Category: United States

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Dinner Discussion with General Mattis

By Feyaad Allie

mattis

Last Friday evening, General James Mattis, retired commander of US Central Command, sat down for a dinner and discussion with members of World Outlook. From this experience, I gained invaluable insight into different viewpoints regarding American policy in the Middle East.

Not surprisingly, General Mattis was called upon to speak about the current situation in Syria. He emphasized that when considering any intervention; the US government must articulate specific goals. He contended that a lack of defined objectives makes it difficult to even consider intervening, no matter the circumstances – leading to questions about the moral imperative in the case of human rights abuses. Mattis responded that since America is not fiscally stable, it is difficult for human rights issues to be a top priority. He asserted that intervention would require cutting domestic costs or borrowing more money from Beijing, both of which are undesirable. Though I didn’t entirely agree with the General’s lack of emphasis on the moral arguments in his assessment of Syria, I did think he offered valid points to consider. The Syrian crisis is a delicate situation and warrants careful thought. The dinner with General Mattis reaffirmed for me that there is no ideal way to handle the conflict.

Other points of interest from the discussion were General Mattis’ justifications for continuing US involvement in the Middle East: 1) US allies, such as Israel and Jordan; 2) the presence of oil; 3) the existence of violent extremism; and 4) the US’ ability to facilitate peace talks. These reasons highlighted the importance of remaining engaged with the Middle East.

Overall, the dinner discussion emphasized the necessity of US involvement in the Middle East and the complexity of issues in that region.

 

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General James Mattis Gives Public Lecture at Dartmouth

By Justin Roshak

For those of us who came of age during the late Bush administration, the world is dominated by two conflicting sentiments. First, American military and economic hegemony gives us hope that we might use them to do good. Second, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan make us deeply suspicious of American imperialism. This past Wednesday, General James Mattis, retired commander of U.S. Central Command, gave a lecture at Dartmouth entitled, “In the Midst of the Storm: A U.S. Commander’s View of the Changing Middle East.” I found it supremely valuable to hear from a man who has stood on the front lines of the past decade of war and hope, disappointment and progress.

During this lecture, Gen. Mattis spoke about US foreign policy and military action in the Middle East and  below I’ve sketched out some of the critical takeaway points from his discussion:

On Egypt: Undeniable setbacks. The road to democracy is long, and there is room for both hope and disappointment.

On Syria: Assad must go, but what replaces him may not be to out liking. Men regularly betray their countries, but rarely abandon their religion.

On Iran: Detente may be near, but Iran must behave responsibly, less like a revolutionary cause and more like a sovereign state.

The United States has, he said, an international responsibility to maintain stability. That means working with perhaps unsavory regimes, supporting positive change where we can, and maintaing a healthy sense of its limitations. The 200,000 soldiers, sailors, and flyers of CENTCOM are only one half of US power, for they stay at the pleasure of the allies.

He spoke movingly about the ethical foundations of the United States armed forces, and urged us not to condemn the vast majority of determined, moral young men and women for the crimes of a few. “We fix our mistakes” he said, and that struggle towards an ideal is a source of great strength. The US volunteer soldier has, he said with visible pride, a remarkable capacity to keep cool in terrible circumstances. Once he approached a young man under fire and, asking him what was happening, he replied that he was “taking the fun out of fundamentalism”. That calm in the face of danger, he said, means keeping to moral restraint.

Practicality must rule the day. We can support moral diplomacy without wasting our time, money, and lives, but “America has no moral imperative to do the impossible” Ultimately, the level of American engagement will be dictated by the American people. We have resources to secure our economic and moral interests, but there must be political will to do so.

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The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute: Part Three

By Nicole Boyd

Political Analysis

What are the political motivations underlying the dispute?


In China, Anti-Japanese protests over the island dispute are concerning to political leaders because a lack of diplomatic response on the Chinese Communist Party’s part could cause discontent to turn to domestic issues, which is a circumstance Beijing has been extremely careful to avoid. As a result, Chinese leadership must appear strong in the face of Japan’s activity regarding the islands. This has manifested itself in a call to boycott Japanese goods and the sudden presence of state fishing vessels in the disputed waters. Despite thinly veiled threats of economic and military retaliation, however, Beijing is highly aware of the cost such ventures could pose.


Japan and China are highly economically co-dependent; trade between the two countries is at an all-time high, amounting to nearly $350 billion in 2011. On top of this, Japan accounts for roughly 11 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China, making it the nation’s third largest source of outside investment after the U.S. and Hong Kong. Pursuit of more aggressive economic means of fighting Japan on this issue would have an undesirable effect on both economies and serve as a negative shock to the world economy, possibly impeding global recovery. A full-out military war with Japan would be extremely costly financially, not to mention the inevitable toll on China’s growth rate. The issue is further complicated by U.S.-Japan security agreements. U.S.-Chinese relations are frequently strained, but the fact is that both states are highly interdependent on one another economically, and the fall out of a war between the nations regarding lost financial and human resources would be enormous.


