

WORLD OUTLOOK

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The state of international affairs is frequently in flux. In the past few years, we have seen a supposed shift away from a confidently unipolar system to one in which the United States appears uncertain, even vulnerable, in the face of non-state actors, regional powers, and rogue nuclear regimes. In this issue, we tried to reflect some of the conflicts likely to powerfully shape American foreign policy in the 21st century. A broad range of issues, including interstate conflicts, genocide, environmental sustainability, and state building, are discussed in this term's published entries. *World Outlook* was fortunate to receive over twenty-five submissions for the Spring '17 issue; the following works represent some of the most well-written articles and engaging topics we have published to date.

In this issue, *World Outlook* has decided to feature two non-standard pieces. First, we have included a recent interview we had with Harold Hongju Koh, who served for nearly four years as the 22nd Legal Advisor of the U.S. Department of State and currently is Sterling Professor of International Law at Yale Law School. He offers his insight on the state of affairs and current challenges facing the international legal order. Second, we have an editorial written by Samantha Koreman who attempts to, given the fraught state of affairs in many democracies in the world, provide a rationalization of how many people across the globe are looking toward isolationism despite the clear benefits to globalization.

We hope you will enjoy this issue's contents as much as we have.

Sincerely,
- Abhishek Bhargava & Jack Sullivan

THE EXTERNALITIES OF ENERGY SECURITY: CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL OIL POLICY AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS

Nandita Baloo

The liberalization of oil and gas markets following the oil shocks of the 1970s turned the Chinese markets for oil and gas into increasingly global, liquid markets and permanently made energy commodities “politically charged.”¹ As China’s economy continues to expand, with concomitant growth in energy demand due to a growing population and industry-led structural demands, attaining energy security has become a priority of the Chinese government. In the most recent five-year plan (FYP) published by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2020, energy investment both at home and abroad has been pushed aggressively. Many of the most recent five-year plans have also placed a heavy emphasis on developing new sustainable energy innovations.² China’s “going out” policy—designed to encourage Chinese enterprises to invest overseas—is one example of a strategy the government has used to increase access to energy. Under the policy, the government supports the efforts of National Oil Companies [NOCs] to increase energy access, and thereby attain energy security.³

However, the outcomes of these energy-led economic policies not only impact China’s relations with other countries, but also change global perceptions of China as a rising power. Economic statecraft—or the study of “economics as an instrument of politics”—is a widely-used framework to describe motivations for state policy.⁴ This paper will explore the question of how China’s energy policy acts as a form of economic statecraft; that is, to what extent has China been able to deploy economic statecraft to advance its energy security as well as larger strategic and diplomatic goals? This question will be answered by: (1) understanding how the government has set up NOCs to coordinate its national needs, (2) analyzing how China has carried out oil diplomacy worldwide, and (3) evaluating how these oil diplomacy measures are simultaneously effective in fulfilling China’s energy security and impact China’s grand strategy—particularly its quest of rising and balancing against the US.

DEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT: THE CHINA CASE

David A. Baldwin, one of the first political scientists to explore economic statecraft in depth, defines the concept as “influence attempts relying primarily on terms of resources that have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money.”⁵ To put it simply, economic statecraft can broadly be described as using international economic transactions as a vehicle to achieve political goals.⁶ The cost of pursuing military force as an instrument to exert power has risen as a result of many

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factors, including the proliferation of states' nuclear arsenals and increased economic and financial interdependency created through trade liberalization. These factors heighten the risk surrounding war, rendering it a last-resort option for states. For this reason, economics is assumed to be a preferred alternative method by which to exert influence and attain strategic goals.⁷ When international economic transactions occur, whether through commercial actors or state-led policies, there are always consequent "security externalities" or non-economic repercussions that cannot fully be internalized by just economics.⁸ When a state deploys economic statecraft policies in the context of increasing overall influence or attaining its strategic goals, these policies are crafted such that the externalities of the transactions frequently touch political or military spheres. Therefore, understanding economic policies implemented by state or commercial actors cannot be done "without also considering the political and military contexts that frequently influenced ultimate economic outcomes."⁹ Baldwin claims economic statecraft is a policy mechanism comprised of 3 basic components: (1) the type of policy used in the influence attempt, (2) the domain of this influence attempt, and (3) the scope of the influence attempt.¹⁰ The scope of the influence attempt—also described as the non-economic dimensions of the target's behavior that policy tries to influence—is what renders "economic statecraft a political act"; this is where the security externalities of a transaction can be fully understood.¹¹

As China is pursuing a "peaceful rise," it is arguable that economic statecraft would be the preferred instrument for its strategic objectives. In a world of increasingly interdependent trade and financial flows, leveraging and building regional economic relationships not only "facilitates Sino-centric economic integration", but also creates a dependency between China and other states that is so deep that states are incentivized to help China succeed, as otherwise the success of its own state is at risk.¹² Energy commodities are frequently referred to as "strategic goods."¹³ As defined by Baldwin, strategic goods are commodities that are "needed to pursue a given strategy and are relatively inefficient to produce at home" (or not available in sufficient quantities). Strategic goods are highly politicized commodities, raising the security externalities of transacting with them.

With energy security quickly becoming one of the Chinese government's top concerns, economic statecraft policies could help the PRC government not only fulfill its energy demand problems, but also aid in its grand strategy of expanding geopolitical power.

DEFINING ENERGY SECURITY: THE CHINA PROBLEM

In order to understand China's energy policy, it is important to first define energy security, and analyze what this means for China. Energy security can be broadly defined as the ability to "assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national values and objectives."¹⁴ China's rapid economic liberalization spearheaded by Deng Xiaoping in the 1990s allowed China to expand into global markets. The growth of China's market economy and

exports exponentially increased consumer and industry demands for energy commodities, with energy consumption growing to 15% of global demand in 2006, over four times faster than predictions.¹⁵ After starting as a net importer of oil in 1993, China is now projected to “become the second largest oil consumer” on earth, meaning that securing oil supply will be of the utmost importance for the PRC.¹⁶ While different countries have different interpretations of energy security, China’s energy security is dependent on how the state can “rapidly adjust to [its] new dependencies” on these global markets in order to meet the country’s growing energy appetite.¹⁷

China’s current energy situation is illustrative of why the PRC places such a high priority on obtaining energy security. Energy demand, particularly petroleum consumption, has surged from 4.8 million barrels a day in 2000 to 11.2 million barrels in 2014.¹⁸ However, this dramatic increase in petroleum consumption has not been matched with a surge in production; petroleum production over this same time frame increased from 3.4 million barrels per day in 2000 to only 4.6 million barrels in 2014.¹⁹ This mismatch in levels of petroleum consumption and production is not unique to this commodity; similar trends of production/consumption disparities in other energy commodities—such as coal and liquid natural gas (LNG)—also exist.²⁰ However, for purposes of this paper, energy security will be analyzed primarily through the lens of oil. The reasons for China’s increased energy usage are many. Although the prevalent assumption surrounds growing consumer patterns, studies have shown that “the main source of today’s [energy usage] growth is energy-intensive heavy industry,” chiefly iron and steel plants.²¹

Attaining energy security has an obvious economic dimension, but what is of greater importance are the political and geostrategic ramifications of this task.²² It is clear that China’s economic growth has risen in tandem with China’s energy consumption, and maintaining a steady energy supply to fulfill growing consumer demand is thereby important to ensure China’s long-term economic growth.²³ Beyond the structural demand for energy that necessitates economic growth, this energy security problem has broader political consequences for the PRC.²⁴ As a government that underpins its legitimacy on economic prosperity, the recent global spike in oil prices and fears of long term energy scarcity—coupled with China’s increased inefficiency in energy use per dollar of GDP—have heightened anxiety within the PRC.²⁵ Thus, maintaining long-term energy security is “viewed by the [Chinese] ruling elite as critical to its long term survival.”²⁶ It is within the governments best interests to do everything it can to “reduce China’s energy vulnerabilities.”²⁷

Energy security is not an issue the PRC wants to leave to market forces, as the government believes energy security is “becoming a matter of ‘high politics’ of national security.”²⁸ As the world becomes increasingly interdependent, the problem of energy security inherently transforms from one that simply encompassed global markets into one that is dependent on state-to-state relations.²⁹ Consequently, energy security is a problem that has significant geopolitical consequences. This is no different for China. The Chinese government has recognized that there is no way it can become

energy self-sufficient, and, as a result, is putting “energy policy front and center in its diplomatic efforts,” allowing energy policy to, to some extent, dictate the country’s foreign policy.³⁰ Beijing has been incentivizing oil-producing nations with promises of aid, strengthened trade relations, infrastructure support and other concessions to “[win] access to key resources” worldwide. As the world’s largest oil importer as of 2016, it is necessary for China to depend on other nations.^{31,32}

In the present era, built on diplomatic relations and economic interdependence, countries can no longer simply focus on military strategy to attain dominance as a world power. Instead, as Aaron Friedberg writes for the National Bureau of Asian Research, states and their leaders must look at a grand strategy, the deployment of a “wider array of instruments, including diplomacy, finance, science, industry, propaganda, as well as armies, navies and air forces” in order to secure dominance.³³ In the case of China, it is widely noted in literature that although China has not “publicly articulated an authoritative, official statement of its ‘grand strategy,’” leaders have been using various instruments, particularly economic statecraft measures, to become the world’s pre-eminent power.³⁴ The hunt for energy security is entangled in China’s overarching aims. China is attempting to use almost any means necessary to attain an alternative source for its energy independent of the US-dominated oil market. The PRC’s going out strategy is clearly derived from this material and strategic need.

The discussion above highlights how China’s economic policies and actions taken to attain energy security have both domestic implications and impact China’s position in the geopolitical world order. To illustrate and analyze these outcomes, this paper will frame China’s energy problems within the context of economic statecraft. With this framework we can evaluate the extent to which China has effectively used economic statecraft to fulfill both its energy and grand strategy goals.

THE PLAYERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF NOCs IN CHINA

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of China’s economic statecraft, we must analyze the vehicle through which these policies are conducted by the Chinese government. Commercial actors—or the “entities that actually carry out the international economic” actions—are arguably the most important body necessary for the state to politically influence in order to achieve domestic and foreign policy goals.³⁵ The Chinese economy was initially developed through the growth of state owned enterprises (SOEs). These enterprises, although technically owned by the state, cannot be directly operated by the government and so the commercial activity of these enterprises is delegated to managers. Yet, to this day, SOEs function as the commercial actors of China.³⁶ The National Oil Companies (NOCs) of China are among the most prominent SOEs that still have a large functional importance to the state. Because they are not directly state-run, NOCs have incentive compatibility constraints and information asymmetries. These factors must be addressed when the PRC attempts to influence these organizations to act in a way that is beneficial to the state, or else works in the direction of the Chinese government’s desired trajectory.³⁷ The PRC realizes that it is

not enough to just be able to buy oil; moreover, the government believes the key to attaining energy security is by “tap[ping] existing technology and capital to exploit oil overseas.”³⁸ When analyzing the evolution of the Chinese energy sector during and following Deng Xiaoping’s period of economic liberalization in the 1990s, it is clear that the extent to which the government is willing to work to economically benefit the NOCs proves that there are clear intentions to align NOC interests with state interests. Through this alignment, the PRC aims to effectively use the NOCs as the state’s commercial actors to lead China’s rise through energy economic statecraft policy.

SOEs have always been emphasized as an important growth instrument for the Chinese government. Early encouragements in the 1990s by the PRC to engage in more “transnational operations” gave SOEs preferential treatment and aided them in their endeavors.³⁹ This preferential treatment highlights the strategic importance placed on these commercial actors by the government as a vehicle to pursue strategic goals. Focusing on the oil industry, the 1990s liberalization measures that de-centralized the power centers of the energy sector and the oil industry resulted in four “oligopolistic administrative companies,” all of which were responsible for one or part of the energy supply chain between upstream and downstream and trading facets.⁴⁰ This proved to be inefficient as the company-split rift in the supply chain increased costs and diminished margins. Without vertical integration, companies adopt less flexibility and profit margins decrease, as a fragmented supply chain results in high transaction costs. Therefore, to build more efficient companies, vertical integration measures were integrated into the industry and the oil companies were yet again restructured, with the idea that “introduc[ing] market mechanisms ... [will]... encourag[e] NOCs to behave more efficiently.”⁴¹ Following this transformation, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) controlled northern upstream and downstream production, Sinopec dominated activity in southern China and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) controlled offshore operations. These restructurings, however, failed to help the government carry out its energy goals and meet energy demands. CNPC and Sinopec engaged in intense price wars, driving losses across all the companies. To prevent this, the Chinese government decided to create operating conditions such as “supply shortages [and] government-set prices” in the domestic market that would allow these companies to prioritize growth and not have to worry about price competition.⁴²

To this day, the National Development and Reform Commission’s Price Bureau controls the range of prices within which the domestic oil price is allowed to fluctuate.⁴³ The price ranges are pegged to a basket of “international market reference prices and the quality of crude.” Although there are hopes to switch to a floating price market, the government considers it “still necessary for oil product prices to be regulated by the government for the time being.”⁴⁴ This pegged price environment, coupled with the integrated supply chains present within each of the NOCs has made the Chinese oil industry an oligopolistic market, where four big firms (CNOOC, Sinopec, CNPC, and Sinochem) maintain control over the entire market. The market

and company structural changes forced by the PRC are designed to allow NOCs to prioritize growth. These changes prove that the government has a significant stake in the success of these oil companies and wants cooperation between the NOCs and the state. Further, the fact that National Development and Reform Commission's Price Bureau sets domestic oil prices inherently creates a politicized relationship between the NOCs and the PRC government; NOCs are incentivized to cooperate with the government's policy objectives so as to swing prices, thereby aligning both parties' interests.⁴⁵

PRC regulation favorable to the NOCs highlights the state's strategic interest in using NOCs as commercial actors to help solve China's energy security problem. The government's intent on using these companies as instruments for statecraft is revealed not only through the preferential treatment the PRC gives the NOCs, but also in the degree of "political clout" imparted.⁴⁶ Consequently, these actions should increase the investment risk threshold for NOCs in favor of helping the government for two reasons: first, as economic growth is crucial to China, the legitimacy of the PRC government rides on the effectiveness of its energy policy, rendering the state highly likely to support the NOCs in times of trouble⁴⁷; secondly, the government's amenability to changing its industry structure and domestic energy policy to position the NOCs to succeed in the past represents a large advantage for the NOCs; they are now incentivized to collude with government energy policy and "[invest] on a cost-plus basis backed by government assurances" at a large scale.⁴⁸ In essence, the assurance of a government safety net for the NOCs incentivizes these companies to align their interests with those of the state and prioritize oil supply security over profits and efficiency.⁴⁹ The PRC has maintained a strong influence in rendering these companies commercial actors for the state and employing their power to achieve governmental goals.

Beyond transforming the oil market structure to incentivize NOCs to collude with state interests, the PRC has implemented other control mechanisms that blur the lines between the oil companies and the government and ensure the state's control over NOCs policy actions.⁵⁰ A prime example of these internal control mechanisms includes the roles of the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and the Central Organization Department (COD). Although the SASAC doesn't directly intervene in the daily affairs of the corporations, it "holds the majority of shares of SOEs and has executive control over corporate policy and executive appointment."⁵¹ Having executive control over corporate policy and executive appointment means that this arm of the CCP can greatly influence the NOCs strategy, tethering the NOCs to the government and ensuring their support of the CCP. Further, COD's control of the appointment of the "5,000 top positions in the party"—which overlap with appointments of SOE executives—solidifies the commitment the NOCs must have to the CCP. All executive positions of CNOOC, Sinopec, and the other NOCs must be appointed by the COD and confirmed by the Politburo.⁵² Beyond this direct link to the state, there are many individuals with high positions in National Oil

Companies that are directly linked to the party. Particularly, individuals such as Jiang Jiemin, the General Manager of the CNPC, are members of the CCP Central Committee, which consists of the “371 most politically powerful individuals in China.”⁵³ These two internal political control mechanisms, on top of market structural changes, remove any incentive the NOCs have to defect from state strategy.

Shaped by the CCP to focus on growth-driven versus profit-driven strategies, the NOCs have, therefore, been more willing to engage in commercial activity that could benefit the government. Some argue that the number of previous restructurings gives rise to the *de jure* promise that the government will catch the companies if they crumble, thereby creating a high risk threshold among the NOCs. That said, the control mechanisms of the SASAC and the COD make sure that the companies generally act in favor of state goals, as these bodies essentially guarantee that party members occupy senior positions in the companies. The CCP has clearly set up its energy industry through these above factors so that it can implement international energy policies as an instrument of statecraft. NOC action in China’s going out strategy is the best example of how the government employs these companies as commercial actors to carry out economic statecraft and advance both China’s energy security and larger goals.

CHINA’S GOING OUT STRATEGY

The going out strategy, first led by CNPC, was encouraged by the government in 1993 as a method for China’s industrial sectors to “engage in the global market as a way to enhance China’s international competitiveness.”⁵⁴ In the energy sector in particular, the going out strategy is useful for the government in gaining a stronghold and sphere of influence over certain countries and regions. The three big NOCs of China (CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC) have all been encouraged to seal long-term supply contracts with other nations worldwide. They have been using state provided “sweeteners”—such as access to China’s growing markets, economic and military aid, cheap financing, and diplomatic support through China’s veto power in the UN Security Council—to confirm deals with oil-producing states.⁵⁵ Using the going out strategy to attain energy security through China’s NOCs without dependence on the US or Western oil companies is attune to the PRC’s implicit grand strategy; namely, to employ “military, economic, and diplomatic measures...to displace the United States as the world’s dominant power.”⁵⁶ The Chinese government is clearly cognizant of the opportunity present. The PRC aggressively pushes the going out strategy as a key part of its Five Year Plans, which outline national policy agendas. According to the chief of the office of the secretary-general of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), with the state pushing Chinese companies to look outwards for resources, China is now ranked 12th on the list of countries investing most abroad.⁵⁷ In the energy sector, this policy has fared well, as it provides NOCs with motives for pursuing and extending their global reach. For example, CNPC proudly proclaims on its website that it operates in 37 countries worldwide, maintaining relationships with important global oil players such as Iran, Venezuela, Russia, and Nigeria.⁵⁸

In the PRC's quest to balance and rise up against the US, using the going out strategy for China's energy sector reflects a preference for not simply relying on the market to influence energy supply. There is a state fear of letting party legitimacy and China's economic livelihood ride on an "industry that is dominated by the US and the major international oil companies of the industrial countries."⁵⁹ This fear, coupled with policy motives to reach out to other countries, underpins the long-term contracts implemented by Chinese NOCs that remove around a "million barrels of oil per day from the supply pool," thereby reducing the liquidity of the oil market. China's going out strategy not only locks up the supply of oil, but also allows China to gain influence in foreign countries through the unilateral oil purchase contracts entered into by the NOCs. To analyze the going out strategy in greater detail, Chinese energy relations with Iran and Nigeria will be discussed and compared in the next sections. Through this analysis and evaluation of how the going out strategies in these countries impacts China-US relations, this paper will analyze the extent to which China has been able to implement economic statecraft to advance its energy and diplomatic goals.

CASE STUDY: IRAN

The Middle East is arguably the region of greatest strategic importance to China. Within the region, Iran is viewed by China as a nation with great tactical and commercial promise. As a result, China has attempted and in many ways succeeded in taking advantage of Iran to create a powerful strategic relationship.

Historical background, coupled with commercial potential envisioned by China, made Iran not only an easy choice as a target state to impact, but also allowed the PRC to foresee successful relations between the two countries. China's relationship with the Middle East was historically hallmarked by the Silk Road, a trade route between China, Central Asia and the Middle East. The Silk Road created a "rich context of mutual cultural influences and cooperation" and has underpinned "historical memory as a source of strength and legitimacy" for China's relationship with the region.⁶⁰ Both Iran and China have histories of war, conflict, and neocolonialism that accentuate their "civilizational and political identification." These histories funnel into an anti-imperialist rhetoric prevalent in both nations that motivates the formation of a closer alliance.⁶¹

On the strategic realm, the "primacy of economic and political interests... drives the relationship" between the two countries.⁶² Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran saw its traditional major trading partners—including the US and the UK—flee.⁶³ China, which had just enacted its economic liberalization policies in 1978, recognized the void in Iran and exploited the opportunity. In addition, Iran's foreign policy stance in the 1980s—hallmarked by the slogan "neither east nor west" and designed to resist both the Soviet Union and the US—appealed to China, signifying an underlying rhetoric of non-alignment and anti-imperialism. China set a clear goal to make Iran a strategic partner as it saw the potential alliance as a way to rise up and balance against the US and Russia.⁶⁴ Further, the resource drain in Iran that

resulted from the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act—deployed by the Clinton Administration in 1996 to “deprive Iran of the ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction to fund terrorist groups by hindering its ability to modernize its key source of revenue - the petroleum sector”—allowed China to take advantage of the vacuum by bolstering Iran’s infrastructure in exchange for the ability to exploit the country’s vast oil reserves.⁶⁵

On the commercial side, Iran has untapped potential in its extraction capabilities. The country has a relatively low extraction rate compared to other oil-producing nations; in 2015, it was recorded that although Iran has 158,400 million barrels of proven crude oil reserves, its crude oil production rate is only 3.2 million barrels per day.⁶⁶ This low rate signaled to China the commercial potential of a strategic relationship with Iran. Further, the distinguishing commercial feature of Iran—compared to the other competing Middle Eastern oil giant, Saudi Arabia—is that Iran’s upstream sector is open to foreigners under the Islamic Republic’s 1987 law, which “[permits] the Ministry of Petroleum and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to establish contracts with either local or foreign companies.” This mandate gave China the commercial access needed to establish predominance in the Iranian market.⁶⁷

The relationship between China and Iran has developed in a way that is inherently political and strategic; China’s intentions to “ensure access to an important export market and develop a political relationship” are made extremely clear through the PRC’s interactions in oil and gas contracts.⁶⁸ During the period when the Chinese NOCs began to search abroad for energy suppliers, Iran was primarily a state-led economy. Since “Chinese firms were quite familiar with operating under conditions of government control,” Iran and China were easily able to meet and agree on projects through an institutionalized governmental entity called the “Joint Committee for Trade, Science, and Technology Cooperation” (simply known as the Joint Committee).⁶⁹

Initially, under the Shah’s regime in 1974, there were small, government-led purchases of Iranian oil organized through the Joint Committee. Soon, however, the volume of oil purchased expanded. China’s purchase of Iranian oil grew from 300,000 tons in 1977 to 1 million tons in 1982, and up to 2 million tons by 1989-90.⁷⁰ As the Chinese economy became “highly marketized,” NOCs spearheaded contracts in Iran, which were then retroactively bundled into Joint Committee Announcements.⁷¹ In the 1990s, China began “extending credit to support expanded cooperation”; for example, in 1993, two loans were provided by China: “one of \$150 million for the Tehran metro project and another of \$120 million to refurbish and build 10 cement factories.” This deal included “Iranian construction of a refinery in China” to process Iranian sour crude oil.⁷² These contracts continued to strengthen the relationship between China and Iran, as seen by the marked growth in the volumes of oil exchanged over time.⁷³ One of the most prominent projects executed in Iran with active participation from China is the expansion of Caspian Sea oil and gas production. This project involves modernization of refining and exploration facilities in the city of Neka in order to “bring Caspian oil and gas through pipelines to the southern Iranian ports for

shipping to Europe and Asia,” a project the US is vehemently opposed to.⁷⁴

With Iran as an oil exporter dependent on China to attain energy security, the alliance between China and Iran has grown stronger than ever. As voiced in the 1988 quote below by Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayi, the relationship between these two countries is one that is highly valued for reasons that are more than just commercial:

“Bilateral cooperation between Iran and China is indisputably useful to maintaining regional peace, Asian peace, and stability and security, and even useful for upholding world peace. It is our hope that cooperation between Iran and China will become a model for cooperation between nonaligned and Third World nations.”⁷⁵

Through these initial commercial oil contracts with supplementary non-energy related development clauses, China has managed to create a critical alliance with Iran that has grown beyond a commercial scope. Evidenced by this growing relationship, we can conclude that China has been successful in deploying economic statecraft to achieve its goals in Iran.

