

STRATEGIC RESTRAINT AND FINDING COMMON GROUND: SENEGAMBIAN INTEGRATION EFFORTS IN THE POSTCOLONIAL PERIOD

Marc Dubois

This paper presents a sweeping historical analysis of Senegalese-Gambian history from colonization to the present day, with particular focus on the reasons for their successes and failures in earlier attempts at regional cooperation and integration. Despite early success at regional integration, these nations have largely failed to institute an enduring regime of cooperation, and instead hold some degree of low-intensity animosity, which has not devolved into outright conflict or direct Senegalese intervention. The questions then become why these once amicable relations have broken down, and why Senegal's restraint in securing its national interests regarding access to trade and its southern Casamance region given its greater power. This lack of overt, large-scale conflict is thus a compelling subject for analysis. Moreover, colonial interpretations rooted in the formulation of ethnic identities and artificial differences are also insufficient to explain the development of Senegambian integration. In answering this paradox, strategic and domestic considerations are instead necessary to explain the fluctuations within these nations' relationship over the past six decades.

This paper presents a sweeping historical analysis of Senegalese-Gambian history from colonization to the present day, with particular focus on the reasons for their success and failure in earlier attempts at regional cooperation and integration. A cursory glance at a map of West Africa or the literature on The Gambia and Senegal quickly demonstrates the former's geographic bifurcation of its sole neighbor and the economic and political repercussions that such a position has created. As a result, Senegal continues to face numerous foreign policy challenges, including ensuring trade and political control over the fractious southern portion of its country. In such a strategic environment, one would expect Senegal to force easy transit access across The Gambia rather than circumventing the country, or at the very least ensure mutually amicable relations. Despite some early success at regional integration, however, these nations have largely failed to institute an enduring regime of cooperation, and often experience some degree of low-intensity animosity. Yet in general, this hostility has not devolved into outright conflict or direct Senegalese intervention. The lack of overt, large-scale conflict is further surprising when considering the power disparity between these nations and The Gambia's strategic inconvenience to Senegal. The degree of Senegambian integration has thus remained remarkably fluid in the post-colonial era, with notable shifts occurring in these countries' interactions. Thus, the factors that have historically influenced this changing degree of cooperation are a compelling subject for historical analysis.

Marc DuBuis is currently an MA candidate at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce majoring in Security Studies. He completed his undergraduate degree with a Bachelors of Arts in Political Science at Oakland University in spring 2015, with research interests focused on international conflict and the resource curse. This paper was originally written for Professor Getnet Bekele's class "Modern African History Since 1800" in spring 2015.

This paper presents a sweeping historical analysis of Senegalese-Gambian history from colonization to the present day, with particular focus on the reasons for their success and failure in earlier attempts at regional cooperation and integration. A cursory glance at a map of West Africa or the literature on The Gambia and Senegal quickly demonstrates the former's geographic bifurcation of its sole neighbor and the economic and political repercussions that such a position has created. As a result, Senegal continues to face numerous foreign policy challenges, including ensuring trade and political control over the fractious southern portion of its country. In such a strategic environment, one would expect Senegal to force easy transit access across The Gambia rather than circumventing the country, or at the very least ensure mutually amicable relations. Despite some early success at regional integration, however, these nations have largely failed to institute an enduring regime of cooperation, and often experience some degree of low-intensity animosity. Yet in general, this hostility has not devolved into outright conflict or direct Senegalese intervention. The lack of overt, large-scale conflict is further surprising when considering the power disparity between these nations and The Gambia's strategic inconvenience to Senegal. The degree of Senegambian integration has thus remained remarkably fluid in the post-colonial era, with notable shifts occurring in these countries' interactions. Thus, the factors that have historically influenced this changing degree of cooperation are a compelling subject for historical analysis. In answering this question, however, colonial, tribal or racial determinants provide little explanatory value. Instead, the degree of Senegambian integration and cooperation throughout this period is a direct result of domestic political factors and strategic considerations within both of these countries, the combination of which has played a significant role in these countries' interstate relations over the past six decades.

