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of International Affairs
at Dartmouth College

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The Editors of World Outlook would like to express gratitude to the John Sloan Dickey Center for its encouragement and assistance.

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Subscription Information:
World Outlook (ISSN 0895-7452) is published bi-annually. Subscription requests should be directed to WorldOutlook@Dartmouth.edu. All contributions are tax-deductible.

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World Outlook welcomes all current and former undergraduate students to submit papers relating to any aspect of international affairs. Papers to be considered for publication must be available in digital format. Papers should include references and bibliography consistent with the Chicago Manual of Style guidelines. Length should be under 7000 words, although outstanding works of greater length will be considered. Submissions must be original works with accurate citations. Submit your work for review to world.outlook@dartmouth.edu, and include your name, school, and class year. All submissions become property of World Outlook.

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World Outlook at the John Sloan Dickey Center
6048 Haldeman
Dartmouth College

Fall 2017 Issue 52

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Editor's Note

The first half of 2017 brought with it the emergence of new leadership, trends, and ideologies across the international system. For many states, the inauguration of a new American president brought uncertainty and some concern. In the Fall 2017 issue, we tried to select pieces that highlight and reflect some of the major actors and issues that will play a significant role in shaping US foreign policy for the next several years. We tried to capture the centrality of transnational issues such as environmental standards, global development, and gender disparities across the world to underscore the increasingly globalized nature of international concerns.

We start this issue off with an essay from Jaejoon Kim about the status of ballistic missile defense systems and capabilities of the prevailing powers in the Pacific region, China and the US. The next essay featured by Ria Goel takes an empirical approach to figuring out if domestic policy changes, namely in the area of corruption, can spur greater foreign direct investment for developing nations. Then, Alec Pelton provides us a great essay on the prevailing state of security affairs in the Middle East by honing in on the status of Saudi Arabia's military and its potential future. Next, we have an essay by Henry Walter concerning China's possible status as a leader in the realm leading the charge against climate change. Nearing the end, we have an analysis of the prevailing trends that lead women to participate in electoral politics in India by Colette Rosenberg. Finally, for the essays featured in this publication, Amelia Ali provides us with a short, but impactful account of the failure of the UN to properly combat the Cholrea outreak in Haiti in 2010.

Alongside the myriad essays that we have selected, we have two editorials writen by our staff members as well as an interview with Stephen Kotkin of Stanford University. The first, by Sam Koreman, is an editorial case study about the disconnect in both ideals and policy between current Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, and President, Donald Trump, and how exactly that plays out in current US foreign policy. The second is a close examination of recent actions and speeches by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, and what that will likely entail for the future of the European Union. Changing gears, our conversation with Kotkin hits on a multitude of topics ranging from US-Russia relations to advice for undergrads wishing to go into similar lines of work as himself.

We tremendously enjoyed reading and editing these pieces, and hope that you will as well.

Sincerely,
- Abhishek Bhargava & Jack Sullivan

Imperfect Interceptors: The U.S., China, and Ballistic Missile Defense

Jaejoon Kim

"The THAAD issue occupies an entirely different dimension from issues of trade or human rights. [It] is a direct threat to China's national security strategy, and has grave implications for the security of all of Northeast Asia. This is not something China can ignore."

Wang Junsheng
Executive director of department of China's Regional Strategy in the National Institute of International Strategy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Introduction

On April 21, 2017, the Wall Street Journal reported that hackers with identifiable links to the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched a barrage of cyberattacks against South Korea's government, military, and private defense companies. While this is not the first time that South Korea has received cyberattacks from China, cybersecurity firms noticed an upward spike following South Korea's decision to deploy Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), a ballistic missile defense installation, on its soil.[2] In recent months, THAAD has become a central issue in the upcoming South Korean presidential election[3], a key test of South Korean sovereignty in the face of Chinese pressure to remove it[4] as well as a cornerstone of the U.S.-South Korea security alliance which dates back to the beginning of the Korean War in 1950. THAAD has recently come to be regarded by the two most powerful states in the world—the U.S. and China—as a matter of critical importance for their strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific. The missile defense system, however, should not be analyzed in a vacuum; rather, the controversy surrounding THAAD is symptomatic of a broader dispute between the U.S. and China over the former's ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities and, broader still, a competition for regional influence between two powerful nation-states.

It is clear—and has been so for quite some time—that the U.S. and China are engaged in a power struggle to accrue the greatest amount of influence in East Asia. On one side, the U.S. has been the leader of a unipolar world, establishing its dominance after the Soviet Union's collapse at the end of the Cold War. On the other, China has stunned the rest of the world with its rapid economic and subsequent military development, quickly poised to exercise influence over East Asia at a level which challenges that of the United States. However, BMD provides the U.S. with a key military advantage over China in the region by allowing the former to neutralize the latter's missile capabilities. While the U.S. maintains that its BMD installations in East Asia are solely for defending against the nuclear threat from North Korea,[5]

Chinese authorities believe that they also serve a more insidious purpose of "neo-containment" against their country's rise to power.[6]

This paper seeks to answer the following questions: first, to what extent does China actually care about U.S. BMD, as opposed to various other factors that contribute to the Sino-U.S. competition, such as tensions over economic leadership or territorial disputes? Second, does BMD do more harm by instigating tension between the U.S. and China, or more good by successfully deterring North Korea? Third, how honest is the U.S. when it claims to use BMD only to deter North Korea, contrary to Chinese suspicions of ulterior motives? Finally, does BMD present or prevent a real risk of war in East Asia? Part I of this paper will establish elementary vocabulary and concepts in BMD literature and describe current U.S. BMD capabilities deployed in East Asia. Part II provides a brief history of U.S. BMD in East Asia, followed by Part III which explores Chinese response to BMD. Finally, Parts IV and V utilize prevailing theories of IR to both explain the current situation and analyze the risks of conflict over BMD.

I. Brief Primer on BMD

The U.S. currently pursues two ballistic missile defense projects: a National Missile Defense (NMD) system to protect American soil from intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats from rogue states such as North Korea and Iran (as well as states with larger nuclear arsenals, such as China and Russia), and a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system to protect overseas U.S. assets and allies from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs) of potential adversaries, including those of China.[7] U.S. TMD is further separated into three distinct programs, depicted in Figure A below. Because the three TMD programs all have subtle differences in the type of radar they use and the phases at which they can intercept the target, the U.S. can use all three capabilities simultaneously to create a three-layered missile defense structure, thereby increasing the reliability with which a missile threat can be neutralized. As of 2016, seventeen ships with Aegis BMD capabilities have been deployed to the U.S. Pacific Fleet.[8] A THAAD battery is deployed in Guam and another is in the process of installation in South Korea, while PAC-3 systems are operational in both Japan and South Korea.[9]

	Aegis System	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)	Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
Altitude of Interception	High	High, Medium	Low
Intercept Phase	Midcourse (emphasis on ascent)	Midcourse, Terminal	Terminal
Deployment	Sea-based	Ground-based	Ground-based
Key Features	AN/SPY-1 radar Standard Missile-2 and -3 interceptor missiles	AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar Battery of 48 total interceptor missiles	K_a band active radar Specialized high-precision interceptor missiles

Figure A[10]

II. U.S. BMD in East Asia

U.S. BMD can be traced to the Eisenhower Administration; while NMD served American strategic interests for many decades (during the Nixon Administration, NMD was necessary to retain American bargaining power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in 1971),[11] it was not until the first Bush Administration that TMD arose as a potential method with which to provide protection to its forward-deployed forces and allied states.[12] Multiple events in the late-1990s pushed the U.S. to prioritize TMD over NMD: Chinese missile tests off Taiwan's coastline in 1995 and 1996, and North Korea's testing of the Taepodong-1 missile in 1998[13] were two of the most important. The tests triggered increased interest by both Taiwan and Japan—potential targets of Chinese and North Korean missiles, respectively—to acquire TMD capabilities from the U.S.[14] Since then, U.S. BMD capabilities in East Asia have gradually expanded to its current iteration, with missile defense systems now installed on Japan and Guam in order to defend against North Korea.[15]

In 2006, South Korea announced its creation of the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, an indigenous BMD capability. Until recently, South Korea insisted that it has no intention of integrating itself into the U.S.-Japan regional BMD architecture.[16] However, recent missile tests by North Korea have mounted political pressure on Seoul to seek protection from the U.S.-Japan alliance's more robust BMD system, demonstrated in the recent agreement to install THAAD on South Korean soil.[17]

But just how effective is THAAD at neutralizing the North Korean nuclear

threat? Experts agree that the two-tier missile defense posture of THAAD and PAC-3 is substantially more effective than its single-tier counterpart for multiple reasons. First, they can cover a wider area and thus provide more opportunities to intercept a warhead. Second, because THAAD can intercept missiles at a much earlier stage of the strike, it enables a "shoot-look-shoot" strategy in which the Washington and Seoul fire interceptors from THAAD and wait until it can verify its success. In the event of a failure, PAC-3 interceptors provide a second chance to strike the warhead. This is particularly important in an attack with a high volume of warheads; a successful THAAD strike would obviate the necessity of firing a PAC-3 interceptor, which then enables the PAC-3s to be available to block the remaining missiles. Finally, even if THAAD is unable to intercept any of the incoming missiles, because it can integrate itself with PAC-3, the latter can utilize the former's radar data to determine the location of a missile before it enters PAC-3 radar coverage, further enhancing PAC-3's defensive footprint.[18] Furthermore, THAAD boasts a 100% success rate over thirteen tests since 2006.[19] Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the addition of THAAD to the BMD systems in South Korea will make it immensely more difficult for North Korea to launch a successful attack onto either South Korea or Japan with ballistic missiles. Combined with Aegis-equipped naval ships, which are able to sail into South Korean and Japanese waters at will, U.S. BMD in East Asia is likely to render the possibility of a successful North Korean attack on its southern counterpart or Japan incredibly slim. The benefits of THAAD certainly make it an enticing option for both the U.S. and South Korea, who wish to see the North Korean threat diminished as much as possible.

III. Chinese Response

Chinese opposition to American BMD arose in the 1980s—long before North Korea acquired nuclear weapons—when Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). China has since consistently renewed its discontent at each stage of BMD's evolution in East Asia.[20] In regards to U.S.-based NMD, China has expressed concern that the program would deny China a guaranteed second-strike capability, thus providing the U.S. with a structural military advantage.[21] China's opposition has been much louder, however, once the U.S. decided to shift focus from NMD to TMD. While NMD installations can be set up on U.S. soil, TMD's shorter range means that it must be deployed within the same region as the target. To defend against missile threats from Iran and North Korea, the U.S. has deployed BMD systems in a ring that "begins in Japan, stretches through nations in the South China Sea to India, and ends in Afghanistan". The result is a "crescent-shaped encirclement" around China.[22] Unsurprisingly, China has displayed significant alarm at the notion of U.S. missile defense systems standing in the way of virtually every direction (except north, where China may strike Mongolia and Siberia as it pleases).

China is well aware that the recent bolstering of BMD in East Asia is motivated by a desire to negate North Korea's missile threat. Nevertheless, top authorities

in Beijing also believe that defending against North Korea is merely a pretext that the U.S. invokes to achieve a broader strategic objective: contain a rising China and prevent it from taking its rightful place as the predominant power in East Asia.[23] China is especially concerned about the deployment of THAAD in South Korea because of one particular capability: the X-Band radar. Equipped to be a part of the system, the radar would be configured in "terminal mode", according to U.S. officials, to intercept missiles in North Korea, with China outside of its range. However, if configured in "look mode", the radar range would be wide enough to surveil the Chinese mainland and provide the U.S. with augmented early warning and detection capabilities, sufficient to undercut China's nuclear deterrent and therefore provide Washington with a critical advantage in nuclear strike capability.[24] This opinion is not just held by the most paranoid strategists in China; the Chinese Foreign Minister specifically flagged the radar as a serious threat to the Chinese nuclear deterrent.[25] In response to American BMD's encroachment on what it believes to be its sphere of influence, China has undertaken a litany of actions to overcome the challenges posed by BMD and pressure South Korea into reneging on its agreement to deploy THAAD.

Amassing a military force that is on par with that of the U.S. would be and has been economically unfeasible, especially for a country like China, which has spent considerable effort in continuing its current trajectory of rapid economic growth. As a result, a core pillar of Chinese nuclear strategy is minimal deterrence, which has been able to mitigate the daunting costs of defense spending while also maintaining some degree of security. Minimal deterrence and the corresponding posture of assured retaliation have been long part of its "asymmetric defense" strategy against the U.S.; acknowledging that it cannot overwhelm U.S. military power with brute force, it focuses instead on maintaining just enough nuclear warheads and missiles to guarantee itself a second strike capability in the event that it is attacked. As a result of U.S. BMD developments, China has sought to modernize its missile capabilities in order to overwhelm BMD. Chinese military strategists are in agreement that nuclear expansion is the necessary step in maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. Some, speaking more bluntly, assert that the Chinese nuclear "lance" must be able to pierce the American "shield" in order to restore the nuclear balance.[26] In recent years, Chinese modernization efforts have been geared specifically towards developing strategic missiles with multiple warheads, increasing the number of missiles that must be fired to completely neutralize the threat, subsequently increasing the chance of a successful strike. The Pentagon publicly declared that China possesses the capability to equip its missiles with multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) in 2015.[27] Additionally, China has seen breakthroughs in its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) technology, providing China with a virtually invulnerable—albeit limited—second strike capability that is highly mobile and concealed in deep waters. Alongside qualitative advances in its arsenal, China has also been increasing its quantitative size to achieve redundancy against a multi-layered missile defense system.[28]

As for South Korea, China has been more direct and punitive. As South Ko-

rea's largest trading partner, China has a significant amount of influence on the South Korean economy, and has recently resorted to a variety of tactics to punish a diversity of South Korean industries that profit from business with China. Lotte Group, one of the biggest conglomerates in South Korea, has received particularly harsh retaliation for having agreed to hand over its golf course to the South Korean government in order to house the incoming THAAD battery. Despite the CCP's denial that it is taking direct action against Lotte over THAAD, Lotte has encountered multiple setbacks to its operations in China, including the abrupt halting of construction for a theme park in northeastern China and the closure of twenty-three Lotte Mart stores across China by local and provincial authorities.[29] China has also ordered its travel agencies to halt trip sales to South Korea, denied entry to K-Pop artists seeking to perform in China,[30] and removed Korean TV dramas from the Chinese internet.[31] South Korean conglomerate operations in China, Chinese tourism to South Korea, and South Korean pop culture are all major sources of South Korean revenue; as a result, there is a fear among South Korea that recent Chinese actions could have a serious effect on its economy. With the upcoming presidential election on May 9, THAAD has become a core political issue for the candidates. The freshly-elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in has recently shifted his historically anti-THAAD stance to one of ambivalence,[32] and has called on China to halt its economic retaliation.[33] It is unlikely that Moon will support the outright removal of THAAD; it remains to be seen as to whether he can successfully renew relations with China without compromising its security in the face of an increasingly dangerous North Korean threat.

IV. BMD and International Relations Theory

The Sino-U.S. competition has long been a topic of study in international relations, and many scholars have utilized different theoretical approaches to study the ways in which the U.S. and China directly and indirectly respond to each other. Three theoretical approaches have established themselves above others for their explanatory power: realism, institutionalism (also referred to as liberalism), and constructivism. While all three theories are able to explain many of the events and trends present in East Asian international relations, they hold differing amounts of explanatory power when specifically applied to the developments regarding BMD in the region.

Realism

Realism is the most attractive theory in the context of BMD. The ongoing dispute over missile defense is in line with the central assumptions of realism: states are the primary actors (the U.S. and its allies, and China), the region operates under a state of anarchy (there is no international governing body or rule of law that is able to determine the legality of BMD or punish the U.S. and its allies for it), and security is a primary concern for the actors involved. In 2006, John Mearsheimer offered a realist analysis of China's recent rise to great power status. Rather than offering an offensive realist interpretation in which China seeks to establish regional hegemony by maxi-

mizing its military power disparity vis-à-vis that of neighboring states, he concludes that Chinese actions more accurately reflect defensive realism. Instead of aggressively maximizing power, which would inevitably be met by a regional counter-balancing coalition of India, Japan and the U.S., all with nuclear weapons, China would advance its military capabilities in order to guarantee its own security while expanding its regional influence through alternative means, such as trade and leadership in multilateral institutions.[34] China's longtime commitment to asymmetric defense, in the form of minimal deterrence and assured retaliation, has provided defensive realism with a significant amount of credibility when assessing Chinese behavior.

However, in response to challenges posed by BMD, China has shifted its strategy to a more offensive posture. At the foundational level, China does not believe BMD is a defensive system; given that the U.S. already possesses a superior offensive missile capability, its experts believe that missile defense is rather a supplementary tool to bolster the effectiveness of an offensive nuclear strike.[35] In other words, in Chinese eyes, BMD is a shield only in the sense that it allows America's sword to be immune to any counterattack. As a result, the aforementioned nuclear modernization programs that China has been pursuing—MIRVed missiles, SLBMs, and quantitative upscaling, among others not mentioned in this essay—signals that China has begun to shift away from its current posture of minimal deterrence and assured retaliation to a strategy of effective deterrence and assured destruction.[36] This change is symptomatic of a broader trend that is visible when analyzing China's recent security strategy: using offensive means for defensive ends.

For example, the Chinese "anti-access and area denial" (A2/AD) strategy—an acronym coined by the Pentagon in 2010—[37]blurs the lines between offensive and defensive military actions, causing great concern in the region. In 2013, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea without consulting any of the nearby states, even as the Chinese ADIZ overlapped with Japanese airspace and U.S. military installments, in order to assert its claim over the disputed islands located there.[38] China has also aggressively pushed its territorial claims in the South China Sea, most notably by building artificial islands off its southern coast and establishing military bases and stations on them.[39] China's aggressive posturing is partially motivated by a desire to hamstring the effectiveness of U.S. intervention in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.[40] The Chinese reaction to THAAD, then, can be seen as yet another instance in which it pursues a defensively-motivated offensive strategy: China claims that BMD is a serious threat to its security by denying it of a guaranteed second strike capability. In response, it enhances its missile capabilities to overcome BMD, re-securing itself through offensive modernization.

Chinese behavior also supports the realist argument that material power is the primary concern for states; regardless of whether or not the U.S. will use THAAD to spy on Chinese missile capabilities, the fact that the U.S. could do so is a great source of concern. Chinese skepticism over U.S. intent is by no means unreasonable. A senior U.S. official has acknowledged that "physics is physics" and that the alternative to

placing both China and North Korea in range of BMD capabilities is to place neither of them in it.[41] A 2012 CSIS report highlighted the necessity of the U.S. and its allies to overwhelm Chinese A2/AD and prescribed additional missile defense capabilities as part of the solution.[42] The same report even provides special emphasis to the interoperation of PAC-3 and THAAD as a necessary hedging tool against China.[43]

Institutionalism

While its assumption about the world are similar to that of realism (anarchic world, states are unitary and rational actors), institutionalism disagrees with the presumption that accruing material power is the only way to secure oneself. Instead of viewing international relations as a zero-sum game (in which one state's security trades off with the security of all other players), institutionalists believe IR to be positive-sum. In other words, they emphasize the role that international regimes and institutions can play in resolving interstate differences, and argue that economic interdependency will encourage states to cooperate with each other and with nongovernmental organizations in order to acquire the desired outcomes for every state. For institutionalists, the lack of a regional institution to develop measures for confidence-building and conflict resolution would give way to a rise in states' skepticism of each other's intents and ultimately lead to armed conflict.[44] This understanding certainly holds some weight when explaining certain regional phenomena, such as North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Agreed Framework of 1994 and nuclearize. An isolated state that was not integrated into any multilateral security collective or economic framework, the DPRK had little incentive to follow the rules placed upon it by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[45] If North Korea had a significant stake in the global economy, institutionalists argue, it may have been compelled to commit to the treaty and remain a non-nuclear state.

However, the case for institutionalism lacks a compelling theoretical basis in the context of BMD in East Asia. Neither tenet of institutionalism—international regimes or economic interdependence—seems to be applicable. For starters, Beijing has become a participating state in a number of international regimes since the 1990s, such as APEC, the ARF, the APT and the WTO. It has even taken the initiative in spearheading some institutions, most notably the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Perhaps most importantly in the context of BMD, it acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992. These organizations, however, either do not address regional security concerns, or are woefully weak in its ability to enforce treaties; the concept of an effective security collective has yet to make its way into Northeast Asia, where security is almost invariably a bilateral affair. With regard to the NPT, it is safe to assume that Chinese accession was motivated more by its desire to legitimize its nuclear arsenal than a genuine commitment to multilateral peace.[46]

As for economic integration, Sino-Japanese, Sino-Korean and critically, Sino-U.S. interdependence has only grown since the Chinese reforms of the 1970s under Deng Xiaoping.[47] Regardless, China has chosen to risk economic gains in order to punish South Korea in the form of informal sanctions. Additionally, China's stance on

Taiwan is a glaring counterexample to institutionalists' notion of economic interdependence as a precondition for peace. Despite Taiwan's overwhelming dependence on the mainland, the PRC nevertheless remains highly sensitive to any rhetoric or event that hints at Taiwanese independence, and consistently reiterates its right to use force to absorb the island. In the context of missile defense, Beijing has displayed serious concern that BMD in East Asia would undermine the Chinese military deterrent against Taiwan, emboldening the latter to resist the former's efforts at reunification.[48] In conclusion, institutionalism certainly explains a variety of trends in East Asia, most notably the unwillingness of the U.S. and China to go to war (this particular phenomena will be discussed in detail below); however, it holds little explanatory power when understanding state behavior in regards to BMD. Experts predicted China to not follow through with the informal sanctions on South Korea due to projected economic losses outweighing the benefits;[49] it is no longer far-fetched to believe that China is willing to risk further losses if they bring Beijing one step closer to removing THAAD from the Korean Peninsula.

Constructivism

Constructivism is another IR theory that may provide meaningful insight on BMD in East Asia. It calls into question the very presumption of international "anarchy" itself, claiming that the concept is not a natural state of the world, but rather is one formulated by states based on their respective senses of self-identity and the international norms that constitute the parameters within which a state reacts to the global environment.[50] Constructivism is certainly more parsimonious than institutionalism when it comes to Chinese reaction to BMD. The wartime atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army during the Second Sino-Japanese war had a direct influence on the leadership circle of the CCP during its formative years; the identity that Communist China crafted for itself has left behind a legacy for future Chinese leaders, giving rise to an animosity that casts itself over Sino-Japanese relations.[51] Indeed, Deng Xiaoping found enormous success in utilizing anti-Japanese sentiment to portray the Party as patriotic and consolidate political power after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident.[52] This animosity would foment into a suspicion of Japanese motives even after it was pacified by the U.S. after World War II; Chinese leaders may believe that BMD in Japan are based on offensive, not defensive, motives;[53] much like how it views BMD as an offensive supplement, China views Japanese support and deployment of BMD as a manifestation of the latter's desire to once again establish a Japanese empire in the region.

The Chinese historical narrative that portrays itself as a victim of imperialism, alongside the futurist narrative that portrays itself as a "peaceful rising power", may provide a solid theoretical basis for Chinese criticism of BMD in East Asia. The peaceful rise narrative, endorsed by Hu Jintao, seeks to dispel the China Threat Theory espoused by western scholars, which Chengxin Pan believes is in turn a manifestation of the American self-imagination as an omniscient and exceptional nation-state.[54] Chi-

na's commitment to the peaceful rise narrative is outlined in a 2005 white paper titled China's Peaceful Development Road, a five-part report that emphasizes Chinese desires to seek harmonious relations over hegemony, reducing global poverty and energy consumption, improvements in education, economically open borders, peaceful resolution of border disputes, and arms control.[55] For the constructivist, Chinese rhetoric denouncing BMD as neo-containment is symptomatic of China viewing itself own as a victim of imperialism,[56] receiving an unjust punishment from the unnecessarily aggressive Americans despite having been a peaceful rising power. Modernization, then, is a solely defensive measure in order to ensure its protection against the malevolent U.S.-Japan alliance, led by a new imperialist force from across the Pacific Ocean and backed by a former imperialist that took over Asia. Constructivism argues that states' self-identities and perceptions of the identities of other states, rather than material interests, shape international relations, rather than material interests.

