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Published on Leave a comment on Diversifying the Workforce, Then and Now

Do you remember what you were doing ten years ago today? Larry Summers was at the NBER, making some remarks as president of Harvard University at a conference on "Diversifying the Science and Engineering Workforce." Those remarks, widely misunderstood in real time and even today, are posted here. Larry lays out his thesis in the second paragraph:

There are three broad hypotheses about the sources of the very substantial disparities that this conference's papers document and have been documented before with respect to the presence of women in high-end scientific professions. One is what I would call the-I'll explain each of these in a few moments and comment on how important I think they are-the first is what I call the high-powered job hypothesis. The second is what I would call different availability of aptitude at the high end, and the third is what I would call different socialization and patterns of discrimination in a search. And in my own view, their importance probably ranks in exactly the order that I just described.

It was the second hypothesis that got Larry into so much trouble. Later in his remarks, he was making a point that is illustrated by the following picture:

The point he made was that if you have two distributions of ability with the same mean but with different variances, then if you look at the extreme tails of the distribution -- here, the ability required to compete for a position in the most selective academic departments -- even a slight decrease in variance will result in a vast under representation of the less variable group. (In the picture above, imagine drawing a vertical line right where the arrow from s2 is placed -- no members from the first group are above that ability level.) Larry's second hypothesis was that the variance of the distribution of female ability was less than that of males. Suggesting in the paragraph quoted above that this had more to do with observed under representation of women in academia than his third hypothesis -- more conventional discriminatory behavior within the professions -- is likely what started the trouble stemming from the remarks. (I blogged about them ten years ago here.)

The broader issues to which Larry was speaking have not gone away.  Ignoring the statistical point in Larry's second hypothesis, his first hypothesis focused on factors that don't favor women that exist across society -- that within households, given current laws and regulations, women tend not to get the same support as men to pursue high-powered careers. The third hypothesis focused on factors that don't favor women that exist within a given profession. On this third hypothesis, my own field of economics is in the midst of some constructive reflection. Some good examples are pieces by Noah Smith in Bloomberg View in November, "Economics Is a Dismal Science for Women," and by Miles Kimball and an anonymous female co-author in Quartz earlier this month, "How Big is the Sexism Problem in Economics?"

Noah, who blogs at Noahpinion, refers to a recent article in Psychological Science in the Public Interest that draws the following conclusions about most math-intensive fields:

We conclude by suggesting that although in the past, gender discrimination was an important cause of women’s underrepresentation in scientific academic careers, this claim has continued to be invoked after it has ceased being a valid cause of women’s underrepresentation in math-intensive fields. Consequently, current barriers to women’s full participation in mathematically intensive academic science fields are rooted in pre-college factors and the subsequent likelihood of majoring in these fields, and future research should focus on these barriers rather than misdirecting attention toward historical barriers that no longer account for women’s underrepresentation in academic science.

However, the paper notes that Economics remains an outlier in a few respects, including promotion and compensation.

Miles, who blogs at Confessions of a Supply Side Liberal, goes on to provide a list of the various, sometimes subtle ways, the path to the top of the profession in economics is still steeper and rockier for women compared to men. I don't think there is a mindset within economics that is unfavorable to women. But a neutral mindset does not always lead to neutral behavior, and as a profession, this is an issue that we should all take seriously.

Published on Leave a comment on Insurance for the Nation’s Health

Mark McClellan will be on campus tomorrow to deliver the Rockefeller Center's first lecture in a series commemorating the 100th birthday of Nelson Rockefeller. (Read more here.) Mark's will lecture on "Universal Health Care," a topic that Governor Rockefeller championed more than four decades ago and that remains a leading policy issue today.

In doing some research for the event, I came across this Nixon-era article in Time magazine from May 11, 1970. Here's the big finish:

While every American may be entitled to at least adequate health care, he is not getting it, and will not, until a momentous national debate reaches election-year levels of acrimony and is somehow resolved.