THE POTENTIAL FOR A COLONIAL OR ETHNIC INFLUENCE

Prior to examining the domestic and strategic factors that have influenced the fluctuating trends of Senegambian cooperation, it is perhaps beneficial to first examine the relative unimportance of other historical factors. Ethnic divisions prior to colonialism, for example, are relatively unhelpful in explaining this phenomenon. Public misperceptions of the African continent might conceivably dismiss interstate disagreements as an unfortunate inevitability of divisive ethnic cleavages. However, this has historically proven inaccurate regarding the Senegambian region due to the remarkably diverse set of intermingled socio-political groupings prior to the region's colonization.¹ Even in the 1800s when other peoples migrated into the region, Charlotte Quinn notes that they settled in an already highly diverse ethnic landscape, one with settlements comprised of different ethnic groups that appeared to coexist relatively peacefully and that recognized the Madingo chief rulers in the region.² As these groups migrated into the Senegambia they settled along the length of the river and throughout the valley, leading to the formation and recombination of numerous empires and cultural influences. Boubacar Barry makes a similar claim regarding the

diversity of the Senegambian peoples and the existence of their political organizations during this period.³ Looking at all the differing ethnic and historical factors at play, it becomes clear that many Senegalese and Gambian peoples share some common heritages. Thus, prior to colonization, this was an area of remarkable diversity, yet one in which cross-cultural ties were constructed throughout the region prior to the start of active European colonization.

Quinn also notes that The Gambia, and to a lesser extent the region in general, benefited from extensive regional and international trading networks. Its strategic position along the Gambian River and the Atlantic Ocean made it a transit point for West African goods prior to colonization as well as a commercial hub where European manufactures and African people, peanuts, and raw materials were later exchanged.⁴ Barry makes a similar argument, making particular note of the region's trade in "salt, gold, cola, horses, cloth, and slaves."⁵ Stephen Golub and Ahmadou Mbaye also show the extensive regional, pre-colonial trade networks connected the Senegambian region internally and to other portions of Africa.⁶ These findings suggest a surprising degree of economic, social, and political interconnectedness for this region in the pre-colonial period. Rather than a source of social cleavages between these two, we might instead expect to find non-receptiveness within the Senegambia for cooperation given the intermingling of societal groups throughout the region. Since the evidence that suggests that cultural diversity was as a source of both cohesion and discord between the two nations, the fact that Senegambian relations continued to fluctuate indicates something else played a role in influencing cooperation between these nations.

Colonial interpretations rooted in the formulation of ethnic identities and artificial differences are also insufficient to explain the development of Senegambian integration. Previous scholarship saw The Gambia's creation and continued existence as a direct result of its colonial legacy and The Gambia's acceptance of a distinct otherness to maintain a separate state. Indeed, "it has sometimes been described as an unworkable result of the European partition of Africa."⁷ Golub and Mbaye also note that the artificially created colonial borders undermined Senegambia's rich social, cultural, and political ties.⁸ However, such arguments are too simplistic to understand the country's complicated relationship with its surrounding and more powerful neighbor. This is not to discount the colonizers' influence on Senegambian society and post-colonial relationships between the two nations. Indeed, The Gambia's odd shape is a direct carry-over from Britain's tiny colony along the river nestled within French Senegal. Both colonial states perceived economic opportunities in the region's peanut production and the slave trade, and actively competed along the river.⁹ This is in part because the British realized that The Gambia's strategic position made the colony ideal for re-export, as noted by Newbury's statistical tables, with most years showing a positive trade balance of exports to imports.¹⁰ While it is unclear how much of this came from re-exporting other goods, it nevertheless demonstrates the importance of the colony's export

orientation. Both nations could at times also cooperate against their common enemy in the Marabout religious opposition leaders.¹¹ In addition, while Britain periodically considered trading The Gambia to France in exchange for concessions elsewhere, neither country seriously pursued allowing the other full control of the Senegambian region. Given its strategic position, Great Britain instead strove to prevent the colony from falling into French hands.¹² As a note by its Deputy Quartermaster in the region, H. Brackenbury, shows, ongoing competition amongst the colonizers made the British determined to keep The Gambia separate from France's other West African colonies.¹³

