused on the conflict and political ramifications surrounding it. Both newspapers had a large quantity of articles that focused on the politics surrounding the crisis, which is logical as the political conflict was, and still is, central to the crisis and resulting disasters. However, the number of purely civilian focused articles in *The Guardian* versus *The Telegraph* is significant. *The Guardian* has a distinctly higher number of articles that were primarily covering the civilian ramifications. The 'other' column are the outlier articles that were focused on something else (for example the pregnancy of President Assad's wife) but most of these 'other' articles had equal coverage of the political and the civilian aspects of the crisis. This typifies the overall theme that, even though *The Telegraph* provided much more coverage of foreign aid and the humanitarian crisis in Syria, this coverage was more often than not accompanied by equal if not more coverage of the political and military aspects of the conflict. This differs from *The Guardian's* coverage which had a much more even spread of focus. These differences could be representative of the trends outlined at the beginning of this paper, in that the Labour Party tends to be more concerned with the individuals receiving aid, whereas the Conservative Party is more concerned with how the UK will be affected by international affairs and so will have a cover more of the political and strategic foreign policy elements of an event. While there were some nuanced differences in the way these two papers covered the foreign aid allocations to Syria in the first two years of the conflict, overall the tone of the coverage was similar across both in that it supported the government's commitment to provide extensive amounts of aid to Syria.

COMPARISON TO COVERAGE OF MACRO AID

To compare the findings of this focused case study to the coverage of foreign aid in general, I conducted another search through Factiva. This time I removed Syria from the equation, and searched only for "humanitarian aid" or "foreign aid" or "humanitarian assistance". I also changed the date to limit the search to articles that have been published in the previous year in order to prevent overlap from the media coverage I had previously examined. These searches returned substantially different results from that of the Syrian case study. By looking at headlines alone, it is clear that the partisanship of these newspapers, and the traditional political approaches to foreign aid is very much present in the coverage of foreign aid on a macro scale. Articles from *The Telegraph* include "Britain's foreign aid law is a scandal that abuses the country's generosity. It must be scrapped", "Britain's aid target is politicians' virtue signalling with other people's money", and "Someone needs to have the guts to say 'Bah! Humbug' to foreign aid" (Patel 2016; Johnston 2016; Johnston 2016). In contrast, the headlines from *The Guardian* present a very different attitude towards aid spending: "Foreign aid is failing fast—but it's not too late to fix", "Plan to align UK aid with trade policy could sideline poor countries", and "In their ruthless flight from liberalism, Tories have left decency behind" (Byanyima 2016; Quinn and McVeigh 2016; Williams 2016). From this small selection of articles, it is clear that there is a distinction between the political preferences of these two newspapers towards foreign aid as a macro concept. This raises the question of why the initial coverage of aid to Syria was so much more neutral that the coverage of aid as a macro issue. The first reason for this could be new government that was in power from 2010. As previously discussed, David Cameron was the first Conservative Prime Minister to make it a priority to increase aid spending. In this way, his views aligned more with those of *The Guardian*, which is why the newspaper did not criticise the government's aid spending. More recent Conservative governments, however, have not made such strong commitments to maintaining the aid budget. *The Telegraph* may have wanted to support their new Conservative Prime Minister, and therefore might have been more willing to support his decisions to increase aid spending in relation to Syria. Furthermore, the crisis in Syria was such an objectively terrible occurrence that criticism of the aid efforts could have come across as harsh or inhumane on the part of *The Telegraph*. Regardless of arguments in favor of or against aid, when there is a specific crisis with death tolls, and images of innocent children suffering, is very difficult to criticize providing assistance. This could be a reason for why there is so much more criticism in *The Telegraph's* coverage of aid on a macro level; they are criticizing the concept rather than specific aid efforts.

CONCLUSION

Coverage of foreign aid to Syria in the first two years of the humanitarian crisis proved to be almost wholly objective. This was especial-

ly true in terms of the presentation of the crisis, the need for aid, and the role of the UK government as an active leader in the provision of aid to Syria. Political preferences did manifest themselves in the way the coverage was framed. In particular, *The Guardian* focused much less on the involvement of specific members of the UK government, and instead focused on the country as a whole. Comparatively, *The Telegraph* made consistent references to the actions and words of UK politicians, particularly Conservative cabinet members. While *The Telegraph* included foreign aid in its coverage as much as, if not more than, *The Guardian*, a substantial amount of these articles also included extensive reporting focused on political news, in particular how it related to the UK. This shows that despite a clear sympathetic sentiment towards those suffering in Syria, there are still remnants of the nationalist approach to aid that has defined Conservative governments throughout British political history. Finally, the comparison between coverage of foreign aid to Syria and that of foreign aid as a macro concept shows that there are far more explicit differences between the two newspapers when covering foreign aid generally rather than specifically. While this paper was only able to touch on this briefly, it would be an interesting and worthwhile topic for future study.

