Event Recording: Conversations on South Asia with Jessica Namakkal

Transcript for Conversations on South Asia with Jessica Namakkal

https://youtu.be/_Cw1yYDOe-k

>> Lhost: All right! Hello everyone and welcome to the April event in the Conversations on South Asia series here at Dartmouth College. It’s wonderful to see so many friends, colleagues, and students in the audience today. Thanks for coming out.

I’m really looking forward to today’s conversation which features a great lineup of panelists, who will all be commenting on Jessica Namakkal’s book Unsettling Utopia: The Making and Unmaking of French India, which was published in the Columbia Studies in International and Global History Series with Columbia University Press last year in 2021.

For those of you who are new to the series, I’m Elizabeth Lhost, a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Society of Fellows and a lecturer in the Department of History at Dartmouth College, and I’m one of the organizers of this year’s series. It’s my great pleasure to be hosting and moderating today’s discussion with all of you.

Before we begin, I would like to acknowledge that Dartmouth College, which hosts this series, sits on the ancestral, unceded lands of the Abenaki people, who belong to the Wabanaki confederacy. I would also like to thank our series’ sponsors: the Bodas Family Academic Programming Fund, the Asian Societies, Cultures, and Languages Program, and the Department of History at Dartmouth. Without their support the series would really not be possible.

I would also like to mention the support and assistance the series receives from Professor Douglas Haynes and our Bodas Family Undergraduate South Asian Studies Fellow Sri Sathvik Rayala. Thank you to both of them for their help.

Today we have four panelists joining us for the discussion. So, in order to give them the maximum amount of time possible, I’m trying to keep my introductions brief today.

So our first speaker will be the author Jessica Namakkal, who is an Associate Professor of the Practice of International Comparative Studies, Gender, Sexuality & Feminist Studies, and History at Duke University’s Trinity College of Arts and Sciences. In addition to Unsettling Utopia, which was published last year, Dr. Namakkal has published articles like “Decolonizing Marriage and the Family: The Lives and Letters of Ida, Benoy, and Indira Sarkar” in the Journal of Women’s History and “The Terror of Decolonization: Exploring Pondicherry’s Goonda Raj” in the journal Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies. Dr. Namakkal is currently working on two projects, one that focuses on decolonizing cults and another related to a history of sexuality, race-mixing, and colonialism in the twentieth century. 

So, after the author has had the chance to introduce the book to all of us, we’ll have comments and questions from our three panelists, beginning with Sana Aiyar.

Dr. Aiyar is an Associate Professor of History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Her research focuses on the regional and transnational histories of South Asia and South Asian diasporas in the Indian Ocean basin. Her publications include Indians in Kenya: The Politics of Diaspora, which was published with Harvard University Press in 2015 and articles and book chapters, including “Revolutionaries, Maulvis, and Monks: Burma’s Khilafat Moment,”  which was published in the volume Oceanic Islam: Muslim Universalism and European Imperialism, as well as “Empire, Race, and the Indians in Colonial Kenya’s Contested Public Political Sphere, 1919–1923,” which was published in Africa: Journal of the International African Institute. Her current projects examine encounters of African soldiers and South Asian civilians in the Second World War and migration, religious and ethnic politics, nationalism, and anticolonial activism across India and Myanmar during the 1930s.

Our second discussant Ananya Jahanara Kabir is Professor of English Literature in the Department of English at King’s College in London. In 2018, she was the winner of India’s Infosys Prize for the Humanities, and in 2019, won the Humboldt Research Prize from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in Germany. Dr. Kabir’s work focuses on creolization as a historical process and cultural theory. She is the author of Territory of Desire: Representing the Valley of Kashmir, which was published in 2009 and Partition’s Post-Amnesias: 1947, 1971 and Modern South Asia, published in 2013. In May 2020, Dr. Kabir and the Franco-Tamil Ari Gautier co-founded the cultural platform Le Thinnai Kreyolk, which, through which they promote their vision of a multilingual, plural and creolized India. For the next academic year, 2022-23, Dr. Kabir will hold a British Academy Senior Research Fellowship to focus on writing her monograph ‘Alegropolitics: Creolizing Connection on the Afromodern Dance Floor.’

Our final discussant will be Jayita Sarkar, who is currently Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University and will very soon be an Associate Professor of Economic & Social History at the University of Glasgow beginning in July 2022. Her book Ploughshares and Swords: India’s Nuclear Program in the Global Cold War, which is forthcoming with Cornell University Press later this year, examines India’s nuclear and space programs through the prisms of technopolitics and territoriality while focusing on their consequences for democratic accountability. Her new book-length project, Partition Machine, investigates the travel itineraries of the idea and practice of territorial divisions from the borderlands of South Asia to the world.

So after each of the panelists has made their remarks, we will then open the floor to questions from the audience and invite you to use the Q&A feature in Zoom to submit your questions. And with that, I’ll pass it off to you Jessica. 

>> Namakkal: Thank you so much, and thanks to Elizabeth for organizing this and all of the talks, many of which I’ve attended and have learned so much from. So, thank you for that and to all of our panelists, who have taken the time to engage and taken time out of their day to be here with us. Thank you so much to everyone. So I’m going to keep this brief to about ten minutes, as directed.

To just talk about the, the sort of the scope of the project and share a few maps, because, as I learned while researching and doing this, maps are sort of fundamental to understanding really what, what is French India. So let’s start there actually and let me share my screen with you.

Okay.

Okay, so what is French India? There’s no subtitles. Okay, so what is French India? French India was a lot of things throughout time, and that’s one of the points of the book is to really think about what French India was in relation to the scope of the making of what we know is India today. And so, just to briefly give you a sense of time and space, the French arrived in India in the 17th century around the same time everybody else was arriving as a, as a trade company, the French East India Company. And, you know, they went to, to trade and to set up ports. There are lots of interesting books about this, and the majority of work that sort of happens on the French territories in India are focused on this earlier period, although there aren’t a lot of them.

And, and, and so there’s, there’s a moment for the French in the, in the 17th-18th centuries, where you, they are considering expanding their presence in South Asia, right. And, and, for, you know, in French historiography, French India is something of a, of a nostalgic failure, it, an imperial failure in that they, they sort of have this memory of we could have, we could have been the British in India, right. So, it stands out, and so it was, this is really important to the 20th century, which I’m working on here, because one of the reasons these five small territories of French India are really important to the French is that they hold cultural meaning to them, right, that they have a presence in this huge cultural, political, economic space that has been dominated by their, by their foes the British, right. So that really sets the stage for what I do in this book, which thinks about what made French India and how does that help us sort of reflect on what happened in the rest of India during this period of what I call decolonization but I’ll get into that in a second.

So the territories and you see a map here. This map was made by a photographer named Tim Stallman, just to give him credit. And, and what you see here is these five areas, now the thing to know about, your, you see four of them and then a line up to the fifth, which is Chandannagar, which is a suburb of Calcutta today and, and was at the time too. So if you know the geography of South Asia, which many of you probably do here, you’ll notice they’re very spread out from each other.

Pondicherry is the headquarters. It was the head, it was the headquarters for the entirety of the French presence in India. It’s about 100 kilometers south of Chennai or Madras, and that’s important because in early, you know, in the 17th-18th centuries, the British and the French are sort of battling between these, these two areas.

Again, you know not to get into the weeds here because I have ten minutes, but this is really important, when we think about the historiography of India and think about how much of this is focused in the north, right, or areas north of South India, all over the place, and to think that there’s so much happening in South India that hasn’t been part of the story of the making of modern India, right. So that’s one of the, one of the goals of the project here. So, there’s five territories. Pondicherry. Karaikal is just south of Pondicherry. Yanam is up in Andhra Pradesh. Mahe is in Kerala. So you know people are speaking different languages, right, and, of course, we have Chandannagar by Calcutta, which becomes a really important point in, in the beginning of anticolonial organizing in the early 20th century, because, of course, Calcutta is really the center of a lot of the anticolonialism that’s happening.

So that’s the first map. The second map I want to show you is of Pondicherry itself. So the one on my left, the territory of Pondicherry, which you see there is actually how Pondicherry was divided up between British and French territory. So all of the black, that’s not water. The gray is water. The black is British territory, and the white areas are the French parts of Pondicherry. And this is just Pondicherry that you can sort of see on the cover of the book behind Elizabeth there, that there’s a rock border through a lot of these areas where there isn’t a water border separating the British and the French areas. So, you know, we have these situations where there are rocks down the middle of villages separating British and French India. After 1947 when the, when the British leave, French India remains India, remains, remains French, and British India becomes India, and those borders don’t change, right. So, that’s something really important to know too. 

The last thing, the last map, I want to show you there is of the central area of Pondicherry. So that’s right on the ocean there, and it’s just, can you even see my pointer right here, it’s this area within here. And I want to show you this to show you that the area below this canal on this yellow, this blue line is racially segregated. And in practice that didn’t always work, but it translates into a privileged area that was called the “white town” and above it is “black town,” Ville Noire and Ville Blanche. And they remain economically segregated today. There was never a much, enough of a European presence to have a pure sort of racial segregation happening, but there were all kinds of spatial segregating practices that were happening, and those have continued today.

So these borders are not widely discussed. It’s interesting they’re actually still there today, so in this Pondicherry one, Pondicherry today, and if I go back here for a moment, Pondicherry today is ruled as a, is governed as an union territory, except for Chandannagar, which voted to join the Indian Union in 1949. The other four territories remain an administrative unit, so they’ve, they’ve retained their separate identities from their surrounding states, and that was part of the negotiation that happened. 

And if you look at Pondicherry here, those borders still exist. They’re not, they’re not securitized in the same way that they were during this period. But if you are going to Pondicherry, if you’ve been there, you will know there’s a lot of traffic stanchions that will say you’re now leaving the Union Territory of Pondicherry and entering Tamil Nadu. So, you can still sort of see their presence and I, you know, I’m not an ethnographer, so I didn’t do this but I’ve heard it conversationally from people that, you know, there is still some sense of policing around them, especially because of the import of alcohol and the taxes differing, but you know any, any borders and excuse for the police to be, be monitoring people right.

So the last picture I want to show you and then I’ll just speak for a moment about the larger themes of the book is that, you know, these, these borders are not widely discussed. There’s really no scholarship on them, and this is a picture at one of those borders in 1952. And what you see is a line of French policemen on the French India-India border, so this is after independence, so India, French India. And they’re holding back a huge crowd of people who are protesting the continued rule of the French in India. So in 1947, after the British left, in French India, there’s a law that’s passed immediately that says you can’t have protests in French India, right. They don’t want anyone sort of calling for independence. They, and in fact, both governments, both the Indian Government, the French Government sort of felt this way because they wanted to do this as a diplomatic process, right. They didn’t really want the activity on the ground, yet, you know, you can’t, you can’t put down the people like that. And, and so you’ve got these huge crowds, and the police become the border here. And it’s a, it’s a visual example of how borders are, can, can be porous, how they also can become less so right just even with with the use of bodies to put them there.

So there’s all of these things happening, happening around the borders. This is not an isolated incident, as I show in the book. There’s a lot of activity. And somehow this isn’t part of the story of twentieth-century India, right. So one of my questions was why, why don’t we talk about this, right. Why isn’t this important to understanding, I’ll stop that there, the, the making of twentieth-century India, especially when you know, the question of who is, who is a citizen, who is an Indian is really at the basis of a lot of what happens in twentieth-century India? 

So, so just to give a few points, I mean that’s a little bit, there’s a lot of other things going on the book which we’ll hear about, but to give, to give a broader sense very quickly, I went into this project thinking about the question of what is decolonization and especially in India, a place that wasn’t fighting for decolonization but was fighting for independence, right. They were fighting for sovereignty. The arguments were about anticolonialism, and it wasn’t so much a project partly just fit, you know, in terms of the theory of decolonization being sort of a different thing in the 1940s, then it became after Frantz Fanon wrote The Wretched of the Earth in 1961 or after it was published. 

So my sort of thinking about this, what does it mean for the people of French India to be thinking about liberation, to thinking about sovereignty. What is sovereignty to them? And my goal in the book was really to center French Indians, right, and to ask the question what is a French Indian. Is it the same thing as an Indian? Is it the same thing as a French person legally, culturally, socially, all the sort of ways that we can do this? And think about what is what, what, what did it mean to them to live in this independent India and to think about what their futures may be.

A key point to this is understanding that in French India, the French allowed people, and you know this didn’t always work but, to become citizens of France. Nobody in the British Empire was a citizen, right. People were subjects of the Crown, so you really have people living a different existence, to some extent, in the French areas than in the British areas. So, so that was one of my big questions here.

I also wanted to push back against a tendency in political and some cultural histories to naturalize state sponsored decolonization. So, I argue in the book that decolonization should also be understood, not just as a moment, but as a movement, and one that does not have a linear or upwards trajectory, right. So to think what are the different forms of decolonization, right, and, and then the overarching argument is that sometimes writing histories of something has tended to, to freeze them in time. and I wanted to think methodologically about a way that we can understand these movements as dynamic and even if we write about them as a historical moment, how do we understand them as continuing on. 

So the way I do this in the book, and this will be my last point, is to look at the continuation of a colonial presence in French India. Of course, independence in French India is very different from British India because there’s no partition. There was no, you know years of traumatic violence and migration and the way that comes with partition and state making, right. But something else is happening. And so my suggestion here, right, is that, where we have this space where we don’t have these huge state processes, the colonial institutions are venerated and live on in a way that isn’t really acknowledged.

So, I turned to really cultural and spiritualism to understand how those two are political processes and how those continue on in today’s French India. So I do this by looking at two institutions. One is the Aurobindo Ashram, which is in Pondicherry and the intentional community of Auroville, which is just outside, although their territory overlaps a little bit.

Auroville has been in the news recently, so perhaps people know about them a little more than before, and I’m happy in Q&A to, to talk about it more. But they were a project. The ashram was established in 1926. The center of that ashram is Sri Aurobindo Ghosh, who was a Bengali freedom fighter, who took refuge in French India to flee British, British persecution. His right hand woman was a woman named Mirra Alfassa, who became known as The Mother, who is a woman from France. And they ran this ashram till his death in 1950. It’s still, it’s still very popular. It’s successful. It continues today.

And in 1968, The Mother started this project called Auroville that was meant to, to take up the project of the ashram and build this universal city. So today there’s about 3,000, between three and 4,000 people that live there, and people from all over the world live there.

And ultimately, what I do is I look at just like my, my consideration of what is a French Indian, what is there, what are their projects, what are their dreams, what are they fighting for. I also thought about this, this territory that had been under French rule, that had been nearby and how, what it means for the people of this area to then have this intentional community built on land that was bought from them very cheaply and which they now provide the labor for, right. So I use this term I call settler utopianism to, to, to really think through and look at the stories and the reasoning that the people who came from Europe and from Australia and from North America brought to the building of Auroville to sort of, to justify them building it there, and to continuing a project of colonial land extraction and labor, and labor, and labor extraction, right,  that they’re, they’re sort of employing the same things. 

And because it’s in postcolonial India, I use the language and the theories of settler colonialism. I’m not calling it a settler colony, but I’m suggesting that the people there are employing these tactics that are important to settler colonialism, to think about. And that’s how I look at what sort of, what happens after the French have left India.

Okay, I will stop there. Thank you everyone, and I’m really looking forward to your comments.

>> Aiyar: Thanks very much, Jessica, for that. I was actually a little nervous I might be going over some material that you’ve already spoken about, but I think that you’ve really set us up well to dive into what I, you know, we thought were the most interesting aspects of this. 

And I thought that I would, you know, organized my comments as sort of talking a little bit about the methodological approach that you use, then speaking a little bit about your historiographical intervention and then sort of ending with what I think are your main analytical contributions and then I have three questions that are related to each of those.

Um, so in the introduction of this book, Jessica talks about her approach as being an approach of minor history, to try and sort of disrupt what she calls major history and to look at minor histories as site of resistance. And, as is sort of obvious from the comments that she opened with, you know, the major history for British is British India, the project of colonialism, led by the British. And, in some ways sort of the French colonial project in India is the, is the sort of benign aspect, right, in the major sort of strands of historiography and also nationalist thinking. Now, in sort of centering French colonialism and putting sort of Pondicherry as the site of this resistance of, you know, sort of the, sort of minor history, I think that there are few things that really come through in those early chapters that felt quite distinctively French and different in some ways to the British.

One is this idea of French citizenship that you alluded to in your opening comments where from as early as 1881, you know, the colonial French subject could opt voluntarily, but all in quotes, for full French citizenship. And, in some ways, once you became a French citizen living in Pondicherry, it was more democratic because then you could have universal suffrage. In fact, that was introduced also from quite early on.

So as much as the sort is, this is something that the French take pride on across their empire,  but it is, in fact, a far more insidious form of colonialism, because, in order to qualify for French citizenship, you had to, in fact, give up all that was, quote on quote, native, and this went to language, you know, religion, etc., conversion to Catholicism. And you know, as I was reading this, I was thinking of Gregory Mann’ work in French West Africa and also Frederick Cooper’s work on the French Union scene, you know, in the post-war context, you know how does sort of the French, how do the French sort of think about decolonization.

The French Union becomes this way of it, and this is really, you know, in a way, we see reminiscences of this in the French idea of assimilation to the diversity plural issue versus the British approach of multiculturalism, both of which put their colonial subjects and postcolonial citizens in a waiting room, so they are sort of distinct in some ways. But ultimately sort of plays out in this very interesting way in Pondicherry, in Auroville as the site of disruption, and I thought that that was really wonderful how you brought that to the forefront.

But more than that, and I think more interestingly, another way in which they show up as a site of resistance is, you know, in sort of drawing attention on the revolutionaries, both in Chandannagar and in Pondicherry were French India does become a site of refuge, and so it’s a different kind of resistance for sort of revolutionaries for whom violence, you know, in violent protest becomes idea, either in terms of ideas or actual application, the form in which their anticolonial nationalism plays out.

And, here again, your work, you know it reminded me of Tim Harper’s, you know, massive volume on Underground Asia where he’s really sort of mapping the itineraries of these refugees in exile, and it is a sort of insurgent Asia, and I think that this fits into that as well. My own work on a Buddhist monk from Burma, U Ottama, who spends a lot of time in, well initially in France and then Chandannagar, you know, there are many different sites in the Maharaja of Baroda where Aurobindo Ghosh first goes. [inaudible] is also part of that. And I think it’s really important to disrupt the nationalist sort of, you know, nonviolent nationalism historiography with some of this. 

And so as I said, you know revolution here becomes, you know, it’s violent, in contrast to the Gandhi and non-violence satyagraha. But it’s also anticolonial and distinctly religious in some ways, and I want to take up these two in the next two comments that I have.

So in South Asia historiographical intervention, you know, this is really focused on what you sort of said that you know, towards the end, you know, of this moment of independence, which is really sort of just the starting point, really, and we have to think about decolonization as, in fact, the unfinished business of independence. And here I think you really sort of are focusing on the politics of anticolonial nationalism, where the story of Pondicherry, you know as it comes, you know begins really in the book with the arrival of Aurobindo Ghosh, who, you know, seeks refuge in the French territory.

But he sort of imagines Pondicherry as a part of his revolutionary imaginary of India. And you have a very interesting discussion of the homeland and what it means for Aurobindo Ghosh, a Bengali revolutionary to settle in Pondicherry in French India and talk about his homeland. But here really I was thinking about other revolutionaries, Subramania Bharati, who, again, you sort of talk about, who during his stay in Pondicherry actually commissions a sort of sculpture, statue of India where Bharat Mata is shown to, in fact, include Burma, and you know the pallu of Bharat Mata’s sari includes Burma. And again it’s a very Hindu idea of India. 

But as you were, as you sort of are distinguishing between the French India, British India and talking about anticolonialism and the politics of anticolonial nationalism, the French are also imagining their territory as Indian, right. So, it’s not sort of the French territory of Pondicherry as a this, as distinct from India. It’s still French India. So, this idea of an Indian homeland is one that I think different historical players sort of, you know, it’s an imagined homeland, which, where there’s no agreement on in terms of the politics and who constitutes it or even the borders, but the idea of India sort of exists in a both political and apolitical way.

Now you also very sort of wonderfully show how the renunciation of this revolutionary politics takes place in the ashram with Aurobindo Ghosh and the arrival of The Mother. And you use, Jessica uses the term anticolonial colonialism to describe the both Aurobindo Ghosh’s, you know, Pondicherry stay and you know his sort of turn to complete spiritual, a sort of non-political spiritualism and sort of The Mother’s sort of visibility that, you know, rises, right, through the 30s and 40s in Pondicherry.

And Jessica makes the argument that, you know, this is anticolonial colonialism, because it’s anticolonial as far as the British are concerned. But you know The Mother and sort of the institution of the ashram, you know, Auroville eventually, have very close ties with the French colonial state. And, here again, what you do is that you then sort of turn to other, so, to, the politics of anticolonialism, then it’s not located in the ashram but, in fact, with some other players in Pondicherry. Two in particular that the book talks about other [inaudible] Subha, the communist workers, and then one convert, Catholic convert to French citizen, who have their own versions of politics, which again are placed, so this is again where that site of Pondicherry is disrupting sort of dominant narratives of nationalism.

And then, in the moment of arrival, two things happen. The French offer a referendum in terms of what happens to their colonies, you know to French India. And although Chandannagar votes overwhelmingly for integration with India, there is no referendum that is held in Pondicherry at all. And then the other, the second sort of way in which that moment of arrival plays out is that The Mother starts asking for dual citizenship here in terms of how individuals will relate to the State. 

And here, you know, there were reference, the sort of resonances of, you know, different scholarship, which I’m sure that Jayita will get into, on citizenship and the long making and unmaking of citizens that plays out in very interesting ways. But also sort of reached very rich regional histories of Kashmir, the princely states, Goa, I’m sure that Ananya will be talking about, and I think this sort of book really is an interesting intervention in this.

Now in terms of analyzing this unfinished business of independence, you know, Auroville emerges, and, you know, the last chapter, which really is the, you know, high point, I think, of this book as settler utopianism. And Pondicherry is, you know, there’s a long line of Pondicherry being imagined as a site of utopia for the revolutionaries as refuge, which is very distinct from the Auroville sort of project of spiritual settlement. But I was thinking, I know Jessica makes the argument that we have to understand this in terms of neocolonialism, right. So it’s not settler colonialism of the sort that we see in the historiography, but they are these sort of reminiscences, you know, they are sort of, it only exists because it was French India.

But I was thinking of the idea of utopia as a cosmopolitan, spiritual community that was settled on a land that of which the settlers were not indigenous. It made me actually think about Gandhi’s phoenix farms in South Africa, which again was about something new. It’s a very cosmopolitan space. And Gandhi’s phoenix farms and then Sabarmati Ashram is a space of, you know, decolonization or independence or anticolonialism, not as a political project. Gandhi’s political project occurs in different sites. But it is a project of the non-political swaraj, and I wondered if, you know, perhaps Aurobindo Ghosh’s turn away from politics could be understood in terms of that kind of Gandhian swaraj rather than only the proximity to The Mother’s, you know, sort of project of settler, of the sort of utopianism.