NIGERIA CASE STUDY

Like Iran, Nigeria’s economy is also largely oil dependent, with the petroleum industry accounting for more than 75% of government revenues and 30% of real GDP in 2008.⁷⁶ Unlike other OPEC nations such as Iran, where “a state owned national oil company often took direct control of production,” Nigeria is unique in that— despite joining OPEC in 1971—it still permits multinationals to carry on operations under Joint Operation Agreements.⁷⁷ As a result, the Nigerian oil market was initially dominated by large Western multinational organizations, including Shell and Exxon Mobil, whose “established presence” actually shut China out of Nigeria’s oil industry for a while.⁷⁸

Nevertheless, there were many factors that made Nigeria a target country for China’s going out strategy. First, as Nigeria is a resource-abundant country with a heavily oil-dependent economy, China sought to form a close relationship with Nigeria to secure its energy supply. Moreover, the PRC believed that, as quoted by Minister Shi Guansheng at the 2000 Sino African Forum and reported in the *People’s Daily*: “as more African countries improve political stability and make headway in economic growth, the continent’s nations will have more to say in international affairs.”⁷⁹ The PRC government believed it was important to form relationships with African nations such as Nigeria in order to capitalize on the future diplomatic potential of these states. Further, China’s going out policy is designed to be hands-off and respect the sovereignty of other nations.⁸⁰ This tenet allows China to have a higher risk threshold when drilling in countries such as Nigeria, where “Western oil companies are . . . hesitant to do so fearing the political risk.” For this reason, the PRC believed it could help

Nigeria fill the gaps that Western firms have failed to.⁸¹ From Nigeria's perspective, the prospect of collaborating with China is favorable because of the potential for generous aid and benefit packages that will supplement long-term oil contracts, essential for helping to refurbish Nigeria's underdeveloped infrastructure.⁸²

China has not hesitated to pursue significant deals with Nigeria. Because, unlike Western corporations already operating there, China assists Nigeria in infrastructure projects and aids in provision to clear debts and soft loans, Nigeria has welcomed China's presence with open arms.⁸³ Initially, China used political contingencies in establishing its partnership with Nigeria; China was "recruiting support among the UN general assembly... to vote in favor of Beijing taking the 'China' seat at the UN" and replace Taiwan's seat, and agreed to financially back anyone in support of the One-China policy.⁸⁴ Once Nigeria agreed to this stipulation, China began establishing a strategic relationship with this oil-rich nation. In 2009, Sinopec took over Addax Petroleum in a \$7.2 billion contract, and in 2006 CNOOC created a \$2.3 billion deal to buy stake in an offshore oil field in Nigeria, which has estimated proven reserves of over 620 million barrels of oil and approximately 3.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, "[making it] larger than any single field the company operates today in China or Indonesia."^{85,86} PRC leadership has continuously thanked Nigeria for its unwavering diplomatic support; during President Obasanjo's visit to China, Hu Jintao frequently "expressed China's appreciation for Nigeria's consistent adherence to the One-China policy and its support to China's adoption of the Anti-Secession Law."^{87,88}

These strategic ties are clearly regarded with great importance by both nations. An excerpt from a speech discussing the benefits of the strategic relationship given by He Xiaowei, the Assistant Minister for Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation at the Closing Ceremony of the Fifth China-Africa Seminar for Economic Management, highlights this dynamic:

"It is my belief that the forum shall have far-reaching effects on the cross-century development of Sino-African relations... and the establishment of a new international political order which is just and rational, forming a new pattern of China-Africa friendly relationship and economic cooperation. There is a broad prospect of... [playing] to the complimentary features of Chinese and African Economies, and The Chinese government stands ready to encourage companies to develop economic and trade cooperation with African countries by adhering to the principles of Equality and mutual benefit, adopting different forms, pursuing practical results and seeking common development."⁸⁹

Similar to Iran, Nigeria was desperate for resource help that was not fulfilled by the established Western multinationals in the region. Thus, Chinese NOCs were quickly able to employ the going out strategy to meet Nigerian resource needs and

exert influence over the nation.

IMPACTS OF CHINESE POLICY'S SECURITY EXTERNALITIES ON CHINA'S RISE

The case studies above clearly prove that China has successfully been able to use its NOCs as vehicles for its going out strategy to deploy economic statecraft and gain influence in many countries. The official statements presented in both case studies by Nigerian, Iranian, and Chinese government officials evidence that relationships which initially started as economic also have security externalities that have allowed these countries to forge even closer alliances. These alliances have further moved beyond their commercial significance. For example, China has used its diplomatic power in the UN to rally behind Nigeria's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Similarly, despite considerable US pressure, China has stated that it opposes sanctions against Iran on its nuclear weapons program.^{90,91}

However, although these security externalities have been useful in allowing China to forge alliances and facilitate its rise in the geopolitical order, the hands-off nature of China's going out policy has resulted in externalities that anger status quo powers, particularly the US. The fact that China's going out policy allows NOCs to invest anywhere, regardless of political circumstances and strategic threats to the status-quo geopolitical order, makes the US wary of China's employment of economic statecraft. In the eyes of the US, although countries such as Nigeria and Iran are falling under the influence of China, the PRC's methodology raises questions about China's responsibility as a rising power. The same security externalities that have solicited close relationships between China and a range of nations have also precipitated a negative reaction from the US and its allies. In many cases helping corrupt governments by providing them with arms—as in the case of Nigeria—or else operating in “troublesome [states] which Washington seeks to marginalize”—such as Iran—China's actions have been alarming to the US; Washington understands how China is hoping to use foreign trade as “a direct source of power,” and believes that if this pattern goes unbalanced by US counter-action, there will potentially be negative global consequences. To analyze this dynamic in depth, we will revisit the case studies of Nigeria and Iran, looking at examples of balancing actions or scenarios where the US and China have butted heads due to China ignoring international norms while deploying economic statecraft.

REVISITING IRAN: THE AZADEGAN OIL FIELD

The US has been wary of the impacts of the growing China-Iran relationship on the possible proliferation of Iran's nuclear program. Despite the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act—under which the “US government was mandated to impose sanctions on foreign firms doing business with Iran”—and following measures such as the series of oil sanctions imposed by the United States and the EU in late 2011 and early 2012, China has persisted and continued to maintain close relations with Iran.⁹² Among other worries, there is a particularly longstanding fear that the unregulated money

given to Iran by China as part of the PRC's going out contracts could be used to fund an Iranian nuclear weapons program. As a result, there have been efforts by the US, with help from its allies, to attempt to balance against China.

One example of US counter-action is seen through the negotiations of development rights to Iran's largest Azadegan oil field, located in the western province of Khuzestan near the border with Iraq.⁹³ During initial talks about developing the field in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Japan had been willing to participate in a \$2.8 billion deal. In order to uphold good relations with China, Iran also "granted the CNPC with an 85 million dollar contract to drill 19 wells in existing natural gas fields in southern Iran."^{94,95} However the US was concerned that Iran was using these oil revenues to fund their nuclear development programs, and as a result convinced Japan to not take part in the deal. Under US pressure, Japan missed the 2003 deadline to gain exclusive rights to the oilfield.⁹⁶ Despite concerns voiced by the US and its allies, China participated in the tender for the development rights to the Azadegan oil field, estimated to contain 3.55 billion ton of oil.⁹⁷ In an attempt to then dissipate the potential negative security externalities of China's tender, the US helped facilitate talks between Tokyo and Tehran to convince Tehran to join the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Tehran's membership in the IAEA would allow the US "to monitor Iran's nuclear facilities" and thereby keep any negative externalities of a growing Chinese influence in check.⁹⁸

In 2003, Iran voluntarily implemented and signed the Additional Protocol (AP) of the IAEA. Following this, Tokyo—backed by the US—continued in bilateral talks with Tehran regarding the Azadegan oil field tender to further deter China.⁹⁹ However, China's close relationship with Iran prevailed over these counterbalancing measures. A 2004 deal between Iranian Vice President Mohammad Sattarifar and Sinopec executives entailed Sinopec importing "at least 5 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas" in exchange for "rights to exploit the Azadegan oilfield."¹⁰⁰ Angered by the delaying tactics implemented by US-backed Japan, the PRC supplemented the 2004 deal with an oil exploration and development, buy-back style deal, which called for "Sinopec ... to buy 250 million tonnes of Iranian LNG over thirty years and develop the Yadavaran oilfield in the Southwest."^{101,102}

The indiscriminating presence of China in Iran is clearly not one welcomed by the US. The PRC is undoing previous US actions to marginalize Iran and promote the status quo morals of "democratic good governance."¹⁰³ Because Iran and other "rogue states" continue to support regional terrorist groups including "Hezbollah and Hamas," China's active support of Iran through its long-term oil contracts paints China as an irresponsible power in the eyes of the US and the greater international community.¹⁰⁴

REVISITING NIGERIA: COMBATING MEND

Unlike in Iran, there is already an established presence of US and other Western multinational corporations in Nigeria. However, the actions of Western actors are

solely commercial in scope; unlike the PRC, Western organizations are not ready to help the government and its security forces due to the rampant corruption throughout the country. US and Western hesitancy to aid countries with unsafe political circumstances, like Nigeria, has weakened traditional “US influence and control over oil in this region.” Chinese NOCs have leveraged the hands-off nature of China’s going out policy and Nigeria’s resulting need for infrastructure resources and aid to gain significant influence.¹⁰⁵ Because China is willing to give aid and weapons to Nigeria in ways other countries are not, Nigeria views the PRC as a crucial partner, allowing China to balance against established Western investors. However, the image effects of this dynamic are negative for China; its negligence in giving aid to potentially dangerous actors tarnishes the image of a “responsible China” that the PRC has worked hard to cultivate.¹⁰⁶

This condition can be seen clearly in the way in which China has helped Nigerian security forces gain weapons to fend off “Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta” (MEND) militias that are attacking Nigeria’s oil supply. Despite Nigeria’s oil resources falling within the bounds of its sovereign territory, the state’s control “where the oil is actually being exploited” is, in reality, relatively weak. Terrorist groups such as MEND and Boko Haram terrorize the region frequently.¹⁰⁷ MEND’s attacks in the Niger Delta, where most of Nigeria’s oil is concentrated, adversely impacts Nigeria’s oil supply, decreases national production by 20%, and raises global oil prices.¹⁰⁸ The security situation for locals and foreign workers alike is becoming increasingly problematic, characterized by occurrences such as a car bomb attack in April 2006 and “kidnappings of foreign oil workers to showcase their “demand[s] [of] more local control of the region’s oil wealth.”¹⁰⁹ In the face of this debilitating situation, when the Nigerian government requested US assistance for their security forces and asked for “200 boats to guard the delta,” the US did not provide Nigeria with what it needed, and only sent over “four old coastal patrol boats” instead.¹¹⁰ The Nigerian government has not been pleased with the US’s hesitancy, as evidenced by a statement from the Nigerian vice-president: “the US has been too slow to help protect the oil rich Niger Delta from a growing insurgence.”¹¹¹ As a result of this vacillation, the Nigerian government moved to request China for weapons, which China willingly agreed to provide. While the US has been “squeamish” about helping Nigeria with its weapons demands due to human rights atrocities allegedly committed by Nigerian security forces—such as politically motivated killings and prostitutions—China, on the other hand, “needs little compulsion to sell weapons to such actors.” As its main priority is securing Nigeria’s oil supply, China has been able to quickly squeeze in and balance against existing Western stakeholders and establish close strategic ties with Nigeria.¹¹²

However, these “undiscriminating and opulent” transactions come at the cost of impeding US and European efforts to help promote democratic good governance and improvements in the region. Members of the Western international community have expressed unhappiness with the lack of regulation China has shown in its dissemination of aid and weapons.¹¹³ Although the impacts of supplying Nigerian security forc-

es with weapons is arguably less severe than that of aiding Iran on its quest for nuclear weapons through unregulated contracts, when China engages in similar actions across Nigeria as well as in other countries such as Sudan and Zambia, the cumulative impact of neglecting the PRC's role as a responsible power transforms the nature of China's rise into one that is predatory and viewed unfavorably by the US.

IMPACTS OF CHINESE ECONOMIC STATECRAFT ON CHINA'S RISE: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

As shown in revisiting the cases of Nigeria and Iran, the single-minded focus of China's policy implementation in foreign countries, regardless of political climate or international security implications, has cost China goodwill in the eyes of the US, negatively impacting how the US views future US-China interactions.¹¹⁴ In the Nigeria case study, it is clear that Nigeria's dangerous political situation and human rights atrocities caused hesitation among Western governments to support such activity, causing an anxious Nigeria to "grab the lifeline that China ... present[s]" in the form of cash and political cover.¹¹⁵ China's speed in blindly responding to such aid requests from Nigeria and its treatment of national political matters as merely trivial has tarnished its reputation. Although the Nigeria case shows a scenario in which China's disregard can impact regional instability, the implications of the Iran case study show a scenario where China's slackness can have detrimental global security implications. China's callous mindset did not deter business relations with Iran—despite the disciplinary sanctions put forward by the United States and other countries—but it did have negative consequences that caused global uneasiness. China's indifferent attitude forced the US to respond to China's economic statecraft policies in the manner that it did, underlying the ineffectiveness of China's policies in improving the country's reputation as a leader on the international sphere.

US responses to the security externalities of China's economic statecraft policies show that although the US may feel strongly towards China's increased sphere of influence, what is more significant and extremely unwelcomed by the US is the destructive nature of China's policies to the established practices of democratic good governance that the US has worked hard to uphold. As a result, in the eyes of the US and the larger international community, China's economic statecraft policies tarnish the PRC's grand strategy of a peaceful rise, allowing us to conclude that China's deployment of economic statecraft policy has been only somewhat effective.

Following this conclusion, the next question to ask is: how will China's economic statecraft impact future US-China interactions? Although many argue that in terms of energy security policy, the best way for the US to approach China is through cooperation, others are not so positive.¹¹⁶ Another common view is that as China continues to pursue different actions on the international stage, the US is weighing these against each other to decide whether to be confrontational or cooperative towards China in the future.¹¹⁷ The more likely China is to pursue a path of neglect for international norms, the more likely it is that a confrontational interaction between

the US and China will occur; however, if China moves to present itself as a state that is a responsible stakeholder whilst attaining energy security, confrontation will be a less likely outcome, raising the possibility of a “co-operative framework between the two states.”¹¹⁸ China needs to consider to what extent it values its relationship with the US and other global powers upon deploying economic statecraft prior to pursuing further energy security policy.

APPENDIX

Table 1: Source: John W. Garver, *China and Iran: ancient partners in a post-imperial world* (University of Washington Press, 2006), Table 9.5.

TABLE 9.5
China's Crude Oil Imports from Iran, 1983–2003

Year	Metric tons	US \$
1983	0	
1984	0	
1985	0	
1986	0	
1987	0	
1988	9,987	1,637,790
1989	266,215	34,500,619
1990	301,240	39,534,000
1991	55,000	7,641,000
1992	114,990	15,574,000
1993	67,860	9,513,000
1994	69,119	8,715,000
1995	931,105	121,317,000
1996	2,311,105	337,072,000
1997	2,756,718	418,409,000
1998	3,619,989	414,915,000
1999	3,949,291	519,838,000
2000	7,000,465	1,464,018,000
2001	10,847,008	2,068,760,522
2002	10,629,865	1,901,986,000
2003	12,393,834	2,635,085,866

SOURCE: *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo haiguan tongji nianjian* [People's Republic of China Customs Statistical Yearbook] (Beijing: Zhongguo haiguan, 1983–2004).

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IDEAL ISLAMISTS? APPLYING THE TURKISH MODEL TO EGYPT

Azhar Unwala

The 2011 Egyptian revolution and subsequent 2013 military coup poses uncertainties about the future of Egypt's governance as well as the role Islamists hold in that future. Many point to Turkey's Islamist-leaning AKP as an accomplished model by which Egypt's Islamists can replicate. While copying Turkey provides an untenable and unrealistic solution for Egypt in the near term, the successes of Turkish Islamists provide strategic and tactical lessons for their Egyptian counterparts in movement-building, party politics, and governance.

The 2011 Egyptian revolution and subsequent 2013 military coup pose uncertainties about the future of Egypt's governance. The Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party's (FJP) success in Egypt's 2011-2012 parliamentary elections sparked further inquiries about Islamism's role in Egyptian politics. These inquiries often referenced the applicability of the 'Turkish model' to Egypt. This was due to the Turkish, Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party's (AKP) electoral and policy accomplishments. Egypt's adoption of Turkey's model was professed by high-level Turkish and Egyptian officials, politicians, scholars, and activists.¹ Consequently, this paper evaluates the Turkish model's relevance to Egypt with a focus on political Islam and democratic governance. Part I briefly examines the Turkish model for political Islam and its developments. Part II analyzes the contrasting nature of Turkey and Egypt's Islamist politics. Drawing upon the Turkish experience, Part III offers key insights to Egyptian Islamism. While the Turkish model cannot be replicated in Egypt, it offers valuable strategic and tactical lessons for Egypt's Islamists.

I. THE TURKISH MODEL: KEMALISM TO ISLAMISM

Understanding Turkish political Islam requires grasping Turkey's founding Kemalist principles. Enshrined by Turkey's first president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, these principles stressed secularism, or religion's separation from the public sphere as well as state control of religion; republicanism, or politics based on rule of law and popular sovereignty; nationalism, or promotion of Turkish citizen identity; populism, or devolution of political power to citizenship; statism, or state-led economic development; and revolutionism, or continuous political adaptation and reform.² From these principles, the state employed all imams as civil servants, banned religious education

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and propaganda, latinized the Turkish language from its Arabic antecedent, and mandated the call to prayer occur in Turkish. The state also pursued immense modernization projects, provided widespread citizen freedoms, and promoted ‘Turkish-ness’ as a principal national identity. Turkish identity promotion was complemented by subjugation of ethnic or religious identities like Islamism or Kurdish-ness, which Kemalism regarded as anti-modern. In many ways, Kemalism sought to erase Turkey’s Ottoman heritage to become a Western-style republic.³

Originally, Islamism emerged in opposition to Atatürk’s agenda. Kemalism was supported by the urban elite and middle class who benefited from state development projects. Yet the authoritarian tendencies of Kemalist reforms were uneasily digested by the urban poor, Anatolian peasantry, and ethnic groups like the Kurds. These marginalized groups could not identify with vague Kemalist tenets and failed to see the ideology’s tangible benefits. Islam instead provided them with a historical and cultural identity. Moreover, Islamists viewed secularism as weakening Turkey. Secularism diminished the strength associated with the Ottoman empire and fomented ethnic and political cleavages that Islam could otherwise cement.⁴

Yet Turkey’s multiparty period after 1950 both politicized and moderated Islamist groups. Of the 24 parties competing in the 1946 parliamentary race, eight had Islamic themes in their programs. Many Islamists joined centrist ‘catch-all’ parties to promote their agenda. For the next 30 years, the governments under Adnan Menderes’ Demokrat Parti and Suleyman Demirel’s Justice Party relaxed state regulation of religious expression. Unlike the harsh secularism practiced by Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party in prior years, these later governments reinstated religious education, restored the Arabic call to prayer, and permitted women to wear the veil in public.⁵ It was in this permissive environment that Islamist political parties were formed.

Necmettin Erbakan’s National Salvation Party was the first Islamist party to gain parliamentary seats in the 1973 elections. The party’s popularity stemmed from its economic program designed to promote industrialization, reduce inflation, and improve social welfare. Erbakan’s Islamist Welfare Party later gained a parliamentary majority in 1996 after prior municipal election successes, productive welfare distribution schemes, and effective grassroots mobilization. In both cases, Erbakan’s parties understood that Islamist ideology could not win elections unless it could deliver tangible benefits to the electorate. Still, the parties were shut down respectively by the 1980 military coup and a 1998 Constitutional Court ruling, which banned then-Prime Minister Erbakan from politics. This was because the parties also depended on their Islamist base, which Erbakan had secured through radicalization. While Erbakan announced his parties’ support for entry into the EU Customs Union and a Turkish-Israeli peace accord, he also called for the recreation of the Caliphate, criticized free trade’s “immodesty”, and tacitly valorized Hamas’s violent jihad in the Palestinian intifada. Islamist pressure also forced Erbakan to support religious schooling that produced radical attitudes towards the secular state. Along these lines, the parties’ closure upheld the Turkish constitution’s secular mandate.⁶

From the demise of Erbakan's Islamist politics ascended Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's AKP in 2001. In contrast to 2001 Felicity Party's traditionalism, the AKP branded itself as the reformist offshoot of Erbakan's Welfare Party. Erdoğan learned that Turkish Islamist parties had to account for a diverse electorate's needs, a secular political system, Constitutional Court mediation, and possible military intervention. Consequently, the AKP was formed as a conservative democratic party without explicit Islamist affiliations. The AKP program affirms Turkey's secular state and defines secularism as rights to belief and personal ethics. Additional rights are based on international charters, European Union accession is a key goal, and governance will provide practical outputs aimed at economic growth. The result has been an AKP single-party government for most of the past decade under Erdoğan's leadership.⁷

II. APPLYING THE TURKISH MODEL TO EGYPT

A. ORIGINS AND LEGACIES

Political Islam's role in Turkey and Egypt is shaped by the countries' varying colonial legacies. The legacy of Turkic superiority is a source of pride for much of Turkish society. The ascendancy of the 11th century Seljuk empire and the Ottoman empire's 600-year dominance still permeates Turkish identity. Even after the Ottoman loss in World War I, Atatürk successfully halted the Treaty of Sèvres's goal of partitioning Anatolia under European control. In this fashion, the Turkish Republic was established without foreign occupation or colonial legacy. Kemalism emerged as a home-grown ideology, and Atatürk's secular pronouncements were largely continuations of 20th century Ottoman reforms designed to compete with European powers. As a result, Turkey's Kemalist principles had robust domestic legitimacy. Turks largely understood modernization, westernization, nationalism, and secularism to be in their interests.⁸ Turkish political Islam has remained generally consistent with these principles. While some Turkish Islamists critique westernization's destabilization of the Turkish social order, they still support Western engagement and adoption of the West's political virtues.⁹

In contrast, Egypt possesses a potent colonial history. The Ottoman Khedive dynasty ruled Egypt for nearly four centuries before ceding sovereignty to the British after World War I. Four decades of British occupation of Egypt fomented hostility towards the West. Even Egypt's 1953 independence is understood to be the result of British consent over the Egyptian struggle's success.¹⁰ As a result, Egyptian Islamism associated many Western practices and values with colonialism. The Muslim Brotherhood's 1928 formation aimed to resist westernization, occupation, and Israel's creation. For the Brotherhood's founder Hassan al-Banna, Islam needed to be resistance's starting point. From there, Islam could produce national reforms, unlike Turkey's political Islam, which sought to inject Islamic identity and values into the Kemalist framework.¹¹

These differing colonial legacies impact political Islam's nature in Turkey and Egypt. The enduring strength of Turkey's Kemalist identity suggests that it does not

have to directly compete with Islamism. Turkish political Islam instead aims to correct certain Kemalist failures. This is in contrast to Egyptian Islamism, which functions as a compartmentalized ideology with distinct state goals. Egyptian Islamism is also situated in a political environment where national identity is routinely contested. In Egypt, Islamism must compete and distinguish itself with Pan-Arabism, which characterized the post-colonial, secular Arab socialist republics and Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt. As a result, Egyptian Islamism challenges the Arab nation-state system itself, rather than pursuing modifications to the state like in Turkey.¹² This presents difficulties for the manifestation of Turkish Islamism's ideological foundations in Egypt. Turkey's Ottoman legacy and its Kemalist nationalism may prevent Egypt from viewing Turkish political Islam as legitimate.¹³

B. IDEOLOGIES TO PARTIES

It is clear that Islamism is prevalent in Egypt and Turkey. For the majority of Turks and Egyptians, Islam remains an important aspect of their lives.¹⁴ The FJP's 2012 electoral success in Egypt and the dominance of Islamist-affiliated parties in Turkey since the 1990s confirm that both countries believe Islam should have a governance role. Yet the extent of that role varies between Egypt and Turkey. Examining Egyptian and Turkish publics' views on this matter can inform Islamist parties' development in their respective countries.

