Category: East Asia

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The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute: Part Three

By Nicole Boyd

Political Analysis

What are the political motivations underlying the dispute?


In China, Anti-Japanese protests over the island dispute are concerning to political leaders because a lack of diplomatic response on the Chinese Communist Party’s part could cause discontent to turn to domestic issues, which is a circumstance Beijing has been extremely careful to avoid. As a result, Chinese leadership must appear strong in the face of Japan’s activity regarding the islands. This has manifested itself in a call to boycott Japanese goods and the sudden presence of state fishing vessels in the disputed waters. Despite thinly veiled threats of economic and military retaliation, however, Beijing is highly aware of the cost such ventures could pose.


Japan and China are highly economically co-dependent; trade between the two countries is at an all-time high, amounting to nearly $350 billion in 2011. On top of this, Japan accounts for roughly 11 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China, making it the nation’s third largest source of outside investment after the U.S. and Hong Kong. Pursuit of more aggressive economic means of fighting Japan on this issue would have an undesirable effect on both economies and serve as a negative shock to the world economy, possibly impeding global recovery. A full-out military war with Japan would be extremely costly financially, not to mention the inevitable toll on China’s growth rate. The issue is further complicated by U.S.-Japan security agreements. U.S.-Chinese relations are frequently strained, but the fact is that both states are highly interdependent on one another economically, and the fall out of a war between the nations regarding lost financial and human resources would be enormous.


Such outcomes are undesirable for China. The nation’s leaders are highly dedicated to regional security as a means of promoting economic growth. It is unlikely that diplomatic actions in this dispute would go so far as to jeopardize this overarching agenda. It should be noted that before the latest excursions following Japan’s announcement that it had purchased the islands, Chinese vessels had not ventured into the disputed waters since August of last year. The Chinese government initially encouraged anti-Japanese sentiments as a means of distracting the public from internal issues, but now it is clear that Beijing feels threatened by the widespread protests and is making an effort to restrain them.20


Japan’s leaders are also facing internal pressure. Since the 2010 incident, domestic criticism of Japan’s weakness in diplomatic dealings with China has escalated. Governor Ishihara, author of the controversial book “The Japan That Can Say No,” is a prominent figure speaking for the rightist nationalist segment of the population that wants Japan to take a more aggressive stance in foreign policy. After Ishihara’s public steps toward buying the islands, the government stepped in not only to appease the nationalism the events stirred up but also as a measure of restraint against Ishihara.


Tokyo leadership has other things to consider as well; elections must be held before the summer and polls indicate a shift in power from the currently ruling Democratic Party to Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party. Naturally this is a period of time when democratic leaders are most sensitive to shifts in public opinion, increasing the effect of domestic criticism on policy decisions. Japan also stands to lose from a prolonged confrontation with China, however pressure from the right is impeding Tokyo’s ability to cooperate by demanding a strong uncompromising image. The way Tokyo has chosen to project that image is not only to engage in verbal battle with Beijing, but also to call upon Japanese-American security relations as another means of threat against would be “invaders.” 

Taiwan’s involvement in the dispute is less intense than it’s larger counterparts. Like China, it also saw fit to make a statement by sending vessels into the disputed waters. However, at the risk of complicating its own sovereign relations with Beijing, Taipei is careful of being too vocal on the issue. 


Taiwan is a major trading partner with both Japan and China and a security partner with the U.S. At the moment, other than its brief show of defiance it appears that Taipei has decided not to complicate it’s relations with the U.S. and Beijing and remains on friendly terms with Japan.


Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy


What does this mean for the future?


Despite speculations in the Wall Street Journal on the outcome of a Sino-Japanese naval war, full-scale warfare seems highly unlikely. Tensions may continue to rise, however, if the governments in question fail to calm elements of nationalism within their respective countries. This will likely manifest itself in the form of increased skirmishes between the Japanese coast guard and Chinese (and to a lesser extent Taiwanese) vessels entering the disputed waters. China might seek to withhold certain imports to Japan as it did with rare earths in the 2010 incident. If such measures are taken, however, Tokyo will feel considerable pressure to fight back economically; the government has already threatened to halt investment in China. This could set off a chain of such attacks that would have the potential to rapidly escalate.