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On Intelligence, National Security, and Cyber Security: A Conversation with Rand Beers

Rand Beers '64 is a U.S. government official who has served a number of positions, including on the National Security Council Staff, Director for Counter-terrorism and Counter-narcotics, Director for Peacekeeping, and most recently, Senior Advisor to President Barack Obama. He is currently a Dickey Center Senior Fellow and Visiting Professor at Dartmouth.

World Outlook: *Could you just talk a little about your background, your work experience, and what got you interested in teaching and coming back to Dartmouth?*

Rand Beers: I left Dartmouth to become commissioned as a marine officer because I had been in the Navy ROTC program. I went to Vietnam, came back from Vietnam in 1968, went to graduate school at the University of Michigan for military history with the intention of joining the Foreign Service, and joined the Foreign Service in 1971. I worked in Washington for a couple of years and did one overseas posting and came back to Washington with the clear intention of transferring out of the Foreign Service. I had enjoyed my two years in Washington before I went overseas, and I wanted to be part of the State Department's Civil Service. So that's what I did for the next several years.

My first White House tour was in 1988 at the end of the Reagan Administration. I was mostly in the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and I went over to the White House to be Director of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Narcotics. I had some experience on the terrorism side from my Political-Military Affairs days through what was going on in the Middle East with the hijackings. I worked at the White House into the near end of the first Bush Administration. Then I came back to the State Department, briefly went back to the White House in the Clinton Administration, and stayed there— again doing "drugs and thugs" so to speak— until I became the Senior Director for Intelligence Programs, which is the person in the White House that not so much monitors the intel traffic as reviews intel policy. This person is responsible for the annual review of the covert action program, which is signed by the President and sent to the Congress, so if you don't have a covert action program that goes on indefinitely on auto-pilot. I was then I was asked to come back [to the State Department] and take over the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs as an Assistant Secretary, which is the first confirmation position that I ever had. I did that into the early Bush Administration. Colin Powell and Rich Armitage— the Secretary and the Deputy [of State]— said, "you can stay on, but you should know that the House Republicans don't like you"— which I knew— "and if you want to move on or need our help to move on we're happy to do that, but please don't misinterpret that as we want you to leave."

Around July of 2002, I got a call from an old friend of mine who wanted me to come back to the White House for a third tour as his deputy in charge of counter-terrorism. This is post 9/11. So I did, and he and I talked a great deal about what was happening, because by that time it was clear despite the effort in Afghanistan to move on to Iraq. We were both troubled by that in large measure because we thought it would impact the ability to deal with terrorism and undermine the global consensus for our presence in Afghanistan. In December, [President Bush] asked the two of us to pull the NSC together to discuss whether or not our counter-terrorism posture was adequate if we were going to invade Iraq given the mistakes made in the entry into Iraq.

We pulled the meeting together and one agenda item was, "will the entry in Iraq increase Bin Laden's advantage to recruit more terrorists?" We got to that point in the meeting, and the CIA director spoke up first and said, "Yes. We really have to pay attention to this." The second person that spoke up was Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy Secretary of Defense— Donald Rumsfeld had bowed out with a sore throat. [Wolfowitz] had been U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, and he said "yes" despite what people know about him in terms of the Iraq War. He didn't pull a punch. The third person who spoke was [National Security Advisor] Condi Rice, in agreement with the preceding two, at which point the President stopped her and said, "this is not going to matter, because victory in Iraq will quell any intention people have to be recruited to [al-Qaeda]." He didn't say it, but the implication clearly was that the shock and awe would lead other governments to be enthusiastic about squelching terrorism. Would-be-terrorists would be wary of joining an organization that might be struck by such a powerful military. So I decided to resign. It was only a question of when. I had read the National Intelligence Estimate and I knew that the [counter-terrorism] claims in it were not only shaky but were really shading the intelligence. And in one case, the actual intelligence was withdrawn. The nuclear stuff was weak. I ended up resigning about a day before the war.

I went back to the State Department and retired, joined Senator John Kerry's campaign for President as his National Security Advisor. That didn't work out. Then I taught at the Kennedy School with my friend Dick Clarke on a course that is quite similar to what I am teaching here. I also organized a non-profit to talk about national security from a Democratic perspective that didn't sound exclusively like "we want no wars" to try to cut the advantage that Republicans traditionally have had in the national security arena and across the board. During the 2008 election, I remained neutral during the primary. After the Democratic National Convention, I got a call [asking if I would] be on the Obama transition team. I ran the pre-election transition team for the Intel Community and DHS, and then I ran the transition team for DHS and became Napolitano's Undersecretary for Cyber Security and Infrastructure Protection and her CT advisor. When her deputy left, I became the acting deputy. And when she left, I became the acting secretary and went to the

White House for my fourth tour under my fifth President and retired from there.

