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From around the web:

  • Greg Mankiw lets New Hampshire Senate candidate Jay Buckey into the Pigou Club for proposing a gas tax of roughly 7 cents per gallon at current prices. Read about the National Security Levy here. It's as good a place as any for an aspiring politician to start.
  • Closer to home, Dartmouth's president, Jim Wright, will receive the Semper Fidelis Award from the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation for his work on behalf of wounded veterans. Read more here.

Frequent commenter ishmaelabroad asks for a reaction to this exchange between Andrew Leonard at Salon and George Borjas on his blog. Keeping in mind that this is a reaction to a comment on an analogy, here goes.

Borjas makes a reasonable point that journalists, more than many other professional occupations, should understand the impact of an influx of competitors with low reservation wages on the prevailing wage level. Leonard accepts this point, but then suggests his own analogy between globalization and the futility of erecting barriers to illegal immigration:

To think that one can turn back the tide of competition unleashed by the Net is a lot like thinking that in a globalized world one can ameliorate the wage impact of illegal immigration by building a border fence or by passing laws imposing strict sanctions against employers who hire illegal immigrants. The work forces of China and India and eastern Europe and of course Mexico have joined the world economy just like bloggers have joined the media universe. In both cases, technology has played a huge enabling role, and, unless the world experiences a truly massive and unprecedented energy crisis, that technologically-midwifed change is not going back in the bottle. In a globalized world, massive disparities between the living standards of individual nations will create more pressure than ever before for some kind of equalization,
whether that means workers finding their way from the developing to the developed world, or capital headed in the other direction.

I think he's right insofar as he notes that there will be "some kind of equalization." I think that he's concluding prematurely that immigration will play, needs to play, or should play a large role in that equalization.

The current Wikipedia entry for globalization points to economic integration in four types of markets: goods and services, capital, technology, and labor. I'm an economist with libertarian views, so I am all for greater opportunities to exchange the first three across national borders, provided that property rights are protected. I'll further assert that if those opportunities were enhanced, there could be less pressure for labor to move across national borders. (See this earlier post.)

The difference between labor and the other three markets is that a laborer is a person, and people have rights unrelated to their economic lives. As I've said before, I don't believe in guest-worker programs that authorize a second-class citizenry. So if people have immigrated, they have the right to vote, and their votes may move policies away from those that would otherwise prevail. As another example, they have the right to make claims against a social welfare system, and their claims may outweigh their contributions through the tax system. I'm sure others could come up with more examples.

So immigration, as distinct from other forms of globalization, imposes a distribution of costs and benefits on the rest of society that is intermediated through the political system. A citizen of the U.S., even one who embraces the other three types of globalization, could reasonably conclude that the costs of immigration imposed through the political system outweigh the economic benefits. This is particularly true if the benefits to the immigrants themselves are excluded. (See the distinction between being generous and being fair to would-be immigrants in this recent post.)

There are obviously many citizens of this country who have come to a different conclusion about these political costs net of economic benefits, and so they are naturally advocating for a more permissive immigration policy. However, if a citizen had come to that conclusion, then the next question is whether the costs of deterring illegal immigration are sufficiently smaller than these political costs net of economic benefits. Leonard (if he is asking this question) seems to believe that the ability to deter (e.g., through a border fence or employer sanctions) is so low or that the costs of deterrence are so high that the answer to this question would almost always be "no." I'm not so sure.

Via Mark Thoma, I learn of a very clear summary at VoxEU of the evidence on the relationship between international trade and child labor in developing countries. It is written by my colleagues Eric Edmonds and Nina Pavcnik. They write:

Our recent research shows that children are less likely to work in countries with more international trade. The negative association between trade and child labour holds even when considering only poor countries’ trade with high-income countries. It also holds up for trade in unskilled-labour intensive products. Quite simply, child labour is less prevalent in countries that trade more because countries that trade more are richer, and children work less in richer countries.

Income effects seem to outweigh the substitution effects when prices rise due to international trade. Their conclusions are worth keeping in mind:

Where does this research leave the concerned consumer? Stories of children engaged in export industries should be met with concern about why children hold those jobs. Before one boycotts a product with child labour content or supports punitive trade sanctions, one should ask whether these measures will make the child better off. Will boycotts or sanctions eliminate the reasons why children work? Thus far, most of the existing evidence suggests that eliminating sources of income will not make poor families better off. It will not change the circumstances that cause children to work.

Read the whole article.

Via Greg Mankiw, we find Alan Blinder qualifying his support for free trade. Greg seems to be taking it personally. Rather, we should just take his suggestion (my emphasis below) to its natural conclusion:

Mr. Blinder's answer is not protectionism, a word he utters with the contempt that Cold Warriors reserved for communism. Rather, Mr. Blinder still believes the principle British economist David Ricardo introduced 200 years ago: Nations prosper by focusing on things they do best -- their "comparative advantage" -- and trading with other nations with different strengths. He accepts the economic logic that U.S. trade with large low-wage countries like India and China will make all of them richer -- eventually. He acknowledges that trade can create jobs in the U.S. and bolster productivity growth.

