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Brad DeLong today correctly questions the wisdom of a particular CBO report on the Commission Model 2. Brad wonders why CBO would mix a certainty equivalent of a personal account with a distribution of other economic and demographic outcomes. I wondered the same thing a while ago, and posted about it in the context of the Kerry campaign's press release and statements about Social Security reform. The following restates those arguments.

The critical issue is this footnote from the CBO's report:

13 Since the medians are presented here as point estimates, IA payouts are computed assuming risk adjusted returns equal to the Treasury bond rate.

CBO inappropriately uses the phrase "expected retirement benefits" in the text but then clarifies that it is using the Treasury bond rate to accumulate the accounts. The appropriate terminology for CBO would be to say that it is assuming that the portfolios were invested entirely in Treasury bonds. This is the most conservative investment approach, since it chooses to take on zero equity risk. As long as the equity premium is positive, this assumption serves to overstate the reductions in expected benefits that would occur. (As implied in the footnote, we would really want to see the whole distribution of possible benefit levels, not just point estimates.)

This is a very odd assumption to make as a baseline. As far as I know, there is no presumption among people who propose adding personal accounts to Social Security that people who opt for them would then choose to invest them in such a way that eliminated one of the key advantages of having a personal account--the opportunity to obtain higher expected returns in exchange for taking on some financial risk.

This makes the CBO report, unfortunately, much less useful as a guidepost in the discussion of Social Security reform.

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Sam Williamson has started a new list on The Economic Issues of Social Security.

This list is designed to provide a forum for discussion of the economic issues of Social Security. We hope that subscribers will find it a useful place to read carefully reasoned comments on the issues void of political agendas.

Right now there are hundreds of articles in newspapers and magazines and at least that many blogs, all debating the merits of changes in Social Security. The level of discussion varies extensively. There are conference proceedings and lengthy papers written by leaders in the field available that discuss the issues in depth.

What is missing on the Internet is a place where economists can have a dialog similar to the discussion that takes place in a seminar, where both sides of a point can be found, where "threads" on an issue are developed that are available to be read later in the list archive. It is hoped that SocSec list can be this place.

Postings will be carefully screened to maintain consistency and to not allow inappropriate comments to be made. I will rely on the editorial board to arbitrate any problems.

Samuel H. Williamson

Editor of SocSec

Editorial Board

  • Jeffrey Brown, University of Illinois and Nominee for Member of the Social Security Advisory Board
  • David Macpherson, Director of the Pepper Institute on Aging & Public Policy, Florida State University
  • Olivia S. Mitchell, Executive Director of the Pension Research Council and Director of the Boettner Center for Pensions & Retirement Security, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
  • Alicia Munnell, Director, Center for Retirement Research, Boston College
  • Peter Orszag, Joseph A. Pechman Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
  • Andrew Samwick, Director, The Nelson A. Rockefeller Center, Dartmouth College

Let's hope that this new forum can help clarify the issues and improve the quality of Social Security policy discussions.

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In a comment on a recent post, and in more detail on The Dead Parrot Society, Victor tries to answer this request:

Matthew Yglesias asks, "The first thing that would be nice to calculate if someone can figure out how to do it is the exact average productivity growth over the next 75 years that we need to make sure that the Trust Fund is never exhausted."

In his search for an answer, and as a critique of a rough answer at Brad DeLong's blog, he finds the sensitivity analysis in the 2004 Trustees Report (Table VI.D4):

A far superior approach would be to do what the Social Security Trustees did: let the real-wage differential vary, keep all the other assumptions constant, and see how the results changed. They found that a 0.5%-points increase in the real-wage differential, improved actuarial balance by .54%-points of taxable payroll, from a 1.89% deficit to 1.35% deficit. Assuming the SSA truly held all other factors constant, this would be equivalent to increasing productivity from their baseline of 1.6% to 2.1%. That's a whopping increase in productivity, and a pretty good improvement in the actuarial balance, but you are still far from 75-year solvency. (which, recall, is only one of the issues that many are concerned about)

Victor just stops too early in his calculation. If one were to use the linear approximation in the text of the report, (0.54 percentage point of imbalance per 0.5 percentage point improvement in the real wage differential), then we would need to boost the differential by 1.89/0.54 = 3.5 units of 0.5, or by 1.75 percentage points up to 2.85 percent to go from the intermediate projections to 75-year balance.