While China's peaceful rise narrative may be able to sufficiently explain Chinese response to BMD stationed in Japan and its modernization against the U.S., its recent response to THAAD suggests that reality shapes threat perception and not the other way around. South Korea does not fit the imperialist identity that China has ascribed to Japan and the U.S.; China and South Korea both suffered at the hands of Imperial Japan during World War II. Despite being a U.S. ally, South Korea experienced incredibly warm relations with China under the Xi and Park, with their relationship at its "best in history" during 2014.[57] The rhetoric behind this "charm offensive" was consistent with the peaceful rise narrative, with Xi proposing to jointly forge a community of shared interests, tightened by historical and cultural intimacy.[58] Even during the honeymoon phase, some scholars were wary that the charm offensive was more representative of a shrewd gambit by China to expand its influence by driving a wedge between the U.S. ally and its regional rivals, rather than a genuine desire to create a peaceful East Asia.[59]

Once the THAAD issue surfaced, however, those doubts quickly turned to reality. The economic sanctions and barrage of cyberattacks seem to confirm what Robert Kelly had been suspicious of all along: that ultimately, the peaceful rise narrative was only adopted because it fit Chinese interests at the time, and that at its core, China is an aggressive rising power that "expects regional states to bend to its demands conveniently packaged as uncontestable and expanding 'core interests'."[60] Ironically, it has so forced South Korea's hand on THAAD that the missile defense battery is now tied to a broader question of South Korean sovereignty in the face of mounting Chinese pressure, which will make a decision to roll back deployment plans look like weakness.[61]

Beijing's charm offensive—as well as its demise—was driven by material interests rather than identity. Constructivism, which makes the sequencing claim that identity shapes material interests, cannot explain Beijing's behavior to THAAD. China is no longer a peaceful power, and its transition to a more assertive stance is more in line with offensive realism, driven by material interests in the form of a guaranteed

second strike capability rather than its self-identity in relation to other states. Establishing this finding is critical to understand how China can be expected to behave in the future.

V. Future Risks of War over BMD

If it is true that Chinese behavior related to BMD is best explained by realism, this is a cause for concern. Realism, after all, seeks to explain war and short-term respites between wars, rather than protracted peace. At the same time, IR theories that do provide explanations for peace may provide us with reasons to be optimistic about the future. Institutionalists, while they may not be able to explain Sino-Korean, Sino-Japanese, and Sino-Taiwanese tensions, can be more confident when they claim that the sheer volume of economic exchange that occurs between the U.S. and China every day would make war far too costly for the two states to seriously consider it.[62] Instead, they would argue, the realist tensions can and ought to be mitigated by establishing additional linkages in the form of multilateral institutions and further economic interdependency. Constructivists also raise a fair point when they argue that because China has adopted a nuclear No First Use policy and adheres to the norms that accompany it, China has significantly mitigated the security dilemma between itself and the U.S.[63] Both statements hold significant weight in explaining peace in the region to date and are not directly impacted by BMD. The conflict over BMD, however, displays three key characteristics that isolates itself from most other sources of tension between the U.S. and China and, more importantly, allows it to indirectly bypass institutional and norms-based checks against warfare: its capacity to shift the offense-defense paradigm towards increased instability, its adverse impact on regional nuclear parity, and its potential to make states more vulnerable to miscalculation.

Offense-Defense Paradigm

Perhaps the most important factor of BMD in East Asia is its capacity to change the terms of the security dilemma itself in a uniquely destabilizing way. Robert Jervis argues that the security dilemma becomes "doubly dangerous" and therefore the most prone to escalation when two criteria are met: first, offensive postures are indistinguishable from defensive ones, and second, the offense has the advantage.[64] By design, BMD is a defensive strategy; however, constructing a defensive system is incredibly expensive and is rendered useless the moment the enemy can develop the technology to bypass it. By contrast, offensively modernizing a nuclear arsenal to overcome BMD is always significantly cheaper and less resource-intensive,[65] and therefore offense holds a clear advantage over defense. Additionally, as mentioned above, China's response to U.S. BMD can be characterized as "offensive means for defensive ends", meaning that it is unclear as to whether Chinese modernization is offensive or defensive. This makes BMD a uniquely destabilizing factor in East Asia. Territorial disputes, unlike offensive measures indistinguishable from defensive ones, do not favor offensive incursions. Though other destabilizing factors offer the poten-

tial for de-escalation, BMD does not offer the same luxury. Once the trigger is pulled, escalation will be quick and destabilizing, launching the world into war.

Nuclear Parity

Economic interdependence certainly raises the costs associated with war; however, according to Aaron Friedberg, it contributes little to a lasting stability. Even if mutual hostilities are suppressed, the U.S. and China will inevitably compete with each other to secure the status of regional hegemon. Competitive behavior such as arms races and opposing alliance structures can lead to escalatory spirals of mistrust and pave the way for open conflict;[66] given China's offensive nuclear modernization and American alliance treaties that are used to hedge against China, the status quo offers little reason to place faith in interdependence to maintain a lasting peace. Friedberg goes onto claim that ultimately, security concerns trump trade.[67] Interdependence has been able to ward off warfare not because the U.S. and China place a higher value on wealth than security, but because neither state has advanced a flagrant challenge to the other's strategic interests. For China, the economic threats of going to war outweigh the security threats of not doing so.

BMD, however, may flip that Chinese calculus; if Beijing believes that BMD will compromise its second-strike capability and subsequently render its nuclear deterrent impotent, it would be willing to risk significant economic losses to restore the nuclear parity that it desires. China is particularly sensitive to BMD in ways that are radically different from other sources of tension with the U.S.; China's denunciation of American Freedom of Navigation exercises in the South China Sea as "infringements" upon Chinese sovereignty[68] is a far cry from its perception of BMD as a "fundamental threat to its strategic deterrence"[69]. A PLA nuclear strategist has publicly stated that missile defense is the single most important influence on Chinese nuclear thinking;[70] thus Beijing's uniquely high sensitivity to BMD may push it to discard interdependence for war.

Miscalculation

Constructivists argue that the problem does not lie in BMD per se, but rather in a broader lack of transparency on both sides' nuclear strike and/or denial capabilities. Confidence-building measures, then, would ameliorate both sides' concerns by verifying that neither side wishes to enter a war, thus avoiding an arms race. At worst, Chinese adherence to a nuclear No First Use Policy would prevent the security dilemma from spiraling out of control. Unfortunately, current attempts to mitigate the security dilemma provide little room for optimism. At the foundational level, China can abandon its NFU policy at any time. Given the quickness with which it abandoned its charm offensive toward South Korea, it is not unlikely that China will also drop NFU if it believes itself to be seriously threatened. Even if China does not abandon it, its NFU policy contains an element of "limited ambiguity" and therefore maintains the Chinese right to fire nuclear weapons if it believes that a conventional attack on its ar-

senal is imminent. Limited ambiguity has allowed China to access nuclear deterrence while maintaining a smaller arsenal.[71] BMD, however, may cause limited ambiguity to backfire by forcing China to develop a larger arsenal, stoking fears by neighboring states that China will proactively use force.[72] This anxiety is by no means unfounded alarmism. States have an incentive to exaggerate their willingness to actually go to war in the hopes that the opposite party will balk, creating a more favorable outcome.[73] Additionally, states have an incentive to hide their true military capabilities if it believes that revealing them would make them more vulnerable (after all, the enemy cannot counter your strongest weapon if they do not know of its existence).[74] This is reflected in Beijing's track record of military secrecy despite over a decade of international pressure.[75] Confidence-building measures, then, would have a marginal effect on mitigating the security dilemma for two reasons. First, there would be little incentive for the U.S. to provide greater transparency in regards to its BMD capabilities if it had virtually no assurance that China would reciprocate. Second, even if the U.S. was open to unconditionally increase its transparency levels, China would view this as an unnatural concession and have a difficult time trusting the information that the U.S. shares with them.[76] Given the numerous volatile flashpoints and deep-seated mistrust for each other, it seems unlikely that norms-based checks on power are unlikely to hold at bay the looming threat of warfare over BMD.

Chinese ambiguity over NFU and lack of military transparency makes it a perfect storm for miscalculation. Neighboring states have limited knowledge on what China's true intent is, and most of them are already locked in territorial disputes with Beijing. Taiwan, the South China Sea and the East China Sea are all sites of bitter contestation in which China has immensely high stakes.[77] Given the doubly dangerous environment in which BMD places the region, the offense holds a clear advantage: an expanded arsenal may embolden China to use its missiles to signal resolve in any one of those already-volatile flashpoints. While Chinese sensitivity to BMD and its implications for the regional flashpoints are intense, it seems to have only a limited concern for the potential of its deterrence posture to cause an escalatory arms race in the region.[78] Those warning strikes could then easily be interpreted by neighboring states and the U.S. not as a sign of resolve but preparation for actual nuclear strikes, triggering catastrophic escalation.[79]

Conclusion

A war between the U.S. and China is by no means certain. Indeed, it is not even probable. The costs involved in a war, however, are of such a magnitude are so appallingly great that the risk must be taken seriously and every action that can be taken to reduce the likelihood of war ought to be taken.[80] American BMD installations in East Asia, and the corresponding Chinese response, are at the heart of the risks of war. Because the Chinese response to BMD in East Asia is best explained by realism, the solution to the conflict will require realist solutions. China shows no signs of halting its intense opposition to BMD, and it is equally unlikely that the U.S. will withdraw

its missile defense systems in East Asia. Solutions will require deep consideration and maneuvering around the sensitive strategic interests of two nation-states who are directly competing against one another for undisputed power in East Asia. The path ahead is treacherous, but positive steps can be made to further decrease the likelihood of war. At the very least, there are measures that can be taken to prevent an increase in its probability.

First, the U.S. must acknowledge and respect China's guaranteed second strike capability. Assured retaliation lies at the root of Chinese fears over BMD; if the U.S. is able to assure Beijing that it will always have a viable nuclear deterrent, thus rendering obsolete the fear of preemption or the necessity to strike first.[81] Second, the U.S. and China must engage in constructive dialogue over the future of its BMD installations and its nuclear arsenal, respectively. Even if the dialogue does not offer groundbreaking protection from instability, it would nevertheless establish opportunities for both the U.S. and China to reaffirm their lack of desire to go to war, fostering a culture against miscalculation.[82] Third, any agreement reached by Beijing and Washington cannot convey to the latter's allies in East Asia that their individual security interests are not being disregarded. South Korea and Japan both are deeply invested in their respective security alliances with the U.S., and fears of American abandonment will prompt them to believe that they are on their own to deal with a daunting and aggressive China, causing them to attempt to acquire their own nuclear capabilities, plunging the region into a destabilizing arms race.[83]

These criteria will be difficult to meet, especially in a region that is ridden with conflict and skepticism about the willingness of each other to work for peace. The onus is on both the U.S. and China to establish and set in place the necessary measures that will stabilize the region and prevent it from spiraling into conflict. The existential threat of a U.S.-China war looms in the vicinity, and the world anxiously looks on as the two most powerful states in the world lock themselves into a global power competition. Even at the precipice of crisis, competition does not have to lead to war. Beijing and Washington must make sure that this remains true.

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Tension Between Tillerson and Trump: A Case Study in Group Agency Dilemmas

Sam Koreman

While it can be easy to determine culpability in situations where individuals are the only actors involved, it can be nearly impossible to figure out who is truly responsible for taking actions in settings where the decisions are attributed to groups. When groups of people act together, individuals inside of the group can reasonably disagree with the decision that the group has made despite the outcome. What about a situation where the 'group' is only two people? When two people choose to make a decision, it is possible that the two individuals could agree about the end decision but disagree throughout the decision-making process. However, it is also possible that in cases where a decision is necessary, the two individuals may never reach an agreement— if one individual has power over the other, then that person's decision will be the one that the two choose to go forward with. In that case, it seems especially wrong to declare that the 'group' made the decision.

Group agency is a field of philosophical inquiry that attempts to explain the differences, similarities, and questions associated with acting as in individual in relation to acting as a part of a group.[1] It discusses issues of culpability in cases, like the above, where it may not be clear which actors to hold accountable, and attempts to shed light on the times when an individual agent acts not in accordance with his or her personal views, but rather acts in such a way as to further the goals and agency of the group as a whole.[2] While group agency is a fascinating concept in general, what makes it especially useful is its application to understanding why public tension between different government actors in a state with liberal democratic values — one that respects and values reasonable disagreement between individuals — can undermine the strength of the state.

President Donald J. Trump has disagreements with numerous members of his administration and with the American public. However, there are certain cases where his disagreements actively harm the United States' image and power. The disagreements between President Trump and his appointed Secretary of State Rex Tilerson not only illustrate the problems that can occur because of group agency dilemmas, but also harm the United States' ability to work with other states in the international arena.

A Secretary of State has numerous jobs. Primarily, he or she must represent the diplomatic interests of the United States in a way that makes the position instrumental to the foreign policy of the United States.[3] As the United States is a political state

Sam Koreman is a proud member of the Dartmouth College Class of 2020, with prospective majors in government and philosophy. Her academic interests lie in analyzing how states can reconcile pragmatic and ethical concerns in order to create effective, interally consistent policy platforms. Although she is only a sophomore, she hopes to pursure a career in academia.

rather than a simple individual, there are questions about which specific actor — or perhaps actors if the answer is the citizen population as a whole — the secretary ought to answer to. Because there are practical difficulties associated with answering to an entire population of individuals that may disagree, the most common answer to this question is that the secretary ought to answer to the democratically elected President. In a normative discussion of agency, this answer is acceptable as the President is the actor who assigned his agency to the Secretary of State. Accordingly, Tillerson both answers to and ought to answer to Trump.

Disagreements between Tillerson and Trump go beyond simple matters of policy implementation and exist on an ideological level. While Trump believes that the United States ought to depart from its past foreign policy leadership in the international arena, Tillerson identifies more with the "'traditional, establishment model'" of past Secretaries of State.[4] Even in private meetings with Trump, Tillerson consistently advocates for traditional policies and Trump consistently overrules Tillerson's ideas. Although disagreements in private would be problematic for the working conditions in the White House and the State Department regardless of their results, these disagreements and incongruences do not end in the Oval Office. Because it is impossible for Trump to describe what policies he wants to implement in a perfect degree of specificity, Tillerson inevitably has discretion when it comes to conducting policy in the name of the President. During these moments of discretion, Tillerson makes decisions that — perhaps unintentionally — reflect his ideological beliefs regarding the way foreign policy ought to be conducted.

The clearest example of this is in cases of direct state-to-state diplomatic talks. Recently, while on a diplomatic visit to Beijing, Tillerson told reporters that the Trump administration was currently in direct communication with North Korea regarding North Korea's potential nuclear threat.[5] In response to this knowledge being made public, Trump responded by tweeting that Tillerson was "wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man" and to "Save your energy, Rex, we'll do what has to be done."[6]This immediate — and rather unprofessional — contradiction of Tillerson's diplomatic work undermined Tillerson's ability to conduct future diplomacy with North Korea and with other states in the international arena. States have little incentive to negotiate with a diplomat whom they know will just be contradicted by the president.

In order to combat the fear of contradiction by the president, Tillerson has often made statements that conflict with his past diplomatic work and complicate his future bargaining endeavors. Regarding North Korea specifically, Tillerson defended Trump's comments in early August that the United States was willing to rain "fire and fury" on North Korea as a statement meant to illustrate that the United States was "just reaffirming…that the United States has the capability to fully defend itself from any attack."[7]Earlier in the summer, Tillerson reiterated that "there is no gap between the president [and himself]…there are [only] differences in terms of how the presidet chooses to articulate elements of that policy."[8] There are very clearly differences be-

tween Tillerson's actions and Trump's policies. By being forced to contradict himself — or to weaken his positioning on certain issues — Tillerson diminishes his authority. By weakening his authority, he also undermines the authority of the United States to realize policy. With respect to North Korea specifically, Tillerson's inability to bargain effectively greatly increases the risk that North Korea may accidentally cross an invisible line drawn by a President who often forgets where the line is. Even if North Korea effectively bargains with Tillerson, that would not guarantee that the results of the negotiation would be respected by Trump.

This same undermining of Tillerson's authority to conduct negotiations occurs in elements of foreign policy other than direct state-to-state diplomatic talks. In multilateral negotiation, Trump's comments inflame tension between the United States and other actors. Specifically, regarding the negotiations surrounding the Iran Nuclear Deal, Trump's address to the United Nations General Assembly when he called the Iranian leadership a "corrupt dictatorship" is acting as a huge disincentive for Iran to even participate in diplomatic talks with Tillerson.[9] Tillerson's beliefs about what the talks ought to consist of are rendered irrelevant by actions that are completely removed from his sphere of influence. While Tillerson's comments represent Trump, Trump's comments do not represent Tillerson — Trump only represents himself. By undermining diplomacy with other states, Trump forces Tillerson to, at the bare minimum, make compromises regarding Trump's foreign policy in order to make any progress in the international arena. What makes this situation perhaps even more noteworthy is that the Iran deal is one of the few areas of foreign policy that Trump and Tillerson agree on. Both Tillerson and Trump want to renegotiate the deal in order to strengthen the position of the United States within the deal and within the Middle East.[10] Although their intentions align in this particular case, Trump's actions negatively affect Tillerson's bargaining power — once again illustrating the importance of total coherence in situation where group agency is necessary.

Another facet of the incoherence between Trump and Tillerson is in regard to events that happen in the domestic arena. While often Tillerson will alter his beliefs to adhere to Trump's wishes, recently Tillerson opted to condemn comments that Trump made in response to racially charged violence in Charlottesville, Virginia. In no uncertain terms, when asked if Trump's response to blame violence on "both sides" — both the white supremacists responsible for inciting the violence and the protesters who simply responded to it — represented American values, Tillerson responded that "the president speaks for himself."[11] The insinuation is clear. Tillerson neither approves nor agrees with Trump's failure to condemn the display of white supremacy in Charlottesville. While many of the US's allies might welcome this comment as it reinforces the idea that at least some of the US's leadership maintains strong, visible support for human rights, they must also consider this remark with a metaphorical grain of salt. Once again, Tillerson does not have the final say on the United States' goals and priorities — he answers to Trump.

All of these practical realities of diplomacy inevitably ask a normative question —

does Tillerson have the right to contradict Trump given his current job? While there may be moral arguments that argue in favor of Tillerson maintaining disagreements in order to preserve and respect a personal sense of identity or integrity, the answer is ultimately "No." To be clear, under any normal circumstances as an agent in and of himself, Tillerson possesses an absolute right to engage in reasonable disagreement with any person he would wish to. [12]However, diplomatic positions within a state are assignments of agency in order to further the goals of the state itself. As the state in some sense assigned its agency to Trump, and Trump assigned his agency to Tillerson, Tillerson's agency is "separated out from what the agent does or achieves…[via] a mirroring or doubling effect" that—while acknowledging the individual importance of Tillerson's agency—also denies its absolute importance.[13] To put this idea in other words, while individual agency may be some vague, intrinsic good, that intrinsic good cannot usurp the instrumental importance of an individual being assigned agency to participate in some sort of collective government action. By accepting the position of Secretary of State, Tillerson's individual agency regarding foreign policy decisions largely disappears.[14]

It is the nature of liberal democracy to allow reasonable disagreements to occur between individuals, and it does seem odd to say that in this particular case there ought not be reasonable disagreement between two individuals who are supposed to represent the values of United States. However, it is worth noting the distinction between Tillerson as an individual citizen and Tillerson as a government official appointed to act on behalf of an elected official. Diplomatic appointments made by a commander in chief imply an assignment of a specific form of agency — while Tillerson performs his job, he has an overarching obligation to represent Trump's wishes. Because the method of conducting foreign policy contains ideological and personal elements, Tillerson the person cannot be separated from Tillerson the agent.[15] Unlike a plumber who can separate his professional and personal life fairly easily by simply not bringing plumbing equipment home with him, individuals acting on behalf of the state cannot separate their values from their work. Or, at the very least, it is significantly more difficult for them to compartmentalize their beliefs from their obligations. But obligations are often difficult to fulfill. In a world dominated by media where private disagreements become public record, it is ill-advised for Tillerson to disagree with Trump as it puts Tillerson's ability to perform his professional obligations in jeopardy.

Unfortunately, this means that Trump will always get the final say. Regardless of what a person's views are on the Trump administration, 140-characters does not a foreign policy platform make. It is dangerous for Trump to get the last tweet when it comes to decisions in the geopolitical arena as nobody knows what the words "Make America Great Again" mean in any specific, applicable context. As such, other states in the international arena have no reason to trust that anything Tillerson proposes is an accurate representation of Trump's policies. Because of how confusing and vague Trump's foreign policy is — because of the extent to which Tillerson personally disagrees with Trump — Tillerson can never be able to adequately represent the presi-

dent's interests.

Even if Trump wishes to "drain the swamp" and shrink the size of the government, he ought not kill the state department. Although Trump might believe that he — and he alone — can conduct foreign policy, that belief is mistaken. The world is a big place. Foreign policy is complicated. In order to sufficiently enact policy and conduct diplomacy, it is necessary to delegate tasks if for no other reason than the fact that one world crisis does not stop when another crisis begins. If Trump himself is required to negotiate with Russia regarding the conflict in Syria, that does not mean that the crisis with North Korea will get put on hold. The normative reason for why Trump cannot conduct foreign policy on his own though is more persuasive; just as no businessman would ever walk into a negotiation without understanding the full implications of the most likely results of every possible compromise, the history associated with previous, similar deals, and perhaps the individual opinions of the other negotiators, no statesman should be so short-sighted to think that he or she could conduct diplomacy without experience. Trump does not have foreign policy experience. As such, Trump is in an odd double-bind. Either Trump can conduct foreign policy alone and not accomplish any of his goals, or Trump must rely on agents who understand specific elements of foreign policy to achieve any element of success.

This situation is such an odd and interesting example because it illustrates the necessity of group agency. Multiple people acting together for a single purpose — even absent a coherent, singular concept of agency — is what allows states to conduct daily operations. Without the ability to implement policy in the international arena, the United States will become isolated. And while there may very well be legitimate ideological reasons why a statesman might wish to adhere to an isolationist foreign policy, that does not justify why a politician should actively take steps to incentivize other states in the international arena to blacklist his or her state from diplomatic conduct. Absent bargaining power, a state is forced to compromise on its own beliefs, values, and priorities. Thus, Trump ought to take steps to heal the fractures that have formed within his administration. Empowering Tillerson to make decisions on his behalf would not undercut Trump's power — it would greatly strengthen it.

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12. Bernard Williams's explanation of integrity in supports this. He explains that there are certain personal projects and values that constitute some intangible "integrity" that ought to act as a side constraint on a person performing certain actions. However, even taken to its logical extreme, the implication of a person possessing integrity does not mean that he or she is justified in not performing obligations. If Tillerson possesses some reason related to integrity for his contradictory actions, then he has the choice to leave his current position. But it is impermissible to shirk his duties while he is obligated to them.
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14. This is not an argument about rights forfeiture in the same vein as rights forfeiture in the case of punishment. Tillerson has not forfeited his right to hold his opinions as he has done nothing wrong. It might be more similar to forfeiting a right to property via some binding agreement. His agency in terms of his discretion regarding policy decisions has been minimized. It is only because of the extent of his job that this idea is disconcerting. For example, the claim that a painter ought not paint a butterfly when someone is commissioning her to paint a portrait does not seem morally repugnant. Even though the painter might have a desire to paint the butterfly—and, in normal cases, has the choice on what she chooses to paint—she ought to refrain from painting it as a contractual agreement has been made. Just as the painter does her job, Tillerson ought to do his job.
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Will Curbing Corruption Invite Investors?

Ria Goel

This paper investigates the effects of corruption on foreign direct investment (FDI) in emerging market economies (EMEs). It specifically focuses on how corruption and other economic and political characteristics of a sample of 50 EMEs in 2012 influence the three-year (2013-2015) average of inward foreign direct investment as a share of GDP. The results indicate that a rise in the corruption levels of EMEs significantly reduces inward foreign direct investment. Additionally, investors are more averse to corruption in less advanced emerging market economies. These findings demonstrate that emerging markets must focus on tackling corruption to stay competitive and continue to attract foreign investors.

I. Introduction

Emerging market economies have increasingly attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) since the 1990s. This surge was mainly due to economic and structural reforms in these countries following the fall of Communism, a shift in the economic and political regimes of Latin American countries, and a new openness in China. EMEs began to reduce trade barriers, lift controls on international capital inflows, provide tax incentives, and deregulate foreign investment to promote themselves as centers of foreign investment. For example, 71 countries made 208 changes in FDI laws in 2001 to promote investment.[1]More recently, however, investment in EMEs has fallen because of the bursting of the technology and telecommunications bubble, the dampening growth trends of the world economy, and the global financial crisis of 2008. Risk and the regulatory environment of EMEs have become even more important factors in the decision-making of investors. Will investors choose to locate their capital based on risk? In other words, do increasing levels of corruption in emerging market economies actually translate into lower inward foreign direct investment?