The impact of colonialism, however, can be exaggerated. This colonial influence was by no means absolute, and while potential social cleavages inevitably developed throughout the colonial period regarding the social, political, and cultural divisions of French Senegal and English Gambia, both nations had ample opportunities to develop cooperation following independence. More importantly, the fact that Senegal and The Gambia actually achieved some degree of regional integration suggests that colonial differences were limited, overcome, or marginalized by other concerns of these states. Indeed, as the preamble of the confederation treaty states, "[Senegal and The Gambia] constitute a single people divided into two states by the vicissitudes of history," yet their ability to form this treaty demonstrated they overcame the effects of this separation.¹⁴ A discussion of Senegambian cooperation in the post-colonial period is thus little aided by justifications rooted in their colonial past.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION: OBSTACLES

Of course, as history has shown, Senegal and The Gambia did succeed in an impressive degree of integration that lasted nearly a decade. This accomplishment, however, was by no means pre-determined. In short, both domestic politics and strategic concerns complicated this issue, yet played an important role in creating the Senegambian Confederation and had equally influential impact on its eventual decay and disbandment. First, domestic opposition, while not powerful enough to derail the integration process, nevertheless was significant even at this early stage. On a basic level, Gambian society maintained a degree of wariness regarding integration, concerned that it would be "swallowed up" by its larger neighbor.¹⁵ Domestic parties in both states also opposed the process, though neither held a majority in the legislatures at the formation of the Confederation. In The Gambia, opposition groups like the National Convention Party (NCP) opposed integration, though they lacked the political power necessary to stop it.¹⁶ Opposition parties within Senegal also opposed the Confederation.¹⁷ In both cases, however, these appear to have been attempts by the opposition to differentiate themselves from their political competition and critique their policies for political capital. In either case, these parties lacked the political power initially necessary to block this integration.

Certain Gambian strategic interests also presented obstacles to integration. Golub and Mbaye, for example, argue that The Gambia has been heavily dependent

economically on "groundnut production, tourism . . . and its role as an entrepot for re-exporting products for trade since the 1970s."¹⁸ This posed a significant threat to Gambian trade if it was forced to harmonize its customs to that of its Senegalese neighbor. Moreover, its government has relied on these sectors for revenue and has therefore maintained relatively low tariffs on exporting goods to maintain this economic activity.¹⁹ A *New York Times* article from the period noted that \$10 million in goods was smuggled every year, and that this raised 70% of the country's \$40 million in revenue.²⁰ That same article also noted the potential economic risks integration and custom regulations posed to The Gambia, which requiring transition to a new currency, and was "virtually certain to adversely [affect] . . . the "border trade" (i.e., smuggling), along with tourism and peanut production."²¹ Indeed, it was the "thorniest problem" confronting the early Confederation.²² The Gambia thus had significant reasons to be wary of any efforts toward integration with its Senegalese neighbor.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE BENEFITS

Of course, the fact that Senegambian integration efforts proceeded suggests that other factors overshadowed the obstacles mentioned above. Once again, considering domestic and strategic factors is crucial to understand the signing of this treaty and the achievement of regional integration. Domestically, The Gambia's majority party worked to articulate the benefits of integration. Jeggan Senghor finds that the People's Progressive Party (PPP) maintained a dominant position within the Gambian legislature and the executive throughout this period, receiving 61.74 percent of the vote in the 1982 election compared to the NCP's 20 percent.²³ Gambian PPP elites then used this position to allay public fears and promote the benefits of integration. A *New York Times* article from November 1981, for example, quotes Gambian President and PPP leader, Dawda Jawara, going on record to say that both nations would maintain their sovereignty.²⁴ Senghor also claims that there was no worry of being swallowed by their larger neighbor, and instead, promised that the integration would bring benefits of "liberty, democracy, dignity, and justice to Gambians."²⁵ Gambian elites thus appeared initially successful in allaying fears and domestic opposition to Senegambian integration.