If we wanted to be a bit fancier, we would note that the change over the three scenarios is not quite linear. The table gives us three pairs of numbers on {real wage differential, 75-year imbalance}: {0.6, -2.42}, {1.1, -1.89}, {1.6, -1.35}. With three pairs, we can fit a quadratic to do the extrapolation. When we do, we get [omitting the gratuitous algebra] about 2.81 percent for the real wage differential. Let's call it 2.8 percent, or an increase of 1.7 percentage points.

If we maintain the Trustees' other economic assumptions in Table V.B1 (earnings as a percent of compensation, average hours worked, and the wedge between CPI and the GDP price index) and Table V.B2 (total employment growth), this translates into long-term growth rates of 3.3 percent for productivity and 3.5 percent for real GDP. That productivity growth rate strikes me as too high.

However, these rough calculations were made without regard to what happens in the years after the 75-year window. In this case, there may be surpluses in the years near the end of that projection period, and so 2.8 percent for the real wage differential is too high for a longer projection period. We would need the actuaries to run the numbers themselves to be sure.

In addition, the "If we maintain ..." is a very big "if." It is not satisfied, for example, in the Brookings Paper by Robert J. Gordon that Victor cites in an earlier post as the basis of what Kevin Drum has been blogging about. It looks like, yet again, I've got more reading to do before I can make a more definitive statement.

And most importantly, it is hardly sensible to treat the Trustees' assumptions as if they are independent of each other, particularly the ones that work together to go from GDP growth to the real wage differential. If one of them changes, it is likely to be offset by changes in the others. For example, note from the historical series of Tables V.B1 and V.B2 that we have had high productivity growth in the past couple of years, but this has been associated with negative real wage differentials largely because of the decline in average hours worked. Using the last couple of years as evidence that productivity can be much higher than the Trustees have assumed is an incomplete argument. It is not evidence that productivity can be much higher, everything else equal.

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In a recent post, I noted that leading demographers think the Social Security Trustees' assumptions about longevity understate the decline in mortality and thus program costs. This is relevant to the ongoing debate about the magnitude of the program's shortfall. It has become common for those who are against reforming the system now to point out that the economic growth rate assumed by the Trustees is low relative to the last 10 years and that higher growth will boost system finances. One should also look at the other assumptions to see if they are too optimistic or pessimistic. I did this in this earlier post. Brad DeLong provides some commentary here and gives his perspective about what aspects of long-term fiscal policy are in crisis.

In yesterday's New York Times, Robert Pear writes a pretty good article about this topic, "Social Security Underestimates Future Life Spans, Critics Say." The issue is well captured in these paragraphs:

For the American population as a whole in the last century, most of the gains in life expectancy at birth occurred from 1900 to 1950. But most of the gains in life expectancy among people who had already reached age 65 were seen after 1950.

Last year an expert panel advising the Social Security Administration found "an unprecedented reduction in certain forms of old-age mortality, especially cardiovascular disease, beginning in the late 1960's."

The panel said Social Security was wrong to assume a slower decline in mortality rates among the elderly in the next 75 years. Rather, it said, the government should assume that mortality will continue to decline as it did from 1950 to 2000.

Ronald D. Lee, a professor of demography and economics at the University of California, Berkeley, said: "I foresee death rates of the elderly in the United States continuing to decline at the same pace they have declined since 1950. In fact, there is evidence that the pace of decline in other developed countries has accelerated in recent decades."

The article then tries to include opposing points of view:

Further, some population experts foresee developments that could wind up buttressing the forecasts of the Social Security Administration. S. Jay Olshansky, a professor of epidemiology and biostatistics at the University of Illinois at Chicago, said the era of large increases in life expectancy might be nearing an end, with the spread of obesity and the possible re-emergence of deadly infectious diseases.