The influence of corruption on investors is surprisingly unclear. Ohlsson[2] observes that corruption in governments may actually attract investment by offering easier alternative methods to conduct business. Foreign firms can pay bribes to skip inspections, speed up paperwork, avoid taxes or receive government funding. However, the costs of corruption should outweigh the benefits. These costs include the cost of bribes, high uncertainty, and a lack of a regulated environment that ensures secure investment. Additionally, a company that refuses to play along with

Ria Goel graduated from Dartmouth College with a degree in Mathematics and Economics. She is interested in the influence of politics and culture on economies around the world. Ria is currently living and working in Bosting with leading companies on strategy, growth initiatives and innovation. She originally wrote this paper for Professor Nancy Marion's seminar, "Topics in International Economics."

a corrupt government faces higher costs than its competitors or other countries invested in that corrupt economy. Transparency International[3] formally defines corruption as "the abuse of public office for private gain." and measure 'the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians' on an annual basis. Using their measure of corruption, this paper tests the hypothesis that an increased perception of corruption in an emerging market economy reduces inward flows of foreign direct investment. It also tests whether investors' sensitivity to corruption differs between less and more advanced EMEs.

In order to test my hypothesis, I use an OLS regression with robust standard errors to examine the effects of corruption in 2012 on the logged three-year 2013-2015 average of inward foreign direct investment scaled by real GDP, $\log\left(\frac{FDI}{GDP}\right)$, for a sample of 50 countries categorized as EMEs by the IMF.[4] I also examine what role the size of the economy, standard of living, infrastructure, and inflation from 2012 and effective tax rates from 2004 play in determining the inward FDI flows. Secondly, I study the effects of corruption on less advanced emerging market economies in the sample with a 2012 GDP per capita below various thresholds.

This paper reveals that corruption is a significant deterrent of FDI in emerging market economies. Additionally, the impact of corruption is more negative and significant for relatively less advanced emerging market economies. This result implies that corruption in less advanced EMEs has a greater negative influence on investors' decision to allocate capital than does corruption in more advanced EMEs. Overall, corruption is detrimental to FDI inflows for all countries, confirming my hypothesis that there exists a significant, negative relationship between corruption and inward foreign direct investment in EMEs.

II. Previous Literature

Previous literature has attempted to estimate the importance of different determinants of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) for developing countries. Authors use a host of different variables such as tax rates, economic development, and demographic characteristics to determine what factors attract or repel inward flows of FDI to the host country. This paper updates and expands on the contributions of Wei.[5] He investigates how corruption and increased taxation depress bilateral investment from 12 source countries to 45 host countries using a cross-section dataset from 1993. The strength of Wei's paper lies in its ability to specify and measure corruption with various indices to produce a convincing result on its effect on investment. The three indices he employs measure corruption according to the degree to which business transactions involve corruption, the amount of bribes expected by the government, and perceptions of corruption from surveys.[6] Due to limited data availability, I incorporate two of the three measures of corruption specifically.

Wei uses an OLS and Tobit regression of logged FDI on tax rate, corruption

and a vector of other controls including political stability, real GDP, population, distance to the source country, wages and linguistic ties. He includes political stability to show corruption has an effect on wages apart from the potential causality between political instability and corruption. I include the political stability variable as a way to test the strengths of my findings on corruption. Finally, his results confirm the hypothesis that an increase in either the tax rate on multinational firms or the corruption level in the host governments will reduce inward foreign direct investment. In magnitude, an increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico would have the same negative effect on inward FDI as raising the tax rate by fifty percentage points. Since not all countries receive FDI from all source countries, the author uses a Tobit regression to account for the reduced number of observations in the OLS regression. To avoid this issue, I focus solely on net inward FDI.

Mathur and Singh[7] find that investors' perceptions of corruption in a country play a significant role in their decision to invest. They use panel data from 1980-2000 and the Transparency Index (TI) where a higher score represents less corruption. Countries ranking low on the index receive low FDI flows relative to the countries above them. They also find that inflows to developing economies are highly interdependent, especially within regions; therefore, a higher perception of corruption in China could negatively impact inflows to other counties in the South-east Asia region. Mathur and Singh[8] explain that "the greater the number of restrictions that governments impose on citizens, the greater the potential for corruption (such as bribe-taking) when administrative decisions determine access to foreign exchange and increase the risk of discouraging legitimate and desirable transactions." The paper is outdated, however, and could yield different results today. Additionally, the authors fail to test whether their results were robust to their chosen index of corruption.

Wheeler and Mody[9] examine the correlation between the firm-specific investment in a foreign country and the host country's risk factor. They define risk as the corruption variable with 12 other indicators such as political instability, extent of bureaucratic red tape, and the quality of the legal system but find that it does not affect the location of US foreign affiliates or investment. However, the RISK factor also includes nonrelated factors such as attitudes towards the private sector, living environment, inequality, and risk of terrorism that may be too noisy and crowd out the effects of corruption. Elfakhani and Mulama[10] determine what factors have made three emerging market economies (Brazil, China and India) attractive for investment. The authors use a nested block regression of net FDI inflows on country characteristics from 1980-2008. The paper is unique because in addition to looking at economic and political factors, they include financial variables (currency exchange rate risk, total market size, inflation) and social variables (standard of living, life expectancy at birth). They find that economic and financial variables such as GDP, inflation, trade balance and sovereign credit risk account for 57% of the change

in net inward foreign direct investment, followed by social variables. The paper's weakness lies in its small sample size of only three countries. This limitation makes their conclusions on the importance of financial variables as determinants of FDI less credible. I expand the sample to 50 EMEs in one time-period (cross-section) and test the hypothesis that corruption and economic strength are the greatest determinants of FDI inflows to the countries.

This paper is novel in that it is the first to use an empirical model focusing solely on emerging market economies and analyzing specifically how corruption plays a role as an FDI determinant in these EMEs. Corruption should significantly deter foreign direct investment in EMEs because these countries draw investors with growth and stability that has been threatened in recent years.

III. Data

The main dependent variable is log $\left(\frac{FDI}{GDP}\right)$, the 3-year 2013-2015 average of the log of net inward foreign direct investment for a sample of 50 countries, categorized as EMEs by the IMF.[11] The data comes from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) that defines foreign direct investment as the net inflow of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital and short-term capital less investment taken out of the country by foreigners. The main independent variable in the regression is the 2012 perceptions of corruption in these countries. Transparency International (TI), an agency whose aim is to fight corruption around the world, annually records the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and defines corruption as the 'use of entrusted power for private gain'. The index ranges from 0, most corrupt, to 100, least corrupt. The CPI uses a number of available and credible sources that capture perceptions of corruption from international businessmen and financial journalists polled in a variety of contexts. They then rescale the sources' data and aggregate it to create the index. In order to make the coefficients easily interpretable, I recode the variable as 100 minus the original TI index so that a high number reflects a high level of corruption.

The alternative measure I use for corruption comes from the International Country Risk Guide's (ICRG) index[12] measured on a 0 to 6 scale. Lower scores indicate that 'high government officials are likely to demand special payments' and 'illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government in bribes connected to import/export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment police protection or loans.' Such corruption complicates business operations and may cause investors to withdraw or withhold investment. This data, however, only has figures for 47 out of the 50 countries in my sample.[13] Therefore, I use it only in the robustness checks and again recode the index as 7 minus the ICRG index so large numbers map to high levels of corruption.

In order to proxy for these measures, I use the following independent variables using data from 2012 to evaluate their effects on post-2012 inward flows of foreign direct investment: real GDP, real GDP per capita, economic openness, inflation, and infrastructure. Real GDP per capita, growth rates in GDP, and trade as a percent of GDP are all logged and obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Real GDP per capita is based on purchasing power parity (PPP) and is recorded in constant 2011 international dollars. Trade is a proxy for the degree of economic openness in a country and computed as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP. Inflation is the annual change in consumer prices and obtained from the IMF's International Financial Statistics database.

I use a political stability index from the World Bank's World Governance Indicators (WGI)[14] to determine the effects of political stability in 2012 on inward FDI. The index measures the perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism. It aggregates the views of a large number of survey respondents from different backgrounds in industrial and developing countries. The index is a percentile rank of all countries from 0 to 100, where 0 represents low political stability and 100 represents high political stability.

The 2012 Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Development Index published by the United Nations International Telecommunications[15] serves as a proxy for advancement in infrastructure and the digital divide be-tween countries. The variable uses the following three sub-indices to measure information and communication technology in countries: access, use and skills. Access reflects the level of networked infrastructure and access to ICTs by using indicators such as number of fixed-telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, mobile-cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, internet bandwidth per inter-net user, percentage of households with a computer, and percentage of house-holds with internet access. Use is the percentage of individuals using the Internet, fixed-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, and active mobile-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. Lastly, skills incorporate mean years of schooling, secondary gross enrollment ratio and tertiary gross enrollment ratio. In order to aggregate these three measures, they assign access a weight of 40 percent, use a weight of 40 percent and skills a weight of 20 percent. The index ranges from 1 to 10, where higher values correspond to greater advancement in information and communication technology.

The five-year averages of effective corporate tax rates were obtained from Djankov et al.[16] who collected the data from a survey, conducted jointly with PricewaterhouseCoopers, of all taxes imposed on the same standardized mid-size domes-tic firm. Their data is comparable across countries and was assembled jointly by the World Bank, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Harvard University. The firm operates in 41 of the 50 EMEs and started operations in January 2004. The authors also calculate the five-year effective tax rate by dividing the present-discounted value of the total corporate tax the company paid over five years forward (until 2008)

by the present-discounted value of the pretax earnings in these five years, using a discount rate of 8 percent. This approach takes into account the present value of depreciation and other deductions to occur in the future, providing more accurate estimates of the effective corporate tax rates. I assume that effective tax rates in a given country should not change drastically from 2004 to 2012; nevertheless, this rate is not exactly representative of what foreign firms will face in 2012. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the variables in my regression. Interestingly, corruption is not widely dispersed on the indices. For example, specifically with the ICRG variable ranging from 1 to 7, corruption never truly reaches the extreme points essentially rendering it a 1.5 to 5.5 scale.

IV. Methodology

According to the Working Group of the Capital Markets Consultative Group[17], investors cite the following determinants for inward foreign direct investment in an emerging market economy: market size and growth prospects, availability of infrastructure, and reasonable levels of taxation. When considering entering and investing in new countries, however, some investors additionally consider a stable political environment, corruption or governance, and the legal framework of the country. I analyze the relationship between corruption and FDI to test my hypothesis that corruption is a significant determinant for FDI in emerging markets and that high perceptions of corruption in an EME hinder inward foreign direct investment.

In my empirical model, I estimate the effects of corruption in EMEs on inward FDI with an ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression. The cross-section dataset consists of 50 countries categorized as emerging market economies by the IMF.[18] I calculate my standard errors as robust to correct for heteroskedasticity from using the cross-section data. The dependent variable is $\log\left(\frac{FDI}{GDP}\right)$, a logarithm for the three-year (2013-2015) average of foreign direct investment as a share of real GDP in country i. The main independent variable, C_i, is the index for 2012 perceptions of corruption in these countries, recorded by Transparency International.

$$log\left(\frac{FDI}{GDP}\right) = \beta_0 C_i + \beta_1 \log(RGDP) + \beta_2 \log(SL_i) + \beta_3 \log(T_i) + \beta_4 I_i + \beta_5 \pi_i + e_i \quad (1)$$

$RGDP_i$, Real Gross Domestic Product, measures the market size of the host country. Foreign investors generally consider a larger market size a pull factor because it allows them to service domestic demand, utilize resources efficiently and exploit economies of scale. While low-cost competitiveness was once the driving force behind FDI, investors today focus on EMEs such as India and China because of their large domestic market.[19] SL_i, real GDP per capita, is a proxy for the standard of living and indicates the purchasing power of the citizens. Thus, real GDP and real GDP per capita are expected to have positive associations with inward flows of FDI.

$\log(T_i)$, trade as a percent of GDP in logs, is a proxy for economic openness because participation in trade should in-crease regional demand and be indicative of a strong economy. Thus, the greater the degree of trade openness, the larger the expected inflow of FDI. The trade variable may be endogenous, however, and its relationship with FDI can only be interpreted as correlation, not causation. The logarithmic transformation of most of my right hand-side variables and the dependent variable help make the error term closer to homoscedastic.

The availability of infrastructure, I_i, can also heavily influence the decisions of investors. In order to capture the level of infrastructure, I use the 2012 ICT Development Index (IDI) described in section III. Lastly, I include inflation, π_i, because it plays a role in the country's overall financial performance; high inflation should inhibit FDI inflows. The 2004 effective tax rate is also included in the secondary regression in attempt to measure the tax incentives for transferring money to a given country. It is expected to have a negative relationship with FDI.

I originally planned to use a political stability index that measured the perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence to estimate its effects on FDI. Including the variable in the regression would test the robustness of the effects of corruption and ensure that the link between corruption and FDI inflows was not driven by political stability. However, the variable had a .612 correlation with the infrastructure index. Thus, I employ the infrastructure index alone to mimic the relationship between political stability and FDI and substitute political stability for the infrastructure index in the robust-ness tests.

V. Results

Column 1 in table 2 displays the results for the basic OLS regression of the normalized FDI inflows on corruption. The effect of corruption on FDI is statistically significant at the 5% level. With the addition of country characteristic controls for all 50 EMEs in column 2, I find that the magnitude of corruption increases and stays statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Corruption perceptions are likely to discourage investment in EMEs. Specifically, in column 2, a one-grade increase on the 100-step corruption index is associated with a 1.84 percent de-crease in the 2013-2015 average inward FDI flows as share of GDP. In other words, holding all else constant, if Mexico (CPI=56) were to decrease its corruption level to that of Chile's (CPI=28) its inflows of foreign direct investment would increase by almost 52 percent of its GDP.[20]

As expected, GDP per capita is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all of the regression specifications, implying that an increase in the standard of living leads to an increase in foreign direct investment. Thus, in column 2 and 3, a 1 percent increase in GDP per capita yields an 18.6 percent increase in normalized foreign direct investment. The coefficient on log(GDP) is negative and significant, implying that market size is a deterrent for investment. Inflation,

as predicted, has a negative and significant relationship with FDI inflows at the 5% level throughout the regressions in Table 2. Contrary to expectations, however, the effective tax rate does not have a statistically significant negative relationship with FDI inflows as seen in column 3. The Working Group[21] states that investors emphasize the predictability and stability of the tax system but downplay tax incentives as an important factor for the location of investment. Tax incentives do not substitute for strong macroeconomic fundamentals, the availability of infrastructure, and a healthy legal framework. Rather, higher corporate tax burdens are also often coupled with well-developed infrastructure and public services.

`In column 4, I include political stability instead of the infrastructure index. This robustness analysis tests whether corruption is in of itself still a significant determinant for the decrease in foreign direct investment after controlling for political stability. In other words, I test to see if the lack of political stability is the driving force behind the decline in foreign direct investment in the EMEs. The coefficient on political stability is not statistically significant. The coefficient on corruption, however, remains negative and significant and is only slightly reduced. This result reinforces the idea that corruption is independently significant in influencing inward FDI.

Table 3 includes dummy variables to measure how the effects of corruption change for countries with different levels of economic advancement. In column 1, I create a dummy variable for less advanced countries that have a GDP per capita below the median for the 50 sampled EMEs in 2012, $13,053.94. When I add in this dummy and interact it with the corruption variable in column 2, it is evident that investors are much more sensitive to corruption in the less advanced countries because of the negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term. Lastly, I study the corruption effect on foreign direct investment (FDI) for the 13 countries in the bottom quartile of GDP per capita. Significant at the 5 percent level, a one-grade increase in the corruption in the least advanced tier of countries can decrease the average normalized FDI inflows by 4.18 percent (almost 3 times) more than for the rest the sample. While the dummies for less advanced countries alone in Column 1 and 3 show no persistent significant difference in FDI between the two groups, their significance in the interaction with the corruption variable suggests that countries on the lower end of a scale of advancement specifically should attempt to combat corruption because it has a more substantial impact on their inward foreign investment. These results may signify that investors perceive more advanced countries as more promising and less risky overall. Investors may pay less attention to corruption in more advanced countries because the advanced countries attract capital with their availability of infrastructure and stable economies.

To determine whether the significant effects of corruption in my sample are sensitive to the scale of the TI corruption index, I study the threshold effect of corruption on in-ward FDI. I define the threshold as the 75th percentiles of corruption, 66, and create a dummy instead of the corruption variable that takes the

value of one in a country when TI>66 and 0 otherwise. In Table 4, the coefficient on the new binary corruption variable is still negative and significant at the 5% level. In line with the previous results, it indicates that the most-corrupt countries receive significantly less foreign direct investment than the rest of the sample.

To check the sensitivity of my results to the corruption variable once again, I use the International Country Risk Group (ICRG) measure for corruption. The TI and ICRG corruption indices are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient equal to 0.77. Therefore, the results between TI should be mirrored with the ICRG measure. Table 5 reports the results of the regression of normalized FDI inflows to a country on the country's ICRG corruption level and has 47 observations due to lack of data. Nevertheless, the coefficient on corruption is still negative and only significant at the 15% level with the controls. My results are not as robust to this model most likely because of the fine-graded 1-7 ICRG scale. Its limited range may prevent it from significantly differentiating between the 50 countries' levels of corruption. I test the threshold effect and create a binary dummy for the ICRG variable as I did for the TI index to examine whether the insignificance is due to the variable imposing excessive linearity on the relationship between FDI and corruption. Thus, in Table 6, for more corrupt countries (ICRG>3) the dummy takes a value of one and zero otherwise. The corruption variable is now statistically significantly at the 5 percent level and shows that more corruption discourages FDI.

While my paper empirically touches on some potential explanations for foreign direct investment, many more factors determine FDI inflows and were not incorporated in my empirical analysis. These factors may include the country's legal framework, property rights, hourly wage levels and other factors that have no concrete measure or for which data is very difficult to find. Adding proxies for these variables, however, can explain more variation in the inflows and increase the R2 for the results. In order to examine further determinants of trade flows such as distance, linguistic ties, and shared borders, it is important to look at bilateral FDI instead of the inward FDI measure this paper employs. It may be more revealing to distinguish between the determinants of FDI in manufacturing and services sectors separately as did Wheeler and Mody (1992). Additionally, the small number of observations (50 or below) may lead to my results being sensitive to the inclusion of a few countries.

On the other hand, a main strength of this paper is that most right-hand side variables are exogenous because the model regresses the 2013-2015 average variable on 2012 data. The paper is novel in that it focuses on emerging market economies and explores how the impact of corruption on FDI differs in less advanced emerging market economies. The result is distinct from previous literature and may have further implications for what types of economies are best suited to certain policies. For example, more advanced economies may be able to focus on infrastructure development and economic growth to promote FDI. Further work can compare and contrast the effects of corruption in a set of developing countries to this sample of emerging markets to see if this disparity holds.

VI. Conclusion

In light of the recent contraction in FDI inflows, emerging market economies have been competing to attract foreign direct investment. Previous literature extensively studies what factors are most important for investment, but this paper empirically examines how corruption in emerging market economies plays a role in repelling FDI. The findings suggest that first, an increase in corruption level does have a significant large and negative effect on inward FDI. Second, investors are much more sensitive to corruption in relatively less advanced emerging market economies.

Many policy makers lean towards providing tax incentives to foreign investors through tax cuts or subsidies to attract FDI inflows. These tactics, however, are detrimental to the countries' tax bases that fund infrastructure and public spending. This paper suggests that curbing corruption is one of the most effective tactics in attracting FDI inflows. Increasing regulations, making disclosure of budget in-formation mandatory, imposing restrictions on connected lending, investing in more effective law enforcement and financial management, and promoting transparency are all just the first steps to what seems like the goal of curbing corruption and inviting investment.

Appendix

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Average FDI/GDP	3.16	2.05	0.42	10.13	50
Log(FDI/GDP)	0.95	0.66	-0.86	2.32	50
Corruption (TI)	42.70	12.40	26.00	82.00	50
Log(GDP per capita)	9.69	1.34	8.38	18.30	50
Log(Population)	16.74	1.72	12.68	21.02	50
Trade/GDP	85.50	38.48	24.81	170.43	50
Political Stability	65.24	7.84	45.00	84.00	48
ICT	4.76	1.42	1.83	8.57	50
Inflation	4.60	2.55	-0.94	10.03	48
5-Year Effective Tax Rate, 2004-2008	18.40	5.94	7.25	32.42	41
ICRG Corruption	2.51	0.73	1.50	5.50	47

Table 2: Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log(FDI/GDP)				
Corruption (TI)	-0.0166***	-0.0184***	-0.0194***	-0.0132**
	(0.00703)	(0.00903)	(0.00952)	(0.00755)
Log(GDP)		-0.115***	-0.145***	-0.133**
		(0.0570)	(0.0551)	(0.0695)
Log(GDP per capita)		0.186***	0.186***	0.182***
		(0.0494)	(0.0521)	(0.0498)
Trade (as % of GDP)		-0.225	-0.293	-0.250
		(0.271)	(0.325)	(0.279)
ICT		-0.111	-0.193*	
		(0.0959)	(0.115)	
Inflation		-0.0949***	-0.104***	-0.0850**
		(0.0462)	(0.0381)	(0.0457)
Effective Tax Rate			-0.0122	
			(0.0200)	
Political Stability				-0.00351
				(0.00402)
Constant	1.892***	5.161***	7.004***	5.035***
	(0.407)	(2.330)	(2.717)	(2.319)
Observations	50	50	41	50
R-squared	0.104	0.304	0.375	0.285

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.05, ** p<0.10, * p<0.15

Table 3: Corruption in Less Advanced Economies

Log(FDI/GDP)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Corruption (TI)	-0.0191**	-0.0144	-0.0185**	-0.0152*
	(0.00962)	(0.0104)	(0.00944)	(0.0102)
Log(GDP)	-0.106*	-0.107*	-0.115**	-0.101*
	(0.0665)	(0.0658)	(0.0622)	(0.0612)
Log(GDP per capita)	0.162***	0.181***	0.170***	0.174***
	(0.0514)	(0.0507)	(0.0521)	(0.0495)
Log(Trade as % of GDP)	-0.163	-0.200	-0.195	-0.168
	(0.278)	(0.267)	(0.274)	(0.277)
Infrastructure	-0.0936	-0.0968	-0.121	-0.103
	(0.139)	(0.137)	(0.111)	(0.116)
Inflation	-0.0836**	-0.0794**	-0.0901**	-0.0749*
	(0.0456)	(0.0443)	(0.0463)	(0.0457)
Less Advanced (RGDP per capita < $13,054)	0.0764	2.215***		
	(0.309)	(1.041)		
Less Advanced*Corruption		-0.0350**		
		(0.0175)		
Least Advanced (RGDP per capita < $9,444)			-0.0674	2.661***
			(0.244)	(1.224)
Least Advanced*Corruption				-0.0418***
				(0.0192)
Constant	4.738*	4.511*	5.215***	4.342**
	(2.860)	(2.812)	(2.446)	(2.555)
Observations	50	50	50	50
R-squared	0.288	0.329	0.288	0.320

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.05, ** p<0.10, * p<0.15

Table 4: Threshold Effect of Corruption on FDI

Log(FDI/GDP)	(1)	(2)
Corruption Dummy (TI>66)	-0.480***	-0.472***
	(0.200)	(0.213)
Log(GDP)	-0.134***	-0.167***
	(0.0591)	(0.0530)
Log(GDP per capita)	0.187***	0.204***
	(0.0488)	(0.0510)
Log(Trade as % of GDP)	-0.241	-0.337
	(0.255)	(0.290)
Infrastructure	-0.0543	-0.152*
	(0.0802)	(0.101)
Inflation	-0.0798**	-0.0999***
	(0.0422)	(0.0361)
Effective Tax Rate		-0.0137
		(0.0201)
Constant	4.450**	6.459***
	(2.314)	(2.510)
Observations	50	41
R-squared	0.307	0.377

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.05, ** p<0.10, * p<0.15

Table 5: ICRG and Foreign Direct Investment

Log(FDI/GDP)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ICRG	-0.228**	-0.181*	-0.281**	-0.154
	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.144)	(0.115)
Log(GDP)		-0.130**	-0.141***	-0.132**
		(0.0668)	(0.0638)	(0.0762)
Log(GDP per capita)		0.135***	0.141***	0.132***
		(0.0434)	(0.0477)	(0.0420)
Log(Trade as % of GDP)		-0.0727	-0.115	-0.0965
		(0.259)	(0.320)	(0.274)
Infrastructure		-0.0396	-0.127	
		(0.0833)	(0.111)	
Inflation		-0.0688*	-0.0749**	-0.0642
		(0.0464)	(0.0383)	(0.0443)
Effective Tax Rate			-0.0127	
			(0.0228)	
Political Stability				-0.000635
				(0.00419)
Constant	1.946***	4.677**	6.247**	4.558**
	(0.564)	(2.533)	(3.201)	(2.524)
Observations	47	47	40	47
R-squared	0.069	0.244	0.302	0.240

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.05, ** p<0.10, * p<0.15

Table 6: Threshold Effect of ICRG on FDI

Log(FDI/GDP)	(1)	(2)
Corruption Dummy (ICRG>3)	-0.809***	-0.990***
	(0.237)	(0.134)
Log(GDP)	-0.118**	-0.155***
	(0.0606)	(0.0635)
Log(GDP per capita)	0.146***	0.161***
	(0.0420)	(0.0444)
Log(Trade as % of GDP)	-0.124	-0.193
	(0.257)	(0.311)
Infrastructure	-0.0417	-0.101
	(0.0770)	(0.0982)
Inflation	-0.0833**	-0.0960***
	(0.0448)	(0.0367)
Effective Tax Rate		-0.00351
		(0.0213)
Constant	4.516**	6.273***
	(2.313)	(2.787)
Observations	50	41
R-squared	0.297	0.391

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.05, ** p<0.10, * p<0.15



Figure 1: Corruption versus FDI

Notes

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More Europe: An Analysis of Jean-Claude Juncker's Vision for the Future of the European Union

Samuel J. Heath

In September, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker gave his annual State of the Union address to the European Parliament (EP) in Strasbourg. It was a speech far more upbeat in tone and more visionary in content than that which he delivered last year, in the wake of the United Kingdom's referendum and amid deep division amongst European Union member states over the migrant crisis.