The issue has already been injected into this year's elections by Democrat Theodore C. Sorensen, campaigning for the U.S. Senate from New York, who last week announced his own plan for "universal health insurance." Apart from such standpatters as the A.M.A. and its arch-conservative Republican allies, there is a growing consensus that some national insurance blanket must be thrown over the ailing body of health care.

It may prove to be more of a patchwork quilt, with multicolored squares for sections covered by contracts with a variety of private insurers. If administration is not made too cumbersome, that would be far better than the present non-system with its huge gaps. Walter McNerney, president of the Blue Cross Association and head of a task force soon to report to the President on the nation's health needs, believes that a monolithic system operated by HEW would be wildly inflationary—and not sufficiently innovative. He wants a flexible, pluralistic plan.

But when? The principal difference between proponents of progress is over whether to put the cart of medical-care delivery before the horse of manpower resources, and let the resources catch up with the overburdened cart—or to take the time to breed more medical horses. That means waiting years for the country's health education system to produce many thousands more doctors and tens of thousands more paramedical personnel. Secretary [of Health, Education, and Welfare Robert H.] Finch sincerely believes that the modest expansions of federal health programs that he has submitted to Congress are important steps in the right direction, but will not commit himself to true national insurance. His chief assistant for health affairs, Under Secretary Roger O. Egeberg, thinks that some such plan may very well evolve in "six to seven years." His prognosis is as good as any.

Read the whole thing, to get an idea of what has changed and what has remained the same in this debate, and be sure to stop by Mark's talk tomorrow evening if you are on or near campus.

Published on Leave a comment on The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2007

Shorter version: Leo Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, and Roger Myerson share the Nobel Prize in Economics this year for "having laid the foundations of mechanism design." Here's more:

Adam Smith's classical metaphor of the invisible hand refers to how the market, under ideal conditions, ensures an efficient allocation of scarce resources. But in practice conditions are usually not ideal; for example, competition is not completely free, consumers are not perfectly informed and privately desirable production and consumption may generate social costs and benefits. Furthermore, many transactions do not take place in open markets but within firms, in bargaining between individuals or interest groups and under a host of other institutional arrangements. How well do different such institutions, or allocation mechanisms, perform? What is the optimal mechanism to reach a certain goal, such as social welfare or private profit? Is government regulation called for, and if so, how is it best designed?

These questions are difficult, particularly since information about individual preferences and available production technologies is usually dispersed among many actors who may use their private information to further their own interests. Mechanism design theory, initiated by Leonid Hurwicz and further developed by Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, has greatly enhanced our understanding of the properties of optimal allocation mechanisms in such situations, accounting for individuals' incentives and private information. The theory allows us to distinguish situations in which markets work well from those in which they do not. It has helped economists identify efficient trading mechanisms, regulation schemes and voting procedures. Today, mechanism design theory plays a central role in many areas of economics and parts of political science.

Congratulations to all three. Here's the official word.

Published on Leave a comment on Conservatives in Academia

Some recent remarks by Larry Summers (reported here) about the dearth of ideological diversity on university campuses have prompted a number of posts at my usual blog reads, George Borjas and Greg Mankiw among them.

Here's what was reported about Summers:

Noting that he had served in the Clinton administration, Summers said he identified strongly as a liberal and a Democrat, but that while in Washington he viewed himself as being on “the right half of the left,” in Cambridge, he landed “on the right half of the right.”

In advance of the symposium, Summers ran some numbers from the study. He focused on elite graduate universities and on what he defined as core disciplines for undergraduate education (excluding health professions, for example). When conducting such an analysis, Summers said, he found “even less ideological diversity” than he thought he would, and that in the humanities and social sciences, Republicans are “the third group,” after Democrats and Nader and other left-wing third parties.

Considering his own treatment by the ideological Left at Harvard, "even less ideological diversity" than he was expecting must be pretty low.

In a post written 30 months ago, which began, "I should have my head examined for getting into this discussion," I wrote, in response to an op-ed by Paul Krugman:

I agree with the general terms that Krugman uses to frame his explanation:

The sort of person who prefers an academic career to the private sector is likely to be somewhat more liberal than average, even in engineering.