"There are no lifestyle changes, surgical procedures, vitamins, antioxidants, hormones or techniques of genetic engineering available today with the capacity to repeat the gains in life expectancy that were achieved in the 20th century" with antibiotics, vaccinations and improvements in sanitation, Dr. Olshansky said.

Indeed, he said, without new measures on obesity and communicable diseases, "human life expectancy could decline in the 21st century."

Two things are missing from this discussion.

First, for Social Security's financing, it matters whether the improvements in life expectancy occur early or late in life. Reducing infant mortality is a net plus for Social Security financing, because it will increase (in a couple of decades) the ratio of workers to beneficiaries. Reducing old-age mortality is a net negative for Social Security financing, for the opposite reason. Some of the issues being discussed here pertain to mortality early rather than late in a person's life.

Second, this discussion of obesity misses the important point that while higher obesity rates will lower Social Security retirement expenditures, they may increase Social Security disability expenditures and reduce tax revenues. It is not clear that the combination is a net plus for financing. It also misses the impact on Medicare, which is even more likely to be negative, since obesity is an important predictor of many chronic conditions (like musculoskeletal injuries, heart disease and diabetes).

But I thought the article was generally pretty good and worth a read.

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In response to my last post, Max has clarified his remarks in a subsequent post. No need to go through it in its entirety. On his main point, he now accurately characterizes my views as to what gets worse over time:

What he means if I understand him correctly is that from the standpoint of future generations -- retirees and taxpayers -- the problem of the unfunded ten trillion dollar liability (as of 2004) gets worse because preceding cohorts of retirees are let off the hook ("held harmless" in his words) by having the good fortune of receiving their SS benefits and meeting their Maker before the bill comes due.

I'll add two additional remarks to further clarify the discussion:

First, Max makes the following statement:

Concerning Andrew's 3.5 percent of GDP, I assume this reflects another one of those calculations out to perpetuity, since the Trustees report shows the gap to be only slighly over two percent of GDP at the end of the 75 year planning period (in 2080). The increase in the cash gap relative to GDP has to take some time to rise much beyond two percent of GDP.

Yes and no. The "3.5 percent" to which I often refer is the 3.5 percent of taxable payroll that would be required immediately and in all future years to close the projected $10.4 trillion financial shortfall. It is shown here in the 2004 Trustees Report and is equivalent to about 1.2 percent of GDP. I cite this figure to put the present value calculation in the context of the traditional revenue base for the program. It is an infinite horizon measure, but it is scaled by taxable payroll not GDP.

Second, Max concludes his post with a discussion of whether "pre-funding" this unfunded obligation is good policy. This is an interesting question. As I have noted, my first choice would be not to pre-fund the unfunded obligation but instead to reduce the growth of future benefits (via increases in the retirement ages, not the replacement rate at the age of normal retirement) so that the unfunded part of the obligations is reduced to zero. Reformers to the left of me ideologically--like Diamond and Orszag--have also designed plans that do not entail substantial pre-funding. They do it with tax increases and no reduction in projected aggregate benefits for about five decades. This is a sensible distinction between right and left--smaller versus larger public spheres. I'd like to see it become the template for Congressional debate.

Without pre-funding, there is no need to work through the thorny issues of how those funds are to be accumulated and invested--centrally (via a Trust Fund with a hands off management and a "lockbox") or in a decentralized system of personal accounts. I favor the latter and prefer it to a Diamond-Orszag approach. Earlier this week, Brad DeLong commented in two posts on why he would prefer the former. Some of the difference may be the scale of the investments that we are each envisioning. Clearly, there is some size of the system's aggregate investment in equities below which even I would concede that it would be fine for the government to control the investments. I don't have a specific threshold in mind, but I'm pretty sure that it's sufficiently small (e.g., less than a hundred billion dollars) that it would do little in the way of restoring solvency. Presumably, there is some size of the system's aggregate investment that is sufficiently large that Brad would say is appropriate for a decentralized system of personal accounts. But maybe not, and I'll be the last one to put words in someone else's blog.