I’m going to end quickly with three questions. I know that we have lots, lots more to say. One is the question on minor history and the site of resistance. Who is resisting what? So, is it the historian resisting the historiography? Or, you know, are we actually able to get to, and this is sort of the second question, more of a regional history where, you know, Pondicherry is placed within the more regional history of Tamil Nadu today or Tamil history? And, you know, Bhavani Raman’s work is the one that I think of in terms of this Tamil history. But you know I really wondered why Chandannagar is the point of departure and gets integrated into Bengal. You know, there’s sort of larger regional histories of Bengal and, you know, what is it about Pondicherry that doesn’t, or does it, right? The sources, the narrative, the perspective is sort of the colonial archive to an extent, and you’re critical of that. So you know what, what of the Tamil sort of voice beyond the two communist and sort of you know [inaudible] that we hear off?

In fact, finally, sort of in terms of spiritual settlement, you raise the point that the French exceptionalism, right, the idea of French exceptionalism in terms of equality and fraternity comes through in Auroville. But what of French secularism? You know, it was very, I kept thinking about how do these ideals of the French Revolution that come through of, you know, equality, fraternity, yes, that’s how we get Auroville as a cosmopolitan sort of space where everyone can be equal. But it is inherently spiritual and how does this square away with French ideas of secularism, which are very different from the British, you know, ideal of non-interference with religious matters which, in fact, creates a kind of Indian secularism, where the state is absolutely, intimately sort of linked with projects of spiritual, religious settlement, etc.? 

And, you know, in a way, I was thinking of Auroville in terms of other huge settlements like the Radha Soami Satsang or Osho’s Ashram where it is built on the land where others, where you don’t belong, built on the labor of local labor. And that really is, in a way, and, and it claims to be non-political but very close to local sort of political heads. So, you know, does this so, although I started with saying there’s this distinction between the French and British colonial project, given the spiritualism and secularism connection, in fact, do we see in Pondicherry that the French India on this issue of religion and spirituality was in fact closer to the British colonial project than perhaps we started off with? 

And I will end there. It’s been, it was a really wonderful book, and thank you very much for writing it, and I’m looking forward to our discussion! 

>> Jahanara Kabir: So I think it’s my turn to take up the baton and indeed it’s, this is a landmark book in, in my opinion. I’m going to, I’m going to actually read out from the final lines, which I think are very strong, and justifiably so, in the claims that you’re making, Jessica, for this work. And I quote the pages of this book are meant as a disruption of ideas, spaces and temporalities. Of the commonly told narratives of colonial and postcolonial history, shedding light on uncommon relationships that also disrupt postcolonial national disreliance on the boundedness of race and nation. I offer this disruption in an effort to further the larger project of decolonizing history. 

And you already spoke to the kind of centrality of decolonization and what it means as a theme and a kind of effort of your work and, and Sana spoke, picked up the idea of the minor, you know, the minor history in that which is, which is forming the disruptive kind of, you know, sort of disrupt vector I would say.

But I am, I wanted to take, take up a few more issues which I think for me arise from this, this claim that you make, which is, as I said, justifiably made. The book really sort of like, what can I say, enters into a sort of reified space of what we think are the cutting edge and and even accepted approaches to South Asia, and it certainly filled a huge vacuum, for me, when I was trying to build a new kind of like a space for myself, clearer space myself my own research. I’m not a historian. I’m a literary critic and cultural critic and historian. And I like to go off in wild directions throughout my career, you know, and in that, if you want to do that, you need people who are doing a really important, a close work in other disciplines, notably history. You need people to open the archive for the literary critic to step in because we don’t, we, our archives, we, of course, use the notion of archives, but it’s somewhat different, and we need that other archival opening, clearing of the space, and setting up certain counter arguments to receive norms in order for us to feel confident in what we are stepping forward to do. 

And so I also liked very much the spirit in which you open the book where you said, the number of people doing work on French India is small but powerful. And you know this, the sense of a small band of people who have worked together to give us a few but important books, for example, I’ve got some of them here. You mentioned some of them. We’ve got Jyoti’s, you know, Jyoti Mohan’s book Claiming India. We have Diana Agmon’s book of A Colonial Affair. We even have tomes, very difficult for non-historians to go through, but diligently, we must, such as Aniruddha Ray’s work. And all these books, you know, are very important so that someone like me can understand the context, you know. I’m working, for example, as you know, on on our common friend and colleague Ari Gautier’s book, books. He’s a, he’s a historical novelist of French India. Where do I go to understand what he’s writing about, you know? And it’s through him that I encountered your work and, indeed, the work of all the other people that I’ve just picked up and, and, and bought in the pandemic period and that was my education. 

But of all these books, yours is different because it takes us, as Sana also said, and, into the kind of like, into the moment where things changed, so the moment that kind of abuts onto the contemporary and the moment, therefore, that is also the moment of questions arising for someone like me, who is a literary critic interested in thinking about postcoloniality and how the afterlife or continuing life of French India, you know, helps us complicate again some, some pretty settled notions of what is the postcolonial in South Asia.

So for sure, I think, the small and powerful band that you’ve talked about is to be, you know, we have to, we have to reckon with this, with this work as a composite but within that because you have done something slightly different you’ve engaged with a moment that perhaps goes beyond the bounds of what is historical, and it’s really moving to the contemporary. And that’s,  that’s why your book gives us another angle into, into the shared set of concerns around how do we understand French India. 

And what you’ve done is, here again, which is very interesting, is you’ve used these, as you said, these three narratives, different, intertwined narratives, which the documentary that you talk, that you start with talking about the documentary about French India made by French people two years, barely two years, after Pondicherry has become absorbed into India. There are three worlds, and you show how those three words, particularly the third world, which is the world of ashram and Auroville, are very deeply intimately intertwined with those other words, which are of kind of French, French India and Tamil French India. 

And so what’s really important is, again as Sana pointed out, that final chapter which pushes all those detailed stuff you’re doing to tell us about how French, French India and Tamil French India came into being, including those milestones of you know, French, the French State inviting Indians to renounce aspects of their traditional, you know, culture and become  French and all those milestones you talked about. 

But the point is that you’re pushing forward and bringing us into the ‘60s, which is when most of us think of nation building in India happening in a completely different way, and you are really shining a spotlight to stuff that’s happening pretty centrally because Pondicherry is situated bang in the middle of the Deccan, and it’s not, you know, while we can, we can say you know, we can say similar stories can be said about say the Lakshadweep or Andamans, it’s kind of in the heart of the peninsula and on the coastline. And, therefore, you know, it can’t be invisibilized. We can’t not talk about, we can’t not want to know what’s going on there, but we don’t know how to know. We don’t know anything. We don’t know where to go. We don’t know the language. We don’t know where the archives are. You do a fantastic job of showing us the scattered archives, which isn’t, you know, all over, you know where do we even begin stitching the archives together.

And so, you know, that scattering which characterizes French India, you make a bonus point out of that, you know. You actually say scattered and fragmented and disjointed the whole thing, maybe, but actually let’s start from there, because that is the meaning of your wanting to talk about minor histories, minor methods, minor, the margins, which are as, as you say constructed, as the center.

So for me, this was really um, I think this was one of the key methodological advances of your book that you’re not frustrated by the scattered nature of the material dealing with, including the territories itself, which, as you showed in the maps, even Pondicherry itself is an enclave of enclaves, you know. It’s a fragment of fragments. So, you know you, you actually say, well that’s the way it is. What do we make of that experience? What does it do to people who live in those spaces when their villages are divided by rock boundaries? So, you know, you’ve managed really to, to say well that’s the state of play. How do we write the history that deals with these fragments and put them straight into, you know, how we rethink centrality? 

So the minor is not just useful because it remains minor. The minor is like a lever to take us to another like perspective, all together, on what we thought was central, and so we reassess the whole system. And actually that’s pretty much also I think what I found was important, when you say India is not a settler colony, but imperial settlements were common throughout South Asia. And from there, you actually take Auroville itself as a, you know, a latter day settlement of this kind. 

Now what you do there is then make us rethink settler colonialism itself. So we don’t have to say, this is another kind of thing going on in India. We actually go back to the theoretical understanding of settler colonialism as a phenomenon, and we have to rethink it because you’ve written this great book, which has all the evidence, you know, to help us do that. So I think these are the methodological moves that you make that are actually really key to thinking about the utility of the world for the rest of us.

I really like that part when you are going empirically into thinking about the fences that were constructed around the enclaves by the British. And then, people are saying, but are these fences like demarcating the British from the French or the French from the British. I mean that kind of, you know, that sort of, you know, this is a sort of realization of the disruption of certainties. This is why your book is disrupting everything because even though that granular level you’re showing how these very strong statements made by these imperial powers were totally like ambivalent because you don’t know, actually, what is the, what is demarcating what from what.

So um I think I’ve, I’m surely coming up to my ten minutes, and we want so many, we have Jayita to also say her part. So, I think what I want to say is I’ll just leave us with a few questions, which of course, we are all, we were all asked to talk about questions and bring questions. One of my questions have already been stolen by Sana because, of course, I too wanted to have a bit broader sense of what is this outlier Chandannagar. You know, how do we like, how do we reckon with the decisions that were maken, made by Chandannagar, by the people of Chandannagar, which was so kind of like, you know, like off pace in a way from the rest of French India? Is it because of Bengal, or you know, whatever? So your views on that would be interesting, of course.

But then I thought, maybe also what I want to ask is then thinking, thinking about Pondicherry then in its sort of Southern space and how it would connect up with the, yeah absolutely, the history of Portuguese India, because, as you show, even the early phase of creating a French kind of person in India was so linked with the people, the Métis, you know, women who are already the product of Portuguese and Indian, you know, kind of interactions. So there’s a kind of very early, a foundational kind of input of the Portuguese in India. 

And Ari, Ari, the work that Ari and I have done on the Le Thinnai Kreyolk, we go back to that a lot, even in the language. When you, you know, when Ari’s book talks about the creoles of Pondicherry, you can see that even that the surnames they hold, they’re Portuguese. They’re Iberian surnames. So there’s a lot of like this, the lived understanding that somewhere Portuguese-ness is part of this picture.

And then, of course, there’s a temporality because Portugal cedes Goa around the same time, officially, as India, as, as India absorbs, you know, French India, French enclaves. So there’s something there, which I think would make for a very interesting story, maybe. I know you’re working on other things now, but this would be another great follow up book.

And finally, of course, I must ask you to tell us a little bit about how you are rethinking or maybe you’ve returned to the notion of creolization, which, in your book you kind of closed off a little bit because, at a certain point, you did say that the situation is quite different. I think I’ve earmarked the page. And you’ve said, can’t find it now. But, you know, you know, exactly where, you know, you, you, you, you say that what’s going on in, with creolization in the rest of French India doesn’t quite hold in India. And so, you know, not, and you kind of leave it there, though we talk, you talk a lot about the creole groups and creolized groups. So I don’t know whether hanging out together with all of us these past two years, we’ve had so many, you know, we’ve learnt a lot together, I don’t know whether you would be thinking differently or opening that question again of how you felt there could be a place for thinking about Creole Indians through Pondicherry.

So, I’ll stop there. Thanks again for this brilliant book and, and looking forward to, to, to the, to the rest of the discussion. Thanks.

>> Sarkar: Frankly, I just want to listen to Jessica’s responses instead of sharing my thoughts, but I will keep my comments quite short, so we can hear what you think about all the things that Sana and Ananya has raised.

So thank you Jessica, once again, for, for writing Unsettling Utopia. It was a gripping read about the ongoing processes of decolonization in South Asia. And it was really interesting and exciting to see how you’re challenging the conventional narratives of what imperial exits, exits in plural, mean and the emergence of the postcolonial Indian nation state, what it meant to the people, pardon me, their identities, legal statuses, and for their mobility.

And, as you know, I’m a big fan of your work, and I’ve read it when it came out last summer. And I reread sections of it with my students this semester in Global South Asia, and thank you, also once again for joining our class. So I’m going to keep my comments very brief and really three parts.

So I’ll start by discussing what Unsettling Utopia has been doing, speaking to decolonization and decolonial history. Then some themes will come up again, because I think that’s one of your call to action in the book and in your scholarship, generally speaking. Second, how the book fits into the contestations over immigration and colonial legacies in France and the contestations over citizenship in India. And finally, I’d like to hear your thoughts on, you know, the concept of settler utopianism, and I think that is something that all of us have been thinking about. And I think Sana’s comments about thinking comparatively with Gandhi’s ashram Sabarmati and his farms in South Africa, something I didn’t think about. I was thinking about ISKCON, but I think, you know, we’d love to hear more about the application of this, you know remarkable concept beyond Aurobindo Ashram.

So in Unsettling Utopia, Jessica Namakkal bravely paves the path for future scholarship on decolonization and decolonial histories by challenging previously held notions of national identity, citizenship, subjecthood, settlers, migrants, tourists, to name a few. Her call to action is to decolonize history by disentangling decolonization as a phenomenon from conventional understandings of time, space, and scale, right. Non-British territories, the French and the Portuguese, did not witness a transfer of power in August 1947, and we tend to forget that.

And the identities and belongingness of those who’ve lived in this [inaudible] were very different from the presidencies of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and yet very different from those in the princely states.

Nehru did not want a moth-eaten India, and it did not get one either, right. But that meant that the processes or decolonization in the subcontinent have to be, be an ongoing process of contestations over territory and belonging through legal, editorial, military, and paramilitary means. And Jessica powerfully shows how that played out in the case of the [inaudible] in the Deccan Peninsula after Chandannagar’s overwhelming support to join the Indian Union in June 1949 referendum. 

Interestingly, you know, as I was preparing my remarks, I found that even in the Chandannagar referendum, the process was contested, even though the outcome was not. It was presumably easier to find pink chits that said no to join the French Union than it was to find white chits to say yes to join the French Union, right. So this is so interesting and then there is not much discussion of that either.

Second, the book tackles the contestations over citizenship and subjecthood head on, bringing to the fore the hybrid, hyphenated and complex belongingness of the people who lived in [inaudible]. Unsettling Utopia, I think, could not have arrived at a more poignant time 

when citizenship has been contested in India through the 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act and the very well known discomfort in France with respect to its own colonial legacy, most recently depicted through the 2021 Stora Report in Algeria. So, I think by, by discussing the otherization of French Indians on racial grounds in France, who often find camaraderie with Sri Lankan Tamils in the [inaudible] of Paris, Jessica skillfully brings the anti-immigration politics of twentieth and twenty-first century France in direct conversation with histories of empire and decolonization. I think that’s truly fascinating and really important. The two have different silos, different historiographical world, and even, even in different disciplines. So, history versus sociology, that’s, that’s what’s going on there.

And I think here I’d like to mention this book that just came out last month, Empire on the Seine by Amit Prakash, Policing of North Africans in Paris, and I think that also brings the conversation of anti-immigration politics and the metropole and with histories of empire and decolonization. 

And so these entanglements that Jessica talks about, of Frenchness, Indianness, Tamilness, through cosmopolitan mobility on the, on the one hand, and the racialized, boundedness on the other, really makes Unsettling Utopia thought provoking on almost on every page. And I’m not going to start at the beginning or the end. It’s just amazing throughout. Third and finally, and here is probably the only question I have, you know, you have a full plate already, is the concept of settler utopianism, and I think that’s fascinating and powerful, and I do think it has applicability beyond Mother and Aurobindo. So, in some ways of picking up the conversation, where we had left off last time we discussed your book at BU, I have been thinking how to apply this concept of settler utopianism to make sense of transnational white or white normative spirituality networks that also involve large infrastructure projects using local light labor and land with foreign capital and an alien spiritual expertise, right.

Perhaps one way to do that is to foreground histories of capitalism with histories of decolonization, and I’d love to hear what you think of that, and also I’ll make one quick remark. I think you, I’ve heard you speak today, and you know, elsewhere that when you talk about settler colonialism in India, you become defensive and you say, well I’m not saying India is settler colonialism, and we don’t have that. But I think you know, we had a conversation, a few years ago, I think Sana and one of the attendees, maybe Kalyani was part of it, where we were talking about, you know, these categories of settler, migrant refugees. They’re, they are so mobile. They are so dynamic.

And then, if I bring the discussion of Adivasis and indigenous land in it, I think settler colonialism is a useful category to make sense of Indian polity, so I would probably not shy away from that. Anyway, thank you again for your excellent book, and I look forward to your discussion.

>>  Namakkal: Thank you everyone. I know we’re short on, short on time. And, so, I would maybe just quickly respond to what I, all three of you mentioned, and then I know Elizabeth just sent a message about extending a little bit.

So thank you everyone. These are amazing comments. Um, you know, I’ll just start exactly where, Jay, you just left off, which is when I, when I say India wasn’t a settler colony, I sort of mean British India. And, in fact, I explicitly don’t mean India, because I think if we talk about Kashmir, I think if we talk about the Northeast, people who aren’t me because I’m not doing that research should certainly make claims about India, you know, India, being the power that is settling. So I do think those rubrics are so important. I also get what you’re saying about defense. 

But um but I, I expanded on the settler utopianism idea a little bit in an essay for the LA Review of Books, which I’ll drop in the chat if anyone’s interested. But that is actually what I’m working on. So the next projects, decolonized cults, doesn’t, isn’t really, anyways, this is what it is—ISKCON, Osho, all of these places. And, and I hadn’t thought about Gandhi in South Africa with, that is, thank you, Sana, that’s certainly something to think about in here, right. Because I mean, Jay, you know you mentioned sort of the whiteness of the spiritual practices and, of course, you know the interesting thing about Auroville in a lot of ways is you had, you know, most of the communal projects were being started in, in North America and in Australia, to a certain extent, New Zealand, in places that were already set up a colony. So, it was abnormal for like a European driven commune to be founded in India, right. Like Osho, that, they, they really appealed to Europeans, but Osho, you know, wasn’t, was an Indian. 

So you know I also think, for Auroville, like that, an interesting question because people are Indian who live there, and I think, maybe, this will get us to the Aurobindo Ghosh, Bengal question, to a certain extent, which is like, you know, what is, who, what does it mean to be a Indian, right. What is this? And you know I’ve been really thinking about Manan Asif’s book—The Loss of Hindustan—to think about sort of the, the longer narrative here of what this territory is and what it becomes in this, these nation building moments. But you know people in Auroville are Indian, and they’re European, and they’re all these other things, and you know kinda of cosmopolitan, and it’s the utopianism of cosmopolitanism.

But anywhere, this is built on some sort of labor exploitation, right. So I mean the history of capitalism, point is, is much, much needed I think in thinking about that. But that is the next project. That’s what I’m doing. So, I hope to address a lot of the things there. 

Should I, should we ask, take questions, Elizabeth? Does that make most sense? Since we’re like . . .

>> Lhost: Yeah, I think it’d be nice. I just sent a message out to everyone saying we’ll extend the conversation about 10 minutes past our scheduled stopping time. So, please do submit your questions that you have for Jessica, for the other panelists using the Q&A feature. 

I believe.

>> Namakkal: It.

>> Lhost: Sathvik has one question for you, if you’re ready for it.

>> Namakkal: Yeah, I’m ready.

>> Lhost: It says, prior to the departure of the French from Puducherry, they offered French citizenship to the Tamil natives and around 6,000 took up that offer. Can you, can you say more about the motivations of these natives of French India who were pro-French and maybe somewhat anti-independence? 

>> Namakkal: Yeah, so it’s not, I don’t, it’s not that they were anti-independence. It was that, they, they were attached to being French, right. And it, you know, it’s a, you know, you have the, you have the perspective of the French administrators who were discussing what they thought. You know, so they had a, they had a narrative they wanted to present, and it wasn’t just in the French territories. This was throughout their colonies and, you know, Sana mentioned Fred Cooper’s work, Between Empire and Citizenship, something like that is what it’s called, and you know you can read about similar conversations in French West Africa.

So these conversations are happening because what the French do is they present the idea of the French Union as a foundation of the Fourth Republic. It was a way to maintain, much like the British Commonwealth, almost exactly like the British Commonwealth, but with more suffrage, right, maintain the networks that they had created throughout empire, right. 

So it’s, it wasn’t, one of the things I try to show in the book is like it wasn’t necessarily anti, it, what, didn’t mean people weren’t anticolonial to want to vote for the French Union, right. Because the question for them, these people living in South India, and we’ll take Chandannagar out of this conversation, but for people living in South India right, the question of do I want to be ruled by a central government in Delhi, I’m right, or do I want to continue to have this relationship to France, who has offered me citizen, my family’s citizenship for a long time.

So you know 6,000, it was, it was about five or six percent. So it’s, you know, it’s pretty small when you think about the population that, that took them up on that. It was poorly advertised.

You had to have a lot of documents, right. So, it was never going to reach the amount of people it would reach today, and there are still active struggles for people to claim this citizenship. And that’s something that’s ongoing. 

But you know, some people who had means and really, you know, they spoke French, they went to the Lycée, they did all of the things, they moved, they moved to France. Many had served in the military, in the French military. They often did migrate. And the people that stayed, you know, and a lot of it has to do with caste, right. Do I want again to be ruled by, even if it’s a secular government, government, a Hindu government or do I want to take my chance with France, right. Chance with France, maybe we’ll call it. 

And so there were a lot of motivations actually to vote for the French Union, and the Indian Government was doing a bad job of appealing to people in the South. You know, I mean, it was really this argument of you’re, you’re our brothers. We are, we are blood, right. And so, if you are a Dalit, right, maybe that just doesn’t speak to you at all. So there’s a fair amount of people there thinking about what it would mean to retain some sort of French. 

You know I think the other reason it was a low number was because, because people didn’t know what would happen. And in the final, so, 1954 is the year France agrees to leave.

They don’t ratify it until they lose Algeria in 1962. So that’s actually, you can see how hard France was trying to retain the empire, right. But people didn’t know and those, you know, ’52 to ’54, India is, you know, they’re employing sanctions on Pondicherry, things, you know people aren’t getting things.

Nobody knew, if you, they would get kicked out, right. If you’re a French citizen, nobody knew what was going to happen with citizenship. There was no dual citizenship. Right, what happens? Can you keep living there? If you don’t have money you know, and you can’t move to France, which takes an enormous amount of resources, right, what are you going to do? 

So, I think there’s amount of, a good amount of fear there. So I think it was more popular than then that percentage actually allows to some extent, and so I hope that answered that question.

>> Lhost: Thanks, we have a, we have a question from Lydia Walker, who asks if you might say a bit more about the difference between decolonization and independence, and particularly how those concepts relate to different temporal moments—1947, 1954, 1961—that have very different meanings in South Asia and also thinking about the French empire, more broadly, in relation to Indochina, Algeria, and can you say a bit more about those terms, as they relate both to political and theoretical transformations.

>> Namakkal: Yeah, thank you, Lydia. That’s a wonderful question, one I’ve been thinking about a lot. You know, they don’t, I, you, never see the word decolonization in, in what’s going on, in the archival documents for this period in French India. Nobody talks about decolonization.

You know, thinking about the, the history of the term, thinking about Stewart Lord’s article about the sort of intellectual history of the word decolonization, the way that it, you know, he argues that it’s really a diplomatic term, term until Fanon imbues it with a radical sentiment in The Wretched of the Earth, which seems fairly accurate. It’s a term that actually comes from France and gets picked up. It’s from, actually, the first use of it is in the 1840s about the, the settlement in Algeria, and it gets taken up again as it’s sort of a diplomatic term in British circles in the early nineteenth or the early 1900s.

And for actually, for Pondicherry, for French India, it really gets used in the sense of that original meaning as a diplomatic diplomatic process, right, of bureaucrats talking about the formal end of empire. Who’s going to, you know, where’s the military going to go? What are we going to do with our economic ties, right, all of these questions. So this really, you know, is a question of sovereignty and independence.