Despite China’s criticisms of “American hypocrisy” regarding its simultaneous claims of neutrality and support of Japan in military defense of the islands under the US-Japan Treat of 1960, to renege on that agreement would have disastrous effects not only on relations with Japan but in the larger scheme of American security interests in the Pacific. With China’s increasing military capabilities, U.S. allies in the region have to consider the ramifications of a potential conflict between the two powers and the possibility that the U.S. is no longer capable of providing the protection that it could in the past. If the U.S. appears to be unwilling to follow through on its security agreements it will send a message to other Pacific allies that with China’s rise a U.S. security agreement no longer guarantees assistance, which will likely spell the end of U.S. dominance in the Pacific.


On the other hand, the U.S. should discourage its allies from deliberately provoking China because they are confident in U.S. support. Not only does this undermine regional stability, but it puts the U.S. in a difficult position diplomatically and undermines reassurances that the U.S. is not trying to contain China. Therefore restraint should be encouraged not only on the Chinese side, but on the side of our allies as well.


The U.S.’s role should continue to be one of neutrality, with no acknowledgement of either sides’ sovereignty over the islands. The situation is a complicated issue historically, legally, and emotionally – to become further entangled in the dispute is to risk relations with all parties. Leaders should continue to encourage calm diplomacy, a point U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stressed in his visit to Beijing on the 18th. All parties stand to lose from prolonged conflict; most of the governments’ aggressive actions have been designed to alleviate internal pressures. With the importance of saving face so prominent in this dispute, Track I diplomacy will likely be hampered by politicians’ attempts to avoid inflaming public discontent by appearing too conciliatory. Therefore, this represents a good situation in which to consider employing Track II dialogues as well in order to promote cooperation between parties and talks that go beyond the party line. A method of doing this would be to encourage confidence-building measures such as joint fishing and or drilling rights in the disputed waters to try to ease tensions between the nations. 



Sources
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinese-government-both-encourages-and-reins-in-anti-japan-protests-analysts-say/2012/09/17/53144ff0-00d8-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_story.html  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aa82cf7a-6f68-11e1-b368-00144feab49a.html#axzz27guHsxfp
http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/20/opinion/china-japan-dispute-kingston/index.html
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20120914/as-japan-politics/

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The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute: Part Two

By Nicole Boyd


Modern Significance

The islands’ true value lies in the right to extend Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that a legal claim to them would provide, which would provide the holder with singular access to the fishing and natural resources located in the surrounding seas. In 1969, the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) released a report estimating huge oil reserves located beneath the region’s ocean floor. Such resources would clearly be immensely valuable in today’s fierce competition for oil, especially for China: as the world’s largest energy consumer, China is acutely concerned with securing enough resources to meet the demands of its expanding economy. It was only after this research was released that China and Taiwan sought to dispute Japan’s administration of the territory. Currently, all three parties claim sovereignty over the islands, but only Japan claims a 200 nautical mile EEZ including the islands.

The islands are of strategic significance as well. Located 120 nautical miles west of the coast of China and 90 nautical miles north of Japan’s Ryukyu Islands, sovereignty over the surrounding waters would give the controlling country the potential to exercise military capabilities closer to the others’ shores, as well as increased potential for control over sea trade that passes through the area.

Nationalism also plays an important role in the dispute. Sino-Japanese relations have never fully recovered from bitterness regarding Japan’s imperialism towards China from the latter half of the nineteenth century through the end of World War II. Anger toward the Japanese is still prominent in Chinese society, and incidents that are perceived as affronts to territorial sovereignty such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute are particularly incendiary to the Chinese public. Both countries have experienced rising nationalism in recent years; this adds pressure on each respective government to maintain the appearance of supremacy in the dispute, a fact that complicates international attempts at resolution.

The Current Situation

The dispute has been simmering unresolved in the background of East Asian politics for the past four decades and for the most part it has been put aside by policy makers; however, the issue has remained a flashpoint for conflict in recent years. In 2010, a Chinese fishing boat rammed two Japanese Coast Guard vessels, resulting in the detainment of the Chinese boat captain in Japan for the duration of the investigation. The incident sparked Chinese outrage, leading Beijing to block exports of rare earth materials to Japan. The captain was released after two weeks and normal trade relations resumed, but the result was widespread internal criticism of the Japanese government for its weakness in the face of Chinese aggression.


Recent events have once again brought tensions to the forefront. The catalyst for this disruption to the status quo was Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara’s announcement on April 16th of his intentions to buy the islands out of private ownership, after which he set up a “Senkaku Fund,” accumulating 1.47 billion yen ($18.7 million) from numerous private donations over a period of roughly five months. In order to avoid possession of the islands from legally falling under the purview of Ishihara, whose strong nationalism and determination to have Japan “say no” to China might have caused relations between the countries to deteriorate even further, the national government made the decision to purchase the islands itself.