The PPP, however, also perceived domestic reasons that necessitated expediting this integration. Less than a year before, a coup nearly removed President Dawda and the PPP from power, and it was only stopped by the intervention of Senegalese troops at Dawda's request.²⁶ Gambian elites realized that without a military force to speak of, the government had little protections against future coups, and the PPP therefore turned to Senegal to protect its tenure and position. Indeed, the notion that Gambian leaders pursued integration as a result of concerns over subsequent coups resurfaces throughout news articles of that time. A report in the *New York Times*, for example, noted that Dawda signed the treaty "less than five months after being saved by Senegalese troops."²⁷ Senghor even notes the importance of the coup in spurring The Gambia's political elites to accept a confederation with Senegal, an influence

recognized by both sides in the Confederation.²⁸ It would appear that such drastic domestic events were the main cause of the countries' integration, at least in terms of The Gambia's motivations.

For Senegal, strategic factors were crucial in its efforts toward integration. As Senghor recognizes, "the security dividend was one of the main attractions of the Confederation [for Senegalese leaders]," because it allowed for the easy transit of troops into the Casamance region and throughout the country to confront potential threats from Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania.²⁹ This access to the Casamance region was especially important because it is a lucrative Senegalese province even though it is mired in endemic conflict. As the Uppsala Conflict Data Program details, the struggle in Casamance has continued off-and on from December 1982 until 2011, though it appears to have reached minor intensity status only in the 1990s and 2000s.³⁰ Given the risks of these potential threats, Senegal needed to insure unfettered lines of communication throughout the Senegambia for quick deployment of troops in case of conflict. Integration also pre-empted dissident groups of either country using the other as a base, particularly within The Gambia.³¹ The fact that this treaty was built on a robust legacy of previous cooperation, with these nations signing some thirty treaties between 1965 to 1982, also aided ratification.³² Moreover, the treaty itself institutionalized the power disparity between these two states, giving Senegal the dominant political position of President within Senegambia, an important distinction for the latter in terms of its national prestige and benefits of integration. Strategic concerns were thus crucial in Senegal's integration efforts, a development that simultaneously provided for the security of both states.

THE SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION

Now that the factors that prompted these states' cooperation have been discussed, it is useful to examine the fruition of these efforts and the high-tide mark of Senegambian integration. The treaty creating the Senegambia Confederation was signed by leaders of both Senegal and The Gambia on December 17, 1981. While both nations retained their sovereignty, the treaty itself was the apex of Senegambian cooperation and integration in the post-colonial era, provided for the integration of both nations' security and armed forces, created an economic monetary union, and coordinated their foreign policy.³³ Organizationally, the treaty created positions within the new Confederation, creating the position of President held by the Senegalese leader as well as the position of Vice President designated for the leader of The Gambia.³⁴ Additionally, a third of all representatives in the Senegambia legislature were reserved for The Gambia.³⁵ The Gambia also agreed to cover a third of the costs and supply a third of the recruits for the military and police.³⁶ Senghor confirms this, and notes that the confederal army would "ensure the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of the two countries against external aggression," though in practice the majority of the troops were stationed in The Gambia and that the Commander in Chief and security officers remained Senegalese.³⁷

It is important to recognize the implications of these treaty clauses. While this integration allowed higher cooperation and addressed concerns of both nations, the Confederation's structure insured that The Gambia remained the junior partner in the relationship. This was on one level merely a reflection of empirical reality and Senegal's greater material power vis-à-vis its neighbor. Indeed, Senegal was comparatively richer (though still poor by international standards), larger, and possessed a stronger military. It is thus unsurprising that Senegal received the dominant positions within the new Confederation and kept the majority of its armed forces stationed in Gambian territory to insure easier north-south intrastate transit of its troops, trade, and supplies. This would resurface in Gambian objections later on, though it did not impede initial integration. However, the Treaty also made an attempt to insure a degree of Gambian influence and voice in the process, as noted by the concessions granted in the treaty. Moreover, the Confederation itself lasted for nearly a decade, demonstrating that Senegambian integration was neither unfeasible nor doomed to failure.