WO: *It sounds like you have clearly had a lot of experience over the past couple of decades in counterterrorism and domestic security. On that note, how would you say the domestic security landscape and the challenges that the government faces have changed since the 1990s, if at all?*

RB: Well, I mean there were people who conducted terrorist acts in the United States for different causes throughout that period of time. The first act of terrorism in the Clinton administration was an effort to blow up the World Trade Center by an Islamic terrorist or a group of them. But you know, we've had others and we've had people who we describe as terrorists who commit acts like [the Las Vegas shooting]. And so the domestic threat environment has probably, with the exception of the World Trade Center and the massive loss of life there, been fairly constant in terms of the number of incidents and the number of people killed. But 9/11 and the horrific nature of it and the fact that it was a foreign plot executed on U.S. territory set the alarms at a much higher level.

The presumption particularly in the immediate days thereafter was that there would another [attack] and another and another. In those years, people would poll experts and it was an overwhelming majority that thought there would be a major terrorist incident in the United States within the next five years. [As a result], the security posture of the United States had changed. We had air hijacking events before [9/11] mostly to Cuba. [The U.S. government] had the air marshal program created specifically for that, but the use of the plane as a weapon was new. And so we created a whole new infrastructure called the Transportation Security Agency— which took over airport security from mostly private sector companies. Regardless of which aisle you were on, private pressure for a federal presence was so high that the reluctance to disengage a private-sector area and make it a public-sector area was simply overwhelmed by that [private pressure]. The Department of Homeland Security was obviously organized [following 9/11], but TSA was created before that and used to belong to the Transportation Department.

Almost immediately after 9/11, [TSA] was up and running very quickly. It led to the creation of DHS and pulling these large and old organizations from other parts of the government to DHS— customs, immigration (which were combined and then split into three organizations— Customs and Border Protection, ICE, and the U.S. Citizens and immigration services), and FEMA, and the Coast Guard, and TSA, and Secret Service. The major law enforcement organizations that didn't move were DEA, FBI, and ATF, although the ATF moved from the Treasury to the Justice Department. Some would say that would be a mistake if we were to create the functional equivalent of a European Interior Ministry— you've got to have all federal law enforcement agencies in the same agency. But nobody was prepared to take on the FBI, and the FBI was not interested in moving. It had a perfectly satisfactory independent or quasi-independent relationship with [DOJ]. Why would they want to take any risk to have their writ cir-

cumscribed? DEA was just not a terrorist focused organization. ATF could have been, but I don't know why it ended up that way. That was just the shuffle that went on at the White House at the last minute when they realized that they were going to have a DHS rammed down their throats, so at least they ought to control who or what went into it.

In addition to TSA and air travel, we had the Coast Guard doing much more in terms of port security. We had Customs and Border Protection doing more of that border security. Not to mention ICE and immigration, because there was always this fear that an illegal immigrant would get into the United States or would come in on a visa and overstay and would conduct some terrorist act. The issue with visas overseas which had pretty much become –I don't want to say rubber stamp— but it was much easier to get a U.S. visa. We decided prior to 9/11 to have a program called the visa waiver program where [citizens of] countries with insignificant overstay rates simply could apply and come any time they want, and they didn't have to reapply. There were some requirements for the government to be assisting the U.S., but it basically meant that there was a large group of people entering or in the United States with little in the way of background checks, which created its own sense of concern.

And then we had occasional, but obviously much smaller, terrorist attacks in the United States but nothing approaching anything like 9/11. Well, the Orlando one became the largest single mass shooting in the United States when it happened. No longer. People, you know, had to some degree adapted. We went through this clerkhood period right after 9/11 and the anxiety at the White House was, if you raise it for something, how do you take it down? How do you justify taking it down if you thought it was important enough to raise it? And that threat hasn't been resolved, but the rest of the country just ignored it. I mean basically if you contacted the police departments outside of Washington and New York, and maybe L.A. and Chicago, they didn't do any extra work. It was a burden if the government didn't pay for overtime.