This year, by contrast, Juncker highlighted what he regarded as some of the EU's key recent achievements and outlined his intentions and aspirations for the future direction of the EU over the next decade. "The wind is back in Europe's sails", he proclaimed, as he welcomed positive economic growth figures both in the eurozone – the collective name for the EU member states that have adopted the euro as their official currency – and in the union as a whole, as well as a positive uptick in employment.[1] CETA, the free-trade agreement between Canada and the EU, and a commitment by Japan to a future deeper economic partnership also earnt themselves a mention. The President emphasised Europe's leading role in innovation in 'clean' technology and in combatting climate change. Lastly, he praised the EU-Turkey migration deal for its success in reducing the number of migrants crossing Europe's south-eastern frontier.

Rather indicative of the mood of the occasion was Juncker's neglect to make any significant reference to the ongoing Brexit negotiations – aside from an off-the-cuff remark that was directed at Nigel Farage. This speech looked forwards, not back; it advanced an ostensibly positive agenda of solidarity, of unity, and of collaboration in the pursuit of common ends. In short, it was Juncker's attempt to leave behind the spectre of populism that has been haunting the EU for more than a decade, and set the union on a new path towards sunlit uplands of harmony and prosperity.

Upon closer inspection, however, a great number of the proposals made by the President in his speech, if implemented, have the capacity to drag the EU even further down the path that has led it into the difficulties in which it now finds itself: most notably, into confrontation between the union's institutions and the governments of individual member states, alongside a rise in Eurosceptic sentiment across the continent. Juncker could have used his State of the Union address to indicate his willingness to compromise on 'ever closer union' and reconcile the Commission with

Samuel J. Heath is a senior at Dartmouth College and is pursuing a major in Government and a minor in Japanese. His primary interests are in international relations, political philosophy, and the politics of New Zealand. He intends to study law in his home country, the United Kingdom, after graduation.

some of the (especially Eastern European) states that are increasingly voicing their dissent. Yet he did not. Instead, he put forth a set of inflammatory proposals that have the potential to do more harm than good.

The first, which could yet turn out to be a purely emblematic move, is Juncker's suggestion to merge the position and responsibilities of the President of the European Council with that of the Commission. This change, though primarily motivated by increased efficiency of decision-making, would also help to make clear that the EU is both a union of states and a union of citizens. "Europe," he explained, "would be easier to understand if one captain was steering the ship".[2] And he's right: a single President would be a major symbolic step towards the EU's metamorphosis into a single, federal state – but that is precisely the sort of move that would provoke the detractors from the European project, the champions of national sovereignty, even further.

A barely disguised threat to the quality of EU-level democracy also managed to find its way into Juncker's address when he announced "new rules on the financing of political parties and foundations".[3] Hitherto, 15% of the part of the EU budget that funds Europe-wide parties has been distributed evenly to all parties, regardless of their vote share in elections to the EP – the Commission's proposal to reduce that figure to a mere 5% would further weaken the hand of the small Eurosceptic parties in Strasbourg.[4] "We should not," Juncker said, in an unveiled threat to the likes of UKIP, France's Front National, and Italy's Five Star Movement, "be filling the coffers of anti-European extremists".[5] This move would leave Eurosceptic parties facing an uphill battle, and thus unfairly reduce the opposition the Commission might face when trying to get controversial legislation past the EP in the future, thereby reducing the already shaky democratic accountability of the EU's legislative bodies.

Another controversial proposal was the establishment of a European Labour Authority (ELA) – "a new European inspection and enforcement body" that would make sure that "all EU rules on labour mobility are enforced in a fair, simple and effective way".[6] Its aim, the President declared, would be to ensure that European workers posted to a member state other than that of their birth are receiving the same pay for the same work as the natives of that country. Elsewhere, the Commission has stated that it wants this new labour authority to carry out cross-border inspections to combat the exploitation of workers and, potentially, to settle disputes between national labour watchdogs.[7]

As things stand, labour legislation is enforced by member states themselves, rather than by a central EU body. This means that, even though details on the new ELA are scarce, it would most likely involve an additional transfer of power from the periphery to the centre of the EU structure and undermine the control of member states over employment rules on their own territories. A few eastern European states such as Poland and Hungary have, in the past, opposed the EU's intrusion into the field of employment and wages regulation in order to protect the competitiveness of

their workers.[8] If the Commission does attempt to establish such a labour authority, it could run the risk of alienating those countries from the European project.

Juncker also pushed for greater European unity in the fields of economics and finance. He argued that, if the euro is to "unite rather than divide our continent, then it should be more than the currency of a select group of countries," and urged that EU member states yet to adopt the single currency and without a legal opt-out – that is, all but Denmark and the UK – do so as quickly as possible.[9] The insistence behind this exhortation was underlined by the President's rejection of a separate eurozone budget and parliament. This suggestion, of course, ignores the possibility that the Swedes, the Poles and others might rather like the flexibility and autonomy that comes with control over their own currencies, especially given the instability associated with the eurozone over the past decade.

To accompany the expansion of the eurozone, the President proposed two more measures that would, he argued, improve the efficiency of the EU's economic decision-making processes: first, the creation of a European Minister of Economy and Finance, whose role would be taken on by the existing Commissioner for economic and financial affairs, and who would also preside over the Eurogroup (the collective of member states' finance ministers) – this new Minister would "coordinate all EU financial instruments that can be deployed if [a member state] is in a recession" and "[promote] and [support] structural reforms" in member states; and second, the upgrading of the (currently intergovernmental) European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM) into a (supranational) European Monetary Fund (EMF) and its formal incorporation as an EU institution, which would effectively take it out of the direct sphere of influence of national governments.[10] The ESM, established in 2013 to provide loans to eurozone countries in financial difficulty, has already been used as a pretext to impose stringent public expenditure restrictions on one of Europe's weakest countries, Greece, in what one academic commentator has called "a stark case of a severe erosion of sovereignty".[11] Combined with the creation of an EU Finance Minister with currently undefined powers, the ESM's supranationalisation should come as a warning to those concerned about the gradual monopolisation of power by Brussels.

And, last but not least, Juncker announced proposals that would set in motion the EU's development as a security union as well. These include: a new European intelligence unit, which would automatically transfer intelligence and data concerning terrorists among national agencies and police forces; the empowerment of the European Public Prosecutor to investigate cross-border terror offences; a European Defence Fund; and, eventually, a European Defence Union, to be fully operational by 2025.

The details of this last are hazy, but a Commission press release from last November gives us some idea of the shape of the Defence Fund.[12] It would, in the interests of efficiency and enhanced cooperation among member states, "support investment in joint research and the joint development of defence equipment and

technologies" by pooling financial resources and enabling member states to purchase in bulk shared military assets such as helicopters or drones.[13] It is, in essence, the inception of what one prominent British Europhile famously dismissed as a "dangerous fantasy" – a European army.[14] How an EU defence force would be structured, who would command it, and whether it would be used in future conflicts like those in Libya or the Ukraine, are questions none of whose possible answers would be likely to engender much consensus amongst European governments. What we can say with reasonable certainty is that such a development would represent not only another major step on the EU's ceaseless drive for statehood, but also a possible risk to NATO's primacy in arrangements for Europe's security, as the three Baltic states have already warned.[15]

The picture of Europe's future painted by President Juncker's address should be of great concern to anyone interested in defending nation-state democracy. It reinforces the view of Eurosceptics across the continent that the current Commission is resolved quixotically to accrue ever more power to Brussels, no matter how high the cost to national sovereignty or how dangerous the outcome, and to brush aside inconvenient democratic opposition in the process. Juncker clearly has not learnt the lesson of Brexit. His vision is one of more centralisation of authority, more bureaucracy, and less democracy; in short, more Europe.

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Pushes and Pulls: Why Western Women Migrate to the Islamic State

Billy McGrath

Introduction

In June of 2014, after a surprise offensive that captured swaths of territory of western Iraq, the jihadist militant group the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) declared itself a caliphate, claiming total governance over the international Muslim community. ISIS members practice a branch of Sunni Islam known as Salafism, which seeks to emulate the "pious predecessors"[1,2] and foretells a militant path to the Day of Judgment. In the first year after the caliphate's declaration, roughly 4,000 Westerners migrated to ISIS-controlled territory in Iraq and Syria. Of those 4,000, over 550 were female.[3] To many in the West, it seems deeply contradictory why someone would migrate to ISIS. Especially confusing for many are what processes could prompt women to travel to ISIS, giving up many freedoms for a radical Islamic lifestyle.

Research by journalists and scholars has since targeted the radicalization process and recruitment methods that might lead women to emigrate from the West and join ISIS. What is of great deal of additional interest is what role women play once they do join the militant organization. However, due to ISIS's relative secrecy and the lack of fluidity through its borders, research into the role that women play in the Islamic State is difficult and information is sparse. A variety of theories seek to explain why women choose to join ISIS. On one hand, there are factors that entice many women to join the Islamic State– otherwise known as 'pull' factors. Some scholars in this camp suggest that women migrate to the caliphate in hopes of marrying the masculine jihadi fighters that are glorified on the pages of propaganda magazines and in the reels of propaganda videos. Others point to online predator-like tactics that ISIS recruiters use to target the vulnerabilities and insecurities of Muslim girls that feel ostracized or unloved in their Western communities. On the other hand, there are factors that drive women out of their states of origin - into the grasp and under the control of the Islamic State, which are known as 'push' factors. Scholars that have fleshed out this subject have painted female migrants as deeply faithful women who reject the Western view of women's rights and desire to live and serve under Sharia Law. Female migrants to ISIS come from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, age ranges, ethnicities, family situations, and locations, just like the males that choose to take up arms under the Islamic State, and their motivations are multi-causal and vary from case to case. [4]

Billy McGrath is a sophomore at Dartmouth College and is majoring in Quantitative Social Science and minoring in Computer Science. This paper was written in the Winter of 2017 for Professor Gillis's class, "Reporting the Arab Spring."

ISLAMIC STATE FACTORS PULLING WOMEN TO JOIN

A. DESIRE TO HELP THE ISLAMIC STATE

An ideological impetus exists to propel women to migrate to the Islamic State. Migration to ISIS-held territory in order to fill support roles is incentivized through a combination of effective propaganda and alienation in their homeland. While women are left out of the fighting in ISIS, some of them take great pleasure in killing and acts of terror by the Islamic State. One women tweeted, "Happy #9/11 Happiest day of my life. Hopefully more to come InSha Allah #IS."[5] Another, Australian migrant Zehra Duman, frequently calls on her Western followers to commit acts of terror or killings in their home countries. In one tweet, she wrote, "Kill Kuffar in alleyways, stab them and poison them. Poison your teachers. Go to haram restaurants and poison the food in large quantities."[6] Another borrowed a quote from Osama bin Laden about violence towards the West, tweeting, "If killing those who kill our children is called terrorism, then I am proud to be a terrorist – Sheikh Osama Bin Laden."[7] These tweets, glorifying violence and commemorating terrorist attacks on the West, have the potential to work in a few different ways. The posts could inspire homegrown terrorism in Western countries and increase the amount of pro-ISIS propaganda online, serving to connect with other men and women who feel that the West deserves to fall victim to violent attacks.[8] Furthermore, for Western women who may be thinking about migrating to ISIS but are given pause by some of the more horrific acts of violence committed by the Islamic State, these posts normalize acts of terror. The tactic of normalizing life in ISIS can be seen in the posts about the daily lives of women, trying to make women more comfortable with a life that will be vastly different from what they are used to in the West.[9] Through posting positive messages about ISIS killings, the women may be trying to make potential recruits more comfortable with the prospects of violence.

Some have also shared their excitement to contribute to the ISIS cause by birthing and raising the next generation of jihadis. ISIS propaganda to recruit women has increasingly included messages about the importance of women in the continuation of the Islamic State. Umm Ubaydah tweets, "Allah fashioned men to endure jihad with strength, just like He fashioned women to bare children & He loves those who take care of their duty // The best thing a man can do is jihad, and the best thing for a women is to be a righteous wife and to raise righteous children."[10][11] From a practical stance, if migration tapers ISIS does not have a next generation of members without women. However, women take more pride in their role beyond merely giving birth. They also have the responsibility of raising their children and molding the minds of the future of the Islamic State, whether it be a daughter to fulfill the same roles that they inhabit or a son to go out and fight in the holy war.

B. DESIRE FOR COMMUNITY

Women are also pulled to ISIS by the sense of sisterhood and feelings of belonging that the Islamic State promises. As discussed earlier, one pushing factor for

women is a feeling of rejection from Western culture. Ostracization from Western society and culture provides women a motivation to seek acceptance from the welcoming Islamic State. In the Islamic State, there is the promise of finding acceptance. Images from ISIS members show women in hijab with captions referring to each other as "sisters" or "family".[12,13,14] Women that have felt detached from the community in which they have grown up are drawn to these displays of unity and camaraderie. Women also speak of the comfort they find in the company of their sisters during iddah, the period of mourning after being widowed, or when carrying out the tasks of everyday life.[15]

Another pull to the Islamic State is the utopian vision that is put forth in ISIS propaganda. Ideological propaganda is a powerful tool utilized by ISIS in order to lure Western women into its influence. Because the propaganda establishes an imperative for women to migrate to the caliphate if they are capable of doing so, women are implored to fulfill their duty as supporters of ISIS through migration. The region is touted as a safe haven for those who want to practice Islam in what they see as its purest form. Furthermore, after declaring a caliphate, propaganda and recruiters have made it clear that all women who are able are obligated to migrate to the Islamic State. [16] A British ISIS migrant, who has been prominent in the recruitment of other Western women, tweeted out to her followers, "Seriously the muslims who are living in thewest [sic] better make hijra if they are able. After [sic] Allah provided us a khilafa theres just no excuse".[17] Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State, has called on women in his official speeches to come and take up their part in the mission of ISIS.[18] Just as men have their duty to fight to expand the Caliphate and thus must migrate to the Islamic State, women have their duty in the fight as well.

C. Pursuit of a Husband

In January of 2016, *CNN* ran an article titled "Isis using 'Jihotties' to recruit brides for fighters".[19] The article received much backlash, though it was not the first of its kind: in 2015, *BBC News* and *Newsweek* respectively published the articles "Attractive jihadist can lure UK girls to extremism" and "ISIS 'Using Paedophile Grooming Tactics' to Lure Young Jihadi Brides."[20,21] The arguments made in these articles are gendered; the same arguments would not and have not been made about men that choose to migrate to the Islamic State. Simon Cottee disagreed with the "jihottie" narrative in his piece "What ISIS Women Want".[22] He contended that the gendered argument was incorrect and that there were other pushing and pulling factors causing women to join ISIS. Cottee is correct: there are other factors beyond feeling vulnerable and wanting a husband that lead women to migrate. He is wrong, however, to criticize the other arguments for being gendered. The debate is, after all, only focusing on one gender. While Western women that migrate to ISIS are motivated by a variety of factors, there are some women motivated by a desire for companionship.

Through analysis of female migrant's online presences, the desire to find a husband can be seen as a pulling factor for many women that have left the West to join

ISIS. In August of 2015, three British schoolgirls – Khadiza Sultana, Amira Begase, and Shamima Begum – fled from their homes to ISIS-controlled Syria in a high-profile incident that shocked all who knew them.[23] Investigators combed through the social media accounts of the three girls, interviewed family and friends, and looked for any other pieces of information that might provide some insight into the girls' thinking. Amira's social media posts before her migration are flooded with talk of love and marriage. One post outlines her believed fate to unite with the other half of the pair with which Allah created her.[24] Her resolve was clear and family reports suggest that Amira was the first of the girls to marry after their arrival in Syria.[25]

In another case, a British Muslim woman, who was radicalized as a young girl but has since come to reject extremist ideologies, talked of wanting to get her "piece of eye candy."[26] She said that she and other young women she had been close with had been infatuated with the attractive jihadi fighters that they had seen in propaganda videos on YouTube. Ayesha – called so in her interview for anonymity purposes –says she was enticed by the idea of marrying a man who shared her devout faith; there was an exciting and exotic quality to these foreign men who exuded masculinity in their willingness to fight and die in the name of Islam. When Ayesha was contacted by a jihadi who began to flatter her, it was not long before she found herself infatuated, and ultimately radicalized. Though her personal experience came before the rise of ISIS, the patterns are similar and suggest ISIS could be employing similar tactics to recruit female migrants.[27] An article in the *New York Times* in 2015 covers a young American woman who converted to Islam after online chatroom exchanges with ISIS members, with particular influence from an ISIS member who flattered and sent her gifts.[28] She was described by herself and family members as having no friends and being very lonely. In ISIS chatrooms, she found people that would listen to her and talk with her every day. While she ultimately did not migrate to ISIS, her story provides an example of how ISIS recruiters exploit women's vulnerabilities and insecurities to target and radicalize potential female members.

ISIS also uses its propaganda to romanticize the life of female migrants and enhance the draw of marrying a jihadi. One such recruiter, known as the Bird of Jannah, runs a blog that features snippets from her daily life.[29] The Bird of Jannah is allegedly a doctor in a women's hospital in the Islamic State. She shares photos of her workplace, husband, and their baby. Her blog posts also include memes, inspiring quotes, or Quran verses superimposed over glamorous and gruesome photos alike. Her writings often read like romantic novels, chronicling her journey to the Islamic State and the love and pride she feels for her husband. In one post, she writes, "I came here alone and broken. You raised my status as a woman."[30] In another, she describes the night of her marriage and the magical moment when her husband finally lifted her naqib. Though aerial images and other reports on life in the Islamic State often contradict her narrative, the Bird of Jannah details the many benefits and luxuries she and other women of ISIS enjoy, such as comfort foods or free health care.[31]

While marrying does not have to be the only reason – or even the primary reason – that women join the ranks of ISIS, it is clear that women cannot be *opposed* to this arrangement, as they will have little choice in the matter. ISIS recruiters have been explicit that women should not immigrate if they plan to remain single. Umm Layth posts on her Tumblr:

> I have stressed this before on twitter but I really need sisters to stop dreaming about coming to Shaam and not getting married. Wallahi [I swear to God] life here is very difficult for the Muhajirat and we depend heavily on the brothers for a lot of support. It is not like the west where you can casually walk out and go to Asda/Walmart and drive back home … even till now we have to stay safe outside and must always be accompanied by a Mahram [chaperone].[32]

Due to Islamic custom, as well as the dangers of living in a war zone, women are not allowed to be outdoors on their own. Women are placed in a hostel upon arriving in the Islamic State, where they remain with little freedom until they are wed and leave to live with their husband.[33] While they are not "free" upon marriage from a Western standpoint, women assume their role as caretaker of the house. The hostel no longer decides when women are allowed to venture outside; that is now subject to their husband's discretion. Few take up professional roles as doctors or as members of the al-Khansaa Brigade.[3435] Many women describe the experience of supporting their husbands and birthing the next generation of jihadis as an intensely rewarding experience.[36]

This idea of supporting the cause by being a good wife is a strong pull for women to join ISIS. Umm Layth, a prominent recruiter of Western women through her social media presence who lives in the Islamic State plays on the excitement of such an opportunity in order to entice potential recruits.[37] She describes her joy, and the joy of the other wives with whom she interacts in a post: "[A]s mundane as some of the day to day tasks may get, still you truly value every minute here for the sake of Allah … Wallahi [I swear to God] I have come across such beautiful sisters who will spend mornings and nights in happiness because they are cooking the Mujahideen food or they'll clean the whole building without anyone even figuring it out who it was."[38] Umm Layth acknowledges that daily life may not be thrilling or glamorous. There is gratification, however, in the contribution to the greater cause that she envisions. She and the women she describes are satisfied because they are doing their own part to aid in the fight for Islam and fulfilling their duty to Allah. The poetry of Ahlam al-Nasr, the wife of a high-ranking Islamic State official, glorifies the everyday duties that women have in ISIS: "Everything had to be clean and wonderful. I kept repeating to myself: 'This food will be eaten by mujahideen, these plates will be used by mujahideen.'"[39] For Al-Nasr, it is an honor to contribute to the cause. Cooking for the men is a joyous task that she feels proud to be allowed to do. For many of these

women, just being able to go about their daily lives in the Islamic State is a reward. While they cannot take up arms and put their lives out there for a cause like their male counterparts, women are fulfilling their own roles in the fight.

While women may choose to join to find a husband, it is not always just to enjoy being married. Women of ISIS believe that when their husband is martyred, their spot in heaven is also secured by association.[40] A large body of ISIS's propaganda encourages women to feel honored and privileged to be the widow of a martyr.[41] Some messages even suggest that women are hopeful that they might be widowed and enjoy the perceived resulting glory.[42] This again is an example of propaganda romanticizing the experience of being in ISIS. The narrative of the wife losing her husband in a battle for a righteous cause only to reunite with him one day in paradise reads much like the plot of a romance novel. One piece of propaganda shows a gun and a rose side by side with the caption, "In the land of Jihad, I met you / O my dear Mujahid," painting the picture from the beginning that the relationship has the ultimate goal of achieving paradise together in the afterlife.[43]

Western Influences Pushing Women to ISIS

While there are many pulls to ISIS, migrants also feel pushed from the West, often because they believe that Muslims have been villainized and are not welcome in Western societies. Moreover, muslim women feel alienated from Western society and sociologically discriminated against. Because Western culture continues to be slow to embrace Muslim tradition and culture, women turn to ISIS as a solace from their discomfort while at home. Because of the combined effects of effective recruiting tactics and the failure of Western culture to embrace Muslim women, many are compelled to join the ranks of ISIS. Disengagement and disillusionment with their current society ultimately successfully push Western women towards ISIS. Khadiza and Amira, two of the British schoolgirls who joined ISIS, seem to have been deeply disgruntled by the rise of Islamophobia they perceived in the Western world. Before her departure, Khadiza had stopped wearing trousers and begun covering her head, which her brother described as a rebellion against the Western pity that has been levied on this "symbol of oppression."[44] Khadiza and her friends had become more confrontational at school when it came to talk of the Syrian conflict and other issues in the global Muslim community. Khadiza's brother believed that the anti-Muslim images that seemingly saturate the media took a toll on her. Amira, too, seemed to have felt out of place in the Western world in which she grew up, writing in one post, "I feel like I don't belong in this era."[45] ISIS's emulation of the earliest Muslim traditions offered an escape to the old times that Amira fetishized.[46] Amira also chastised sexualized Western fashion and images in other posts. In messages with family members after their migration, the girls repeated similar sentiments: desires to seek religious purity and a virtuous life and to reject the sinful Western world that had rejected them.[47]

Umm Muthanna, another British woman who fled to join ISIS, documents in a group of tweets an argument she had in one of her university lectures that mirrors

some of the sentiments of the schoolgirls. After the professor lectured on feminism, students were asked to raise their hands if they identified as a feminist. Umm Muthanna kept her hand down and was asked to explain her position:

> And I said clearly, Islam has given all my rights to me as a woman and I feel liberated, I feel content and equal in society and all. I explained to them, how both men and women have rights in Islam, given us to in the Qu'raan… I explained how this western society has made you think in a certain way, pressurized you to feel weak and always thirsty to make money. Pressurised you to compete with men, when in reality if you knew your place as a woman, if there was Shari'ah implementation, you would not be complaining like you are now. I said all this and basically everybody tried refuting me. These feminists are deluded![48]

It seems naïve and rather condescending to suggest that in this case Umm Muthanna was "groomed" by recruiters or targeted from her vulnerability.[49] Furthermore, to suggest that she might have joined ISIS only in hopes of finding a husband because she was lonely strips her of the very strong convictions which she appears to hold. Believing that the "jihottie" narrative extends to all cases of female ISIS migrants is failing to recognize that Western ideals and Western views of feminism are not universal and not shared by every woman. Umm Muthanna seems to be devout in her faith and passionately follows the interpretation that women and men were designated separate duties under the Qu'raan. For her, fulfilling her role according to Islamic principles is empowerment, which she does not believe the West can understand.

