

IDEAL ISLAMISTS? APPLYING THE TURKISH MODEL TO EGYPT

Azhar Unwala

The 2011 Egyptian revolution and subsequent 2013 military coup poses uncertainties about the future of Egypt's governance as well as the role Islamists hold in that future. Many point to Turkey's Islamist-leaning AKP as an accomplished model by which Egypt's Islamists can replicate. While copying Turkey provides an untenable and unrealistic solution for Egypt in the near term, the successes of Turkish Islamists provide strategic and tactical lessons for their Egyptian counterparts in movement-building, party politics, and governance.

The 2011 Egyptian revolution and subsequent 2013 military coup pose uncertainties about the future of Egypt's governance. The Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party's (FJP) success in Egypt's 2011-2012 parliamentary elections sparked further inquiries about Islamism's role in Egyptian politics. These inquiries often referenced the applicability of the 'Turkish model' to Egypt. This was due to the Turkish, Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party's (AKP) electoral and policy accomplishments. Egypt's adoption of Turkey's model was professed by high-level Turkish and Egyptian officials, politicians, scholars, and activists.¹ Consequently, this paper evaluates the Turkish model's relevance to Egypt with a focus on political Islam and democratic governance. Part I briefly examines the Turkish model for political Islam and its developments. Part II analyzes the contrasting nature of Turkey and Egypt's Islamist politics. Drawing upon the Turkish experience, Part III offers key insights to Egyptian Islamism. While the Turkish model cannot be replicated in Egypt, it offers valuable strategic and tactical lessons for Egypt's Islamists.

I. THE TURKISH MODEL: KEMALISM TO ISLAMISM

Understanding Turkish political Islam requires grasping Turkey's founding Kemalist principles. Enshrined by Turkey's first president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, these principles stressed secularism, or religion's separation from the public sphere as well as state control of religion; republicanism, or politics based on rule of law and popular sovereignty; nationalism, or promotion of Turkish citizen identity; populism, or devolution of political power to citizenship; statism, or state-led economic development; and revolutionism, or continuous political adaptation and reform.² From these principles, the state employed all imams as civil servants, banned religious education

Azhar Unwala received his B.S. in International Politics and Arab Studies from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service in May 2016. He is currently a media intelligence and political risk analyst in Washington D.C focusing on Middle East affairs. This paper was originally written to satisfy his Certificate in Contemporary Arab Studies from Georgetown University.

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and propaganda, latinized the Turkish language from its Arabic antecedent, and mandated the call to prayer occur in Turkish. The state also pursued immense modernization projects, provided widespread citizen freedoms, and promoted ‘Turkish-ness’ as a principal national identity. Turkish identity promotion was complemented by subjugation of ethnic or religious identities like Islamism or Kurdish-ness, which Kemalism regarded as anti-modern. In many ways, Kemalism sought to erase Turkey’s Ottoman heritage to become a Western-style republic.³

Originally, Islamism emerged in opposition to Atatürk’s agenda. Kemalism was supported by the urban elite and middle class who benefited from state development projects. Yet the authoritarian tendencies of Kemalist reforms were uneasily digested by the urban poor, Anatolian peasantry, and ethnic groups like the Kurds. These marginalized groups could not identify with vague Kemalist tenets and failed to see the ideology’s tangible benefits. Islam instead provided them with a historical and cultural identity. Moreover, Islamists viewed secularism as weakening Turkey. Secularism diminished the strength associated with the Ottoman empire and fomented ethnic and political cleavages that Islam could otherwise cement.⁴

Yet Turkey’s multiparty period after 1950 both politicized and moderated Islamist groups. Of the 24 parties competing in the 1946 parliamentary race, eight had Islamic themes in their programs. Many Islamists joined centrist ‘catch-all’ parties to promote their agenda. For the next 30 years, the governments under Adnan Menderes’ Demokrat Parti and Suleyman Demirel’s Justice Party relaxed state regulation of religious expression. Unlike the harsh secularism practiced by Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party in prior years, these later governments reinstated religious education, restored the Arabic call to prayer, and permitted women to wear the veil in public.⁵ It was in this permissive environment that Islamist political parties were formed.

Necmettin Erbakan’s National Salvation Party was the first Islamist party to gain parliamentary seats in the 1973 elections. The party’s popularity stemmed from its economic program designed to promote industrialization, reduce inflation, and improve social welfare. Erbakan’s Islamist Welfare Party later gained a parliamentary majority in 1996 after prior municipal election successes, productive welfare distribution schemes, and effective grassroots mobilization. In both cases, Erbakan’s parties understood that Islamist ideology could not win elections unless it could deliver tangible benefits to the electorate. Still, the parties were shut down respectively by the 1980 military coup and a 1998 Constitutional Court ruling, which banned then-Prime Minister Erbakan from politics. This was because the parties also depended on their Islamist base, which Erbakan had secured through radicalization. While Erbakan announced his parties’ support for entry into the EU Customs Union and a Turkish-Israeli peace accord, he also called for the recreation of the Caliphate, criticized free trade’s “immodesty”, and tacitly valorized Hamas’s violent jihad in the Palestinian intifada. Islamist pressure also forced Erbakan to support religious schooling that produced radical attitudes towards the secular state. Along these lines, the parties’ closure upheld the Turkish constitution’s secular mandate.⁶

From the demise of Erbakan's Islamist politics ascended Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's AKP in 2001. In contrast to 2001 Felicity Party's traditionalism, the AKP branded itself as the reformist offshoot of Erbakan's Welfare Party. Erdoğan learned that Turkish Islamist parties had to account for a diverse electorate's needs, a secular political system, Constitutional Court mediation, and possible military intervention. Consequently, the AKP was formed as a conservative democratic party without explicit Islamist affiliations. The AKP program affirms Turkey's secular state and defines secularism as rights to belief and personal ethics. Additional rights are based on international charters, European Union accession is a key goal, and governance will provide practical outputs aimed at economic growth. The result has been an AKP single-party government for most of the past decade under Erdoğan's leadership.⁷