That still meant that political leaders used terrorism as an election issue. Who is stronger on terrorism? Saxby Chambliss ran in 2002 and called Max Cleland unpatriotic, because he thought that when the defense mapping agency became part of a larger organization that it was poor policy to think that a government union would be appropriate for that organization. You know Bush? Bush ran on Iraq for re-election. The worst hadn't hit yet. That was 2006. You know, by 2008 it became an election issue in the other direction. I think by then, people had to some degree disengaged Iraq from terrorism. It was a civil war and we had picked sides in the civil war with the majority population. Including the fact that they also happened to have relations with Iran made it a little complicated in those times but, again, that persisted. So when events happened each President would dutifully say, "and we're going to review our policies and make sure they're stronger" and then come out with an announcement about how the policies had been strengthened and so on, up to and including the

2016 election. [Terrorism has] become a security attention that's much stronger than [the perceived threat during] the Red Scare of the 1950s. In terms of domestic acts of terrorism or anarchism, if you want to call the Red Scare anarchist. I think that it is, without question, an overreaction to what statistics would say has been pretty much controlled. There are still more people killed by guns in non-terrorist acts in the United States since 9/11 than by terrorist acts in the United States; there are a lot more dangers in your everyday life, [such as] driving a car and other kinds of common accidents that occur. And yet, we have created a domestic security economy, which is even more pronounced than the Cold War security economy, which was focused on a foreign foe.

WO: *During your time in DHS under President Obama, would you say that the folks that you worked with tended to [or] like did you get the sense that these fears were being overblown for political purposes or was it more of a sense that it was possible that people simply fell in line with the public perception and hadn't looked at the numbers quite as closely?*

RB: The people who work at DHS together with the Intel Community and the FBI take seriously what could and should be done on security. But I don't think that the [Intel Community's] general view is that we adapted to the clear failures that occurred during 9/11 and recognized that no bureaucracy can ever be truly bereft of defect. People really understood what it was but were always willing to think about or listen to other measures, particularly after an incident, whether overseas or in the United States. But I think the excesses that were associated with the immediate aftermath of 9/11 were understood to be excesses. But you know the other side of that is if you are in law enforcement, you know that you cannot stop all crime. You still go to work every day, [and try] to think about how you can stop crime. And this is a crime. And the question is to make sure that it doesn't become an excuse to do things that don't necessarily make us safer and undermine the values that Americans hold surrounding freedom, privacy, and civil liberties.

WO: *I know that you have some experience working with cybersecurity infrastructure, as well. On the topic of privacy, where would you say that you stand?*

RB: Oh, boy. I divide it into two things. The privacy issue centers primarily around government access to your information. In fact, I remember I was on a panel after I was out of government at Harvard on this very issue, and my presentation was [about] the private sector, [which] takes and mines all that data, and the government is prohibited from taking that information or is limited in its ability to take that information. How do you square that? And the answer that I got from a former Congressman— oh gosh, I don't remember his name, but he was head of the American conservative union from Georgia— [who] said the government can arrest you, [but] the private sector can't arrest you. And that was ok. I understand that. I wasn't arguing for it. I was just struggling with that issue because I was involved in … what

used to be called the encryption war, which took place in the late Bush 1 administration and extended on into the Clinton administration, where there was a question about the encryption of messages [and] making it difficult for the national security agency to decipher messages that they could pick up lawfully. This is pre-9/11, using it for the US without a warrant, and it was pretty clear that the privacy community was prepared to accept the diminution of American security capabilities in order to protect that. And John Podesta— who you would think of as civil libertarian— he was on the encryption side of it. ... At that time, it was to basically offer government encryption, government-sponsored encryption with a back door. The same argument that Comey used more recently having to do with the California iPhone. So that's a long way to get to and did it make any difference? And so how much information do you get anyway, if you know who is on the other end of a phone call?

WO: *And what tangible security benefits does that actually provide?*

RB: And so, what more you get other than that will tell you whether or not you really want to pay attention and hire somebody to break the code. You know, the FBI is unclear about who they hire— there are reports. It almost doesn't matter; it is a device; it can be broken into. The question is, how long does it take? So where I come down is, I would want to be very careful about how quickly you wanted a back door in order to take information that was private information, certainly without a warrant. And you can't compel a person to self-incriminate in other parts of our society and if that person feels that the information on that phone is incriminating, but why is whether or not they want to open the phone is even an indication that the person doesn't want to be self-incriminated. I would stick with what we have, and if there's really something that needs to happen, it can probably happen and that's just the nature of cybersecurity. That there is no perfect defense.

WO: *Do you think we will ever see a point where cybersecurity policy really starts to take shape, and more importantly, is not strictly reactive?*

RB: There are a couple of features to that. The first is you can buy pretty good cybersecurity, which will prevent the— I don't want to call it nuisance— but the less important break-ins to your private information. But then there's the private sector, which has a lot of that information in its own possession and not just for you, but for millions of people. You have to accept the same kind of expectation that the [private sector companies] will work as hard at it as you will, you know different people don't work at all.