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In a recent post, Max Sawicky casts some arguments against fixing Social Security's projected shortfalls in the form of dialogues between deluded people and readers of his blog (MR below). In the third, he auditions a Vox Baby reader for the role of deluded person. Very poor form. The whole thing:

Third Deluded Person: You're all too optimistic. The program is ten trillion in debt, and every year it gets worse. I read it on Vox, Baby.

MR: Actually, the present-value to perpetuity calculation is designed precisely to be time invariant. By construction of the concept, the "problem" cannot "get worse," unless there is some policy change (analogous to the new Medicare drug benefit). No more than $1.03 next year, at a three percent discount rate, is "worse" than $1.00 this year. The number gets larger each year, but each such number is just the future value of ten trillion in 2004.

TDP: O.K., but the gap is still there, and it's big.

MR: When the sociologist was asked, "How's your wife?" he responded, "Compared to what?" The gap does not have to be closed at any particular point in time. What does need to be financed is the gap between program costs and revenues. On an annual basis, it's roughly two percent of GDP, less than the revenue loss from the Bush tax cuts, and of the same order of magnitude as the increase in defense spending since 2000.

TDP: Well the program gap keeps growing after 2080.

MR: Tell it to Captain Kirk.

When I read this, I thought, "How can it be that Max is correcting me for confusing the word 'worse' with the word 'bigger?'" So I searched my blog for the word "worse" and I discover the following paragraphs in a previous response to Max:

Max Sawicky kindly (and constructively!) responds to my recent post about whether we need to reform Social Security today. His original statement began:

There is absolutely no reason at present to make changes in Social Security, except out of political fear of the Right.

As I noted, first in "Why is Social Security a Campaign Issue?" and then again in the post to which Max is responding, my reason is that we make the problem about $300 billion worse every year that we delay. This is roughly the interest that we accrue on the unfunded obligation of $10.4 trillion in a year when the real interest rate is 3 percent, as in the 2004 Trustees Report's long-term assumptions.

So, yes, I do use the word "worse" where the precise word is "bigger." But if Max were to follow the link in that last paragraph, he would discover the full context:

So if we have an implicit debt of $10.4 trillion, and the real interest rate is 3 percent, then next year, the implicit debt will grow by 0.03*10.4 trillion = $312 billion, up to $10.7 trillion, if the assumptions underlying the projection stay the same. Why does this matter? Primarily, it matters because both the President and Senator Kerry have repeatedly stated (see the two speeches in Pennsylvania linked above) that they will not cut benefits for those at or near retirement age. (The Senator's statement may be even more encompassing, including benefits at any time in the future. I cannot tell for sure from his public statements.) This, in turn, means that each year that elapses without reform causes the burden of financing the unfunded obligations to be shifted away from one more birth cohort that crosses the threshold of being "at or near retirement." The more we wait, the larger the burden on future

generations, and the higher that 3.5 percentage point surtax would have to climb.

So a better dialogue between readers of the two blogs would have done three things. First, it would have acknowledged that we've done the math already at Vox Baby and that we understand that it is the current value getting bigger over time (and bigger relative to projected GDP). Second, it would have accurately characterized the "problem" according to Vox Baby as the increase in the burden of fixing this shortfall on future generations of workers that results when the fix is delayed and more cohorts of retirees are held harmless. Third, it would have had MR explain exactly why shifting this burden is a desirable policy to pursue.

As a casting director, I say that TDP is no reader of Vox Baby.

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From the comments on my last post, I see that I should not quit my day job (or this one) to work as a consultant to the Democratic party. In all fairness, I should point out that others in the blogosphere with views generally dissimilar to mine have made similar points. See this post at the American Prospect online:

The Democrats' best option here, it seems to me, begins with what Kerrey and Rudman laid out. The Dems need to come up with an alternative to Bush's plan that can be framed as change and as solving the Social Security problems that they too have been yammering about for more than a decade.