The ISIS English language magazine *Dabiq* published an article criticizing Western confusion over gender roles titled "The Fitrah of Mankind and the Near-Extinction of the Western Woman."[50] The fitrah is the human nature instilled in all people by Allah that allows them to distinguish between good and evil. The article argues that Western Judo-Christian values have corrupted the fitrah and that this phenomenon can be most clearly seen in Western gender beliefs:

> The role of man and woman was mixed up, as was the responsibility father and mother had towards daughter and son. Woman need not be a mother, a wife, or a maiden, but rather, she should work like man, rule like man … without being conscious of her Lord watching both her and her heinous partner in crime.[51]

The article goes on to outline the many other ways in which Western women fail in the eyes of Allah. However, it also offers these women a glimmer of hope— recruitment. The article suggests there is a way out for those who choose to accept it: join ISIS. There is still hope for repentance because the fitrah will always exist in everyone

even if only a trace remains buried deep beneath Western filth. Though the path there — more concretely, to ISIS territory — may be arduous, living in a society that practices Sharia Law is the only way to cleanse oneself of the stains of Western society. Again, like the ideas of Umm Muthanna's, the ideas posited here are directly antithetical to Western ideals of gender equality and what liberation for women means. If one believes in this interpretation of Islam, however, then a woman can find liberation through feeling righteous in her faith. As the article concludes, the Western woman must "liberate herself from her enslavement to hedonistic addictions and heathenish doctrines. The solution is laid before the Western woman. It is nothing but Islam, the religion of the fitrah."[52] A woman does not need the Western view of equality if she can accept her role as outlined by Salafism. Liberation is the knowledge that, with fulfillment of her duties, she will find paradise in the afterlife.

Umm Muthana also puts forth a more combative view towards the West, one which she believes to be mutual. In the months before she left, Umm Muthanna posted the following tweets detailing the reciprocated hatred she perceives between Islam and the West:

> "There are only two states: The Islamic State and the Kufr State[53,54] Which state are you on?" Dec. 7, 2014, 4:33P.M.
> "All the nations have gathered, allied against the believers, it's not the Islamic State they hate, it is Islam, When will realise this [sic]?" Dec. 7, 2014, 4:35P.M.
> "…Where do you stand? With the world against Islam…?" Dec. 7, 2014, 4:36P.M.[55]

Umm Muthanna claims that the whole world has united against the Muslim faith. She believes that the West hates her and her people. It is not hard to understand how then, with this mindset, Umm Muthanna decided that she could no longer live in Britain and that she had to flee for the Islamic State, the one place that stands with her.

Umm Muthanna has polarized the issue to two sides: supporters of the caliphate and enemies of Islam. In doing so, Umm Muthanna creates both a push factor from the West and a pull factor to ISIS. The binary lens through which Umm Muthanna and others choose to view the world leaves very little room for choice. Either she can remain in Western society in which she feels a mutual disrespect and hatred, or she can leave for ISIS where she believes she will find people aligned with her beliefs who will welcome her. Other tweets from women in ISIS share Umm Muthanna's binary view of the world. Another migrant, Umm Khattab, tweets that there are "Two camps in the [world] either with the camp of iman [belief] or camp of kufr [unbelief] no in between."[56] Just like Umm Muthanna, she sees the world at war with only two sides fighting. She even uses the same word, "kufr" to characterize the Western, non-Muslim side. In another instance, Umm Khattab asks, "How can you live amongst people who desire to get rid of islam … Wallahi [I swear to God] these

Kuffar and Munafiqeen [hypocrites] will do anything to cause the Muslimeen [Muslims] harm."[57] In her eyes, the Western world has not just rejected Muslim people but is actively working to dissolve the religion through violent means.

There are even more examples of this dichotomized, bellicose thinking. ISIS migrant Umm Irhab tweets, "[t]his is a war against Islam, so you are either with us or against us."[58] A post on the blog of another ISIS recruiter reads, "[t]heir (Kuffar) agenda is to destroy and prevent the awakening of Muslim Ummah [community]."[59] The Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a leader in the study of why women leave the West for ISIS, identifies this — feelings that the international Muslim community is under attack — as one of the main factors that push women to migrate to ISIS.[60] The tweets of these women demonstrate such thinking and show that these sentiments are prevalent in many of the Western women that choose to join the ranks of the Islamic State.

Another factor pushing women from the West is anger over the West's perceived apathy towards the plight of Muslims, especially during the Arab Spring. Many ISIS migrants and supporters post images of mutilated children and towns destroyed by the rebellions and civil war in the Arab world on their social media accounts.[61] Some of these ISIS-affiliates suggest the West is complicit in the violence against Muslims for its lack of intervention against the oppressive regimes that plague many Arab countries. The most frequently cited example is the United States' sluggish response to the atrocities carried out by the Assad regime in Syria.[62]

The West is often criticized in ISIS tweets and blog posts for showing signs of caring about the persons of the state only once members of its own population have been affected. Umm Irhab tweets about this frustration, asking, "What is 1 James Foley compared to the thousands of innocent muslims being slaughtered daily by filthy US[?]"[63] Umm Irhab is also implying that, by not intervening or by supporting some of the oppressive regimes, the United States is responsible for the killings. Others share this belief that the West is at fault. Another ISIS woman tweets, "The killings of innocent muslims [sic] is not just collateral damage tolerated by the leaders of the west, but also directed by them."[64] This anger with Western indifference reinforces the dichotomist view of the world that pushes people away from the West while simultaneously motivating them to join ISIS.

Conclusion

It is clear that there are many causes that have pushed women from the West. Feelings of social and cultural isolation leave women believing that they do not have a place in Western culture. Moreover, migrants often feel that have been rejected by Western culture, so they not only believe that they do not belong, but also that the West does not want them to belong. Many also observe a rise in Islamophobia nudging women out of the in their home countries and perceive that the international Muslim community is under attack from both the media and from governments carrying out physical violence. Migrants grow frustrated and find it hard to remain among those who are seemingly apathetic to, and often appear complicit in, the suffering of Mus-

lims in the Arab world and international arena. The anger and persecution that many Western Muslim women feel work to alienate them from the West and leave them looking for another place to go.

Similarly, it is clear that there is no singular motivational matrix that has drawn Western women to the Islamic State. The desire for companionship, either in wedding a jihadi or in being part of the "sisterhood," has enticed both lonely, vulnerable individuals and women with strong convictions and devout Muslim faith. Others are taken in by the romantic pictures of life in ISIS painted by recruiters living there. The promise of an Islamic utopia and feelings of religious duty have also exerted a significant influence on female migrants. This combination of opportunity and obligation have led women to take drastic measures and endure much hardship to successfully journey to ISIS-controlled territory.

Understanding that there are multiple causes and both pushing and pulling factors that lead women to emigrate from the West to join ISIS is important for both comprehension and prevention by Western peoples. The United States, and the Western coalition dedicated to fighting ISIS, has committed not just to dissolving the physical state but also to defeating the idea with the goal of destroying ISIS permanently. To do so, the United States needs to understand the idea and the appeal of ISIS, which it has not yet fully demonstrated it does. In 2014, Major General Michael K. Nagata, commander of American Special Operations forces in the Middle East, said in a confidential conference call, "We do not understand the movement, and until we do, we are not going to defeat it. We have not defeated the idea. We do not even understand the idea."[65] The bulk of research thus far has focused on the males joining ISIS, presumably because they are the ones participating in jihad. Women, too, have a vital role in the state and its survival, and therefore it must also be understood what the appeal is for women in order to prevent more from joining.

Notes

1. Refers to the first three generations of Muslims. "Pious predecessors" is translated as al-salaf al-sālih in Arabic.
2. Joas Wagemakers, "Salafism," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion (Aug. 2016), Web. Feb. 27,
3. 2017.
4. Erin Marie Saltman and Melanie Smith, "'Till Martyrdom Do Us Part': Gender and the ISIS
5. Phenomenon," Institute for Strategic Dialogue, "Women and Extremism" Vol. 2 (June 2015), Web. Feb.
6. 28, 2017, pp. 4.
7. Saltman and Smith, "Till Martyrdom Do Us Part," 5.
8. Saltman and Smith, "Till Martyrdom Do Us Part," 21.
9. Ibid., 35.
10. Hoyle, Bradford, and Frenett, "Becoming Mulan?," 30.
11. Ibid, 31.
12. Ibid, 22.
13. Hoyle, Bradford, and Frenett, "Becoming Mulan?," 31.
14. The "//" indicates a break in tweets. The tweets were written in succession and have been combined to read more easily.
15. Saltman and Smith, "Till Martyrdom Do Us Part," 30.
16. Ibid., 34.
17. Hoyle, Bradford, and Frenett, "Becoming Mulan?," 24.
18. Ibid., 27.
19. Saltman and Smith, "Till Martyrdom Do Us Part," 13.
20. Hoyle, Bradford, and Frenett, "Becoming Mulan?," 14.
21. Ibid.
22. "Isis Using 'Jihotties' to Recruit Brides for Fighters," CNN Situation Room (20 Jan. 2016), Web. 3 Mar. 2017.
23. "Attractive jihadist can lure UK girls to extremism," BBC News, Newsnight (3 Mar. 2016), Web. 5 Mar. 2017.
24. Hayley Richardson, "ISIS 'Using Paedophile Grooming Tactics' to Lure Young Jihadi Brides,"
25. Newsweek, 16 Mar. 2016, Web 3 Mar. 2017.
26. Simon Cottee, "What ISIS Women Want," Foreign Policy (17 May 2016), Web. 28 Feb. 2017.
27. Katrin Bennhold, "Jihad and Girl Power: How ISIS Lured 3 London Girls," New York Times (17 Aug.
28. 2015), International ed., Europe sec., Web. 2 Mar. 2017.
29. Ibid.
30. Both Khadiza and Shamima are thought to have married since.
31. "Attractive jihadist can lure UK girls to extremism," BBC News.
32. Ibid.
33. Rukmini Callimachi, "ISIS and the Lonely Young American," New York Times (27 June 2015),
34. International ed., Worlds sec., Web. 6 Mar. 2017.
35. Bird of Jannah, "Muslimah the Bird of Jannah," Facebook, Web 28 Feb. 2017.
36. Atika Shubert, "Blogger romanticizes life with ISIS," CNN Video (27 May 2015), Web. 3 Mar. 2017.
37. Ibid.
38. Carolyn Hoyle, Alexandra Bradford, and Ross Frenett, "Becoming Mulan?: Female Western Migrants
39. to ISIS," Institute for Strategic Dialogue, "Women and Extremism" Vol. 1 (Jan. 2015), Web. 27 Feb.
40. 2017, pp. 23.
41. Hoyle, Bradford, and Frenett, "Becoming Mulan?," 24.
42. Kathy Gilsinan, "The ISIS Crackdown on Women, by Women," The Atlantic (25 July 2014), Web.

6 Mar. 2017.
43. Female doctors are responsible for the health care of other females, as Sharia Law prevents male
44. doctors from effectively treating women. Likewise, the al-Khansaa Brigade is an all-female religious
45. police force tasked with holding the female members of ISIS accountable and enacting punishments.
46. 1Hoyle, Bradford, and Frenett, "Becoming Mulan?," 21.
47. Ibid. 22.
48. Ibid.
49. Robyn Creswell and Bernard Haykel, "Battle Lines: Why Jihadis Write Poetry." New Yorker
50. Magazine (8 June 2015), The New Yorker, Web. 26 Feb. 2015.
51. Hoyle, Bradford, and Frenett, "Becoming Mulan?," 26.
52. Ibid, 27.
53. "It was like, get with him before he dies. And then when he dies as a martyr you'll join him in heaven."
54. From "Attractive jihadists can lure UK girls to extremism," BBC News.
55. Saltman and Smith, "Till Martyrdom Do Us Part," 17.
56. Katrin Bennhold, "Jihad and Girl Power."
57. Ibid.
58. Graeme Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants," The Atlantic (March 2015), Web. 25 Feb. 2017.
59. Katrin Bennhold, "Jihad and Girl Power."
60. Simon Cottee, "What ISIS Woment Want."
61. Sara Khan, "The jihadi girls who went to Syria weren't just radicalised by Isis — they were groomed," The Independent (25 Feb. 2015), Web. 2 Mar. 2017.
62. "The Fitrah of Mankind and the Near-Extinction of the Western Woman," Dabiq, Issue 15 (July 2016), Jihadology, Web. 2 Mar. 2017.
63. Ibid., 20.
64. "The Fitrah of Mankind and the Near-Extinction of the Western Woman," 25.
65. Dar al-Kufr means the "Land of Disbelief".
66. Editorial Staff, "Clarifying the meaning of Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Islam," The Khilafah (28 Mar. 2007), Web. 8 Mar. 2017.
67. @Umm_Muthanna, Twitter. The account was deleted by Twitter after Umm Muthanna fled for ISIS, but her tweets were archived on Pastebin on 7 Dec. 2014, accessed on 28 Feb. 2017.
68. Hoyle, Bradford, and Frenett, "Becoming Mulan?," 11.
69. Ibid., 12.
70. Ibid., 11.
71. Ibid.
72. Saltman and Smith, "Till Martyrdom Do Us Part," 9.
73. Ibid, 12.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid, 17.
76. Ibid, 13.
77. Eric Schmitt, "In Battle to Defeat ISIS, U.S. Targets Its Psychology," New York Times 28 Dec. 2014,
78. U.S. ed., Politics sec., Web. 11 Mar. 2017.

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The Future of Saudi Arabian Military Efficacy

Alec Pelton

Though the daily drama of a new presidency has recently pushed down the Middle East on the news cycle food chain, the region still remains one of the most volatile and important in the world—one in which the US is deeply entangled, despite the new administration's isolationism. Thus, the stability and strength of American ally states will be crucial to protect the American-dominated international order. The nation most prepared for this new reality is Saudi Arabia, whose annual defense budget of $87.2 billion dollars (a whopping 13.2% of GDP) makes it the world's third-highest defense spender and the likely preeminent military power in the region if the US pulls back.[1] From an American perspective, it is better for an ally to fill any void created by U.S. retreat than an enemy such as Iran, but Saudi Arabia's potential emergence would also create problems. The horrific Saudi-sponsored bloodshed in Yemen has reflected the increasing risk of proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both countries are bitter rivals in developing their military might and political influence. Despite Saudi Arabia's alliance with the U.S., its long and ugly record of human rights violations creates serious image problems for a U.S.-led world order that preaches the superiority of liberal enlightenment. While this phenomenon in U.S.-Saudi relations is not new, it could become more problematic if Saudi Arabia's power and influence grow with its military might. Saudi Arabia has committed enough resources to its army to become a dominant regional power, though its small population limits its potential to grow further. Its military efficacy, however, depends on far more than money spent. While a massive defense budget gives Saudi Arabia the chance to develop militarily, results will ultimately depend on civilian-military relations, cohesion in Saudi society, the military's access of advanced technology, and the impact of Arab culture on warfare. Because of these factors in Saudi Arabia, a regionally-dominant military will require substantial improvements in civilian-military relations and in modernizing Saudi culture and education, coupled with the retention of current advanced technology and social cohesion.

Though it is easy to equate defense spending to military power, this is an inadequate measure. History is littered with cases of poorer armies defeating well-financed rivals. Risa Brooks better defines power by her guidelines for military effectiveness identified by integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality. For Saudi Arabia to develop a military capable of exerting power throughout the Middle East,

Alec Pelton is a junior at Dartmouth College majoring in Government. Alec hails from Jericho, Vermont and is interested in international security and the impact of great power politices on international relations. Eventually, he hopes to pursue a career in diplomacy. This paper was origianlly written for Professor Jennifer Lind's course, "Rise and Fall of Grat Powers."

it will require most or all. A military is well integrated if its internal procedures are "consistent and mutually reinforcing" starting from individual units all the way up to the grand strategy.[2] Integration is vital to a functional military, since it "reduces waste and the duplication of effort;" integration allows it to be both strategically cohesive and efficient in the use of its personnel and materiel, allowing it to accomplish more with less.[3] Responsiveness, "the ability to tailor military activity to a state's own capabilities, its adversaries' capabilities, and external constraints," ensures that a military is aware of its strengths and limitations and can adapt accordingly to avoid falling behind rivals and to maximize its advantages.[4] Skill, the ability of "military personnel and their units…to achieve particular tasks or carry out orders," reflects how well basic units can adapt to rapidly changing situations and integrate new technologies and strategies with existing ones.[5] Unsurprisingly, a more skilled military can outmaneuver a numerically and fiscally superior but inepter adversary. Finally, quality is a military's ability to "provide itself with highly capable weapons and equipment" preferably in a cost-efficient manner.[6] Better armaments are optimal on the battlefield, especially when low costs allow a state to purchase more. By combining all these factors, a military can gain world-class effectiveness. Without, it will only be competitive with its rivals by vastly outspending them - a highly inefficient and unsustainable proposition. Saudi Arabia's military hopes rest on its ability to meet these criteria.

Integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality determine a military's potential, but a complex web of factors in a nation's society determine those four influences. Here, I will focus on the impact of civilian-military relations, societal fissures, advanced technology, and Arab culture itself on military effectiveness. Considered together, these factors provide a comprehensive overview of the strengths and challenges of the Saudi military.

To develop a formidable military, a nation must enjoy good relations between its civilian government and its armed forces. This requires the balance of power between the two organizations. A military with too much political influence can block necessary governmental reforms if it considers them against its interests. In Kadercan's words, "When the military enjoys a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the civilian authority, it may block military reforms that would undercut its corporate privileges and interests."[7] If, however, a military has an excessive political role but little organizational cohesion, its lack of integration will cripple it, leaving the civilian government without viable national defense, perhaps raising the risk of a coup.[8] Similarly, an effective military requires strong organizational identity while also holding little political power, as it will be marginalized and unable to advocate for its own development. In Kadercan's theory, the ideal military has a strong culture but little political agency: this combination facilitates the development of effective practices while also allowing the civilian government to reform the military when necessary.[9] When the military can block these reforms to protect its traditional interests, it will stagnate and eventually fall behind its rivals' efficacy. Thus, proper bal-

ance of military and governmental power keeps the system up to date and effective.

A unified, stable society is also vital to the development of an effective military. Without such a society, a nation must focus much of its security apparatus inwards to stabilize the country against the threat of domestic violence or even coups.[10] Furthermore, a divided society can produce ineffective social groups within units thus creating "fissures in the unit that reduce the effective military power of the unit as a whole."[11] These divisions can lead military units to become inefficient as unworthy candidates from one side of the fissure are selected for promotion over better qualified candidates who are "on the wrong side." These internal conflicts reduce a military's efficacy and offer adversaries an obvious weakness to exploit. A military in a socially divided country can try to avoid this pitfall by distancing itself from society as a whole. This distancing, however, comes at its own cost: "it may create distrust of the military, …the military may then be seen as an alien element by that society. This will generate civil-military friction that will reduce the military power, not of the military, but of the state as a whole."[12] In a state facing these problems, the development of an effective military is exceedingly difficult. On the other hand, a unified nation also has no guarantee of successful integration, and must actively implement meritocratic promotion and consistent strategic systems among other hallmarks of a well-integrated military. While a divided society is no guarantee of failure and a unified one is no guarantee of success, the latter gives a country a significantly better chance to develop an effective military.

Even if a nation has the political and societal requirements to build a formidable military, it must still give its soldiers the best possible equipment to be able to compete with other elite modern armies. This requires either the creation of new technologies or the diffusion and adaptation of already developed advanced technology. If a military fails to innovate or adapt new technologies, it will be vulnerable to rivals who have continued to move forward. Conversely if a military is more advanced than its rivals, it will able to exploit their relative backwardness. According to Horowitz, this advantage can be gained or lost through the diffusion of an innovation: "understanding the diffusion pattern of the dominant innovation of a time period and the match of adoption requirements to the capabilities of states can help us more accurately explain power transitions."[13] Technologies and strategies are constantly evolving; if a military is unwilling or unable to adopt these tools either due to parochial interests or lack of access to innovations, it will become vulnerable. In Brooks' framework, this access to innovations directly impacts a military's quality if improved training regimes are developed and adopted. This makes the access to and adaptation of military innovations key to the development of an effective military.

Finally, the development of an effective, powerful military in Arab states has often been limited by the failure of Arab cultures to produce citizens who are able to fight effectively on a chaotic and complex modern battlefield. As Pollack says, "skill in maneuver warfare is highly dependent upon aggressive, innovative, independent tactical leadership as well as the rapid, accurate transmission of information" (Pollack

32). Achieving and harnessing this skill requires soldiers who are highly capable and generals who are willing to cede much of their authority to their soldiers in the heat of battle. This, however, requires a society that produces and accepts independent and creative thinkers which is not a strength of Arab cultures. Arab military training focuses on practicing specific tasks and produces excellent "set-piece" soldiers who nonetheless rapidly wilt in battle when faced with situations they had not explicitly trained for. "[J]ust as the Arab educational system has resisted reform, so too the military training systems of most of the Arab countries have proven very difficult to change" -- this underscores the connection between Arab civilian culture, Arab military culture, and the frequent failures of Arab militaries in battle.[14] Though an Arab nation may possess all other ingredients for an effective military, it may struggle to produce skilled soldiers capable of taking its army to the next level.

While the balance of power between the Saudi monarchy and its military is theoretically conducive to the formation of an effective military, there are significant challenges facing this development in practice. The armed forces of Saudi Arabia are divided into two main groups: the Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF) and the Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG). Both forces are highly professional but politically distant, representing Kadercan's ideal balance for a modern army. Though there is some overlap in their roles, the RSLF is generally expected to provide security against foreign threats and to be the main tool of Saudi power projection, while the SANG is tasked with maintaining internal peace and the rule of the Saud monarchy.[15] This balance of power is key, since it splits the armed forces into two distinct entities(neither of which has the power to overcome the government on its own, giving the monarch considerable leverage as long as one or both of the factions remains loyal). This subordinate position prevents either section of the armed forces from becoming either a "volatile partner" capable of removing the civilian leadership or from having "powers over the civilian rulers to pursue its corporate interests, which may sometimes be affiliated with policies that impede battlefield effectiveness and contradict a state's long-term security priorities."[16] However, while Saudi civil-military relations are currently robust and the bifurcated ground forces offer a theoretically strong balance of power, this practice creates significant problems for the Saudi military's effectiveness.

The presence of two separate ground fighting forces under different control presents difficulties for effective integration, since they are by design redundant. This structural inefficiency is further compounded by the fact that the purpose of the SANG is to "counterbalance the influence of the regular armed forces" meaning that the Saudi government explicitly favors one defense branch above another.[17] The less favored (and less trusted) RSLF has seen its capabilities intentionally underdeveloped. Unsurprisingly, this has led to serious organizational problems within the RSLF, since it is more prone to corruption, poor promotion practices, and ineffective training techniques than the SANG.[18] These problems further decrease efficacy, as corruption and promoting unworthy candidates reduces the army's professionalism

and efficiency by placing unskilled soldiers in vital leadership positions and wasting state funds. Worse, RSLF training methods emphasize fighting in regimented steps, which produces an underprepared fighting force.[19] This has recently been on display in the ongoing conflict in Yemen where RSLF forces "have often appeared unprepared and prone to mistakes."[20] The government's vested interest in keeping the SANG superior to the RSLF has had tangible negative impacts on the RSLF's warfighting ability. Unfortunately for the army, these interests appear unlikely to change any time soon.