But of course we have this, these are French spaces, to a certain extent. They’re unique French spaces, but they are Francophone spaces, and so you actually have, especially in Indochina, and then, of course, Algeria, you have these radical ideas circulating because of Fanon and Cesaire, and these other French intellectuals. So it does enter this sort of the conversation amongst people. There’s quite a few Pondicherrians who live in Indochina. And, you know, they’re not really a radical leftist bunch. The Communists are mostly in Pondicherry. But, but they start, say sort of get these ideas.

The question of Algeria becomes really important and here, not only because the timeline of independence in French India does mirror the, after the French leave Indochina, lose Indochina, they agree to leave French India. And then in 1962, you know, they lose Algeria, they ratify it then. And so it does follow that temporality and we can’t talk about French India without Algeria and Indochina. 

But also in the negotiations between the Nehru Government and the French Government, Algeria is a big problem because Nehru, you know, as a leader of the non-aligned movements is in solidarity with Algerians. You know, he, he wants to support them, but he’s, he also wants to create a good postcolonial relationship with France, and Jay can probably tell us more about those relationships. But Algeria becomes a big political problem for him in that sense. Like what are you going to do with the students in Pondicherry that you, there were anticolonial student movements in Pondicherry, who are saying, you know, get rid of the French? How does he support them but also, right, not stepping the boundaries, with what he said he would do with France, right? They want to do something easy in India, because France is dealing with all these other places, right. 

So, so, I think that, that is interesting, I mean the last, the last thing I’ll say about this, and I think there’s so much more to think about Lydia is, of course, you know, when we talk about decolonization now we have the sort of Fanonian meeting, and then we have the meaning that’s been talked about a lot by indigenous, global indigenous movements, who call for land back, who are calling, you know, for, for territorial sovereignty, who talk about decolonization not being a metaphor, right. 

So I did take all of that very seriously in the writing of the book, even though it’s, you know, anachronistic for the character, the archives. But I took it very seriously by centering the land in Auroville and even the land in Pondicherry that the ashram buys, the property that they buy, to think, you know, if I’m doing this work now, which I hope is in acts in solidarity with decolonization, we think about land, and we think about what it means for people who had land, who became dispossessed, right. So I, I hoped that I will get into them, to the method that way.

 >> Lhost: Yeah, thanks. I think we have one, time for one last question before we wrap up, even though we’re already over time. But this question asks you to think about the place of Auroville within contemporary debates about cultural appropriation and decolonization within the sort of new age modern yoga, wellness discourses that are circulating today. Can you say a bit more about how your work on Auroville and the ashram fits into some of these debates and where, where you see those debates resonating in your own work?

>> Namakkal: Yeah, thanks Phillip. And that, you know, that might be an answer, I ask you, Phillip. 

But, but so Auroville, I mean, I think these questions are really important for Auroville and again, you know, partly because this is people who go to India. And, you know, if people have read Karma Cola, the book from the 1970s, it’s, it’s funny, you know, which is a bit of a parity book, but it like, it gets the language that people use going to India in the 1970s quite well, right. And, you know, I think when you’re in India opposed to being in the maybe the ISKCON spaces or in, you know, Rajneeshpuram in Oregon or something like this, you’re within that you’re, you know, you’re fully within this area. So the, like a dawning of special clothing and all of these things becomes like, it goes head to head a little bit more.

You know, this may be actually, this will get to the question that Ananya had about or maybe Hassan, I mean this is your question about secularism, sorry, too because the mother made it very clear that Auroville was not a religion. There was no religions, over and over again. It is spiritual, right. And this is, actually, the really slippery part for people that live in the area, right, or who wanted, maybe to join, or who are wondering how to like get in on what’s going on there. They have all these resources.

And it’s, it’s a spirituality, that is, you know approved of by, by specific people, right. And so I think that appropriation question is really interesting there because The Mother, you know she’s this figure who, for better or worse, like really holds fast to a lot of you know, I think we could just call them Orientalist ideas, about what India is, right. It’s sort of a land of spirituality. She’s imbued with it by being in the land, right. 

She, you know, she brought a lot of European practices, you know, everybody plays tennis. Everybody, everybody does all of these calisthenics. They, you know, they sing the French national anthem. They sing the Indian national anthem, so that you know sort of these traditional ideas in some way, but she thinks that you know that, you, but, you know, she’s using the land, the language of shakti, she’s using the language of the divine and, like all of these ideas that you know Aurobindo was sort of picking and choosing from various traditions. And I’m not an Aurobindo scholar, so people can defend the thought all they want. 

But so, you know, I, you know, I don’t know that reads always as appropriation, right. She’s sort of creating a new thing, but what is it you know, is I think a question that we can ask. When I was in Auroville doing research, there were like, I took yoga from a Russian woman. You know, it’s like, it’s, it’s their communal way to do these things.

So I don’t know, I think, I think, maybe in some senses, it disrupts our thinking about appropriation being a one to one sort of relationship and to think about like how complex it is when cultures change and should it matter who’s sort of the engine of change there. But you and I can talk about this later perhaps.

>> Lhost: Yeah, thanks Jessica. So we have a couple of questions that are remaining and those of you who submitted them, I will pass them onto Jessica and the other panelists so that they can follow up with you. I regret that we don’t have, you know, tons of endless time for this conversation to continue, but I would like you to join me in thanking our author and our panelists for coming out for this discussion today.

And if you would like to join us on May 10, we’ll be back for a discussion on Shenila Khoja-Moolji’s book Sovereign Attachments, which just won I believe two prizes from the APSA. So registration is available for that event online and hope to see you there.

>> Namakkal: Thank you.

>> Aiyar: Thank you.

>> Sarkar: Thank you everyone! Take care.

Event Recording: Conversations on South Asia with Kyle Gardner

Conversations on South Asia Header
https://youtu.be/RTNCDeMX0lE
Event Recording

Transcript for Conversations on South Asia with Kyle Gardner

> > Lhost (she/her): All right! Hello everyone and welcome to our March Conversations on South Asia event here at Dartmouth College. It’s wonderful to see so many friends and colleagues in the audience here, especially as we approach the very end of winter quarter on Dartmouth’s campus. I’m really excited to be hosting today’s conversation featuring Kyle Gardner’s excellent work on the history and indeterminacy of the India-China border.

The book is called The Frontier Complex: Geopolitics and the Making of the India-China Border, 1846–1962. It came out first with the Cambridge University Press in January 2021. It is now available in paperback.

For those of you who are new to the series or don’t know me, I’m Elizabeth Lhost. I’m a postdoctoral fellow and lecturer in the Department of History at Dartmouth College and one of the organizers for this year’s series. And it’s really a great pleasure to be moderating today’s conversation, which brings together three experts on South Asia who have divergent, yet very comparable, backgrounds in the region.

Before we begin our formal program and discussion, I would like to acknowledge that Dartmouth College, which hosts this series, sits on the ancestral, unceded lands of the Abenaki people, who are members of the Wabanaki confederacy. I would also like to thank our series sponsors: the Bodas Family Academic Programming Fund, the Asian Societies, Cultures, and Languages Program at Dartmouth, the Department of History, and the Dickey Center for International Understanding for their ongoing support of the series.

I would also like to give a special thanks to Professor Douglas Haynes for all the work that he does on campus to support South Asian programming and the Conversations on South Asia Series. And I would also like to applaud and thank Sri Sathvik Rayala, our Bodas Family Fellow and current Dartmouth undergraduate student, who is doing a lot of work behind the scenes, promoting and publicizing the series. In addition to hanging flyers on campus, sending emails, and managing our Instagram and other social media accounts, he’s always thinking of new ways to promote our programs on campus and to grow our audiences. So thank you, Sathvik, for doing that.

Today’s conversation features three panelists with extensive, distinguished careers in South Asia, history, foreign policy and government. I will introduce all of them now in the order they’ll be speaking and then we’ll get the formal program underway. So to kick things off, Kyle Gardner will provide a brief introduction into his research and his book. Dr. Gardner obtained his PhD in history with distinction from the University of Chicago, where he also served as a lecturer in the Department of History and the Social Sciences Division. In addition to writing the Frontier Complex, Gardner’s scholarship has also appeared in the Historical Journal, Himalaya: The Journal for the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies, The Atlantic, The Hindustan Times, and India-China Brief, along with other outlets.

In 2018, he received the Wayne C. Booth Graduate Student Prize for excellence in teaching at the University of Chicago, and his research has been supported by the American Institute of Indian Studies and the Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship Program. Dr. Gardner is currently a non-resident fellow at the Sigor Center for Asian Studies of the George Washington University, a term fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a senior associate for India and South Asia practice at McLarty Associates in Washington D. C.

Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao will be our first discussant responding to Gardner’s work. Ambassador Rao spent four decades in the Indian Foreign Service, holding several important appointments during her long and distinguished career. I can’t possibly summarize all of her accomplishments in the few minutes I have here today, so I’ll just highlight a few details that I think are particularly relevant for today’s conversation. Specializing in India’s relations with China, Ambassador Rao served in the Ministry of External Affairs: East Asia Division from 1984 to 1992, visited Tibet with the delegation led by then-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, spent time at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard, where she focused on Asia-, Asia-Pacific affairs. In 2006, she became India’s first woman ambassador to China before serving as India’s Foreign Secretary in 2009, beginning in 2009. In 2011, she became India’s ambassador to the United States. And following her retirement, she has since held several academic appointments and fellowships in the US, including positions at Brown, Columbia and UC San Diego. And recently Ambassador Rao has published The Fractured Himalaya: India-Tibet-China 1949-62. She is also currently affiliated with the Wilson Center, where our third panelist, Michael Kugelman, is based.

Michael Kugelman is the Asia Program Deputy Director and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson Center, where he oversees the center’s research, programming, and publications on the region. With interest and expertise in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the US, including US foreign relations with the three, with the region, Kugelman maintains an active profile, writing the weekly South Asia brief for Foreign Policy and monthly commentaries for War on The Rocks. His writings regularly appear in the Wall Street Journal‘s think-tank blog, and he has also published commentaries for The New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, Politico, CNN.com, Bloomberg View, The Diplomat, Al Jazeera, and The National Interest. He is regularly interviewed about South Asian affairs by major media outlets, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, the Financial Times, The Guardian, The Christian Science Monitor, National Geographic, BBC, CNN, NPR, Voice of America, among others.

He has also produced a number of publications on the region, including the edited volumes Pakistan’s Interminable Energy Crisis: Is There Any Way Out?, Pakistan’s Runaway Urbanization: What Can Be Done, and India’s Contemporary Security Challenges. He holds an MA in International Relations from the Fletcher School at Tufts and a BA in International Studies from the School of International Studies at American University.

So, after Dr. Gardner’s introduction, each of the discussants will provide roughly 10 minutes of reflections of the book, followed by discussion questions and answers from the audience. So please use the Q&A feature through Zoom to submit your questions.

And now, Kyle 

> > Gardner: Thanks, Elizabeth! Let me just go ahead and share my screen. Right, well, thank you, can, can everyone see that? Let me, uh, come to presentation mode. Is that clear for everyone? Great, okay, well, thank you for that very kind introduction, Elizabeth and for the invitation to speak to you all today. Thank you all for attending.

Particularly, particularly looking forward to our discussion and so we’ll keep my introductory remarks brief. And, given that this is a [series focused] on South Asia, I will assume the audience has a certain degree of familiarity with the places I reference. But I also know that Ladakh occupies a somewhat peripheral place in the geography of South Asian studies and really even Himalayan studies, especially prior to the unfortunate events of June 2020. So, please chime in with questions or comments if I’m referencing anything that is unclear.

My book provides a history of three interrelated subjects, the first is Ladakh’s encounter with the British Empire. Ladakh is often overlooked in studies of South Asian frontiers, particularly during the colonial period, because it was relatively quiet compared with the turbulent Northwest Frontier where Russian imperial encroachment produced greater concern than Qing or Tibetan encroachment.

The second topic, focus of the book is a history of imperial border making in the Himalaya, a history that reflects a broader transformation of political space and territory. And this is the, certainly the most global dimension of the book, given the proliferation of frontier and border making among imperial powers in the 19th and early 20th centuries. But this is also an ironic aspect in the case of the Himalaya because, while the massive mountain range was long described as an ideal boundary making object by so-called frontier experts, it failed in significant segments to yield a satisfactory or precise border.

And that gets me to the final aspect of the book and the one of greatest contemporary relevance, which is that it provides the colonial backstory to the border dispute between India and China, one of the most divisive issues between the two giant neighbors during the last 73 years.

The goal of the book is to show how the transformation of the historical crossroads of Ladakh into a disputed borderland reflected a broader transformation of political space, one that tied abstract ideas of sovereignty to concrete practices of geography. The British did this, I argue, through a range of border making practices and concepts. This assemblage, this assemblage of practices and concepts is what I call the frontier complex.

So, this is just an overview of, of, of the particular chapters. But each of these practices and concepts is detailed in individual chapters in the book, and these include the development of border making principles, road building and intelligence gathering, the development of standardized forms of official information that reflect what I contend is an emergent geographical episteme. And, above all, the creation of so-called frontier experts who would come to practice and promote a geopolitical view of the world that emphasized the importance of strong scientific frontiers and borders for the, for the survival of the state. Many of these practices and ideas extended past 1947 and can still be seen in India and China’s approaches to border areas.

Now, given that the Sino, that Sino-Indian relations are top of mind today and without going into too much detail, I’ll just highlight a few pertinent aspects of the, from my book that have a bearing on the roots of the border dispute in Ladakh, and I’d be happy to focus on other aspects in the Q&A whether Ladakh’s relationship with Tibet, the intellectual origins of geopolitics, or the important roles played by roads, frontier experts, gazetteers, and even goats.

The book begins with precolonial Ladakh and draws on the Ladakhi sources to examine precolonial understandings of indigenous space and frontiers. It’s worth emphasizing that while Ladakh had long established historical border points, there was no historical sense of a single complete borderline encircling Ladakh. And this reflects the practical reality of a region defined by passes and trade routes, the name Ladakh, after all, literally means land of passes.

And here on this, this map, you can see, and I think if, if you can follow my cursor here, we have a number of, of sites that may be familiar to some who either know Ladakh or, or followed the dispute here, for instance, is Demchok. Over here in Kache or Kashmir, we have the Zoji Pass here. And so, this is a composite historical map that shows at, in some detail, the particular border points that, that we can discuss in the Q&A if, if of interest.

So, while linear borders are ubiquitous today, for much of the Himalaya and, indeed, much of the pre-modern world, there were not clearly defined linear territorial limits, and this, of course, proved unsatisfactory to the British. Soon after the British defeated the Sikh Empire in 1846, the governor general sent out boundary commissioners to survey its newly formed dependency of Jammu and Kashmir, which included Ladakh. The Rajas of Jammu, vassals of the Sikh Empire, had conquered Ladakh in the previous decade. And these commissioners were given instructions to use the limits of watersheds to guide their survey. The water parting line, the line of mountains or high ground that separated water flowing one way from water flowing another, became an ideal object to use for determining a border. Not just because [it] spared the use of artificial objects, such as pillars, but unlike rivers, water partings and mountain ranges generally tended to separate distinct communities, or at least this was the logic used by the frontier experts developing these principles.

The northern limits of the Indus became, by the end of the 19th century, the stated northern boundary of British India, despite the failure to survey and demarcate much of it. The water partying principle, as the theory came to be known, was eventually applied around the world and to many segments of India’s, India’s mountainous periphery reflected with some infamy, by the names of the administrators associated with them, for instance, Durand, the Durand Line in the Northwest or the McMahon Line in the Northeast.

And the principal cause of the failure to apply the water principle of, water parting principle in Ladakh was the complex topography of eastern Ladakh and the western Tibetan plateau. In this region, there’s no single mountain range to provide the guiding line for a would-be border.

Ladakh and the broader and Western Himalayan region is part of a topographical tangle of mountains hundreds of miles wide, and this complex of mountains and high plateaus are a far cry from the linear image of the Himalayas so often depicted on maps.

And the map that resulted from the first boundary commissions to Ladakh did not instill much confidence. The first map to do so, oh sorry that’s a detail of these border points, here’s the Johnson map. The first map to represent a northern and eastern border came from a survey in 1865 carried out by William Johnson, who would later become the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir’s appointed wazir-e-wazarat in Ladakh. The resulting map, published in 1867 and shown here, did not identify water partings nor did it sketch in more than a sort of rough perimeter of mountains. And, as it turned out, not only does the Indus watershed limit not coincide with the ring of mountains that formed the proposed eastern border here, but subsequent surveys and satellite images revealed that much of the sketched ring of mountains here did not even exist, as you can see from this Google satellite image of roughly the same, roughly the same region. Here is Pangong Tso in the bottom left.

Subsequent surveys, official memoranda and unrequited requests to the Qing Empire to agree to a border in eastern Ladakh and the Aksai Chin resulted in a range of conflicting border lines that were depicted on small scale maps, but never com- comprehensively surveyed on the ground. And I’d be happy to discuss comparisons to the McMahon line in the eastern Himalaya during the Q&A.

When India won its independence in 1947, it also inherited maps that were in many cases, literally borderless. Following China’s occupation of Tibet and the signing of the Sino-Indian agreement in 1954, Jawaharlal Nehru ordered India’s external boundary to be shown as definite.

This decision cemented India’s claim to the Aksai Chin, a region, it should be noted, that was never permanently inhabited by anyone. This is a an arid, high-altitude plateau, described in 1888 by one unfortunate Scottish trader weeks before his murder on the Karakoram Pass as a, and I quote, “howling desolate waste.”

So, the last point I should make before I stop is that the book provides what I hope to be a comprehensive prologue to the ongoing border dispute. It does not in any way assume that today’s dispute was predestined because of that imperial legacy. Many excellent histories, including Ambassador Rao’s new book, provide the greater geopolitical and diplomatic context in the years between the birth of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China and the war in 1962.

And I would, I would also emphasize that there’s a, there’s a distinction to be made between the root causes of the border disputes and the causes of the war in 1962. They are of course related in many aspects, but the causes of the 1962 were also involved with different range of variables and dynamics.

My book aims to set the stage for that tragic drama, but it doesn’t seem to explain how or why those actors trust their parts, but I think I’m over my time so I’ll stop right there.

> > Rao: Shall I come on now?

> > Lhost: Yes, thank you Kyle. Ambassador Rao.

> > Rao: Thank you, thank you Kyle, and thank you Elizabeth. It’s wonderful to be a part of this panel discussion today. I’d like to first, congratulate Kyle on an extremely well researched and in-depth study of the subject of the making of frontiers in Ladakh. It’s the first of its kind in decades, and I believe deserves our very serious attention, especially since after the tragic events in Galwan in eastern Ladakh in June of 2020, this whole frontier land, this whole border area has been very sharply in focus. And, and we are talking, today, of a Line of Actual Control in the area where Indian and Chinese troops are in very close confrontation. The military commanders have been having frequent meetings in order to de-escalate and disengage. It had, that has been achieved in a few pockets, but there are other parts of the Line of Actual Control where this disengagement has yet to take place, so tensions run high. And, you know, the, the danger of a conflagration or  a conflict, military conflict, remains very, very, very much a tangible possibility.

India and China have a relationship, today, that’s very low on trust, I would say completely absent on trust and mutual understanding. And, in many ways the, efforts made over the last three decades to build a management regime for this relationship that would control tensions along the border and maintain peace and tranquility which, indeed, it had succeeded in achieving, all that structure has, in a sense, dissipated, and we are pretty much at, with a blind slate at the moment, as far as dealing with the issue is concerned. 

Now, when you talk with the border in Ladakh, this is where the border dispute between India and China really began in the late 1950s when the Chinese built a road in the area. That the famous Aksai Chin Highway, Highway 219 as its, as its referred to by the Chinese. And over the years, since the discovery of that highway, the Chinese engaged in an eastward expansion of their claim area, which finally amounted to more or less the line at which they are today, which I must say, the last two years, appears to be advancing once again. 

So we really don’t know the motives for this. The line has never really been jointly defined by India and China. What the, what we say in India, when we talk about it in Parliament, is that the Chinese are in occupation of about 38,000 square kilometers of India’s territory in the Ladakh region. Now, I found Kyle’s book very fascinating for the reason that, of course, I’m very interested in the subject having dealt with it while in the Foreign Office, and I continue to to read about it and to follow developments in the area.

But his account of how colonial practices and ideas have helped to shape postcolonial borders, I think is extremely relevant and he, and he, he refers to the emotionally charged ideas that especially we in India have about frontier making and about the border lines as they exist today. The Ladakh region, as it were, is, is, is a bit understudied in, in all these, in all these accounts, we have of the frontier. But the human landscape and the physical landscape, both of which Kyle refers to really encompasses a once vibrant borderland, a contact zone between Xinjiang, between Tibet, and between Kashmir and of which Ladakh has been apart, at least in the last 150 to 60 years. 

Today, of course, Ladakh, as again Kyle speaks of, is a marginalized kind of territory. It was once a busy meeting point of trade and cultural and religious and spiritual activity between India, Central Asia, particularly Turkestan, Afghanistan, and Tibet. And all that for many of the people of the younger generation remains shrouded in the form of history. Today we have the militarization of Ladakh, which occupies, occupies the spotlight and the frontiers of the mind, as Bérénice Guyot-Réchard puts it.

Now, again, Kyle’s book spoke to me in its definition of the birth of geopolitics, that marriage of geography and politics to serve the needs of empire and its expansion. And the border-making principles that were put in place by the British, particularly the principle of the watershed, continues to define in many senses our own approach in India to frontier-making, to the definition of border lines and the way in which the Indian border claims are defined vis-à-vis the Chinese. The Chinese have a different approach. You know, they would like to add to the concept of the watershed the issue of passes and river valleys, for instance, in the definition of boundary, boundary lines.

Again the, Kyle spoke in his remarks about the indeterminate, indefinite nature of the boundary in this area inherited by, by India in 1947. The British had been content with this ambiguity, but that vagueness was obviously not acceptable to the modern Indian nation state, which could ill afford that level of ambiguity in representing, again, something Kyle calls the country’s geo-body. And the details of the momentous decisions taken by India post-independence to show this boundary as firm and definite and not open to question are all well known to us. But the Chinese knew even less, I believe, of this expansive territory, and they proceeded on the basis of steadily and stealthily advancing occupation in the 1950s rather than historical evidence or principle in effecting possession. 

Another aspect that spoke to me was the issue of connectivity and the tools of connectivity. Now, the roads, the Hindustan-Tibet Road, for instance, in the central sector of the boundary, was conceived as a free and unobstructed road to Central Asia and Tibet. But today, roads, far from linking peoples across borders, have become defense and security enhancers, enabling troop ability, first and foremost, and keeping out the foreigner and the transgressor. And I just referred to the Aksai Chin Highway, which is an instance of a communication artery that excludes rather than facilitates human contact, connoting a barrier, rather than a passage, not what roads are essentially meant to be.

And another issue which I thought I should highlight is the whole question of the Ladakhi consciousness, especially when today this talk of restoration, you know, there are lots of rumors and reports about a possible restoration of Article 370, and I wonder how Ladakh is going to react to that.