Egypt's Islamization is stricter and stronger than Turkey's. While Turks and Egyptians largely favor Islam's role in politics, 60 percent of Egyptians believe laws should strictly follow the Quran compared to 17 percent of Turks. 44 percent of Turks do believe laws should follow Islam's values and principles, compared to 32 percent of Egyptians. 27 percent of Turks also think the Quran should have no role in law-making, compared to 6 percent of Egyptians. Only 58 percent of Egyptians believe women should have equal rights as men, compared to 84 percent of Turks. This aligns with Saudi Arabia's increased popularity over Turkey among Egyptians. 68 percent of Egyptians view Turkey favorably, but 81 percent of them view Saudi Arabia favorably.¹⁵ According to a Gallup survey, 22 percent of Egyptians view Saudi Arabia as Egypt's political model compared to 11 percent for Turkey.¹⁶

These variances in Islam's popularity and governance roles are reflected by Egypt and Turkey's respective Islamist movements. The Muslim Brotherhood has largely determined Islamism's course in Egypt since its inception.¹⁷ Echoing popular sentiment, the Brotherhood's primary goal has been the establishment of an Islamic society and state that fully conforms to the Shari'a. Since the 1960s, this goal has reflected the increasing diffusion of Qutubi and Salafi thought within the movement. These schools of thought promote a political revolutionary and textual reading of the Quran that emphasizes identity politics' unifying elements while rejecting violence.¹⁸ Additionally, the Brotherhood's governance vision is based on humbleness and modesty, which opposes the exploitative nature of capitalist accumulation.¹⁹

Turkey's National View Movement has served as the main platform for Tur-

key's Islamist parties. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood's focus on state reform, the Movement aims to reform Turkish identity, public discourse, and policies. During its 1969 inception, the Movement opposed westernization's erasure of Turkish Islamic history, culture, and identity. It further purported the creation of a 'Just Order', which stressed Turkish modernization and development within the bounds of social justice similar to the Muslim Brotherhood. It also suggested Islamic economic integration to balance the Christian West's power. By the 1990s, the Movement adopted a strong social message against economic liberalization's negative impact on the urban poor. It had also promoted radicalization among its religious elements against Palestinian injustice and the killing of Muslims in Bosnia.²⁰ However, the Welfare Party's 1998 closure and the government's eradication of radical organizations forced anti-secular and anti-Western Islamists to join Erdoğan's support for secular democracy.²¹ Supporting Erdoğan's AKP, the Movement used Islamic principles to adopt a pro-western stance as well as advocate for human rights and rule of law.²²

The differences between the National View Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood reflect the difficulties in applying Turkey's model of political Islam to Egypt. The Turkish version consists of a bottom up connection with Islam linked to a communal heritage and aimed at policy goals. The Egyptian counterpart aims at revolutionary establishment of a Shari'a-based Islamic state and top-down societal transformation through Islamic principles. Turkish Islamism represents a grassroots movement where religiously motivated individuals seek Islamization of policy and society through social networks, secular and religious education, entrepreneurship, and media use. In particular, this movement operates within secular democratic boundaries rather than attempt building a new state.²³

The movements' differences also extend to government. Once in power, the FJP vaguely argued for a "civil state with an Islamic frame of reference" to brand itself as moderate. Yet the FJP supported Article 2 of Egypt's 2012 Constitution stipulating the Shari'a as the primary source of legislation. Still, the Shari'a was applied alongside the Islamic notion of necessity, which can legitimize acts that are otherwise religiously illegitimate under proper conditions. Applying this notion became common due to the party's weak legislative agenda that largely maintained the status quo. The result was President Morsi and FJP officials emphasizing Islamic identity to maintain a unified base.²⁴ On the other hand, the AKP's ascendancy could be regarded as a post-Islamist party; the party kept its Islamist ties in the social realm but abandoned it as a political program.²⁵ The AKP generated an immense growth-oriented governance agenda, but also maintained its Islamist base to promote conservative social policy. This included lifting the ban on the veil, promotion of Islamic education, public event keynotes by Islamic clerics, and encouragement of Islamist movements overseas.²⁶

It is also important to note political Islam's variants within Turkey and Egypt. Turkish Islamism does not exhibit much diversity. The transnational Gulen movement contains AKP supporters, but has been accused of organizing attempts to undermine Turkish secularism despite its moderate and tolerant nature.²⁷ The traditionalist

Felicity Party only governs at the municipal level with a pro-liberty and democracy agenda that seeks Turkish ascension to the EU.²⁸ Egyptian Islamism possesses some diversity. The Salafi Al-Da'wa movement offers a stricter, puritanical alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood, and seeks establishment of a firmer Shari'a-based Islamic state. Its al-Nour party was formed after the 2011 revolution and gained 27.8 percent of the 2012 parliamentary election vote share.²⁹ A reformist wing of the Muslim Brotherhood seeks creative interpretation of Islamic texts to justify democracy and citizenship and avoid proselytization, but the FJP has rejected them.³⁰ An offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, the moderate Wasat party coalesced around a pluralist, civilizational Islam that rejected its precursor's scripturalism and Shari'a focus.³¹ Despite likening of itself to Turkey's AKP, Wasat only received 3.7 percent of the 2012 parliamentary election vote.³²

Along these lines, the Turkish model does not seem to fit Egyptian Islamism's aspirations. Turkish Islamism reflects a moderate, governance-oriented political approach that has internalized the state's secular democratic rules. It is unclear whether Egyptian Islamism's revolutionary state-building approach can immediately replicate that model given the electorate's stronger Islamist desires.

C. ECONOMICS AND GOVERNANCE

The different economic legacies in Turkey and Egypt shape Islamism's support and provide context for its economic governance today. The AKP's economic foundations stem from 1980s liberalization policies under Turgut Özal. Özal's technocratic program stressed fiscal caution and export-oriented, market-based governance to augment Turkey's international competitiveness.³³ The result was the emergence of conservative Muslim businessmen from greater Anatolia who sought to export their goods to new global markets. Large Turkish companies were owned by secular businessmen and already dominated competitive European markets. The small to medium-sized businesses accordingly sought Islamist political representation to gain market access to the Muslim-populated Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. It was this emerging devout bourgeoisie that formed the AKP's base.³⁴

Egyptian Islamists' economic foundations stem from disenfranchising liberalization schemes under Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. Sadat's 'Infitah' policy aimed to attract foreign investment and stimulate the private sector. Yet Infitah primarily benefitted the construction, petroleum, tourism and banking sectors and did not provide Egypt with new sources of employment or export capacity. Mubarak furthered Sadat's policies with IMF-directed structural adjustment. However, these reforms did not generate the 'trickle-down' effect that Turkey experienced. Instead, it produced cronyism. The Egyptian state continued to play a dominant economic role and subsidized large transportation and communication businesses. This sidelined small to medium-sized businesses, as they had no personal or political access to the state-big business ruling coalition. Along these lines, a pro-Islamist bourgeoisie never expanded like in Turkey. Disenfranchised businessmen usually remained apo-

litical due to the high costs to regime criticism, and devout businessmen supported the Wasat party. The remaining lower and middle class Egyptian strata supported the Muslim Brotherhood.³⁵

Turkey's devout bourgeoisie incentivizes AKP pragmatism and supply-side governance. Erdoğan's ascent to power developed from effectively delivering tangible benefits to his electorate as Istanbul's mayor.³⁶ His party's electoral successes since 2001 further reflect Turkey's preference for the AKP's 'regulatory neoliberalism' over its Islamist affiliation. This preference exists even amongst the devout bourgeoisie, whose predominance within the Islamist constituency has moderated Turkish Islamism. Economic growth also enlarged the AKP electoral coalition beyond the devout bourgeoisie, forcing the AKP to prioritize good economic governance over Islamist-leaning policy.³⁷ Even if poor or rural conservative Muslims are excluded by AKP neoliberal benefits, they are still connected to AKP welfare institutions and patronage networks as well as broader Islamic civil society led by the devout bourgeoisie. This ensures economic exclusion does not produce radicalization as it does in Egypt.³⁸

Egypt's lower and middle class disenfranchisement from the state resulted in adherence to the idea of an Islamic state that would improve livelihoods by rewarding merit over cronyism. The Muslim Brotherhood's mobilization through voluntary organizations, mosques, clinics, schools, day care centers, and vocational training institutes aims to create this welfare-oriented Islamic polity.³⁹ Nevertheless, the absence of an interest-driven bourgeoisie like in Turkey meant that the Brotherhood never formulated a coherent national governance agenda. While the movement bore neoliberal economists and supported liberalism in Egypt's countryside, its version of Islamism also purported protectionism and anti-privatization while seeking increased wages and welfare.⁴⁰ Unlike Erdoğan's AKP, the Brotherhood or the FJP also never held local governance roles due to the state regime's hold on local politics. In this way, Egyptian Islamists only thrived as a national religious and welfare network rather than a political party with a clear policy vision. When the FJP gained power, its scarce policy agenda only maintained the Mubarak-era status quo.⁴¹

The distinct economic contexts shaping Turkish and Egyptian Islamism weakens the Turkish model's applicability to Egypt. From governance's standpoint, Turkish Islamism consists of Muslims in a secular-democratic state working within a neoliberal framework. It is unclear whether Egypt's structural economic conditions or bourgeoisie can enable its Islamists to produce a similar economic governance agenda with or without an Islamic framework.

D. DEMOCRACY AND RIGHTS

Most Turks and Egyptians desire democratic freedoms, but the differences in each country's relationship to Islamism impacted the degree to which these freedoms were manifested.⁴² Turkish Islamism's experience in movements, local politics and national leadership have imbued it with collective political memory that has enabled its gradual democratization. Its bottom-up movement seeks Islamization of Turkish iden-

tity and policies, but that movement largely conforms to secular democratic politics. A devout bourgeoisie can advocate for rights, freedoms, and economic opportunities through politics, which enables greater alignment of Turkish state and civil society interests. Seeking economic opportunities also sidelines harsh ideologies and promotes healthy exchange of ideas through global economic transactions.⁴³

Egyptian Islamism's limited political experience reveals that elements of democratization have yet to be internalized. The Muslim Brotherhood's understanding of democracy represents its aim to implement the Shari'a rather than a system that reflects the peoples' will to govern themselves. State institutionalization of the Shari'a to transform Egyptians into better Muslims may not be as democratic as Muslims projecting Islamic principles onto the state.⁴⁴ The Muslim Brotherhood's official spokesperson Mahmoud Ghoslan notably claimed that "[they] don't want the Turkish model...in Turkey women may go to university without a headscarf. They have adultery and homosexuality. We will not allow that in Egypt. Egypt is a Muslim country. The Shari'a, the Muslim legal framework, must be the foundation for everything."⁴⁵ The Brotherhood's socio-economic base and deficit of devout bourgeoisie may account for the stringency in political views. Still, moderate Brotherhood members promote concepts like citizenship, human rights and pluralism, but consensus over those concepts' meanings have yet to occur. Different leaders have offered contradictory remarks on democracy, Coptic rights, and gender equality.⁴⁶ This may suggest that democratic issues are secondary to state institutionalization of ideology.

Lack of consensus over democracy's tenets were also reflected in the FJP's platform. The Morsi regime failed to replace the state with a functioning system that represented the 2011 revolution's democratic aspirations. Upon realizing power, Morsi blamed the judiciary for his policy failures despite his retention of executive and legislative powers prior to the 2012 constitution. After the constitution's establishment, he shifted blame to the opposition and the media, resulting in restrictions on the media and freedom of speech. He did not initiate judicial reforms, but instead issued a decree insulating the presidency from judicial review. The regime also failed to dismantle the Mubarak-era corruption and cronyism that preceded him. Morsi appointed pro-Mubarak politicians and businessmen to ministerial posts and traveled with them on foreign trips. His appointment of radical Islamist governors was also provocative due to the governors' links to groups that attacked tourists and Egyptian Copts. These controversial policies were coupled with the regime's profession of Islamic identity, suggesting that its supposed affirmation of democratic politics and political pluralism has yet to be internalized.⁴⁷

That is not to say Turkey does not possess democratic consolidation issues. In recent years, the Erdoğan regime has faced broad allegations of corruption and infringements of civil liberties. Those infringements include threats to the media, jailing of journalists, and restrictions on women's healthcare. The government has also increased police brutality after the 2013 Gezi Park Protests, and routinely persecutes Turkey's Kurdish minority.⁴⁸ Yet these practices seem to be a symptom of Erdoğan's

own authoritarian tendencies rather than the AKP or Turkish Islamists' issues with affirming clear democratic principles. Turkish Islamists promote rule of law and human rights, and the AKP program stresses its adherence to rights based on international charters. Erdoğan's radicalism or repressive tactics are also restrained by potential Court prosecution of the regime or military intervention.

E. MILITARY MATTERS

A central counterweight to Turkish and Egyptian Islamism are the countries' militaries. The military holds historic roles in both nations' political systems. Apart from guiding national security policy, Turkey's military has functioned as a guardian of the Constitution's Kemalist values. This guardianship resulted in the 1960, 1971, and 1980 coups to restore national order from political gridlock and escalating violence. Egypt's military also holds an important legacy. The three presidents prior to Morsi emanated from the military, and the military has held strong sway in Egyptian policy-making.⁴⁹ Both countries' militaries also possess independent economic resources. The Turkish military owns an independent holding company as well as various shopping centers and recreational facilities.⁵⁰ The Egyptian military is believed to control between 10 and 40 percent of Egypt's economy.⁵¹ Most importantly, Turkey and Egypt's military are also skeptical of Islamism. Turkey's military opposes Islamism based on its staunch defense of secularism, and Egypt's military tends to oppose Islamism's threat to the state and national stability.⁵²

Yet the Turkish military holds a unique relationship to democracy. The institution maintains a guardianship role over the political system and rarely intervenes in policy decisions. Its three coups were accompanied by a transparent national agenda to quickly restore order and transition back to civilian rule. After the 1960 coup, the military also produced Turkey's most liberal constitution.⁵³ In addition to the Turkish military's highly centralized and disciplined structure, these characteristics make it a highly trusted institution.⁵⁴ Still, the military's opposition to Islamism has frequently produced political fights with Erdoğan and the AKP. In response, Erdoğan forced out much of the military's leadership through the prominent Ergenekon trials. Many Egyptian Islamists view this action an example where Islamists successfully reigned in military power. Yet, it is unclear whether that is the case. The military remains an autonomous political institution with immense resources and self-management. However, its withdrawal from politics correlates with its goal for EU accession and its wish to signal internal stability to Turkey's NATO allies.⁵⁵

In contrast, Egypt does not possess an external actor that can constrain military authoritarian rule. The United States markedly backs the Egyptian military through arms agreements and opposition to Islamist parties.⁵⁶ The FJP's ascendancy resulted in a substantial dismissal of military leaders, but largely left the military's institutional capacity intact. This may be due to the military's initial alliance with the Islamist regime.⁵⁷ This alliance generated constitutional enshrinement of the military's autonomy from civilian oversight, its control over Egypt's defense ministry, and its

domination of national security policy. Interestingly, these new military powers were pulled from Turkey's constitution. They were also reinstated in the 2014 Constitution under General Sisi. The 2013 ousting of President Morsi over stability and governance concerns, and the military's subsequent violent crackdown on Islamists reflects its consolidation of power. These events make Egypt's adoption of the Turkish model unlikely. The Egyptian military adopted the Turkish military's institutional characteristics without the Turkish version of constitutional guardianship role and external democratization pressures. Without these internal and external checks on military involvement in politics, it is possible that Egyptian military authoritarianism will re-solidify. This will make civilian, democratic Islamist rule increasingly difficult to achieve.⁵⁸

III. TURKISH LESSONS AND THE FUTURE OF EGYPT'S ISLAMISTS

In the near term, Turkey's model for political Islam cannot replicate itself in Egypt. The failure of the AKP-modeled Wasat Party and the successes of FJP and al-Nour suggest that Turkish-style Islamism would not be accepted. Turkey's distinct structural conditions gave rise to a unique form of Islamism. The absence of Turkish colonial legacy made Kemalist state principles acceptable. In this fashion, Islamism was mediated by Kemalism's rigid secular boundaries. Egyptian Islamism sprouted as colonial resistance which necessitated revolutionary upheaval of corrupt, foreign-backed regimes to establish a new Islamic state and society. This contrasts with Turkey's grassroots movement to infuse Kemalist thought and policy with Turkey's Islamic heritage and values. Turkey's economic liberalization strategies under secular governments gave rise to a devout bourgeoisie that spearheaded the Islamist movement into politics and leadership based on market-driven interests. This bourgeoisie also moderated Islamism through interest-driven advocacy and demand for democratic rights. The result was Islamism's collective political memory and experience in governing Turkey. Egypt's cronyism and disenfranchisement of the middle and lower classes created an Islamist movement whose community welfare projects and intense identity politics gave it legitimacy. Yet without an interest-driven, pro-Islamist bourgeoisie, Egypt's Islamism was not mediated to govern or provide democratic rights to an electorate. The result is its ideology-driven politics and lack of experience to govern.

The threat of Turkish military intervention also moderated Turkey's Islamist parties to focus on delivering tangible benefits over purporting Islamist ideology and Islamizing society. At the same time, the pressure on the military to limit itself as a constitutional guardian and promote democratization for EU accession provide sufficient room for Islamist-affiliated parties to succeed. Despite Egypt's adoption of the Turkish military's institutional framework, the Egyptian military's lack of internal and external checks make military rule likely at the expense of civilian Islamist democracy.

The 2013 coup by Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the accession of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to the presidency already demonstrates that likelihood. Sisi's ruling coalition primarily consists of Egypt's officer corps, its intelligence services, its internal security apparatus, and a portion of the Egyptian judiciary.

In the 2015 parliamentary elections, pro-Sisi independent candidates and the ‘For the Love of Egypt’ alliance headed by former general Sameh Seif Elyazal received the majority of the votes.⁵⁹ Though, only 10 percent of the country’s population voted. Amid this consolidation of power, the future of Egypt’s Islamists looks grim. In 2013, Judgment 2315 of the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters ruled that the Muslim Brotherhood was a terrorist organization. The ruling and subsequent 2015 Terrorism Law resulted in the Brotherhood’s suspension, their assets frozen, and their ban from politics.⁶⁰ It also resulted in the regime’s seizure of Brotherhood social service networks. In early 2015, the regime assumed control over the Brotherhood’s extensive healthcare service system and replaced its leadership with pro-Sisi figures.⁶¹ In February 2015 the Minister of Education also claimed that 85 percent of the Brotherhood’s schools were under government control and school managers would be pre-cleared by security services.⁶² These seizures coincided with the arrest and capital punishment of hundreds of Brotherhood members and other Islamists.⁶³ It also overlapped with laws authorizing government to expel and dismiss students and faculty from universities, censor journalists and media, as well as expand military judiciary authority to try civilian and police cases.⁶⁴

Despite the government crackdown, an Islamist resurgence in Egypt is still possible. General Sisi has tried to improve Egypt’s economic health, but has continued to face high unemployment, budget deficits, and difficulties attracting foreign investment even with major cabinet reshuffles.⁶⁵ Opposition to the regime may also be stronger than polls may indicate. General Sisi’s approval rating was at 85 percent in December 2015, down five percent from the previous year.⁶⁶ The five months following the 2013 coup also possessed the highest number of protests since the 2011 uprising against President Mubarak.⁶⁷ Even with the regime’s legal attempts to quell protests, there continue to be five times as many protests per day under Sisi as there were from 2008 to 2010 under Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood in particular is looking for an opportunity to regain power. Ashraf Abdel Ghaffar, a Muslim Brotherhood leader residing in Qatar, claimed that:

“We will not accept any military system to govern us...Most of the Muslim Brotherhood is moving forward to reclaim this revolution... we are the most powerful group in Egypt and we exist in more than 80 countries all over the world. Despite the fact that we have more than 50,000 members in jail, we are still coming to save our country again.”⁶⁸

Other Brotherhood members—especially the youth—continue to maintain the organization’s societal networks and underground education, health, and financial services to “send a message that the revolution is continuing.”⁶⁹ Yet many Brotherhood programs have shifted their focus toward building political awareness and mobilization against the Sisi regime. Reports indicate two competing strategies for a political resurgence within the Brotherhood. One involves a widespread revolution led by

youth inside and outside the movement, and the other entails exploiting emerging rifts in the Egyptian army to orchestrate a military coup with Islamists' help.⁷⁰ These strategies further demonstrate the near-term issues with Egyptian Islamists modeling Turkey's AKP experience. Even with military-enforced restrictions on Turkish Islamist parties, the AKP acquired power within the existing political structure and influenced that structure from within. The Brotherhood's current dialogue about altering the political structure through revolution or coup reveals the constrictive nature of Egypt's current political system as well as the ideological and socioeconomic character of its Islamist movement.

Interestingly, Turkey may hold a unique influence with regard to Egypt's Islamists. A welcome leader of Muhammad Morsi, President Erdoğan condemned General Sisi's accession and crackdown on Islamists. He also suspended diplomatic relations with Egypt for nearly a year. Relations resumed in 2016, but Erdoğan refuses to meet personally with Sisi. Turkey also continues to host FJP members and Brotherhood media outlets.⁷¹ Moreover, as Saudi Arabia and Israel strengthen security and economic ties with Turkey to respond to conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, it is possible that Turkey will leverage expansion of those ties to Egypt in return for Egypt's release of imprisoned Islamists and respect for human rights.⁷² This may enable Turkey to facilitate the resurgence of Egypt's Islamists in exchange for guaranteeing Egypt's security.

The future of Egypt's Islamists remains to be seen. Yet Turkey's favorable ties with Egyptian Islamists hints at the possibility for Egypt's internalization of the Turkish experience. While the Turkish model cannot be replicated in Egypt, Egypt's Islamists can learn valuable lessons from their Turkish counterparts. The Islamist experience in Turkey points to a history of government suppression and party closure as well as movement-building, electoral success, and governance. Egypt's Islamists can accordingly look to Turkey's successes and failures to absorb key strategies that enable their movement, political, and governance goals.

A. MOBILIZING MOVEMENTS

The success of the Turkish Islamist movement can be attributed to the mobilization of diverse interests toward broad policy goals. Turkish Islamism was a natural outlet for specific social groups and classes. It attracted those who were politically dissatisfied with and distanced from government institutions led by a secular military-bureaucratic elite, notables, and industrialists. The National View movement accordingly represented rural peasantry and the lower-to-middle class. However, it also represented the middle-to-upper class urban youth and student population facing high unemployment who were supportive of social-justice driven economic policy. It represented devout Turks but also conservative Sunni Kurds who believed an Islamic order could improve their livelihoods and end conflict in the Kurdish region.⁷³ These diverse groups were linked and assembled through social networks, education, media, entrepreneurships and business.

Egypt's Islamist movement focuses on Islamizing the state and society, but

requires greater mobilization around a concrete vision for the state and its responsibilities. The Egyptian movement possesses a more robust social service network, but lacks the diversity and vision that Turkey has. The Muslim Brotherhood's success stems from their opposition to state cronyism and widespread social service provisions. The Brotherhood's extensive education, healthcare, financial service, and food aid networks ensure its appeal among the lower-to-middle class. Yet its continued calls for a Shari'a-based Islamic state needs to include a robust discussion over that state's roles and responsibilities. A state-building movement requires deliberation and consensus over key issues regarding the the use and scope of Shari'a law, democratic rights, and constitutional checks and balances. An incoherent vision may have been overcome by the Brotherhood's past success in welfare provision, but it may create difficulties in the future. As the Sisi regime seizes the movement's social service networks, the Muslim Brotherhood's success may increasingly depend upon the appeal of their vision for Egypt's state. Turkey in the 1990s demonstrates that an Islamist movement's ideological radicalization, rhetoric of caliphate-style integration among Muslim countries, and vague, impractical state visions can provoke societal resistance and massive government suppression.⁷⁴

Furthermore, the prioritization of Islamist identity should not justify the suppression of debate about the Egyptian movement's direction and operations. Many young Brotherhood members increasingly feel distanced from the organization's leadership. Elder Brotherhood leaders tend to denounce internal opposition as godless. One young doctor explained his mixed feelings associated with participating in the movement:

“[The Brotherhood] absorbs young Egyptians who are active and ambitious and want to do something good. They are there for the love of Egypt, and they are willing to risk their lives, to be arrested, and even to be killed... Unfortunately, after the Brotherhood has absorbed them, it freezes them. The movement discourages independent thought and fosters blind independence.”⁷⁵

This trend could also undermine the Brotherhood's success. Continued ideological rigidity and alienation of specific groups has already begun to result in a fractured Islamist movement. Many young members have already left the Brotherhood, and some have started their own organizations that represent young Islamists and leftists. Still many youths believe in the Brotherhood's potential, and the Sisi crackdown on the organization's leadership offers a unique opportunity for a generational change in the movement's direction and ideas. Turkish Islamism's success stemmed from its ability to meld differences from a wide variety of individuals under one vision for state and society. Diversity of people and ideas within the Brotherhood has the ability to grow the movement's base and foster innovative visions for Egypt's future.⁷⁶

B. PARTY POLITICS

Turkey demonstrates that Egypt's Islamists need to formulate political parties independent of their movements and prioritize a governance-oriented platform. The AKP represented a reformist current within a trend of Islamist political parties formed by Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan's most successful Welfare Party held a platform that drew upon Islamic values of social justice and unity to support populist and interventionist economic policy. The AKP similarly drew upon the Welfare Party's political experience to produce a growth-oriented agenda while rebranding Islamism as conservative social policy. Yet both parties operated independently of their Islamist electoral base to push a platform that catered to Islamists and the general Turkish population. This enabled the AKP to distance itself from its Islamist base in the economic and foreign policy realms while offering them concessions in the social realm.