II. APPLYING THE TURKISH MODEL TO EGYPT

A. ORIGINS AND LEGACIES

Political Islam's role in Turkey and Egypt is shaped by the countries' varying colonial legacies. The legacy of Turkic superiority is a source of pride for much of Turkish society. The ascendancy of the 11th century Seljuk empire and the Ottoman empire's 600-year dominance still permeates Turkish identity. Even after the Ottoman loss in World War I, Atatürk successfully halted the Treaty of Sèvres's goal of partitioning Anatolia under European control. In this fashion, the Turkish Republic was established without foreign occupation or colonial legacy. Kemalism emerged as a home-grown ideology, and Atatürk's secular pronouncements were largely continuations of 20th century Ottoman reforms designed to compete with European powers. As a result, Turkey's Kemalist principles had robust domestic legitimacy. Turks largely understood modernization, westernization, nationalism, and secularism to be in their interests.⁸ Turkish political Islam has remained generally consistent with these principles. While some Turkish Islamists critique westernization's destabilization of the Turkish social order, they still support Western engagement and adoption of the West's political virtues.⁹

In contrast, Egypt possesses a potent colonial history. The Ottoman Khedive dynasty ruled Egypt for nearly four centuries before ceding sovereignty to the British after World War I. Four decades of British occupation of Egypt fomented hostility towards the West. Even Egypt's 1953 independence is understood to be the result of British consent over the Egyptian struggle's success.¹⁰ As a result, Egyptian Islamism associated many Western practices and values with colonialism. The Muslim Brotherhood's 1928 formation aimed to resist westernization, occupation, and Israel's creation. For the Brotherhood's founder Hassan al-Banna, Islam needed to be resistance's starting point. From there, Islam could produce national reforms, unlike Turkey's political Islam, which sought to inject Islamic identity and values into the Kemalist framework.¹¹

These differing colonial legacies impact political Islam's nature in Turkey and Egypt. The enduring strength of Turkey's Kemalist identity suggests that it does not

have to directly compete with Islamism. Turkish political Islam instead aims to correct certain Kemalist failures. This is in contrast to Egyptian Islamism, which functions as a compartmentalized ideology with distinct state goals. Egyptian Islamism is also situated in a political environment where national identity is routinely contested. In Egypt, Islamism must compete and distinguish itself with Pan-Arabism, which characterized the post-colonial, secular Arab socialist republics and Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt. As a result, Egyptian Islamism challenges the Arab nation-state system itself, rather than pursuing modifications to the state like in Turkey.¹² This presents difficulties for the manifestation of Turkish Islamism's ideological foundations in Egypt. Turkey's Ottoman legacy and its Kemalist nationalism may prevent Egypt from viewing Turkish political Islam as legitimate.¹³

B. IDEOLOGIES TO PARTIES

It is clear that Islamism is prevalent in Egypt and Turkey. For the majority of Turks and Egyptians, Islam remains an important aspect of their lives.¹⁴ The FJP's 2012 electoral success in Egypt and the dominance of Islamist-affiliated parties in Turkey since the 1990s confirm that both countries believe Islam should have a governance role. Yet the extent of that role varies between Egypt and Turkey. Examining Egyptian and Turkish publics' views on this matter can inform Islamist parties' development in their respective countries.

Egypt's Islamization is stricter and stronger than Turkey's. While Turks and Egyptians largely favor Islam's role in politics, 60 percent of Egyptians believe laws should strictly follow the Quran compared to 17 percent of Turks. 44 percent of Turks do believe laws should follow Islam's values and principles, compared to 32 percent of Egyptians. 27 percent of Turks also think the Quran should have no role in law-making, compared to 6 percent of Egyptians. Only 58 percent of Egyptians believe women should have equal rights as men, compared to 84 percent of Turks. This aligns with Saudi Arabia's increased popularity over Turkey among Egyptians. 68 percent of Egyptians view Turkey favorably, but 81 percent of them view Saudi Arabia favorably.¹⁵ According to a Gallup survey, 22 percent of Egyptians view Saudi Arabia as Egypt's political model compared to 11 percent for Turkey.¹⁶

These variances in Islam's popularity and governance roles are reflected by Egypt and Turkey's respective Islamist movements. The Muslim Brotherhood has largely determined Islamism's course in Egypt since its inception.¹⁷ Echoing popular sentiment, the Brotherhood's primary goal has been the establishment of an Islamic society and state that fully conforms to the Shari'a. Since the 1960s, this goal has reflected the increasing diffusion of Qutubi and Salafi thought within the movement. These schools of thought promote a political revolutionary and textual reading of the Quran that emphasizes identity politics' unifying elements while rejecting violence.¹⁸ Additionally, the Brotherhood's governance vision is based on humbleness and modesty, which opposes the exploitative nature of capitalist accumulation.¹⁹

Turkey's National View Movement has served as the main platform for Tur-

key's Islamist parties. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood's focus on state reform, the Movement aims to reform Turkish identity, public discourse, and policies. During its 1969 inception, the Movement opposed westernization's erasure of Turkish Islamic history, culture, and identity. It further purported the creation of a 'Just Order', which stressed Turkish modernization and development within the bounds of social justice similar to the Muslim Brotherhood. It also suggested Islamic economic integration to balance the Christian West's power. By the 1990s, the Movement adopted a strong social message against economic liberalization's negative impact on the urban poor. It had also promoted radicalization among its religious elements against Palestinian injustice and the killing of Muslims in Bosnia.²⁰ However, the Welfare Party's 1998 closure and the government's eradication of radical organizations forced anti-secular and anti-Western Islamists to join Erdoğan's support for secular democracy.²¹ Supporting Erdoğan's AKP, the Movement used Islamic principles to adopt a pro-western stance as well as advocate for human rights and rule of law.²²