Brad DeLong also makes some useful points about how things have changed to the point where he is out of the crisis mode (i.e., his view that the uptick in productivity since 1995 looks to be here to stay and this is not reflected in the Trustees' projections). However, I think these comments are incomplete. In particular, leading demographers think the Trustees' assumptions about longevity understate the decline in mortality and thus program costs. (See this paper for a recent example.) I discussed these issues in more detail in an earlier post.

So I still think we are in crisis mode, or, more precisely, that we are in "impending crisis" mode. If we do nothing, we hand a growing stream of annual Social Security shortfalls to future generations of workers with little policy flexibility to deal with them. I am trying to avoid that outcome. In the whole set of posts that I have done on Social Security, I haven't asked the Democrats to do anything that is more difficult than what I have asked the Republicans to do. I acknowledge that the problems facing Medicare are larger than those facing Social Security. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't solve Social Security's problems.

One comment asked that I find an example of a policy that the Bush administration has implemented that it has not messed up. In the realm of economic policy:

  1. I was extremely disappointed to see the Medicare prescription drug benefit add an enormous unfunded obligation when we already face long-term shortfalls in our old-age entitlement programs.
  2. Looking forward, the persistent deficits in the budget forecast, even with above-potential economic growth and no particular fiscal challenges, are deeply worrying. The "cut the budget deficit in half in 5 years" approach is far too timid for my tastes.
  3. Looking backward, I think the tax cut packages in 2001 and 2003 were appropriately timed and of the appropriate magnitude. They averted what could have been a much deeper reduction in output. But they have clearly set us up for #2.
  4. The bright spot for me is international trade. With a few highly visible exceptions, the Administration has generally worked to lower trade barriers. This has occurred despite the stalled WTO, particularly through free-trade agreements in our hemisphere. I give the USTR's office appropriate credit.

But most of this is neither here nor there. The critical issue with Social Security reform is to restore solvency. As I watch this policy process unfolding, I get very nervous when I hear personal accounts discussed without a discussion of restoring solvency. All sugar and no medicine would equal very bad policy.

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Matthew Yglesias has two posts on whether the Democrats should participate in the legislative process on Social Security or remain united in opposition to any action by the Republicans. From the first of these posts:

It's not so much a question of conservatives versus moderates, as it is a question of people who happen to have a bug in their pants about Social Security versus those who are nervous about the political risks here and who have other agendas they'd like to advance. The only really feasible way to put a stop to this is to make sure that the nervous nellies stay very nervous. Key to that is making sure that unlike with, say, the Medicare bill, they can't drape their vote in even the merest veneer of bipartisanship.

In the second post, he endorses the following:

"Message No. 1 to Americans: When it comes to Social Security, the sky is not falling," said the Senate's new assistant Democratic leader, Richard Durbin (D-Ill.). "There are people in this administration who have an agenda that is not friendly to Social Security."

And then he adds:

Exactly. Message number one is that Social Security is healthy and successful. There is no crisis.

I'll look to address (again) the substance of the "there is no crisis" refrain in another post. In this post, I'll focus on why I think this is not a winning strategy for Democrats. I'll be very frank about my bias here. I have no partisan interest in the Democratic party per se, but it would be nice if someday it fielded a candidate for President who inspired me to vote for him or her.

First, the focus group results that I have seen show that very few approaches to Social Security cause as negative a reaction as denying that Social Security has a problem that needs to be fixed. If you don't like the idea of adding personal accounts to Social Security, then argue against it. But to go beyond that and suggest that there is no need to reform the system (leaving aside for now whether the current predicament merits the label of a "crisis") is unwise. I think that most people understand that the aging of the Baby Boom will reshape our fiscal landscape. They don't have much tolerance for people who seem to doubt that widely held view. On the other side of the issue, I have sequenced my arguments on this on the blog very precisely to make sure that every reader knows that I think the key issue is solvency and not personal accounts.