Egypt's FJP failed to transform itself into an independent political party. It instead operated under the Islamist movement's umbrella, placing economic, political, and cultural goals secondary to building an Islamic state. This exposed the Muslim Brotherhood's priority for power over governance: unlike the 2004 FJP platform's focus on greater democracy and freedom, its 2011 platform capitalized on a national uprising to demand a new state based on Shari'a law.⁷⁷ Still the FJP lacked a clear and agreed-upon platform for the country. According to a senior advisor to former President Morsi, the party's lack of a "realistic path" resulted in party divisions and alienation of the electorate.⁷⁸ The party itself held contradictory policy goals: some explained the FJP as a force for economic liberalization, and some saw it as anti-privatization and statist.⁷⁹ Lack of a platform forced the party to resort to a movement's tactics of demonizing opposition politicians and establishing links to jihadist groups.⁸⁰ The Turkish political experience shows that Egypt's Islamists need to formulate a political party that draws upon its movement for support but also aims to represent the entire country through a consensus-driven governance agenda. That agenda can include an Islamic state as a goal, but it cannot be an end itself.⁸¹ Turkey demonstrates that a governance platform representing the national population is a critical factor for continued electoral success, and Islamic values can be employed to effectively inform and brand that platform.

Furthermore, successful party politics requires internalization of democratic principles and respect for democratic processes. The Welfare Party and AKP operated within the Kemalist constraints of the nationally elected 1982 constitution. The AKP's platform in particular respects the constitution's secular democratic nature, so the party pushed constitutional reforms to amend the state's structure in its favor after 2002.⁸² Egypt's FJP on the other hand viewed their 2011 electoral success as a mandate to act without much concern for the opposition. They possessed 43.4 percent of the parliamentary seat share, yet responded to criticism by touting their electoral results.⁸³ The FJP besieged the Constitutional Court's offices and launched a media war against its justices. They also formed a constitutional assembly that over-represented Islamists and caused secular and liberal members to boycott its proceedings, and then enabled

the subsequent constitution to pass referendum with a weak mandate. They further propelled Morsi to the presidency despite past promises to avoid supporting a Brotherhood candidate.⁸⁴ As state and non-state opposition arose towards the FJP, the Muslim Brotherhood's media spokesperson Gehad El-Haddad tweeted, "When Future of Egypt is in balance, we have no regrets, we are more than willing to pay for it with our lives not votes [sic]", suggesting that the FJP viewed democracy as expendable to achieve consolidation of power.⁸⁵ The AKP under Erdoğan demonstrates the problems of flouting democratic principles and using electoral success as a *carte blanche* mandate. Erdoğan's infringement on civil liberties, suggestions to disobey Court rulings, and attempts to suppress the Kurdish People's Democratic Party from electoral gains resulted in the 2013 Gezi Park Protests and the AKP's loss of a two-thirds majority in the 2015 elections.⁸⁶ Similarly, the FJP's actions polarized the Egyptian electorate and circumscribed the FJP's democratic legitimacy. Turkey in this manner highlights that Egyptian Islamist parties need to respect and operate within the constraints of democratic processes and coalition-style government to avoid a breakdown in allies and voters' support and trust.

C. GOOD GOVERNANCE

Once in power, the Turkish case suggests that Egyptian Islamist parties must adopt a pragmatic governance approach and understand that certain goals may only be realized over the long-term. This is particularly important in Egypt's political system due to the prevalence of the military and Mubarak's deep-state elements. In Turkey, the AKP gained acceptance from the military by adhering to the political system's Kemalist rules. After proving his governing credentials, Erdoğan reigned in the military by enacting gradual National Security Council reforms and by prosecuting military officers connected to alleged coup plots against the AKP government. It is likely that the two sides now possess a working relationship where the military defers to civilian leaders, but the Turkish military still distrusts Erdoğan.⁸⁷ In this manner Turkey reveals that the process of controlling state institutions and deep-state elements requires considerable time. Egypt's FJP failed to recognize the extent of Mubarak-era state networks that extend to the military, police, judiciary, ministerial bureaucracies, public-sector companies, and municipalities. These networks have traditionally been hostile to Islamists and keen to protect their vested power and economic interests. The FJP neglected to invest the time to build trust with all these actors and held the illusion of controlling some. The party replaced Field Marshal Mohammad Tantawi from the military leadership with General Sami Enan, and the military accepted the FJP's leadership in order to quell the nation's revolutionary violence. However a combination of the FJP's failure to perform economically and politically, concern from Gulf countries of a potential revolutionary domino effect from Egypt, and the party's reported attempts to unilaterally and immediately interfere with the military were decisive factors in the military's decision to promote the 2013 coup.⁸⁸

Pragmatism also extends to policymaking. The AKP consolidated power by

moderating its ideology and initially focusing on implementing policies that appeal to different electorates. These included social policies targeted at housewives, pro-Western discourse and EU ascension goals for urban, educated voters and the international community, as well as welfare programs targeted at low-income voters. Yet to the AKP, moderate ideology and pragmatism did not necessarily mean less religiosity. The party appealed to Turkish Islamists by claiming its actors were devout even if the AKP platform was secular, and catered to Islamists through alcohol restrictions, building mosques, and promoting economic interaction with the Middle East.⁸⁹ A similar policymaking method can help Egypt's Islamists produce results for their lower-to-middle class base and appease the upper-class urbanites and international community. Prioritizing pragmatic governance in Egypt will further Islamist parties' electoral success, legitimize their Islamic state, and provide the needed leverage to control aspects of the old deep-state.

Moreover, Turkey's AKP displays the value of political experience and skills in effective governance and electoral success. AKP leaders and cadres possess decades-long political experience from the successes and failures of past Islamist parties. They acquired governance and electoral skills from their participation in municipal, parliamentary, and executive politics. Furthermore, their centrist nature enabled them to acquire the best practices and ideas from conservative and liberal political currents. The FJP on the other hand lacks the experience and technical skills to govern Egypt effectively. The Brotherhood invested primarily in organizational and social network skills, yet did not adequately educate their members in government, politics, or economic management. Most FJP politicians are engineers or doctors who became Brotherhood leaders and hold sufficient social capital for electoral gain. Once in power, the FJP experience mirrored nepotistic practices from the Mubarak-era, in which unqualified Brotherhood members were appointed to positions of authority. These members' ascent stirred rancor within government institutions, leading to bureaucratic instability and administrative failure. Egypt's Islamist parties should heed the Turkish political experience and emphasize training and educating Islamists in government and economics within Egypt and abroad. This would especially provide unique opportunity for younger Brotherhood members to help shape a coherent governance and ideological party agenda that is not reliant on their movement's interests or their politicians' personal piety. Yet in the near term it is likely that the FJP will require other civic and political forces' support to achieve its political vision. This necessitates the FJP's willingness to compromise on social and moral issues that may upset their movement's ideological hardliners. Winning over Brotherhood opponents without alienating its supporters will entail navigating a fine line between affirming its Islamic identity and values and honoring democratic politics by making short-term concessions for long-term strategic benefit. This will also help Islamist politicians acquire the experience and skills necessary to effectively enact their vision for Egypt's future.⁹⁰

CONCLUSION

The 2011 Egyptian revolution and subsequent 2013 military coup poses uncertainties about the future of Egypt's governance as well as the role Islamists hold in that future. The FJP's success in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections suggested that Islamists possess a crucial role in the country's ascent in the post-Mubarak era, yet their failure to govern and withstand opposition curbed their effectiveness and their credibility. The current crackdown and repression of Islamists in Egypt under General Sisi pose further difficulties for a possible civilian Islamist regime.

Government officials, politicians, scholars, and activists in and outside of Egypt point to Turkey's Islamist-leaning AKP as an accomplished model by which Egypt's Islamists can replicate. Yet copying Turkey provides an untenable and unrealistic solution for Egypt in the near term. Turkey and Egypt possess different historical legacies, religious and democratic orientations, socio-economic dynamics, political obstacles, and international concerns. The AKP's Islamist orientation and Turkey's regional influence can perhaps provide backing for Egypt's Islamists, but it is unlikely that Turkish Islamists can export their political orientation and governance style to Egypt. Regardless of whether the Turkish model is applicable to Egypt currently, it is worth considering whether, given a conducive environment, Egypt would implement it well. If Egypt's Islamists gain power and govern effectively, it is conceivable that improving Egyptian structural conditions can bring the country closer in line with the Turkish model. Still, Egypt's history and position in the Arab world will make its version of Islamism different from Turkey's.

Nevertheless, the success of Turkish Islamists does provide strategic and tactical lessons for their Egyptian counterparts in movement-building, party politics, and good governance. Given the military's consolidation of power and control of politics, Egyptian Islamists will likely have to orient their movement towards a new revolution. Turkey demonstrates that this revolution can be ideological, but requires openness, diversity, and a coherent vision to unite Islamists with other Egyptians against the state. If the movement is successful, Turkey reveals that an Islamist political party should separate itself from its movement under a governance platform that caters to all Egyptians, not just its base. This platform can be branded and informed by Islamic tenets and values, but should not profess a grand religious ideology as an end in itself. Furthermore, party politics requires compromise and respect for democratic processes to maintain trust with voters and other politicians. Turkey further displays the importance of political pragmatism and governance skills to deliver tangible results to voters and maintain consolidation of power. For Egypt, this strategic thinking can help legitimize claims for an Islamic state, normalize Islamist rule, and create leverage to reign in deep-state remnants over the long-term. Whether Egypt's Islamists can actualize these lessons from its Turkish counterpart remains to be seen.

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OPENING INTERNATIONALISTS UP: A DEFENSE OF ISOLATIONISM

Samantha Koreman

In today's globalized world, strict isolationism is neither feasible nor advised. When ideas, capital, and populations move freely and quickly across borders, a more cosmopolitan view on foreign policy is necessary. A growingly complex, interconnected world deserves decisions that take into account all of the world's actors. To be isolationist is to be inherently selfish and short-sighted. At the same time, it is even more selfish and short-sighted for someone to ignore a viewpoint just because he or she disagrees with it. As isolationism has persisted for decades in the minds and hearts of American citizens and policymakers alike, it must be given its due and investigated in a way that gives it every affordance possible. To the internationalist: you can only convince your isolationist counterparts if you understand their position and justifications. Isolationists: consider this a reprieve from ridicule. This paper will contextualize modern isolationism and then proceed to justify this contextualization theoretically, philosophically, and by evaluating the modern state of American politics.

There is a great deal of debate regarding the roots of American isolationism and the historical shift that occurred around World War II that potentially shifted American foreign policy decisions into the sphere of internationalism. Academics continue to argue about the extent to which the United States was motivated to act as an isolationist world actor. Some are of the view that the United States was never isolationist and that instead it utilized subtle diplomatic tactics to influence the world arena.¹ Others are of the opinion that isolationism dominated the United States' foreign policy decisions for the entire first half of the twentieth century.² Although this field of research is fascinating to delve into—although it is of the upmost importance to understand the context behind political ideologies in order to apply them—a discussion of this historical context unfortunately is outside the scope of this paper. Instead, to avoid this debate and instead focus only the current iteration of American isolationism, a set of formalized parameters will be set forth.

Ideologies are notoriously difficult to define; as the world continues to adapt and change as a result of applied systems of knowledge, these very systems adapt to the world. As the globe has become so interconnected through a process of radical globalization, isolationism has a different character than it had prior to this modern technological era. Modern isolationism is best defined by a “voluntary abstention by a state from taking part in security-related politics in an area of the international system over which it is capable of exerting control.”³ Like any ideology, isolationism guides its

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proponents to advocate for foreign policy decisions that have a fundamentally different character than they would otherwise. For example, while an internationalist would have argued that the United States ought to have directly intervened in Russia's 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by sending military troops to the Ukrainian border, the strict isolationist would have ignored the situation in its entirety. It should be noted that these two responses are the extremes of the internationalist–isolationist spectrum. The middle ground of this spectrum may have very well have been sanctions, which recognizes some internationalist obligation while simultaneously respecting the limits of the isolationist. It should also be noted that isolationism does not imply that its champions will never intervene in the affairs of other nations. Even the strict isolationist is capable of making rational decisions about which policies will end up being the most effective in securing their home state. A single case where an isolationist agrees to interfere in the affairs of another state does not deny his or her isolationist character if the justification for the action is that it is the last possible action that has the greatest probability of ensuring security for the isolationist's home state.

With this set of parameters for contextualizing isolationism, it becomes evident that there are legitimate reasons why the isolationist ideology is attractive to individuals in the United States. Every state in the international arena has its own unique aspects of their respective political cultures. In the United States, political culture is often underscored with a balance between “Lockean Liberalism and American Exceptionalism” that simultaneously highly regards some sort of loose conception of democratic ideals.⁴ A notion of American exceptionalism, the idea that somehow the United States is “a unique place free from the stains and evils of the Old World, and thus blessed with the opportunity to create a world of freedom, liberty and justice without its motives, and goals being damaged by the corruption of...European colonial powers” acts as an undercurrent within these scripts that motivates the way that American citizens view their political identity.⁵ One of the methods by which this exceptionalism can be defined is by turning to an idealized notion of liberalism wherein American citizens spout a desire for individualism, personal freedom, and—most relevant to a discussion of the isolationist ideology—a freedom from undue government authority.⁶ While an isolationist policy maker can recognize human rights abuses and deem the actions of a fellow state unjust, he or she must simultaneously acknowledge the sovereignty of this state.

While it may seem heartless for the isolationist to not act to condemn the actions of an unjust, undemocratic state in the international arena, in this case, it is simply a rare example of internal consistency in terms of extreme notions of liberalism. Furthermore, policymakers as agents of the state have obligations that are different from the obligations of individuals. If a member of the state, acting as a proxy for the state, must make a judgment, he or she must do so as the state would. The relationship between states and individuals is messy at times; in many cases, states are only capable of interacting as unified bodies that care only about being large, overarching

decision-making calculators. If individuals within a democratic society must respect the autonomous value of other citizens, then states in the international arena must respect their fellow states.

The isolationist mindset—the perspective that denies an obligation to interfere in the decisions of members of the international arena—respects the notion of state sovereignty in a way very much consistent with the democratic ideals that the United States values in a few odd but important ways. First, democratic ideals imply a value on equality of opportunity that contrasts with an equality of ends. Equality of opportunity allows for there to be “losers” at the end of a process as long as the beginning of the process allowed every participant to start out on equal footing. Equality of ends would condemn a process that had any conception of “losers” at the end of the process. Although there are blatant historical inequalities between states as a result of historical trends like European colonization, equality of opportunity in the international arena correlates most strongly with a strong respect of sovereignty as the “opportunity” for states would be to legislate within their own borders. Interfering in the affairs of other states to assist in some sort of equality of ends would contradict with this precept. Second, a prioritization of personal freedom and individual determinism would incentivize those who adhere to a democratic ideology to attempt to focus efforts inward in order to assist in the actualization of their home state. Inherent in the notion of democratic liberalism is the idea that individuals ought to be given the freedom to pursue and achieve their own ends without interference. This implies a reciprocity clause wherein every member of this free society should adhere to principles that will allow for negative liberty.⁷ Inevitably, in its idealized ideological form, this mindset most closely aligns with a radical sort of libertarianism that places a high value on personal culpability and potential. For isolationist policymakers within the United States, this mindset would justify policies that focus efforts inward at bettering the United States rather than looking to improve the welfare of other states.

To make this argument less abstract and theoretical, one can turn to the United States Constitution, the ideological backbone and codification of American ideals. The Preamble states that the purpose of the United States was to “form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”⁸ It clearly prioritizes the wellbeing of the United States and its constituency over that of other nations. While there are many arguments about whether the Constitution has—or ought to have—any normative force, the most common argument that it does is a general, codified social contract theory. As the state was established under the guise of agreeing and consenting to the Constitution, the Constitution is the best, most objective way of evaluating the appropriateness of policymaker’s action. In a more direct sense, abstracting normative context from the argument, the Constitution is legally binding and therefore must be adhered to. The isolationist policymaker can use a pragmatic resource-allocation argument to justify their ideology. As the state has a limited amount of resources, those resources ought to

go to directly benefit the constituency. This holds some special significance in the case of the United States as a significant portion of the government's budget comes from taxing its constituency.⁹ In terms of justifying foreign action to their constituency, there are a few problems. Primarily, the argument would be that because these foreign benefactors had not paid taxes, they have no right to reap the benefits of the resource expenditure. A stronger claim that could also be made is that by spending tax dollars on actions that do not benefit its constituency, the United States has no contractual or constitutional grounding for foreign interference, invalidates its established contract with its citizens, and inherently undermines its relationship to its constituency.¹⁰ The only legitimate contractual or Constitutional justification for interfering in the affairs of other nations would be to ensure security or procure some benefit for the United States. However, as established in the contextualization of the modern isolationist ideology, this justification falls under the purview of isolationism.

If one accepts that policymakers in the United States must—to a certain reasonable sense—be able to justify their decisions to their constituency, then it would be logical to look at what the population of the United States believes. Even if one does not believe that policymakers must justify their decisions to the common folk, there is a strong claim to be made that, in a state that has elections and cares about democratic ideals, policymakers have a vested interest in appealing to the interests of their constituents to prevent a disenfranchised, alienated population that would negatively affect social welfare and to gain some sort of approval as to ensure reelection. In 2013, views of U.S. hegemonic dominance fell to a 40-year low with 53% of Americans agreeing that the United States had a “less important and powerful role [in the world arena] than 10 years ago.”¹¹ Furthermore, for the first time since 1964, the poll found that a majority—52% of citizens polled—agreed that the United States should “mind its own business internationally.”¹² Additionally, 70% of Americans found that the United States was “losing respect internationally” as a result of its failed interventionist foreign policy endeavors.¹³ Since 2013, this trend has only worsened. In 2016, polling data found that 57% of Americans believed that the United States should “deal with [its] own problems [and] let others deal with theirs as best they can,” 41% of those polled found that the United States did “too much” to solve the world's problems, and 49% had a negative perception of United States' involvement in the global economy.¹⁴ Interestingly enough, this 49% is an averaged account of responses from all points on the political spectrum. Most apropos to America's current political dynamic, 65% of individuals—the most out of all the cohorts polled—who had a positive opinion of current President Donald Trump during the Republican primaries agreed with the statement that “United States involvement in the global economy is a bad thing, lowers wages, [and] costs jobs.”¹⁵

This polling data underscores a few important features of the attractiveness of the isolationist ideology. First, regardless of a policymaker's personal views on the United States' effectiveness in the international arena, when a substantial, bipartisan portion of their constituency maintains isolationist views, this policymaker has

reason to favor isolationist policies. Second, there must be some reason why a large proportion of Americans favor isolationism. Not only is it unacceptably dismissive to ignore a popular opinion because of preconceived notions of the opinion's misdeeds, it also will contribute to the same disenfranchisement that most likely contributes to Americans favoring isolationism as a means to focus the government's efforts inward. Perhaps most importantly, this polling data represents the dialectical nature of ideological shifts. If Americans influence policymakers, and policymakers shift their policies to somewhat reflect the desires of their constituents, then Americans will see these policies in action, it will affect their original beliefs, and then policymakers will be forced to adapt to these beliefs for a second time. In the modern era, news outlets and the media act as the primary sources of information regarding foreign policy decisions for the majority of Americans. However, news stories become sensationalized as the media "place[s] greater emphasis on dramatic, human-interest themes and episodic frames and less emphasis on knowledgeable information sources...while also having a greater propensity to emphasize the potential for bad outcomes."¹⁶ As average Americans receive their news from these softer news sources, most will have an extraordinarily myopic, negative view of the United States' foreign interventions and thus favor isolationism as a default response. After all, if all of the information that a person consumes on a subject comes to the same conclusion, it is almost impossible to refute that conclusion. Although "highly politically aware individuals" tend to be by the large majority internationalists, that does not deny the opinion of the majority. Because the misinformed—and even the uninformed vote—politicians and lawmakers must give credence to isolationism.

The 2016 presidential election underscores this political reality. Although President Trump has taken action to intervene in Syria since entering office, it benefited his campaign to have an isolationist platform. Because the executive branch has few constraints on international action, when a political party has control of the executive branch, the party has a vested interest in expanding their ideology to support further international action in order to gain clout and develop an agenda. Accordingly, the opposing party has an equally strong reason to oppose intervention in order to capitalize on the inevitable failures of intervention, exploit the effect that the 24-hour news cycle's emphasis on those failures will have on the voting population,¹⁷ and further distance themselves from the other party.¹⁸ As the Democratic Party had control of the executive branch for eight years, every Republican has a strong reason to engage in advocating for isolationism. Because the Republican party tends to have more libertarian leaning—and, as discussed previously these libertarian ideals already correlate with isolationism—Republican policymakers and citizens alike have a secondary reason of maintaining platform consistency to favor isolationism. It may seem absurd, but the state of American politics does create a coherent, robust reason why certain individuals would be attracted to isolationism. To deny this conclusion is to deny the power that political parties have in the United States. Obviously, in today's polarized political society, it would be ludicrous to deny that partisanship motivates political choices.

However, to dismiss isolationist policymakers as only maintaining this ideology to appease their constituency or support their party would be to do a disrespectful disservice. There are valid economic reasons to favor isolationism for a simple reason—foreign intervention costs money. Not only can the original costs of intervention be exorbitant, the upkeep cost in the region in a situation that calls for a proposal like democracy promotion can accumulate over time. This accumulation often ties the United States to the region for many financial years and acts as a drain on economic resources. This money comes from taxpayers and one could make the argument that it could be spent in ways that better the lives of United States citizens. Regardless of the amount of money that the intervention and its upkeep costs, it is still money that could go to welfare programs that, although they are not large portions of the budget, still end up being cut in favor of defense spending. To use a single example, although the estimated costs to go to war in Iraq and Afghanistan at the start of the intervention were between \$50 billion and \$200 billion.¹⁹ In 2007, the Congressional Budget Office reevaluated their prior estimate and projected that over the next decade, the total cost of intervention would reach upwards of \$2.4 trillion.²⁰ Furthermore, intervention is costly in other ways—as the United States has seen in the Middle East, interfering with the affairs of other states often carries with it the baggage of casualties. Once again, as discussed above, this negative humanitarian reality of the direct results of intervention often strengthen the pull that citizens and policymakers alike have to isolationism as an ideology.

For the internationalist, it might often be preferable to minimize foreign action for two reasons that each correlate with the above costs. First, in modern times, as indicated by polling data²¹ and political shifts related to the Obama Doctrine of foreign policy, Democrats are more inclined to be internationalists. However, Democrats also are in favor of increased spending and increased efforts within the domestic sphere to care for the wellbeing of their own citizens. With less money spent on defense, the budget could perhaps be balanced more in favor of domestic social programs. For internationalist Republicans, the argument could be made that without so many interventional drains on resources, if you keep defense spending constant, there would still be more financial resources for the military to more effectively provide for a common defense. If that argument were to be unpersuasive, then the claim could also be made that the extra money in the budget could go towards helping the deficit. Second, for any political actor—regardless of party affiliation or any extraneous political beliefs not encompassed by party lines—who believes in the validity of internationalism, it would be important for them to gain more support for their internationalist endeavors. If there are fewer negative reactions to internationalist policies, then the internationalist ideology has a better chance at gaining support in the general public.

At the end of the day, isolationists and internationalists, Republicans and Democrats, politicians and citizens all want mostly the same end result for the United States. A comparison of methodologies is of the utmost importance for accomplishing this task. However, for this to occur, every party must be willing to understand one

another and shirk polemics. No one has ever lost by educating themselves. Ignorance and dismissiveness, in contrast, certainly contribute to decreases in effectiveness and undesirable end results. When one considers isolationists as patriots attempting to minimize risk and benefit their direct constituency, their advocacy does not seem all that preposterous. It would do internationalists well to remember and learn from that.

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**IN DEFENSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
HAROLD HONGJU KOH ON CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE GLOBAL
LEGAL ORDER**

Harold Hongju Koh is Sterling Professor of International Law at Yale Law School. He returned to Yale Law School in January 2013 after serving for nearly four years as the 22nd Legal Advisor of the U.S. Department of State. Professor Koh is one of the country's leading experts in public and private international law, national security law, and human rights. He holds a B.A. degree from Harvard College and B.A. and M.A. degrees from Oxford University, where he was a Marshall Scholar. He earned his J.D. from Harvard Law School.

***World Outlook:** Looking back on your time in the State Department, what were some of the projects you worked on, and what were your proudest achievements?*

Harold Hongju Koh: I had two stints at the State Department: first as Assistant Secretary for Human Rights from 1990 to 2000, and second as Legal Advisor from 2009 to 2011. My first post was at the end of the Clinton administration and my second was during the Obama administration. I worked with two great bosses and leaders: Madeline Albright and Hillary Clinton. Both of them have become good friends of mine and I think the world of both of them. In each situation I got to work with really phenomenal and talented people, so I love the State Department as an institution. The first time around I worked on Kosovo, East Timor, North Korea, and Sierra Leone - the human rights crises of the day. One moment of continuity was that I went to Kosovo when the U.S. was using humanitarian intervention to free Kosovo in the late 1990s, and then argued for Kosovo's legal independence at the International Court of Justice when I was Legal Advisor. My second time around, I worked on everything that crossed the State Department's plate, including drones, Guantanamo [Bay], the Paris climate deal, and the Arab Spring (which were a very challenging set of experiences), and Wikileaks. The most compressed experience was probably the release of Chen Guangcheng, a blind Chinese activist who came into the U.S. embassy. We were there for fourteen days and got him out and into the United States without destroying the relationship between the U.S. and China.