Ladakhi consciousness really has never wanted links with the Kashmir problem and is sensitive to the manner in which Ladakh is treated, and Kyle refers to it. He talks of Kushok Bakula [Rinpoche], that almost mythical figure, Ladakhi spiritual leader, whose voice was very much heard also in the geopolitical space. His eminence and stature made him a powerful spokesperson for his people, and he wrote the Prime Minister Nehru, Kyle refers to this, in 1951 how if Ladakh could not merge automatically with India in the event of a possible plebiscite in Kashmir, that could see the valley secede: “our people,” and I quote him, “our people will seek political union with Tibet, which, in spite of our political connection with Jammu and Kashmir state for the last hundred and twenty years, has continued to be the great inspirer and controller of our spiritual life and which, whatever our political affiliations, must be looked upon as our eternal and inalienable home. 

You know rather weighty words, those. So this, again, illustrates, I think, the complex nature of Ladakh itself. We often focus on the Kashmir issue, but there is this whole, you know, contiguous problem, contiguous quests on the questions raised in terms of where Ladakh  stands, what it status is, how it regards its future, and its own identity. So, the border, as Lord Curzon, said, is today, between India and China, is the razor’s, razor’s edge on which life suspended questions of war and peace, especially between nations, such as India and China, because both, both these Asian giants contend today to impose their own lines of control on these spaces and I’ll stop here. Thank you.

> > Lhost: Thank you, Ambassador Rao. Michael.

> > Kugelman: Well, thanks, very much Elizabeth. It’s great to be a part of this discussion, have great respect for Kyle’s scholarship and really honored to be part of this conversation. His book is a terrific contribution to the literature, and I think such a strong validation of that, that evergreen truism that history matters, understanding such a complicated issue as the India-China border crisis, border dispute really requires knowing the history of it. And his book really does a great job of providing that essential historical context, and I should say that Ambassador Rao’s book does as well, for that matter, in similar, albeit in somewhat different ways.

So I am, I have just one question for Kyle, stemming from his book if he cares to, to respond during the discussion before I provide some broader thoughts triggered by the book and Kyle’s comments this afternoon, and it’s a very specific question. So, the book refers briefly, as I recall, to two agreements, two treaties that had been used to help set boundaries for the border, the Treaty of Amritsar in 1846 and a much older, earlier treaty, the Treaty of Tingmosgang for the 17th century. So what is the status of these agreements, today, are they dead, how are they seen by the two governments, how are they seen by local, how are they remembered by local communities in the borderlands? Are they seen as relevant? Just curious if you have any thoughts about how those agreements are perceived today, if you choose to, to, to address that comment, that question.

So, being a, a South Asia regional analyst, someone who tries to keep an eye on all of South Asia, as difficult as that is to do, for obvious reasons I would think, thought I would just zoom out a bit and share some thoughts about the region on the whole that were triggered by by the book. Three three brief comments. 

First, this idea of the India-China border being fraught and unsettled in present times because of the inability of colonial regime to properly demarcate the border or simply because of the actions, more generally, of colonial regimes, but this is clearly an idea an ocean that resonates beyond the India-China border and clearly the story of partition, the independence of India and Pakistan, the resulting crisis over Kashmir is really so interwoven with the actions of the British during the final period of the colonial era. And of course it has an incredibly different history from the China-India border, but as equally complex and contested. And it features the same basic reality of a disputed border, deep rooted disagreements over territoriality that have constituted a fundamental constraint to the broader relationship. 

And certainly there have been dialogues at times, there’ve been ceasefires meant to manage tensions on the Line of Control. But these have not managed to address some of the core drivers of those tensions on the Line of Control separating India and Pakistan administered Kashmir.

And then there’s the, the Durand Line, which of course separates Pakistan and Afghanistan, and which, so far as I know, no Afghan Government has accepted as legitimate since the emergence of the state of Pakistan. The impact of colonial era on this border can be seen so starkly by effect that the very name of the border is that of a top British colonial official who was involved in negotiations to try to delimit the border between Afghanistan and colonial India. And you know we’ve seen this border heat up in recent months with the Taliban forcefully stopping Pakistani soldiers from building a fence along it, an indication that the Taliban, much like the governments that it has fought as an insurgency, rejects that border.

And this has become a notable tension point in a relationship between Islamabad and Kabul in the Taliban era, which many in Islamabad thought would be a relatively smooth one given the Taliban’s friendly relations and deep ties to, to Pakistan over the years.

I think it’s notable, just from a linguistic standpoint, that the term that is used to describe these fraught borders—line, the Line of Actual Control, Line of Control, Durand Line—it sounds like such a harmless term, such an innocuous term, but in fact it can be code for something so complex and indeed at times explosive.

A second brief observation is that this discussion of colonial Britain’s role in shaping the India-China border, as it is today, think amplifies the lasting legacy that the Raj continues to have in the neighborhood more broadly, India and also Pakistan. And I know that for, for this audience, which features a number of South Asia themed historians, this is no news, it’s nothing new, but I think it’s important to amplify nonetheless that we’re talking about an impact that goes far beyond borders and territorial disputes and extends into the realm of law and society.

And I think the two examples that come to mind, in particular, are the blasphemy law and sedition law. Of course, these are colonial era laws that were retained and, to a degree, toughened by free, postcolonial governments in India and Pakistan in ways that have oftentimes badly undermined rights and freedom. Pakistan’s blasphemy law, of course, was inherited from the British, it is today, it has been for quite some time exploited by religious militants and other hardliners to wrongly accuse religious minorities of offending Islam and this trend is particularly troubling today given that the new radical political parties embracing the blasphemy law as their main platform have emerged and become a part of the Pakistani political mainstream. And in India, that the sedition law, again something inherited from the colonial era, it’s used to target or frequently used to target peaceful critics of state policy.

So the irony here is that deep deeply nationalistic and proud governments on the subcontinent and many of their supporters have weaponized colonial era tools to target dissidents, state critics, and the vulnerable.

Third and final observation, getting back to the issue of borders, is that in, in South Asia, it seems that everywhere, nearly everywhere, borders are fraught and not just borders that came about, uh, as a result of colonial era machinations. It seems that there are relatively few quiet frontiers in the region. Disputes of various intensity are seemingly baked into them all. India and Pakistan both have multiple contested borders. The India-Nepal border has seen trouble in recent years. India-China border disputes in recent years have drawn in Bhutan, as we saw with the Doklam standoff some years ago. Bhutan’s border with China has had some issues. And it’s not just territory that is the cause of these tensions along borders in the region, terrorism, cross-border terrorism, cross-border insurgency, violence, this has been a long standing issue on the India-Pakistan and Afghanistan-Pakistan borders and also on the borders that serve as gateways to other regions, the Pakistan border with Iran, the India border with Myanmar. 

Another trigger for border tensions, particularly in more recent years, is migration. We’ve seen this on the India-Bangladesh border with India having built a border fence in Assam to deter illegal immigration from Bangladesh. Afghan refugees coming to Pakistan and to Iran have caused tensions in these countries as well.

And I would argue that a third, particularly significant trigger of tensions along borders in South Asia has been water, and this is going to become even more pronounced. It’s quite striking that many of the region’s transboundary rivers pass through or originate in contested or disputed areas. So the Tibetan plateau, where four key rivers, including the Indus and the Sutlej, they spring to life here, providing water to 1.5 billion people downstream. The Tibetan plateau is controlled by China and abuts the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which, is of course, claimed by China. The rivers of the Indus basin flow through Kashmir. So no wonder that many of the riparian pairings of South Asia, so to speak, reflect troubled relationships in the region. The Indus River flows from India to Pakistan. The Kabul River flows from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Of course, the Brahmaputra flows from China to India.

And, more broadly, many people in, in South Asia depend on water supplies that originate beyond their borders. They are dependent on others. 91% of Bangladesh’s water resources come from beyond its borders, which is remarkable, and that figure is 75% for Pakistan. So two countries totaling nearly 400 million people depend so heavily on water resources that originate elsewhere. And also, aside from the relative success of the Indus Waters Treaty, many of the region’s water, trans-boundary water treaties have not been properly implemented or have been the source of disputes.

The Teesta River Accord between India and Bangladesh has been in draft form for decades. The Ganges River Accord is constrained by a dispute over the Farakka Barrage between India and Bangladesh. And I think the water issue could prove to be an increasingly serious source of border related tensions in the decades ahead. South Asia is one of the world’s most climate change vulnerable countries. Water scarcity is really all but inevitable in many parts of the region. And so, with river water becoming increasingly scarce, the stakes could rise with transboundary water disputes, meaning that the risk of people resorting to the use of violence to address these disputes in the coming decades could go up.

And you know to wrap up the border tensions of South Asia, I think, amplify what I think is one of the most long standing challenges for the region, one that has constrained development and prosperity for many years, and that is a lack of connectivity and integration. Intra-regional trade is rife with potential, but in reality is woefully low. The lack of regional engagement and commerce in South Asia as a product of various factors, bad infrastructure, for one, a lack of effective regional organizations for another. But poor political and diplomatic relations are a big reason too. And these bad relations are in many cases rooted in these long standing border disagreements.

So to go back to Kyle’s book, I think one can argue that one can perhaps draw a line, no pun intended, a meandering line, perhaps, but nonetheless a line, extending from colonial era rooted drivers of territorial disputes to the contemporary struggles of one of the world’s most populous regions to achieve more prosperity and well being. So I’ll end there, thank you.

> > Lhost: Wonderful! Thank you, Michael.

Kyle, would you like to respond to any of those comments and questions while we gather input from the audience? And audience members, please use the Q&A feature to submit your questions.

> > Gardner: Yes, well, I’m happy to. Thank you, both, first and foremost, for those very thoughtful, very, very eloquent comments on, on both my book and the larger context that, that it, that it rests in. Conscious of Elizabeth’s plea to keep my response somewhat succinct, I’ll just touch upon a few of them, and maybe move, move sort of backwards, starting with Michael’s comments first.

I think your point about water is, is, is very well taken and, and in the fact that, that the Tibetan plateau and Himalaya is Asia’s water tower and indirectly feeds nearly, nearly half of the world’s population—47%, if you extend all of those rivers from, from source to sea—as it were—and, and the point about water, lack of water sharing agreements as well is taken. Although it is, although it’s seen its fair share of problems, it is notable that Asia’s one really long-standing successful water sharing agreement is between India and Pakistan and has managed to survive multiple wars.

I don’t think you would in an audience that has several historians and historians of the British Empire, I don’t think anyone would dispute your point, Michael, that, that the legacy of the British Empire, is still very much in play today.

To, to your question about the legacy of the treaties mentioned, so in, in, in fact, there are, there are really sort of three notable historical treaties worth mentioning. The first, the Treaty of Tingmosgang in in 1684, was, was noted, notable in so far as it established, it established a, one of these border points which is represented actually on the map that I showed near Demchok. And it the, the description is, is quite brief. It, it basically marks, it says in the, in the Tibetan Ladakhi that the, the, the sum–the border—rests near the Lha-ri stream, which is near Demchok. So to the point about border points existing in the kind of premodern world, this, this is not a particularly detailed description, but it did establish among many notable long lasting dynamics between Tibet and Ladakh a reciprocal trade and tribute mission that lasted, actually, well, technically, the last trade mission of the lopchak was in 1950, although there were only four, four traders participating at that point, indicative of a long slow decline in the Ladakh-Tibet trade. That is, I would argue, is is somewhat [the] responsibility of of the British and some of the, the practices and restrictions that they, they attempted to enforce, albeit very, very imperfectly. 

But that Treaty established this first sort of relationship and vague idea of a border. Subsequently, that was reaffirmed in the Treaty of Chushul in 1842 between the Sikh Empire and the, the Llama guru of Lhasa, aka the Dalai Lama. And that, again, did not provide any more detailed description of the border, except saying that sort of such as it was so will it be.

Then the Treaty of Amritsar, which you referenced, which was the result of the end of the first  Anglo-Sikh War, which created the state of Jammu and Kashmir, that in turn kind of created this new state which, which was an assemblage of both Ladakh and the Kashmir valley and Jammu given to the Dogras Rajas of Jammu for effectively siding with the the the British during the war against their, against the Sikh empire. 

These were respected, and in fact when and as Ambassador Rao notes in her book, these, one of the assertions that Nehru and others made following independence was that the boundaries, the customary boundaries ought to be respected. And, of course, this then raises a problem of well if the customary boundaries were you know, like the Treaty of Tingmosgang in referencing you know, a specific point, then there really was no detailed, detailed complete borderline and this gets to, to the broader problem of you know, the, the British insistence on a linear mapable borderline in a region that that never had those articulated. 

And you know, as ambassador Rao, mentioned in her, in her comments that the Chinese did know even less, and in some sense, it is, this whole undertaking of unilateral border making was destined, in some sense, although historians don’t like to use that term, was destined to produce problems because it takes two sides to make a border, and when you have the British going out and insisting on a, a concept of a border that was distinct from what existed, then you run into trouble too. 

I am so glad Ambassador Rao that you raised the, the Kushok Bakula Rinpoche because you know, one of the reasons why I wanted to extend the scope of the book beyond 1947 was because I wanted to emphasize that for Ladakh, there was this, you know, intense period of uncertainty following 1947. And, you know, there were, there were, I mean some very, very strongly worded statements from Bakula Rinpoche or those supporting him, you know, preference to, you know, we would rather, we would rather join Tibet than be thrown into the fiery hell of Pakistan or you know these rhetoric that you know, in part, was, I think, meant to to get Nehru’s attention and the government’s attention.

But, but, it also, I think, reflects the sheer indeterminacy of that, of those early years and, of course, for an audience familiar with South Asian history we don’t need to detail, just the, the upheaval, the integration of princely states, the violence, massive displacement of partition, and so forth. But, but I think one of the, the real reasons that I did want to extend to 1962, even though it, by doing so, it brings in all of these sort of additional geopolitical variables and nationalism was because I really did want to touch upon the you know the, the, the challenge faced by Ladakh and Ladakhis and its leaders and the, the, the final imposition of an actual, effective border only coming with the Line of Actual Control following the the war in ‘62. 

Lots more points to respond to and including the, my total agreement with both of you on the points about the lack of connectivity. I think that is, that is absolutely, you know, a, both, both the result of the, the, the problem of borders being enforced and, and used, I think, as really a front line for more aggressive nationalistic states, but also in the practical sense of roads no longer connecting but, but actually being used to to divide people, but I should stop there and see what questions we have.

> > Lhost: Yeah, thanks Kyle. Your, your, the book, but also some of Michael’s discussions about water and rivers, got me thinking about the boundary markers that separate the state of New Hampshire from the state of Vermont and the boundary markers are located on land, at least some of the ones that are by a trail that I walk along, on the Vermont side of the Connecticut river, but they actually refer to the the line being off the boundary marker. And so, if you go to Google maps, you get just a neat line down the middle of the River, sometimes it’s right on the bank of Vermont showing like who controls the river, whose space that is, and it just seems to bring together a lot of the discussion that you have in a book about the way that representing space also reflects certain ideas about how the space is either owned, occupied, or possessed, or used. Just sort of bringing that home to New England.

However, we have a lot of questions coming in, so I won’t blather on anymore.

Benjamin Hopkins asks if you can say a bit about how your work fits within the burgeoning field of frontier discussions within the framework of British India but also perhaps frontier studies more broadly. And if you’re feeling adventurous, maybe also borderlands studies, if you’d like to engage with those ideas.

> > Gardner: Yeah, thanks! Thanks, Ben and also a plug for Ben’s award winning book, which I’m blanking on the title, but it involves the savage periphery, savage in scare quotes, I think. Why am I blanking on Ben’s book? But it just won the Coomaraswamy Award from the, from the AAS. So, congrats, Ben! The, wait, Ruling the Savage Periphery, there, sorry.

So I would situate, well, A, I think that Ben, this is a somewhat leading question because you  are, one of, I would, I would say, one of the leading figures of what has been a real revival, a revitalization of frontier history, particularly in a more comparative context and, and I think the, there are sort of two points that I hope my work sort of addresses. One is in a, in a sort of sense in, it fills a gap, which is not the most inspiring argument to make necessarily for, for one’s research, but I think, in this case, it really does fill in an important absence in the study of colonial South Asian frontiers, precisely because the Ladakh frontier was very much a sort of relatively pacific frontier when compared to some of the more volatile ones in the Northwest frontier, which Ben’s work has focused on, as well as the Northeast where work by Bérénice Guyot-Réchard and Thomas Simpson, and, and others, has, has really, really opened up new and exciting of avenues of inquiry.

To the question of borderland studies, I think one of the, one of the contentions that I make is that borderland studies can in some sense be a, a vague and imprecise catch all, and I think the, the, the hope that I sort of offer in my book is that if we focus borderlands a little bit more specific, on the specifically, on the, the, the defining object of a borderland, i.e. the border, then we, I think, have a better, a better means of examining those dynamics particular to what we might call borderlands because I think there’s always the, right, with terms like frontier and even borderland, I think there’s, there’s an inevitable risk of replicating the imprecision of the category by, by sort of falling into the kind of polysemic character of these, of these terms. So I hope at least that my work offers maybe one way of, of a maybe slightly more objective approach to borderlands studies and frontiers by looking at exactly how they’re made.

> > Lhost: Yeah, thanks Kyle! [We have] a question that I think really gets to the first couple of chapters of the book and asks whether you can say a bit more about precolonial understandings of Ladakh and how precolonial sources envision Ladakh as a territory and maybe say a bit about whether there are any continuities between those precolonial imaginaries and what happened to the colonial and the postcolonial period in terms of thinking, thinking about Ladakh as a region.

> > Gardner: Yeah, so one of the things I outline in, in my, in my first chapter is the, the multiple ways in which precolonial Ladakhis conceived of space, that in some sense were not there when- in the imperial vision that the British imposed. And this includes, you know, the really rich and very cosmological dimensions that, that tied- to get- tied Ladakh not just to the greater sort of Tibetan Buddhist world, but also really shaped local conceptions and understandings of space. So, you know, for the British who are primarily looking at mountains, from the perspective of a kind of boundary object, I wanted to emphasize that, that, of course, when people look at a mountain, they see, those who are able to see, see a mountain, but the, the fact that Ladakhis also had very kind of rich cosmological associations with the deities inhabiting mountains and those mountains, and the deities associated with them, being sources of water for, for villages and connecting village level cosmological space.

Also, to the point about you know passes and again emphasizing that you know, Ladakh is literally, the name, defined by its passes, speaks also to you know, a concept of space connecting networks of, of, of trade routes that were very much seasonally dependent. People moved when the snow cleared on the passes, and people were, were frozen in place during, during the winter months.

So I think that, the one of the, one of the things that I, that the book tries to do is really emphasize the, that the competition between different visions of space and how the imperial project was an imposition of a particular kind of political, territorial conception of space that that overlooked a richer and more diverse assortment of of understandings.

> > Lhost: Thanks, Kyle. We have a question from Galen Murton, who asks whether you might be willing to reflect on the other part of the India-China border, so looking eastward, and whether, to what extent do you consider recent Chinese border village development around Doklam to be a repeat performance and part of an ongoing Chinese strategy of making and claiming territory [through] settlement in the building of infrastructure, how is what’s happening in sort of eastern India, along that region, different from what happened in the Aksai Chin in the years leading up to the 1962 war, and maybe and how other, in what other ways is it different from what happened in the, in the Northwest versus the Northeast?

> > Gardner: Well, conscious of the, the time here, I, I probably won’t attempt to address each of those and, in fact, would probably do, do better passing that, that question off to Ambassador Rao here, but since I am, I suppose on the hot seat here, I can, I can take kind of take a bit of a stab at it. 

You know, I think the, the Northeast, on the one hand, it has a, there is a clearer sense of a, of a border line. That is to say, not that the Chinese agree with the use of the term but and refer to it as the illegal McMahon Line, but there is a clearer and less varied conception of, of a would be border that, that up until I would say the last decade appeared to be respected by both sides, even if not officially agreed to. And, in part, that’s because it more successfully applies the water parting principle, although there are some noticeable, notable segments where that is not the case in the Northeast.

But recent, and in recent years, with, with some of the things that Galen noted, the appearance of, of Chinese villages, either potentially within claimed, within the claim lines or very close to [them], I think there is a sense that we are now seeing a more, I think the diplomatic term is assertive behavior, on the part of, on the part of the Chinese to, you know, to, to push India on those.

If that becomes the primary zone of contest I, I will just say that I think there are substantially more variables in play in the Northeast than there are in Ladakh and Aksai Chin, uninhabited except for the unfortunate soldiers stationed there. The Northeast, its populace, diverse populations, it also brings into play the politics around the Dalai Lama, particularly in the case of Tawang.

And so, if, and, of course, with water, as Michael noted, with the Brahmaputra moving through there and, and occasional concerns being raised about the possibility of, of the Chinese diversion on the great bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo, as the Brahmaputra is known in Tibet, that could incorporate it, it could incorporate some of those waters into this great sort of South-North diversion project that, that China has been working on for some years. 

So, I think the Northeast is a very, it’s a concerning potential zone of, of conflict and certainly one that I think you should be paying close attention to.

> > Lhost: On that note, I would like to invite everyone to, to thank our discussants and panelists for joining us for this discussion. I would like to invite all of you to join us for our next event which will be on Tuesday, April 12 featuring Jessica Namakkal’s Unsettling Utopia: The Making and Unmaking of French India, and you can register for that event, using the link that Sathvik just put in the chat.

So, thank you, Kyle, for sharing your work with us, and thank you, Ambassador Rao and Michael [Kugelman] for joining us for this discussion today. We hope to see you all back here next month.

> > Rao: Thank you all very much, thank you.

> > Kugelman: Thanks a lot.

Event Recording: Conversations on South Asia with Sana Haroon

Transcript for Conversations on South Asia with Sana Haroon

https://youtu.be/mIZyrwyor0o
Event Recording: Conversations on South Asia with Sana Haroon

> > Lhost: Alright, everyone, welcome to the February event in the Conversations on South Asia series here at Dartmouth college. It’s wonderful to have all of our guests and panelists today and to have so many friends and colleagues in the audience. I think we’re about to hear a really fantastic conversation calling on people’s different interests, educational backgrounds and experiences and bringing them to bear on Sana Haroon’s latest book—The Mosques of Colonial South Asia: A Social and Legal History of Muslim Worship—which was published in the Library of Islamic South Asia series with I.B. Tauris.

For those of you who are new to the series or don’t know me, I’m Elizabeth Lhost, and I’m a Postdoctoral Fellow here in the Society of Fellows at Dartmouth College and one of the organizers of this, this year’s series, and it’s my great pleasure to be moderating the conversation today.

Before we begin, I would like to acknowledge that Dartmouth College, which hosts the series, sits on the ancestral and unceded lands of the Abenaki people, who are members of the Wabanaki confederacy. I would also like to thank our series sponsors: the Bodas Family Academic Programming Fund, the Asian Societies, Cultures, and Languages program, and the Department of History at Dartmouth College. Without their support, this series really would not be possible. I would also like to thank Bruch Lehmann in History and Professor Douglas Haynes for his support and assistance for being such a strong champion of South Asia programming on and off campus. 

And I’d also like to applaud and thank Sri Sathvik Rayala, who is our Bodas Family Fellow for the current academic year. And he does a lot of work, promoting and publicizing the series, in addition to hanging flyers up around campus, sending emails, and inviting many of you to attend our events, and managing our Instagram and other social media profiles. He has also been working behind the scenes to prepare the transcripts from some of our recorded events from earlier in the series and to write event summaries for those events that we haven’t recorded and posted. And several of those are already up or are about to be up on our website, and others will be up there soon. So thank you Sathvik and check out our website if you haven’t been there already and if you’ve missed earlier events.