Second, there's an old saying in Washington, "You can't beat something with nothing." I hated having this quoted to me by policy folks in the White House last year--it caused otherwise sensible small-government people to propose all sorts of expansions of the federal government. Not very Republican of them. But there is a big danger to the Democrats who suggest that unity in opposition is a sensible policy for a (shrinking?) minority party in the Congress. If Democrats elected to the legislature refuse to engage in the legislative enterprise, then the rationale for re-electing them disappears. We saw some of that in 2004: the Democrats lost ground in Congress and Senator Daschle was defeated even though he held the leadership position. Had he used that position to be something other than the President's chief obstructionist, he may have stood a better chance.

There are plenty of ways the Democrats could constructively engage. For example, they could insist that, in exchange for going along with personal accounts of the size suggested by the President's Commission (e.g., 4% of payroll up to $1000), solvency be restored not through reducing benefits across the board but by raising the ages of full and early retirement (a much better policy). To cover themselves politically, they could even insist that this change be proposed on a bipartisan basis. If they did that, they would have dramatically improved the system compared to its present status. And they would also come a step closer to getting the "Grownup Republican" vote that they needed in November. As an alternative example, they could shore up the support of their base if they proposed something like this.

I don't want a replay of the Medicare bill any more than Matt does.

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Brad DeLong often titles his posts "Why Oh Why Can't We Have a Better Press Corps?", and Andrew Sullivan often names his posts after and gives awards in (dis)honor of journalists who make outlandish statements. I would like to introduce my own award--the Voxy--to be bestowed occasionally on journalists in the mainstream media who make exceptionally lucid and thoughtful contributions to the public discussion. Feel free to e-mail me with nominations.

The inaugural award goes to Greg Ip, for his article in yesterday's Wall Street Journal, Medicare Ills Make Social Security Look Fit. Read the whole thing. I'm just going to focus on some excerpts that show why the article is noteworthy. Greg begins with an observation:

Reforming Social Security occupies countless scholars, commissions and legislators. Reforming Medicare, the program that could really wreck the budget, gets almost no attention at all.

He's right. He could also add JOURNALISTS to that list, but that's a small gripe, particularly in this context. He continues:

The mismatch between the programs' problems and the energy devoted to them is striking. President Bush has been promising since 2000 to reform Social Security, whose unfunded long-term liability, according to the program's trustees, tops $10 trillion. Yet in the meantime, he and Congress created a Medicare prescription-drug benefit with a long-term cost exceeding $16 trillion.

Yes, that's basically right, too. According to the 2004 Medicare Trustees Report (see Table II.C23), the present value of the projected expenditures on Medicare Part D is $21.9 trillion, or 2.4% of GDP. (I would have called this the long-term cost.) Beneficiariy premiums and state transfers are projected to offset $3.6 and $1.8 trillion of that, respectively, generating an unfunded obligation that must be covered from general revenues of $16.6 trillion (after rounding), or 1.8% of GDP.

There are two caveats to comparing this $16.6 trillion directly with the $10.4 trillion in unfunded obligations for Social Security. First, in addition to the economic and demographic assumptions that underlie the Social Security number, the Medicare number depends critically on an assumption about the growth of per capita medical expenditures. The disparity could be higher or lower than $6.2 trillion even if the $10.4 trillion projection is completely accurate. Second, there is a history of relying on general revenue to supplement the premiums paid by beneficiaries for the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) program, of which the new Part D is a now a component. Some general revenue financing appears to be part of the design.

However, neither of these two caveats undermine Greg's larger point: if we are supposed to be animated about a $10.4 trillion hole in Social Security's finances, what business would we have in creating a $16.6 trillion hole in Medicare's finances? And for pointing out that inconsistency, Greg earns a Voxy. Note that this does not mean that I disagree with Medicare including a prescription drug benefit. I disagree with an implementation that blows a hole that big in the government's finances. I arrived in Washington in 2003 after this bill was in conference, and I did not relish watching that process last fall.

In fact, Greg retains the Voxy despite including a quote from me in his article that will render yours truly unconfirmable for future positions in government:

So how to fix Medicare? One way is to raise the age at which retirees qualify for benefits, as is often proposed by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and others for Social Security. "Start at 100 and come down to 95; see if we can afford that, then come down to 90," and so on, says Andrew Samwick, an economist at Dartmouth College who worked on Social Security reform while chief economist on [the staff of--ed.] President Bush's Council of Economic Advisers. "There is some age at which the system is in balance."