The differences between the National View Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood reflect the difficulties in applying Turkey's model of political Islam to Egypt. The Turkish version consists of a bottom up connection with Islam linked to a communal heritage and aimed at policy goals. The Egyptian counterpart aims at revolutionary establishment of a Shari'a-based Islamic state and top-down societal transformation through Islamic principles. Turkish Islamism represents a grassroots movement where religiously motivated individuals seek Islamization of policy and society through social networks, secular and religious education, entrepreneurship, and media use. In particular, this movement operates within secular democratic boundaries rather than attempt building a new state.²³

The movements' differences also extend to government. Once in power, the FJP vaguely argued for a "civil state with an Islamic frame of reference" to brand itself as moderate. Yet the FJP supported Article 2 of Egypt's 2012 Constitution stipulating the Shari'a as the primary source of legislation. Still, the Shari'a was applied alongside the Islamic notion of necessity, which can legitimize acts that are otherwise religiously illegitimate under proper conditions. Applying this notion became common due to the party's weak legislative agenda that largely maintained the status quo. The result was President Morsi and FJP officials emphasizing Islamic identity to maintain a unified base.²⁴ On the other hand, the AKP's ascendancy could be regarded as a post-Islamist party; the party kept its Islamist ties in the social realm but abandoned it as a political program.²⁵ The AKP generated an immense growth-oriented governance agenda, but also maintained its Islamist base to promote conservative social policy. This included lifting the ban on the veil, promotion of Islamic education, public event keynotes by Islamic clerics, and encouragement of Islamist movements overseas.²⁶

It is also important to note political Islam's variants within Turkey and Egypt. Turkish Islamism does not exhibit much diversity. The transnational Gulen movement contains AKP supporters, but has been accused of organizing attempts to undermine Turkish secularism despite its moderate and tolerant nature.²⁷ The traditionalist

Felicity Party only governs at the municipal level with a pro-liberty and democracy agenda that seeks Turkish ascension to the EU.²⁸ Egyptian Islamism possesses some diversity. The Salafi Al-Da'wa movement offers a stricter, puritanical alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood, and seeks establishment of a firmer Shari'a-based Islamic state. Its al-Nour party was formed after the 2011 revolution and gained 27.8 percent of the 2012 parliamentary election vote share.²⁹ A reformist wing of the Muslim Brotherhood seeks creative interpretation of Islamic texts to justify democracy and citizenship and avoid proselytization, but the FJP has rejected them.³⁰ An offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, the moderate Wasat party coalesced around a pluralist, civilizational Islam that rejected its precursor's scripturalism and Shari'a focus.³¹ Despite likening of itself to Turkey's AKP, Wasat only received 3.7 percent of the 2012 parliamentary election vote.³²

Along these lines, the Turkish model does not seem to fit Egyptian Islamism's aspirations. Turkish Islamism reflects a moderate, governance-oriented political approach that has internalized the state's secular democratic rules. It is unclear whether Egyptian Islamism's revolutionary state-building approach can immediately replicate that model given the electorate's stronger Islamist desires.

C. ECONOMICS AND GOVERNANCE

The different economic legacies in Turkey and Egypt shape Islamism's support and provide context for its economic governance today. The AKP's economic foundations stem from 1980s liberalization policies under Turgut Özal. Özal's technocratic program stressed fiscal caution and export-oriented, market-based governance to augment Turkey's international competitiveness.³³ The result was the emergence of conservative Muslim businessmen from greater Anatolia who sought to export their goods to new global markets. Large Turkish companies were owned by secular businessmen and already dominated competitive European markets. The small to medium-sized businesses accordingly sought Islamist political representation to gain market access to the Muslim-populated Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. It was this emerging devout bourgeoisie that formed the AKP's base.³⁴

Egyptian Islamists' economic foundations stem from disenfranchising liberalization schemes under Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. Sadat's 'Infitah' policy aimed to attract foreign investment and stimulate the private sector. Yet Infitah primarily benefitted the construction, petroleum, tourism and banking sectors and did not provide Egypt with new sources of employment or export capacity. Mubarak furthered Sadat's policies with IMF-directed structural adjustment. However, these reforms did not generate the 'trickle-down' effect that Turkey experienced. Instead, it produced cronyism. The Egyptian state continued to play a dominant economic role and subsidized large transportation and communication businesses. This sidelined small to medium-sized businesses, as they had no personal or political access to the state-big business ruling coalition. Along these lines, a pro-Islamist bourgeoisie never expanded like in Turkey. Disenfranchised businessmen usually remained apo-

litical due to the high costs to regime criticism, and devout businessmen supported the Wasat party. The remaining lower and middle class Egyptian strata supported the Muslim Brotherhood.³⁵

Turkey's devout bourgeoisie incentivizes AKP pragmatism and supply-side governance. Erdoğan's ascent to power developed from effectively delivering tangible benefits to his electorate as Istanbul's mayor.³⁶ His party's electoral successes since 2001 further reflect Turkey's preference for the AKP's 'regulatory neoliberalism' over its Islamist affiliation. This preference exists even amongst the devout bourgeoisie, whose predominance within the Islamist constituency has moderated Turkish Islamism. Economic growth also enlarged the AKP electoral coalition beyond the devout bourgeoisie, forcing the AKP to prioritize good economic governance over Islamist-leaning policy.³⁷ Even if poor or rural conservative Muslims are excluded by AKP neoliberal benefits, they are still connected to AKP welfare institutions and patronage networks as well as broader Islamic civil society led by the devout bourgeoisie. This ensures economic exclusion does not produce radicalization as it does in Egypt.³⁸

