During Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Washington last week the two governments announced the revision of the Defense Guidelines. The Guidelines provide a framework for military cooperation within the US-Japan alliance; they were first signed in 1978 and later revised in 1997.  See Sheila Smith and “Sak” Sakoda for their thoughtful analysis on what the revised Guidelines encompass. This is their first revision in 18 years. How big a deal it it?

Some observers call the revisions remarkable: Jeffrey Hornung, for example, writes the Guidelines could produce a “truly transformed” alliance. Others such as CATO’s Justin Logan are unimpressed. “The new standards,” writes Doug Bandow, “affirm what should have been obvious all along—Japan will help America defend Japan.”

It’s all in the context. When viewed on the continuum of normal great-power behavior, the changes represented by the new Defense Guidelines are barely perceptible; a highly unequal alliance may become slightly less unequal, and a highly dovish country may become slightly less dovish. But when viewed as part of the evolution of Japanese national security policy and the US-Japan alliance, the Guidelines are a significant step.

Indeed, the Guidelines may be too significant a step from the standpoint of the reluctant Japanese people. Polls show that in Japan about half of the people oppose the revisions. The success of even this modest move toward a greater Japanese role will also depend on debates in the Japanese Diet about the interpretation of collective security. As Adam Liff writes, “Washington and Tokyo are in principle agreeing to do things before domestic debate within Japan over their constitutionality and legality has run its course.” The conversation, in other words, is just beginning.