For a brief period, attitudes among the ruling Saud family appeared to be moving away from seeing the RSLF as a potential threat towards seeing it as a potential valuable tool of Saudi power projection. This shift was best seen in the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) in 2005, which "was created to coordinate Saudi strategies regarding defense, intelligence, and foreign policy with the ultimate aim to increase effectiveness and efficiency across agencies."[21] This was exactly the sort of integrating program needed to reduce redundancies in operations and personnel between the SANG and the RSLF, which would increase the effectiveness of the Saudi military as a whole and allow it to exert more power abroad. Unfortunately, the NSC was disbanded in 2015 and replaced with the newly formed Council for Political and Security Affairs (CPSA).[22] The CPSA is expected to act as a decision-making body rather than a coordinating one (SUSRIS). While adding diversity and additional experts to the decision-making process is a positive step for the Saudi Arabian security apparatus, it does little to address the integration problems that the NSC was intended to fix. Without a suitable replacement program, Saudi military power risks stagnating in its current form which Gray describes as "arguably sufficient for internal regime security, and able to … deter some external actors from acting hostilely."[23] This is a rather low bar for a national security service, but reaching any higher levels of effectiveness will require significantly improved integration between the SANG and the RSLF. While it is still early in the CPSA era, this necessary reform seems to have been pushed further backwards with the dissolution of the NSC.

For all the issues the Saudi military has and likely will continue to have in projecting its power abroad, it has been exceptionally successful at maintaining control domestically in large part to a generally loyal and unified citizenry. Despite the potential problems posed by the intense and highly contagious Arab Spring to the Saudi monarchy, Saudi citizens have shown remarkably little interest in bringing revolution to Saudi Arabia. The fact that this potential conflict has been avoided despite Saudi Arabia's "extremely young population, high youth unemployment, repression and corruption" is even more impressive.[24] This is undeniably due in large part to the efficacy of the state's internal security apparatus. Between the SANG and the police, protesters and potential revolutionaries would face two extremely well equipped and efficient armed forces - a prospect that is presumably enough to put off all but the most disgruntled rabble-rousers. However, while the SANG and police amount to

a powerful tool of internal suppression, it should be mentioned that many Saudi citizens simply were not interested in revolution. Syrian protesters carried on their as their protests turned into a bloody revolution despite a strong government security; their Saudi peers never even took to the streets. This illustrates the vastly different societal conditions in each country. The Saudi citizenry's tacit acceptance of its monarchy is reflected by King Abdullah's "almost unanimous" support and the sense that while Saudi Arabia has its share of problems, "an uprising is not 'the best way' to bring about improvements."[25] This disinterest in joining the wave of revolutions sweeping the Arab world reflects a level of societal cohesion which should allow the Saudi government to build a well-integrated military focused on external issues rather than internal affairs.

This conclusion is slightly counter-intuitive in a nation that boasts a nominally internal security force capable of going head-to-head with the conventional army. Nonetheless, while the presence of the SANG and Saudi Arabia's impressive police force suggests serious societal issues, they represent more of an insurance policy than a necessary tool of political suppression. Instead, the combination of the day to day safety and security provided by the Saudi government, and the pacifying effect of the clergy's alliance with the monarchy makes most Saudis uninterested in revolution. This saves the monarchy from worrying about internal security as much as they otherwise might.[26] This is reflected in the SANG's growing role as a tool of Saudi power projection abroad - especially in the Yemeni civil war - where the SANG was called upon as the primary ground force for Saudi power projection.[27] The external use of the SANG reflects the Saudi government's growing trust in its citizens, which has been made possible by King Abdullah's cautious acceptance of reform movements and his generous financial programs in times of economic distress.[28] Though modernization has been a relatively slow moving project in Saudi Arabia, the king pursued a broad slate of progressive reforms to fight corruption, correct socioeconomic inequities, and fix educational failings.[29] These projects have earned the Saudi government significant loyalty and helped stave off whatever appeal the Arab Spring may have held for many Saudi citizens. This has allowed the government project the SANG outwards as an effective tool for the advancement of Saudi foreign priorities, rather than just a simply reactionary domestic force. In short, the increasing cohesion of Saudi society has allowed the government to shift its defense resources from internal security projects to external national interests allowing for a major increase in Saudi power projection capabilities.

Saudi Arabia's greatest asset for the formation of an effective, powerful military is undoubtedly its access to and adoption of advanced technologies and strategies. This access is provided by the Kingdom's tight ties to the US (and to a lesser extent Europe) and is funded by the phenomenal national wealth generated by oil. In 2012 alone, Saudi Arabia bought $35.1 billion worth of US military products; while this was three times more than they had ever spent before in a year, there is nonetheless a long history of Saudi imports of advanced American military technol-

ogy – and the Obama presidency saw the highest sales to Saudi Arabia since George H.W. Bush.[30] These periodic massive investments have allowed the Saudi military to modernize with remarkable speed and consistency. The first such major push happened in the 1970's, as the Saudi government moved aggressively to modernize first the RSLF and then the SANG; this process was repeated in the early 1990's, and is once again in full swing.[31] These periodic hardware updates are necessary for an effective military, since they preclude the quality of arms used by the army from stagnating and give Saudi soldiers access to the most cutting edge weaponry in the world.

All of the advanced arms in the world cannot benefit a military if its soldiers are incapable of using them or if their tactics are outdated and easily countered. The solution to both of these potential problems is the willingness to adopt new training techniques and strategies alongside new weaponry. Although it is easier to simply buy better weapons than to reform structural elements like training, Saudi Arabia has largely navigated this pitfall successfully. This is due in large part to the tight ties between the US and Saudi Arabia and to the Saudis' impressive ability to recognize their own weaknesses. Because of the strong American interest in seeing Saudi Arabia become a capable military actor in the Middle East, the U.S. has poured resources into training the Saudi military. U.S. Army advisors and American contractors have both been heavily involved in training the Saudi army, ensuring their ability to make full use of America's advanced arms.[32] Furthermore, the army has shown good awareness of its own shortcomings in battle, though its success in adopting the necessary reforms has been more mixed. After the Gulf War, it was clear that the military needed to significantly improve its joint warfare capabilities between the SANG, RSLF, and air force. Since then, it has implemented a training regime adopted from American, French, Egyptian and Israeli military, and is "steadily reevaluating its doctrine and ways to improve joint operations."[33] While integration between the various Saudi armed forces remains suboptimal, it is clearly moving in the right direction aided by excellent organizational practices which allow needed reforms to proceed. However, this process is not guaranteed to succeed, since the army's internal reforms are ultimately still at the mercy of the government's recent shift away from integration. Nonetheless, the Saudi military is in a privileged position because of its close strategic alliance with the US.

Historically, traditional Arab culture has had a significant negative impact on the military effectiveness of Saudi armed forces. The stirrings of modernization, however, may sweep those cultural limitations away. This movement has received unexpected support from King Abdullah, who proved remarkably reform-minded. Better yet, many lower-level Saudi officials have also made highly realistic assessments of the limiting nature of some traditional aspects of culture and have acknowledged the need to change them.[34] According to Fatany, this openness to reform has endeared the King to his subjects, reinforcing their unwillingness to participate in the Arab spring, while also providing a vital positive feedback loop to incentivize the

royal family to remain committed to its cautious reform process. Though changing cultural norms is a difficult and slow process, the successful modernization of Saudi culture would be a massive boon to the country's military and other institutions and should provide enough incentive for the government to continue moving forward. While serious civil and human rights issues weaken optimism over positive changes in Saudi culture as a whole, reforms in education at least offer hope for the steady liberalization of Saudi society at large.

When Pollack offered his cultural explanation for the recurring military shortcomings of Arab militaries in 1996, he identified excessive the deference to authority, lack of creativity, and centralization of authority drilled into Arab students by dominant educational and societal systems as key limiting factors in Arab military effectiveness and suggested that this was unlikely to change.[35] Fortunately for Saudi Arabia, change is exactly what Abdullah's reforms have ushered in albeit at a carefully measured pace. Reforms in the education system aim directly at the root problem: "we no longer want the pupil to repeat mindlessly what the teacher says. Everyone has to learn to think for himself."[36] The success of this shift would mean a fundamental change in Saudi society. Rather than rely on rote memorization and deference to superiors, Saudi education should look distinctly Western with individual problem solving becoming a valued ability. On a modern battlefield, this is a vital skill. Soldiers who are taught only specific tasks and to follow specific plans are prone to breaking down into "a leaderless mass of individuals; their officers could pass on orders but failed to provide leadership in the absence of specific guidelines."[37] Conversely, soldiers with the flexibility of thought that Saudi educational reforms hope to instill are able to adapt to such situations. Furthermore, the initiative to make "the uncritical drumming in of teaching material trotted out by submissive teachers…a thing of the past" should help open the door to reforms in training and attitudes in the military which allow for more effective, realistic training of soldiers, and to produce soldiers who are capable of acting effectively even in a leadership vacuum.[38] Though it is too early to say with certainty that these reforms will succeed, they offer hope for the future of the Saudi military's ability to be an effective fighting force since it will reap the benefits of drawing recruits from an increasingly creative and adaptable society.

The future of Saudi military effectiveness is dependent on the country's ability to assemble a military force that is integrated, responsive, skilled, and outfitted with quality equipment. Currently, its quality is undoubtedly world class thanks to the Saudi-US alliance and the access to world-class weapons systems this relationship provides. Furthermore, while the current depression in oil prices has hit the Saudi economy hard, its defense spending binge in the early 2010s means that the army has already paid for a major modernizing program and should be in good shape for the foreseeable future. Although the Saudi economy's heavy dependence on oil may limit the nation's growth in the short term, economic, educational and social reforms offer hope that an innovative modern information economy can take its place.

Combined with the vast wealth provided by oil, this would make for a formidable economy, and one more than capable of maintaining its military quality through American imports. Even if this shift does not come to pass, the military would be set for the next 20 years based on historical frequencies of modernizing spending on the military. The quality of equipment in the Saudi Arabian military would remain high, giving it a major advantage over its potential regional competitors apart from Israel.

Saudi military responsiveness is another area of strength, as its uptake of new technologies and willingness to learn from failures allow the military to react quickly to changing strategic environments. This has been on display through the nation's adaptation of American and other advanced militaries' training techniques and weaponry after conflicts have shown either the flaws in existing Saudi military doctrine and equipment, or the merits of those of other nations. High levels of responsiveness keep a military grounded in reality, neither overestimating its own strengths nor underestimating the capabilities of adversaries, while also ensuring that its leaders and soldiers are adequately prepared. The Saudi army has proven itself adept at maintaining responsiveness in the past and is unlikely to backslide on this front.

The Saudi military's responsiveness has also allowed it to make headway in improving the skill of its soldiers - an area of military effectiveness that it has historically struggled. Ultimately the military's skill is a separate arena which may continue to be problematic. Recognition of limitations in Saudi training methods and the culture which produces them has led the Saudi military to contract with the American government and American companies to provide better training. While this exchange improves the skill of Saudi soldiers, it is not sustainable in the long term. Reforms in education and the cultural shifts may provide a long-term solution, but the reforms are new enough that it is difficult to determine with any certainty how successful they can be. Even if the reforms are eventually successful, it will be a long time before their liberalizing effects are felt uniformly across Saudi society. Until then, military skill will likely continue to be problematic as traditional modes of learning and leadership will constrain the creativity and rapid improvisational decision-making necessary for success in modern warfare.

Integration, the final aspect of a truly effective military, is also Saudi Arabia's greatest weakness, and it will require a concerted reform effort which currently looks unlikely. The structure of the country's armed forces with the SANG and the RSLF essentially acting as equal but separate ground forces is the antithesis of integration. While the short-lived NSC appeared to offer a solution to the longstanding problems created by this separation, its subsequent dissolution and replacement with the CPSA has reintroduced doubt that Saudi Arabia's leaders learned their lesson. Because of the distance between the two armed forces, they are liable to take counter-productive actions while also limiting the amount of cross-force cooperation possible due to differing equipment, training methods, and tactics. These factors combine to make the ongoing split between the SANG and the RSLF the single largest inhibitor

to Saudi military effectiveness. It is a flaw which increasingly appears unnecessary and self-inflicted. Despite the monarchy's fear of an uprising in connection to the Arab Spring, it has managed to ride out the worst of the movement with a combination of sheer force and trust in the large sections of the country which are loyal to the monarchy due to religion, reforms, and economic stability made possible by the current government. At this point, the continued use of the SANG as an internal security apparatus is inefficient especially given the efficacy of the police force. There is little reason to maintain the strict separation between the SANG and the RSLF that has characterized Saudi security policy since the 1950s. King Salman's actions suggest that he plans to preserve the divide and that he may even prefer to widen it.

Saudi Arabia's military enjoys access to the physical equipment necessary for an elite military and is fortunate enough to be largely unconstrained by internal organizational issues. These qualities will be crucial to its future military effectiveness, because significant doubts remain over its ability to produce skilled soldiers and smoothly integrate the various branches of the military. Currently, Saudi Arabia's military is not the Middle East's undisputed preeminent force despite vast amounts of foreign and domestic investment. With targeted, sustained, and successful reforms in leadership structure and training, this dominance is an achievable goal. Until these necessary steps are taken, the Saudi military will never be truly effective and will remain reliant on American military might in the event of direct aggression against the Saudi homeland.

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Chinese Climate Leadership: Feign or Future?

Henry Walter

As industrial civilization confronts the devastating consequences of global climate change, the difficult choices surrounding its solutions have only become more complicated following the election of United States President Donald Trump and his recent declaration of intent to exit the Paris Climate Accord. This paper analyzes whether China—the world's second largest economy by nominal gross domestic product and an increasingly significant player on the global stage—is prepared and credible to fill the void left by the US abdicating its role as global climate leader. Analysis focuses on whether China's domestic efforts are sufficient to project a sense of both willingness and capability to be the world's foremost authority on climate change policy. This article ultimately determines that China is both ready and willing to act as the preeminent climate power, despite imperfections in domestic energy and environment policy.

Introduction

China emits more greenhouse gases than any other country on the planet. However, China may also become the world's next climate leader. With the election of Donald Trump, many analysts speculate that the United States may downsize its role in climate negotiations in the near future. Faced with this reality, it is critical to determine whether China's domestic efforts to combat climate change legitimize its global ambitions to lead the rest of the world in doing the same. As China attempts to fill the power vacuum left by the United States and improve its standing relative to the rest of the world on global warming initiatives, domestic Chinese climate policies will be scrutinized by competitors and followers to determine the efficacy of China's strategy.

Some argue that while China's domestic efforts are imperfect, they do indicate a willingness and capacity to address climate change by both promoting renewable development and showcasing China's eagerness to participate in international climate agreements. Contrarians posit that China is unable to effectively lead global action in reducing emissions because of its continued domestic reliance on fossil fuels and simultaneous opposition to binding emissions restrictions under international frameworks. There is robust data on both sides and it is difficult to conclude that one position or the other is completely correct. However, the stronger argument holds that countries are willing to accept China as the climate action leader because most states recognize that China has taken sufficient action to demonstrate a commitment to the problem of global warming even if China has not solved its own fossil fuel addiction entirely.

Henry Walter is a junior at the University of Kansas, majoring in political science and economics. Henry is from Overland Park, Kansas, and is interested in the impact of government regulation on the goals of both economic growth and climate change mitigation. Eventually, he hopes to pursue a career in law. This paper was originally written for Professor John Kennedy's course, "Foreign Policy of China."

LITERATURE REVIEW

Those in favor of the idea that China's domestic climate efforts legitimize its leadership goals generally present two core arguments: 1) China is the global leader in renewable energy and 2) China is the global leader in climate agreements. Falkner cites China's 2014 investment of 83.3 billion USD in renewable energy as particularly significant, given that it was the largest ever investment in alternative energy in a single year.[1] In addition, China has ramped up solar-cell production from 50 megawatts to 23,000 in less than ten years.[2] Li forwards a similar argument by citing specific programs the central government has formulated: The China Renewable Energy Development Program and China Renewable Energy Scale-up Program have both been tremendous successes and have put Chinese-manufactured renewables on the cutting-edge of global energy development.[3] These investments and programs are particularly important for determining China's leadership capacity because they have focused on promoting export capacity, which can be an effective way to disseminate technology and influence other countries.

Proponents also defend China's domestic efforts based on China's willingness to establish linkages with other actors. Falkner argues that the bilateral agreement negotiated in 2014 between the United States and China represents the single most important climate deal ever. Not only did the deal bring the issue of climate change to the forefront of each country's respective political discourse, but it also proved critical in paving the way for the success of the Paris agreement that would follow a year later.[4] Moreover, China's goal of leading the world in climate action is tied to its foreign policy priority of avoiding international ridicule.[5] Li argues that one of the major motivations for China in developing a domestic emissions-trading scheme is to eventually be able to link it with the European Union's cap-and-trade system and lead the developing-nations wing of emissions trading.[6] While arguments that posit China's domestic efforts as a strong foundation for international leadership tend to focus on overarching goals and general trends, arguments against this position tend to instead highlight the specific details of emissions and policy.

Aldy and Pizer argue that China cannot be a top climate leader until its emissions are under control. They cite that total Chinese emissions have grown 250% since 1997, the intensity of Chinese emissions is five times that of the United States, and that Chinese coal consumption continues to grow rapidly while US and EU rates are falling.[7] The study referred to uses absolute emissions totals and chooses not to account for population growth. Although the energy intensity of growth accounts for rising incomes, the significance of the combined influence of income, population, and technology will be explored later in this paper.

In addition to the statistically driven critique of China's potential international leadership role, Godement reasons that China is not fit to lead the international community because of its opposition to binding international agreements.[8] Although China has played a proactive role in negotiating climate agreements, the 2008 global financial crisis exposed potential weaknesses in the Chinese economy,

prompting CCP leaders to be more cautious regarding measures that could threaten growth. Hence, Godement argues that China has pushed its domestic growth agenda ahead of and onto its foreign climate agenda, making it less ambitious and more flexible, as mirrored in agreements like COP21.[9] The precise nature of international agreements is an important arena to explore because these deals operate as the nexus at which foreign policy negotiation and domestic policy implementation either reinforce or weaken one another.

Analysis

This section will focus on the claim that China's domestic climate policy does legitimize its international leadership efforts, but there is one implicit assumption that must be thought through first: Can domestic efforts legitimize international leadership efforts in the first place? The answer to this question is also yes.

There are several reasons why domestic efforts are critical to international ones, so each will be discussed only briefly. First, Chinese decision makers and the Chinese public must be convinced that particular solutions work before they are willing to risk their political livelihoods and international image on those fixes.[10] The domestic arena acts as a laboratory and training ground for such solutions. Second, Chinese leaders have tried to frame its leadership ascendance around its intention to be a "responsible great power."[11] The climate has become the ultimate area of 'responsibility' on the international stage and as a result, China's climate action has become a litmus test of this promise.

Striving to be a responsible great power is a component of a larger foreign policy goal: to avoid international ridicule.[12] China has been roundly criticized by many Western powers for not doing enough to curb its emissions and this has generated a fear among Chinese leaders that a negative perception of the Chinese government may 'spill back' to influence Chinese public opinion.[13] Using climate action as an opportunity to demonstrate that China is a responsible power committed to a rules-based order would go a long way towards silencing critics and promoting Chinese leadership.[14]

In order to complete this argument, it is necessary to consider whether the relationship between Chinese domestic and international climate efforts is reverse causal. In this scenario, reverse causality would mean that an absence of domestic policy would make international leadership impossible and that the presence of robust domestic climate action would be sufficient to legitimize Chinese leadership. It is almost undoubtedly true that if China were to take no domestic action, it could not lead parallel international efforts. However, the question this paper will investigate is the threshold for that action. Godement argues that one of the critical factors holding back Chinese climate leadership is the internationally perceived lack of domestic follow through.[15] By this argument and those above, it seems that domestic efforts are a necessary prerequisite to international leadership. However, it is difficult to make the case that domestic efforts—on their own—are a sufficient condition for

international leadership. There are an infinite number of variables that factor into whether a particular country follows another on a particular issue, but in the case of China, many of those alternative factors—leadership void, growing global interdependence, et cetera—are also trending in favor of climate leadership. With these conditions, it appears that domestic policy can act as a sufficient foundation for global leadership.[16]

Having provided a basis for the assumption that domestic climate policy has a bearing on global leadership initiatives, there are two subdivisions that can be made regarding the influence of domestic policy: practical and perceived. Practical considerations regarding domestic climate policy include calculations such as whether emissions are increasing or decreasing, the energy intensity of growth, and so on. The perceived impact of domestic efforts deals with whether countries believe China is a climate leader, regardless of the effectiveness of their action.

It is undeniable that Chinese emissions are the largest single source of greenhouse gases and are continuing to increase. Yet, precisely how the issue is framed can make China seem more or less culpable. As explained in the arguments section, Aldy and Pizer focus on cumulative emissions. From this perspective, it is difficult to deny that Chinese emissions are only climbing higher and are to blame for a massive portion of global greenhouse gases (Figure 1). However, when analyzing per-capita GHG trends in Figure 2, it is a different story. From this alternative view, Chinese emissions are increasing, but remain only a fraction of American and Russian emissions while being roughly equivalent to those of the EU. Moreover, it is important to consider factors that impact emissions such as affluence and population. I = PAT (environmental impact = population x affluence x technology) is relatively well accepted in both environmental science and policy-making circles because it accurately describes complex environmental problems while collapsing that complexity into just a few digestible variables.[17] Although there are criticisms of this model for its lack of specificity in the context of specific environmental issues, it is useful for describing broad trends over time.

With I = PAT in mind, not only do per capita emissions become more relevant, but population growth and affluence trends do as well. Total population growth rates (Figure 3) are somewhat sporadic for particular countries, but in the case of China, there is a smooth downward trend. This should make it easier for China to get a handle on its pollution because energy expansion can be met by renewable sources that may take longer to fund and construct rather than by coal plants that spring up to meet rapidly increasing demand. Considering aggregate population trends in tandem with urbanization rates is key to effectively scrutinize emissions because higher levels of urbanization generally produce lower emissions.[18] This reduction is likely to be amplified in China as the central government increasingly pushes localities to plan megacities in a low-carbon, sustainable fashion.[19] Figure 4 shows that while many industrialized countries and even developing nations like India are slowly becoming more urban, China's urban population is growing at

a monumental pace. This rural to urban migration inevitably strains resources and puts stress on municipal infrastructure, such as energy utilities, to provide for the rapidly growing population. As such, emissions may increase in the interim, but it is a boon for climate action down the road. Figure 4 suggests that most developed countries do eventually stabilize at a particular level of urbanization and this is likely to occur in China as well. Once the transition is over and city planners can rework some basic systems, there is likely to be a drastic reduction in emissions.

The flip-side of the population coin is affluence. In one scenario, there can be many people who do not earn much money and emissions are likely to remain low, as was the case in China some time ago and in India more recently. Or, in another, there can be a smaller group that earns much more and emits according to their ability to consume, as in the case of the United States. Figure 5 indicates that although Chinese GDP has grown at unprecedented rates over the last two decades, the average Chinese income is still much lower than the American or European income. This state of affairs represents a threat to climate action and a potential argument to project ballooning Chinese emissions: There is still a high ceiling on wealth and, in turn, emissions. However, Figure 6 should allay some of that concern. Energy intensity is a measure of how much energy is required to produce a given unit of growth. Figure 6 shows that while Chinese growth remains relatively energy-intensive, it is a dramatic decline from just two decades ago and the trend continues to point downward. This is another flaw in Aldy and Pizer's analysis: they simply consider Chinese growth intensity relative to the US, but fail to account for how high that intensity has been in the past and how low it could fall in the future. Less energy-intensive growth can mitigate the impact of an increasingly wealthy population by decoupling that wealth from emissions. The trend towards fewer emissions per dollar of purchasing power has yet to level off and is likely to continue as China develops a more robust renewables capacity, the "T" in I = PAT.

Perhaps the most promising trend in Chinese domestic policy is the increasing growth of renewable energy. In absolute terms, China has the largest capacity of solar and wind projects of any country in the world.[20] Figure 7 illustrates that as many actors stagnate in their adoption of renewables, China continues to lead the way—nearly keeping pace with the EU. Although China's prospects as a climate leader appear promising from an examination of Figure 7, Figure 8 presents the opposite outcome. Figure 8 reveals the clearest difference between actors of any graph presented: China's coal consumption remains sky-high. Despite its best efforts and burgeoning renewables sector, China cannot seem to kick coal for good. Although this curve has begun to level off and even dip, it is unlikely that China's coal consumption will sink to levels comparable with the other countries considered any time soon. The question of whether these levels of coal consumption restrain China's ability to become a climate leader then arises. Although it will invariably be criticized, China's coal consumption is not sufficiently limiting to prevent the country's rise to global climate leadership.