Today we have with us three wonderful distinguished speakers, who each bring a unique set of skills, expertise and experiences to the conversation. I’m really looking forward to hearing what they have to say.

First, we will have Sana Haroon, who is the author of the book we will be discussing. Professor Haroon will spend about ten minutes introducing the book to all of us, followed by comments from each of our two panelists. Sana Haroon is a historian with interests in everyday Islam and Muslim social organization within the territorial and spatial configurations of modern South Asia. She is currently an Associate Professor in the Department of History and Asian Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, where she has been since 2012. She teaches courses on South Asia in the Indian Ocean World, and India Since 1857, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in Modern World History, and Faith and Politics in Islam. In addition to the Mosques of Colonial South Asia, Professor Haroon has also published Frontier of Faith, faith, excuse me, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland, which came out in the UK in 2007 and in the US in 2008 and then in paperback in 2012.

She’s written extensively on the northwest regions of South Asia, focusing especially on religious and cultural exchanges in the borderlands between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.

She’s written on the Durand Line in an essay titled “Intersections of Religious Revivalism,” published in the volume Alienated Nations, Fractured States. She has written on “Pakistan between Iran and Saudi Arabia”, for the volume Pakistan Today, has an essay called “Competing Views of Pashtun Tribalism, Islam and Society in the Indo-Afghan Borderlands” in the volume Afghanistan’s Islam, and has contributed the essay “The Visibility of Women and the Rise of the Neo-Taliban Movement in the Pakistan North-West 2007-9” in the volume Beyond Swat: History, Society and Power along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier edited by Magnus Marsden and Benjamin Hopkins, who might actually be in our audience today.

After Professor Haroon has introduced the book, we will have comments from Mudit Trivedi and Adnan Zulfiqar. Mudit Trivedi is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Anthropology at Stanford University. His research interests include, excuse me, his research interests include archaeology, the anthropology of religion, conversion, tradition, archaeological theory, archaeometry, glass, Islam, and South Asia. Professor Trivedi completed his PhD at the University of Chicago in 2020 and has been doing what I think is really amazing and very fascinating work at the intersections of archeology, anthropology, and religious studies.

Some of his most recent scholarship includes the essay “Between Archaeography and Historiography: Unsettling the Medieval?” that was published in the Medieval History Journal in May 2021, and he also co-authored the introduction to that special issue on Archaeologies of the Medieval. Professor Trivedi is currently working on a book project called An Archeology of Virtue that explores the archaeology of conversion to Islam, based on archaeological work in the North Indian state of Rajasthan. The book will bring together what’s really an amazing set of material and analyses of architectural, spatial, and artifactual data sets to consider archeology’s secular, modern commitments and the nature of archeological traces, and I’ll add that I’ve had the chance to see Professor Trivedi present some of this work and it’s, it’s really truly remarkable.

Our second discussant will be Adnan Zulfiqar. Professor Zulfiqar is an Associate Professor of Law at Rutgers Law School, where his courses include Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure: Investigations, Police, Prisons, and Protests, and he also teaches courses on Islamic Law.

Professor Zulfiqar’s CV is filled with an amazing range of activities and achievements. In addition to having a JD and a PhD from the University of Pennsylvania, he also completed an MA at Georgetown, where he wrote on Frantz Fanon and jihad. And he holds additional certificates from institutes in universities in Pakistan, Morocco, Syria, Jordan, and Yemen. In addition to producing scholarly publications on topics like “Revolutionary Islamic Jurisprudence” and “Jurisdiction over Jihad: Islamic Law and the Duty to Fight, Professors Zulfiqar has also written publicly on topics like “Islamic Jurisprudence for Revolution” and “Prisons, Abolition and Islamic Legal Thought.” Recently, he has also been engaged in a digital project on fatwas in the age of COVID, called “Mapping COVID-19 Fatwas,” which you can check out on the Islamic Law Blog. And I think we can put the link to that in the chat for those who might be interested.

In addition to being a legal scholar, Professor Zulifqar has also used his expertise to help states like the Maldives and Somalia draft and implement criminal codes. And closer to home, he serves on the legal advisory committee of the ACLU Pennsylvania, the Philadelphia office and also serves as a social justice mentor at Rutgers Law School. He is currently working on a book project called Duties to the Collective, which explores how pre-modern jurors utilized collective obligations, fard Kifaya, in Islamic law to promote cohesion. So with that and without wanting to take any more time away from our discussion, I will hand the floor over to Professor Haroon. 

> > Haroon: Thank you so much, and thank you for this invitation to present in this wonderful series. I’ve enjoyed the conversations here so far, and it’s a great format. And what a, what a real honor to have Professor Trivedi and Professor Zulifqar engage with my work, so thank you for the invitation to be here, and I’m delighted to present this book, which was long in the making, and I finished in the chaos of the last couple of years and haven’t had much of a chance to talk about or present.

So this, this project was an outcome of a long interest in really examining the spaces of the public in colonial South Asia. These are concepts that I had become interested in in grad school, and they seemed useful and to have a lot of facility for studying the organization of Muslims and Muslim political thought in South Asia, and I thought well what better place to go look for the Muslim public than the mosque. And the incredible outcome of this work, which took me far too long, was that I found that the mosque really wasn’t a public space of the sort that I expected it to be.

So I’m going to share a couple of slides with you just to give you a little bit of a sense of the sites that began to occupy my interest in the study that I took on. This book presents the histories of Muslim expectations in worship in six mosques across the territories of British India. They’re marked with the little dark icons there, along with the cities closer to them and the cities that sort of fueled religious participation and debate about those mosques. 

In Tajpur, Bihar, in 1883, a congregation wished to follow the widely subscribed Hanafi style of prayer. In Rangoon, in 1909, worshipers of the Friday Mosque sought to influence the curriculum at the mosque school there. And in Kanpur and Aurangabad, worshipers expressed a belief in the sanctity of the perimeter of the mosque at the junction of the mosque and the road. Muslims in Lahore, in the 1930s, petitioned for the return of a site that had been classified as a gurdwara during the settlement of the Lahore District eight years earlier. And from 1911, local Muslims were accused, local Muslims accused the Hindu custodians of the mosque Imambargah at Kora Jahanabad of trying to cut off worshipers’ access to that endowment.

These cases are significant because each one rose through a system of appeals to the judicial committee of the Privy Council, the final court of colonial appeals. And each of these case files constitutes a rich archive of the mosque site that it pertains to. The decisions in these cases drew on colonial trust law to determine that rights in mosque management belong to the custodian. They upheld administrative practices that assigned the local magistrate the control of the mosque perimeter. And they used documentation, they asserted the inviolability of colonial land management practices that use documentation of the occupancy of land at the time of settlement to characterize sites as religious endowments.

The judgments in these suits reveal Muslim devotionalism in and around the mosques of colonial South Asia to have been subject to the authority of petty officers of the mosque, and the state under colonial law and statecraft. The case files and other historical sources related to these mosques provide evidence of the diversity of Muslim beliefs and religious practices across the region, and they also provide evidence of the rich and complex history of legal activism for worshipers’ rites in mosques.

Migrant Muslims from all over India and local Burmese Muslims worshiped together at this site, the Friday Mosque of Rangoon by the late 1800s. And they expressed different preferences for programming in the mosque. The suit for democratic management of a mosque here drew inspiration from the management style of a mainland mosque in Mauritius and also drew inspiration from procedures for registering, registering societies. In Lahore, the Muslims suit for the return of the Shaheed Ganj Mosque and waqf revealed both the history of Sikh and Muslim uses of this site and the conceptualization of the mosque as god’s land and not subject to proprietary claims.

And the Kora Jahanabad suit documented 200, a 200 year history of an endowment created by a Hindu courtier of the Awadh state, who converted to Islam, but named his Hindu nephews and their successors as custodians of this site. Muslims, seeking to establish Muslim custodianship of this site in the early 1900s, were faced with proprietary claims by these, as I go back to that slide, were faced with the proprietary claims of the Hindu custodians. And by the 20th century, these two competing claims produced entirely different representations of the character of this endowment. The decision in this final suit, which was issued in July 1947, just on the eve of independence and decolonization, was the outcome of two decades of work for new legislation that created provincial, regulatory bodies for Muslim endowments and established standards for financial management and custodial accountability. This new legislation enabled any Muslim and not just worshippers at the sites to sue custodians for management of mosques, and at the same time, courts began to admit expert Muslim testimony about what the devotional uses of mosques should be.

The case studies in this book, which span about 80 years of South Asian history and cover a variety of disputes, some of which we are quite familiar with and others which we may be know a little less about and have appeared less regularly in the literature on South Asia, allow us an opportunity to close the gap between two different assessments of what mosques were and what Muslim endowments, really the social function of Muslim endowments, in South Asia.

There are some who treat the mosque as a space of unrestricted social participation and on the other hand, we have Gregory, Gregory Kozlowski’s argument, that Muslim endowments were sites of social influence by benefactors. Mosques were indeed sites of social influence, but the influence of a series of very unlikely characters. District magistrates and revenue department officials evaluated and adjudicated Muslim claims on public and private land for mosques. Custodians prayer leaders and eventually Muslim associations managed the programs of activities in mosques. Muslims relentlessly organized for more rights in mosques, which was limited in success until the very end of the colonial period.

I hope that this, the contribution that this book makes within the field is to allow a much more localized and located treatment of mosque sites as places of Muslim organization. Hopefully, the, my effort to use micro-histories in engaging and, and thoughtful ways will also do something for that approach to history writing. And, moreover I, I hope that this book sort of opens up more of a conversation about some of the purposes of Muslim organization in South Asia and the shape that, that took the sites on which that occurred.

> > Lhost: Alright, thanks. Mudit.

> > Trivedi: Thank you. Um, I have to start by thanking Elizabeth for picking me out of the legions of many more qualified commentators, so many of them in the audience today for this conversation. And I must thank Professor Haroon, Sana, if I may, for such a rich, engaging, and definitely argued book. The book’s many contentions spoke to me to such an extent that I could talk to an hour and still say very little of all that I find [inaudible] in it.

But to keep to time, I will first try and characterize what I understand that Sana’s significant achievement in a few ways. Then I’ll offer a few very partial, selective reading responses framed as first as lessons for a few lessons from the book for material histories of the mosque, and how those are framed. I have a few comments on legal aspects, but I will reserve them and differ to Adnan’s wisdom. Next, I’ll try and think about the books arguments about secular colonial rule and its implications and close with a few thoughts about the implications for the study of Muslim worship itself.

Now, the Mosques of Colonial South Asia definitely opens new historiographical space via a series of quick maneuvers. The research that the historiography, especially since Kozlowski’s book, has been focused on private waqfs. Assimilating all into that, all histories to that history of waqfs’, as Sana just said, as assertions of social influence.

Be that as it may, I understand Sana is telling us the colonial treatment of mosques, congregations, and disputes, amongst them is another story. This story that we are here to discuss and a story, which is shaped profoundly on one hand by the loss of older order of [inaudible] Mughal imperium and also by the loss of the abolition of the qazis office as a framework for resolving disputes. To tell this story, then, Sana calls into question another historiographical assumption that mosques were in any transparent [inaudible] way a public arena. And against this assumption, she asserts that secular colonial rule fractured the expectations of the post-Mughal namazi, shoring up mutawallis, securing custodianship in an understanding of waqf trusts, and then colonial rule then resolved disputes by recourse, to be or recourse to the originally act of the founder or by ever expanding realm of discretionary powers handed out first to magistrates, then revenue officers, who rented the mosque a fragment of land, the legal subject of urban and revenue governance.

Now, Sana has also forever widened the cast of characters who must be included in any [inaudible] of the mosque. Alongside with mutawallis, she reminds us of the place of the khatib, the imam, the muezzin, and the [inaudible]. And there is much archival [inaudible] to be admired in this text around these figures, from fragments of homework that were assigned to students in the maqtab in Rangoon to the story of the activist construction of the Lahore Shab Bhar Masjid. I have profound admiration for the kinds of sources and the histories motivated here. As if this is not enough of an achievement, then the book participates in a wider historiographic movement of new histories from legal archives, which is at once, social, legal and critical. Sana tracks the differentiated recourse to law by particular Muslim communities, their field arguments, the countersuits, and the post-1919 recourse to legislative changes as all one arch of rethinking rights, individual and collective, in the masjid and modernity, of recovering consensus from the fractured spaces of colonial authority. 

Now, one quick, unfair way of summarizing the five cases the book charts is by the Joint Committee of the Privy Council, the judicial committee of the Privy Council decisions that Sana tracks. These are, first, that the individuals have no rights in the mosque beyond prayer and access. Second, that they have no innate right in management of waqf, of waqfs. Third, that more broadly, rights when spaces around the mosque cannot be derived from custom, that they must, they enjoyed only at the magistrates’ discretion. And forth, that mosques are ultimately land, vulnerable to adverse possession. And this arc of the book changes until in our fifth case study of Kora Jahanabad, settled as, she points out, only a few days before partition, when Muslim litigious associations win back collective rights. And I want to think about how they win them back.

The appellants, the mosque defenders in this case, do so, ultimately, as very litigious [inaudible]. As Sana says, they have to recast themselves as experts in very telling ways. And what I find fascinating is that they present forms of knowledge that had been admissible by the state, who, because these are subjects who survey, who document, who even map a waqf to the standards of colonial evidence and land, and that has implications for people like me who also map these places. And I’ll say more about that, but most tellingly, they ultimately write a historical reconstruction, not of worship, but of the ruins of the waqf which the state made. This is a story, then, which has implications for all of us and other forms of knowledge we produce about a mosque. Following this victory, this victory comes from pushing aside worship at some level. 

And now in the time that remains, I just want to start talking about the implications of what I think we could most broadly learn from this incredible book. One response would be, I think that Sana is asking us to learn to ask ourselves a few questions. First of these might be, what do we think is the temporality of the mosque. What do we think it’s spatial extent is? As we examine our preconceptions, our chronotopes for the mosques, I think Sana is encouraging us also to ask what understandings of dispute, authority, and agreement, what scene of congregation and consensus do, do we allow in our histories of it. Well, in other words what assumptions do we make of haq or hud upon mosque and it’s, all persons within it. Now, to specify what I mean by some of this, in historical terms, all of us are [inaudible] by our best intentions, by the best [inaudible] of history writing to identify, when we introduce, a mosque by its patron. Now this foundationalism in our account guides our evaluation, especially for architectural historians, and it’s typification in style and period, its historical eminence. But I think Sana is asking us to attend to all that follows from the tamam shud of the Mughal dedications and inscriptions. And archeologists and art historians participate in these discourses, which extract the mosque from the city, from them mohalla, from its neighborhoods, from it’s lived communities. Our representations certainly lie between those of the Revenue Board and the All India Shia Conference Activists, which Sana had just put on the screen. 

So, I want to pause and think about how few plans we draw ever wonder where is the maqtab, where did the students live, where did the katib sleep. Do we pause to puzzle whether the tazias might have been kept? Most of our plans, and this is important, if there are any surviving arrangements for wudu, they get edited out by the time we get to publication. Now this matters because it matters as all of these accounts ultimately come to stand as evidence in that future where almost all mosques of some parts of South Asia might indeed need to be defended someday in court. Continuity, occupation, adverse possession all have material traces. And a much needed shift is in approach is a first step for an archeology and art history responsive to its own complicites in the history that Sana tells. We will do well to heed these minute traces. They open out material archives of how mosques endure, how they how they witness mortal time. 

Now, from these we could state, one of the questions I had throughout with Sana gives us a very concise account of the precolonial moral world of the mosque and a relational sociology of haq and had in that world. I’d ask, I’d like to ask Sana to say more later about what she would like, for us, for those of us who work in the preview to her story. She says a lot about what she expects of us to do for the period post-47, but I would love to hear that. A few comments follow just on how Sana characterizes secularism. Now, the secular strait, in her words, creates the waqf crisis, abolishes the qazi, then it ignores what she calls values arising from devotion in judicial reasoning. And the colonial state declares its commitments to non-interference, neutrality, to try to unburden, in Sana’s words, whatever responsibilities for dispute resolution of managing mosques that come its own way. But as Sana says, it’s critical that the state admits cases and then dismisses religious reasons. It refuses to admit arguments from taqlid, she says, it says it cannot adjudicate this, but then goes on to read all manner of religious practice, text, and testimony as evidence anyway.

Now, in each case, a chain of reasoning emerges from state practice. Is vocalized amin an essential aspect of prayer, is it essentially a prohibited action, the state is asking. Is the mosque out of the [inaudible]? The area for wudu, is it essentially a part of the mosque? And the key then is that even as the colonial state professes neutrality, admission of any claim to waqf  involves the indeterminacy produced by the state’s purported lack of authority to rule on religious reason. This space was used, this indeterminate space, was used to build an understanding of what is essential, what’s customary, what was permitted, what’s injurious, and what categories the colonial order will not change, such as property and possessions. Now this remaking of a realm of practices of waqf, the reduction [inaudible] tradition into a vision of religion that fit the secular presumptions of the state occurs through what Hussein Agrama calls the questioning powers of secularism, operating through this indeterminacy and so fuels the ambition of the law and what Sana characterizes as its discretionary, non-statutory powers.

And I wanted to pause and just see a couple of things about how Sana so powerfully asked us to think about the post-1920s era when native elected officials and associations create essentially an extra bureaucratic waqf board, which allow the state to continue to have its moral fiction of neutrality, and I find that fascinating and a move of great relevance for the studies of secularism in South Asia. So my question is really at this point, where do we place the litigious middle-class subject with a liberal vigilance against corruptions of power and where do we behold Omed Ali, the julaha who conscientiously cast himself out of the mosque for his silent passions, to recall just two memorable historical reconstructions from the book. 

Now building on Sana’s insight, we could also say how do we complicate the story of secular passion so loudly speaking in a for law in a world so given to mistaking silent prayer. And on that point, I just want to add one historical question, amongst the many insights for the history of worship that emerged from the book. Now, the masjid is not just the scene for the material conditions of possibility and impossibility for worship, but it is the site of salat, it is the place of not just rehearsed spontaneity and [inaudible], but, but where niyat itself is forged. And we come to have a very interesting insight into what Sana casts, in some ways, as unmarked Hanafi or unmarked Sunni rights, to what she calls, a right to silence as it comes up against the [inaudible], the vocalized amin, as it comes up against Shia processions and their vocal marsiya. And it made me think about how this emphatic silence, which people would willingly litigate for, is itself a production of a world where silence and audition were held in a different and particular relation, perhaps arising out of 18th century debates over silence and the wide arc and influence of Naqshbandi and [inaudible] practice.

Now, well, there is much anthropological work on audition, I must thank Sana for her attentiveness and for her directing us to histories of silence. On that point, I think I’m out of time, so I will, I will look forward to learning from Adnan’s comments and only to say that five chapters, five mosques, five accounts of how the adhan constituted publics in the world of mutawallis and magistrates. Thank you Sana for the pleasure of working with you and traveling with you, and this peripatetic account.

> > Lhost: Thanks Mudit, Adnan.

> > Zulfiqar: Okay. So, I want to also begin by thanking Elizabeth, thanking Sana for this wonderful book and and, and right now, after listening to Mudit, you know, I am almost thinking, well, that I kind of just want to hear him comment more and listen to his conversation with Sana because that was, that was an excellent capturing of this book. So, I’m going to do a couple things in the time because I do want to make sure that we have enough time for the audience.

I want to first say, I come to this as probably the least of, having the least expertise in this particular arena than my colleagues here, someone who works on medieval Islamic law and modern but really sort of doesn’t touch too much on colonial South Asia, except for in the cases of kind of jihad resistance. So for me, this was an incredibly rich book in terms of me learning much more about the literature in this field, but the sort of extent of detail, the, the range of sources, and, and kind of the range of context that you covered. I would say that you know as anyone who comes to a book, you come to it, and there are questions in your head that you are exploring for your own research, reasons that, that inevitably start kind of popping out, and you start seeing things in the book that you find more deeply relevant to what you’re doing, and so, in some respects that’s where I want to take this because I found this book especially fascinating in the way that it examined stories and or a story or the stories of Muslim life in the absence of its historic governing authority or its traditional governing authority and parts of that story have been told by others in the context of law and the context of the creation of codes, the participation in, you know, whether one participates in the colonial states, these sort of debates around that and, and the context of jihad or peace or that relationship that should exist.

But the mosque is a space, the masjid is a space to examine the challenges, the opportunities, the contestations of Muslim life under colonial rule in the absence of traditional sort of governing authority. And this adds, oh, I think a wonderful layer to our understanding of this particular period, and I would say, in many respects to our understanding of or opportunities and avenues for the understanding of Islamic history in the post or in the colonial period and on. In particular, this move from sort of a state controlled space in the precolonial period where there’s kind of an oversight function over Friday prayers and the masjid and all of this kind of traditionally articulated in much of the fiqh and sort of substantive law literature to a space of communal authority or more communal authority with these other actors that Mudit mentioned as well kind of rising up raises some very interesting questions for me.

Partly, you know, where is this impetus for communal control coming from within sort of the communities? It’’s simply a desire not to have colonial control in these spaces over the masjid. Why isn’t there kind of recreation of kind of traditional hierarchies in this space as well that you kind of see happening in the jihad context and others where there’s an absence of the traditional state and so that that raised a lot of interesting questions for me that ceding of control to the community then also seems like this very interesting gateway into sectarianism and sort of the growth of sects having now this immense power because essentially ceding control of the masjid means ceding control of the pulpit which and the minbar and which, which, from a legal standpoint means that now the, the Hanafi, Deobandi, or ​​Ahl i-Hadith, then can say that no you, you are required by Islamic law to come, listen to me, and what I have to say something, which you know, is a real, in many respectsm a departure from what we see in kind of the early centuries of Islam. And so that, that raises some interesting questions.

Another interesting concept that Sana used and that kept appearing. and which was honestly, it was new for me, is this idea of Islamic normativity, which seemed to be a more expanded and possibly gentler notion of Islamic orthodoxy, maybe, or you know that’s kind of where I see, so this idea of Islamic normativity was really fascinating to me and what’s fascinating was kind of the idea of it being based on this notion of expectations or societal, you know, expectation as opposed to text or even tradition and, and obviously they’re linked, because you know expectations can arise from text and tradition, often do. But, but you know this, this raises some very fascinating questions, right. In, in the prayer context in Bihar, is the objection to the certain practices, particularly when they’re done by the prayer leader, you know the kind of vocalization of amin, etcetera, is it arising out of kind of deviation from the expectations that existed because of Mughal, Mughal statecraft or whatever else or, or is there also this idea that your prayer will not count if the amin is vocalized or if, if prayer is conducted in a particular way will it not count?  And so part of my question, that, that I felt I was curious about is, where is kind of religiosity factoring in here? Where’s the sacred kind of factoring in and how does the sacred figure into these disputes, and is it, are there things that end up becoming hidden when the sacred is being argued in secular space, right? And, and so from that standpoint, as it was very curious to me as to how that exists.

So last couple points. In and, and one thing with regard to orthodoxy or normativity based on expectation or practice expectation, it’s, it’s interesting you know the challenges that that potentially creates within the context of Islam, which seems as though it’s structured to give the text primacy in certain ways. And so, you know, and its Bihar example, of course which, which I found very fascinating because it, it tapped into many of the areas that, that I think about, you know. It’s, it’s interesting because it’s the Ahl i-Hadiths who are kind of these textualists in many respects that are, that are the, the antagonists in this situation and so really puts to the fore this kind of notion of where normativity is based upon. 