The result has been a wave of anti-Japanese protests across China, as well as the destruction and looting of Japanese businesses. Since the announcement of the islands’ purchase on September 11th, China has sent numerous patrol boats into the disputed waters and has cancelled the celebration of the 40th year anniversary of the rekindling of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Taiwan also made a statement on Tuesday, September 24th, sending over forty fishing boats and ten surveillance ships into the area. When the ships did not respond to warnings from the Japanese Coast Guard, the Japanese vessels shot at the Taiwanese boats with a water cannon, prompting the Taiwanese vessels to withdraw. 



Sources
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703720504575376712353150310.html
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/28/a-sea-of-trouble-in-sino-japanese-relations/
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14799850902886617
Shirk, Susan. China: Fragile Superpower. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/the-history-behind-china-and-japans-anger-over-a-few-empty-islands/262702/
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201206090024
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9534711/China-deploys-two-warships-after-Tokyo-announces-disputed-island-purchase.html
http://asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4860&Itemid=214
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2012/sep2012/chjp-s26.shtml
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-26/china-japan-foreign-ministers-meet-as-island-tensions-hurt-trade.html

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The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute: Part One

By Nicole Boyd

This is the first part of a three-part series on the disputed territory in the East China Sea. Stay tuned for parts two and three!

The Issue

Arguments are heating up in the East China Sea over the disputed sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The islands represent a long-standing territorial dispute between China, Japan, and Taiwan. Tensions have increased as a result of the Japanese government’s purchase of the islands from private ownership, straining relations between the nations. This is a delicate situation for the United States, which officially maintains a neutral position but stands by the islands’ inclusion in the 1960 U.S.-Japan security treaty, which would require the U.S. to support Japan in any military dispute concerning the islands. Mismanaging the situation could result in damaged relations with all parties involved. I seek to outline the history of the dispute, its current significance and political implications, as well as recommend that the U.S. continue to maintain its neutral position regarding the sovereignty over the islands, provide military support to Japan under the 1960 security treaty, and promote diplomacy and restraint rather than economic or military retaliation in resolving the dispute.

Conflicting Claims

The disputed islands, called the “Senkaku” in Japanese, and the “Diaoyu” in Chinese, are a small chain of 5 islands and 3 barren rocks located in the East China Sea. The islands were administered by Japan from 1895 to 1946, when they were transferred to U.S. control following World War II under the San Francisco Treaty between Japan and the allied powers. In 1972 the U.S. returned control of the islands to Japan.


Japan makes the following arguments for its rightful claim to the territory:


1. Japan surveyed the land in 1894 and determined that it was Terra Nullius, or “land belonging to no one.”The cabinet then formally decided to incorporate the islands into its territory in 1895 on the principle of discovery and acquisition as its right under widely accepted conventions of international law.
2. China did not administer the region nor dispute Japan’s claim prior to 1971 when the U.S. began preparing to transfer control to Japan.

3. The islands were never a part of Taiwan or administered by the Chinese government, thus are not contained in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in which China ceded control of “The island of Formosa [Taiwan], together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa” following the end of the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895. As a result, the islands were not included in the San Francisco Treaty of 1951 in which Japan renounced control of Taiwan.


Both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) dispute Japan’s territorial control of the islands.  As each claim that they are the rightful seat of the Chinese government, they make the same arguments for “Chinese” rights to the islands:


1. China had knowledge of the islands in documents and maps as far back as the 14th century, thus refuting Japan’s claim on the basis of Terra Nullius.
2. China argues that the islands were included in the 1895 Treaty as part of Taiwan, and thus were included in the San Francisco Treaty and should have been returned to China with Taiwan.

3. In 1971 China used this argument to formally oppose the island’s return to Japan by the U.S.

These arguments are still widely disputed. The current U.S. position is one of neutrality, but with the affirmation that it will hold to the U.S.-Japan Treaty of 1960 with respect to the islands, which calls for the U.S. to help defend Japan against military attacks to its territory.

Sources
http://news.yahoo.com/u-believes-japan-u-security-treaty-covers-disputed-031746983.html
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm

http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1257.pdf
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/vajint14&div=17&g_sent=1&collection=journals
http://www.sdh-fact.com/CL02_1/79_S4.pdf
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/shimonoseki01.htm
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-09/25/content_15782260.htm
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139