And it costs money, and it generally isn't perceived as part of a contribution to the bottom line. What have we had, let me think. The biggest encryption company in the United States named RSA, had a breach into its vault, which was not even con-

nected to the internet, because some employee took a USB drive and moved it from the internet to the vault and stole the encryption keys. RSA had 85 percent of the dual key encryption market including clients from most of the U.S. government.

WO: *When was this?*

RB: Back in the early Obama administration. The CEO [of RSA]— Art Coviello— did not lose his job. He was really shaken by that and became a very public advocate for all of the protective measures that people talk about. The military was also caught in the same thing— where the Russians had breached a top-secret computer, and so they said, "no more use of USB ports in classified systems" and in some cases soldered them closed. So, the issue here is, the military may be the best at it and they're not perfect. The federal government is much more distributed than the military system or the classified system, which the military also runs. And just getting the rest of the federal government, which was DHS's job, to undertake good practices like how many access points to your department are there, and there were thousands. There's a big move to reduce that number.

It took several years before most, but not all of the federal government was willing to get behind a firewall that was provided by DHS with the assistance of NSA, and there were some agencies who said well actually since you're technically reading my information— I know you're not "reading" it— but it is being read by a machine, and we receive proprietary information. FDA or HHS we are legally bound not to do that. Then you have to get a legal opinion and work around it in order to do that. [And then you need to monitor what goes on, and you look for anomalous behavior.] You had to convince Congress to fund it at DHS, and the first concern was well, wait a minute, you're funding one department to provide a product to all departments and that's a contradiction of the way that the budget is supposed to work.

And then you have the private sector and you have no ability to compel. The one act that came closest to doing that was undermined by the Chamber of Commerce because it was a quasi-regulatory act. What we have is the cybersecurity framework that the National Institutes of Standards and Technology puts out and updates, which is a guide to private sector companies about how to think about cybersecurity. But back to the point about Coviello. Until you get to the target breach, you don't have a CEO who lost his or her job. It certainly dampened the stock of some companies, but not significantly. RSA didn't lose a dollar in its stock price after a slight dip. So how do you get a CEO to think, "I have to not only have a chief information security officer, but I have to allow that person to advise me to spend money that's not going to help my quarterly report, and my stock payers are hiring me to make money for them." So that's a roundabout way of saying that it's a hard climb until there are clear penalties that cause companies to fire their CEO.

And even then, it's not perfect. So that's a long way of saying we will move forward slowly, but not enough and not soon no matter how much we talk about it.

So, we have the election, a different kind of cybersecurity— although the DNC was breached by a Russian hacker. I mean it's not new that the Russian government hacks the U.S.— they also hack the White House and the State Department. The Chinese do the same thing in other parts of the government. I'm reporting public information to the press; I'm not revealing what I know from my background. So, it's a different approach, but it started in part from a plain old breach. Well an aspect of it came from a plain old breach, and the information there was disclosed. And we haven't even talked about the insider threat.

WO: *In general, how would you assess President Trump's performance in responding to domestic security concerns, both natural disasters as well as man-made threats?*

RB: He has distorted DHS and its mission by the emphasis on immigration. I actually think it makes sense to have a system like E-Verify, which says that if you apply for a job and you provide your social security number, the employer is obligated to run it against the national database to make sure you are who you say you are. There are problems with that system, and redress is one of them, and that needs to be fixed. There is no question about it because they're false positives. There still will be a cash economy and everybody knows that. Landscaping is certainly one [job example], and to some extent construction since there's not a direct deposit.

There will be violations, but to some extent that's not an unreasonable system. However, suggesting that the government isn't doing as much as you could reasonably expect to prevent terrorists from coming into this country, and that somehow blocking people from places coming into this country isn't going to make us safer. I mean hypothetically, a European passport holder under the visa waiver program can go undetected to Syria and fight for ISIS and come back. Rather than doing something in his own country, he decides to get on a plane and come to the United States where it's actually easier to obtain weapons or explosives than it is in most of Europe. It's shocking that it hasn't happened already except I think that it's related to the affinity that people who go feel to coming back to the country from whence they came and to the group that probably had something to do with them being recruited in the first place. It's a familial/clan/tribal set of relationships rather than Khalid Sheikh Mohammed having this truly brilliant idea of inducting a terrorist attack to blow up the World Trade Center and Pentagon.