It's hard to know which I would pick as the biggest accomplishment. We announced the first set of rules on cyberwar. I set up the first linkages between the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights, and the European Court of International Justice. It's sort of like asking what your favorite moment in college was. A lot happened in four years.

***WO:** What were some places you wanted to make progress but hit a wall?*

HHK: I think we should have closed Guantanamo. I think it was a mistake that we

didn't and I think we'll regret it.

WO: How do you predict American exceptionalism in global leadership will be affected by the Trump administration's foreign policy and use of legal doctrines?

HHK: A few years ago, I wrote an article in the Stanford Law Review on American exceptionalism. I said there were two kinds of exceptionalism – positive exceptionalism and negative exceptionalism. Positive exceptionalism is exceptional American leadership. Negative exceptionalism is when America tries to exempt itself from international rules. What people don't quite get is that everybody wants positive American exceptionalism because it's the only way to get things done on very critical issues. You can't have Middle East peace without American leadership. With negative exceptionalism, it detracts from capacity building.

I think the danger of Trump, which is similar to the danger of George W. Bush, is that the more the U.S. exercises negative exceptionalism, the more it impairs its power to engage in positive exceptionalism. It diminishes the capacity to lead. It happens gradually, so it's a little like someone who has lost their moral authority saying "let's do this." They could be right, but if they don't have moral leadership then nobody is going to follow them. So you can't take influence for granted.

WO: A common critique of international law is that it is applied selectively. This is apparent with the NATO intervention in Libya's civil war but not in Syria's, even though many of the same international law principles are being violated there. What are some positive and negative aspects of the lack of an international legal enforcer?

HHK: You have to distinguish between spotty enforcement and there being no rule. If people break into cars in Hanover, New Hampshire, that doesn't mean it's not illegal to break into a car. It just means the law is not perfectly enforced. Domestic law is easier to understand. We have an executive, judicial, and legislative branch. Congress passes the law, the president enforces it, and the court decides whether it's lawful. It's a simple process. International law is enforced by a complex process I call the transnational legal process, where there are many legal enforcers. The president is an important actor, but is by no means the only one. And so what ends up happening is that there are default patterns of behavior that are created by law. And when you have a default pattern, there's an impulse to follow it. It's harder to break away from that than you think.

We're seeing Trump claim to want to make radical changes. As we speak today, the immigration order from January 27 was in existence for about twelve hours, which were twelve hours of chaos, and since then it's been blocked. The thing about selective enforcement is enforcers have to get together to make sure that important rules

are followed. If on this campus you suddenly had a violation of free speech, I'm sure all the students would get together and march to make sure it didn't happen again, even if they didn't agree with the speech. You can call that selective enforcement, but in fact it's this complex enforcement process playing out. I think it's very interesting to watch. In other words, it's easy for people who aren't lawyers to think that the law doesn't belong to the people, but it sure does. And we have a president who is coming to understand that he doesn't own the law.

WO: *What are the international law consequences of increasing isolationism among world powers, notably Trump's campaign rhetoric and Brexit? Do you think international issues will increasingly be addressed unilaterally rather than through coalitions or international organizations as a consequence of this isolationist impulse?*

HHK: First of all, it's early days for Trump. There's no way he's going to leave NATO. One of the perils of making a lot of shallow promises is that when you back away from those promises, it doesn't make any sense. People will notice you broke away from your promise. That's a process of education. Brexit is a serious mistake. One of the dangers of popular democracy is that people have to be well informed. Demagogues can mischaracterize decisions to voters, which can lead to mistakes like Brexit. It turned out before Brexit, leaders told the public that the money going to Brussels would come back in, but the day after they said "it's not true." Europe and the UK are so deeply integrated now; it's just very hard to unscramble those eggs. The biggest point though is that there are pendulum swings, and the actual path is closer to staying on track. On one hand, these guys act like they're making dramatic changes, but they tend to go back toward the default, and there's a reason that something can come from this result. It might be the thing that best represents everyone's interests and concerns. The Brits have an expression – Keep Calm and Carry On – and that's what we have to do about Brexit: it's not over until it's over. And the Brexit vote was on June 2nd. Today's date is February 16th. It's been blocked by the Supreme Court of the UK and they're not even close to giving the notice. There's similarity there with Trump. There's a difference between talk and action.

WO: *Recently we have seen action from other countries that may not have been at the forefront of global leadership before, like Germany regarding the refugee crisis or China investing in infrastructure development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Who are other key players in the game who may be willing to take up the mantle of global leadership if the UK and U.S. follow through on threats to step back?*

HHK: Well the BRICS (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) played a big role in climate change. And some other countries like Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. On different issues there are different coalitions of countries that can make a difference. But these people don't think the big powers don't own the interests. One reason we're

at an important moment is that there's a big difference between spheres of influence and real cooperation in the world of law. And spheres of influence is what we had with the Monroe Doctrine and similar policies, but real cooperation in the role of law means everyone plays by the same rules. That system has been led by the U.S. for as long as I've been alive. I think what's at risk is that the U.S. will sacrifice that position and no one will step in. I think Angela Merkel is doing a brilliant job and deserves credit.

WO: When Obama's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) plan was struck down, it represented a check on executive power in immigration. Do you think that precedent will withstand the current administration?

HHK: It's happening already. The states of Washington and Minnesota just won a suit against Trump on immigration. There's a difference though between policies that are smart and self-sustaining, and policies that are dumb and likely to fail. We have millions of immigrants in the country and the ones who are going to school and doing well in public universities are the people most likely to make a big contribution and become citizens. So if you're going to have a procedure where you prioritize how you deport people, you always put those people last. All the Obama program did was say this formally. Now, in the early days of the Trump administration, we have these immigration raids going after people with criminal offenses. The question is are they picking the right people. You can have a violation for turning on a traffic signal! But the question is how much people really want federal money to be going to a wall or to a deportation force. American people don't like wasting money on stupid things.

It's early days, but what you want to watch is what are the real priorities of this administration. I think their real commitments are minor and if they get resistance they'll shift to something else. Republicans are angry at Trump because he's making few friends with this immigration business: it wasn't their priority. In the UK you can have a coalition government where two minority groups combine and control the government for a while, but if you break them apart they're both minority groups. The overlap between the Republicans' interests and Trump's interests are pretty small. There are so many issues that they disagree on. And if they pick a bunch of wedge issues, then it turns out that one side will distance themselves. Look what happened with the Secretary of Labor. Trump picked him because it's a personal relationship and did a terrible job vetting him. Few Republicans defended him so they had to pull his nomination. And it's only day thirty.

WO: You've written about how whistleblowing puts civil servants and military servicemen in danger, and hold the opinion that these are crimes that should be punished by law. In light of recent concerns about the Trump administration's practice of concealing or deleting information regarding climate change data, tax releases, or the President's relationship with

Russia, have your personal or legal views softened on the issue?

HKK: No. There's a difference between whistleblowing and truthfulness. Take the Pentagon Papers case, in which whistleblowers turned documents over to the New York Times and the Washington Post, which are reputable journals with processes for vetting and selecting what to publish. That's different from the case of Julian Assange, who I do not think was a hero and was very openly uninterested in what the negative consequences were in bringing all of this stuff up. In fact, Wikileaks published the names and addresses of human rights workers who were all of a sudden in jeopardy in countries across the world – this was all about publicity and not about doing the right thing. Now that means that you need to have whistleblowing but according to certain rules. Everybody was praising Wikileaks, but now it turns out all they're doing is giving stuff to the Russians; during the election Wikileaks was not acting in a bipartisan way or according to journalistic conventions. In some strange way they were trying to influence the outcome, to bring us Donald Trump.

So I think there's a place for whistleblowing and there's a place for confidentiality. Let's use an example: suppose you're in a student group and you have an agreement that you're not going to tell anybody what people say. Every single person in the world is part of some group that has a rule of confidentiality that you don't likely breach because it allows the group to function. And I think we've acknowledged that. Things that the government does require some degree of confidentiality, at least for a certain period of time. We also have other ways to make information transparent such as the Freedom of Information Act, I'm certainly all for that. I'm for the government proactively revealing information, I'm for freedom of information, I'm for the orderly disposition of information.

WO: But if the government were not to freely disclose that information, do you think there is a place for that kind of behavior, like the scientists trying to preserve government climate change data before it disappears from the White House website?

HKK: In terms of the Wikileaks account, no. Who is Julian Assange accountable to? Himself. I think powerful institutions should be accountable. WikiLeaks has become a powerful institution and that's supposedly their model, but if you want accountability you have to explain what your principles are and consider if your rules for distributing information are you favoring one side or the other. The cult of Assange I think is a sad thing. Take another person you know, Chelsea Manning, who is in a very sad situation and has already paid a price in terms of punishment. This is a person who is very young who I think should be given another chance. Assange, on the other hand, has a long history of very strange and antisocial behavior.

WO: Drones and torture are issues that get a lot of public attention, but what are some others international law issues that you think will become salient in the coming years?

HKK: How we make agreements and how we break agreements. I have an article in the Harvard Law Journal about this issue, which argues that it was lawful to enter the Paris Climate Change agreement and that Trump can't get out of it so easily. How we make deals is extremely important, and it's not something that private citizens understand very well. International law and emerging technology is huge, and so is reproductive technology. One of the most interesting things that happened when I was in the government was a lesbian couple decided to have a baby by in vitro fertilization. One mother is American and the other is not; the American woman carried the baby to term and the fertilized egg was implanted in her body, but the child was born in the other mother's country. The sperm that created that egg was from an American sperm bank; because of confidentiality reasons we don't actually know what the citizenship was of the sperm donor. So the baby's born of an American mother in a foreign country, and the question is what is the nationality of the baby? Now if the mother had done this through the traditional process, the kid would be American because mother and child have a "natural relationship," which is typically construed to mean shared DNA. In this case mother and child do not share DNA, but she did carry the baby for nine months in her body, which I argue was a different kind of natural relationship: gestational rather than genetic. Otherwise the baby would be stateless and have no passport, right? You can't survive in this world without one.

Literally every day I ran across an issue that had something related to emerging technologies, and you have to adjust your perspective to meet these challenges. There are two ways to address a new issue. One is to say, "nobody thought about it, so it's a black hole, there is no law, and you can do whatever you want." The problem with that is that the powerful get what they want. The other way is to translate existing rules to the current situation in the spirit of the laws. Now people can disagree when you translate things, but you're at least trying to apply law. Someone could disagree with my view that a gestational baby has a natural relationship with the mother, and then launch a legal debate about the definition of "natural," but the debate happening within the framework of law, not outside of it.

WO: *Have you ever had to balance a clash between your personal ethics and your professional duty, and how did you resolve that tension?*

HKK: Not really. When I went to the government I said to Madeline Albright that I could defend any decision that I was a part of, because there was an opportunity to make my voice heard and ultimately the decision was hers to make. Also, I could leave at any time because I have tenure: if I don't like it, I leave and I make more money and I work less hard. But I never thought about leaving because I respect those decisions, and I don't do anything I don't believe in. That's why you should work with people you believe in. Do I agree with Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama about every single

thing? No, but do I generally agree with them? Do I think they're good people? Do I think they're the right guys for the job? Yes. I don't agree with Trump and I could never work with him, because I don't respect him as an intellectual person. Why would you work for a person you don't respect? Life is too short. As I like to say to my students, you're only as good as the principals who you work for and the principles that you stand for.

WO: *What advice would you give to undergraduate students who are in the process of applying to law school, and what qualities make successful law students?*

HKK: What qualities make successful law students? Honesty, hard work, resilience. So honesty: you have to take a hard look at a case and say how strong it is or how weak it is, and you don't do anybody favors by saying a case is stronger than it is. Hard work, there's just no substitute for it. People talk about imaginary people who are brilliant and do things effortlessly. I don't know anyone who is really that way – successful people work hard. And resilience – everything won't go your way and you'll get knocked down, but you have to get back up – I think that's the theme of every Rocky movie.

Those considering a legal career should get to know lawyers. Talk to lawyers, understand what they do in their life and see whether it's something you find exciting and attractive. I didn't know that many lawyers growing up – my father was legally trained but he wasn't a practicing lawyer. I'd never been in a courthouse I'd never been in a courtroom. I didn't know any judges. I didn't even know that many people who'd gone to law school, but they're all around you and worth seeking out. One of the greatest challenges is how you consider your education when you're not in a great university. In university you often take your education for granted, but in life you teach yourself. So you have to teach yourself how to read and how to learn about the world and how to keep yourself informed. You know we have a president now who has a very short attention span, he says it himself, and he doesn't read much, and there's a cost to that – we're seeing that cost. One of them is that he doesn't see connections between things. Bill Clinton likes to say that some people can see around corners because they think through things all the way to the end; they don't just do the thing that's most attractive to them at that moment. You want to get experienced at thinking down the road – when my own children were little I'd say to them every day, “think ahead, think ahead, think ahead. Have you thought ahead enough?” and now I'm glad to say they think very far ahead. Don't act on impulse, act on reason.

NOWHERE TO TURN - THE PLIGHT OF CIVILIANS IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR: A COMPARATIVE APPLICATION OF MASS KILLING LITERATURE TO STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS

Freya Jamison

I. INTRODUCTION

Three-year-old Aylan Kurdi shocked the world in early May 2016, when images of the Syrian toddler's drowned and lifeless body went viral on global media. In the words of British-Somali poet Warsan Shire, "no one puts their children in a boat / unless the water is safer than the land."¹ For many Syrians, risking everything to flee their war-torn homes is the only hope for enduring the country's bloody civil war. For far too many more, fleeing is not an option, and the best chance for survival is keeping one's head down and hoping not to be noticed by any of the belligerents. It is clear that civilians have borne the brunt of atrocities in the civil war that has plagued Syria since 2011; what is not clear is why. The intentional targeting of Syrian noncombatants is a well-established practice of both the government forces commanded by President Bashar al-Assad and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The second part of this paper provides an overview of civilian casualties in the Syrian Civil War. Part three examines the literature on the reasons for mass killing and applies these theories to the actions of the Assad government and the Islamic State. Part four reviews the literature on mass killing on the individual level and how it relates to the Syrian conflict. Part five summarizes the gaps in mass killing scholarship. I conclude that the government's massacres serve a military purpose as a rational counterinsurgency tactic, but the existing literature falls short of explaining the rewards ISIL gains from the strategy. The literature succeeds, however, in providing a framework for understanding the motivations of individual perpetrators in both state- and non-state contexts.

II. MASS KILLING AND THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

In March 2011, Arab Spring protestors took to the streets of Damascus and other major Syrian cities, demanding democratic reform from the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Government security forces responded by firing upon and illegally detaining protestors. By early April, protestors escalated their demands from reform to regime change, and chants of "the people want the fall of the regime" echoed throughout the nation. By July, activists and army defectors formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to fight the regime's highly organized army. Clashes between the two militaries continue today, despite a UN-led ceasefire attempt in early 2016. The Syrian rebels are exceedingly fractured, and the conflict is further complicated by the

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involvement of foreign backers on both sides and the opportunistic participation of Salafi jihadist groups, ISIL and its affiliate, the al-Nusra Front.

Sustained fighting has taken an incredible toll on the civilian population of Syria. Estimated total casualties range from 300,000-470,000. Of that number, at least 86,692 were civilian deaths, according to numbers recorded by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) between March 2011 and August 2016.² SOHR reports that about one fifth of civilian casualties were children under the age of 18. Both sides have been accused of manipulating casualty statistics, and Lebanese daily al-Akbar asserts that some insurgent deaths were wrongly counted as civilians.³ In a joint report released in early 2016, the Syrian Center for Policy Research and UN Development Programme described a national death rate of about 10 people per thousand with an additional 1.88 million wounded, meaning approximately 11.5% of the Syrian population has been killed or injured in war.⁴ The fighting has disproportionately disrupted civilian lives: an estimated 7.5 million Syrians are internally displaced and more than 4 million currently seek refuge in other countries.⁵

Acts committed by both government forces and jihadi rebels qualify as mass killing, defined by Valentino as “the intentional killing of a massive number of non-combatants.”⁶ The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria found that both government forces and the terrorist group ISIL committed and (as of the report’s publication in February 2016) continue to commit crimes against humanity against Syrian civilians; these crimes included the use of indiscriminate air and ground assaults, siege tactics, and targeting hospitals and schools in violation of international humanitarian law.⁷ In 2013, Assad and his forces used chemical weapons against civilians. In 2016, the United Nations declared that ISIL’s actions against the Yazidi minority, including mass killing, kidnapping and rape, constitute genocide. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry went further to say, “In my judgment, [ISIL] is responsible for genocide against groups in areas under its control including Yazidis, Christians, Shia Muslims... and in some cases also against Sunni Muslims, Kurds, and other minorities.”⁸ Sporadic reports also accuse other rebels and the FSA of intentionally targeting civilians, but the opposition is so disorganized that it is difficult to attribute these actions to a certain leader, and the scale of any atrocities of this kind is much smaller than those committed by government forces and ISIL.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW – WHY LEADERS COMMAND MASS KILLING

Theories that explain the mass killing of civilians generally fall into three main camps: mobilization around cleavages, regime type or political stability, and atrocities as the byproduct of war. They point to different motivations for the leaders ordering murderous policies: ideology, power, or military necessity. For some scholars, one-sided killing is the only way to resolve intractable societal cleavages, while theorists on the opposite end of the spectrum believe killing is avoidable when there are checks on leaders’ power and societies celebrate, rather than fear, diversity (both domestically and internationally.)

The first set of theories blame psychological cleavages or entrenched ethnic hatred for mass killing. This explanation claims that humans are adept at sorting themselves around perceived differences. These differences – whether constructed in the mind or more definite (like as skin color or religion) – inspire populations to murder members of the “outgroup” in incredible numbers. In “Killer Species,” Richard Wrangham tracks this tendency to evolutionary biology, noting that humans, like genetically similar chimpanzees and wolves, organize to form alliances against other members of the same species.⁹ He observes that killing is most likely when resource competition is fierce and the operation is low-risk, implying that modern massacres occur when aggressors feel they can forcibly take limited resources from the out-group at a low cost to themselves. Psychologist Ervin Staub explains identity-based violence by generalizing the frustration-aggression theory of individual psychology to the national level, arguing that in societies plagued by “hard times,” such as economic depression, war, or other intense social pressure, threatened groups target an out-group to collectively scapegoat.¹⁰ He cites the case of Nazi Germany, which blamed the Jews for the economic downturn leading to World War II as a supporting example. For Scott Straus, some nations are more susceptible to mobilizing cleavages than others. He contends that groups undertake mass killing when they perceive a “fundamental and imminent” threat to their core political project or political future.¹¹ Straus argues that “pre-crisis ‘founding narratives’ shape how elites understand and respond to threats,” and that violence is more likely when the apparent threat derives from a group excluded from the country’s founding narrative.¹² Scholars from the mobilization around cleavages camp commonly cite Rwanda’s 1994 genocide and mass killing in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s as instances where perpetrators from a single ethnic group victimized members of another group on the sole basis of ethnicity.

These scholars offer an important warning: elements of identity, such as ethnicity, race, and religion can (and have) been used to delineate groups in conflict. They neglect, however, to explain the internal calculation of potential perpetrators deciding whether to participate in violence, and rely instead on the assumption that not only is diversity visible and existent, but that identity lines are salient enough for people to take up arms for, risking their lives and stability. They also fail to present a unified hypothesis for the path from divided societies, to prejudice, to conflict; Straus argues that prejudice and “othering” is present but latent and surfaces in times of crisis, while Staub would posit that discrimination can become a coping mechanism for difficult times. Finally, identity-based theories do not explain cases where mass killing occurs within a national or ethnic group, such as within communist regimes.¹³ It is plausible that Staub-style “othering” can occur among subgroups of a generally homogenous population, but it is clear that diversity is not a sufficient condition in most instances.

A second set of scholars point to regime type or characteristics to explain what types of government target their own people. Rummel’s power principle contends that democracies kill citizens less than their autocratic counterparts because checks and balance restrain this sort of behavior. Essentially, “where absolute power exists, inter-

ests become polarized, a culture of violence develops, and war and democide follow.”¹⁴ The power principle supplements the democratic peace theory, a key concept in the liberalist school of international relations. This theory maintains that democracies prefer diplomacy and peaceful conflict resolution in relations with other democracies because of shared norms and values. Mann retorts with the argument that democracies are equally capable of mass killing as their autocratic counterparts,¹⁵ and that historical examples, such as the American use of the atomic bomb against Japan in World War II, or the mass cleansing of native peoples prove that they are also willing. He follows that democracies are peaceful when they have ethnically cleansed their land to the point where remaining groups are small enough or sufficiently restricted from power that they cannot threaten “the people.” Stepping back from the regime type debate, Barbara Harff identifies six political criteria to predict when war or the failure of a regime will lead to mass killing: regime change (“political upheaval”), recent genocide, a political system with exclusionary elite ideology, ethnic and religious cleavages, lack of economic development, and lack of trade openness.¹⁶ Case studies here are mixed: the communist regimes of Stalin’s Soviet Union, Mao’s China, and Pol Pot’s Cambodia executed their own citizens on a massive scale, but so did democratic Germany in World War II.

History makes it clear that both democracies and autocracies have the ability and resolve to kill civilians at a massive scale, so the Rummel/Mann debate is an interesting theoretical question but ultimately not as worthwhile as looking for common characteristics among the regimes (democratic or not) who have authorized mass killing in the past. Harff bridges this gap by highlighting these factors, many of which suggest that regime stability is a more reliable predictor than regime type. Her work should be expanded upon to include instances of mass killing independent from war. State composition theories do acknowledge a weakness of identity-based arguments by clarifying that killing is the result of decisions made by leaders and governments rather than the aggregate effect of grassroots outbursts of racism. Obviously, these notions do not apply to non-state actors or to counter-majority killing.

Finally, some contend that the best indicator of mass killing is war, 1) because standard legal and moral norms are suspended during wartime, and 2) because mass killing can be a viable strategy for military victory. First, mass atrocities can be enabled by the circumstances surrounding conflict. Gordon notes that losers are generally the only ones punished for civilian abuses, while winning perpetrators generally emerge from the conflict with their international reputations unscathed. She points to Iraq, where American sanctions were premeditated to cause “large-scale and long-term damage”¹⁷ to the Iraqi economy and population, but the occurrence is rarely mentioned in lists of atrocities. Furthermore, case studies suggest that racism is normalized during war in a way that it is not in peacetime to mobilize populations and increase troop cohesiveness. Dower studied both Japanese and American attitudes toward each other during WWII to conclude that “In the heat of war, points of common ground were lost sight of and the behavior of the enemy was seen as unique and particularly odi-

ous.”¹⁸ Japanese troops also committed excessively violent murders and rapes during their occupation of China, behavior Macdonald describe as “typical.”¹⁹ Mass killing is also a legitimate strategy to counter internal and external threats. Insurgencies rely on civilian populations for support, so targeting the civilian population both with positive incentives (a ‘hearts and minds’ approach), or negative ones, like the threat of blockade or execution, is a rational strategy to draw support away from the guerillas.²⁰

An obvious drawback of this approach is that it limits the scope of cases covered. Yes, mass killing is often associated with war, but sometimes targeted killing is the instigator of war rather than its outcome, or completely independent from a multi-party conflict. Additionally, rather than being the cause of conflict, war could serve as cover to carry out a nefarious, premeditated goal of ethnic cleansing. Labeling mass killing the unfortunate byproduct of conflict risks desensitization to the crime’s gravity.

Is it something about people, something about politics, something about war, or something else altogether that causes mass killing of civilians? These factors do not exist in a vacuum, and certainly interact with each other. Although they imply very different policy solutions, what each points to is a fundamental desire of groups to preserve or enhance their power, resources, or ideology in the face of an imagined or immediate threat. Case-by-case evaluation can help explain how these three schools of thought interact with each other. Existing literature glaringly neglects to account for atrocities committed by non-state actors, who have different stakes and incentives than state actors. Non-state actors may place more emphasis on ideology, may be more likely to strike during wartime when government is less stable, and have nothing to lose but everything to gain from a transition of power, so may be more likely to implement radical policies.