WHY IT BROKE DOWN

Unfortunately, however, the Senegambian Confederation was not destined to last, but instead fell victim to factors that undermined support in both nations to maintain the relationship. Once again, considering domestic and strategic causes—such as a decrease in Senegal's available resources and political will to devote to integration efforts or a lack of grassroots support for integration in both countries—provides the most insightful explanation for this changing relationship. Strategically, Senghor notes that the final years of the Senegambian Confederation were “particularly turbulent.”³⁸ In two of the cases, a border dispute with Mauritania between 1989 and 1991 and a dispute over maritime territory with Guinea-Bissau nearly led to the start of two separate wars.³⁹ If this were to occur, Senegal/Senegambia would have found itself surrounded by conflict on three sides, engaged in border clashes in the north and south, and facing naval strikes on its Atlantic coast to the west. Strategic concerns regarding these threats thus left Senegal preoccupied when its partner petitioned for lowering the number of troops stationed in The Gambia. This came as an affront to Senegal, which shouldered the majority of the costs of the Confederation with a “1986–1987 budget [that] amounted to \$5 million dollars.”⁴⁰ Senegal was thus busy confronting other issues, and therefore had less time, resources, patience, and political will to sustain this integration effort.

Domestic factors in both nations were also crucial to the collapse of the Senegambia Confederation. As Senghor claims, the Confederation failed due to a lack of domestic support.⁴¹ While the strategic factors previously mentioned weakened and preoccupied the Confederation, the integration itself “[was seen] by the average Gambian . . . as an arrangement between two heads of state and the political elite.”⁴² It therefore lacked the necessary grass-roots support that needed to buy into the initiative to sustain it once the PPP and “no political party or other forms

of organized movement in Banjul or Dakar championed the Confederation.”⁴³ The necessary political support committed to maintaining this relationship was thus critically lacking in both nations. Further, while the Senegambia Confederation collapsed during PPP control of The Gambia, the bloodless coup on July 22, 1994, brought the military and opposition parties into power that had condemned the PPP and its policies as “corrupt and mismanaged.”⁴⁴ They were also opposed to efforts at integration and cemented the breach in Senegambian ties. This military coup brought President Jammeh to power, a ruler far less likely to pursue integration given his political rise to power.⁴⁵ Moreover, unlike in 1981, the Senegalese government refused to intervene to save the Gambian government, signaling the nadir of Senegalese cooperation and the final death knell of the Confederation.⁴⁶

POST-INTEGRATION ISSUES

Pre-existing domestic and strategic issues have remained and hindered subsequent attempts for these countries to cooperate since the breakdown of the Confederation. As previously stated, The Gambia has historically relied heavily on its groundnut production and re-export/smuggling industry. Strategically, this dynamic has remained after the breakup of the Senegambia Confederation and continues to act as an enduring obstacle to greater levels of interstate cooperation. Senegal remains very concerned over Gambian actions that threaten Senegal’s connection to its Casamance region in the south. As two separate BBC reports state, unilateral Gambian doubling of the ferry price for Senegalese crossing infuriated its larger neighbor.⁴⁷ Such actions not only hampered transit to its fractious southern region, but also threatened its trade and economy. Golub and Mbaye show that Senegal employs higher trade taxes to protect its economic base and small industrial sector, with noticeably higher taxes than The Gambia on every 2006 product (both agricultural and manufactured) examined in their analysis.⁴⁸ Other sources of contention include whether to build a bridge over the river, application of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) transit agreements, and fishing rights.⁴⁹ A number of strategic issues thus make the road to re-integration a political minefield of obstacles these nations would have to overcome if they sought a renewed regional Senegambia framework.