Secondly and sadly, every administration seems to go through [a learning process]. Clinton learned from Bush one and Hurricane Andrew not to make the same mistake, Obama learned from Bush two not to make the same mistake, and Trump hired someone with serious credentials. He was the emergency director for Alabama. The

[Trump administration] did a really good job, I think most people would say, for both Texas and Florida. Puerto Rico is, without ascribing a motive, an odd, slow, incomplete response, and tars whatever good public support the Trump Administration got from the first two [natural disasters]. More importantly, those are the kinds of disasters in which everything has to move as quickly as possible and it didn't. The excuses about the runways and the ports are inadequate. There are runway repair crews in the military that can take a bombed down airport and make it useable in twenty-four hours. People know how to clean up ports, but until the port is clean, you can put a helicopter carrier in the area and began the process of moving emergency people in. And as soon as you open the airports, you can move emergency vehicles in, if that's what you need, and you can certainly supplement the driver population who maybe not even able to get to their truck or who may not even want to leave home because of the disaster. So that's a sad commentary on the lack of response, but as a large sector of America learned, Puerto Ricans are American citizens.

Those two things have overshadowed everything else that DHS does and they're still going to be impacted by budget cuts. If you're worried about domestic security, you can't say that DHS doesn't belong in a protected category in the same way that the Pentagon does. Maybe not an expansion of its budget. For instance, why would you cut the Coast Guard, which deals with maritime immigration, drugs, port security, and a possible flotilla coming from Cuba, not to mention oil spills and other things like that? Why would you flat-line the Secret Service when you have an expanded security requirement for the First Family and a President who likes to go to places that don't have their own natural security? Yes, you increase the number of people who are supposed to be hired by Customs and Border Protection and ICE, and that might help to some degree with immigration security, but there are other things that could do it just as well. So they're underfunding the Department of Homeland Security while emphasizing domestic security.

Threat Analysis: Applying Differential Security Frameworks to Assess Russian Aggression

Lynette Long

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, United States–Russia relations have oscillated between periods of hostile distrust and cautious cooperation. Russia's annexation of Crimea, continued threats against Baltic states, and military buildup in recent years has endangered the stability of the European post-Cold War order and caused mounting foreign policy concerns for the United States. It will be useful to consider several theories in security studies that provide frameworks. By doing this, we can document and classify threats and assess potential outcomes and implications. To be explicit, I assume that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has not expanded further, that Vladimir Putin will remain Russia's leader with high approval ratings, and that tensions will persist over Ukraine and Syria throughout the next five years. Given these assumptions, I will highlight and discuss the balance of power theory, nuclear deterrence, and psychological theories of war.

Balance of Power Theory and NATO

According to the balance of power theory of war presented by Jack Levy in *Theories and Causes of War*, states focus on their position relative to other countries on the international stage in terms of security, power, and wealth (Levy 2011). For context, this model resides within the neorealist school of thought in international relations theory. Within neorealist ideology is the division between defensive and offensive neorealism. The former predicts that decision-makers are satisfied when the state's territorial integrity is secure while the latter predicts that a state seeks to continuously maximize its relative power to guarantee its survival. Applied to the case of the Russian Federation, the implications of both strains of neorealism can be informative in categorizing President Vladimir Putin's actions. Given that Russia's physical territorial borders are—and will likely remain—intact, Putin's decision to destabilize Eastern European states that were once satellite countries under the Soviet sphere of influence is indicative of an offensive neorealist ideology. Moscow can only be aiming to restore the reach of its former regional hegemony and undermine the current international order.

Russian aggression can be interpreted as a response to the three waves of NATO expansion. In 1999, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic joined NATO. Around five years later, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania followed. In 2009, Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro signed on. With each wave, Russian decision makers perceived, and were aggravated by, increased aggregation of hostile power. Although the West cited stability and democracy promotion as its benign motivations for expansion, Putin reacted by modernizing the Russian military and threatening invasion. In recent years, Moscow has proven that these threats were, and are, credible. Putin used a combination of low-level hybrid warfare and nuclear brinkmanship to deter outside intervention

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against Ukraine and Georgia, and deployed troops in Crimea (Lanozka 2016, 175).

Even considering the increase in aggression from both parties, a direct altercation between the United States and Russia is extremely unlikely. First, Ukraine and Georgia were not under NATO protection. Extending military conflict to NATO-protected territory is unlikely, due to the Article V provision of the treaty, which states that an attack against a single NATO state is treated as an attack against all member states. The potential costs of an all-out war with the entirety of NATO are high for Russia. Given the status quo scenario—where Russia is making hostile threats but not taking concrete action against Baltic states— and the assumption that NATO does not continue to expand its membership, it would be risky for Russia to test NATO's resolve without additional provocation, especially given the alliance's more advanced military capabilities and forward deployment. Second, even if Article V is not credible, NATO falls apart, and Russia invades without immediate consequence, the United States would be able to abandon its commitment to its allies and avoid a direct war.