Egypt's lower and middle class disenfranchisement from the state resulted in adherence to the idea of an Islamic state that would improve livelihoods by rewarding merit over cronyism. The Muslim Brotherhood's mobilization through voluntary organizations, mosques, clinics, schools, day care centers, and vocational training institutes aims to create this welfare-oriented Islamic polity.³⁹ Nevertheless, the absence of an interest-driven bourgeoisie like in Turkey meant that the Brotherhood never formulated a coherent national governance agenda. While the movement bore neoliberal economists and supported liberalism in Egypt's countryside, its version of Islamism also purported protectionism and anti-privatization while seeking increased wages and welfare.⁴⁰ Unlike Erdoğan's AKP, the Brotherhood or the FJP also never held local governance roles due to the state regime's hold on local politics. In this way, Egyptian Islamists only thrived as a national religious and welfare network rather than a political party with a clear policy vision. When the FJP gained power, its scarce policy agenda only maintained the Mubarak-era status quo.⁴¹

The distinct economic contexts shaping Turkish and Egyptian Islamism weakens the Turkish model's applicability to Egypt. From governance's standpoint, Turkish Islamism consists of Muslims in a secular-democratic state working within a neoliberal framework. It is unclear whether Egypt's structural economic conditions or bourgeoisie can enable its Islamists to produce a similar economic governance agenda with or without an Islamic framework.

D. DEMOCRACY AND RIGHTS

Most Turks and Egyptians desire democratic freedoms, but the differences in each country's relationship to Islamism impacted the degree to which these freedoms were manifested.⁴² Turkish Islamism's experience in movements, local politics and national leadership have imbued it with collective political memory that has enabled its gradual democratization. Its bottom-up movement seeks Islamization of Turkish iden-

tity and policies, but that movement largely conforms to secular democratic politics. A devout bourgeoisie can advocate for rights, freedoms, and economic opportunities through politics, which enables greater alignment of Turkish state and civil society interests. Seeking economic opportunities also sidelines harsh ideologies and promotes healthy exchange of ideas through global economic transactions.⁴³

Egyptian Islamism's limited political experience reveals that elements of democratization have yet to be internalized. The Muslim Brotherhood's understanding of democracy represents its aim to implement the Shari'a rather than a system that reflects the peoples' will to govern themselves. State institutionalization of the Shari'a to transform Egyptians into better Muslims may not be as democratic as Muslims projecting Islamic principles onto the state.⁴⁴ The Muslim Brotherhood's official spokesperson Mahmoud Ghoslan notably claimed that "[they] don't want the Turkish model...in Turkey women may go to university without a headscarf. They have adultery and homosexuality. We will not allow that in Egypt. Egypt is a Muslim country. The Shari'a, the Muslim legal framework, must be the foundation for everything."⁴⁵ The Brotherhood's socio-economic base and deficit of devout bourgeoisie may account for the stringency in political views. Still, moderate Brotherhood members promote concepts like citizenship, human rights and pluralism, but consensus over those concepts' meanings have yet to occur. Different leaders have offered contradictory remarks on democracy, Coptic rights, and gender equality.⁴⁶ This may suggest that democratic issues are secondary to state institutionalization of ideology.

Lack of consensus over democracy's tenets were also reflected in the FJP's platform. The Morsi regime failed to replace the state with a functioning system that represented the 2011 revolution's democratic aspirations. Upon realizing power, Morsi blamed the judiciary for his policy failures despite his retention of executive and legislative powers prior to the 2012 constitution. After the constitution's establishment, he shifted blame to the opposition and the media, resulting in restrictions on the media and freedom of speech. He did not initiate judicial reforms, but instead issued a decree insulating the presidency from judicial review. The regime also failed to dismantle the Mubarak-era corruption and cronyism that preceded him. Morsi appointed pro-Mubarak politicians and businessmen to ministerial posts and traveled with them on foreign trips. His appointment of radical Islamist governors was also provocative due to the governors' links to groups that attacked tourists and Egyptian Copts. These controversial policies were coupled with the regime's profession of Islamic identity, suggesting that its supposed affirmation of democratic politics and political pluralism has yet to be internalized.⁴⁷

That is not to say Turkey does not possess democratic consolidation issues. In recent years, the Erdoğan regime has faced broad allegations of corruption and infringements of civil liberties. Those infringements include threats to the media, jailing of journalists, and restrictions on women's healthcare. The government has also increased police brutality after the 2013 Gezi Park Protests, and routinely persecutes Turkey's Kurdish minority.⁴⁸ Yet these practices seem to be a symptom of Erdoğan's

own authoritarian tendencies rather than the AKP or Turkish Islamists' issues with affirming clear democratic principles. Turkish Islamists promote rule of law and human rights, and the AKP program stresses its adherence to rights based on international charters. Erdoğan's radicalism or repressive tactics are also restrained by potential Court prosecution of the regime or military intervention.