Actions by both states over the past decades have further soured relations. The Gambia, for example, briefly held some Senegalese soldiers in the country in 2005.⁵⁰ As mentioned above, Gambian unilateral price increases on ferry transit have also soured relations with Senegal.⁵¹ In addition, as a repressive dictatorship, integration poses a potential political threat to The Gambian regime domestically, and it has therefore limited subsequent cooperation between both nations to insure its tenure. Moreover, as a BBC article claims, Gambians resent Senegal’s greater power compared to their own.⁵² Strategically, Senegal has maintained a degree of dominance over its enclosed neighbor, as demonstrated by its redirection of Malian-Gambian trade to go through Senegal.⁵³ Both enduring and new domestic and

strategic factors have thus helped solidify Senegambian separation in the decades following the failure of the Confederation.

SENEGAL AND THE GAMBIA CANNOT SIMPLY WALK AWAY

The 1994 coup marked the nadir of Senegambian integration efforts, though as previously mentioned, relations have frequently remained strained over subsequent decades. Since then, both nations have proven incapable of attaining their previous levels of cooperation. Despite the factors impeding these efforts, however, Senegalese strategic considerations necessitate that it cannot simply ignore The Gambia or risk relations deteriorating too far. As previously stated, this is especially relevant regarding its long-lasting low-intensity conflict in its fertile Casamance region. Moreover, these separatists' attacks have continued despite agreements to cease fighting, with notable attacks in 2000 and 2002.^{54, 55, 56} While they do not pose a threat to overthrow the entire state, these separatists seek Casamance independence and have been an ongoing annoyance "engaging in robbery, extortion, arms trafficking and drug-dealing."⁵⁷ Senegal has thus historically had to insure it maintained some degree of political engagement with The Gambia so that it could quickly address these threats as they arose. Moreover, it is likely that Gambian leaders have been concerned that conflict could spill across their border, or that rebels could attack through their country through Senegal. Strategically, therefore, both states have had to at least maintain a working relationship so that they can address these issues.

In response, Senegal has pursued a policy of restraint regarding disagreements with The Gambia, and has considered alternatives to circumvent its inconvenient neighbor. Rather than force the issue of Gambian price increases, it has refrained from using overt pressure to ensure easy transit to its Casamance region. And rather than a military response or economic sanctions, Senegal instead restricted itself to diplomatic complaints and allowed its transporters to boycott transit through The Gambia.⁵⁸ Senegal effectively limited itself to economic tit-for-tats in response to this sudden increase in prices. It also restrained its response regarding The Gambia's holding of some Senegalese troops.⁵⁹ Senegal's temperance demonstrates that it has controlled its responses to disagreements with The Gambia and kept Senegalese issues from escalating to threaten access to its southern region. While The Gambia is an occasional diplomatic and strategic headache for Senegalese leaders, it has also generally restrained its actions, being careful to refrain from overtly hostile acts or activities that push Senegalese leaders too far.

Senegal has also considered alternatives to completely bypass this strategic inconvenience, contemplating building a tunnel under The Gambia or operating its own ferry.⁶⁰ While this may solve the strategic issue, ignoring The Gambia is not a beneficial Senegalese response. Aside from a tunnel arguably infringing upon Gambian territorial sovereignty, its economic repercussions for The Gambia's economy could potentially devastate the country and region. Indeed, such an action could prove disastrous for these impoverished nations, particularly The Gambia. If

The Gambia were to be hostile, it might then suffer domestic instability that could threaten the region, and Gambian support of Casamance rebels as retribution would not be inconceivable. An at least cordial The Gambia is thus crucial to effectively addressing issues to the south and maintaining stability in the Senegambia region. Therefore, while Senegal has considered such options over the past few decades, it has wisely not pursued these ideas, but has instead continued to engage its smaller neighbor to some degree, and has maintained a level of restraint in its foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