On the international stage, alliances play an important role in altering the balance of power and adding to the power of deterrence. An alliance is defined as a formal or informal commitment between two or more states for security cooperation, formed to augment each member's power, security, and influence (Miller 2018a). Alliances may prevent conflict because the increase in combined power can deter potentially unfriendly countries. However, alliances may also cause conflict in, for example, cases where increased protection may lead to the emboldenment of junior partners, and the senior partners are unable to restrain their junior partner's actions. Additionally, increased aggregate power may worsen the effects of a security dilemma—the problem that arises when a country's military buildup can be perceived as offensive even if it is intended to be defensive.

A security dilemma is tied to a country's perception of threat. On one hand, alliances may counteract a security dilemma by identifying partners with benign intentions. On the other hand, they can also contribute to the dilemma by creating military capabilities that have the potential to be used offensively, increasing perceptions of hostility. Brett Leeds found that the effects of alliances on conflict depend on the alliance type (Leeds 2003). Aggression results unless states and alliances explicitly promise only defensive aid. For this reason, actors in the international arena should not only assess the balance of power, but also the balance of threat. A state may wield great military power while having only defensive motivations, and thus have low threat. According to Stephen Walt, four factors contribute to calculations of threat: aggregate power, offensive capabilities, geographic proximity, and perceived aggressive intentions (Walt 1985). Russia's assessment of threat may take into account the high aggregate power of NATO, perceive forward deployments to be offensive and aggressive, and view any NATO expansion as intruding on its regional sphere of influence.

NATO member states situated in Eastern Europe are concerned about the United States abandoning its commitment to protect them. These concerns are exacerbated by the United States's powerful position on the world stage and its mostly

uninhibited freedom of action. Michael Beckley argues that the United States can use four mechanisms to limit entrapment risks: loopholes in alliance treaties, sidestepping commitments, establishing diverse allies to cite pressures for restraint, and reining in dependent allies (Beckley 2015). Even if these mechanisms are not used, the United States would likely prefer to suffer the reputational costs of making an incredible commitment to NATO than the costs associated with engaging in war with Russia. Abandonment may not even be an issue if the United States develops infrastructure reinforcement and logistical improvement to support the credible territorial defense of Eastern Europe. By ensuring the mobility of potential theaters and assets, NATO can introduce ambiguity of response and strategic flexibility if Article V is declared to reduce the chance an attack could be manipulated into a credibility test. These deterrence tactics reduce the likelihood that the United States and Russia will go to war with each other.

Nuclear Deterrence

Another prominent deterrent of war that both the United States and Russia possess are their massive nuclear arsenals. Deterrence is one of two main variants of coercion, which is defined as the use of threats, the limited application of force, or use of punishment to prevent an actor from doing something (Miller 2018b). For deterrence to be successful, a threat must be credible, have proportional cost, and have credible assurance. This means that a target must perceive the ability and resolve for a state to implement the threat, it must be unable to defy with noncompliance, and it must be credibly and explicitly assured that compliance will ensure that no punishment will result. In the case of Ukraine and Georgia, Russia successfully used its nuclear power to prevent outside intervention. With those historical precedents in mind, we must assess Russia's potential success in deterring foreign intervention if it were to occupy a NATO member state.

Vipin Narang argues that the extent of nuclear deterrence depends on a state's nuclear posture (Narang 2009–2010). A catalytic posture relies on the willingness of a third party to defuse conflict and act as a nuclear patron. Assured retaliation requires a secure second strike to deter another country's first use and coercion. Asymmetric retaliation, classified as the most effective posture for deterrence, aims to deter both nuclear and conventional attack and only requires a capability for first use. The United States maintains a policy of assured retaliation and reserves the right to a first use option. Russia, since it is weaker in terms of conventional military strength, may use asymmetric retaliation. But even given Russia's aggressive posture, security scholars who subscribe to nuclear optimism seem to agree that nuclear war between the two countries is improbable.

According to these scholars, nuclear weapon use is unlikely and the possession of warheads decreases the odds of war. The costs of a nuclear war and escalation risks far outweigh any potential benefits, so deterrence is generally viewed to be powerful and stable. Since nuclear arsenals have been developed, there has not been any great power war, or war between nuclear-armed states. Furthermore, the safeguards in place for warheads ensure that potential for miscalculations and accidents are minimized.

Contrastingly, nuclear pessimists argue that the lack of great power war can be contributed to other factors, such as norm evolution and increasing costs of war. Nuclear weapons may incentivize preventive war or low-level conflict and embolden states. Additionally, this view observes that humans, the physical weapon technology, and organizations governing nuclear use are fallible, so deterrence is fragile (Miller 2018c).