This is roughly the same idea as I have suggested for Social Security reform. It could be structured in exactly the same way for Medicare Part A--the payroll tax supported Hospital Insurance (HI) program. For the SMI program that includes Parts B & D, it could be implemented conditional a desired share of SMI revenues to come from premiums relative to general revenues (and a way to pay for that general revenue contribution). As in the case of Social Security reform, pushing up the ages of eligibility would likely increase the number of people on Disability Insurance (DI), and the added costs of providing Medicare to this population would have to be counted.

He keeps the Voxy because he shows where a "raise the eligibility age" strategy may come up short:

But it's not a cure-all. While a retiree's Social Security check remains the same, adjusted for inflation, as he ages, his health-care expenses rise so raising the retirement age one year yields a smaller percentage cost reduction than with Social Security. And it's politically unpalatable.

Greg's right again. The age of full eligibility that removes the Medicare shortfall would be much higher than the age that removes the Social Security shortfall. Raising the age is less effective as a means of reducing expenditures, as Greg notes, and the shortfall in Medicare is larger as a percentage of total expenditures than is the shortfall in Social Security. Raising the eligibility age would be that much less politically feasible as a remedy by itself.

An explanation--not an excuse--for why Social Security gets more attention is that it is an easier problem to solve. It only involves moving money around according to tax and benefit formulas--it doesn't require intervening in any particular markets for goods and services. This doesn't mean that it has gotten no attention. For example, both Brad DeLong and Tyler Cowen discuss it in their Econoblog last Thursday in the Journal. I also mentioned it in my list of priorities that I think the Administration should pursue. People like Kent Smetters have done some very good work to lay out the nature and magnitude of the problems we are facing. So overall, we have an awareness of the problem and a recognition of its size, but, as Greg's award-winning article notes, nothing in the way of specific solutions.

Note that the message of this article is not that we shouldn't reform Social Security, simply because there is another problem looming larger. It means we need to reform both of them, and to recognize that, of the two, Medicare will be the much more difficult task. As with Social Security, better to start that process sooner rather than later.

Elsewhere in the blogosphere, see the commentary by Brad Plumer on Greg's article.

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In a recent post (and an article at TechCentralStation), Arnold Kling wonders whether the Left and the Right should switch their positions on Social Security reform financed by debt. Quoting from the article:

However, there is one important difference between keeping Social Security as it is and switching to privatization. Under the current system, Social Security's liabilities will continue to be funded by payroll taxes. However, under privatization, the transitional debt would be repaid using -- guess what? General revenues! In other words, privatization is a vehicle for changing Social Security's medium-term funding mechanism from payroll taxes to income taxes. It is exactly what the Left presumably wants, and what the Right presumably opposes.

Following up in his post, he notes:

The Left complains about "diverting" payroll taxes into private accounts. But that means that other taxes, mostly income taxes, would be needed to cover current benefits. From the standpoint of the supporters of progressive taxation, that would seem to be an improvement. I honestly do not believe that either side has really thought this through.

Actually, this need not be the case. For example, suppose the reform turned out to be exactly Commission Model 2 with all near-term cash flow deficits covered by borrowing. As I noted in an earlier post, all of the debt issued to cover these deficits is repaid out of reduced future expenditures of the pay-as-you-go system. (As interest accrues on the debt, more debt is issued to cover that expense, and all of it is eventually paid back.) At no point in this decades-long transition do income taxes have to rise to retire this debt.

So I don't think that people on the Left would believe that any reform on the horizon necessarily would have this "salutary" benefit that Arnold is ascribing to it.

In his question for discussion, Arnold asks:

Has there been an analysis undertaken of the distributional effects of a shift toward privatization?

Yes. A very good collection of analyses are presented in The Distributional Aspects of Investment Based Social Security Reform, edited by Martin Feldstein and Jeffrey Liebman. The editors served in the Reagan and Clinton administrations, respectively, and the contributors reflect a wide range of opinions.

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