But I do not buy into the remainder of his argument, which can be loosely paraphrased as not enough conservatives believe in the virtue of scholarship to get enough of them to be interested in the academy. Rather, I think the explanation for why liberals outnumber conservatives is that they actively like the way the academy is organized.

I then went on to liken an elite university to a "kibbutz hooked up to an ATM." I commend the whole post to your attention, so that you can see my explanation for the simile.

Taking all of that as background, I would add now that, at present, we are in a low point for conservatives or Republicans self-identifying as such among academics. The reason, I believe, is that my paraphrase of Krugman's argument regarding the virtue of scholarship--while it is not true for most of the conservative- or Republican-leaning people whom I know--seems to be a pretty good characterization of the top Republican in the White House. (And this is coming from someone who spent a year working at the CEA for this Administration and, despite the ample misgivings I have aired on this blog, would do so again.)

Here's a small prediction. When there is a new person in the White House, particularly if it is a Democrat who now has to take on the responsibilities and potential failures of governing rather than merely criticizing the job that others are doing, we will see a bit less self-identification as Democrats or liberals and a bit more as Republicans or conservatives. It won't be anything close to parity in the academy, by virtue of the organization of the academy that I discussed in the earlier post, but it won't be quite so shocking to observers and analysts.

Published on Leave a comment on Alan Greenspan, Meet Irony

There have been a number of posts about the morsels of revisionist history in Alan Greenspan's new memoir, The Age of Turbulence. I think Brad DeLong gets the indictment exactly right toward the end of his book review:

One piece of this third book is worth noting: Greenspan's defense of his tenure as Fed chief. Why does he need a defense? Thirty-five out of 36 decisions is a very good batting average. But one could indict him on four counts: that he should not have, but did, support the Bush tax cut of 2001; that he should not have, but did, encourage new U.S. homeowners to get adjustable-rate mortgages -- ARMs -- in the early 2000s; that he should have done something to abort the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s; and that he should have done something to prevent the real estate bubble of the 2000s.

The first two counts are misdemeanors, and Greenspan pleads guilty. He says that he was warned that his testimony on the proposed 2001 tax cut would send a different message than he intended and that he ignored those warnings, which proved correct. Greenspan says his support for a tax cut was nuanced and partial, provided there were triggers to prevent budget deficits but that his statements were interpreted by the news media and politicians as a blanket endorsement. He adds that he did not understand how institutionally corrupt and thus unconcerned about good budget policy his Republican Party had become by early 2001. He says he did not properly understand in the early 2000s the large effect low teaser interest rates and prepayment penalties would have in leading new and financially strapped homeowners into deals that were not in their best interest.

The other two counts could be considered economic felonies, and here Greenspan stands his ground. Given the state of investor psychology, he says, he could have aborted the stock market and housing bubbles of the late 1990s and the early 2000s but only by paying an unacceptable price in idled factories and unemployed workers. He may be right and he may be wrong in this judgment -- I don't know. I do know that this is a judgment call, a difficult aspect of monetary policy.

I find it fascinating that someone whose tenure as Fed Chair was aptly characterized by the paraphrase, "If you understood what I said, then I must have misspoken," would now be complaining that his statements in support of the President's tax cuts in 2001 were misconstrued.

Published on Leave a comment on Global Climate Change

Catching up on my reading after some recent travels, I notice an excellent symposium on "Global Climate Change" in the latest Economists' Voice, with contributions from Joseph Stiglitz, Sheila Olmstead and Robert Stavins, Kenneth Arrow, and Thomas Schelling. The first and the last were particularly interesting.