Neither of these views is completely correct. But, they are instructional in assessing the possibility of war between the United States and Russia. Another aspect that should be considered is that norms that stigmatize and constrain first use can also determine whether states use nuclear weapons (Tannenwald 1999). Russia is more likely to use low-level hybrid warfare to intimidate its weaker neighbors, violate their sovereignty, and meddle in their internal affairs without resorting to a full-fledged military crisis that may include the use of nuclear weapons (Rumer, et. al 2017).

Psychological Explanations of War

Although the use of nuclear weapons may be clearly and rationally excluded from a set of military options, warheads may be deployed if states miscommunicate or misperceive other states' intentions. In the case of the United States' invasion of Iraq, information asymmetries resulted in miscalculations by both sides regarding the other's intentions, resolve, and capabilities (Duelfer and Dyson, 2011). In an anarchic international system, intentions are never perfectly clear and no centralized, effective international authority exists to maintain order. Cognitive biases and misperceptions may be causes of war if elite decision-makers interpret ambiguous information to fit their preexisting views, ignore contradictory evidence, and fill their knowledge gaps with faulty mental schema.

In the case of the United States and Russia, the United States pushed for NATO expansion to deter Russian aggression, encourage regional stability in Eastern Europe, increase Western influence, promote democracy, and prevent German-Russian conflict at the close of World War II— all seemingly benign motivations. However, Russia had, and has, a geopolitical outlook that took into account the geographic proximity of NATO member states, assessed the potential of hostile intentions behind the treaty, and perceived infringement upon areas that once were under its historical sphere of influence. Misperception of intentions regarding the existence (or lack thereof) of a NATO non-expansion pledge also came into play during the Ukraine crisis and Georgia's occupation. Although there was never a written, codified pledge, Russian officials cited expansion as a grievance and a reason for why Russia intervened in Georgia and Ukraine. Their basis for intervention relied on signals and public statements received from the United States, from an administration that internally did not have a cohesive, clear position. NATO's leaders had hoped that expanding its zone of protection in Europe and fostering democracy, stability, and peace would entice Russia to become a strategic partner of the organization (Kroenig 2015). NATO made reassurances to Russia that its force pressure would not encroach on Russia's former spheres of influence, but Putin saw expanding Western influence in former Soviet territories to be a geopolitical

catastrophe and reacted by modernizing the Russian military and threatening invasion.

One important empirical leg of the broader psychological explanation of war is prospect theory, which relies on the idea that humans disproportionally weigh losses over gains from any particular reference point and are often incapable of processing information in fully rational ways, instead relying on heuristics and biases for decision-making. More practically, this theory suggests that leaders behave more aggressively when they feel like they are losing status or power (Miller 2018d). To enumerate the findings of prospect theory more clearly, it states that people: 1) are disproportionately attuned to losses rather than gains 2) take risks to protect what they possess or recover what they have lost 3) are driven to obtain high status and honor 4) act aggressively when frustrated 5) fall prey to the "sunk cost fallacy," which is when they irrationally persist in a lost cause and 6) often seek revenge (Rumer, et. al 2017). Rumer et al. notes that "while [Putin] has demonstrated a rational and calculating streak, he has also been less risk-averse and more unpredictable than previous Russian leaders" (Rumer, et. al 2017). Prospect theory explains the paradigm shift in Russia's foreign policy to ethno-nationalist ideology (Tsygankov 2015). Under this ideology, Putin intends to defend Russians everywhere in Eurasia and reunify territories in the former Soviet space (Simmons, Stokes, and Poushter, 2015).

Although Moscow seeks to remain a major player on the international stage, some political scientists have determined that Russian leaders have abandoned Soviet-era ambitions of global domination and retain bad memories of the Cold War-era arms race (Trenin 2016). Furthermore, while an inadvertent conflict spiral may lead to war, we have seen through the cases of Syria and Ukraine that Russia is very careful to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States.

Conclusion

An increased frequency of proxy wars or cyber-attacks between the United States and Russia is more likely than the occurrence of a conventional or nuclear interstate war. Hybrid warfare can be used to incrementally perform subtle, revisionist actions to prevent an automatic, robust military response that may result from the invocation of Article V. These actions would more easily be justifiable and have more "plausible deniability" than an outright large-scale military invasion. Furthermore, Russia could engage in nuclear brinkmanship to deter NATO intervention and offset NATO's conventional superiority, especially since Russia's resources are more limited than those of the United States In addition, NATO would likely not be willing to risk nuclear war over the destabilization of, or minor territorial encroachment of a member state.

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