Senegambian relations have historically witnessed surprising fluctuations in their degree of regional integration and cooperation. While the relatively open political landscape prior to colonization allowed the spread and intermingling of a diverse set of people and groups, the colonial influences of French and British colonization separated this region into decidedly abnormal-looking states. However, neither of these aspects of Senegambian heritage is very helpful given the marked fluctuations of integration following decolonization. While Senegal and The Gambia achieved initial success at regional cooperation, subsequent events and factors after decolonization must have weakened these nations' relations and undermined their earlier attempts at economic and political cooperation. In addressing this puzzle, this paper analyzed domestic factors and strategic considerations within both countries as compelling explanations for the continuing failure of these nations to develop amicable relations. Despite the deterioration of these ties, Senegal has apparently maintained a degree of restraint regarding its weaker neighbor, restricting retaliations for foreign policy insults through economic tit-for-tats. It recognizes that despite the inconvenience, Senegal cannot ignore The Gambia, for conflicting relations or inattention have historically threatened economic relations and hindered its ability to confront secessionists operating in its isolated Casamance region. Strategic and domestic considerations are therefore instrumental in understanding the fluctuations in these nations' relationship over the past six decades, factors these nations must work cooperatively to address if they ever hope to re-attain the degree of regional integration they once enjoyed.

NOTES

1 Charlotte A. Quinn, *Mandingo Kingdoms of the Senegambia: Traditionalism, Islam, and European Expansion*

2 Quinn, *Mandingo Kingdoms*, 11–28.

3 Boubacar Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1988). Print. 5–26.

4 Quinn, 7–9.

- 5 Barry, *Senegambia*, 33.
- 6 Stephen S. Golub and Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, "National Trade Policies and Smuggling in Africa: The Case of The Gambia and Senegal," *World Development* 37.3 (2009): 595.
- 7 Quinn, *Mandingo Kingdoms*, 3.
- 8 Golub and Mbaye, "National Trade Policies," 595.
- 9 Quinn, *Mandingo Kingdoms*, 148–149.
- 10 Newbury, *British Policy Towards West Africa*, 612–613
- 11 Quinn, *Mandingo Kingdoms*, 148.
- 12 R. H. Meade to Sir Rowe: Gambia Treaties, 14 April 1887. In C.W. Newbury's *British Policy Towards West Africa: Select Documents 1875–1914 with Statistical Appendices, 1800–1914*. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1971). Print. 11–12.
- 13 Newbury, C.W. *British Policy Towards West Africa: Select Documents 1875–1914 with Statistical Appendices, 1800–1914*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1971. Print. 194–195.
- 14 Agreement Between the Republic of the Gambia and the Republic of Senegal Concerning the Establishment of the Senegambian Confederation, Dakar, Senegal, 17 December 1981, www.gambia.dk/senegambia_confederation.html.
- 15 Golub and Mbaye, "National Trade Policies," 597.
- 16 Jeggan Colley Senghor, *The Politics of Senegambian Integration, 1958–1994*, Bern: Peter Lang AG, International Publisher (2008). Print.
- 17 Senghor, *The Politics of Senegambian Integration*, 281.
- 18 Golub and Mbaye, "National Trade Policies," 598.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Pranay B. Gupte, "Gambia Enters Union with Senegal on Wary Note," *New York Times*: Special Report, 1 Feb. 1982.
- 21 Gupte, "Gambia Enters Union."
- 22 Gupte, "Gambia Enters Union."
- 23 Senghor, *The Politics of Senegambian Integration*, 264.
- 24 "Around the World; Gambian Calls Union with Senegal Premature," *New York Times*, 19 Nov. 1981. Web.
- 25 Senghor, *The Politics of Senegambian Integration*, 226.
- 26 Gupte, "Gambia Enters Union."
- 27 "Around the World; Senegal Assembly backs Union with Gambia," *New York Times*, 30 Dec. 1981, Web.