One of the factors mediating international perception of China's thirst for coal is the difference in exports between Chinese coal and alternative energy. Brazil has produced 90%+ of its electricity from renewable sources for over twenty years, but Brazil has not led a global effort to adopt low-carbon energy because its model of hydroelectric power is not universally replicable and Brazilian industry has struggled to export their innovations.[21] For this same reason, China's renewable development is comparatively more influential than is its coal consumption: While China is the leading exporter in renewable energy, it is a net importer of coal.[22] This dynamic begs the question of perception. If China were a poor marketer, there is certainly enough evidence to make the case that Chinese climate leadership would represent hypocrisy, but if China is able to control the spin, then its alternative energy development can be emphasized.

The statistical discussion above should give the impression that although China can put forth a compelling case to underpin its rise as a climate leader, it is not without holes. This fact renders perception especially important. Despite having the highest levels of coal consumption in the world by far, China also has the highest level of renewables investment,[23] the highest levels of renewables exports,[24] and the highest level of solar and wind manufacturing and installations.[25] China's leadership in these areas has been produced by a commitment to international agreements and domestic policy that promote the growth of renewables such as COP21, CREDP, CRESP, and the Chinese ETS.[26] This policy suite of technological advancement, international agreements, and market-based approaches has given China at least the image of being one of the most innovative climate leaders.[27]

These policies and agreements were discussed earlier, but it is essential to consider them again in the context of international perception. Although Godement and others forward legitimate critiques of the logistics of implementation and enforcement of these programs, those are only likely to stick in a world of a better alternative. In other words, if binding agreements were the norm, it is far more likely that China's resistance to such restrictions would damage Chinese leadership credibility. But that is not the plane on which status quo climate politics operate. Instead, countries with concern for climate change are looking for what Hallding et al. refer to as "two minimals."[28] The purpose of China's domestic climate effort is not to build the world a silver bullet, but to demonstrate that the most coal-intensive, fastest-growing developing economy in the world can take positive climate action too. By demonstrating some level of commitment to climate action through domestic policy, other states can be provided the "assurance that China is sufficiently 'in' for there to be a realistic chance of containing global emissions."[29] In so doing, China can act as the global leader by building trust and bridging the gap between developing and developed economies to begin to resolve the ultimate first mover problem that is climate change.

Conclusion

Combatting global climate change is a collective action problem that will require global coordination and leadership. China is well positioned to take on the global green mantle by both objective and perceived metrics. It is more likely than not that Chinese emissions will begin to level off and decline in the future as urban populations grow and growth intensity continues to fall. However, this does not mean that Chinese domestic climate policy is a clear success. There are still many measures by which China lags behind the rest of the world, namely, the paradox between its simultaneously increasing coal and renewables consumption. Yet, precisely because of China's importance and complexity, foreign actors are likely to look to China as the global climate leader based on the country's commitment to climate policy domestically, despite imperfections. Future research ought to track the United States' international climate influence as the Trump administration's agenda takes shape, and should pay special attention to China's actions at the 2017 Boston climate summit. Moreover, the trends observed in the figures of this paper should continue to be tracked given that the basic factors of population, affluence, and technology are likely to remain considerably influential in determining emissions levels.

Notes

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Appendix

Figure 1 (Source: World Resources Institute CAIT Tool)



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Female Voter Turnout in India: Trends, Causes and Effects

Colette Rosenberg

Introduction

Although men and women in India have legally had an equal right to vote since 1947, women have not been able to equally exercise this right. Women's "prescribed social roles" have traditionally restricted them from participating in politics to the same extent as men.[1] Women are often tied to the home, taking care of the family and reminded to "[uphold] the family honour" when entering the public sphere.[2] Unlike men, who conventionally have had political autonomy, women have had to navigate a variety of social barriers in order to cast their vote. Additionally, a variety of "sociodemographic factors including education and income, sociocultural norms and caste" all shape a woman's mobility, freedom and electoral participation.[3] Nevertheless, India has certainly made progress in closing the voter gender gap over time as more women have come out to vote. While a variety of variables may influence a woman's ability to vote, the way in which female voter turnout has been observed in more conservative Indian states specifically suggests that social factors are contributing to increased female voter turnout. In the following sections I will explore specific social factors, including education, technological change, and political interest as well as safety and security at polling booths, which have changed over time and have likely empowered women to vote.

Background Information

Beginning with the first few general elections, there was a large gender gap in voting. Even fifteen years after independence, the Lok Sabha's third general election in 1962 saw 63.3 percent of men turn out to vote in comparison to only 46.6 percent of women.[4] Five years later, in 1967, only 41 percent of women voted, in comparison to 61 percent of men.[5] In the 1980s, this gap reached a low of 9 percent. By late 1990s, it reached 8 percent, and the gap continued to decrease into the early 2000s, as women increasingly turned out to vote.[6] The Fifteenth General Election in 2009 saw a 4.4 percent gender gap in voter turnout. Five years later, in the most recent general election of 2014, the gender gap closed even further to under 2 percent.[7,8]

While the general elections from 1971 to 2014 did not show a substantial change in male voter turnout, female voter turnout increased by "more than twice as much in the same period, from 49.11 percent to 65.54 percent." [9] This rise in female electoral participation has not gone unnoticed. Rather, it has been described as one

Colette Rosenberg is a junior at Dartmouth College from Connecticut. She studies Geography and is particularly interested in the nexus of environmental and socail issues, and enjoys investigating matters of displacement, migration and urban planning. She is currently off campus working for NPR in D.C. This paper was origianlly written for Professor Chuchard's course, "Politics of India."

of "the defining features of the last 60 years of elections."[10] Furthermore, this trend has had concrete political effects, as increased female voter turnout has changed policy implementation, campaign efforts, and ultimately, the notion that the political sphere is inherently masculine.



Figure 1. Gender Gap in Turnout: Lok Sabha Elections (1957–2014)

Source: Authors' analysis of data released by the Election Commission of India.
Note: Calculated as the difference between men's turnout (in percentage) and women's turnout (in percentage) for the Lok Sabha elections.

VOTING VARIATION ACROSS THE COUNTRY

Although India has witnessed a major increase in female electoral participation overall, a closer look reveals that women's political participation varies regionally, depending on an area's social characteristics and culture. For example, voter turnout among women differs between northern India and southern India. While southern India exemplifies a matriarchal social structure, where women are given more freedom and mobility, northern India is known to have more "conservative views towards women," including "discrimination against women in marriage, divorce [and] education."[11,12] Despite such potential barriers, data has consistently shown increasing female voter turnout in northern India. Three of the five states with female voter turnout rates higher than men in the 2014 general election were in the North.[13] Furthermore, in Madhya Pradesh and Odisha, two northern states described as highly conservative, female voter turnout increased from 558 and 572 women voters for every 1,000 male voters in the 1960s to 804 and 866 for every 1,000 male voters in the 2000s.[14] The way in which the voter gender gap has decreased in the northern states particularly over time suggests that women are facing fewer social barriers and have gained autonomy as voters.[15,16,17]

Education

Higher levels of education are often associated with higher turnout rates.[18] Although the 86th Amendment to the Indian Constitution grants men and women an equal right to education, a significant discrepancy exists between educated men and educated women.[19] Northern states and rural areas traditionally show lower female education and literacy rates.[20] While some states, such as Kerala (located in the South) report a female literacy rate of 91.98 percent, other states, such as Rajasthan and Bihar (both in the North) have female literacy rates as low as 52.66 and 53.33 percent.[21]

Although the gender gap in education persists, women's education has improved over time. In 1991, less than 40 percent of Indian women were literate. Twenty years later, the 2011 census reported a female literacy rate of 65.46 percent.[22] Although the 2011 census still showed a higher literacy rate for men, at 82.14 percent, this 20 percent increase in literacy among women within twenty years should not be overlooked.

Studies have pointed to increased literacy rates amongst women as a likely explanation for increased female voter turnout. As women become more educated and literate, they are increasingly able to access information, and thus, increase their political awareness.[23] Furthermore, it is believed that increased education, literacy rates, and, consequently access to information have increased political interest among women.[24]

This being said, a study using data from the 2001 and 2011 Census of India found that, "No clear relationship exists between changes in women's turnout and literacy," among states with large gender gaps in voter turnout.[25] The study points to Bihar as an example of a state in which female literacy rates have remained constant while female voter turnout has increased.[26] While increased literacy rates have likely only had positive effects on female empowerment and political participation, this study shows that attributing increased female voter turnout solely to education likely oversimplifies this observation.

Media and Information Access

In addition to education, media platforms, including televisions, newspapers, radios and more, have allowed women to readily access information and thus, have likely increased women's political awareness, interest and voter participation. A significant increase in India's media infrastructure began in the 1990s with the "liberalisation and opening up of the Indian economy."[27] The Census of India shows that access to media has continued to substantially increase over time. For example, TV ownership went up from a reported 32 per cent in 2001 to over 47 per cent in 2011.[28]

The influx of electronic media provided women with alternative and convenient platforms to access information, increase their political awareness "about their political and electoral rights."[29] Moreover, for women who have limited mobility and

are primarily confined to the home, media has expanded their ability to access information in the private sphere.[30] The way in which media has made information more accessible has helped lower the "cost" or "effort of becoming informed" and instead, has amplified the benefits of voting.[31]

Furthermore, increased access to media platforms amongst women means that women are not only able to access information overall but specifically, information directly from political parties. The Election Commission of India, as well as "various civil society organizations", use media as "a platform for their voter awareness campaigns."[32] Furthermore, political parties have resorted to media and technology to campaign and promote their platforms.[33]

Studies show a correlation between media exposure and voter turnout. A study, which used a Media Exposure Index to categorize women into low, medium and high media exposure groups, found that higher exposure to media increased awareness among women as well as their willingness to engage in politics.[34] Women with higher exposure to media participated in election campaigns at a 28% higher rate.[35] These statistics exemplify the relationship between knowledge and power. Furthermore, given that media exposure among women will likely increase and reach a wider audience, this data is promising as it shows that media will likely continue to empower more women over time.[36]

Accommodation and Mobilization of Women Voters

Although changes in social variables have likely empowered women to vote, researchers hypothesize that the Election Commission of India's efforts to mobilize voters may have also contributed to increased female voter turnout. In general, the ECI has managed to substantially increase voter registration across the country. That said, it is important to note that researchers have made an important distinction between increased voter registration and voter participation.

An analysis of 50 years of the Election Commission data for the Assembly elections between 1972 and 2012 found an improvement in women's election participation over time. However, the study found that this improvement was due to an increase in active participation amongst women rather than increased registration and ability to vote. This analysis further substantiates the fact that a change in social factors and a breakdown in social barriers are encouraging women to turn out and exercise their right to vote.[37]

Furthermore, the ECI's efforts to increase security at polling stations have encouraged women to vote. Increased security around polling stations increases "confidence building measures" as women feel more secure and are better equipped to cast an independent and personal vote. The ECI began efforts to "[conduct] free, fair and violence-free elections" in the 1990s.[38] This "empowered vulnerable groups" to vote by decreasing electoral fraud and "instances of rigging or intimidation." Furthermore, EVMS has "led to a 6.4 percent increase in the likelihood that a less educated voter will cast her vote," an improvement specifically important for women

as they have and continue to be disadvantaged educationally.[39] Ultimately, EVMS has helped promote a more secure voter environment.[40]Thus, EVMs has contributed to creating a safe voting environment and has "empowered the vulnerable groups by increasing their participations in elections."[41]

The ECI continues to make an effort to mobilize female voters and create a safe voting environment. For example, there is now at least one female polling officer at each polling station and "separate queues for men and women in order to improve the quality and perceived safety of the voting experience for women."[42,43] Having a female polling officer makes women feel more comfortable at polls, as some women may feel uncomfortable having "a male polling staff member applying indelible ink on their fingers."[44]Furthermore, the ECI has expressed an interest in increasing the number of all-women polling stations in other parts of the country, such as in Goa (All Women Polling Stations 2016). These measures to increase safety, security and efficiency at polling booths are important as personal safety continues to be women's primary concern when deciding to vote.[45]

Furthermore, these efforts have likely increased women's ability to cast a vote that is exclusively their own. Data from the 2009 general election shows that women who were able to independently decide how to vote, as opposed to women who were "governed by family and peer groups," were more likely to participate in elections.[46] Thus, these efforts have helped women overcome logistical, social and mental barriers which may have inhibited their ability to vote.

Table 5. State-wise Analysis of Proportion of Voters Who Voted without Taking Anybody Else's Opinion

State	Increase in Women's Turnout between 2009 and 2014 (in percentage points)	Gender Gap in Voting		Change in Proportion of Women Voting on their Own (in percentage)
		2009 (in percentage points)	2014 (in percentage points)	
Rajasthan	16.6	6.7	3.2	27
Uttar Pradesh	13.2	6.5	1.7	22
Assam	12.4	5.3	−4.8	11
Chhattisgarh	16	6	2.7	9
Madhya Pradesh	12.7	13.7	9.5	2
Jharkhand	15.8	6.2	0.7	1
Bihar	15.1	6.5	−2.6	−1
Odisha	10.4	1.5	−2.4	−8

Source: National Election Studies 2009 and 2014 conducted by CSDS.
Note: Gender gap estimated as the difference in the men's turnout (in percentage) and women's turnout (in percentage).

Female Political Participation and Interest

Researchers have further observed a correlation between the upsurge in female voter turnout and an increased interest in politics among women. An increase in female political participation, ranging from campaigning to attending meetings, over time suggests that women are increasingly becoming more connected to the political sphere and thus turning out to vote in higher numbers. For example, in the Lok Sabha Elections of 1999 only 13 percent of women voters were considered

high political participants while 22 percent of women were so considered in 2009.[47] More specifically, between 2009 and 2014, there was an increase in the proportion of women's attendance at election meetings from 9 percent attendance in 2009 to 15 percent attendance during the 2014 Lok Sabha election.[48] While higher participation rates and higher voter turnout are correlated, it is difficult to decipher if increased political participation amongst women is a cause or effect of greater voter turnout. Nevertheless, this correlation is significant as it shows that there is an increase in political participation, beyond voting, among women and may further suggest that women are increasingly empowered to vote as they face fewer social barriers.

Additionally, it is possible that more women are coming out to vote because they feel more personally connected to the issues being discussed. Studies show that the more personal interest and connection an individual has to an election, the more likely they are to vote.[49] In other words, women are more likely to turn out to vote if female-related issues are raised. For example, the question of reserved seats in political office for women first emerged in the 1990s and acted as a "catalyst" for women to vote and increased grassroots political participation amongst women.[50] In 1993 the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Indian constitution introduced 33 percent reservations for women at the local level.[51] This gave women a sense of "sharing power" in the 1990s, and thus likely increased female political participation. Reservations challenged the stereotype of politics as an exclusively male domain.[52,53]

Today, female reservations continue to be an issue. The Women's Reservation Bill, a bill which would extend 30 percent reservations for women to the national level, was introduced in 1997. Although many considered the Women's Reservation Bill to be a crucial next step in order to increase female political representation and presence, others objected to the bill, and the debate over the bill has continued to serve as a female-specific political issue for women to champion.[54] Especially as women continue to be disenfranchised and excluded from the political sphere, voting serves as a powerful tool for women to have their voices heard.[55,56] Thus, this bill has likely encouraged more women to vote and fight for a more inclusive political culture.

Researchers hypothesize that the most recent 2014 general election showed the way in which politics in India is becoming increasingly feminized through political issues and the way in which parties appeal to voters. For example, the BJP's platform was centered around economic issues, which were described as specifically "appealing issues to women in particular [as] 'in many households, it is the women –not the men – who are most acquainted with household expenditure and who interact with commodity markets.'"[57] Political campaigns have begun to target women as important decision-makers and critical constituents.

Furthermore, the recent platforms of the BJP and Congress showed an interest in women's issues and an increasing effort to mobilize women voters. Both Congress's Rahul Gandhi and the BJP's Narendra Modi added plans "to improve

women's safety" into their speeches during various appearances.[58] The Congress Party's manifesto describes how "[the party will] provide sanitary napkins to adolescent girls for free and will increase the number of women-only police stations."[59] Similarly, the BJP tried to appeal to women as it "promised to reduce the gender gap in the judiciary and introduce self defence classes in school."[60] Although these efforts to appeal to women have likely mobilized women to vote, it is difficult to decipher the direction of this relationship. It could be that, as increased female voter turnout is seen, these efforts are a result of parties becoming more aware that they cannot afford to ignore women voters. However, it is also possible that women have been attracted to the polls by the parties' efforts to incorporate women's issues into their platform.

Implications of Increased Female Voter Turnout and Looking Ahead

Increased voter participation amongst women has demonstrated India's growth as a democracy as it is a promising indicator of increased "equality and freedom" across gender divisions.[61] Previously low levels of electoral participation amongst women have been indicative of the way in which women experience higher costs when it comes to voting.[62] For example, women often face restrictions related to family, income, education, and mobility, as well as mental boundaries that may limit their ability to vote. Furthermore, even when some women did vote, they were not always able to cast a vote that was truly theirs as they would often receive "counseling" from family members prior to casting their votes and would need permission before entering "the political domain."[63] Nevertheless, improvement in female turnout, specifically in northern states, holds promise as it suggests that women have gained more autonomy both socially and politically.

While studies have pointed to increased education, media exposure, issues related to women, ECI efforts, and the feminization of politics as possible contributors to enfranchising women, it is often difficult to conclude that there is a clear causal relationship between these variables and female voter turnout. It is likely that multiple variables have worked collectively to empower women as voters. For example, a safe and secure voting environment in conjunction with increased education, media exposure, and access to information have helped women cast a vote that is indicative of their personal opinion and beliefs. Overall, decreased social barriers have allowed women to use their votes as a tool of power and a way to make their voice heard. As Mukulika Banerjee, an anthropologist at the London School of Economics, explains in her book, Why India Votes, "Women in India are told what to wear, what to cook, what to say, how to behave, where to go. But with voting, there is a very clear sense that this is one instance that they're able to register their own opinion."[64]

Increased female voter turnout has further helped promote the "feminisation of Indian politics," as a positive feedback loop exists between women voters and the prominence of women's issues. Women voters are more likely to encourage "wom-

en-centered policies, such as issues relating to safety, health and sexual assault."[65,66] Furthermore, although increased female turnout is indicative of a more inclusive political environment, "this feminisation of politics" continues to face opposition from "male-dominated political establishment and party personnel, apparatuses and procedures."[67] Women continue to be absent from top political positions and have a substantially lower presence than men in the Lok Sabha as well as other legislative bodies throughout the country.[68] Finally, as the Women's Reservation Bill continues to be a divisive issue, it is imperative that women voters continue to feel equipped and empowered to independently exercise their vote in order to further diversify and open up the political sphere.

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The U.N.'s Instrumental Negligence During Haiti's 2010 Cholera Epidemic

Amelia Ali

During their tenure in Haiti, United Nations peacekeepers poorly disposed of human fecal matter and contaminated the Meye tributary system of Haiti's longest river, the Artibonite. A pathogenic strain of the Vibrio cholera bacterium was inadvertently imported and spread as substantial rainfall and the breakdown of sanitary infrastructure accelerated interaction between contaminated water and humans. Because thousands of Haitians utilize the river water for washing, bathing, agricultural irrigating, drinking, and recreation, scores were exposed to the pathogen; in a country of 10 million people, one in five individuals became seriously ill with cholera making the disease endemic in the island nation. Despite orally vaccinating high-exposure areas with the cholera drug Shanchol, significantly reducing the disease burden will require more institutional intervention as mortality persists.[1]

The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates annually that between 3 and 5 million people are affected worldwide by cholera, with over 100,000 cases resulting in death.[2] After the devastating earthquake in October of 2010, Haiti accounted for 57% of all cholera cases and 53% of deaths reported to the WHO.[3] If left untreated, individuals with cholera experience diarrhea, vomiting, dehydration and may be die in less than twelve hours. Haitians do not possess substantive immunity, and projections estimate 1,000 deaths annually until the endemic disease is eradicated in the country.[4] Concern arises because the unusually virulent strain has spread across the Caribbean, into South America, and the United States; as of 2014, the pathogen was reported in countries such as the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Mexico.[5]

Results of comprehensive genomic analysis and phylogenetic analysis show the pathogen strain isolated in Haiti resembled epidemic, clonal isolates from Nepal. This variant has the propensity of protracting outbreaks.[6] Piarroux et al. concluded that the point source of contamination was a Nepalese camp near the town of Mirebalais, where encamped men dumped up to 1,000 liters of contaminated feces into local waters despite outward public reassurances that all was well.[7] Sanitary deficiencies and poor waste disposal into an open septic disposal pit catalyzed the first alert of an outbreak in less than 48 hours, which directly caused 1,766 hospitalizations, 3,020 cholera cases and 129 deaths.[8] Rainfall contributed toward producing environmental conditions optimal for the pathogen's proliferation and circulation.

Haiti received a total of 209 mm rainfall, with 26 out of the 30 rain days pre-

Amelia Ali is junior, double majoring in English and Environmental Studies. She is from Philadelphia, PA. She loves to study the intersectionality of global health and environmental degradation and development, specifically on the African continent. She hopes to attend law school after Dartmouth, where she hopes to pursue a concentration in humanitarian or environmental law. This paper was originally written for Professor Bill Roebuck's course, "Global Environmental Health".

ceding the first reported cholera case (See Figure 1).[9] Communities where water and sanitation infrastructure had been destroyed or were non-existent experienced particularly high contamination levels, especially in seven communes downstream of the Artibonite River (Figure 2).[10] Further evidence of the strong correlation between rainfall and exposure shows most affected individuals worked or resided in rice fields alongside a stretch of the river.Further, reports indicate that 67% of people drink untreated water from the river or canals.[11]

In the years since exposure, incidence has lowered but the pathogen's mortality and morbidity continues. By October 20, 2012, the health ministry reported 604,634 cases, 329,697 hospitalizations, and 7,436 deaths from cholera.[12] Children observed playing near the unrestricted site were most susceptible. Those under 5 years of age accounted for 78,938 cases (13.1%), 34,394 hospitalizations (10.4%), and 580 deaths (7.8%) (Figure 3).[13] By June 30, 2013, 663,134 cases, 366,995 (55.3%) hospitalizations, and 8,160 (1.2%) deaths were reported.[14]

New technologies are imperative to combatting exposure in the years since the outbreak. Attempts at controlling cholera are hindered by inadequate medical systems and sanitation, so new technologies like bivalent whole cell oral cholera vaccines (OCV) are of utmost importance. Ivers et al. found that OCVs were highly immunogenic in Haitian adults and children, which conferred protection beyond 6 months and up to 2 years.[15] The Haitian government authorized two pilot studies to assess the practicality of the Shanchol vaccine in urban and rural areas of the country. Charles et al. found the proportion of vaccinated Haitians, who demonstrated vibriocidal seroconversion, approached or exceeded 75% across all age cohorts.[16] These seroconversion rates parallel successful vaccinations seen in Bangladesh, where community coverage in the region was between 62.5-92.7%.[17] Charles et al. illustrated that robust immune responses to bivalent oral cholera vaccine Shanchol can effectively remediate the pathogen among Haitian adults and children. Invers et al. concluded that the most effective strategy combines public health interventions that include the use of OCV while expanding access to clean water and sanitation. Haiti's vaccination campaign was strongly associated with significant improvements in knowledge of cholera and practices related to waterborne disease.[18] Although Haiti is taking the necessary steps, the available OCV supply is not sufficient to vaccinate the entire Haitian population with the required two-dose regimen.[19]

It seems that no clear end is in sight for Haiti and the rest of the Caribbean. The South Asian pathogenic strain's presence placed the UN in a peculiar position. If held responsible for the cholera outbreak, the UN will be helpless against lawsuits from around the world, citing misconduct over actions of its peacekeeping forces. Although Haiti's vaccination campaign appears to be flourishing, the pathogen appears to be as well because of the Caribbean's warm climate. The public must be mindful in its visits to the Caribbean, and take preemptive measures to prevent contracting cholera.

Notes

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APPENDIX

Figure 1:



Monthly rainfall in Haiti in 2010 compared with historical rainfall data.

Figure 2:



Cholera cases in Mirebalais, seven communes (St. Marc, Dessalines, Desdunes, Grande Saline, Lestere, Petite-Rivière-de-l'Artibonite, Verrettes) and other communes (data obtained from Piarroux and others). Daily rainfall data were obtained from teh Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission stellite (black).

Figure 3:



Cases of Cholera in Haiti during a 2-year period, according to age.

