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In an article with the title, "Exuberant Palestinians Rush to Gaza as Last Israelis Depart: Some Jewish Synagogues Vandalized In a Day Mostly Free of Violence," The Washington Post provides an account of what occurred to synogagues in Gaza today, after the last Israelis left:

In some of the former settlements, Palestinians scuffled occasionally amid the rubble, prompting police to intervene with batons and warning shots. But the day was largely free of violence, although the former synagogue buildings that the Israeli government decided to leave intact were vandalized with hands and hammers. At least four of the roughly two dozen were set ablaze early in the day.

Take a look, via Powerline, at what happened. To suggest that a picture is worth only a thousand words fails to consider how empty those words can sometimes be.

Guest-blogging over at AndrewSullivan.com is Walter Kirn, who takes the occasion of his first post to question our nation's response to terrorism:

I'll start with something that's been bugging me but that I haven't had a forum to write about: this idea, almost universally agreed upon, that Americans mustn't let terrorism change our way of life. I disagree. Our way of life had its problems before Osama appeared, and we probably could have stood to change it then, but now that we have the added impetus of being collectively attacked in ways that we never dreamed about in past years, I think it's high time that we did a few thing differently that maybe we should have done already ... Like, say, spread out a little geographically.

Reading a bit between the lines of Walter's post, the lesson we are not learning is that we need to separate out two distinct phenomena. The first is that the quality of life in a world with terrorism is substantially worse than the quality of life in a world without it. At this point, that issue is settled, and pretending that we live in the other world doesn't make us better off and it doesn't help us win. The second is that, even in a world with terrorism, we can make ourselves better off by reacting optimally to our (new) environment. I discussed two ways in which society will evolve--in response to the newly inflated price of congestion and anonymity in an age of suicide [sic] bombers--in this earlier post.

There is a time and a place for making things harder on ourselves than we might otherwise have them, particularly in wartime when we need to signal to our enemies that we are a more determined foe and stronger adversary than they think. (Consider the now famous example of James Stockdale as a POW in Vietnam.)

Effective signals necessarily make life more difficult (in the near term) than it would have to be, but not everything that makes life more difficult is an effective signal. To be an effective signal, the action has to be associated with some characteristic that is hard to observe and that would change our enemies' assessment of us. We want to signal our resolve to protect our Constitutional republic and our society based on liberty. Like anything else, we want to economize on the signal--to pick the signals that give us the most protection from or intimidation of the enemy at the lowest cost.

Walter mentions an example of poor signaling near the end of his post:

There's a price for supersaturating small areas with people, wealth, and technology, and now we're paying it by trying to secure in thousands of ways targets that are inviting as they come. This folly of rebuilding the World Trade Center proves that we'd rather be proud and stubborn than safe. Here we go piling up the blocks again just to show how bloodied but unbowed we are instead of learning our lesson and reshaping things.

He is right. Our enemy doesn't care how proud and stubborn we are, or even how much sorrow we feel for what happened on 9/11. What we do at Ground Zero should, first and foremost, honor the victims of 9/11 (and only 9/11). If there are new office buildings to be built, they ought to reflect the needs of the post-9/11 world. The best idea I have read about the non-memorial part of Ground Zero is to insist that the United Nations relocate its headquarters to those new buildings. Putting the UN there doesn't make the re-building an effective signal per se--it just stops the building of a large office tower there from being a childish dare to hit us again without being much better protected than we were before.

What are some affirmative signals that we could be sending? I would start by taxing every product whose revenues flow back to terror sponsors, with the revenues redistributed progressively back to the taxpaying population through the income tax. Given our current enemies, that means a pretty large tax on oil. I'm sure we could come up with other suggestions.

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The reported death toll from this morning's explosions in London is listed as "at least two," but that seems likely to rise. Prime Minister Blair asserted that it was "reasonably clear" that these attacks were designed to coincide with the opening of the G-8 summit in Scotland. He also captured the essence of what terrorists are about with this statement:

He added that it was "particularly barbaric" that the attacks had occurred during a summit intended to aid people in developing nations.

I'm glad to see that the plan is to continue with the summit, even if the Prime Minister cannot attend all of it. An AP story also reported the following:

Recent intelligence indicated that London was considered a prime target for Islamic extremists, in part because al-Qaida was having difficulty getting people into the United States, the official said.

If true, it's good to see that homeland security is also stepping up to its challenge, at least in part.

My prayers and condolences are with the people of London this morning.

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Congratulations to London for its winning bid to host the 2012 Olympics. The Samwick family plans to attend, and we'll be live-blogging it on our cell phone, PDA, wristwatch, or whatever the latest gadgetry turns out to be.

I think Londoners are some of the best sports fans anywhere. Judging the English based on the conduct of soccer hooligans would be a bit like judging Americans based on the end zone of an Oakland Raiders game. I recall being in London during the 1994 World Cup, when England failed to qualify but the U.S. and Ireland were in and doing well. I drank for free that week in every pub.

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At Dartmouth, as at many other institutions, incoming first-year students are assigned an optional reading assignment over the summer. In the spring of 2002, the Dean of First-Year Students asked me if I would assign the book and give a public lecture on it during Orientation Week in September. I was happy to oblige, and, being an economist, I naturally thought of Capitalism and Freedom by Milton Friedman as the one book from my field that I would have all college students read. But I figured that Free to Choose, which was co-authored with his wife, Rose, and covers many of the same insights, would be a more inviting title. So that's what I assigned to the Class of 2006--a primer on how to use basic economic insights to study all manner of social interactions. The slides from the presentation are here.