A. GOVERNMENT KILLING AS COIN STRATEGY IN RESPONSE TO EXISTENTIAL THREAT

Although media coverage of the Syrian Civil War emphasizes religious and sectarian strife, religious or ethnic cleansing is not the main force behind government killing. Syria is largely ethnically homogenous, with Arabs constituting 90.3% of the population.²¹ Nearly the same proportion of the country identifies as Muslim, but the Muslim population is split between the 74% Sunni majority, and the Shia, Alawites and Ismailis communities, which together comprise 13% of Syrian Muslims. There are also small but significant Christian and Druze minorities. Alawites have held power in Syria since Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, declared himself President in 1971. Although excluded from decision-making roles in both civilian government and the military, Sunnis are integrated into Syrian society and fill the majority of low and mid-level public positions. Sectarian tensions have flared into conflict in the past. A notable case is the 1982 Hama massacre – where President Hafez al-Assad killed between 10,000–40,000 citizens in Hama to subdue a coup attempt by the Sunni-led Muslim Brotherhood. However, the government maintains an official position of inclusivity, and the only groups it targets with pejorative language are jihadists and select

foreign actors, particularly Israel; a sharp contrast to the framing of targeted groups as subhuman pushed by Hitler's Germany in the Holocaust or Yugoslavia and Rwanda during their genocides. Assad's government does not intend to ethnically cleanse all Sunnis, Druze, and Christians from the country, because it relies on their majority to maintain everyday functionality in the country. Counter to the ideas of Straus and Staub, the government perceives its main enemy as political, rather than religious.

Is there something about the autocratic character of the Syrian regime that explains its brutality? Yes, the Assads' autocratic hold on power explains the regime's violent suppression of military and political threats, both past and present, but it does not account for the specific targeting of civilians. The regime's large military and police presence were designed to deter rebellion, and mandatory military service for men over the age of 18 warns potential dissenters of the government's power. The harsh crackdown on the 1982 Muslim Brotherhood power grab was carried out swiftly and brutally because the elder Assad's virtually unchecked power enabled him to act in a way that would be permissible in a functioning democracy. Today's Arab Spring demands for regime change pose another existential threat to the status quo, although this time the challenge is to the younger Assad. Genuine democratization would likely unseat Bashar, who has held onto power by maintaining a one-party state, but slaughtering all of the civilian opposition would be counterproductive because, like democracies, authoritarian governments also have an interest in mobilizing populations and creating favorable narratives among the population.²² This desire to be seen as legitimate is evidenced Assad's decision to allow a presidential election in 2014, where he won in a landslide victory of 88.7% of the popular vote (compared to challenger Hassan al-Nouri of the NIACS party's 4.3%). The election was far from democratic – voting was only allowed in government-controlled areas of the country, the election was boycotted by the opposition, and both the U.S. and EU condemned the outcome²³ – but is highly symbolic. Literature that asserts authoritarian regimes kill because they can get away with it neglects both the strategic concern for popular support (or at least tolerance), and the regime's desire for a semblance of credibility to present to the international community.

It is the third scholarly camp, specifically theories that focus on mass killing as a battle tactic, which best explains government targeting of civilians. The Assad regime implements the standard counterinsurgency tactic of siege to strain the relationship between insurgent enemies and the population that supports them. In numerous instances over the course of the war, the Syrian army used "artillery, airpower, and ballistic missiles to drive Syrians out of insurgent-held areas and committed massacres when it entered controlled territory. The regime does not so much 'clear' territory of rebels as it does 'cleanse' it of opposition."²⁴ Although coercive, this tactic has proven successful – reports confirm that some Aleppo neighborhoods rejected the rebels to prevent further government reprisal for supporting the insurgents.²⁵ Although siege tactics and various other methods of credibly threatening civilian targets aid Assad's short-term goal of rooting out insurgents, modern counterinsurgency practitioners,

including the authors of the United States' counterinsurgency field manual (FM 3-24) urge positive incentives and policies to win civilians' hearts and minds for sustainable popular support. The theory that oppressors are able to get away with atrocities more easily in war is also applicable to the Syrian case; Stevenson argues that Assad's compromise on chemical weapons provided him with "political cover" to using conventional military tactics against civilians without backlash from outside actors.²⁶ Counterinsurgency strategy explains Assad's mass killing better than the concepts of identity conflict or typical authoritarian behavior.

B. ISIL KILLING AS IDEOLOGICAL OPPORTUNISM

ISIL's killing of civilians serves a very different goal than the state-sponsored civilian massacres in Syria. ISIL is pursuing a policy of ethnic cleansing against all civilians unwilling to accept its extreme brand of Sunni Islam in line with identity-based hypotheses of mass killing. However, as an unconventional state actor, arguments about government type are irrelevant. War-centric models are useful only in that the chaos resulting from the conflict provides an opportunity for ISIL to launch an offensive when defenses are weak and the population is desperate for protection. Instead of focusing resources on countering violent extremism, the government's capacity is stretched between defending itself from the FSA, fighting to take back ISIL-controlled territories, and accomplishing its own strategic goals. A new theory is needed to explain the economic and strategic benefits of ISIL's mass killing of civilians, one that acknowledges its unique character as an organization seeking religious, geographic, and political power.

Identity conflict is key to understanding ISIL's massacres in Syria, because it is necessary to fulfill the group's ultimate goal of creating a religiously pure state, or Caliphate, centered around modern day Iraq and Syria but eventually extending throughout the entire Muslim world. It is extremely rare for genocidal leaders to publicly admit the extent of their nefarious aims – historians struggled to find a document linking Hitler to an order to exterminate all European Jews. ISIL, however, has been very explicit in its aim of building a devout empire of all Muslims under the prophet (and ISIL's current leader) Abu Baker al-Baghdadi. ISIL preaches a fundamentalist Wahhabi doctrine of Sunni Islam that promotes violent jihad and considers Muslims who disagree with extreme Quranic interpretations infidels. Rather than winning over the existing populations of Iraq and Syria, ISIL seeks to cleanse all "non-believers" from the land and replace them with the descendants of their loyal supporters and pilgrims to the holy site. Advocacy groups and internal ISIL documents provide evidence of ISIL's eliminationist ideology. Human Rights Watch reports that male Yazidis held in Iraq and Syria were given an ultimatum to "convert or die," while Yazidi women were forced to marry ISIL fighters to produce children for the cause.²⁷ The documents of assassinated ISIL strategist Samir Abd Muhammed al-Khlifawi clarify that there is no room for apostates in the Islamic State – the group seeks to physically annihilate all potential opposition.²⁸

ISIL enjoys further benefits of mass killing that are not considered in the existing literature, namely the propaganda value of graphic atrocities and the economic benefits of controlling land. ISIL's sophisticated propaganda machine serves two purposes: one, to antagonize western governments and undermine their cultural and military hegemony, and two, to inspire both foreign and Muslim recruits to settle in the Caliphate. Showcasing civilian massacres forwards both of these aims. First, professionally produced English-language videos portraying the brutal murder of western journalists and travellers including American James Foley send the message that westerners and their governments are not safe, even though they are far from the battlefields. Additionally, ISIL produces an online magazine, a series of films, and prolifically uses social media to highlight the quality of life followers enjoy in its territories. Accounts of ruthless executions back up these claims by projecting ISIL's power and the idea that ISIL is militarily strong enough to protect its supporters. An ISIL defector describes an "army of media personnel," with equal rank to military leadership, reflecting the earnestness of ISIL image project.²⁹ Additionally, indiscriminate killing allows ISIL to more efficiently capture lucrative oil fields and operate them without worrying about internal uprising. Oil is the jihadist group's largest revenue source – ISIL controls Syria's Deir Ezzor province, from which it extracts between 34,000 and 40,000 barrels of oil per day for profits of a maximum \$1.5 million per day.³⁰ In ISIL's mind, this economic benefit outweighs the costs to human life. Bottom line, killing for no strategic reason can be rational when fear is your currency. Current scholarship fails to take this into account, only accounting for irrationality when it is driven by deep-seated ethnic hatred.

IV. LITERATURE REVIEW – WHY INDIVIDUALS CARRY OUT MASS KILLING

To understand how mass atrocities occur, one must not only look at leaders and their governments, but also at the individuals responsible for executing the orders to kill. An incredibly small number of culprits are capable of extensive violence – over the course of only six weeks in Rwanda, a Presidential Guard of a mere 1,500 men and approximately 50,000 recruits massacred an estimated 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu civilians.³¹ History testifies that mass killing is usually done in a way that is incredibly visceral. In Rwanda, for instance, the majority of killing took place at short-range using machetes, and piles of bodies clogged the streets and rivers. Perpetrators were often normal people drafted into the armed forces and police. Two main hypotheses exist explain how individuals are capable of murdering innocent men, women, and children in cold blood: first, that killers are a self-selected group of abnormally belligerent individuals looking for an outlet for their aggression, or two, that everyday people can be induced to violence through a combination of psychological and situational pressures.

Self-selection theories emphasize individual motives for mass atrocities. John Mueller conjectures that most conflicts that appear to be ethnically motivated are actually waged by a small group of combatants, usually consisting of drunks, crim-

inals released from jail, and thugs. Nationalism is not what rallies this motley crew, but rather serves as “the characteristic around which the marauders happened to have arrayed themselves.”³² Mueller cites instances in the Yugoslavian and Rwandan cases where perpetrators enjoyed a ‘carnival’ of rape and looting. This question of killers’ mental soundness has haunted psychologists for decades. Waller surveys all attempts by psychologists over decades to identify a “Nazi personality” or shared mental illness among the executioners of the Holocaust, but finds that “the most outstanding common characteristic of perpetrators of extraordinary evil is their normality.”³³ If Mueller’s theory is correct, then killers are selfish and violent, but they are not crazy.

A growing body of psychological research finds that under the right circumstances, the majority of (normally peaceful) individuals are capable of knowingly inflicting pain upon others. Stanley Milgram’s obedience experiments discovered that 65% of volunteers were willing to shock another participant with a deadly 450 volts of electricity when asked to by a lab-coated Yale experimenter, despite the victim’s cries of pain.³⁴ In addition to having the tendency to obey authority, humans are adept at adopting the societal roles assigned to them, even if it means violating their personal moral code. In Philip Zimbardo’s infamous “Stanford Prison Experiment,” college students selected for their averageness were held in a mock prison and asked to play either prisoners or guards. Within a few days, the prisoners showed signs of helpless, dehumanization, and depression, while guards found “inventive” ways to be cruel to their wards.³⁵ Bandura posits that individuals can psychologically “disengage” from their morally dubious actions by believing that noble ends justify violent means, displacing responsibility to commanders and/or victims, and distancing themselves from the direct consequences of their actions.³⁶ These theories and experiments grew out of the real-world observations of historians like Christopher Browning, who catalogued the brutal actions of German Police Battalion 101 in the systemic massacre World War II of Polish Jews at Jozefow. His study found that the killers were not particularly anti-Semitic or violent, but rather motivated by deference to authority, diffusion of responsibility, and to some extent career ambition.³⁷ Goldhagen counters, labeling the men of Battalion 101 as “willing executioners” – anti-Semitic Germans who supported an anti-Semitic government, went above and beyond to inflict pain on their victims, and did not take advantage of opportunities for dissent.³⁸

Ultimately, these varying descriptions of likely killers are not incompatible. Although Zimbardo’s sample size of guards was small, he noted that about one third were “cruel and tough,” half acted “tough but fair,” while 20% were “good guards,” offering the prisoners small comforts when they could.³⁹ Perhaps Mueller and Goldhagen’s theories explain this first group, while Goldhagen and Bandura uncover how the middle group can carry out their duties faithfully yet unenthusiastically. Little is known about the 20% of interveners. Additional scholarship is necessary to understand the majority of the population who neither participates in killing nor stops it, and what incentives are needed to increase the ability and willingness of these bystanders to intervene. More work is also needed to differentiate the calculations of lower

level perpetrators from those of their commanders.

A. GOVERNMENT PERPETRATORS: INVESTED ALAWITES

Syria's executioners hail from the various branches of the security services and are armed by international allies. At beginning of the war in 2011, the Syrian army consisted of nearly 300,000 active duty troops with an additional 314,000 in reserves and 108,000 members of various paramilitary groups. The vast majority of the conscripted soldiers are Sunni, but Alawites dominate the officer corps, filling 80% of leadership positions. The number of low-ranking combatants fell dramatically at the beginning of the conflict, when great numbers of Sunni soldiers defected to join the Free Syrian Army, effectively leaving the most loyal and invested soldiers behind to fight for the government. Elite paramilitaries, including the Presidential Guard and the Shabiha, lead the charge in civilian deaths. The 25,000-man Presidential Guard is controlled by Assad's brother Maher and is tasked with defending Damascus from any foreign or domestic threats. The Shabiha (translated to "ghosts" or "spirits") is a government-maintained shadow military composed completely of Alawites and is responsible for cracking down on dissent.⁴⁰ Russia has provided more than four billion USD to the Syrian government in both weapons and support. North Korea, Iran, and Hezbollah have also provided weapons to Syrian forces.

The Shabiha is accused of the worst atrocities against civilians, in line with Mueller's drunks and thugs theory. Sources disagree about the exact origin of the Shabiha, but rumors tie members to the mafia and/or networks of doping gyms, and accuse leadership of paying Shabiha recruits with steroids and large cash sums. Recruits are "less professional and often more brutal than conventional forces,"⁴¹ and are infamous for bragging about drinking the blood of their enemies. The 2014 documentary film "Silvered Water, Syria Self-Portrait" compiles unprofessional footage of government forces committing human rights abuses during the siege of Homs, including footage of a soldier forcing a naked teenage boy to kiss his boot. The filmmaker contends that abusers took sadistic pleasure from their actions, filming them for fun, and singing taunting songs about their future victims.⁴² Human Rights Watch reported multiple instances of Syrian security forces using sexual violence against detainees and during home raids "with complete impunity," but "does not have evidence that high-ranking officers command their troops to commit sexual violence."⁴³ Portions of the Syrian forces are undoubtedly ruthless beyond the necessity of war, but it must be noted that the Shabiha are a group hand-selected for the most odious tasks, and reports of these kinds of abuses are sporadic among mainstream security forces. By refusing to acknowledge and punish perpetrators of extraordinary abuses, the government is sanctioning (at least tacitly), Shabiha atrocities, and may even encourage them as a tool to inspire fear in adversaries.

The majority of Syrian soldiers are motivated not by deep-rooted sadism, but by the fear of losing the spoils they receive in exchange for loyalty to the regime. Although many infantrymen defected, the corps of middle- and high-ranking officers

remains faithful to Assad, arguably because to reach this level of achievement, officers must invest their personal and professional lives to the regime's success. For example, Dahiet al-Assad is a military housing complex on the outskirts of Damascus, inhabited solely by officers and their families who can apply to purchase homes through a state run subsidy program. The program is a rare opportunity for ambitious men from modest backgrounds to attain property in the expensive capital city and the social capital that comes with it. However, this lifestyle is contingent on the stability of the regime, so revolution is "a personal threat to [the officers'] assets and livelihood."⁴⁴ Furthermore, membership in this fringe community means accepting isolation both from officers' home communities, often inhabited by impoverished Syrians who have never visited the capital and from mainstream Damascus life. Instead, residents only option for community and shared identity comes from their neighbors and peers.⁴⁵ This desire for community resonates with social science theories of the human desire for conformity and belonging. Compounding the incentive for officer loyalty is the fear of reverse genocide and discrimination if Assad's regime were to fall – a Sunni majority could easily target the Alawite community if it controlled the resources and arms of the Syrian state. Essentially, the Alawite soldiers and officers have nothing to gain but everything to lose if the government were to be toppled. While psychological mechanisms may inspire Syrian soldiers to believe in their cause and act more brutally than they would be comfortable in everyday life, it is clear that more tangible material incentives and security concerns drive their continued loyalty.

B. JIHADISTS SEEK COMMUNITY AND CAUSE

ISIL sources its fighters from around the globe, but the vast majority of its troops fight in their home counties of Iraq and Syria. In late 2014, the CIA estimated that ISIL had 21,000-31,500 troops in Iraq and Syria, but other estimates place the number as high as 100,000. Up to 6,000 ISIL fighters are foreigners. Neither figure accounts for the continued supply of fighters traveling to the region from abroad, the potential for similar jihadi groups to pledge loyalty to ISIL, padding their numbers, and the non-armed supporters who support ISIL and live in its territories. ISIL mainly relies on weapons captured from the Iraqi and Syrian armies to arm its combatants, but sometimes asks volunteers to bring their own arms. A Quantum Research survey quoted by the U.S. Department of Defense shows that the motivations behind foreign ISIL fighters and their internal compatriots differ greatly; foreign fighters are more likely to be facing identity crisis and/or seeking belonging, while Muslim fighters are motivated to protect Sunni brothers from the 'apostate' Assad regime.⁴⁶ To a lesser extent, money and status are also incentives.

ISIL fighters, particularly foreign ones, are far from "ordinary." They are, after all, willing to give up their passports and chance of returning to their families in pursuit of ideology. However, demographic research on foreign fighters reveals that ISIL recruits at least look normal on paper – according to a World Bank dataset of 3,803 foreign ISIL recruits leaked from the organization's personnel files, the jihadis are an

average age 27.4 years old, nearly 70% have at least a secondary education, and recruits from the MENA and SE Asia regions have higher education attainment than is typical for their countries⁴⁷ – a far cry from the stereotypical image of the poor and uneducated terrorist. Instead, the study found that countries with low male employment rates were more likely to yield jihadis, and concluded that foreign fighters seek social and economic inclusion.⁴⁸ The anecdote of a 23-year-old girl from rural Washington State induced to convert to Islam through gifts and the promise of friendship from online ISIL contacts⁴⁹ further evidences the inclusion/community theory. Like Goldhagen's German killers, ISIL fighters believe that struggling for their cause will lead to a better life. But like Browning's ordinary men, many are inexperienced in killing, and acclimatized to violence through psychological incentives and group norms.

Extreme abuses and violence are institutionalized ISIL practices that serve the purposes outlined earlier in this essay, but the orderly execution of these practices suggest that they are strategic rather than simply the self-indulgent actions of individual soldiers. Sexual violence is systemic within ISIL strongholds. Human Rights Watch confirms that young Yazidi girls are separated from their families and forced to marry combatants, sometimes as "gifts" to fighters.⁵⁰ ISIL not only acknowledged this practiced of providing girls as "spoils of war," but also justified it in Dabiq, claiming that Islam allows sex with young, non-Muslim slaves. This perceived need to validate their atrocities (in combination with the controlled nature of ISIL's rape system) is more in line with Bandura's disengagement theory, which posits that it is easier to commit brutalities if you believe that your actions are justified, than Mueller's thugs who seek simple, hedonistic pleasure. More support for Bandura's theory over Mueller's comes from fighters' lack of personal financial enrichment. ISIL soldier salaries are modest and tightly controlled; fighters receive between \$400-\$1,200 USD/month with additional stipends for wives and children. Recent pay cuts did not result in massive defection, as would be expected if the recipients were solely motivated by greed.

V. CONCLUSION: APPLICATION OF MASS KILLING LITERATURE TO STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS

This examination reveals that the gap in applicability of existing literature is wider on the strategic level than on the individual. Although government forces are driven by the great personal costs of defeat, while ISIL recruits primarily seek a community of like-minded individuals, contemporary scholarship provides frameworks to explain both, while also accounting for the abnormally brutal members of each group. The government-level decision to commit mass killing is best understood in the framework of counterinsurgency strategy, a sub-theory of war-related mass killing literature. ISIL's strategy, however, is tailored to fit goals unique to its status as a radical non-state actor, and is not explained by the same theories as government-sponsored killing. First, ISIL is not bound by the same expectations as an official actor; it aims to profoundly change the norms of everyday life and does not seek legitimation from outside states. Second, non-state actors are able to take advantage of power vacuums

left by civil unrest within a state to accomplish their goals of identity-based cleansing. And finally, ISIL does not need to preserve a civilian population to serve the bureaucratic needs of the country, as it assumes foreign immigrants to the caliphate can replace the dead. Hybridizing literature on terrorism with literature on mass killing may help resolve some of this dissonance, as the two phenomenon are often linked in the 21st century.

It is crucial to identify the factors that enable mass killing on both the macro and individual levels so that concerned peacemakers can address the root causes of conflict, and develop an approach to address similar situations in the future. Until then, those seeking to alleviate the Syrian population's suffering can a) support refugees by lobbying their home governments to accept Syrian immigrants and donating to refugee aid organizations; and b) encourage organizations dedicated to cataloguing human rights abuses for future prosecution.

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Trouble with the Neighbors: The Baltic States' Perspective on Security After the Annexation of Crimea

Girard Bucello IV

The Russian Federation's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula has broad implications beyond Ukraine. This paper assesses the perspective of the three Baltic countries on their security environment after the annexation of Crimea. The research briefly assesses the security history of the three Baltic republics. It then qualitatively analyzes government documents, official statements, and publications by, and interviews with, scholars and policymakers to determine how recent Russian behavior has affected the perspective of the Baltic states, and how they have affected NATO and the EU. This paper finds that, from the perspective of decision-makers in the Baltic states, the annexation of Crimea vindicated those who had expected such behavior. It further determines that the cohesion of the Baltic states has leveraged the EU and NATO to refocus attention on their eastern flank.

INTRODUCTION

The three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia occupy a unique political, cultural, and geographical position in Europe's contemporary security architecture. They represent the frontier of the European security community on the doorstep of Russia, and are currently the only former Soviet republics to accede to the European Union (EU) and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 marked a major shift in Europe's security environment, one that this paper will analyze from the Baltic perspective. The contemporary assessment by the Baltic states of their participation and role in Europe's security architecture is fairly unified. They view NATO as an instrument of collective defense and an alliance of shared values, rather than one forged purely out of military necessity. They share similar views of the EU, which they see as a significant (although less tangible) security dimension that derives from their integration with the rest of the European community of nations, a view not necessarily shared by the other EU member-states, who see mainly economic benefits of membership.¹

The Baltic states are similarly unified in their assessment of Russia's view of geopolitics, and of Russia's general intents in their neighborhood. They see Russia as a state seeking to reconstruct a sphere of influence that encompasses its immediate neighbors—most especially Soviet successor states. They find that Russia believes that NATO threatens its security, a view validated by Russia's annexation of Crimea and ongoing participation in operations in eastern Ukraine. However, Baltic states differ in their assessments is of the gravity of the Russian threat posed to them, and what the

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nature of any such threat may be. These differences in assessments exist both between the three Baltic states and between different factions of each society at the professional and the public level within them.

This paper will qualitatively analyze statements and articles by, and interviews with, scholars and policymakers in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, to ascertain the prevailing views in them towards the European and transatlantic institutions in which they participate, their role in said institutions, and the threat posed by Russia towards those institutions generally and their nations specifically. The paper comprises two sections. The first is an assessment of the European security architecture, which will be further divided into subsections on NATO and on the EU. The second is an assessment of Russian behavior, which will be divided into subsections on Russian intentions and strategy and on how threats from Russia would likely arise.

BALTIC PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

A discussion regarding Baltic perceptions of a potential Russian threat must first examine the security architecture in Europe and analyze the Baltic perspective on institutions of European security and their roles in such institutions. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact at the end of the Cold War left NATO as the guarantor of the security for much of Western and Central Europe and seemingly removed the threat that had dominated European security thinking for over four decades. The alliance also engaged in political and military outreach to non-NATO nations, as well as in collective security functions outside of the European neighborhood. Meanwhile, the establishment of the EU, replacing its predecessor—the European Community—had obvious political and economic benefits much of Europe. More tangible security benefits pertain largely to aspects of internal security through institutions such as the European Police Office (Europol). There is also the European Defence Agency (EDA), tasked with fostering defense cooperation and improvements in and among EU member-states (as well as Norway, a non-EU state which opts into EDA programs).² While the EU does take on certain hard security elements, it does not function as a defensive alliance, though Article 42.7 (referred to as the “Solidarity Clause”) states, “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.”³ This indicates a precedent for collective self-defense and, in turn, underscores the pragmatic benefits to each state inherent in the alliance.

BALTIC PERSPECTIVE ON NATO AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE ALLIANCE

The three Baltic states have major security concerns with regards to Russia. While these concerns are rooted in assessments of Russian intentions, the relative military weakness of the three Baltic states compounds such fears. There are significant gaps between the capabilities that the Baltic states require to defend themselves and those that they actually possess. Therefore, they see one of the key functions of NATO

as a mechanism for filling these capability gaps. Martin Hurt, the deputy director for the International Center for Defence and Security (ICDS) in Tallinn, said,

“You join NATO, and you bring whatever assets you have. It was evident that the Baltic states didn’t have, and would never have, all capabilities, but [...] I think that’s something that goes for every ally. Probably not the U.S., but most of the others have capability gaps for which other allies need to step in and cover them. Thus, that’s the whole essence of NATO. I mean, if everybody were able to defend themselves, then NATO wouldn’t exist.”⁴

Kalev Stoicescu, a research fellow at ICDS, echoed these sentiments, stating that only the nuclear states of the alliance had the military strength to defend themselves independently of NATO and adding that membership in the alliance has enhanced Baltic security beyond what was the states thought attainable throughout the years prior to their accession.⁵ These notions are explicitly stated at the policy-making level, as the defense concepts of all three Baltic States note the importance of NATO’s ability to augment their defense capabilities.⁶ Therefore, is a recognition at an official level that certain capabilities are unobtainable by the Baltic states alone, yet simultaneously are integral to their defenses. It is in this domain that NATO explicitly operates.