- 28 Senghor, *The Politics of Senegambian Integration*, 226–227.
- 29 Ibid, 269.
- 30 “Senegal,” Uppsala University: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Conflict Encyclopedia. Web. <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=135&value=#>.
- 31 Senghor, *The Politics of Senegambian Integration*, 269.
- 32 Golub and Mbaye, “National Trade Policies,” 597.
- 33 Agreement Between the Republic of Gambia and the Republic of Senegal.
- 34 Agreement Between the Republic of Gambia and the Republic of Senegal.
- 35 Agreement Between the Republic of Gambia and the Republic of Senegal.
- 36 Senghor, *The Politics of Senegambian Integration*, 233.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Senghor, *The Politics of Senegambian Integration*, 273.
- 39 Ibid., 274.
- 40 Ibid., 275.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 Ibid., 279.
- 43 Senghor, *The Politics of Senegambian Integration*, 279.
- 44 David Prefect, “Politics and Society in The Gambia Since Independence,” *History Compass* 6.2 (2008): 431.
- 45 “Gambia’s Election Challenge,” BBC. 17 Oct. 2001. Web.
- 46 Prefect, “Politics and Society,” 432.
- 47 James Copnall, “Gambia Acts to End Senegal Feud,” BBC, 5 Oct. 2005. Web.
“Bid to Solve Senegal-Gambia Feud,” BBC, 21 Oct. 2005. Web.
- 48 Golub and Mbaye, “National Trade Policies,” 602–603.
- 49 Ibid., 598.
- 50 “Senegal may Tunnel under Gambia,” BBC. 21 Sept. 2005. Web.
- 51 Copnall, “Gambia Acts to End Senegal Feud.”
- 52 “Senegal may Tunnel under Gambia,” BBC. 21 Sept. 2005, Web.
- 53 Golub and Mbaye, “National Trade Policies,” 604.
- 54 “Senegal Agreement over Casamance,” BBC, 26 Dec. 1999, Web.

55 "New Fighting in Casamance," BBC, 24 April 2000, Web.

56 "Casamance Rebels Attack Town," BBC, 4 Jan. 2002

57 "Casamance Separatists," BBC, 10 April 1998. Web.

58 Copnall, "Gambia Acts to End Senegal Feud."

59 "Senegal may Tunnel under Gambia."

60 "Senegal may Tunnel under Gambia."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agreement Between the Republic of the Gambia and the Republic of Senegal Concerning the Establishment of the Senegambian Confederation, Dakar, Senegal, 17 December 1981. Web. www.gambia.dk/senegambia_confederation.html.

Archer, Francis Bisset. *London: The Cambia Colony and Protectorate: An Official Handbook*. Franck Cass and Co. LTD 1967. Print.

"Around the World; Gambia and Senegal Sign Unification Pact." *New York Times*. 19 Dec. 1981. Web.

"Around the World; Gambian Calls Union with Senegal Premature." *New York Times*. 19 Nov. 1981. Web.

"Around the World; Senegal Assembly backs Union with Gambia." *New York Times*. 30 Dec. 1981. Web.

Barry, Boubacar. *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1988. Print.

"Bid to Solve Senegal-Gambia Feud," BBC. 21 Oct. 2005. Web.

"Casamance Separatists." BBC. 10 April 1998. Web.

Copnall, James. "Gambia Acts to End Senegal Feud." BBC. 5 Oct. 2005. Web.

"Gambia's Election Challenge," BBC. 17 Oct. 2001. Web.

Golub, Stephen S. and Ahmadou Aly Mbaye. "National Trade Policies and Smuggling in Africa: The Case of The Gambia and Senegal." *World Development* 37.3. 2009. Web.

Gupte Pranay B. "Gambia Enters Union with Senegal on Wary Note," *New York Times*. 1 Feb. 1982.

Newbury, C.W. *British Policy Towards West Africa: Select Documents 1875–1914 with Statistical Appendices, 1800–1914*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1971. Print.

Prefect, David. "Politics and Society in The Gambia Since Independence." *History Compass* 6.2.

Quinn, Charlotte A. *Mandingo Kingdoms of the Senegambia: Traditionalism, Islam, and European Expansion*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1972. Print.

R. H. Meade to Sir Rowe: Gambia Treaties, 14 April 1887. In C.W. Newbury's *British Policy Towards West Africa: Select Documents 1875–1914 with Statistical Appendices, 1800–1914*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1971. Print.

"Senegal may Tunnel under Gambia." BBC. 21 Sept. 2005. Web.

"Senegal." Uppsala University: Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Conflict Encyclopedia. Web. <http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/433>.

Senghor, Jeggan Colley. *The Politics of Senegambian Integration, 1958–1994*, Bern: Peter Lang AG, International Publisher. 2008. Print.