Of the many topics in the book, the Friedmans' discussion of educational reform in general, and vouchers for primary and secondary school in particular, generated the most interest from the students. I'll share my views on that topic in a later post. To end the lecture, which took place a little over a year after 9/11, I tried to think of how to use the insights from the book to think about the War on Terror.

The core of economics is optimization under scarcity--it is the science of tradeoffs and how markets dictate the relative prices at which those tradeoffs can occur. An economist's analysis of the world after 9/11 would begin by asking, "What aspects of the way our society exists have seen their relative prices increase?" I offered two:

  1. Congestion: Economies of scale often dictate that congestion is efficient. Examples include densely populated cities, tall office and residential buildings, busy highways, and transportation and communication hubs with near universal access. That same efficiency now makes them vulnerable as targets. A strategically placed assault can cripple many systems or kill many people all at once.
  2. Anonymity: This has historically been one of the best protections afforded by large, competitive markets. I can purchase the goods and services that I need and sell my services without having to introduce myself personally to the other parties in the transaction. Very few of these counter-parties collect anything more than rudimentary information about me. In other contexts, I routinely drive on roads near cars whose drivers I do not know and travel on planes with people I've never met. I agree that some of the best transactions are the ones that are not anonymous, but the option to transact anonymously makes a lot of interactions more efficient. It also allows terrorists to strike with a greatly reduced risk of apprehension or reprisal.

After 9/11, we would have to find ways to go about our business with less congestion and less anonymity. Not zero--but definitely less. To become less congested, we would need to spread out our people and assets more evenly in the country and add some redundancies in our networks. Managing this process would be a job primarily for planners and engineers. I don't follow the relevant sectors well enough to know whether there have been changes in residential and commercial planning since 9/11, nor do we yet have good information on whether there has been a change in migration from more to less densely settled parts of the country.

To become less anonymous, we would need to increase our collection of real-time data and develop stringent privacy standards for how it is handled. Managing this process would be a job primarily for those who manage the access points to networks--whether for electronics, communications, transportation, or finance. And, appropriately, many of the most contentious issues would be adjudicated in courts. The Patriot Act, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and the recently passed Intelligence Reform are all attempts, at least in part, to redefine the concept of anonymity.

Some of what we are discovering in this ongoing process is that people differ in how price sensitive they are to changes in the relative prices of congestion and anonymity. Some people are very price sensitive--they would do with quite a bit less of each in response to small increases in their costs. Others are hardly price sensitive at all--they wouldn't change their behavior at all even in the face of large increases in their costs. For ordinary things we consume, a market would accommodate our different preferences. This is possible to some extent with congestion and anonymity, but because we are all interconnected in at least some of the things we do, a large amount of it must be negotiated in the political environment.

Thanks to Roland Patrick for suggesting that the lecture might make for a good post to the blog.

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I finished reading America's Secret War. In an earlier post, I took some issue with the author's claim that:

We went into Iraq to isolate and frighten the Saudi government into cracking down on the flow of money to Al Qaeda.

I don't think that the book "proves" that this was the purpose of the war. In that earlier post, I conjectured that the strategic benefit of Iraq would have to be evaluated based on how it hastened the arrival of democracy in Iran. I read the book with this alternative in mind. On pages 250-1, the book suggests that we were in a deal with Iran--to obtain access to Iran's intelligence on Al Qaeda, we toppled Saddam in favor of a government that would have a Shiite majority. Here are the relevant two paragraphs:

Iran wanted the United States to invade Iraq. It did everything to induce the United States to do so. Its strategy was to provide the United States with intelligence that would persuade the United States that invasion was both practical and necessary. There were many intelligence channels operating between Teheran and the United States, but the single most important was Ahmad Chalabi, the Defense Department's candidate for President of Iraq. Chalabi, a Shiite who traveled extensively to Iran before the war, was the head of the Iraqi National Council, which provided key intelligence to the United States on Iraq, including on WMD. But what it did not provide the U.S. was most important: intelligence on Iranian operations in Iraq or on Iraqi preparations for a guerrilla war. Chalabi made it look easy. That's what the Iranians wanted.

The primary vector for Chalabi's information was not the CIA, but OSP under Abe Shulsky. OSP could not have missed Chalabi's Iranian ties, nor could they have believed the positive intelligence he was giving them. Bus OSP and Shulsky were playing a deeper game. These were old Cold Warriors. For them, the key to the collapse of the Soviet Union was the American alliance with China. Splitting the enemy was the way to go, and the fault line in the Islamic world was the Sunni-Shiite split. The United States, from their point of view, was not playing the fool by accommodating Iran's wishes on Iraq. Apart from all of its other virtues, they felt that the invasion would create a confluence of interests between the U.S. and Iran,

which would have enormously more value in the long run than any problems posed by the Iraqi invasion. From the standpoint of OSP--and therefore Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld--Chalabi's intelligence or lack of it was immaterial. The key was the alignment with Iran as another lever against Saudi Arabia. And there were more immediate threats as well.

Again, not proof, but an attempt to tell a coherent story in hindsight with still limited information on the government's internal decision-making. The excerpt also reflects the author's writing style, and the book makes for an interesting perspective on the War on Terror from its start through a few months ago.

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