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World Outlook Sits Down with Stephen Kotkin

Stephen Mark Kotkin is an American historian, academic and author. He is currently a professor in history and international affairs at Princeton University and a fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution.

***World Outlook**: First off, thanks so much for agreeing to meet with us. I'm sure you've had a pretty busy couple of hours while you've been on campus, but we appreciate you taking the time. Could you start a little bit by telling us about you background, how you got interested in your field, when you decided or how you decided you wanted to specialize in Eurasian history, stuff like that.*

Stephen Mark Kotkin: You know, that's not a simple story and it could take a while, if you really want to know the truth. It wasn't foreseen. I didn't plan it. I went to university as a pre-med and did very well in science, especially chemistry, but during a molecular biology seminar in the hospital for people who have done the best in chemistry, a select invitation-only class - during the operation, I fainted, but I threw up first so I fainted in my throw up. It was the end of my pre-med career despite having very high grades. So, I ended up changing to English, became an English major. The advisor in English told me I needed an allied field, eight courses in English and four courses in an allied field. I said I have more than four courses in high level math and he said I'm sorry that's not an allied field so you need to take some history. Had I not fainted at the sight of blood or had he recognized math as an allied field for the English major I don't know if we would be sitting here today.

***WO**: Very interesting.*

Kotkin: I could go into greater detail but it's sillier and sillier. So therefore, my whole life I've focused on the question of unintended consequences.

***WO**: Interesting. Good little segue there. Could you talk a little bit about a what you make of the current state of U.S.-Russia relations and do you see it as being singularly unique the way it is right now or do you see any parallels from the past one hundred years of so.*

Kotkin: When do you remember U.S.-Russia relations being good?

***WO**: Never.*

Kotkin: Certainly not since the U.S. has been a great power - there has never been a sustained period of good relations. There have been moments of cooperation or episodes of cooperation. There was the WWII alliance which was very difficult. Nei-

ther side coordinated any military activities and there was a tremendous amount of distrust. That was the high point of the relationship. So, it is not as different now as people assume. The periods of good relations or lack of conflict are rare except if you go back to before the U.S. was a great power, like for example the time of the American Revolution. So, relations are difficult. Why are they difficult? Are they difficult because we have misunderstandings, we misunderstand them or they misunderstand us and if we just talked a little bit more we could be friends? Or is there something else going on? I believe that it is not a misunderstanding. I believe that there is a fundamental clash of interests. The United States' grand strategy more or less, to simplify, is to prevent the domination of any world region by any power.

***WO**: Other than the US.*

Kotkin: So, no domination by a European power of Europe. No domination by an East Asian power in East Asia. No domination of Eurasia. We've succeeded in that. That's been tremendously successful, supremely important, for world stability grand strategy. What's Russia's grand strategy? The U.S.: prevent domination of any particular country in its region. What's the Russian grand strategy? It's dominate its region.

***WO**: It's fundamentally irreconcilable.*

Kotkin: Correct. Let's move to values. Let's talk about values. What's the supreme value in American political culture?

***WO:** Freedom?*

Kotkin: Correct, it's freedom. What's the supreme value in Russian political culture?

***WO**: Order and state control?*

Kotkin: Correct. So, it is a fundamental clash of values as well. So, there is a fundamental clash of geopolitical interests and a fundamental clash of values. So therefore, it shouldn't be shocking the relationship is complicated and often bad. Now it can be managed better or worse. There can be good policies or poor policies, but nonetheless, it's hard to see how these fundamental differences are overcome, and if they can't be overcome, then you can't expect greater understanding. So, you know, if we just talk to them a little more, or if we just respect them a little bit more, all the things we hear as advice about how we can improve relations, you can't expect those things to fundamentally alter the relationship. They can improve it, they can better manage the fundamental clash of interests or values. So having said that, it is pretty remarkable how much Russia dominates American consciousness given the size of Russia's economy, the weight that it carries in the world in reality as opposed to perception,

the other issues that carry importance. It is shocking that we allow Russia to occupy this much mental space in U.S. political culture. The Soviet economy was 1/3rd of the U.S. economy at its peak and it was pretty impressive in terms of its military industrial complex. 40,000 nuclear weapons, 40,000 chemical weapons, incredible delivery systems of great accuracy, and a biological weapons program, 650,000 troops in East Europe, including 400,00 in East Germany. The Soviet Union was pretty significant, but Russia is 1/15th the size of the U.S. economy with no forces in Eastern Europe. In fact, Russia is farther for Europe than at any time since Peter the Great, territorial wise. And to think, somehow, that they are this colossal power or this colossal challenge, is pretty remarkable how things are in U.S. political culture.

***WO**: This past spring, I was fortunate enough to talk to former Ambassador Dan Fried, and we talked about the U.S.-Russia relationship, especially in light of allegations about interference in our elections. He mentioned that he had a conversation with some of his Russian friends discussing why the relationship was so cold, they jokingly remakred that it's easier to hate America than it is to deal with China which is a lot more complicated now that they're a rising power. So I was wondering from the Russian perspective, what are some of the challenges that dominate the Russian political consciousness, such as China, and how do you think that it'll implicate our relationship with China as well?*

Kotkin: So, Russia is a great civilization. It has remarkable achievements. Can we imagine world culture today without, and I could not list how many names, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Tchaikovsky, and on and on it goes. In so many fields of endeavor, science, engineering, mathematics, chess, Russia has done and earned a place in the world of significance. Russia's challenge is that it wants to be in the first rank of world powers. It calls itself or envisions itself as a providential power, a power under God with a special mission in the world. But, it doesn't have the capabilities that match its aspirations. It's powerful, but it's not in the first rank. The West has always been more powerful than Russia and has the technology, superior technology, that Russia needs and often purchase or obtains some other way. So, in this, as it were, divergence between aspirations to be in the absolute top rank and capabilities that are not in the absolute top rank, although are impressive, Russia looks for ways to make up. This is usually recourse to the state, building a strong state. Russia uses the state instrument to manage or, most ambitiously, overcome the gap with the West. This leads to spurts, economic spurts for example, followed by periods of stagnation. It leads to a certain degree of coercion as they try to force their way into a higher form of competition, a higher place in the competition with the West. And then the quest for the strong state also leads to personal rule. Every single time they end up not with a strong state, but with a single ruler. And so, this providential power, special mission in the world, capabilities that don't quite match that, although they are impressive, recourse to the strong state which is coercive and leads to spurts followed by prolonged stagnation and then personal power, or personal rule. This

picture varies, it's not the same exactly throughout the sweep of modern Russian history, but it's there in variants. There is a Czarian variant, a Soviet variant, and now a post-Soviet variant. So, it is a geopolitical conundrum that Russia faces. Either it wants to relinquish its aspirations, which it doesn't want to do, or it has to find these mechanisms, these tools, these asymmetric ways to make up for the gap. If we end up with conflation with state interest and personal rule, everybody assumes for example that the survival of Putin's regime is equal to Russian state interests. I would argue that it's not true, but the argument of the Russians is that Putin equals Russian state interests. So, you have this conflation of personal rule and state interests.

So, this Russia problem or this Russia conundrum, which is not of the United States' making, the United States doesn't create this, doesn't cause this. This is something that is internal to Russia's own geography, history, political culture and dynamic. This is a problem that can be managed from a U.S. point of view. From a Russian point of view, the goal is to diminish the power of the West. Because if Russian power is relational to Western power, and if it's difficult to raise Russian power, you can lower or diminish Western power. You can divide, confuse, undermine the West. People say NATO doesn't matter anymore. Then why does Russia spend so much time trying to divide NATO if it's so insignificant. Russia's actions vis-à-vis NATO and the EU testify to their significance. Alliances are valuable, Russia doesn't have any alliances, we do. So, this behavior on their part, this strategy of diminishing the outside that is stronger than them is perfectly understandable given their premises that we just talked about. But if the West is unified, if the West understands it's strength, if the West is not intimidated, if the West knows that it is more powerful and uses its instruments, then Russia has a more difficult time. China, to some people in Russia, is seen as an alternative, a form of de facto partnership because China also measures itself against Western or American power and wants to diminish Western or American power to raise itself. So, Russia seems superficial aligned in this regard. However, China's strategy of a grand Eurasia, revival of the Silk Road, one belt, one road, and various other slogans that can be used to help define China's own strategy, are at the expense of Russia. So, Russian elites fully understand while China seems to be a de facto power in standing up to the west, Russia doesn't have a strategy for standing up to China. So, Russia refuses to be the junior partner to the United States, but it then risks becoming the junior partner to China. So that's their dilemma.

Now you would say, "OK, if I were in that situation, I would make more alliances, try to get more friends, hedge not only against the West but hedge against China, maybe even choose the West over China for the long term, potentially. I'd invest in human capital, infrastructure, and all the things that underline, that underpin great power status. But Russia doesn't do that.

Anywhere between five and ten million Russians since 1991 have left the country and lived beyond the confines of the old Soviet Union. So that's London, Berlin, Vienna, Tel Aviv, New York, Princeton, Hanover. Moreover, those Russians, that five to ten million – there's no census of these Russians, so this is an estimate, we don't know for sure – but that very substantial number of people are earning twenty per cent above the median in all the countries they're living in. So that tells you they're talented people. They're some of the best educated, most entrepreneurial people that that country has produced. And they've lost them now. And they've lost them without necessarily crying over that loss. In some ways they're happy they're gone because they don't vote any more inside Russia, they don't contribute to opinion polls about whether the régime is popular, they don't protest in the streets. They are no longer a political factor inside Russia. But that's a huge loss of human capital. The entire middle class inside Russia now is only ten million-strong.

Can you imagine if the U.S. were willing to give up a group of people the size of its middle class, to keep the political regime in place? If we were willing to just kick them out and let them go, and let them contribute to other people's economies, people would think we had gone nuts, that we were insane. Who would make a sacrifice that big? So that what Russia looks like.

When it looks like Russia is winning, when it looks like Russia's got the upper hand, when it looks like Russia's more daring, whether that be Syria or Crimea or whatever people point to, you have to remember the facts. No long-term strategy, no investment domestically on a significant scale in human capital and infrastructure. Willingness to give up or force out some of their best people in large scale. And playing a strategic game in which China is eating their lunch.

So to me, if I were a Russian patriot – and in fact, I have very positive feelings about Russia – I would consider the current regime not a defense of Russian interests. The posture of standing up the West is a costly cul-de-sac for Russia. They need a better strategy, and most of their elites understand this, even if there's some psychological satisfaction in poking the U.S. in the eye.

WO: *People have a tendency to talk about Putin as a master strategist and someone who is single-handedly responsible for causing the perceived frostiness in relations between the U.S. and Russia. But as you just kind of pointed out he's also costing Russia tremendous amounts of money, and infrastructural development through losses in human capital, refusal to modernise, stuff like that. Do you think then that, in an almost counter-intuitive way, a Russia that is led by someone who was willing to encourage that but still had those same sort of Russian ambitions of expansion in Eurasia, would actually lead to worse relations, or higher tensions at least, between the U.S. and Russia?*

Kotkin: You know, this is bigger than Putin. Putin is a significant figure. People can come to power by all sorts of accidental ways, but staying in power for long periods of time requires a level of skill, aptitude, intelligence, diligence…

WO: *Seventeen years and counting…*

Kotkin: Right. So, whatever we think of how he got to power, he's been in power for quite some time. So that's an achievement. It's a perverse achievement, because it's an authoritarian regime, but it's still an achievement and we must give him his due. Is he the singular cause of the difficult relations? Obviously not. It is, as I said, the fundamental clash of geopolitical interests and fundamental clash of values. Moreover, in some ways, the culture produced Putin and supports Putin's posture. If we believe in democracy, we have to acknowledge that even under authoritarian regimes you can have popular support for, for example, confrontational policies with the US. Anti-Americanism is the single most widespread ideology in the world. Pro-Americanism is a close second. America organizes a lot of people's politics. The Russians are too obsessed with the United States, just as we are too obsessed with Russia.

Having said that, Russia's long-term game must involve additional technology transfer. They cannot be in confrontation with the West forever. So the pattern that we see is pulling back from confrontation at some point to try to get to a détente, or a less confrontational posture, in order to improve economic ties to permit technology transfer and acquisition. You can do that sometimes on a limited basis – have bad relations but try to get Exxon Mobil's Arctic drilling technology. In other words, that's a one-off, it's extremely important to the Russians, very valuable to them. Do they really need overall good relations or can they have poor relations with us and pick off that technology, for example?

But nonetheless, for Russia it's important to have better relations with the countries that are rich. Trading with them is valuable, and acquiring their technology is valuable. So I predict that the Russians will at some point make gestures to diminish the tensions, even though it looks very advantageous for them politically.

The problem in Russia is the one that we see time and time again. The regime needs to liberalise, but liberalisation is the end of the regime. To open up, to introduce better governance, to stop the confrontational posture, threatens the regime itself. And so regime survival is now trumping regime modernisation. But long term requires modernisation. And so that's the tension that they always get involved in. And sometimes it has led to collapse, and sometimes it's led to spurts of reform, and sometimes it's led to crack-down and confrontation, but that's a familiar dynamic. The confrontation for Russia's purposes can't last forever, however good it seems in the moment.

WO: *Do you think that a post-Putin Russia, if and when we end up seeing that, do you think that's going to mean better, worse or unclear in terms of the relationship with the United States?*

Kotkin: Yeah, so, I'm not sure I will see a post-Putin Russia. It could be that you'll see one. He's healthy, he's relatively young. Brezhnev did 18 years. He was quite sick, for much of it – not for the beginning part: he was extremely vigorous – but towards the end he was quite ill, but he nonetheless did 18 years. Putin is just about there with Brezhnev's longevity, and much younger and healthier. Stalin did about 30 years. Putin has quite a way to go, but could well beat Stalin's record. He could also stay in power the Chinese way, which is to relinquish his formal posts and just become, quote, paramount leader, behind the scenes. That option certainly seems plausible in the Russian case. So a post-Putin Russia could be quite different. History is full of surprises.

But the issue would be whether or not the U.S. would walk away from its strategy of preventing domination in any particular region, or the Russians would walk away from their strategy of seeking to achieve that. If one of those two things happened, or both potentially, then there's great room for improvement in relations.

Another thing that would potentially affect not only U.S.-Russia relations but Russia's future would be economically advantageous scalable alternative energies. Alternative energy right now is not as competitive as hydrocarbons in the market place. It's not only about the price of each, or whether they're priced properly, subsidies et cetera, it's also about the performance of the companies. Because alternative energy companies need to win in the marketplace, they need to be as good at the marketplace as Exxon Mobil is in the marketplace. We could see that in your lifetime, we don't see it now. If we did see the end of the hydrocarbon energy regime, that would potentially be decisive in the Russian case, in terms of pressure on the political system to undertake changes that they're otherwise reluctant to change, because the cash stops. The hydrocarbon revenues– which is the way in which you don't have to make hard choices, you continually have this fantastic hydrocarbon revenue stream, and you can put off any hard choices, and you can keep on doing what you're doing and getting away with it. Not if the tap were to be turned off.

But I don't know how close we are. I mean, it's up to your generation to reinvent the global energy regime. But in the marketplace, Silicon Valley used to be known for economic entrepreneurs. Now it's a lot of political entrepreneurs. They go to Washington and they grab subsidies for so-called alternative energy. And that's one way to do it. But that's not a long-term winnable strategy in the marketplace. Companies have to get better at delivering that energy – and remember, it's a competition. Oil is

an incredible technology, incredible resource. It's plentiful, it's extractable, it's transportable, it's refinable, it's convertible. There's a reason we have a hydrocarbon energy régime. But if that that changed, that would be really different for Russia, and for Russia's calculus. Not only Russia, the Middle East as well. The U.S. is a major global energy power in hydrocarbons, absolutely major. Better now than when I was your age. But if the global energy regime changed, the U.S. would change easily. It would adapt. Its economy would adapt. Investment would adapt. It wouldn't fall of a cliff. Russia, however, is a system that is politically dependent on those revenues, on that energy regime. So we'll see. You guys get to work.

WO: *Sounds good. In that vein, do you have any advice for any undergrads that are interested in government or history, as far as how best to kind of pursue a position to get to, a place where you are? I know you mentioned that your path was very unusual, and I think that's actually common when you speak with a lot of professors. They mention that the path that they happened to take was very unusual. How best do you plan for that unusual, unexpected plan, if that makes sense?*

Kotkin: So there are three kinds of capital that are important. There's human capital, there's social capital, and there's financial capital. Financial capital looks decisive. After all, who wants to be poor? Financial capital is the least important of those three. Human capital and the social capital are by far more important than the financial capital. Because the financial capital follows, first of all. So human capital means investing in yourself- meaning as much education as you can get, as many languages as you can master, as much experiences outside your comfort zone as you can risk. Learning. Stretching. Challenging. Doing. That's the human capital piece. If each year of your life, you're making massive deposits into your human capital, you're going to be fine. Then there's the social capital piece, also really critically important. That has to do with the people you know. You want different walks of life. You want different kinds of people. You want a network, or you want social capital, that's as deep and varied as you can make it. That's reciprocal! You do things for people, they do things back. You volunteer your time, you participate in stuff, you join things, you give of yourself – that's where you acquire the social capital.

So you continually acquire human and social capital, and your life is going to be a great life and the financial capital will likely follow. Financial capital is a matter of sufficiency. Once you have sufficient financial capital, you're good. To be able to pursue your passions, that's all you need. Now, if you're going to plan a family, have kids, put kids through college and all of that, you need a sufficient amount of financial capital. Do you need a 17-bedroom house or a 7-bedroom house – that's up to you to decide. How much financial capital do you acquire? But there's a minimum that's necessary and that minimum has to do with, usually, family issues but not exclusively family issues, and that varies depending on where you live. Because some

places are less expensive, the standard of living can be higher with less financial capital because the cost of living is low. But that's the thing that students your age worry too much about. Some of it is pressure your parents put on, some of it is pressure your peers put on, and the attention that's paid to the human and the social capital is less. I'm guessing that you guys have been investing heavily in the human and the social capital up til now – even without necessarily talking about it like that.

***WO**: Yeah, I'd agree with that.*

Kotkin*:* Okay, so continue that. The other piece is the ethics piece. We tend no longer to teach ethics, or no longer to make moral character a major part of a liberal arts education. This is a significant mistake. It's very important to have some ethical understanding. Understand what the basis of character is and to behave with that understanding upmost in your mind. To always do the right thing, to never cut corners, to never do anything at someone else's expense. Even if nobody is looking, even if you're not going to be caught. You have to always do the right thing you have to live ethically, you have to have an ethical practice, and you have to understand this. You have to be self-conscious about your ethics. What's a good life? What's proper behavior? What's the right thing to do? This ought to be part of our conversation, a normal part of our conversation. It should be part of our curriculum, it should be how we talk to peers, it should be how we think ourselves.

So, if you do the human and the social capital piece, and you have an ethical approach, and an ethical understanding in your life, I think you got a great future. You'll be resilient. Life is about resiliency in crisis. Everyone has a crisis. Everyone makes mistakes. We've created a campus culture in the United States which is risk adverse. People are afraid to take risks – resume building, protecting the GPA – it's a mistake. We've done this. The students haven't done it, we've done it, the grown-ups have. The result is that people don't know how to take intelligent risks, and they don't know how to fail. People don't fail enough. I didn't learn anything from my successes. I thought I was brilliant when I had a success rather than lucky, but when I failed it forced a little bit of rethinking, especially if it happened more than once. Failure is amazing. It's the best teacher – provided it's not failure which comes from poorly calculated risk taking. Where the risk is too high and the reward is too small even if it works. Risk-reward calculation where you should take calculated risks where the reward is really high and the risks are manageable. So being able to fail, to take some calculated risks, to learn from your mistakes, to be a little bit humble, this is also an important quality for success in life. Then, like I said, you got to be ready to be lucky.

You know there was this golfer named Gary Player. He was excellent, and he won a tournament. A lot of the puts he took went around the cup, kinda lipped the cup and instead of lipping out, they lipped in. The announcer said, "Gary congratulations," you know the TV announcer with the microphone, again said, "Gary,

congratulations for winning the tournament. You were pretty lucky out there today." And Gary said, "yes, you know, I was, and the more I practice the luckier I get." Because in order for the cup to lip in, it's got to be on the lip. You got to be ready to be lucky, and you get ready to be lucky by working really hard.

You can't have people outwork you. If people are out working you, it's gotta drive you crazy. You gotta say, how come that person can outwork me? When you're gifted, you have good genes from your parents, you have excellent upbringing from your parents, you have admission to something like Dartmouth College, you can begin to think that you're so good, you don't have to actually work for it, and in fact, you show up – well, you don't even show up to class. You just do a little cramming, you take the test, you fool the professor, you get the A-, you may even get an A! I don't know that's the way we succeed in life. It's certainly the way one can succeed in college. I see it with smart kids all the time at Princeton University, which is one of the reasons why I demand more from the students. The reason I demand more from the students is that the more you demand, the more you get. The harder you are, the more they deliver. But these are all banal points. These are more obvious to people like you. Nothing that I've said here is something you didn't know before you asked the question.

There are things that we really want to believe, deeply, deeply want to believe. We so want to believe them, they're so close to our heart, that all we do is go out and look for information that confirms it. If something contradicts what we want to believe, we look away, explain it away, dismiss it, and then we grab on to those things. "Ah hah! Here's the evidence." This is what I want to believe. The problem with that is, what we want to believe and what we should believe don't always align. So what's the answer?

Let's imagine that you are in the hedge fund industry, and you heard from somebody, then you heard it from somebody else, and then you read some reports that in the aluminum business, inventories were low. And you also heard that there was going to be a big order, a massive order for stuff that required aluminum. One Middle Eastern country was going to buy a whole bunch of stuff from Boeing or wherever it might be, Airbus, and you said to yourself, "my God, if inventories are low and demand is going up, the price of aluminum is going to skyrocket. I'm going to bet $250 million in the futures market, the commodities future market on the rising price of aluminum." You go out and do that but you're wrong. That's going to be a very expensive mistake. You're going to pay big money to make that mistake, so what are you going to do? You have this hunch. You've got something that you want to believe that could potentially make you a bigger fortune than you already got. What are you going to do if you're the hedge fund guy?

You're going to go out and work like a dog looking for evidence that contradicts what you want to believe. You're going to work day and night, 24/7, to disprove

your hunch that the price of aluminum is going up. You're going to find every piece of evidence against your view that's out there. No matter what stone you have to turn over – every stone gets turned over. Now if it turns out you don't find any evidence that contradicts your point of view, you're going to make that bet. You're going to bet big on the price of aluminum going up, and you're going to be a happy guy, because you're going to be right. But if you find the evidence that contradicts, you find inventories are not that low in certain places, wherever that might be. You go to Russia. You go to South Africa, right? You do the investigation. You find out the right story. You don't bet on the price going up on aluminum. You're a happy guy too, because you didn't lose that bet. So, what do we do in the social science and humanities? What do we do in the government department, for example, or history? Do we actively go out and search for information that contradicts what we want to believe?

***WO**: I think so. I think in a lot of political science, you set a null, and you go out to disprove it or prove it based on what you find.*

Kotkin: That's what we hope happens. That's exactly what we want to see happen. Will we want to see that with our political beliefs also?

***WO:** No*

Kotkin*:* Okay, so that's the problem, isn't it? People stick to their interpretations even when the contrary evidence comes through. So that's the challenge. It's a real challenge. We're going to hold our beliefs. We are who are. Our beliefs can evolve. There's nothing wrong with having beliefs, but the issue is being willing to put them to the test. The more you're willing to put your beliefs to the test, the more you can engage in dialog with people who have other kinds of beliefs, and that's really a big challenge in universities. I'm not familiar with the campus culture here at Dartmouth. This is only my second visit here.

***WO:** I would imagine it's not too different.*

Kotkin*:* But I'm familiar with what it is back home where I've been working. This is my 29th year at Princeton University, and I got to say that we're not always as good as we need to be about actively, proactively looking for evidence that contradicts what we want to believe. If we did that more, life would be better. We'd be better people, and dialogue would be easier. It's not just a willingness to hear people out, though that's good too. It's a willingness to subject yourself to the scientific method. That's much harder, and I have a hard time with that myself I have to confess. There are things I so want to believe that when I see contradictory evidence, I want it to go away. I deeply want it to go away. At the same time, I've trained myself that when evidence contradicts what I've written or said or told people in the classroom, I'll pick it up. I'll want to look at it further.

I'll go against my instincts to preserve my view to try to test it. That's really import-

ant, and that's a lesson that took me a while to learn. Nobody taught me that lesson. It's something that I learned from my mistakes. But I think it's potentially valuable for young people.