From Stiglitz, arguing for a global environmental tax on emissions:

The big advantage of taxation over the Kyoto approach is that it avoids most of the distributional debate. Under Kyoto, getting the right to pollute more is, in effect, receiving an enormous gift. (Now that pollution rights are tradeable, we can even put a market value on them.) The United States might claim that because it is a larger country, it "needs" more pollution rights. Norway might claim that because it uses hydroelectric power, the scope for reducing emissions is lower. France might claim that because it has already made the effort to go into nuclear energy, it should not be forced to reduce more. Under the common tax approach, these debates are sidestepped. All that is asked is that everyone pay the social cost of their emissions, and that the tax be set high enough that the reductions in emissions is large enough to meet the required targets.

Greg Mankiw has previously confirmed Stiglitz' entry into his Pigou Club. From Schelling, a good discussion of how to appreciate the uncertainty of projections of climate change:

In some public discourse, and in sentiments emanating from the Bush Administration, it appears to be accepted that uncertainty regarding global warming is a legitimate basis for postponement of any action until more is known. The action to be postponed is usually identified as “costly.” (Little attention is paid to actions that have been identified as of little or no serious cost.) It is interesting that this idea that costly actions are unwarranted if the dangers are uncertain is almost unique to climate. In other areas of policy, such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, inflation, or vaccination, some “insurance” principle seems to prevail: if there is a sufficient likelihood of sufficient damage we take some measured anticipatory action.

At the opposite extreme is the notion, often called the “precautionary principle” now popular in the European Union, that until something is guaranteed safe it must be indefinitely postponed despite substantial expected benefits. Genetically modified foods and feedstuffs are current targets. (One critic has expressed it as, “never do anything for the first time.”) In this country the principle says that until a drug has proven absolutely safe it must be deferred indefinitely.

Neither of the two extreme principles—do nothing until we are absolutely sure it’s safe; do nothing until we are absolutely sure the alternative is dangerous—makes economic sense, or any other kind. Weigh the costs, the benefits, and the probabilities as best all three are known, and don’t be obsessed with either extreme tail of the distribution.

Kudos to Lawrence Goulder for putting this together as special editor.

Published on Leave a comment on Where’s Your Brain?

If you ever wondered whether there was a place in the online world where the use of Google was prohibited, I have a candidate for you. How else would we politely explain Matt Stoller's post at MyDD, "Where's Your Core?" in which he refers to Jeff Liebman as a "Cato-infused nut?"

At issue is Jeff's position as one of Barack Obama's top economic advisors and his status as a co-author of the LMS plan to reform Social Security. Stoller quotes a Bloomberg article as follows:

Liebman, an expert on Social Security, isn't easily pigeon- holed either. He has supported partial privatization of the government-run retirement system, an idea that's anathema to many Democrats and bears a similarity to a proposal for personal investment accounts that Bush promoted, then dropped in 2005.

``Liebman has been to open to private accounts and most people in town would say he's a moderate supporter of them,'' said Michael Tanner, a Social Security expert at the Cato Institute in Washington, a research organization in Washington that advocates free markets and often backs Republicans.

In a 2005 policy paper Liebman, along with Andrew Samwick of Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire, and Maya MacGuineas, a former aide to Senator John McCain, advocated a mix of benefit cuts, tax increases and mandatory personal accounts to shore up the system, which will begin paying more in benefits than it takes in through taxes by 2017 under current actuarial estimates.

Obama has called Social Security's problems ``real but manageable'' and has pledged to preserve what he's called the ``essential character'' of the pension program.

If they allowed the use of Google at MyDD, then Stoller might have typed in "jeffrey liebman" "social security" and hit return. The first link would be to this description of the LMS plan, the first paragraph of which is:

The three of us – former aides to President Clinton, Senator McCain, and President Bush – did an experiment to see if we could develop a reform plan that we could all support. The Liebman-MacGuineas-Samwick (LMS) plan demonstrates the types of compromises that can help policy makers from across the political spectrum agree on a Social Security reform plan. The plan achieves sustainable solvency through progressive changes to taxes and benefits, introduces mandatory personal accounts, and specifies important details that are often left unaddressed in other reform plans. The plan also illustrates that a compromise plan can contain sensible but politically unpopular options (such as raising retirement ages or mandating that account balances be converted to annuities upon retirement) -- options that could realistically emerge from a bipartisan negotiating process, but which are rarely contained in reform proposals put out by Democrats or Republicans alone because of the political risk they present.