And, finally, I wanted to talk about the idea of, it, towards the end there’s this discussion of the ulema and their physical absence from the mosque space and from the prayer space, except in these limited ways, you know, where they come in to give a hukm, or maybe a talk and that, in some respects, you know, it seemed to me there was, Sana was making the implication that now their influence was diminished as a result of their absence, the physical absence and, and the presence of these other actors and their physical presence, giving them more influential roles and, and, to some degree, just disaligns with sort of this enhanced role of the community and its control of the masjid space, but I wonder, you know if the ulema has always been absent from the prayer space, right. They’ve never really been in that space. They’re limited sort of engagements, they teach there, they might you know, give a hukm, but they’re very absent, and, and, yet, you know, their influence seems to stem from other places and sort of as these arbitrators of the role of, you know, what is permissible and impermissible, etc. So, I’m curious as to whether, did the ulemas role really changed, like is, and, you know, and can we comment as to their influence being sort of changing as a result of this kind of physical absence. So you know those were things that came to mind.

But I’m going to end it there, and give the audience and Sana the rest of the space, but this was a really a delight to read, and I encourage everyone who has not had a chance to read it to really sit down with it for a few days and enjoy it. Thank you.

> > Lhost: Fantastic, thanks so much Adnan. Sana, would you like to respond to some of those comments and questions while we gather questions from the audience. We have about 20 minutes for discussion, so you should be in good shape to have.

> > Haroon: Great, thank you! Oh, my goodness, thank you so much Mudit and Adnan, if I may, for such meaningful engagement with some of the ideas that I present in this book. So, I’m going to take up just two of the many wonderful points that you raised. The first being and what I really enjoyed was how much you engaged with the arc of the argument that I present. And so I’m going to take up that question that you both raised about the precolonial period and what we do with an, and how I treated that precolonial period. 

So, that’s not my area of expertise. I am not fully equipped to work with those records or that history and, and so I purposefully chose not to. But I needed a start point for the study, and I really, I do believe that colonial law fundamentally changed the way in which Muslims worshiped in mosques in South Asia and so the evidence I gathered related to the very late precolonial period, so about 1800 onwards, and I worked with printed texts. And what I was looking for were, and I worked with some maps, and I worked with some oral accounts of and memoirs, which related to that very late precolonial period. And the argument that I put forward in the introduction, and that I am confident holding to is that the expectation, the widely accepted expectation of Muslims in under the late Mughal state and under many pre-colonial states, Muslim precolonial states, was that they in worshiping in mosques were submitting to the authority of the temporal ruler of the sovereignty of the state, of the state ruler. And that is validated in, I validate that in a couple of different ways.

I believe that it’s also true for non-Muslim states for the late, for the Sikh states as well, for the reason that disputes that took place in mosques, even in the Punjab, in late precolonial Punjab, would often find their way to the durbar for resolution, and they were resolved in, it seems from some anecdotal accounts, in creative ways, not necessarily through reference to sharia, but they were certainly resolved by the judicial authorities of those who rulers.

And that is what fundamentally changes in the colonial period. The state no longer wants to be involved. The state no longer has officers who will be designated or deputed to resolve disputes that arise in places of worship and so that’s the shift that takes place is the, is the Muslims as to worshiping, but there’s nobody to solve the problems that arise in moments of conflict and disagreement.

And so, in terms of how do we treat the precolonial sacred, there’s precolonial, there’s so much work to be done, of course, and I’m, all I can say is that there is evidence there, and if we just, possibly some creative approaches that evidence might elicit more substantial understandings of that [inaudible] than what I have offered here.

But what I, the other question that, that came up was relating to the, the arc of change that takes place in South Asia. And in here, finally, by the end of the colonial period, we have Muslims, who very clearly perceive, and I believe do perceive their distancing from the patronage of rulers and from the direct paternalistic, perhaps, care of rulers in their capacity as Muslims in those States. They are, much later on, then come back to organize and, and push back against their lack of control over their mosques, and their lack, the sets, state’s lack of attention to their perceived rights in their mosques, and they come to organize through these associations which you already know a lot about. In, in tandem with the responses to and Muslim interest in their rights in mosques, there’s a vibrant and powerful conversation going on about how Muslims can come together in organizations and societies and associations to assert rights in all sorts of ways and to forge a more collective identity. And it is those associations which take center stage in claiming back rights in mosques.

I think, Adnan, you had asked how it is that happens. That happens in tandem, and in, in conversation with Hindu and Sikh and other sorts of associations, Parsi associations, which are doing exactly the same thing. There’s a lot of cross fertilization of ideas and strategies. And of course the post-1920 period of Muslim reorganization for mosque, of Muslim organization for rights in mosques is, is exactly, is happening the same time as Sikh organization for rights in gurdwaras.

So, and just very finely about the ulema, do I imply that they, their influence declined, not so much. What I’m hoping to force a consideration or visit there are forms of authority in and among Muslims, aside from the ulema, and that we can attend to them in different ways, and so caveat is thinking about the authority of the ulema over Muslim society.

> > Lhost: Fantastic, we have some questions that are coming in here. I think, I’ll try to place these in order so that they make sense for the way that you, that you answer them, seeing some of the ones that have come in, but I’m going to start with one from Benjamin Hopkins who asks about your case studies. Can you say more about why you chose these cases, why are these sites the ones that you focus on the book, and why not other ones? 

> > Haroon: Absolutely, thanks, thank you for that question. The sites I chose were the cases which made their way to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and the reason why those cases are so important is partly, and this is from not a sophisticated enough understanding of colonial law but, but, I think I do believe that these cases were significant because their judgments became sort of, their judgments tended to guide other judgments related to mosques and set precedents. But, even more importantly, the Judicial Committeeof the Privy Council case files often run into three or 400 pages, and they’re very nuanced, and they are rich veins of evidence related to the sites that were being contested. And actually, this reminds me of another question that Adnan had raised that how, how, how is it that we can discern an Islamic normativity from these or a sense of an Islamic normativity from these cases. It’s because these case files contained depositions from the Muslims who were contesting, often mosque management or principles of mosque governance. And their depositions express their beliefs and their feelings about mosques. I think that this is how Muslims should pray. I believe that that is how Muslims should pray. And, and, often when they’re probed further and, and asked, well, why do you believe this, and they will sit, express, well, because the khatib of the mosque told me so or because it’s written in the book of the Ahl i-Hadiths. And so you can see that the, this belief in, in Islamic norms is not quite the same as an orthodoxy, but it expresses both the firmly held nature of beliefs about mosques, but also often demonstrates their non-scholarly nature. They’re there, these are lay people expressing their beliefs about mosques.

And so, why these particular case studies, because there is the most evidence about them, and I have been engaged other sources like India documents in the India Office Library, political department documents, and published Urdu texts and Persian texts that comment, maybe a little further, on some of these sites or other similar sites. And I used, I’ve aggregated other evidence around the central case studies, which, which sort of stand on their own and are, in the conclusions that I reach about these sites, are much easier to defend the cause of the evidence that exists for them.

> > Lhost: Yeah, I think what’s a really interesting thing about, and we have a question that’s come in asking you to say more about your sources, but one of the things that I note looking at published reported cases that is that often you get a sense of what the British judges or sometimes the Indian Muslim judges were thinking about various concepts, but so often those decisions don’t include any of the witness testimony, and they don’t include any of the depositions even in translation. So, if you can get to what people are actually saying through other sources, that adds just a completely different layer of information and material. I don’t know if you’d like to say more about sources. We have a number of other questions coming in, as well about.

> > Haroon: Well, I’ll just add very briefly that, in addition to those witness depositions and the published, in the some of the published texts and fatwas even that appear in this case files, there are often a detail site maps, like the one which I showed you right at the end of my presentation and those, these, what’s so wonderful about these cases is that the colonial courts are always evaluating mosque site as land and as features of the built environment, as well as evaluating with some claims in them and some devotional claims within them. And so, it’s, you can, I can, I could really use these case files to constitute the mosque in a variety of ways in this to some of the wonderful points that Mudit had raised earlier about the materiality of the mosque and what’s happening within it.

> > Lhost: Yes, I have one question that’s come in from Irfanullah Farooqi, who asks if you could say more about the chronology, in particular what changes the post 1920s landscape and maybe like to say a bit about how the Tablighi Jamaat or other organizations might have changed, change the way organizations and associations worked with in and through mosques.

> > Haroon: It’s a great question. So the chronology, it begins with the very first mosque case, the first, the first case that goes to the Privy Council. Actually, not the first thing, I might be able to say more if anybody’s interested in how many of these cases did go to the Privy Council, but one of the early ones, the Tajpur Mosque case, which in fact is, I’m certainly not, and I notice this question comes up somewhere else, I’m not the first person to have talked about this case. It appears in Barbara Metcalf’s book many years ago, and a few other people, recently Julia Stevens has also talked about this case. 

I take a different, I take a different approach to that evidence. I’m interested in people’s interest in the mosque itself rather than the broader legal arguments pertaining to that site, and I, and it’s the first, it’s the first case, that is adjudicated after the laws of trust and the laws relating to charitable endowment substantially changed. As it was the first case in which the court not only clearly articulates its inability to adjudicate a case and to evaluate Muslim legal claims, fiqh and taqlid, and other approaches to Islamic law, it is also the first case in which the court clearly designates a different authority within the mosque to, to the officials of the state, and it does so by allowing the Ahl i-Hadiths’ argument that the prayer leader can lead prayer within the mosque how so ever he chooses it as long as it is not in a manner that is impermissible under Islamic law. And, of course, that allows the Ahl i-Hadiths a lot of latitude to express, to pray in the ways in which they prefer to do. 

But the court’s acceptance that the prayer leader leads within the mosque hall, within the prayer hall, is an important one, and so that is the first of the cases that I look at and the six, the cases that, that up until the very last case that I evaluate, there’s no particular ordering to the decisions that that are issued. The second case that I consider points to the significance of the custodian over the mosque. The third one points to the significance of the magistrate over the mosque perimeter. But there’s a lot of evidence that the custodian was important in 1891 as well, and the magistrate was also important in 1891. So, there’s no particular chronology to those first three cases, but those first few judgments allow us to stagger our attention to them. But those who, perhaps in a sense, those first three really work together in a, in a, to show us the landscape of emerging authority in and around mosques.

And then the last two chapters which look at the case relating to the Shaheed Ganj, and finally, the case relating to the Kora Jahanabad Mosque, they both, both those judgments in a, in a, are, first of all, those cases are taken forward by Muslim associations, and they are influenced by the evidence gathered by Muslim associations. And they both in different ways take into account the testimonies of Muslim experts and who speak to the importance of the mosque. So, I think I addressed the question of chronology.

> > Lhost: Yeah, I’m gonna try to bring two questions together here. They both have to do with space, authority, secularism. And so the first is from [inaudible] Khan, who asks, asks about other Muslim spaces as sites of secular activities of secular politics, whether it’s a Jama Masjid filling in as a place for political activity during anti-CAA protests or mosques in Kashmir being subject to shutdowns by the current Indian government. And then so that’s looking sort of into the present to talk about the way that spaces are functioning, functioning as, as political and secular spaces. 

And then the other question is from Ali Imran and asks to, to look to the past, to the precolonial, to think about other places, other sites where the, the power of imperial authority was employed in the sense that durbars were also a space where people would give, would submit to authority. How do those sites kind of map on two sites of worship given that they’re both embedded within these relationships of power between the community and the ruler?

> > Haroon: Yeah, those, those are really important questions, and both, I see evidence of both even in the mosque, some of the mosques [inaudible] that I studied. So, the Shaheed Ganj site, through the 1920s, at in a couple of different instances, actually served as a space for Sikh and Muslim collaboration in an anti-colonial politics. And the same is true of the, the Friday Mosque or the Imperial Mosque of Lahore. Abul Kalam Azad wrote a treatise on how mosques should actually function in precisely this manner of sites of colonial, anti-colonial organization.

So, and so, there is this potential for mosques to serve in this manner, but even the Rangoon Mosque, some of the people who advocated for reform of the management of the Rangoon Mosque really saw the mosque to function as a political space. And, I suppose what I’m saying is that, in many instances, it did, in, but those instances were not sanctioned by colonial law, they could not be defended under colonial law. And so, if a custodian of a mosque sought to close off access of that, to that space for Muslims, who wanted to perhaps hold a political meeting there, they could do so, and they could do so, they were entirely within their rights to do so. And so, the, while mosques may serve many other functions and maybe even capture and reproduce some of those elements of other sorts of spaces or social organization or authority like a durbar, that is, I haven’t looked for that evidence, and I haven’t systematically evaluated how that might happen. I think it’s entirely possible that it happened systematically, but I cannot speak to that, but what I can speak to is that this one structure of our schematization of mosque use did emerge under colonial law, and you can see it functioning in a variety of mosques across Asia.

> > Lhost: Thanks, we have just two minutes, and I’m afraid there are going to be some questions that we don’t quite get to, so I think I’ll end with this one from [inaudible], who asks, asks about whether we might be working toward the emergence of a new paradigm that moves away from understandings of Islam as being sort of bifurcated between scripturalist Islam and Sufi silsilas where we’re sort of seeing more emphasis on and more evidence of grassroots practices and trajectories cohering.

> > Haroon: Yeah, that’s, it’s a wonderful field for study, and I think that we should attempt to look for other sorts, other sorts of patterns of Muslim organization, so I fully acknowledge and agree with the sentiment behind that question and do hope to see other methods presented.

And if I have the last minute, actually, I remember that I didn’t fully address an earlier question about the Tablighi Jamaat and mosques. And I caught a little bit of an earlier question about more contemporary issues related to mosques.

There are a number of possible offshoots of the arguments that I have presented, and one set of offshoots relates to what Muslim organizations, I focus more in Deobandis, but the Tablighi Jamaat would be implicated in this, the Barelvi school would be implicated in this, what any organization has been able to do with the laws pertaining to mosque use and authority within mosques and I believe that the bifurcation, the growth of specifically Deobandi, Barelvi, Tablighi mosques is an outcome of the, the changes that happened in the colonial period where custodians and prayer leaders could defend particular ritual practices by specific ritual practices within mosques. So the, this factionalism that emerges around mosques is, is part of the story that I have told.

And I, and I think that there are other contemporary sites which also capture many of the tensions that we can see from the colonial period.

> > Lhost: Yeah, thanks. So we’re just one minute over time, but on that note, I would like to thank all of our, thanks Professor Haroon for writing this book, giving us the opportunity and a chance to get together today, and thank Professors Zulfiqar and Trivedi for joining us in this discussion, even though both of them seem to think that others would have been better suited. It was great to have both of you here. It was nice to see all of you. And thanks to all of you for coming out today. 
Our next event will be on Tuesday, March 8 and which will feature Kyle Gardner’s book The Frontier Complex: Geopolitics and the Making of the India-China Border, 1846–1962, and you can already register for that event at the link https://dartgo.org/conversations-gardner, which is in the chat. Thanks everyone!

Participant’s Report: Conversations on South Asia with Nicole Karapanagiotis (Dec. 7, 2021)

On December 7, 2021, the Conversations on South Asia Series at Dartmouth College hosted Nicole Karapanagiotis, Associate Professor of Religion at Rutgers University-Camden, for a discussion of her new book Branding Bhakti: Krishna Consciousness and the Makeover of a Movement (Indiana University Press, 2021).

Reiko Ohnuma, Professor of Religion at Dartmouth College, and Mara Einstein, Professor of Media Studies at Queens College, participated as discussants. Elizabeth Lhost, Postdoctoral Fellow at Dartmouth College, moderated the event.

The author began by presenting the main question that drove her research for the book:

How do religious groups reinvent and rebrand themselves to attract new followers?

Karapanagiotis

The book, she explained, is the result of her efforts to answer that question by focusing on how the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) has embraced new strategies for outreach and participation over the past several decades.

Beginning in the 1980s, ISKCON’s devotional base began to shift from being a community of non-Indians to one dominated by Hindu Indians. This shift occurred partly because despite being “culturally different” from American followers of ISKCON, “many Hindu immigrants took religio-cultural comfort in ISKCON temples and felt an affinity to the ISKCON devotees with whom they shared much religious practice,” she explains in the book (41).

many Hindu immigrants took religio-cultural comfort in ISKCON temples and felt an affinity to the ISKCON devotees with whom they shared much religious practice

Karapanagiotis, Branding Bhakti, 41

But the shift in demographics was also one that went against the vision of ISKCON’s leaders, who wanted the movement for Kṛṣṇa consciousness to be truly global.

Following this introduction, Karapanagiotis then described how ISKCON’s self-presentation radically shifted, following this influx of Indian expats, to attract a broader audience. Rebranding the movement as one rooted in mindfulness, yoga, and meditation—and building yoga studios, mindfulness institutes, urban spiritual lounges, and meditative retreats in rural areas to support this vision—ISKCON’s leaders set out to attract new communities of so-called “Western” devotees. Such rebranding efforts were designed to attract younger people and those the community refers to as “Westerners,” efforts—Karapanagiotis relays—that also aimed to be inclusive of non-white devotees and to garner followers from Black and Latinx communities.

Mantra Lounge, Lisbon

In her work, Karapanagiotis admits that moving away from religious ritual towards mindfulness and yoga clearly marks a change from the Gauḍīya-vaiṣṇava, temple-centric origins of ISKCON. Yet adding nuance to ISKCON’s activities, Karapanagiotis suggests that ISKCON’s rebranding has not led to the complete abandonment of traditional theistic worship for many of groups rebranding ISKCON. Rather, these new rebranding strategies, for some, are understood to be “just a stepping stone.”  For example, the de-ritualized and de-theologized lounge space that some leaders like Devamrita Swami now use “is just a temporary resting place for them [devotees] to stop until [Devamrita Swami] and other lounge staff believe they are ready to be introduced to and participate in temple ISKCON—complete with its theologies of embodied divinity and the ritual worship of mūrtis (embodied forms)” (116-117). 

Thus, Karapanagiotis concluded her introduction to the book by noting that while ISKCON’s rebranding does consist of de-ritualized yoga and meditation spaces aimed at appealing to a younger, Western audience, they sometimes still retain the theistic worship of Kṛṣṇa, rooted in the Purāṇic, temple-oriented Gauḍīya-vaiṣṇava milieu of ISKCON’s origins. 

Commentary from media studies scholar Mara Einstein and religious studies scholar Reiko Ohnuma followed the author’s remarks.

Drawing upon her expertise in media and marketing, Mara Einstein, while noting ISKCON’s earlier rebranding from Hare Krishna, asked whether ISKCON’s rebranding, as Karapanagiotis frames it, is actually rebranding. The shift away from ritual activity toward yoga and meditation is not necessarily a rebranding of Gauḍīya-vaiṣṇavism or of Kṛṣṇa devotion. Instead, at least as Einstein’s reading of Branding Bhakti suggests, ISKCON’s marketing efforts have actually produced a new product—one that allows so-called “Western” participants to side-step or bypass Hindu religious content.

An expert in Buddhist traditions, Reiko Ohnuma’s subsequent discussion centered around the similarities between ISKCON’s rebranding efforts and those of Buddhist movements in North America. Similar to how parts of ISKCON are now dedicated to a de-ritualized mindfulness movement aimed at connecting with a Western audience, Ohnuma noted that Buddhists in America have employed similar strategies to adapt to this new context. In many ways, these efforts to make Buddhism fit with North American spirituality overlap with the efforts (and struggles) of ISKCON’s leaders, though these Buddhist movements tend to emphasize elements like scientific rationality over spirituality. These changing emphases, Ohnuma suggested, created divergent practices among “Western” converts to Buddhism and Asian immigrants practicing Buddhism in North America. How these differences manifest in efforts to define and determine who counts as “Buddhist” overlap with questions of race, nationality, identity, and authenticity that Karapanagiotis also observes in the ISKCON community.

These broader questions that arise from Branding Bhakti‘s examination of ISKCON’s efforts to attract more devotees speak to the continuing importance of race, religion, identity, and community in the twenty-first century—and demonstrate Karapanagiotis’s rich contributions to these debates.

If you missed the lively discussion we hosted in December, then we invite you to pick up a copy of the author’s Branding Bhakti: Krishna Consciousness and the Makeover of a Movement.

Sri Sathvik Rayala (Dartmouth ’24, Bodas Family South Asian Studies Fellow, 2021–22)

Event Recording: Conversations on South Asia with Mytheli Sreenivas

Conversations on South Asia 2021-22 Decorative Banner
https://youtu.be/RT-kqJbWcQY

For those who weren’t able to join us for this event, here’s the recording and transcript. Enjoy!

Transcript for Conversations on South Asia with Mytheli Sreenivas

> > Lhost: Hello, everyone and welcome to the November event in the Conversations on South Asia series here at Dartmouth College. I’m Elizabeth Lhost, a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Society of Fellows and a lecturer in the Department of History here at Dartmouth, and I’m also one of the series co-organizers for this year. 

It is my distinguished pleasure to welcome you all to this event featuring Mytheli Sreenivas’s Reproductive Politics and the Making of Modern India, which was published with the University of Washington Press earlier this year. And event attendees can use the promo code w139 to receive a 30% discount when ordering the book directly from the press. We’re very grateful to have them make this available to attendees of the event. The book is also available as an open access text, which was made possible by generous support from a Project TOME grant. Very exciting to see more works coming out with open access editions for students and scholars who are unable to purchase books. Professor Sreenivas also informs me that, after some pandemic related delays, Reproductive Politics is now available for purchase in a South Asian edition through Women Unlimited. And we have a special link that we will put in the chat very shortly to share with all of you to buy that book directly from the publisher.

Before we begin, I would like to acknowledge that Dartmouth College, which hosts the series, sits on the ancestral and unceded lands of the Abenaki people, who are members of the Wabanaki confederacy. I would also like to thank our series sponsors: the Bodas Family Academic Programming Fund, the Asian Societies, Cultures, and Languages program, and the Department of History at Dartmouth College for supporting this program, and I’d especially like to thank Bruch Lehmann and Britny (Town) Marsh for their support with logistics.

Momentarily, I’ll hand over the platform to my colleague Professor Douglas Haynes, who will be introducing our panelists and moderating the Q&A today. But before I do that, I would like to thank our two Bodas Fellows Sri Sathvik Rayala and Bryanna Entwistle, who are working and have been working behind the scenes to make sure the program runs smoothly today, so please join me in acknowledging their contributions.

I would also like to announce that the complete schedule for the conversation series is available on our website, which is sites.dartmouth.edu/southasiastudies and you’ll see a link to the conversation series on the left hand side. And I’d also like to announce that our next event featuring Nicole Karapanagiotis’s Branding Bhakti will take place on Tuesday, December 7 from 12:15 to 1:15 PM Eastern and registration is available at the link dartgo.org/conversations-karapanagiotis, and we’ll also put that in the chat so that you can access it pretty easily.

Finally, for those of you who can never quite get enough of South Asia events in your lives, Professor Haynes has also asked me to announce that on Thursday, this Thursday, just two days from now, he will be hosting a conversation with Kavita Sivaramakrishnan on India’s second COVID wave with reflections on a longer history of epidemics and erasures. So we’ll post information about that event in the chat so that those of you who are interested may attend.

And now, without further delay, on to our panel discussion. Today, we have joining us the author Mytheli Sreenivas, and two discussants. Each panelist will provide roughly ten minutes of comments and reflections on the book, beginning with the author. And then we’ll open up the floor to questions and comments from the audience. When submitting your questions, please use the Q&A feature in the Zoom webinar to submit your questions and now please welcome my colleague Douglas Haynes, who will be introducing our distinguished speakers.