E. MILITARY MATTERS

A central counterweight to Turkish and Egyptian Islamism are the countries' militaries. The military holds historic roles in both nations' political systems. Apart from guiding national security policy, Turkey's military has functioned as a guardian of the Constitution's Kemalist values. This guardianship resulted in the 1960, 1971, and 1980 coups to restore national order from political gridlock and escalating violence. Egypt's military also holds an important legacy. The three presidents prior to Morsi emanated from the military, and the military has held strong sway in Egyptian policy-making.⁴⁹ Both countries' militaries also possess independent economic resources. The Turkish military owns an independent holding company as well as various shopping centers and recreational facilities.⁵⁰ The Egyptian military is believed to control between 10 and 40 percent of Egypt's economy.⁵¹ Most importantly, Turkey and Egypt's military are also skeptical of Islamism. Turkey's military opposes Islamism based on its staunch defense of secularism, and Egypt's military tends to oppose Islamism's threat to the state and national stability.⁵²

Yet the Turkish military holds a unique relationship to democracy. The institution maintains a guardianship role over the political system and rarely intervenes in policy decisions. Its three coups were accompanied by a transparent national agenda to quickly restore order and transition back to civilian rule. After the 1960 coup, the military also produced Turkey's most liberal constitution.⁵³ In addition to the Turkish military's highly centralized and disciplined structure, these characteristics make it a highly trusted institution.⁵⁴ Still, the military's opposition to Islamism has frequently produced political fights with Erdoğan and the AKP. In response, Erdoğan forced out much of the military's leadership through the prominent Ergenekon trials. Many Egyptian Islamists view this action an example where Islamists successfully reigned in military power. Yet, it is unclear whether that is the case. The military remains an autonomous political institution with immense resources and self-management. However, its withdrawal from politics correlates with its goal for EU accession and its wish to signal internal stability to Turkey's NATO allies.⁵⁵

In contrast, Egypt does not possess an external actor that can constrain military authoritarian rule. The United States markedly backs the Egyptian military through arms agreements and opposition to Islamist parties.⁵⁶ The FJP's ascendancy resulted in a substantial dismissal of military leaders, but largely left the military's institutional capacity intact. This may be due to the military's initial alliance with the Islamist regime.⁵⁷ This alliance generated constitutional enshrinement of the military's autonomy from civilian oversight, its control over Egypt's defense ministry, and its

domination of national security policy. Interestingly, these new military powers were pulled from Turkey's constitution. They were also reinstated in the 2014 Constitution under General Sisi. The 2013 ousting of President Morsi over stability and governance concerns, and the military's subsequent violent crackdown on Islamists reflects its consolidation of power. These events make Egypt's adoption of the Turkish model unlikely. The Egyptian military adopted the Turkish military's institutional characteristics without the Turkish version of constitutional guardianship role and external democratization pressures. Without these internal and external checks on military involvement in politics, it is possible that Egyptian military authoritarianism will re-solidify. This will make civilian, democratic Islamist rule increasingly difficult to achieve.⁵⁸

III. TURKISH LESSONS AND THE FUTURE OF EGYPT'S ISLAMISTS

In the near term, Turkey's model for political Islam cannot replicate itself in Egypt. The failure of the AKP-modeled Wasat Party and the successes of FJP and al-Nour suggest that Turkish-style Islamism would not be accepted. Turkey's distinct structural conditions gave rise to a unique form of Islamism. The absence of Turkish colonial legacy made Kemalist state principles acceptable. In this fashion, Islamism was mediated by Kemalism's rigid secular boundaries. Egyptian Islamism sprouted as colonial resistance which necessitated revolutionary upheaval of corrupt, foreign-backed regimes to establish a new Islamic state and society. This contrasts with Turkey's grassroots movement to infuse Kemalist thought and policy with Turkey's Islamic heritage and values. Turkey's economic liberalization strategies under secular governments gave rise to a devout bourgeoisie that spearheaded the Islamist movement into politics and leadership based on market-driven interests. This bourgeoisie also moderated Islamism through interest-driven advocacy and demand for democratic rights. The result was Islamism's collective political memory and experience in governing Turkey. Egypt's cronyism and disenfranchisement of the middle and lower classes created an Islamist movement whose community welfare projects and intense identity politics gave it legitimacy. Yet without an interest-driven, pro-Islamist bourgeoisie, Egypt's Islamism was not mediated to govern or provide democratic rights to an electorate. The result is its ideology-driven politics and lack of experience to govern.

The threat of Turkish military intervention also moderated Turkey's Islamist parties to focus on delivering tangible benefits over purporting Islamist ideology and Islamizing society. At the same time, the pressure on the military to limit itself as a constitutional guardian and promote democratization for EU accession provide sufficient room for Islamist-affiliated parties to succeed. Despite Egypt's adoption of the Turkish military's institutional framework, the Egyptian military's lack of internal and external checks make military rule likely at the expense of civilian Islamist democracy.

The 2013 coup by Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the accession of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to the presidency already demonstrates that likelihood. Sisi's ruling coalition primarily consists of Egypt's officer corps, its intelligence services, its internal security apparatus, and a portion of the Egyptian judiciary.

In the 2015 parliamentary elections, pro-Sisi independent candidates and the ‘For the Love of Egypt’ alliance headed by former general Sameh Seif Elyazal received the majority of the votes.⁵⁹ Though, only 10 percent of the country’s population voted. Amid this consolidation of power, the future of Egypt’s Islamists looks grim. In 2013, Judgment 2315 of the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters ruled that the Muslim Brotherhood was a terrorist organization. The ruling and subsequent 2015 Terrorism Law resulted in the Brotherhood’s suspension, their assets frozen, and their ban from politics.⁶⁰ It also resulted in the regime’s seizure of Brotherhood social service networks. In early 2015, the regime assumed control over the Brotherhood’s extensive healthcare service system and replaced its leadership with pro-Sisi figures.⁶¹ In February 2015 the Minister of Education also claimed that 85 percent of the Brotherhood’s schools were under government control and school managers would be pre-cleared by security services.⁶² These seizures coincided with the arrest and capital punishment of hundreds of Brotherhood members and other Islamists.⁶³ It also overlapped with laws authorizing government to expel and dismiss students and faculty from universities, censor journalists and media, as well as expand military judiciary authority to try civilian and police cases.⁶⁴