Though there are clear hard security implications of NATO membership, the Baltic states also note an ideological and moral dimension to alliance participation. The Estonian National Security Concept of 2010, in discussing the alliance’s enlargement, argues that NATO expansion “has widened the area based on common democratic values, thus reinforcing European security.”⁷ In 2001, the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced a fact sheet promoting NATO accession. In it, the Ministry declared two of its main reasons for seeking membership as Latvia’s European identity and its respect for democracy.⁸ Moreover, the publication argues, “The reason for NATO’s existence is the defence of certain territories and common values—democracy and the market economy. Purely military considerations about which countries are entitled to be ‘defensible’ and which are supposedly ‘indefensible’ should not determine which nations can thereby enjoy the security and stability that NATO membership brings.”⁹

Tempting as it may be to dismiss these statements as pithy comments made only for public consumption, and therefore without policy implications, there is evidence to indicate that these beliefs are held at the decision-making level, and that they motivated Baltic accession to the alliance. Stoicescu contends that shared core values underpin the modern alliance, arguing, “NATO has proven that it is not simply a military alliance, but it is a political alliance too, and it is a bond between that glues the transatlantic community together. Of course, you always have to think of interests. You have to look at risks. But the question of common values is the one that is so important.”¹⁰ Closely linked with these shared values is a shared identity between

the states. Professor Karmo Tüür argues that, in discussing the national identities of the three Baltic countries, “it is not so much about who we, but who we are not. We are not Russia. This comes first.”¹¹ As a result, NATO membership serves to act as a codification of a non-Russian identity. Hurt approached Estonian national identity in a distinct yet parallel way. Rather than frame accession to NATO as an attempt to spurn Russia, he argues, “I think that it was a way of trying to join the Western community [...] I think we wanted to join the democratic club of free countries. That was the purpose.”¹²

While the idea may be phrased in different ways, there is clear evidence that NATO membership for the three Baltic republics springs both from security concerns regarding their Russian neighbor and a view of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian national identities as European. NATO membership both offers security guarantees to the Baltic states that augment their standing defense capabilities and affirms their European history, identity, and heritage. Furthermore, these two concepts are not mutually exclusive. The concept of national sovereignty in all three Baltic states is firmly rooted not only in their security, but also in their national identity. Both factors motivate NATO membership because they both factors are intertwined. The occupation also further entrenched their view of their nations as European, compelling them to seek security by aligning not with their eastern neighbors, but with their western ones. Ideology and security cannot, therefore, be viewed or examined in isolation.

BALTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE EU AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE UNION

The Baltic countries generally accept that membership in NATO was necessarily linked with membership in the EU—that, from a politically and militarily strategic point, to be a member of one organization or the other would be far less effective than to be a member of both. This view of dual membership as essential stems from a recognition that membership in one without the other would result in gaps in security. In discussing the European security community, Boyka Stefanova, a professor of European politics at the University of Texas—San Antonio, writes, “A particular security organisation (NATO) is the main security provider, and in Europe’s case the security institution is not coterminous with the actual network of most transaction flows (the EU).”¹³ To phrase this sentiment differently in order to reflect its nuances, while NATO deals in security, the main advantage of EU membership to the Baltic states is economic, a view that the public in those countries largely shares.¹⁴ This view is common among those with a peripheral interest in and knowledge of the Baltic states’ membership in both groups. Such a view does not, however, fully translate to decision-making levels in those countries.

While the Baltic states undeniably view NATO as a guarantor of their security, they ascribe a security function to the EU as well. However, most see the EU’s security role as less central than that of NATO. Even so, the way the Baltic states (and other states near Russia) view the union is noticeably distinct from Western European views. Hurt observes,

“When other countries join the EU [...] , it’s much about economic growth and so on, to be part of a single market. I think that, if you look at the Baltic states, [...] there was another reason, and that was to become a member of the club so that we could say that we’re together with our neighbors and friends, and we left our enemy behind us. Now, the economic growth and [...] the other benefits from joining the EU are also there, and they’re important, but I think that we also saw a security dimension that many countries had not really seen who want to join the EU—especially, the further you go from Russia, the more you see the other reasons for joining the EU.”¹⁵

The State Defense Concept of Latvia also explicitly references the security functions of the EU through the Solidarity Clause, stating that “the EU for Latvia is an additional instrument for strengthening national security and defense.”¹⁶ Additionally, the Baltic states view the EU as a mechanism for tying together non-NATO states whose security is still intertwined with and integral to that of the Baltic region as a whole—namely, Finland and Sweden.¹⁷ The Baltic states therefore perceive that, in a limited sense, the provision for the common welfare of EU states creates incentives for EU members to enhance the security of other member-states. Additionally, the EU does fill a crucial security role that NATO does not address, but this tends to largely focus on matters that could be classified as internal security—and even here, the Union acts largely in a support role for its member-states.

Despite a view by the Baltic states of a designated security role for the EU, they do not ascribe the same weight to the EU’s perceived security functions as they do to NATO. A number of those at the decision-making level have historically seen EU membership as insufficient to guarantee their security, and it is evident that there is a gap between the rhetoric on the EU’s security role and the value that policymakers in the Baltic states assign it. The reasons behind this stem from the differences in how the security roles of NATO and the EU have manifested themselves. NATO members routinely train and cooperate in preparation for Article V territorial defense missions, something for which there is no analogous EU endeavor.

The Baltic states draw clear distinctions between the benefits of EU membership and participation in NATO, assessing the alliance as the primary guarantor of their security. Their assessment of the EU as an essential aspect of the security of Europe generally—and, by extension, the Baltic region—separates them from their other European counterparts. The confluence of security concerns and shared ideals between member-states motivated the accession of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to the EU just as it motivated their pursuit of NATO membership—indeed, citing shared values as a catalyst for the pursuit of EU membership would appear to be an obvious assertion given the frequent rhetoric of the EU as a project of European common values. There is therefore an overlap in the Baltic states between the perspectives

on EU membership and on participation in NATO; however, as demonstrated, the benefits of EU membership are not seen as interchangeable with or replaceable by the benefits of NATO membership, though the Baltic perspective on the EU's roles differ measurably from the perspectives of their European neighbors.

BALTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

As diverse as the history and domestic politics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are, the three Baltic republics are tied together by the nature of their security environment regarding Russia. In particular, the Baltic states' absorption into the Soviet Union after the Second World War unified the Baltic states in their attitudes on what threatens their nations. Currently, there is generally an agreement at the decision-making levels in the Baltic capitals that Russia has the capacity to threaten all the Baltic republics in isolation, and that Russia's views on the expansion of NATO and the EU foster a paranoid vision of what such an expansion might entail. Whether Russia will ever strike the Baltic states, either overtly or covertly, and what method will be used should it decide to do so, is very much in dispute.

BALTIC PERSPECTIVE ON CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE

Positive characterizations of Russia's motives and mindset by the three Baltic states are sparse; the portrait they paint of their neighbor is one of a paranoid state, engaged in patterns of deceptive and destabilizing behavior. Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves stated that Russia's recent behavior in seeking to block nations—including through the use of force—from freely joining NATO and the EU threatened international principles granting nations a right to choose their alliances.¹⁸ Additionally, he characterized Russia's annexation of Crimea as an Anschluss, evoking the memory of Nazi Germany's annexation of Austria before the outbreak of World War II in Europe, claiming that it was "the proper term for what happened in Crimea."¹⁹ The Lithuanian government has printed and disseminated a preparedness guide, for civilians and military personnel alike, should open conflict arise.²⁰ In speaking about the guide, Lithuanian Defense Minister Juozas Olekas declared that its production was motivated by Russia's behavior, stating, "When Russia started its aggression in Ukraine, our citizens here in Lithuania understood that our neighbor is not friendly."²¹ Even if the Lithuanian government does not see the likelihood of war with Russia as high, the guide still characterizes Russia as a threat to Lithuania. While shying away from the Nazi imagery invoked by Ilves, Hurt argues that there was never a period of time during which the Baltic political leadership entertained the notion of cooperation with Russia, observing, "There was no thinking in the Baltic states that Russia [...] since 1991 is a friendly nation, comparable with Germany and Portugal and Norway and all those other democratic states. For us, what is happening right now is, for sure, not a surprise by any means."²² The consistent and strong distrust of Russia's motives and intentions, especially in the immediate post-Cold War environment, indicates a belief that Russia is intrinsically opposed to cooperation, and is thus unable to do so.

Policymakers in the Baltic tend to view Russia's mindset as paranoid in Moscow's assessment of NATO intentions. This view was explicitly clarified when Putin signed a document designating NATO and its expansion as a threat to Russian security, a designation condemned by the Baltic states and by NATO as a whole.²³ Russia has often characterized the alliance's expansion as a provocation towards Russia, and Putin has used rhetoric that very strongly insinuates that if Russia believes conflict to be inevitable, they will not wait for the beginning of hostilities, but rather will strike first.²⁴ This lack of trust on the part of Russia, combined with a haste to consider worst-case scenarios and a confrontational (if not outright aggressive) foreign policy in its neighborhood, is a trait that many in the Baltic states believe can lead to a dangerous confrontation. It should be noted that the Lithuanian National Security Strategy expresses the need to "seek to enhance mutual trust with the Russian Federation in the field of security,"²⁵ which would appear to undercut the notion of Baltic mistrust of Russia. However, the document was produced prior to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and may simply reference cooperation with Russia for diplomatic purposes.

Closely linked to this characterization of Russia as paranoid is the impression that Russia views itself as mistreated by the West. There is a prevailing belief in the Baltic states that Russia feels itself maligned by NATO and its standing in the world denigrated by western nations. Tüür argues, "Russia actually and really [believes] that they are mistreated, that the West humiliates them—humiliated, at least until now, but now they have real options to fight back, to stand up from their knees."²⁶ There is also a consistent Russian narrative that NATO has, through its policy of enlargement, broken promises made in the immediate post-Cold War aftermath. Mary Elise Sarotte writes, "Russian President Vladimir Putin's aggressive actions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 were fueled in part by his ongoing resentment about what he sees as the West's broken pact over NATO expansion."²⁷ There is evidence, therefore, to support the Baltic states' impression of a Russia that considers itself to be betrayed or otherwise maligned by the West—a consideration that is detached from reality.

VARIED PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATURE OF THE THREAT POSED BY RUSSIA

The unified assessment of Russia's worldview contrasts with the varied opinions on the exact manner a threat against the Baltic states would arise. The distinctions here are not necessarily between the three Baltic republics, but rather within the policymaking ranks of all three states. There is disagreement over whether Russia is likely to come into conflict with any of the Baltic republics at all, and even more so with respect to the manner by which such a conflict might manifest itself. There is also disagreement over what the most likely target for Russia might be—be it Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, or somewhere outside of the Baltic region entirely. Such a varied range of opinions has not yielded a consensus on the likelihood of Russian action against the Baltic states, or what such action would consist of.

POTENTIAL FORMS OF AGGRESSION

Russia's annexation of Crimea made use of what has been referred to as hybrid warfare, characterized by the use of conventional military assets in unconventional manners. In defining the term, Pauli Järvenpää notes that hybrid warfare is not simply the application of military force, or the application of covert methods of coercive force, but rather the application of the two in concert.²⁸ It is understood that Russian soldiers did participate, in some capacity, in the initial actions that spurred the independence referendum. Armed gunmen established roadblocks and positioned themselves at or near critical government and civil infrastructure, significantly undercutting the control of local Ukrainian authorities; many considered these forces to be Russian soldiers without identifying insignia.²⁹ Noting that such a threat could pertain to the Baltic region, Järvenpää argues, "It is important to react quickly and decisively to hybrid threats. Therefore the [Nordic-Baltic-Poland Nine] countries, allied and non-allied alike, would benefit from jointly designing and executing complex 'comprehensive security' or 'total defense' plans that would bring together these countries' civilian and military authorities to work and integrate their separate efforts into a common response plan."³⁰

This is not the only mechanism by which Russia might attack the Baltic states that policymakers in the region fear. Analysts and military planners have openly expressed concerns that Russia may use military exercises as cover for the movement of large numbers of combat-ready forces who might be preparing for combat against the Baltic States. Drills such as these have been a major cause for concern in the Baltic states. Hurt argues that it is rational to predict that Russia would use snap drills as cover for a surprise attack, and does not view the use of hybrid warfare as an option mutually exclusive with the use of a snap drill as cover for a surprise assault, saying, "I wouldn't say that there is option one and option two [...] Both could be used together or independently."³¹ It is evident, therefore, that policymakers in the Baltic consider the aforementioned potential forms of aggression as dangerous in equal measure.

If past actions are any indication of Russian behavior, one must consider the realm of cyberspace—an area in which Russia has threatened many of its neighbors, the Baltic states included. In 2007, after the Estonian government relocated a Soviet-era monument against the wishes of its ethnic Russian population, Estonian websites experienced a crippling attack. The distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, which flooded the target websites with overwhelming requests for information from many malicious servers, hit government, financial, and media websites.³² The crude nature of the attack led many analysts to determine that the Russian government was not at fault.³³ The Estonian government, however, found the Kremlin responsible, citing the fact that Estonian investigators traced the attacks back to locations in Russia with ties to the Putin administration, as well as obstinacy from the Russian Public Prosecutor's Office when Estonia requested legal cooperation on its behalf.³⁴ Even if Putin's administration was not directly responsible for the DDoS operation, the attack still underscored the vulnerability of the Baltic states to an attack if Russia

should decide to carry one out. A year later, the Russo-Georgian War underscored this vulnerability when a wave of cyberattacks directed against Georgia struck critical websites as hostilities were unfolding.³⁵ As in Estonia, Russia denied responsibility. By its nature, cyber warfare allows the Kremlin (or any other aggressor) to have near total deniability for an attack, making retaliation all but impossible.

Russia has also historically used the dependence of its neighbors on natural gas against them, a fact not lost on policymakers in the Baltics. Europe saw a particularly salient example of this in late 2005 and early 2006, when the Russian state-owned company Gazprom accused Ukraine of siphoning natural gas intended for Central and Western Europe and more than quadrupled the price of gas that they had charged Ukraine, from \$50 to \$230 per 1000 cubic meters.³⁶ When Ukraine denied the charges and refused to pay the inflated rates, Gazprom halted shipments of gas to Ukraine—a move that left Ukraine and the rest of Europe without Russian natural gas during a particularly frigid winter.³⁷ Ukraine ultimately had little choice but to accept Gazprom's terms to resume normal imports. It also admitted to siphoning gas shipments not intended for Ukrainian consumption.

Episodes such as the 2006 Ukraine gas crisis underscore the security and political dimensions of energy dependence. Rojas Masiulis, Lithuania's Minister of Energy, stated bluntly in remarks delivered in Washington, D.C., "Energy is being used as a political weapon."³⁸ The Baltic states are especially exposed to disruptions in supply. None of the three Baltic countries have natural gas deposits, and as of 2014, all three import natural gas from Gazprom exclusively.³⁹ An EU-led stress test gauged the ability of member-states to cope with a complete cessation of Russian transport of natural gas. In such an instance, all of the Baltic countries would only be able to cope with the disruption for one week before the crisis would necessitate what the EU report termed non-market measures, or government intervention to mitigate the damage.⁴⁰ Estonia would be among the countries hardest hit: assuming a lack of cooperation among EU member-states to address a shortfall, supplies of natural gas in Estonia would last only five days.⁴¹ The particular vulnerability of the Baltic countries and their complete dependence on Russia for access to natural gas makes the issue of energy security particularly salient, and underscores the dire consequences if Russia chooses to leverage this dependency against the three Baltic states.

POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES

Where there is agreement on how Russia might attack the Baltic states should they choose to do so, the question of if and where they might do so is less clear, even among Baltic policymakers and analysts. A number of analysts consider the greatest vulnerability to lie just south of Lithuania, as the narrowest point between Kaliningrad and Belarus, Russia's ally, crosses roughly 65 kilometers (41 miles) of Polish territory, which would completely separate the Baltic states from their NATO allies.⁴² Both Stoicescu and Ilves, in describing the situation, argues that the stretch of territory connecting Lithuania and Poland "is the new Fulda Gap," referencing the city

of Fulda, West Germany through which a Soviet attack would be most likely during the Cold War.⁴³ Not all share this view, however: Radosław Sikorsky, the former Foreign Minister for Poland, argued that “politics will trump geography” in the case of Kaliningrad due to, among other things, the generally weaker and smaller nature of Lithuania vis-à-vis Poland.⁴⁴ Former Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius agrees, saying, “We are afraid of any kind of possible provocations on transit routes, both railways, or gas pipeline, or electricity transit routes, which can be organized in order to have some type of pretext from Moscow’s side [...] to begin some aggressive actions.”⁴⁵

Others, in examining the threat to the Baltic states, look at the heavy presence of Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia. While a quick assessment of the ethnic composition of the three countries might lead one to conclude that both Latvia and Estonia are more likely to suffer from the sort of hybrid takeover experienced in Crimea, a more cautious assessment of the situation in Latvia and Estonia would yield evidence suggesting that there are differences in opinion among ethnic Russians in both countries. Those in Latvia, for example, are more inclined to be disillusioned with the government in Riga and express greater enthusiasm for Moscow, whereas residents of the Estonian border city of Narva, while they may not consider themselves to be truly Estonian, have developed a unique regional identity and are less sympathetic to the Russian government.⁴⁶ One must note, however, that though Russia may still use the (albeit greatly inflated) grievances of ethnic Russians as a justification for action absent any organic support.

When one does not consider the Baltic states in isolation, there are those who argue that the threat to any of the three republics is very small when compared against threats to Russia’s other neighbors. Tüür argues that there are “easier targets and [...] higher priorities” where Russia would be more likely to focus any application of military force.⁴⁷ Indeed, any threat assessment cannot look at one region in isolation, and must instead consist of a holistic view of the security position both of one’s own country and of one’s potential adversaries. The three Baltic republics engage in such an assessment. While references to potential Russian targets aside from the Baltic states are absent from the stated security and defense policies of the three nations, all state that the likelihood of war is low, but present.⁴⁸ However, as the nature of what threats are most likely to arise, and where, are still debated, at this point, the agreement ends.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Regarding European security architecture and the role of the three Baltic republics in it, they are largely unified. All share the belief that both NATO and the EU serve critical security functions for their respective countries; that NATO, while first and foremost an instrument of collective defense, is an alliance of shared European values and an embodiment of a Euro-Atlantic identity; that NATO has primacy over the EU insofar as which serves as the principal guarantor of their security; and that the EU’s internal security functions fill gaps in the European security architecture left

open by NATO, especially with regards to hybrid warfare tactics. The Baltic states also share an assessment of Russia's worldview, which they characterize as a paranoid, zero-sum vision of the international political environment. Furthermore, they assess this view to be dangerous for their region and for the European security community in general, raising the possibility of conflict, though there are varied assessments of the likelihood of a concrete threat from Russia materializing and, if so, the form such a threat will take.

The cohesion between the three Baltic republics regarding their role in NATO and the EU continues to serve as a solid foundation upon which their relations with both institutions—and with the member-states of which they comprise—can grow. The concurrence of their visions for both organizations strengthens prospects for consensus-building and the political will to be active contributors, rather than passive participants. Similarly, the relative unity in their assessment of Russia's intentions and general security posture guides Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian defense and security planning, fostering cohesion not only among themselves, but also among their NATO allies. There is also generally agreement over the likelihood of a specific Russian threat against the Baltic states: low, yet not absent. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have planned accordingly on the basis of this assessment, ensuring preparedness without needlessly expending resources on their defense where they may be better spent.

Speculation on the specifics of what may comprise a specific threat by Russia against the Baltic states is far more varied. This is not cause for concern on its own, as it fosters a more holistic consideration of what scenarios the three Baltic republics may face. However, if the divergence in opinions leads to a divergence in defense planning—whether the Baltic states' defensive plans differ from each other, or from NATO's as a whole—this will gravely undermine the defensibility of the Baltic region. Further research is required to determine whether the trend in the Baltic states is towards a divergence or a convergence of defense planning. Currently, however, all indications are that the cohesiveness of the three Baltic republics significantly outweighs areas in which they deviate from each other. This, in addition to their healthy and enthusiastic working relationship with both NATO and the EU, offers a positive prognosis for the defense posture of the Baltic states.

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STATE-BUILDING IN SOMALIA: THE CASE FOR LIMITED THIRD PARTY STATE-BUILDING

Daehyun Kim

INTRODUCTION: THE FRAGILE EQUILIBRIUM OF SOMALIA

At the heart of contemporary debates regarding approaches to state-building lies Somalia. While the internationally recognized Federal Government of Somalia took office in 2012, continued infighting and cronyism has fragmented political stability. Democratic mechanisms of power transfer, namely elections, have been undermined by corruption, allowing wealthy businessmen and warlords to control the parliament.¹ The government controls most of Somali territory, but the presence of groups such as al-Shabab and Somali pirates has prevented the federal government from establishing a monopoly on the use of force. Despite efforts by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the unwavering strength of al-Shabab suggests that efforts have only succeeded at displacing, not defeating them.² This forces actors to remain committed to Somalia, as when they withdraw their support, as Ethiopia did by reducing its troop presence in 2016, al-Shabab regains territory.³ Thus, the constant fear of an al-Shabab resurgence has kept AMISOM from withdrawing despite tensions between AMISOM and Somali authorities. In terms of its foreign policy, Somalia is defined by its cooperation with the international community to meet its needs. Despite regional cooperation to combat al-Shabab, Somalia struggles to become a part of regional communities such as the East African Community due to requirements for economic reforms. Although the southern Somalia is most often cited for its instability, political problems persist in the north as well. Puntland faces many of the same institutional deficiencies as Somalia due to its focus on the peace process.

While political state-building has taken precedence over economic policy, economic conditions in Somalia have been gradually improving and reforms are underway. However, many of these changes face large hurdles and remain vulnerable to shocks. Weak institutional capacity has hampered the effectiveness of technical assistance from international actors, and the issue of fiscal federalism remains volatile as disagreements arise from various parties. Fiscal and monetary reforms are essential to economic recovery but the slow, fragile transition threatens to ruin the progress made in development so far. Instability has threatened key transport routes and created uncertainty, deterring investment. For example, Somali piracy has created economic hubs centered around illegal commerce which lack the infrastructure to successfully contribute to the Somali economy. The criminal economy has crowded-out legitimate businesses and empowered warlords, further weakening the prospects for institutional

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change.⁴ Additionally, the lack of coping strategies has left the Somali economy vulnerable to shocks due to weather. The impact of weather is particularly devastating due to its effects on the Somali livestock industry which employs over half of Somalia's population and generates 80% of its foreign-exchange receipts.⁵ Other sectors, such as the services sector, have the potential to become economic drivers, but they will require investment and a resolution of political disputes.

To address the issue of Somali state-building, this paper will utilize the concepts of third party state-building and shared sovereignty and apply such concepts to Somalia by comparing them to historical forms of governance in Somalia. This paper concludes that while third party state-building offers a promising way to revive the Somali state, such a measure requires building loyalty and legitimacy, or nation-building, within Somalia first. Alternatively, a third party could take control through full executive authority to resolve the political obstacles posed by local actors. However, this measure is unlikely to produce a sustainable state in Somalia, and given the legacy of intervention tainted by colonialism, should be viewed with skepticism. While third party state-building may be a useful tool to engage Somali institutions, such an approach requires a deeper understanding of Somali nationalism and traditional institutions and will need to be limited in scope. This paper will begin by presenting a brief history of Somalia and the Somali Civil War to illuminate the conditions that enabled the present situation to manifest. Then, it will introduce the concepts of third party state-building and shared sovereignty and trace their application in recent history. After an application of these concepts to Somalia, this paper will explore the possibility of statelessness as an alternative, ultimately concluding that despite the risk of colonialism, a limited version of third party state-building and shared sovereignty can be of assistance to the project of Somali reconstruction.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE FAILED COLONIAL STATE

The character of Somali national identity stands out from other African identities. Whereas most African states attempt to create a national identity from diverse ethnic groups inside their boundaries, Somalia has essentially one nationality and the Somali population shares an identity with Somalis in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. The Somali cultural identity is a product of a common language (Somali, albeit with regional variations), a belief in common ancestors, shared historical experiences, an Islamic heritage, occupation of a common territory and a pastoral lifestyle.⁶ Much of the history of the Somali national identity is not well known due to colonial scholars' preoccupation with political and territorial matters over underlying cultural processes. Additionally, despite the 2500-year long occupation of Somali-speakers on the Horn of Africa, their nomadic lifestyle meant that permanent settlements and artifacts have been difficult to find. The absence of a centralized government also made written records or official documents from pre-colonial Somalia rare. Despite the lack of a state, Somali tribes resolved disputes through a common law system based on kinship ties and Islamic law (qanoon). While clan differences existed, communitarian kin ties

maintained Somali civil society, or a moral commonwealth (*umma*), and prevented a total fracturing of society as some accounts might suggest. Precolonial mechanisms for sustaining civil society may be useful as the Somali people attempt to rediscover their national identity and mend the tears that colonialism has created in the social fabric.