It's hard to see what's so inflammatory about that. If I had to guess, it's either "bipartisan negotiating," "compromise plan," or "personal accounts." Let's give Mr. Stoller the benefit of the doubt and assume he understands that the first two are essential to getting any substantive public policy implemented. So it must be those "personal accounts."

Where oh where could Mr. Stoller find the answer to his conundrum of how a top advisor to Senator Obama could support such things? This is where that Google thing helps again. Mr. Stoller could click on the second link in the search, in which he would find the following excerpt from an interview with Jeff:

Q: Why are personal retirement accounts such an important element to the Social Security system as we move forward?

Liebman: The benefit of having personal retirement accounts in the plan is that if we’re going to spread the burden across generations and start putting some extra revenue into the system now, we need to have a way to save that money so that it doesn’t get diverted to other purposes, as the current Social Security surplus often does. If you bring in new revenue but put all of the net new revenue into personal retirement accounts, then you have a way to spread the burden across even current workers in terms of making extra contributions today, but to do so in a way that you can really be sure is going to be contributing to people’s retirement incomes in the future.

Yes, that's a very sinister explanation--you cannot reliably prefund without personal accounts. If Mr. Stoller would like to take the opposite position--that, for example, President Bush's budget policies have not spent the Social Security surpluses during his time in office--he's welcome to do so.

I don't know how Senator Obama would fare as President, but it seems pretty clear that he's better off with Liebman as an advisor than Stoller as a supporter. As I wrote regarding some earlier criticism of the LMS plan, "If you fancy yourself a liberal, and if your coalition doesn't extend far enough to the right to include Jeff Liebman, then you have relegated yourself to political irrelevance."

Normally, this is the part of the post where I would suggest that we raise some money to help Mr. Stoller afford a decent search engine. But search engines are free and improving the quality of the posts at MyDD may be impossible. Making progress against Cystic Fibrosis is neither. The pledge drive is still on. You can support our team at Great Strides or make donations directly to the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation in honor of Mother's Day.

Published on Leave a comment on Race and Performance in the NBA

The New York Times article this week about the study of racial bias in NBA officiating by Joseph Price and Justin Wolfers generated quite a bit of commentary. What is amazing is how little people understand, or are willing to understand, about statistics. Here's what the authors claim in the abstract of the study:

We find that--even conditioning on player and referee fixed effects (and specific game fixed effects)--that more personal fouls are awarded against players when they are officiated by an opposite-race officiating crew than when officiated by an own-race refereeing crew.

Much of the reaction among sportswriters has been to take the authors to task for calling the refs racist. (See Mike Wise in his column in Thursday's Washington Post and Kevin Hench at FoxSports.) Having taken a look at the study myself, I am surprised that those who make a living based on the sport would be so dismissive of the result. The main result of the paper is that the foul rate (fouls called per 48 minutes played) increases for black players when the racial composition of the three-person crew of referees goes from black to white. (See Table 4 and the discussion on page 8.) Any honest sportswriter should hold the NBA accountable for the result--why are the outcomes for fouls different across different racial configurations of refs and players?

It is very difficult to posit an explanation for these results that would attribute them to something other than race. First, no one disputes the NBA's claim that it does not assign referees to games based on their race or the racial composition of the two teams. (See page 4 and Table 1 of the study for discussion and evidence.) With (conditionally) random assignment, and the fact that the explanatory variables are fixed characteristics of people (i.e., race), we have the conditions for a clinical trial here, where "controlling" for possibly confounding factors is not likely to be important. Second, the authors do in fact control for a number of "fixed effects," exploiting the fact that their dataset is a panel consisting of a limited number of individuals observed in numerous interactions. This includes characteristics of the player and the refs that don't change over time. As the authors note, the most comprehensive results "are identified only off the differential propensity of teammates to earn extra fouls when the refereeing crew is of the opposite race."