Despite the government crackdown, an Islamist resurgence in Egypt is still possible. General Sisi has tried to improve Egypt’s economic health, but has continued to face high unemployment, budget deficits, and difficulties attracting foreign investment even with major cabinet reshuffles.⁶⁵ Opposition to the regime may also be stronger than polls may indicate. General Sisi’s approval rating was at 85 percent in December 2015, down five percent from the previous year.⁶⁶ The five months following the 2013 coup also possessed the highest number of protests since the 2011 uprising against President Mubarak.⁶⁷ Even with the regime’s legal attempts to quell protests, there continue to be five times as many protests per day under Sisi as there were from 2008 to 2010 under Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood in particular is looking for an opportunity to regain power. Ashraf Abdel Ghaffar, a Muslim Brotherhood leader residing in Qatar, claimed that:

“We will not accept any military system to govern us...Most of the Muslim Brotherhood is moving forward to reclaim this revolution... we are the most powerful group in Egypt and we exist in more than 80 countries all over the world. Despite the fact that we have more than 50,000 members in jail, we are still coming to save our country again.”⁶⁸

Other Brotherhood members—especially the youth—continue to maintain the organization’s societal networks and underground education, health, and financial services to “send a message that the revolution is continuing.”⁶⁹ Yet many Brotherhood programs have shifted their focus toward building political awareness and mobilization against the Sisi regime. Reports indicate two competing strategies for a political resurgence within the Brotherhood. One involves a widespread revolution led by

youth inside and outside the movement, and the other entails exploiting emerging rifts in the Egyptian army to orchestrate a military coup with Islamists' help.⁷⁰ These strategies further demonstrate the near-term issues with Egyptian Islamists modeling Turkey's AKP experience. Even with military-enforced restrictions on Turkish Islamist parties, the AKP acquired power within the existing political structure and influenced that structure from within. The Brotherhood's current dialogue about altering the political structure through revolution or coup reveals the constrictive nature of Egypt's current political system as well as the ideological and socioeconomic character of its Islamist movement.

Interestingly, Turkey may hold a unique influence with regard to Egypt's Islamists. A welcome leader of Muhammad Morsi, President Erdoğan condemned General Sisi's accession and crackdown on Islamists. He also suspended diplomatic relations with Egypt for nearly a year. Relations resumed in 2016, but Erdoğan refuses to meet personally with Sisi. Turkey also continues to host FJP members and Brotherhood media outlets.⁷¹ Moreover, as Saudi Arabia and Israel strengthen security and economic ties with Turkey to respond to conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, it is possible that Turkey will leverage expansion of those ties to Egypt in return for Egypt's release of imprisoned Islamists and respect for human rights.⁷² This may enable Turkey to facilitate the resurgence of Egypt's Islamists in exchange for guaranteeing Egypt's security.

The future of Egypt's Islamists remains to be seen. Yet Turkey's favorable ties with Egyptian Islamists hints at the possibility for Egypt's internalization of the Turkish experience. While the Turkish model cannot be replicated in Egypt, Egypt's Islamists can learn valuable lessons from their Turkish counterparts. The Islamist experience in Turkey points to a history of government suppression and party closure as well as movement-building, electoral success, and governance. Egypt's Islamists can accordingly look to Turkey's successes and failures to absorb key strategies that enable their movement, political, and governance goals.

A. MOBILIZING MOVEMENTS

The success of the Turkish Islamist movement can be attributed to the mobilization of diverse interests toward broad policy goals. Turkish Islamism was a natural outlet for specific social groups and classes. It attracted those who were politically dissatisfied with and distanced from government institutions led by a secular military-bureaucratic elite, notables, and industrialists. The National View movement accordingly represented rural peasantry and the lower-to-middle class. However, it also represented the middle-to-upper class urban youth and student population facing high unemployment who were supportive of social-justice driven economic policy. It represented devout Turks but also conservative Sunni Kurds who believed an Islamic order could improve their livelihoods and end conflict in the Kurdish region.⁷³ These diverse groups were linked and assembled through social networks, education, media, entrepreneurships and business.

Egypt's Islamist movement focuses on Islamizing the state and society, but

requires greater mobilization around a concrete vision for the state and its responsibilities. The Egyptian movement possesses a more robust social service network, but lacks the diversity and vision that Turkey has. The Muslim Brotherhood's success stems from their opposition to state cronyism and widespread social service provisions. The Brotherhood's extensive education, healthcare, financial service, and food aid networks ensure its appeal among the lower-to-middle class. Yet its continued calls for a Shari'a-based Islamic state needs to include a robust discussion over that state's roles and responsibilities. A state-building movement requires deliberation and consensus over key issues regarding the the use and scope of Shari'a law, democratic rights, and constitutional checks and balances. An incoherent vision may have been overcome by the Brotherhood's past success in welfare provision, but it may create difficulties in the future. As the Sisi regime seizes the movement's social service networks, the Muslim Brotherhood's success may increasingly depend upon the appeal of their vision for Egypt's state. Turkey in the 1990s demonstrates that an Islamist movement's ideological radicalization, rhetoric of caliphate-style integration among Muslim countries, and vague, impractical state visions can provoke societal resistance and massive government suppression.⁷⁴

Furthermore, the prioritization of Islamist identity should not justify the suppression of debate about the Egyptian movement's direction and operations. Many young Brotherhood members increasingly feel distanced from the organization's leadership. Elder Brotherhood leaders tend to denounce internal opposition as godless. One young doctor explained his mixed feelings associated with participating in the movement:

“[The Brotherhood] absorbs young Egyptians who are active and ambitious and want to do something good. They are there for the love of Egypt, and they are willing to risk their lives, to be arrested, and even to be killed... Unfortunately, after the Brotherhood has absorbed them, it freezes them. The movement discourages independent thought and fosters blind independence.”⁷⁵

This trend could also undermine the Brotherhood's success. Continued ideological rigidity and alienation of specific groups has already begun to result in a fractured Islamist movement. Many young members have already left the Brotherhood, and some have started their own organizations that represent young Islamists and leftists. Still many youths believe in the Brotherhood's potential, and the Sisi crackdown on the organization's leadership offers a unique opportunity for a generational change in the movement's direction and ideas. Turkish Islamism's success stemmed from its ability to meld differences from a wide variety of individuals under one vision for state and society. Diversity of people and ideas within the Brotherhood has the ability to grow the movement's base and foster innovative visions for Egypt's future.⁷⁶

B. PARTY POLITICS

Turkey demonstrates that Egypt's Islamists need to formulate political parties independent of their movements and prioritize a governance-oriented platform. The AKP represented a reformist current within a trend of Islamist political parties formed by Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan's most successful Welfare Party held a platform that drew upon Islamic values of social justice and unity to support populist and interventionist economic policy. The AKP similarly drew upon the Welfare Party's political experience to produce a growth-oriented agenda while rebranding Islamism as conservative social policy. Yet both parties operated independently of their Islamist electoral base to push a platform that catered to Islamists and the general Turkish population. This enabled the AKP to distance itself from its Islamist base in the economic and foreign policy realms while offering them concessions in the social realm.

Egypt's FJP failed to transform itself into an independent political party. It instead operated under the Islamist movement's umbrella, placing economic, political, and cultural goals secondary to building an Islamic state. This exposed the Muslim Brotherhood's priority for power over governance: unlike the 2004 FJP platform's focus on greater democracy and freedom, its 2011 platform capitalized on a national uprising to demand a new state based on Shari'a law.⁷⁷ Still the FJP lacked a clear and agreed-upon platform for the country. According to a senior advisor to former President Morsi, the party's lack of a "realistic path" resulted in party divisions and alienation of the electorate.⁷⁸ The party itself held contradictory policy goals: some explained the FJP as a force for economic liberalization, and some saw it as anti-privatization and statist.⁷⁹ Lack of a platform forced the party to resort to a movement's tactics of demonizing opposition politicians and establishing links to jihadist groups.⁸⁰ The Turkish political experience shows that Egypt's Islamists need to formulate a political party that draws upon its movement for support but also aims to represent the entire country through a consensus-driven governance agenda. That agenda can include an Islamic state as a goal, but it cannot be an end itself.⁸¹ Turkey demonstrates that a governance platform representing the national population is a critical factor for continued electoral success, and Islamic values can be employed to effectively inform and brand that platform.

Furthermore, successful party politics requires internalization of democratic principles and respect for democratic processes. The Welfare Party and AKP operated within the Kemalist constraints of the nationally elected 1982 constitution. The AKP's platform in particular respects the constitution's secular democratic nature, so the party pushed constitutional reforms to amend the state's structure in its favor after 2002.⁸² Egypt's FJP on the other hand viewed their 2011 electoral success as a mandate to act without much concern for the opposition. They possessed 43.4 percent of the parliamentary seat share, yet responded to criticism by touting their electoral results.⁸³ The FJP besieged the Constitutional Court's offices and launched a media war against its justices. They also formed a constitutional assembly that over-represented Islamists and caused secular and liberal members to boycott its proceedings, and then enabled

the subsequent constitution to pass referendum with a weak mandate. They further propelled Morsi to the presidency despite past promises to avoid supporting a Brotherhood candidate.⁸⁴ As state and non-state opposition arose towards the FJP, the Muslim Brotherhood's media spokesperson Gehad El-Haddad tweeted, "When Future of Egypt is in balance, we have no regrets, we are more than willing to pay for it with our lives not votes [sic]", suggesting that the FJP viewed democracy as expendable to achieve consolidation of power.⁸⁵ The AKP under Erdoğan demonstrates the problems of flouting democratic principles and using electoral success as a *carte blanche* mandate. Erdoğan's infringement on civil liberties, suggestions to disobey Court rulings, and attempts to suppress the Kurdish People's Democratic Party from electoral gains resulted in the 2013 Gezi Park Protests and the AKP's loss of a two-thirds majority in the 2015 elections.⁸⁶ Similarly, the FJP's actions polarized the Egyptian electorate and circumscribed the FJP's democratic legitimacy. Turkey in this manner highlights that Egyptian Islamist parties need to respect and operate within the constraints of democratic processes and coalition-style government to avoid a breakdown in allies and voters' support and trust.