> > Haynes: Thank you, thank you very much. I’m very pleased to be moderating this this event, about a book, I read, several months ago, not just in preparation for this occasion. Besides all the thanks that Elizabeth has already mentioned, I want to thank Elizabeth herself for organizing this event and for all the work she’s done in putting together this Conversation on South Asia series, which I think is really a unique contribution to South Asian studies, not just at Dartmouth, but actually globally. And, and I hope we are able to keep it, keep it going in the years, in the future future years.

Today, we’re pleased to have with us Professor Mytheli Sreenivas, who is an Associate Professor at Ohio State University. Her work focuses on women’s and gender history, and more recently on the history of sexuality and reproduction. Her first book, Wives, Widows, and Concubines: The Conjugal Family Ideal in Colonial India, is the most critical work on the history of conjugality in modern South Asia, and it showed how the advocacy of the conjugal family became central to the constitution of modernity and nationalism in South Asia. And it certainly has been extremely valuable in my own work, which deals with conjugality in advertising. 

Her second and latest book, the Reproductive, Reproductive Politics and the Making of Modern India, the subject of today’s discussion, we’ll hear plenty about that. But it has immediately established itself as the most important study of the history of birth control and reproductive politics in India.

She’s also published numerous journal articles and book chapters, including works on conjugality and reproduction, but also very broad historiographic essays. We have with us two very appropriate commentators to reflect on this work, and we will go in this order.

The first is Amna Qayyum, who is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University. Her primary field of study is twentieth century global history, with a particular focus on decolonization and the Cold War in South Asia and the Muslim world. Her research and teaching interests include the histories of gender, science and technology, development, and Islamic thought. Her current book project, tentatively titled “Demographic States: The Global Biopolitics of Authoritarianism in South Asia,” offers insight into how postcolonial sovereignty intersected it with and disrupted global bio, bio-political projects by situating Pakistan and Bangladesh as critical participants in the production of global demographic knowledge and practices and recently she’s also advised the Government of Pakistan on Covid-19 related human security.

After after comments from Amna, we’ll have comments from Carole McCann, who is a Professor and Chair of Gender, Women and Sexuality Studies at the University of Maryland-Baltimore with an affiliate faculty appointment in the doctoral program in Language, Literacy and Culture Doctoral Program. Professor McCann’s work involved, involves, among other things, transnational feminist theory, transnational feminist science studies, and population/reproductive politics. She has published two books, including Figuring the Population Bomb and Birth Control Politics in the United States, 1916-1945. I’m sorry, that’s, that was two books. And she also co- co-edits the Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global Perspectives, and she’s joined the editorial team for the 2021 edition. So I’ll be very interested in hearing what Dr. Qayyum and Professor McCann have to say about this, this compelling work, but first we turn to Professor Sreenivas to hear ten minutes of summary of her own, her own work, and then thoughts on her work.

> > Sreenivas: Thank you so much, and thank you so much to the organizers of the Conversations on South Asia series, especially Elizabeth Lhost for organizing this talk and for being so supportive. I’m also really grateful to Carole McCann, Amna Qayyum, and Doug Haynes for engaging with the book, and I look forward to your comments and conversation.

Following Elizabeth, I’ll also start with a land acknowledgment. You know these events seem like they’re happening everywhere and nowhere. But I want to acknowledge the place from which I speak, which is Columbus, Ohio, which occupies the ancestral and contemporary territory of the Shawnee, Pottawatomie, Delaware, Miami, Peoria, Seneca, Wyandot, Ojibwe, and Cherokee peoples. As an employee of Ohio State, I want to honor the resiliency of these tribal nations and recognize the historical context that have and continue to affect the indigenous peoples of this land.

And so, turning to the book itself, as, as Professor Haynes mentioned, I was asked to talk or introduce the book a little bit for folks who may not have, have read it and broadly speaking, it has its roots in how I experienced and learned about India as the child of Indian immigrant parents, back in the 70s and 80s. Overpopulation was my family’s answer to nearly every question I asked when visiting India during my childhood summers, from why the buses were more crowded than what I was used to to why poverty seems so visible to me as the child of American suburbs.

In short, overpopulation was the go-to explanation for why India was the way it was. But more insidiously, it was an explanation that suggested inevitability. How else could India be given its population size?

Revisiting these childhood memories as a historian, I began to wonder about the history of this hegemonic idea that had been my explanation for India for so long. And I started reading some work both in population history and in feminist critiques of population control policy, including, of course, Carole McCann’s work on the gendering of demography. And from here, it was a short step to recognizing, as others have before me, that population was always also a reproductive question. So human numbers are about how many children are born, how many die, and all the social, cultural, corporeal, and gendered practices that are associated with these births and deaths.

Population, in other words, is a reproductive justice issue. Indeed, much of the foundational feminist work on women’s and gender history in South Asia has engaged with reproductive questions, though they’re not always named as such. So, there is importantly, and, of course, the historiography of birth control, including the foundational work of Sanjam Ahluwalia and Sarah Hodges. There’s also a wider range of research that examines reproductive politics, so the controversies around child marriage and widow remarriage, the scandal around Mayo’s Mother India, the reform of Hindu laws of marriage and inheritance are just some of those examples. So, this was the conceptual space from which I wrote the book. 

A question about the hegemonic idea of overpopulation, a recognition that the history of population must also be a history of reproductive politics and a connection between this work and the broader field of South Asian Women’s and Gender Studies. My goal was to write a history of modern India that put reproduction at its center. I believe that many of the core questions we ask about the 19th and 20th centuries, about colonial rule and anti-colonial thought, about inequality and hierarchy, about economic development, about decolonization and post-colonialism, are also questions of and about reproductive politics.

With that goal in mind, for the rest of my time today, I’ll highlight a few interventions that I see the book making. And I’ll talk about each of these in brief and just list them first off. They’re about the question of chronology for a modern history of reproductive politics, the centrality of India to obstensively global change, the place of feminist activism and population control programs that were effectively anti-women, the intersection of histories of heterosexuality with histories of economy and development and, finally, the implications of this history for our current moment of climate crisis and resurgent populationist discourse.

So, my first point is that we need our histories to have longer time horizons. We tend to see population and reproductive politics as mid-20th century concerns. They seem to arise from transnational population control networks and the national developmentalist state, both in India and elsewhere in South Asia and across the Global South. However, I argue in the book that reproduction as a modern political question was first asked and answered in the process of imperial consolidation in the late-nineteenth century. In other words, Malthusian fears that India was an overpopulated place took hold alongside the conditions created when the Indian colony became part of global systems of food and finance, of agrarian production and capitalist markets ushered in by the British Empire. These fears of overpopulation became entrenched in Indian political culture, even though the population itself was not increasing in the late-nineteenth century.

This brings me to my second point about the book’s findings, which concern the place of India in the global history of reproductive politics. Histories of population and reproduction, even those taking a transnational approach, often tend to center the West. The result is that the rest, even if understood to be important, become, in effect, sort of local spaces, where global—that is Western forces—are enacted. Within such analyses, India becomes a preeminent site for global population control measures or—at most—a sight of collaboration between Western and Indian elites. However, in working on this book, I came to see something different, that is, India was not simply a local place for global politics, reproductive politics was enacted. Instead, I argue that historical conditions in India prompted a reproductive politics with global aspirations to take shape. This was true, for instance, in the mid-twentieth century when the International Planned Parenthood Federation was founded in Bombay with the goal of taking the transnational birth control movement in more explicitly Indian directions. And I start the book with an anecdote about that, and for the founders, Dhanvanthi Rama Rau and Margaret Sanger, this meant a focus on population control as the rationale for contraception. There are a lot of other examples, but in short, I’m interested in how Indian conditions helped to define the meaning and purposes of reproductive control transnationally.

This brings me to a third point of intervention. The history of reproductive politics implicates and is deeply implicated in histories of feminism. Many scholars and activists have made clear that the history of birth control was not a simple sort of trajectory from subjection to freedom in any part of the world. Instead, advocacy for contraception, abortion, and maternal and child health sprang from a variety of motivations, for instance Malthusianism and eugenics, sexual radicalism and anti-patriarchal thought, anti-capitalism and socialism, casteism and anti-caste politics. Feminist activists contributed to all these streams of thought about reproductive control. Consequently, there’s no direct line connecting feminist contraceptive advocacy to a progressive politics.

So, my book aims to build on this understanding to show that organized Indian feminists, who’re often overlooked in the history of state-led development, actually, played a pivotal role in putting family planning on the state’s agenda during the early post-colonial decades. And they did so by making it an essential form of economic development to be conducted by middle class women for their subaltern sisters. Recognizing this makes visible a certain kind of paradox. How is it that avowedly feminist activists helped pave the way for state-led population control programs that would ultimately disregard the reproductive health and autonomy of women, especially of Dalit, Adivasi and Muslim women, who are already the most marginalized.

I try to work through some of these thorny questions in the book, and I’m happy to talk about that more in the Q&A. So, the last chapter of the book considers images of the small and happy heterosexual family as they proliferated across public culture from the 1920s to the 1970s. This is my attempt to investigate the sexual politics of India’s family planning machine and, more broadly, to ask about the co-constitution of histories of heterosexuality and economic development. And that chapter takes a lot of inspiration from recent work on Indian sexology and Professor Haynes’s own work has been absolutely pivotal here on sexuality and advertising. I’m interested to identify a politics that mobilized heterosexuality to naturalize certain modes of planning, certain orientations towards time, structures of sexual intimacy and economic rationality, and visions of future consumption. And I have a few examples of these images that I can share in the Q&A as well. 

So lastly, the book’s epilogue learns from the words of rural women in Tamil Nadu, women who have historically been the targets of state-led population control, to consider what this history might mean for the current re-energizing of a populationist discourse in the context of climate change. So I’ll pause for now and turn it over, I think to Amna. 

> > Qayyum: Mytheli, thank you so much for getting us started and giving us such a rich sort of overview in just ten minutes of the book. Also, many thanks to Elizabeth and Doug for the invitation and for giving us a chance to gather here today, and I’m looking forward to being in conversation with Mytheli and Carole over the course of the hour. So, in the interest of time, I think we only have about an hour, so I’ll get started on my comments.

So, I won’t go into summarizing some of the book’s key takeaways because I think Mytheli has done that so well. But I will signal briefly to some of its main historiographic interventions, which I think we should keep in mind as we discuss the work. So, the first is the ambitious temporal arc of the book as Mytheli mentions, spanning from the 1870s to the 1970s. And this, as Mytheli rightly points out in the book, many projects on population and reproduction, including the one that I’m currently writing, they start with post-war or mid-century histories. So, the book is not only a call to arms for us to write histories of reproduction which cross the temporal colonial-postcolonial divide, but it also expertly shows us how reproduction emerges as a terrain on which to enact a framework of politics across this period from famine to child marriage to, obviously in the post-colonial period, national development. So the book also makes a compelling argument for us to think about what family planning means for different actors who are engaged in supporting it. So, from the straight-up link between population and economic development, to different, differing valences of liberation and welfare.

And Mytheli, I would love for you to speak a little bit more about this difference between family planning as liberation versus women’s welfare and what this does is about differences within elite women and their conceptions of the political economy of reproduction. And I guess with that, uh, I guess I’ve already started on my questions and comments, so I have a few more that sort of bunched together, but please feel free to engage with the ones that you think are more productive.

So, my first question is about the ethical and the religious, and I really, really enjoyed reading chapter five about the happy family and the rich detail and, in particular, engagement with the visual sources and thinking about the normative aspects of family planning. And because this is a book which crosses that sort of colonial-postcolonial temporal divide, what struck me most were how debates and re-configurations around Brahmacharya figured in reproductive and birth control thinking. And from what it seems, is that by in the post-war period, they get wedded to the small family norm, and the focus on sexual ethics is increasingly replaced by ideas of consumption and modernization within the soft small family unit. So I’m wondering if you could reflect on this change that happens in the post-war period in the ethical and religious case made for or against family planning. So is family planning mostly about political economy, or are there figures who continue to make a case for it in ethical terms? And I’m thinking here about the Pakistan case which I’m working on and I focus on sort of Islamic modernists who are actively writing about family planning as an ethical project. So I wonder if there are any similarities that we can also draw on from India. And while we are on the subject of religion, also wondering if you could speak a little bit more about the religious and caste dimensions of the postcolonial population control project. So your book and Sanjam Ahulwalia’s book talks about how Muslim and Dalit reproduction was vilified under late colonialism, but what happens to this in post-1947? And what does this tell us about citizen formation in Nehruvian India? So is it vilification of reproduction now packaged along class lines or is religious and caste identity still overtly or covertly targeted in these projects and how?

And then another set of questions has to deal with your work on the global color line, which you bring out so powerfully how Indian actors, including demographers, involved in this project of creating and resisting the notion of a global color line constructed through you know demographic axes of knowledge and mediating debates over migration, among other things. But I wonder if you could speak a little bit and I guess, this is going to be a recurring theme in my questions, about what happens to the global color line in the post-war period. So at their core, mid-century population control is a racializing project, but I’m wondering if we can think through the valences in which racializing forms of knowledge are deployed in different ways in the post-war period.  

And I’ll stop there, one final question about labor. So you bring out a very wide range of actors: feminists, demographers, sexologists, everyday citizens. But I’m wondering if we could think a little bit more about physicians and doctors as well, and how they negotiated their space within a state-led population control project. What relationship did they share with it, and is there a way in which, if we think about labor, so physicians, health visitors and others, we can think about the relationship, rethink some of the relationship between the citizens, the state and population control?

So I think we’ll stop there, and we can have more time for Q&A, and I think should I hand it over to Carole now, yes okay.

> > McCann: Thank you. Thank you very much, and I want to start as well by thanking Elizabeth and Mytheli for and Doug for inviting me to be part of this, and I’m looking forward to the conversation with all of the participants, as well as the panelists. 

I think this book provides a really rich analysis of India within the history of the modern population-imaginary, and that’s an imaginary that I would define that constructs human reproductive impacts on past prosperity is the central problem of the modern world. The ability and obligation to regulate the natural forces of population come to signify the modernity of nations and individuals. And the book’s interrogation of this flawed narrative I think deepens our understanding of the role of numbers within the colonial imagination by situating the calculus of life and death and imperial fiscal management, anti-colonial politics, national development planning, and feminist engagements with them. In so doing, I really do think the book effectively reframes the historiography of mid-20th century family planning population control and feminisms, both by expanding the scope of that history and by placing India at the center of that history. And I should situate my remarks by noting that I am not a student of South Asian history. My engagement with India comes through my interest in demography and in numbers as the language with which modern stories of human reproduction and its impacts are told.

My own work focuses on the epistemic and effective commitments population statistics and the work those statistics do in shaping women’s lives, social worlds and futures, and national futures. I argue that understanding the cultural work of population figures is a vital importance for reproductive justice movements, because population statistics are really tricky tools for social justice movements, because they, while they can reveal inequities, they also conceal the politics that brings statistics to life. And I’ve written about demography’s statistical practices that animated the mid-20th century population crisis and how that configured women’s naturalized bodies as the cause of population excess and thus the site of regulation and that those practices underpinning family planning programs build a binary of contraceptively competent and incompetent women and that that structures so much of feminist engagement around the question of family planning and population control and birth control.

And as part of my work, I do, I have critiqued Western demographic research on Indian population dynamics, perhaps, in fact, committing the, the biases that Mytheli points out in terms of focusing on the West. But that is the perspective I bring to my reading of this book. And from that perspective, I particularly appreciate the expansive archive that Mytheli has compiled. It appropriately centers India and the full range of population’s concerns: death, movement, and birth. And I say it in that order because I think that’s the order in which it captured the attention of imperial governments, anti-colonial actors, and postcolonial nations. Histories of statistics note the 19th century was about quantifying mortality and the value of life and, and, but mostly they ignore the role of India and famine management and epidemic management in that history.

Early 20th century, as Mytheli points out, a history of migrations ignores the South Asian voices that spoke against the drawing of that color global color line. And the mid-20th century population discourse made a fetish of fertility rates and changed human reproductivity. Fertility rates were and often still are conflated with growth rates as if routine death and migration no longer mattered, only the natural excesses of women’s bodies mattered. But the Malthusian spectors of mass misery want war and death haunt mid-20th century futurities.

By beginning of the late 19th century, I think the book really illuminates the long history of the framing of the question of reproduction in India in terms of economic scarcity and want. It really helps us understand that deeply inflected imperial, how deeply inflected and by imperial logics the preoccupations with costs and the value of India’s population are.

And from my point of view, it’s critical to trace the impact of that sedimented imperial logic in the enumeration and aggregation practices by which we convert human events of birth, death, and movement into national rates of mortality, fertility, and migration.

I won’t belabor that point, which I have a tendency to do, but I want to, I want to focus on what I think of as a major contribution to the project of excavating the political inflections of population numbers that is, that the book makes through its really nuanced analysis of the affective and political commitments to national well being, pride, and progress, but both by India’s political leaders and feminist family planning advocates. You know, as she notes, family planning was a means to bridge tensions within the national planning process. It enables claims of poverty alleviation without challenging structural inequities, promoting women’s development without challenging patriarchy, and together these smooth the tensions producing politics of dehumanizing women in terms of population control, and I think the careful analysis of the conjuncture, conjunctures and complexities of Indian feminists in this history is, is really very important.

One point I would want to question, while I agree that and use the same, the 1952 founding of International Planned Parenthood Federation, as that that India is central to shaping the population policy, I also wonder if the analysis leads us to give insufficient weight to the crowds of American demographers and funding that and the weight of that on shaping the definition of and the solution of India’s population problems in the, from the 1950s to the 70s. And I’d be really happy to talk about that, because I think it’s important to consider how we can both center India as a shaper of global policy and fully account for those neo-colonial interventions.

To conclude, as my interest always comes back to how feminist might navigate the terrain of population politics towards justice, I want to highlight that final provocation of the book that I think warrants much further discussion on our part. The epilog brings the human scale back in through the contrast between the promise of future prosperity and family planning programs, contrast it with the precarity of the present that oral history participants cite as underpinning their reproductive decisions. I think that notion of the precarity of the present has the potential to draw our attention back to the structural inequalities and patriarchal constraints that population statistics, population control, family planning discourses alike allied. And in so doing, I think you can open space to effectively challenge the current, the terms of current reproductive politics under late stage capitalism, and I really hope we can talk more about that. 

Thank you. Doug. Oh sorry.

> > Lhost: I was gonna say Mytheli, I’ll give you a minute to respond to some of those questions and comments briefly if you’d like while we gather questions and answers from the audience and for those of you who are in the audience, you can submit questions through the Q&A feature.

> > Sreenivas: Great, I will try to keep my comments pretty brief and hope to cycle back to many of these questions, but first of all, thank you for such a rich sort of engagement with the book and some really wonderful questions for me to keep thinking through, and I think for us to think through together, so thank you for that. Um I think there’s a, as Amna herself pointed out, there’s a number of questions that you raised that are essentially around what’s the relationship between the colonial and the post-war or postcolonial and what changes and what are points of continuity, and I think that’s a really excellent question on a whole, whole number of levels. I’m not going to take up all of those levels, but I sort of welcome for their conversation on that, but I think one one place to think about it has to do with the question that you raised about religious, caste, and class dimensions. And this is something that I’m really kind of curious to keep thinking about because the late colonial period, as many people have shown, I mean certainly Sanjam’s work but also Charu Gupta’s work and others, you know have really sort of made clear that the kind of communal demography that characterize the 1930s and 1940s, has a long life into into sort of postcolonial India and what I was interested in, and we see that long life now right with the, with the really like, I don’t know it was it was communalized before I don’t even know what to call it now, right. I mean it’s sort of like, I don’t know, hyper communalized in the current moment and context right and the sort of current vilification of Muslim populations, in particular, but Dalit populations as well, and I think, so I’ve been wondering about this, in part, because the explicit discourse and rhetoric that I found from the 1950s and 1960s tended to avoid the kind of, the kind of language that we see reemerging from the 1980s and especially 1990s. And I’m trying to figure out what to do with that, like there were these moments that appear once in a while, and I talk about them, where I find them, in the book, you know where some of the the women family planners who go out to talk about you know sort of talk family planning to rural women will sometimes get frustrated and make these kind of side comments about who’s accepting and who’s not accepting family planning. But yet a lot remains I think sort of unsayable in these discourses, and I, this is sort of more of a question than an answer, but I’m sort of not just thinking about pre and post-47 but thinking about this moment of the 1950s and 1960s and national development discourses and what it, what it opens up and what, what it leaves unsaid or kind of under the surface, just as a thought. 

And because I said I would keep my my things brief, I’ll just come to one other point that comes from from Carole’s comments having to do with the place of sort of American demographers and their commitments in these policies, which I would absolutely, I would absolutely agree with and kind of reflecting back on the book, I think, part of, part of the longer chronology, I hope, sort of allows me to situate the American presence, which was my goal, in terms of recognizing that these politics come from a set of collaborations and not only, right, from from a kind of an American intervention. 

But, that being said, I think there’s a lot of room for something that I’ve been thinking about in some future writing and I’m hoping some maybe collaborative writing if folks are interested in in these questions, I am really wanting to be able to situate this shift in the 50s and 60s within a more effectively transnational frame that sort of looks at multiple places over time and and thinks through what a truly transnational history of this process might look like that sort of locally grounded.

So I just want to put that out there for folks who are interested. That’s certainly a project that I would really like to engage in, but I’ll pause there for now, if there are other questions.

> > Haynes: Okay, I don’t think we have questions, yet, but I had, I have reading this book, I had a, had a number of of questions. I guess the one I would like to ask is is about the epilog which Carole mentioned and and where you bring in the oral interviews and, and I wondered whether you know how does the question that really occurs to me is how, how does one engage the perspective of the subaltern and subaltern women in this, in this process and clearly the adoption of reproductive technologies does become more widespread, but a sense is that maybe it has very little to do with the discourses, the elite discourses that you, you talk about through much of your book and so how do we get at how ordinary people are perceiving the issue of reproductive technologies and, and other aspects of the birth control process. So this seems to me the real, a real gap that we have in our in our understanding of the politics.

> > Sreenivas: Yeah, thank you for that. Um I spent a lot of time, when I was writing this book kind of like worried about this exact question because you’re absolutely right. These are a set of elite discourses that operate in a particular space with you know so that some of these, you know, Indian demographers are far more likely, of course, to be talking to American and other demographers than they are to be actually kind of engaging with sort of grassroots or folks on the ground. 

So yes, I think that gap remains, and I think the reason that the epilog exists, was in part to recognize that gap, but I think the, the thing that enabled me to write the epilogue was to, was to stop looking to these alternative voices for critique or an alternative perspective. Which is not to say that these alternative perspectives don’t exist, I really think they do, but rather to kind of stop asking the oral history work to sort of solve my archival problems. Right and to say, well, no way there, there must be like, there must be a critique and as someone once pointed out to me like earlier earlier in the work, you know, it’s a tall order to ask for such a thing, because, of course, if you have been confronted by this discourse, potentially for your whole life, and you are constantly told that your reproduction is the problem, and you’re constantly going back to the medical sort of institutions, right, you’re constantly, every time you encounter a doctor or health care practitioner you’re getting the same message it really does become a taller to ask for something different, and so.