Having said that, I think the authors soft-pedal one possible explanation of the results that would exonerate the refs. The following passage appears on pages 12-13:

The fourth point speaks to a relatively subtle interpretation issue: while we document a correlation between a player’s foul rate and the race of the referee, this may reflect the players responding to the race of the referees, rather than the referees policing opposite-race players more aggressively. Strategic responses by players would lead to an attenuation bias: expecting to receive more fouls for a given style of play, the players may play less aggressively, minimizing the impact of referee discrimination on realized fouls. This suggests that our results understate the amount of discrimination. Alternatively, if players exhibit oppositional responses, they may play more aggressively when policed by the opposite race. Importantly, such oppositional responses suggest that our findings are driven by changes in player behavior, rather than referee behavior. Yet if this were driving our results, one might expect to see effects not just on the number of fouls earned, but on the likelihood of fouling out, as well as other indicators of aggression, including blocks and steals. Instead, we find that blocks and steals actually decline under opposite-race referees.

I'm not persuaded by this reasoning. The player response needn't take the form of aggression--it merely needs to be a general decline in player performance in the presence of opposite-race referees. What if, for example, players find it more difficult to concentrate on their tasks when the refs are of opposite race? Elsewhere in the paper, the authors write, "Player-performance appears to deteriorate at every margin when officiated by a larger fraction of opposite-race referees." So why assume that it's the refs not the players? And why make a statement, "Basically, it suggests that if you spray-painted one of your starters white, you’d win a few more games," even under the possible coaxing of a reporter?

The interpretation of the results that it's the players, not the refs, may also reconcile the results of NBA's internal studies that claim that, on a call-by-call basis, there is no evidence of racial bias. (The NBA has not released the results of these studies, much less the data.) If the players are changing their game based on the racial composition of the refereeing crew, then it is possible that every call or non-call is legitimate, and both studies can be accurate.

Published on Leave a comment on The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration

So goes the title of a report to the Council on Foreign Relations by UCSD Professor of Economics Gordon Hanson. From the Introduction, here's a teaser:

This analysis concludes that there is little evidence that legal immigration is economically preferable to illegal immigration. In fact, illegal immigration responds to market forces in ways that legal immigration does not. Illegal immigrants tend to arrive in larger numbers when the U.S. economy is booming (relative to Mexico and the Central American countries that are the source of most illegal immigration to the United States) and move to regions where job growth is strong. Legal immigration, in contrast, is subject to arbitrary selection criteria and bureaucratic delays, which tend to disassociate legal inflows from U.S. labor-market conditions. Over the last half-century, there appears to be little or no response of legal immigration to the U.S. unemployment rate. Two-thirds of legal permanent immigrants are admitted on the basis of having relatives in the United States. Only by chance will the skills of these individuals match those most in demand by U.S. industries. While the majority of temporary legal immigrants come to the country at the invitation of a U.S. employer, the process of obtaining a visa is often arduous and slow. Once here, temporary legal workers cannot easily move between jobs, limiting their benefit to the U.S. economy.

I'll have to add this one to the "good intentions" pile of reading.

Published on Leave a comment on Tit for Tat

Continuing on my Richard Dawkins theme, I came across this period piece, in which Dawkins responds to some early misunderstandings about his pathbreaking work in The Selfish Gene, the treatise of which was that it made more sense to think about natural selection as operating on the level of the gene rather than the organism. He was particularly concerned that people understand that if genes are "selfish," then the behavior of the organism would display a high degree of cooperative behavior.

As an example of this, he discusses Robert Axelrod's seminal work in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, in which a simple tit for tat strategy turns out to be extremely effective. The reasons for its success, as Dawkins summarizes them, are that:

  1. It is nice. It seeks to cooperate initially.
  2. It forgives quickly after retaliating.
  3. It is not envious. It does not measure its status in relative terms. It cannot win in an individual game against a single opponent, and it cannot do well unless other parties also cooperate.
  4. It is simple--easy to read and uncomplicated.

Some days, I wish those characteristics were more pervasive in the population.