C. GOOD GOVERNANCE

Once in power, the Turkish case suggests that Egyptian Islamist parties must adopt a pragmatic governance approach and understand that certain goals may only be realized over the long-term. This is particularly important in Egypt's political system due to the prevalence of the military and Mubarak's deep-state elements. In Turkey, the AKP gained acceptance from the military by adhering to the political system's Kemalist rules. After proving his governing credentials, Erdoğan reigned in the military by enacting gradual National Security Council reforms and by prosecuting military officers connected to alleged coup plots against the AKP government. It is likely that the two sides now possess a working relationship where the military defers to civilian leaders, but the Turkish military still distrusts Erdoğan.⁸⁷ In this manner Turkey reveals that the process of controlling state institutions and deep-state elements requires considerable time. Egypt's FJP failed to recognize the extent of Mubarak-era state networks that extend to the military, police, judiciary, ministerial bureaucracies, public-sector companies, and municipalities. These networks have traditionally been hostile to Islamists and keen to protect their vested power and economic interests. The FJP neglected to invest the time to build trust with all these actors and held the illusion of controlling some. The party replaced Field Marshal Mohammad Tantawi from the military leadership with General Sami Enan, and the military accepted the FJP's leadership in order to quell the nation's revolutionary violence. However a combination of the FJP's failure to perform economically and politically, concern from Gulf countries of a potential revolutionary domino effect from Egypt, and the party's reported attempts to unilaterally and immediately interfere with the military were decisive factors in the military's decision to promote the 2013 coup.⁸⁸

Pragmatism also extends to policymaking. The AKP consolidated power by

moderating its ideology and initially focusing on implementing policies that appeal to different electorates. These included social policies targeted at housewives, pro-Western discourse and EU ascension goals for urban, educated voters and the international community, as well as welfare programs targeted at low-income voters. Yet to the AKP, moderate ideology and pragmatism did not necessarily mean less religiosity. The party appealed to Turkish Islamists by claiming its actors were devout even if the AKP platform was secular, and catered to Islamists through alcohol restrictions, building mosques, and promoting economic interaction with the Middle East.⁸⁹ A similar policymaking method can help Egypt's Islamists produce results for their lower-to-middle class base and appease the upper-class urbanites and international community. Prioritizing pragmatic governance in Egypt will further Islamist parties' electoral success, legitimize their Islamic state, and provide the needed leverage to control aspects of the old deep-state.

Moreover, Turkey's AKP displays the value of political experience and skills in effective governance and electoral success. AKP leaders and cadres possess decades-long political experience from the successes and failures of past Islamist parties. They acquired governance and electoral skills from their participation in municipal, parliamentary, and executive politics. Furthermore, their centrist nature enabled them to acquire the best practices and ideas from conservative and liberal political currents. The FJP on the other hand lacks the experience and technical skills to govern Egypt effectively. The Brotherhood invested primarily in organizational and social network skills, yet did not adequately educate their members in government, politics, or economic management. Most FJP politicians are engineers or doctors who became Brotherhood leaders and hold sufficient social capital for electoral gain. Once in power, the FJP experience mirrored nepotistic practices from the Mubarak-era, in which unqualified Brotherhood members were appointed to positions of authority. These members' ascent stirred rancor within government institutions, leading to bureaucratic instability and administrative failure. Egypt's Islamist parties should heed the Turkish political experience and emphasize training and educating Islamists in government and economics within Egypt and abroad. This would especially provide unique opportunity for younger Brotherhood members to help shape a coherent governance and ideological party agenda that is not reliant on their movement's interests or their politicians' personal piety. Yet in the near term it is likely that the FJP will require other civic and political forces' support to achieve its political vision. This necessitates the FJP's willingness to compromise on social and moral issues that may upset their movement's ideological hardliners. Winning over Brotherhood opponents without alienating its supporters will entail navigating a fine line between affirming its Islamic identity and values and honoring democratic politics by making short-term concessions for long-term strategic benefit. This will also help Islamist politicians acquire the experience and skills necessary to effectively enact their vision for Egypt's future.⁹⁰

CONCLUSION

The 2011 Egyptian revolution and subsequent 2013 military coup poses uncertainties about the future of Egypt's governance as well as the role Islamists hold in that future. The FJP's success in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections suggested that Islamists possess a crucial role in the country's ascent in the post-Mubarak era, yet their failure to govern and withstand opposition curbed their effectiveness and their credibility. The current crackdown and repression of Islamists in Egypt under General Sisi pose further difficulties for a possible civilian Islamist regime.

Government officials, politicians, scholars, and activists in and outside of Egypt point to Turkey's Islamist-leaning AKP as an accomplished model by which Egypt's Islamists can replicate. Yet copying Turkey provides an untenable and unrealistic solution for Egypt in the near term. Turkey and Egypt possess different historical legacies, religious and democratic orientations, socio-economic dynamics, political obstacles, and international concerns. The AKP's Islamist orientation and Turkey's regional influence can perhaps provide backing for Egypt's Islamists, but it is unlikely that Turkish Islamists can export their political orientation and governance style to Egypt. Regardless of whether the Turkish model is applicable to Egypt currently, it is worth considering whether, given a conducive environment, Egypt would implement it well. If Egypt's Islamists gain power and govern effectively, it is conceivable that improving Egyptian structural conditions can bring the country closer in line with the Turkish model. Still, Egypt's history and position in the Arab world will make its version of Islamism different from Turkey's.

Nevertheless, the success of Turkish Islamists does provide strategic and tactical lessons for their Egyptian counterparts in movement-building, party politics, and good governance. Given the military's consolidation of power and control of politics, Egyptian Islamists will likely have to orient their movement towards a new revolution. Turkey demonstrates that this revolution can be ideological, but requires openness, diversity, and a coherent vision to unite Islamists with other Egyptians against the state. If the movement is successful, Turkey reveals that an Islamist political party should separate itself from its movement under a governance platform that caters to all Egyptians, not just its base. This platform can be branded and informed by Islamic tenets and values, but should not profess a grand religious ideology as an end in itself. Furthermore, party politics requires compromise and respect for democratic processes to maintain trust with voters and other politicians. Turkey further displays the importance of political pragmatism and governance skills to deliver tangible results to voters and maintain consolidation of power. For Egypt, this strategic thinking can help legitimize claims for an Islamic state, normalize Islamist rule, and create leverage to reign in deep-state remnants over the long-term. Whether Egypt's Islamists can actualize these lessons from its Turkish counterpart remains to be seen.

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