The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute: Part Two

By Nicole Boyd


Modern Significance



The islands’ true value lies in the right to extend Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that a legal claim to them would provide, which would provide the holder with singular access to the fishing and natural resources located in the surrounding seas. In 1969, the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) released a report estimating huge oil reserves located beneath the region’s ocean floor. Such resources would clearly be immensely valuable in today’s fierce competition for oil, especially for China: as the world’s largest energy consumer, China is acutely concerned with securing enough resources to meet the demands of its expanding economy. It was only after this research was released that China and Taiwan sought to dispute Japan’s administration of the territory. Currently, all three parties claim sovereignty over the islands, but only Japan claims a 200 nautical mile EEZ including the islands.

The islands are of strategic significance as well. Located 120 nautical miles west of the coast of China and 90 nautical miles north of Japan’s Ryukyu Islands, sovereignty over the surrounding waters would give the controlling country the potential to exercise military capabilities closer to the others’ shores, as well as increased potential for control over sea trade that passes through the area.

Nationalism also plays an important role in the dispute. Sino-Japanese relations have never fully recovered from bitterness regarding Japan’s imperialism towards China from the latter half of the nineteenth century through the end of World War II. Anger toward the Japanese is still prominent in Chinese society, and incidents that are perceived as affronts to territorial sovereignty such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute are particularly incendiary to the Chinese public. Both countries have experienced rising nationalism in recent years; this adds pressure on each respective government to maintain the appearance of supremacy in the dispute, a fact that complicates international attempts at resolution.

The Current Situation



The dispute has been simmering unresolved in the background of East Asian politics for the past four decades and for the most part it has been put aside by policy makers; however, the issue has remained a flashpoint for conflict in recent years. In 2010, a Chinese fishing boat rammed two Japanese Coast Guard vessels, resulting in the detainment of the Chinese boat captain in Japan for the duration of the investigation. The incident sparked Chinese outrage, leading Beijing to block exports of rare earth materials to Japan. The captain was released after two weeks and normal trade relations resumed, but the result was widespread internal criticism of the Japanese government for its weakness in the face of Chinese aggression.


Recent events have once again brought tensions to the forefront. The catalyst for this disruption to the status quo was Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara’s announcement on April 16th of his intentions to buy the islands out of private ownership, after which he set up a “Senkaku Fund,” accumulating 1.47 billion yen ($18.7 million) from numerous private donations over a period of roughly five months. In order to avoid possession of the islands from legally falling under the purview of Ishihara, whose strong nationalism and determination to have Japan “say no” to China might have caused relations between the countries to deteriorate even further, the national government made the decision to purchase the islands itself.


The result has been a wave of anti-Japanese protests across China, as well as the destruction and looting of Japanese businesses. Since the announcement of the islands’ purchase on September 11th, China has sent numerous patrol boats into the disputed waters and has cancelled the celebration of the 40th year anniversary of the rekindling of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Taiwan also made a statement on Tuesday, September 24th, sending over forty fishing boats and ten surveillance ships into the area. When the ships did not respond to warnings from the Japanese Coast Guard, the Japanese vessels shot at the Taiwanese boats with a water cannon, prompting the Taiwanese vessels to withdraw. 



Sources
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703720504575376712353150310.html
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/28/a-sea-of-trouble-in-sino-japanese-relations/
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14799850902886617
Shirk, Susan. China: Fragile Superpower. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/the-history-behind-china-and-japans-anger-over-a-few-empty-islands/262702/
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201206090024
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9534711/China-deploys-two-warships-after-Tokyo-announces-disputed-island-purchase.html
http://asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4860&Itemid=214
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2012/sep2012/chjp-s26.shtml
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-26/china-japan-foreign-ministers-meet-as-island-tensions-hurt-trade.html