The development of colonial relationships accentuated clan differences and fragmented Somali national identity. The unequal distribution of the benefits of trade to Somalia combined with the zero-sum nature of Somali clan power competition allowed colonial regimes to exploit tensions between groups to strengthen their foothold in Somalia. The Treaty of Berlin in 1884 triggered a scramble for Africa that was particularly devastating for Somali society. For brevity, the most prominent agents of colonialism in Somalia were Britain, France and Italy. As a result of the efforts of the Somali Youth League (SYL) and the Somali National League (SNL), British Somaliland and Southern Somalia (under Italy) united to form the first Somali Republic on July 1, 1960.⁷

The period of the Somali Republic was littered with various problems. Somalis viewed the state with suspicion and rebelled against the leadership. National institutions were violated and economic downturns eventually culminated in the assassination of President Sharmarke in 1979 and the military coup that followed. Upon seizing power, Siad Barre, the leader of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), crushed political activity and organization by eliminating the constitution, the Supreme Court and the National Assembly. After Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden War, the Somali political sphere turned inwards as the regime heavily favored clans of Siad Barre's family. The combination of ecological degradation, internal strife and a failing economy raised defiance to the regime, eventually resulting in the ousting of Siad Barre in 1991. The end of Siad Barre's regime marked the escalation of the Somali Civil War as armed factions began competing to fill the power vacuum left by Siad Barre. While the north remained relatively peaceful, Mogadishu and the south devolved into chaos. The displacement of farmers in the Jubba Valley created the conditions for the devastating famine in 1992 which killed approximately 300,000 Somalis. Ultimately, the inability of farmers to generate strong local institutions created an overdependence on militias for security. Thus, the farmers' lack of military training enabled warlords to loot the farmers, a pattern of activity that continued with the increase in international intervention.

The United Nations Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM) was launched as a response to the famine, yet it ended up exacerbating many of the problems it aimed to solve. International food aid competed with producers in the Jubba Valley, the very farmers suffering the brunt of the famine. Additionally, failure to loosen the grip of warlords on farmers led to aid being appropriated by the warlords to maintain their control. As UN troops entered Somalia, the violence escalated, most notably when the UN held General Aideed responsible for the ambush of 23 Pakistani UN troops. The violence continued after UN forces left in 1995, yet some regions in Somalia began to find methods to mitigate the chaos in their communities, such as the usage of Islamic

law (sharia) in tribunals to settle disputes. The Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed in 2000 to help guide Somalia to another republican government. In 2008, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) signed an agreement for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. This marked the formation of a coalition government, which began its campaign to regain control of southern Somalia in 2009. As the TFG's interim period ended on August 20, 2012, the current Federal Government of Somalia was established as a permanent central government in accordance to the Roadmap for the End of Transition, a UN-backed agreement providing milestones for the creation of democratic institutions.

ORIGINS OF THIRD PARTY STATE-BUILDING AND SHARED SOVEREIGNTY

Third party state-building has been discussed by scholars as an alternative to traditional, indigenous state-building. The distinctive features of third party state-building are the scope of international administration in governmental functions and international authority over these functions.⁸ Third party state-building is more political in nature, as it is intrinsically tied to issues such as election design, education reform and currency systems. While traditional forms of intervention, such as peace support, have deliberately avoided the controversy tied with direct political engagement, third party state-building must inevitably address political issues, as was the case in Bosnia.

Third party state-building is a relatively recent phenomenon, with its earliest roots being the strengthening of territories by colonial powers to prepare for the transfer of sovereignty.⁹ Since 1995, there have been four cases of third party state-building: Eastern Slavonia (now part of Croatia), Kosovo, East Timor, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The recentness of third party state-building may be explained by contemporary trends that have shifted state-building away from traditional, internally-focused processes. Historically, states have needed strong internal institutions to raise revenue and obtain military power. Due to historical processes, such as war, that determined the survival of states, states that were not internally sound were often destroyed and replaced by ones that were.¹⁰ In the contemporary era, borders have been constructed around the world and the state has become the dominant political form, causing states to worry less about external threats destroying their borders. The rise of the United States post-WWII increased globalization and the decentralization of finance and capital, altering the links between war-making and state-building and shifting trends towards state-building based on external support.¹¹ Due to these trends, even weaker and smaller states could garner sufficient international support to sustain themselves. Post 1950, foreign aid boomed to unprecedented levels due to the interests of donor countries and belief in a just international order.¹² These factors combined have created the conditions for third party state-building and what Krasner calls "shared sovereignty."¹³

Like third-party state-building, shared sovereignty involves an agreement be-

tween domestic political authorities and an external actor to cooperate on various issues. Krasner argues that shared sovereignty could improve governance by encouraging the creation of new political structures that check abuse of power by factions in power and by allowing political candidates to align themselves with better governance. In countries where predation by officials is a barrier to development, shared sovereignty could serve to deter actors from breaking the equilibrium. A historical example of shared sovereignty is the relationship between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) powers and West Germany to protect Western Europe during the Cold War. NATO maintained jurisdiction of their forces in Germany while Germany was allowed to arm itself. The Convention on Relations gave western allies a right to resume their occupation until the Bonn Agreements were terminated in 1990 by the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. This gradual shift towards self-governance provides an example of how shared sovereignty can avoid creating overdependence on external assistance. Per Krasner, the reason for the success of shared sovereignty in the case of West Germany was the support for democracy and a market economy amongst Germans.¹⁴ A more contemporary and relevant example is found in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone made a deal with the UN in 2002 to create a special court to try war crimes and crimes against humanity. The court was appointed by the UN and took precedence over national courts. The Sierra Leone case provides an example of how external actors can provide assistance in a targeted area of governance countries ravaged by internal warfare. By having the UN appoint the court's judges, the 2002 agreement gave legitimacy to the court in the view of the citizens of Sierra Leone. In both the West Germany and Sierra Leone cases, shared sovereignty was utilized to supplement the recipient country's inability to sustain or defend itself. Despite the theoretical potential of shared sovereignty and third party state-building, most cases of state failure involve complex dynamics between competing factions that limit the ability of shared sovereignty and third party state-building to effectuate reform. A clearer diagnosis of the potential benefits and limitations of these concepts in the Somali context requires an analysis of social, political and economic dynamics in Somalia.

APPLICATION: REBUILDING SOMALIA

As described above, the complex dynamics between competing factions in Somalia make the application of third party state-building and shared sovereignty a difficult project. Aside from major political parties, there are various marginalized groups that can play a larger role in determining the future of Somali development. For example, pastoralists, traders, women and farmers have the potential to engage in community-based projects to rebuild institutions at a local level. By using mechanisms such as increasing community participation on institutional needs, development and state formation can occur "starting from the bottom."¹⁵ While statelessness will be discussed in further detail later, this kind of community participation can also serve as a valuable supplement to approaches such as third party state-building and

shared sovereignty. The strengthening of local institutions could bolster Somali federalism and prevent a central government from treating the highly heterogeneous regions of Somalia as if they were the same. Of course, it is unlikely that the strengthening of local institutions will revive all clan traditions and ancestral customs since many of these have disappeared. Many of these systems, such as the caste system, were based on social exclusions that are most likely undesirable in modern Somali society. Thus, although there is a need to revive Somali nationalism, communities must be careful about which aspects of their historical identity they choose to contribute to the larger projects of nation and state-building.

Strong local institutions may also result in more representative political systems. For example, Mohamed discusses the possibility of a head of state that is primarily responsible for foreign affairs and has a limited domestic role.¹⁶ Domestic matters could be determined mainly by an assembly of representatives from different clans and regions. Of course, the effectiveness of such a system would depend on the Somali population's willingness to adopt representative democracy. An adapted solution would be for Somalia to develop a democracy born out of its own culture, rather than to copy a style of democracy based on European states. Such a political system would emphasize the restoration of moral values which have been replaced by genealogical clan bonds (*xigaalo*) and individualism. The historical failure of Somali states, ranging from the liberal politics of the Republic of Somalia to the military regime, shows that absent adaptation to Somalia's customs and peoples, political systems are bound to fail. Part of this project is an understanding of the fluidity of Somali identity. Traditional clan and tribal theories were built on *xigaalo* but staticized social organization by removing *xigaalo* from its social and legal context. Thus, a more effective form of democracy must incorporate an understanding of *xigaalo* as a dynamic system, constantly evolving and being recomposed to incorporate the wide range of differences in Somali identity.

The importance of Somali public opinion in determining the outcome of policies such as third party state-building makes understanding it a priority for international policymakers, or as Caplan puts it, "loyalty before guns."¹⁷ Understanding Somali public opinion, however, presents its own set of complex problems. First, public opinion data is scarce, and the credibility of polling mechanisms remains dubious due to the low participation rate of important social groups, such as women. Additionally, the importance of public opinion relative to the stances of political leaders is questionable. On one hand, political leaders are often able to shape public opinion and enact policy changes. However, absent genuine public support for institutional change, third party state-building would likely continue the legacy of failed intervention in Somalia. To complicate the matter further, intervention is most likely inevitable in Somalia. The presence of peacekeepers, foreign aid, and new actors such as the Gulf states and Turkey suggest that even if nations that are currently invested in Somalia withdraw their support, other actors will be there to fill in.¹⁸ Additionally, the combination of international humanitarian norms and the presence of terrorist groups

in Somalia will continue to keep nations invested in Somalia. Thus, the question for intervening actors becomes how they adapt their intervention to address the specificities of Somalia's complex situation.

While the Somali public's opinion on intervention has generally been negative, there are specific areas where there have been signs of public support. According to a Voice of America poll, Somalians exhibit strong support for the incorporation of Sharia Law into civil and legal code.¹⁹ The poll also revealed support for a strong central government balanced with more robust regional governments. Additionally, the Somali people are likely to support salaries for government forces that have received external training. This would prevent defection, improve morale and encourage armed forces to respond to civilians, rather than just their clan commanders.²⁰ This reform would likely contribute towards reducing warlords' ability to exploit civilians and international aid by creating loyalty to the Somali civilian base, instead of specific factions. By catering to specific areas where Somali support for reform exists, external actors may find a fruitful chance to engage in limited, targeted instances of third party state-building. Limiting third party state-building to specific areas instead of adopting it as part of a sweeping reform agenda may help policymakers avoid what scholars refer to as the "nirvana fallacy," the tendency to compare the status quo to an ideal state in favor of consideration of relevant alternatives that are realistically available.²¹

Before discussing the areas of Somali society where third party state-building could have an impact, it is important to address the Promethean dilemma as well as the three questions that Darden and Mylonas pose as prerequisites to effective engagement.²² The Promethean dilemma asks how an external actor can transfer organizational capacity to a local population without those capabilities being used to undermine efforts to establish stable governance. Current international aid falls prey to this problem, as mentioned in the discussion of warlords and their ability to seize aid for themselves. In response to the Promethean dilemma, Darden and Mylonas suggest third party state-building as the final step of a broader nation-building strategy. They propose building loyalty through education and indoctrination to resolve the threat of the receiving country from utilizing capabilities against the donor country. However, the Somali situation presents an additional challenge: the ability of warlords to use those capabilities against civilians. Thus, efforts to gain the loyalty of the Somali people cannot occur separately from the strengthening of local institutions and Somali identity to protect civilians from warlords and political infighting. While education and indoctrination may be useful in some instances, such as in campaigns to deter civilians from joining pirate and terrorist groups, they can also become tools of colonial domination when taken too far. Thus, it may be safer to adapt third party state-building to Somali identity, rather than attempting to build Somali support for policies that have historically received negative feedback in Somalia.

Responding fully to Darden and Mylonas' three questions requires a careful analysis of international dynamics and relations with Somalia which exceeds the scope of this paper. Their second question regarding the structure of the international en-

vironment is highly dependent on the stances of great powers and the global balance of power and is thus not discussed in this paper, as the debate over the trajectory of US hegemony is too expansive to cover appropriately in this paper. In regards to their first question, the agent of nation-building, external actors must play a limited role in this process. While they may assist in implementation of reforms or development of local capacity, the Somali people must find a way to reclaim their nationalism and culture without being indoctrinated by foreign powers. When intervention is appropriate, efforts led by groups with legitimacy, such as the UN, may be able to avoid the interference from other parties that a unilateral approach by a regional power might face. More importantly, assistance from groups perceived as legitimate is more likely to receive support from local populations. The third question, regarding the characteristics of the local population, deals heavily with the current fractures and possibilities for unification in Somali society, which has been discussed above.

After policymakers determine that Somalia has met the conditions for third party state-building, it is important to discuss the areas in which this strategy will prove most effective. While a discussion of the specific implementation of third party state-building and shared sovereignty in different areas of Somali politics and economics cannot be covered comprehensively in this paper, I will discuss the potential of third party state-building and shared sovereignty in monetary policy and election reforms, two areas that are crucial in determining the future of Somalia.

Monetary policy is an area where external actors may offer valuable assistance. Somali history suggests that a successful banking system will require an independent central bank institution. While private banks may be able to provide confidence, they cannot effectively guarantee sustained development due to their volatility.²³ Currently, the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) has little influence over money supply or exchange rate, and most transactions are made with US dollars or counterfeit shillings.²⁴ Currency reform is an essential part of monetary policy reform, yet it presents many challenges. Corrupt networks that control the counterfeit market will be difficult to dismantle, and the central banks of Somaliland and Puntland (currently functioning as treasurers for their respective regions) will need to have their monetary responsibilities redefined if the CBS attempts to establish monetary control. In this area, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can provide legitimacy to currency reform efforts and appointments to leadership roles in the central bank.²⁵ The IMF could sign a contract with Somalia to negotiate cooperation on monetary policy until both parties decide to terminate the agreement. This setup would generate domestic support if it succeeds in controlling inflation, and would avoid being costly to the external actors involved.

Elections are another area where third party state-building has the potential to assist Somalia. National elections in Somalia since the establishment the Federal Government of Somalia in 2012 have suffered from insecurity and lack of government control.²⁶ While external actors can provide assistance in shaping democratic processes and providing credibility to elections, the more important benefit of external assistance in elections is its appeal to the target country. For example, candidates in Somali

elections may use shared sovereignty contracts to symbolize a break from a past of corruption and to win the faith of voters. Additionally, shared sovereignty agreements for elections may reassure competing political leaders more than an election process run by a government agency prone to corruption by one of the involved parties.²⁷ Therefore, the actual form of democracy can be determined through local processes and incorporate Somali identity while external actors give credibility to candidates that commit themselves to democracy.

While elections and monetary policy are two of the most significant issues that will determine the trajectory of Somalia, there are other areas where third party state-building may be helpful or even necessary for development. For example, the Somali Civil War severely damaged the health sector. Due to the destruction of basic infrastructure necessary for a revival of the health sector, external assistance may help to fund initial efforts to revive the sector.²⁸ Menkhaus argues that whatever application of third party state-building occurs in Somalia, the process will likely be very slow and difficult due to spoilers, as will be discussed in the section on statelessness.²⁹ Therefore, external actors would do well by playing Somalia's strengths and assisting in areas where Somalia cannot grow on its own. For example, Somalia's business elite have the potential to determine the fate of the Somali economy. By productively engaging this class, external powers could stabilize Somalia's economy. This framework would also entail careful consideration of the effects of international actions on ongoing processes in Somalia. For example, the recognition of Somaliland has been proposed to secure political stability. However, such recognition could easily disrupt the balance of power between the executive branch and the legislature as well as Somaliland's movements for democratization.³⁰ To apply third party state-building and shared sovereignty effectively in Somalia, policymakers must ensure that they are not interrupting processes that have driven the progress made in Somalia up until today.

STATELESSNESS

While most of the literature compares potential methods of state-building in Somalia, some scholars have attacked the foundational assumption that Somalia needs to be a state in the first place. Leeson, for example, finds that anarchy has been net beneficial for Somali development.³¹ Using data from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, he finds that life expectancy, access to health facilities, access to sanitation, and the presence of communications technology have unambiguously increased under anarchy, while poverty, infant mortality, maternal mortality and fatalities due to measles have dropped. Leeson's findings, however, should not be taken as a dismissal of the potential of state-building in Somalia. Although he finds that statelessness is preferable to the Somali central government, this does not necessarily indict new forms of governance that can arise. Rather, his conclusion suggests that it is more productive to examine the causes of the fragile equilibrium between competing factions and evaluate the effects of policy proposals on this balance.

As mentioned in the introduction, there are a variety of competing factions that maintain the uneasy equilibrium of the status quo. The major parties in Somalia are the Somali Restoration and Reconciliations Council (SRRC), the National Salvation Council (NSC), the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, al-Shabab, and various local administrations. Many of these parties fit the definition of spoilers, “actors who ‘actively seek to hinder, delay, or undermine conflict settlement.’”³² An analysis of these spoilers and their motivations sheds some light on the failure of Somali state-building efforts. The more protracted the condition of statelessness is, the more difficult it is to revive the Somali state. Additionally, the adaptation of local actors to the condition of state collapse reduces their incentives to revive the state. Thus, it is important to target the interests of a wide range of local actors when engaging in Somali state-building.

While it is certainly true anarchic arguments assume that the status quo is worse than the alternative, this paper argues that the status quo is fundamentally unsustainable and that third-party state-building should be explored as a tool to resolve some of the issues preventing institutional change in Somalia. One of these issues that third party state-building could offer a solution to is the problem of power-sharing. Past interventions that attempted to use power-sharing accords have proven ineffective due to their failure in addressing the perceived zero-sum nature of state control. Somalia’s tax base also remains weak, as foreign aid has created dependency and reduced the incentive for the leaders to govern effectively. This suggests that absent major fiscal and monetary policy reforms, a new Somali state will be limited in its scope and authority. Third party state-building offers a way to break through some of these limitations by providing assistance for structural reforms. While some of the problems in the status quo limit the extent to which third party state-building can be implemented, third party state-building can remove barriers to reforms which may further facilitate both internal and external state-building efforts, as discussed in the Applications section.

Another important factor in the debate regarding Somali statelessness is the effect orientation has on autonomy movements and their institutional stability. Between Puntland and Somaliland, Somaliland has been more successful in its transition to autonomy. Puntland’s involvement in military conflicts has pushed reform and democratization down on the agenda. However, Puntland’s relative institutional weakness is, at the root, a result of its orientation towards the central government.³³ Puntland’s prioritization of participation in the Somali peace process has made power-sharing and elections more difficult. The lack of effective power-sharing mechanisms has maintained armed struggle as the primary means of obtaining central power. On the other hand, Somaliland’s relative lack of a coherent center of governance has driven power-sharing to occur at a lower level. The resulting inter-clan cooperation has made self-governance more effective in Somaliland than in Puntland. While this result may initially seem to align with Leeson’s argument that relative statelessness is preferable to an orientation towards a central government, Dill’s findings can inform state-building efforts. Orientation towards a central government in Puntland failed due to the

dysfunctional nature of the center. Thus, an analysis of the merits of autonomy must incorporate a discussion of the effectiveness of the central government in upholding self-governance. The potential of third party state-building to reform power-sharing mechanisms suggests that such a proposal could resolve the issues present in the case of Puntland. Rather, Puntland's actions committing itself to a central government align well with the mechanisms of shared sovereignty. Shared sovereignty could realistically assist in Puntland's development of an effective, constrained central government through small, gradual reforms. Attempting to construct a strong central government quickly and hoping for the international community to abandon intervention in Somalia and to facilitate a return to statelessness are two sides of the same romantic coin. Both of these options suffer from the nirvana fallacy discussed above. Although statelessness may have existed successfully in the past, growing levels of international intervention promise to interrupt political and economic processes in Somalia regardless of what type of governance it chooses to adopt.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND IMPLICATIONS: THE SHADOW OF COLONIALISM

While scholarship regarding the theories of third party state-building and shared sovereignty combined with policy reports on the political and economic conditions in Somalia may present a compelling case for external influence, it is crucial to insert an analysis of Somali history into normative work and policy-making. Under the backdrop of failed state-building and intervention efforts, scholars must be highly skeptical of seemingly sound proposals such as third party state-building and shared sovereignty. For example, if scholarship on Somalia concludes that third party state-building would be feasible and beneficial for Somalia, but the Somali population rejects the proposal, at what point do external actors decide that their interests outweigh the Somali opinion? While seemingly respecting Somali sovereignty, international actors may use increasingly coercive methods or create justifications to produce favorable conditions for intervention. Rather than being limited to the implementation of policy, colonialism manifests itself in the scholarship that supports interventionist policies. For example, many of the policy reports that cite the need for 'sharing of ideas' and 'technical assistance' to developing countries sanitize the language of development and legitimize continuation of colonial relationships.³⁴ The usage of ahistorical and racialized metaphors is particularly prone in the case of Somalia, where scholarship frequently characterizes Somalia slipping towards collapse, tottering on the brink and collapsing. Additionally, reliance on "official" colonial documents to construct accounts of Somali development erases the Somali voice from history. Prominent scholars in the field, such as I.M. Lewis, have often relied too heavily on documents from Italian officials during the Italian colonial administration and deliberately ignored Somali records.³⁵ This selective usage of literature has been used by supporters of Italian colonialism to conceal violent acts of land grabbing by denying the land rights claims of indigenous farmers. Other scholars often mistakenly generalize field work in a certain region of Somalia to make broader claims about the

Somali economy. Part of the reason behind this may be the drive of editors to produce more relevant and generalized conclusions, which forces authors to extrapolate their highly-specific research and make overly broad generalizations.

Although engaging in these frameworks of literature and language may appear to be tangentially related to the implementation of policy, such engagement is necessarily political. The historical record proves that, absent a thorough engagement with indigenous frameworks, liberal-democratic efforts could establish the conditions for long-term exploitation and genocide.³⁶ Attempts to instill democratic structures and the rule of law in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor have resulted in varying degrees of failure, ranging from a lack of internalized reform to the collapse of the liberal state in East Timor in 2006. While the case of Somalia is different, as the government may be more welcoming to a third party and ethnic divisions do not run as deep as they did in Bosnia and Kosovo, these cases illustrate an important point: theories in the abstract may be sound, but attempting to impose state-building without consideration of indigenous standards, preferences, and capacities can worsen the situation. In the case of Somalia, it is apparent that international aid has failed to remove warlords' abilities to externalize the costs of their endeavors on civilian populations. Thus, warlords free ride on aid and strengthen their political positions, making institutional reform more difficult. Incorporating indigenous frameworks into third party state-building is a difficult task, and the exclusion of Somali voices from the decision-making process is a complex issue. Additionally, this paper does not fully escape the trap of using scholarship that may support or use the language of the colonial legacy. However, by stressing the need for careful literature review and engagement with discursive political frameworks in Somalia, this paper hopes to illuminate a path for international cooperation which accommodates Somali agency in reconstruction efforts.

CONCLUSIONS

The status quo promises no sustainable future for Somalia. Absent an effective state to keep local factions in check, foreign aid will continue to be appropriated by warlords to maintain control of their localities. Ending the ability of warlords to exploit civilian populations via reform is the only viable solution due to the seemingly inevitable nature of foreign intervention in Somalia. While statelessness has managed to improve development and generate cooperation between competing factions, such a condition is unsustainable and leaves Somalia vulnerable to economic and political shocks. Even if a stateless Somalia gained the support of the US and other powers, regional governments would strive to intervene in hopes of addressing humanitarian norms and the threat of terrorism. Despite the lengthy, durable commitment that third party state-building requires, it may offer a way to stabilize Somalia and check the ability of warlords externalize costs upon civilians. Of course, third party state-building is no silver bullet to the deep, structural problems that Somalia faces. Implementation of third party state-building is also highly dependent on the result of current events and reforms in Somalia, making much of the potential analysis prone

to becoming outdated. However, the analysis stressing the need for thorough consideration of Somali identity will remain relevant, as the project of nation-building will span generations. It is important for Somalia and the international community to target specific areas of the state that can benefit from or require external assistance, such as monetary policy and election reform. While the scope of these reforms may appear narrow, these reforms are necessary to open up spaces in Somali society for further nation-building and state-building which will facilitate cooperative relationships while avoiding the trap of overdependence. If international actors can shift their policy focus from providing aid to engaging Somalia in cooperative forms of state-building constructed on Somalian identity and history, Somalia may find itself well positioned to start down the path of reform and state revival.

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