I, once I stopped that search and instead tried to listen to a little bit more of these voices, it at least enabled me to think about how the sort of the, the end product, in other words, the sort of reproductive control, right, the that’s evidenced in sort of the big demographic data about declining fertility rates in India now, that that big story doesn’t necessarily mean the winning out of the sort of ideologies of modernity and consumption that are underpinning family planning discourse, that there’s a lot of room between those two which I was, I was trying to get up.

> > Haynes: We have at least, we have a couple questions in the Q&A now from [inaudible] Bhandari. He says, thank you for this wonderful session I was wondering if you could comment on how much of these reproduction policies were an attempt by the postcolonial state to sanitize history and mythology by proposing the main the main ideal was a heterosexual couple, with emphasis on reproduction, whereas mythology show the richness of sexualities and love and sex for passion as well that’s, the first question. And, and in the second question is that goes beyond perhaps goes beyond the focus of book, but how would you explain, forced sterilization drives as by Sanjay Gandhi, were these policies and politics foreshadowing the, these brutal interventions so.

> >  Sreenivas: Yeah, thank you for, for both of those um, and the second one is maybe easier for me to answer than the first, but on the question of the forced sterilization under the Emergency, one of the arguments in the book is, is trying to, is one that all of the structures and ideas that, that were enacted in the Emergency predated the Emergency. So, although it is true that the Emergency Period was much more draconian in its sterilization policy, and it turned towards male sterilization, think that’s significant, nevertheless, all of the you know the, there was already an existence of sterilization camps prior to the Emergency. There were sort of targets and quotas prior to the Emergency, so all of the things that we associate with that already sort of pre-existed it. And so I think what I’m interested in is how the Emergency sort of rightfully you know gets sort of figured as the sort of worst forms of population control, but often leaves all of the other structures and ideological underpinnings sort of off the hook. And in fact helps to normalize, I would argue, female sterilization in its wake, which we still see in the disparate rates of male and female sterilization across South Asia.

So yeah, I think that the heterosexuality question in regard to sort of like sanitizing is super interesting, and I really want to think about that, think about that a little bit more. I don’t really have an answer. I don’t know if actually Doug does. When I’m sort of thinking about sort of earlier histories of sexology and sort of cleaning up certain myths and ideas about Brahmacharya, but I do think that one of the sort of interesting points that you know Ishita Pande makes, for example, in thinking through how certain ideas like Brahmacharya get sort of reconfigured in the space of the modern, right, and she argues about Brahmacharya becoming a life stage, which I think is and Doug talks about this as well, and I think this is sort of maybe one way to go right. I don’t think what’s happening is a sort of a total rejection of those earlier visions, but how they get sort of categorized into these modern spaces, so that they can neatly fit that way, right, so like Rama and Sita, for example, becoming sort of the ideal monogamous couple, sort of rewritten along those lines.

> > Haynes: We have a couple more more questions. Okay. Okay. I’m sorry. I’m trying to see if there’s two different questions or one. 

So one question from Sushant Kumar is, is the role, about the role of scientific authoritarianism or scientism on behalf of the pre, pre and post-independent state institutions in shaping Indian population policy. So, I guess it’s a question area that is being posed here. Could so could you talk about that, and we have another question after that.

> > Sreenivas: Sure um. Yeah, so I think, I think this probably touches on Carole’s work as well, in regard to demography, so please feel free to chime in, but I think what, I think what I was interested in was thinking through the sort of scientific certitudes around development and the way in which population figures as a variable within demographic or population discourses and as Carole also pointed out sort of some of the affective connections that are made to that vision. 

So the book, you know, doesn’t spend a huge amount of time sort of talking about sort of science, with a capital S per se, but what I am more interested in is how do people, how does that vision, right, that sort of a set of ideas about demographic transition theory, for example, as an idea that all societies are supposed to pass through this demographic transition and that it’s possible to do top-down interventions to accelerate that transition, I’m interested in how that becomes figured in public discourses as like an ideal to have attachment to, right. How do you have pride in the notion of controlling population, right? How does that have the small happy family become the site of desire that is, that acts as if that the sort of the scientific discourse sometimes acts as if that’s not happening, but I think is actually, you know, central to sort of translating these claims on the ground. And one of the things that I’ve been struck by just in sort of talking about the book with, with folks both inside and outside of sort of academic context is how often people have said to me well this, this helps me to understand, especially those who are maybe not historians, this helps me to understand like why I grew up with the ideas that I did, and I think that speaks to this question of like the kind of affective attachment to the small family that has its roots in a particular kind of science set of scientific authorities, but that that, that becomes real in people’s lives through these other set of mediations.

> > Haynes: From Muhammad Ali Imran. He says, I was wondering if the panelists could speak more on if and how post-partition, these national development discourses have diverged. I think he means between India and Pakistan in particular. Correct me if I’m wrong. How do you mediate geopolitical definitions and perhaps divergent yet co-constituent, constituted histories in understanding the sexuality and reproductive rights, especially in the case of Pakistan, India?

> > Sreenivas: Yeah, I wonder if that’s a question that Amna and I would have to answer jointly. 

The first thing that occurs to me is like well you know go to her talk later because it’s um because that’s where I’m hoping to learn more about this. So I, you know, I don’t know the answer to that question because I, it’s not something that I was able to particularly focus on. I guess, I could sort of start us off, though, in terms of thinking about where, if the earlier history of this book which focuses on the 19th century and pre-1947 are making a claim that I think is relevant for thinking about South Asia, more broadly, right, which is that the neo-Malthusian idea about population in South Asia or in colonial India takes hold well before there is any rise of population, so that any population rise is always sort of ready, always has a ready framework within which it can be situated and explained and intervened in. That I think is a history that is probably shared. I think there is a sort of a, I wonder about the questions of divergence that emerged, for example, between sort of the other set of demographic debates about West Pakistan and East Pakistan and the role of that you know in 1971. I think there’s sort of huge, huge places or moments that could push towards a kind of a divergent response.

But I don’t know, I don’t know if Amna, you know, you want to speak to that at all. Not to put you on the spot.

> > Qayyum: I will, I can just put in a comment or two because it’s, it’s a, it’s a really good question, and it’s something I’m working through throughout the project. I think one of the places where we do see divergences is, which I sort of alluded to earlier, is sort of the ethical dimensions of population control, and I think in Pakistan because the locus of sovereignty is not just you know in a straight-up relationship between sovereignty and national development, Islam also emerges as a locus of sovereignty given sort of Pakistan’s peculiar formation. Population control, then, is not while it might be about economic development, there’s also a case that is deeply normative or ethical that is being constructed in Pakistan for it, which then leads to it being sort of politicized and resisted by multiple actors. So I’ll put the ethical in there, and I’ll leave it for that, and this is something you know we can talk about more in our shared conversations later.

> > Sreenivas: Yeah and, if I can just come back on one piece of this, on the ethical question, because I know you raised it before, and I didn’t address it. I’m also thinking about what are, your questions are sort of prompting me to think what are the ethics of development itself, right, and so to not situate those as necessarily as as separate sets of discourses and questions and, and going back to my affective attachments point, right, what kind of attachments to the nation as a site of the development process, I think, become, is, this is, there’s an attempt to mobilize that set of affective attachments as opposed to, not opposed but, but in a way that I don’t see the kind of trends that you’re suggesting here about an ethical attachment that’s perhaps exists outside of or beyond the nation state in the national space. So maybe that’s just another, another point that we might want to think about.

> > Haynes: A kind of related set of questions is why did, why did the convergences remain in many cases and do, why are there, why are there continued overlaps despite the different ideologies of the, of the state? 

We do have several questions now, so from Haley Swenson. I’m just going to ask the first one here. So climate and disease seemed to be the chief concerns of the colonial, colonial proto-population control project. Can you speak to the way the precarity of the present creates or makes difficult opportunity for an alternative to population control rooted in both climate and reproductive justice?

> > Sreenivas: Yeah, thank you and hey Haley, um I think yeah, and this also relates to I think Carole’s points earlier about precarity and sort of thinking about that in relation to this, so. For those who are not constantly following the climate change in population discourse, I will just sort of put out a little background, which is that the resurgence of, you know, so, so in the 1990s, in large part due to feminist organizing and activism, the language of population control sort of fell out of favor, as probably many people know, and was sort of substituted with claims around reproductive health and health and rights. And you know Mohan Rao and others have talked about how that transition occurs at this moment of simultaneous, the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of neoliberal capitalism globally and so that the promise of the rejection of population control is never really fulfilled.

That’s all by way of saying that, but that the ideologies sort of remain and have kind of come back now, in the context of climate change and, once again, we find that those who are at the, at the margins and who are rendered most vulnerable are also those rendered both responsible for or are seen as responsible for climate change and rendered as responsible for fixing it. You know Kalpana Wilson, who just did a brilliant talk, I went to last week sort of outlined the stakes of, of how this, how this happens in the context both of the rise of authoritarian nationalisms that in the Indian context sort of demonized Muslim women, in particular, but are very much part of sort of global development discourses that sort of use the claim of climate change to call for greater contraceptive usage by women in the Global South so.

All that by way of saying, so anyone who looks at these histories, I think will have to, I guess I’ll set back and say so there’s a question of crisis, right, that, that in the 1960s, the claim of a population bomb, right, became the crisis that enabled all kinds of you know coercive interventions in people’s bodies and especially women’s bodies. And so now again we’re confronting a crisis, this one, a real one, of global climate change and what I see as the sort of real importance of not, the failures of the population bomb were that it was neither true nor did, did the the control measures that were designed to deal with it, were they successful on their own terms, which was lowering fertility rates. And I think that’s a good and important story for us to remember, now that if you’re sort of truly to confront climate crisis, we can’t look to these sort of like false stories about who’s responsible for causing it or who’s responsible for fixing it and that, that, and there I think that addressing the question of precarity of people’s lives and livelihoods as being the crisis of climate because, as opposed to their fertility, I think, becomes the sort of central intervention that that we need to make.

> > Haynes: Elizabeth, we have time for one more question? Yes, okay for this comes from, there are several questions, there are a couple of questions, but I think we’re only going to have time for the first.

Aprajita Sarcar, as she says, I’m asking questions that come, are coming from my work. So, so thank you for the discussion. My first question is about archival traces. I have Durba Mitra’s book Indian Sex Life in mind when I ask how to work with excessive stress on the heterosexual nuclear family and the erasure of all other forms? As a second tied question, would framing the Indian nuclear family to be a product of Hindu aggrandizement limit its creative meanings?

> > Sreenivas: Yeah, those are both really good questions for which I probably don’t have answers, to be honest. But I think, I guess on the, on the first question, you know, I guess I would sort of humbly say that when I was sort of working on my book, really all I felt I could do was to sort of make that history of heterosexuality visible um as opposed to a taken-for-granted norm. But also to think about one of the, one of the struggles I had in, in writing the book right is comes with this sort of universality that you’re talking about that makes it seem as if there is no history there.

But secondly that ironically, separates that history, from all the other things that we think are associated, in this case with colonial and postcolonial development. So, I guess my attempt was to to historic size, by putting those in conversation, right, that the history of economic development has to grapple with the question of heterosexuality and not sort of leave that as a, as an unquestioned assumption, so I, again I don’t think that fully answers the question, but I that’s, that’s sort of where I was, where I was starting from.

> > Lhost: I think now, unfortunately, we are at time, so I would like to ask everyone to join me in thanking our, our author and our discussants, and Professor Haynes for leading what has been a very stimulating and a wide ranging conversation. Just thinking about where reproduction goes, it takes us in so many directions from political economy to climate change and everything else going on these days. 

So, I would like to just announce once more that our next event will be on Tuesday, December 7, and we’ll be talking about Branding Bhakti. And with that, I would like to thank Mytheli for agreeing to participate and for being a stellar author in terms of promoting and publicizing this event, in addition to putting together comments and participating. So thank you all for joining us today, and I look forward to seeing you again at the next event.

> > Sreenivas: Thank you so much, and just really quick, I know we didn’t get to all the questions, so please feel free to like shoot me an email or tag me on Twitter. I’m happy to keep talking okay.

> > Haynes: I hope you’re still able to see comments and the questions and, and in the, in the chat there before, before you depart so.

> > Lhost: I will, I’ll save the chat and I can send it to you, Mytheli.

> > Sreenivas: Oh, that would be great. Thank you.

> > Lhost: Yep, alright. Alright, thanks everyone.

> > Haynes: There were at least two questions I didn’t read. Thank you.

> > Sreenivas: Awesome, thank you. Bye.

Spring 2022 Courses

Looking for a class to add to your Spring 2022 schedule? Check out these South Asia–related courses!

From Colonial India to Post-Independence South Asia

ASCL 54.08 | HIST 76 | Taught by Elizabeth Lhost
Time: 11 (MWF 11:30-12:35, T 12:15-1:05)

This course examines the history of modern South Asia (focusing on the nations of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) from the eighteenth century to the present. Key themes include: the character of British colonialism and its impact on Indian society; cultural change and the “invention” of new religious and caste identities; the Indian middle class; the emergence of the Indian national movement under Mahatma Gandhi; Partition in 1947 and Partition violence; and post-independence South Asian politics and economy.

Highlights include:

  • An opportunity to work with digital primary sources in the South Asia Open Archives on JSTOR.
  • A chance to imagine the effects of historical change from different perspectives by keeping a historical. character journal.
  • Freedom to write about history in new forms, including character studies and screenplays.   

Voice and Images from Asian Borderlands

ASCL 70.12 | Taught by Miya Xie

Time: 2 (MWF 2:10-3:15, Th 1:20-2:10)

Borderlands are where modern nation-states are geographically defined and where their orders are both challenged and reinforced. This course studies the formation of modern nations in Asia and its consequences in the twentieth century from a “borderland perspective.” The cases to be studied include Hokkaido in Japan, Manchuria in mainland China, the Partition of India and Pakistan, the division of the two Koreas, the Taiwan island, and the highlands connecting East and South Asia commonly referred to as Zomia. The long historical process from colonial expansion to post-war demarcation across Asia, along with the ordinary people’s experience of this process, is witnessed by writers and artists from the borderlands with distinctive creativity and criticism. The disciplinary perspectives involved in the course range from literature, film, and art to history, anthropology, and linguistics. Enrollment is open, and there are no prerequisites. You do not need to know any Asian language to take the course.

Highlights include:

  • Study literary and artistic works about six Asian borderlands: Okinawa in Japan, Manchuria in mainland China, the Partition of India and Pakistan, the division of the two Koreas, Taiwan, and the highlands connecting East and South Asia, commonly referred to as Zomia. 
  • Gain a general understanding of the histories and cultures of some of the most troubled areas in Asia in the twentieth century, areas that shaped the geopolitics of the continent.
  • Learn how to appreciate literary and artistic works within their specific historical and geographical contexts and in comparison with each other.
  • Acquire the critical approach of borderland studies, an emerging but increasingly important approach in both the humanities and the social sciences. 

Colonialism and Culture in Asia and Africa

HIST 96.01 | Taught by Douglas Haynes

Time: 3A (MW 3:30-5:20, M 5:30-6:20)

This course examines the ideologies and cultural practices associated with European colonialism and with opposition to European colonialism in Asia and Africa, focusing on the period of “high imperialism” between 1870 and 1930. After exploring the major forms of imperial ideology, the course then looks at various manifestations of colonial culture, including science and technology, medicine, anthropology, photography, art, sport and gender practices. Finally, the course treats bourgeois nationalism and the cultures/ideologies of anti-colonialism.

Highlights:

  • Discuss the ideology and culture of colonialism in Asia and Africa at the height of European and American imperialism (1870-1930), as well as the influence of colonial cultural forms on the cultures of Asians and Africans.
  • Read Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj and David Arnold’s Colonizing the Body, as well as comparative works with extensive discussion of South Asia, like Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, and Antoinette Burton’s study Burdens of History

South Asia Events, 2021–2022

Spring Quarter 2022

Wednesday, May 11, 2022 | 3:00–5:00 pm ET

“South Asian Art Viewing” art exhibit with the South Asian Studies Collective and the Hood Museum.

Additional details forthcoming.

Tuesday, May 10, 2022 | 12:15–1:15 pm ET

Conversations on South Asia with Shenila Khoja-Moolji, author of Sovereign Attachments: Masculinity, Muslimness, and Affective Politics in Pakistan.

Register for the webinar here.

Tuesday, April 12, 2022 | 12:15–1:15 pm ET

Conversations on South Asia with Jessica Namakkal, author of Unsettling Utopia: The Making and Unmaking of French India.

Additional details here.

Winter Quarter 2022

Tuesday, March 8, 2022 | 12:15–1:15 pm ET

Conversations on South Asia with Kyle Gardner, author of The Frontier Complex: Geopolitics and the Making of the India-China Border, 1846–1962.

Additional details here.

Thursday, February 24, 2022 | 4:30-6:30 pm ET

“The Ethics of Adventure: The Changing Dynamics Between the Sherpa Community and Climbers in the Himalayas” with Pasang Yangjee Sherpa (University of British Columbia), author, climber, and guide Freddie Wilkinson (Dartmouth ’02), and climber Matthew Moniz (Dartmouth ’20) 

Additional details here.

Thursday, February 17, 2022 | 12:15-2:15 pm ET

“Lecture: Educating for the Anthropocene” with Peter Sutoris (University of York)

Additional details here.

Tuesday, February 8, 2022 | 12:15-1:15 pm ET

Conversations on South Asia with Sana Haroon (University of Massachusetts Boston) 

Additional details here.

Thursday, January 13, 2022 | 5:00-6:00 pm ET

“Agriculture and Environment in Nineteenth-Century South India” with Prasannan Parthasarathi (Boston College)

Additional details here.

Tuesday, January 11, 2022 | 12:15-1:30 pm ET

Conversations on South Asia with Mircea Raianu (University of Maryland)

Additional details here.

Fall Quarter 2021

Tuesday, December 7, 2022 | 12:15-1:15 pm ET

Conversations on South Asia with Nicole Karapanagiotis (Rutgers University, Camden)

Additional details here.

Thursday, November 11, 2021 | 12:30 pm ET

“India’s Second Covid Wave: Reflections on a longer history of epidemics erasures” with Kavita Sivaramkrishnan (Columbia University)

Additional details here.

Tuesday, November 9, 2021 | 12:15–1:15 pm ET

Conversations on South Asia with Mytheli Sreenivas (The Ohio State University)

Additional details here.

Wednesday, October 13 | 12:15–1:15 pm ET

Conversations on South Asia with Abhishek Kaicker (University of California, Berkeley)

Additional details here.

Public Talk: India’s Second Covid Wave: Reflections on a Longer History of Epidemics and Erasures

Join us Thursday, November 11 at 12:30 PM (ET) for a public talk with Kavita Sivaramakrishnan, Associate Professor in the Departments of Sociomedical Sciences and History at Columbia University. 

The lecture will explore India’s recent COVID surge from the perspective of a past of epidemics and their politics in India in the colonial and post-colonial contexts. It probes a longer history of disease outbreaks and their containment at various scales that involved the power of experts, uses of medical knowledge, and the state power in India.

These changing approaches to epidemics offer insights into state priorities, and a growing marginalization of vulnerable populations as India’s modernization projects and quest for productivity have deepened. It has implied a diminished access to care and inequitable health priorities that preceded the COVID Second Wave and situate the human crisis of pain and loss that unfolded. 

Join Zoom Meeting | Meeting ID: 910 4552 9162  | Passcode: 383735 

Courses: Winter 2022

Credit: Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya

Colonialism, Development, and the Environment in Africa and Asia

HIST 75/AAAS 50/ASCL 54.07/ENVS 45. Taught by Douglas Haynes.
Time: MWF 10:10-11:15, Th 12:15-1:05

This course examines the environmental history of Africa and Asia, focusing on the period of European colonialism and its aftermath. Topics include deforestation and desertification under colonial rule; imperialism and conservation; the consequences of environmental change for rural Africans and Asians; irrigation, big dams and transformations in water landscapes; the development of national parks and their impact on wildlife and humans; the environmentalism of the poor; urbanization and pollution; and global climate change in Africa and Asia.

The Global British Empire from 1600-Present

HIST 90.14. Taught by Tiraana Bains.
Time: MWF 2:10-3:15, Th 1:20-2:10

This course charts the long history and continuing legacies of the British Empire, an entity that has transformed every single continent over the last four centuries and is widely associated with the makings of the modern world. We examine how and why a powerful and expansive British Empire emerged and sustained itself. Equally, we zoom in on the regular contestation and even outright rebellion that this transcontinental polity inspired. This course is an opportunity to think connectively and comparatively about historical experiences in America, India, the Caribbean and Africa among multiple other British imperial spaces. Through the prism of a changing British Empire, we trace the rise and evolution of global trade, slavery, the consumption of commodities such as sugar, tea, opium, and cotton; and new ideas about governance, sovereignty, race and identity. We conclude with a discussion of the persistence of imperial institutions, laws and power relations in shaping the world we inhabit. Students will be introduced to major debates about imperialism and colonialism and the political, economic, environmental, legal and racial underpinnings of the British Empire. Students will read a combination of primary and secondary sources every week and will develop a research paper drawn from original sources over the course of the term.

 Sacred Architecture of Asia

ASCL 70.01/ARTH 38.01. Taught by Allen Hockley.
Time: MWF 10:10-11:15, Th 12:15-1:05

This course provides an introduction to the sacred architecture of Asia and the Middle East through a series of case studies that include Buddhist monasteries, Hindu temples, Mosques, Daoist and Confucian temples, Shinto shrines, funerary architecture, and the sacred dimensions of political authority as manifested in palaces, city plans, and mausolea. The pan-Asiatic nature and long historical development of Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam affords opportunities to examine national and sectarian adaptations of architectural practices. This course has no prerequisites and assumes no prior experience with Asian religions or architectural studies.

Announcement: Welcome our Bodas Family Academic Programming Fund South Asian Studies Fellows

The South Asian Studies Collective is excited to welcome Bryanna Entwistle and Sri Sathvik Rayala as Bodas Family Academic Programming Fund South Asian Studies Fellows for the 2021–22 academic year! Their biographies are below:

Bryanna Entwistle

My name is Bryanna Entwistle, and I am currently a third-year student at Dartmouth College. I’m double majoring in Government and History while minoring in Asian Societies, Cultures, and Languages. I was born in Hong Kong and raised in both Mumbai and Singapore, so the region is close to my heart! On-campus, I’m involved in the Sugarplum Dance Troupe, do research on the Vietnam War with the Dartmouth Digital History Initiative, and have engaged deeply with the Center for Social Impact. I’m looking forward to serving as one of the Bodas Family Academic Programming Fund South Asian Studies Fellows for the upcoming school year!

Sri Sathvik Rayala

Greetings! My name is Sri Sathvik Rayala, and I am currently a second-year student at Dartmouth College with a multi-disciplinary interest (politics, international affairs, economics, history, philosophy, and religion) in South Asian Studies. I am presently intending to double-major in “Government Modified with Economics and Philosophy” and “Asian Societies, Cultures, and Languages” with a focus on South and Southeast Asia. On-campus, I’m involved with the World Outlook, the Dartmouth Undergraduate Law Journal, and the Dartmouth Political Times, and I’m also part of two off-campus academic reading groups concerned with the study of Vaishnava traditions and Manipravalam texts of South Asia. I’m eagerly looking forward to serving as one of the Bodas Family Academic Programming Fund South Asian Studies Fellows with the South Asian Studies Collective for the 2021–22 academic year.