But he says the harm done when some lose jobs and others get them will be far more painful and disruptive than trade advocates acknowledge. He wants government to do far more for displaced workers than the few months of retraining it offers today. He thinks the U.S. education system must be revamped so it prepares workers for jobs that can't easily go overseas, and is contemplating changes to the tax code that would reward companies that produce jobs that stay in the U.S.

Fantastic. We can be a nation of barbers, gardeners, and custodians, and we can enforce this nirvana by favoring it in the tax code.

Jobs have many characteristics. It is true that for the purposes of talking about jobs in trade policy, economists often collapse these characteristics into a single characteristic, the wage at a point in time. Blinder is correctly pointing out that another characteristic is the risk associated with that wage in the future. That risk could come from a number of sources, of which foreign competition is just one.

When people choose jobs, they have the freedom to trade off among the characteristics embodied in each job. Standard economic analysis would suggest that, for jobs that require the same degree of skills, those that offered more risk would also have to offer higher average wages to compensate. Starting from an equilibrium in which workers have information that is no worse than the government about the terms of this tradeoff, a policy that favored less risky wages would necessarily generate lower expected wages. What's the compelling interest by the government to justify this shift in outcomes?

I can think of two. First, one could assert that the government has better information than the public about relative risks and rewards. Second, one could assert that the social cost of risky jobs is higher than the private cost, i.e. that the government bears a fiscal cost of people being employed in jobs with higher compensation risk. I am skeptical in both cases, but I would be interested in hearing other perspectives.


I'll confess that I haven't been following the details of the Summit of the Americas, now underway in Mar De Plata, Argentina. I also haven't figured out why economic growth and higher standards of living stubbornly refuse to arrive in most Latin American countries, despite their abundance of resources and proximity to the largest market in the world.

But I'd be pretty surprised if Chavez, Maradona, Esquivel, or these fellows pictured above had a better plan for starting the process than ratifying the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.

Read all about this cast of characters here.

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And all you have to do to see it is go to China. Via Keith Bradsher of the New York Times, we learn that GM's business is thriving in China with a $5,000 minivan that gets 43 miles to the gallon in city driving.

That's the good news. GM has apparently found the right formula for a vehicle that appeals to small business owners and a working class that is gaining in economic resources.

Much of the article is about the way the joint venture was conceived and implemented by former executive Philip Murtaugh:

Their development was led by an American, Philip F. Murtaugh, a native of Ohio and a maverick executive who was willing to zig while the rest of G.M. was zagging. Mr. Murtaugh was able to create in China the kind of innovative environment that G.M. has struggled for decades to achieve in its American operations. But whether G.M. can duplicate elsewhere its achievements in China or even keep its pace here is unclear.

In what may be a telling sign of the corporate culture at G.M., Mr. Murtaugh's success in China led not to promotion but to his departure from the company. G.M. declined to discuss personnel matters, but both it and Mr. Murtaugh said he resigned and was not dismissed.

A soft-spoken man in a company known for autocratic leaders, Mr. Murtaugh ran the China operations for more than nine years from his base in Shanghai, repeatedly making some of the best calls in the industry. Now he finds himself unemployed and living in a small community in rural Kentucky.

His resignation in March, at the age of 49, came shortly after senior company executives reorganized management to give more power to Detroit executives to oversee design, engineering and various manufacturing disciplines all over the world, including operations in China.

I have a feeling his phone will be ringing. For GM, I guess it's time to zag again.

(See also this post at Our View from Madison on the NYT article and this post of an Economist article from April on foreign car companies in China.)

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The U.S. trade deficit receded, somewhat surprisingly, in May from a record in April.

In the blogosphere, I am always intrigued by what Brad Setser has to say on global macro issues. He's got an interesting post today arguing that the trade deficit has not peaked, despite this latest dip. I think he's on safe ground there--the trade deficit has been increasing at a pretty rapid annual clip for about 6 years. But Brad tends to be more alarmist in his rhetoric than I would be. My views are closer to what James Hamilton wrote recently, after doing a hypothetical calculation of what the current account deficit would have been if personal saving had not gone down, oil imports had not gone up, and nothing else had changed since 1999. His calculations suggest that the current account deficit would be about the same as it was in 1998.

I think the personal saving rate in the United States is low--in large part--simply because it can be. We are a country that doesn't put up too many formal or informal barriers to consumption. And interest rates remain low while the dollar remains surprisingly strong. Eventually, those key macro prices will move against consumption, as foreign investors become sated with their holdings of US-based assets, and domestic savings will rise. I will be interested to see how long it takes for that day to arrive.

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