Such outcomes are undesirable for China. The nation’s leaders are highly dedicated to regional security as a means of promoting economic growth. It is unlikely that diplomatic actions in this dispute would go so far as to jeopardize this overarching agenda. It should be noted that before the latest excursions following Japan’s announcement that it had purchased the islands, Chinese vessels had not ventured into the disputed waters since August of last year. The Chinese government initially encouraged anti-Japanese sentiments as a means of distracting the public from internal issues, but now it is clear that Beijing feels threatened by the widespread protests and is making an effort to restrain them.20


Japan’s leaders are also facing internal pressure. Since the 2010 incident, domestic criticism of Japan’s weakness in diplomatic dealings with China has escalated. Governor Ishihara, author of the controversial book “The Japan That Can Say No,” is a prominent figure speaking for the rightist nationalist segment of the population that wants Japan to take a more aggressive stance in foreign policy. After Ishihara’s public steps toward buying the islands, the government stepped in not only to appease the nationalism the events stirred up but also as a measure of restraint against Ishihara.


Tokyo leadership has other things to consider as well; elections must be held before the summer and polls indicate a shift in power from the currently ruling Democratic Party to Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party. Naturally this is a period of time when democratic leaders are most sensitive to shifts in public opinion, increasing the effect of domestic criticism on policy decisions. Japan also stands to lose from a prolonged confrontation with China, however pressure from the right is impeding Tokyo’s ability to cooperate by demanding a strong uncompromising image. The way Tokyo has chosen to project that image is not only to engage in verbal battle with Beijing, but also to call upon Japanese-American security relations as another means of threat against would be “invaders.” 

Taiwan’s involvement in the dispute is less intense than it’s larger counterparts. Like China, it also saw fit to make a statement by sending vessels into the disputed waters. However, at the risk of complicating its own sovereign relations with Beijing, Taipei is careful of being too vocal on the issue. 


Taiwan is a major trading partner with both Japan and China and a security partner with the U.S. At the moment, other than its brief show of defiance it appears that Taipei has decided not to complicate it’s relations with the U.S. and Beijing and remains on friendly terms with Japan.


Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy


What does this mean for the future?


Despite speculations in the Wall Street Journal on the outcome of a Sino-Japanese naval war, full-scale warfare seems highly unlikely. Tensions may continue to rise, however, if the governments in question fail to calm elements of nationalism within their respective countries. This will likely manifest itself in the form of increased skirmishes between the Japanese coast guard and Chinese (and to a lesser extent Taiwanese) vessels entering the disputed waters. China might seek to withhold certain imports to Japan as it did with rare earths in the 2010 incident. If such measures are taken, however, Tokyo will feel considerable pressure to fight back economically; the government has already threatened to halt investment in China. This could set off a chain of such attacks that would have the potential to rapidly escalate.


Despite China’s criticisms of “American hypocrisy” regarding its simultaneous claims of neutrality and support of Japan in military defense of the islands under the US-Japan Treat of 1960, to renege on that agreement would have disastrous effects not only on relations with Japan but in the larger scheme of American security interests in the Pacific. With China’s increasing military capabilities, U.S. allies in the region have to consider the ramifications of a potential conflict between the two powers and the possibility that the U.S. is no longer capable of providing the protection that it could in the past. If the U.S. appears to be unwilling to follow through on its security agreements it will send a message to other Pacific allies that with China’s rise a U.S. security agreement no longer guarantees assistance, which will likely spell the end of U.S. dominance in the Pacific.


On the other hand, the U.S. should discourage its allies from deliberately provoking China because they are confident in U.S. support. Not only does this undermine regional stability, but it puts the U.S. in a difficult position diplomatically and undermines reassurances that the U.S. is not trying to contain China. Therefore restraint should be encouraged not only on the Chinese side, but on the side of our allies as well.


The U.S.’s role should continue to be one of neutrality, with no acknowledgement of either sides’ sovereignty over the islands. The situation is a complicated issue historically, legally, and emotionally – to become further entangled in the dispute is to risk relations with all parties. Leaders should continue to encourage calm diplomacy, a point U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stressed in his visit to Beijing on the 18th. All parties stand to lose from prolonged conflict; most of the governments’ aggressive actions have been designed to alleviate internal pressures. With the importance of saving face so prominent in this dispute, Track I diplomacy will likely be hampered by politicians’ attempts to avoid inflaming public discontent by appearing too conciliatory. Therefore, this represents a good situation in which to consider employing Track II dialogues as well in order to promote cooperation between parties and talks that go beyond the party line. A method of doing this would be to encourage confidence-building measures such as joint fishing and or drilling rights in the disputed waters to try to ease tensions between the nations. 



Sources
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinese-government-both-encourages-and-reins-in-anti-japan-protests-analysts-say/2012/09/17/53144ff0-00d8-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_story.html  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aa82cf7a-6f68-11e1-b368-00144feab49a.html#axzz27guHsxfp
http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/20/opinion/china-japan-dispute-kingston/index.html
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20120914/as-japan-politics/